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VOLUME XLIV

PART 1
NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY, 1985–1988



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Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988

Volume XLIV, Part 1

National Security Policy, 1985–1988

Editor James Graham Wilson
General Editor Kathleen B. Rasmussen

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate

with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The records that constitute the Department's central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will be transferred eventually to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which was administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still classified records held in various Presidential libraries. Throughout the course of the project, many, but not all, records at each Presidential library were scanned. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Team Lead of the Editing and Publishing Team. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type.

Words and phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designations such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type).

The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place.

All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related

documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Classification Policy and Declassification Review, Bureau of Administration (A/SKS/IAP/CD), conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and if applicable, the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2018 and was completed in 2023, resulted in the decision to withhold 2 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 14 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 20 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an undiluted record of the Reagan administration's national security policy from 1985 to 1988.

John C. Powers
The Acting Historian

Kathleen B. Rasmussen
General Editor

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. Two volumes in the subseries are devoted to Reagan's national security policy: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984; and *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988, which is split into two parts. Part 1 is a chronological documentation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the Strategic Modernization Program (SMP) during the second Reagan administration. Part 2 presents thematic documentation from the same period in four chapters: (1) Defense Policy and Strategic Planning; (2) Soviet Analysis and Risk Reduction; (3) The Strategic Stockpile, Machine Tools, and Export Control; and (4) National Security and Defense Preparedness. These volumes are closely linked to the four volumes in the subseries devoted to Reagan's Soviet policies: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986; and Volume VI, October 1986–January 1989. The crafting and negotiation of the landmark U.S.-Soviet nuclear treaties of this era are explored in two additional volumes: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I, and Volume XII, INF, 1984–1988. Documentation on chemical weapons, nuclear testing, space arms control, and non-proliferation negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union will be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XL, Global Issues I.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1

The main focus of this volume is the Strategic Defense Initiative, which Reagan announced on March 23, 1983, and established as a top administration priority after his reelection on November 6, 1984. With the commencement of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva in March 1985, and as Reagan prepared to meet Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time in Geneva from November 19 to 20, internal U.S. debates—which often played out publicly—focused on ballistic missile defense research and testing under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, including “narrow vs. broad” interpretations thereof. Discussions intensified following

Gorbachev's proposal in January 1986 to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000; Reagan's July 1986 proposal laying out three five-year phases to achieve a similar objective; and the two leaders' dramatic encounter in Reykjavik the weekend of October 11–12, 1986.

The Reagan administration's pursuit of SDI during 1985 and 1986 complemented its strategic modernization program, announced on October 1, 1981, featuring the Peacekeeper ("MX") Missile, D5 ("Trident II") Missile, and the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB, or "B-2 Bomber"), among other systems. On May 27, 1986, Reagan publicly declared his intention to no longer adhere to a policy of "Interim Restraint," under which the United States had respected the terms of the unratified 1979 "Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" (SALT II). He also announced that, by the end of the year, the United States would exceed the numerical limits of SALT II.

On November 3, 1986, Reagan signed National Security Directive Decision (NSDD) 250 instructing his national security team to provide options for a transition toward a world free of offensive ballistic missiles, setting off a series of vigorous interactions among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and members of the National Security Council Staff. Coinciding with cuts to the defense budget in the form of automatic sequesters resulting from the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act, as well as the Republican Party's loss of the Senate in elections held on November 4, 1986, NSDD-250 foreshadowed equally contentious debates in 1987 over how to preserve funding for SDI and complete the strategic modernization program. The volume concludes with the 5-year review of the ABM Treaty in 1988, during which the Reagan administration declared that the Soviet Union was in violation of the treaty yet stopped short of describing the Soviets' Krasnoyarsk Radar or other violations as a "material breach."

The volume also documents the views of influential advisers such as Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle, as well as other key national security principals and officials.

Acknowledgments

The Office of the Historian wishes to thank the interagency declassification personnel who conducted the review of this volume, including those at the Department of State, Office of Classification Policy and Declassification Review (A/SKS/IAP/CD); the FRUS Coordination Team at the Central Intelligence Agency; the OSD, Records and Declassification Division (RDD) at the Department of Defense; and the

Directorate of Records Access and Information Security Management at the National Security Council.

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, especially Cate Sewell and Lisa Magana; the Library of Congress, especially Jeffrey Flannery and Ernest Emrich; and the National Security Council, especially Tom Lutte. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, was accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency; Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable assistance. The editor wishes to extend special thanks to Joel Christenson, Edward Keefer, Erin Mahan, and Steven Phillips of the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

James Graham Wilson collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Kathleen Rasmussen, then Chief of the Global Issues and General Division. The volume was reviewed by Kathleen Rasmussen and Kristin Ahlberg, the Assistant General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of the Carl Ashley, Team Lead of the Declassification Coordination Team. Kerry Hite performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Team Lead of the Editing and Publishing Team. Both the declassification review and technical editing were conducted under the supervision of John Powers, Director of the Declassification Coordination, Publishing, and Digital Initiatives Division.

James Graham Wilson
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

The White House Staff and Office Files at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library illuminate the Reagan administration's high-level decision making involving national security policy. Therein are files of the National Security Council (NSC) Executive Secretariat, which include key collections such as the USSR Country File, the Head of State File, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), NSC Meeting Files, and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) files. In some instances, the original version of NSDDs and minutes of NSC and NSPG meetings and their preparatory material remain at the National Security Council in Washington. Key collections of individuals include the files of National Security Advisors Robert "Bud" McFarlane, John Poindexter, Frank Carlucci, and Colin Powell, as well as those of NSC staff members William Cockell, Michael Donley, Sven Kraemer, and Robert Linhard. Also at the Reagan Library are a copy of the George Shultz papers housed at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, Fred Ikle and Frank Carlucci papers, and the PROFS System of White House electronic messages. The NSC's W files—Reagan Library files located in Washington—also yielded valuable documentation for the volume.

The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department of State includes the cable traffic between Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Key lot files for this volume include: Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989; and Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) facility in College Park, Maryland, will eventually include records deemed worthy of preservation as part of Record Group 59 (RG 59).

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of those Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

P Reels
D Reels
N Reels

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Lot 01D127: Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament Records, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie

Lot 85D308: Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files

Lot 89D056: S Records, Records of Counselor Max Kampelman

Lot 89D149: Executive Secretariat, S/P Records, Memoranda and Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and other Seventh Floor Principals

Lot 90D397: Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989

Lot 91D257: S/S–IRM Special Caption Files, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum

Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (ES) and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989

Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, The Executive Secretariat's Special Caption Documents

Lot 93D188: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990

Lot 94D092: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis and Exdis Secretariat Memorandums

Lot 94D093: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis and Exdis Secretariat Memorandums

Lot 94D432: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 NODIS and EXDIS MEMORANDUMS

Lot 94D433: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 NODIS and EXDIS Memorandums

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

PROFS System

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

W Files

White House Staff and Office Files

Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security Council

Head of State File

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) File

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File

System IV Intelligence Files

Frank Carlucci Files

Tyrus Cobb Files

William Cockell Files

Kenneth deGraffenreid Files

Michael Donley Files

Alton Keel Files

George Keyworth Files
Sven Kraemer Files
Ronald Lehman Files
Robert Linhard Files
Jack Matlock Files
National Security Affairs
 Office of the Assistant to the President
John Poindexter Files
Colin Powell Files
Steven Steiner Files
William Tobey Files
Fred Ikle Papers
President's Daily Diary
George Shultz Papers

George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas

Vice Presidential Records
 Donald Gregg Files
 Sam Watson Files
Bush Presidential Records
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Central Intelligence Agency

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
 Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986)

Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

Manuscript Division
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National Security Council, Washington D.C.

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OSD Files: FRC 330–87–0008, Official Records of the Secretary of Defense, 1985

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- _____. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald W. Reagan, 1981–1988*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982–1991.
- Washington Post*.

Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACDA/SP, Bureau of Strategic Programs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACM, Advanced Cruise Missile
ACSG, Arms Control Support Group
ACVC, Arms Control Verification Committee
AFB, Air Force Base
ALCM, Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ALPS, Accidental Launch Protection System
ASAT, Anti-Satellite
ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASW, Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATB, Advanced Technology Bomber (B2 “stealth bomber”)
ATBM, Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System

B, Billion
BMD, Ballistic Missile Defense
BSTS, Boost Surveillance and Tracking System
BW, Biological Weapons

C, Confidential; (Office of the) Counselor, Department of State
CH, Charles Hill
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM, Cruise Missile
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
COB or C.O.B., Close of Business
COG, Continuity of Government
CONUS, Continental United States
CORRTEX, Continuous Reflectometry for Radius Versus Time Experiments
(a hydrodynamic yield measurement for nuclear testing)
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CW, Chemical Weapons
C-W-P, Carlucci-Whitehead-Powell
CY, Calendar Year
C^s, Command, Control, and Communications
C^I, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

DAB, Defense Acquisition Board
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DEPSEC, Deputy Secretary
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD, Department of Defense
DOE, Department of Energy
DSP, Defense Support Program

XVIII Abbreviations and Terms

EMP, Electromagnetic Pulse

ERIS, Exoatmospheric Re-Entry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem

EUR, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPM, Office Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Exdis, Exclusive Distribution

FCC, Frank C. Carlucci

FOC, Full Operational Capacity

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FSED, Full-Scale Engineering Development

FY, Fiscal Year

FYI, For Your Information

GBSTS, Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System

GLCM, Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

GNP, Gross National Product

GRIP, National Security Council channel for sensitive arms control matters with limited distribution

HASC, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee

HOE, Homing Overlay Experiment

HLV, Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle

HMG, Her Majesty's Government

IC, Intelligence Community

ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IG, Interagency Group; Interdepartmental Group

ILC, International Law Commission

INF, Intermediate Nuclear Forces

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IOC, Initial Operational Capacity

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

JMP, John M. Poindexter

KGB, Soviet Committee for State Security

KKV, Kinetic Kill Vehicle

KT, Kiloton(s)

LCI, Legally Correct Interpretation (of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty)

LPAR, Large Phased Array Radar

LPS, Limited Protection System

LRINF, Long(er) Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

LTBT, Limited Test Ban Treaty

LTG, Lieutenant General

LWIR, Long-Wave Infrared

M, (Office of the) Under Secretary of State for Management; Million

MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction (or Mutual and Assured Destruction)

MaRV or MARV, Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicle

MC, Military Committee (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
MIRV, Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle
MM, Minuteman Missile
MPS, Multiple Protective Shelter
MUSE, National Security Council channel for Interim Restraint Study with limited distribution
MV, Miniature Vehicle
MX, Missile eXperimental

NAC, North Atlantic Council (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
NASA, National Aeronautical and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA, National Command Authority
Niact, Night Action
Nocontract, Not Releasable to Contractors
Nodis, No Distribution
Noform, Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NSC, National Security Council
NSDD, National Security Decision Directive
NSPG, National Security Planning Group
NST, Nuclear and Space Talks
NTM, National Technical Means

OJCS, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPP, Other Physical Principles
Orcon, Originator's Control
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSTP, Office of Science and Technology Policy (White House)

PENAIID, Penetration Aid
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PM/SNP, Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PN, Paul Nitze
PNE, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PNET, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
PROFS, Professional Office System (White House electronic mail)

R&D, Research and Development
RCM, Robert C. McFarlane
RDT, Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation
RI, Restrictive Interpretation
RSVP, Responding to Soviet Violations Policy
RV or R.V., Re-entry Vehicle

S, Office of the Secretary of State; Secret
SACG, Senior Arms Control Group; Special Arms Control Group
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAM, Surface-to-Air Missile
S/ARN, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters
SASC, Senate Armed Services Committee
SBI, Space-Based Interceptor
SBKKV, Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle

XX Abbreviations and Terms

SCC, Standing Consultative Commission
SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative
SDIO, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SDS, Strategic Defense System
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Septel, Separate Telegram
SIOP, Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM, Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile
SLOC, Sea Line of Communication
SMP, Strategic Modernization Program
SNDV, Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State; after May 7, 1985, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SRAM, Short-Range Attack Missile
SRINF, Short(er) Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SSBN, Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear
S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SSTS, Space Surveillance and Tracking System
STM, Significant Technical Milestone
START, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
S-W-P, Shultz-Weinberger-Poindexter; Shultz-Weinberger-Powell

TLAM, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TRW, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge Inc., a U.S. aerospace and defense contractor
TTBT, Threshold Test Ban Treaty

UK, United Kingdom
UNODIR, Unless Otherwise Directed
US or U.S., United States
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USG, United States Government
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VOA, Voice of America
V/R, Very Respectfully

Wnintel, Warning Notice Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

Z, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)
ZBM, Zero Ballistic Missiles

Persons

- Abrahamson, James A.**, General, USAF; Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, from 1984 until 1988
- Abramowitz, Morton I.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1, 1985, until August 18, 1986; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
- Abrams, Elliott**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from July 17, 1985
- Abshire, David**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until January 5, 1987
- Adamishin, Anatoly**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union from 1986
- Addabbo, Joseph P.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–New York) until April 10, 1986
- Adelman, Kenneth L.**, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, until December 13, 1987
- Akhromeyev, Sergei F.**, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of Staff, Soviet Armed Forces
- Andreotti, Giulio**, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Arbatov, Georgii**, Director, Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
- Armocost, Michael H.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Aspin, Leslie**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Wisconsin); Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, from 1985
- Baker, Howard H., Jr.**, Senator (R–Tennessee) until February 27, 1987; White House Chief of Staff from February 27, 1987, until July 1, 1988
- Baker, James A., III**, Secretary of the Treasury until August 17, 1988
- Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr.**, Secretary of Commerce until July 25, 1987
- Ball, William L.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs from April 2, 1985, until February 28, 1986; President's Assistant for Legislative Affairs from 1986 until 1988
- Belenogov, Alexander**, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1986
- Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr A.**, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1986 until 1988; Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1988
- Block, John R.**, Secretary of Agriculture until February 14, 1986
- Boschwitz, Rudolph E.**, Senator (R–Minnesota)
- Brooks, Linton F.**, Captain, USN (Ret.); Director, Defense Programs, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1986
- Brown, Harold**, Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1981
- Buchsbaum, Solomon**, Chairman, White House Science Council Panel on the Strategic Defense Initiative
- Burns, William F.**, Major General, USA (Ret.); Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from April 1, 1988
- Burt, Richard**, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs until July 18, 1985; thereafter, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany
- Bush, George H.W.**, Vice President of the United States
- Byrd, Robert**, Senator (D–West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader from January 3, 1987

XXII Persons

- Carlucci, Frank C., III**, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from December 2, 1986, until November 23, 1987; Secretary of Defense from November 23, 1987
- Carnesale, Albert**, member, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I, from 1970 until 1972
- Carrington, 6th Baron of (Peter Alexander Rupert)**, Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, until 1988
- Carter, James Earl (Jimmy)**, President of the United States until January 20, 1981
- Casey, William J.**, Director of Central Intelligence until January 29, 1987
- Chain, John T. (Jack)**, General, USAF; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until 1985
- Chernenko, Konstantin**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until March 1985
- Chernyaev, Anatoly**, Advisor to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
- Clyne, Norman G.**, Colonel, USA; Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff to Ambassador Nitze
- Cobb, Tyrus P.**, Lieutenant Colonel, USA (Ret.); Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1988
- Cockell, William**, Admiral, USN; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense Policy, National Security Council Staff, from July 1986
- Cooper, Henry (Hank)**, Deputy Negotiator for Defense and Arms, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from May 25, 1985
- Combs, Richard E., Jr.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, from July 1985 until 1987
- Costello, Robert**, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions from September 1987
- Courtney, William H.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Deputy U.S. Negotiator, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985 until December 1986; thereafter, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- Crowe, William J., Jr.**, Admiral, USN; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1, 1985
- Culvahouse, Arthur B. (A.B.), Jr.**, White House Counsel from March 20, 1987
- Dam, Kenneth**, Deputy Secretary of State until June 15, 1985
- deGraffenreid, Kenneth**, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1987
- Dekok, Roger**, Colonel, USAF; Director, Space Programs, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1987 until 1988
- Derwinski, Edward J.**, Counselor of the Department of State until March 24, 1987; thereafter, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology
- Dobrynin, Anatoly F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States until May 1986; thereafter, Director, International Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Dole, Elizabeth**, Secretary of Transportation until September 30, 1987
- Dole, Robert**, Senator (R-Kansas); Senate Majority Leader from January 3, 1985, until January 3, 1987; Senate Minority Leader from January 3, 1987
- Donley, Michael**, Director, Defense Programs, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1985
- Douglass, John**, Director, Defense Programs, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Duberstein, Kenneth**, Deputy White House Chief of Staff from February 27, 1987, until July 1, 1988; thereafter, White House Chief of Staff
- Dubinín, Yuri**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from May 1986

East, John P., Senator (R–North Carolina)

Ellis, Richard, General, USAF (Ret.); U.S. Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission

Emery, David, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ermarth, Fritz, National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and member, National Intelligence Council, until 1987; President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from February 11, 1987, until January 1989

Exon, J. James, Senator (D–Nebraska)

Fitzwater, Marlin, President's Assistant for Press Relations from February 1, 1987

Fortier, Alison, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, Legislative Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from April 2, 1987

Fortier, Donald, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, Policy Development Directorate, until 1985; President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from December 1985 until August 23, 1986

Foster, John S., Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, from 1961 until 1965; member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Gaffney, Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control until November 1987; Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from April 1987 until November 1987

Gandhi, Rajiv, Prime Minister of India

Gardner, John L., Director, Defensive Systems, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

Garthoff, Raymond L., former Central Intelligence Agency analyst; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, from 1980 until 1984

Gates, Robert, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until 1986; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from April 18, 1986

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, West German Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs

George, Clair E., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, until 1987

Glitman, Maynard (Mike), U.S. Ambassador and Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms until June 22, 1988; U.S. Ambassador to Belgium from June 22, 1988

Godwin, Richard, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions from 1986 until 1987

Goldwater, Barry, Senator (R–Arizona); Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, from January 3, 1985, until January 3, 1987

Gorbachev, Mikhail, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 11, 1985; also Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from October 1, 1988

Graham, Daniel, Chairman and Director of High Frontier

Graham, Thomas, Jr., General Counsel, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Graham, William, Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Gray, Colin, member, President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament

Graybeal, Sidney, member, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I; Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission

Green, Grant, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Executive Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from 1986 until 1987

Gregg, Donald, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs until July 2, 1985; Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, until October 1, 1988

Guhin, Michael, Counselor, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

- Hartman, Arthur A.**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until December 18, 1986
- Hawes, John**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until 1987
- Heiser, G. William**, Director, Defense Policy, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1987 until 1988
- Herres, Robert**, General, USAF; Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from February 1987
- Herrington, John**, Secretary of Energy from February 7, 1985
- Hicks, Donald**, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
- Hill, M. Charles**, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1985 until 1989
- Holmes, H. Allen, Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from April 14, 1985
- Hopkins, William**, Interpreter, U.S. Embassy in Moscow
- Horowitz, Lawrence**, Aide to Senator Edward Kennedy
- Howe, Jonathan T.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Chairman, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee, from 1986 until 1987; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1987 until 1989
- Iklé, Fred C.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy until February 1988
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines**, President of the United States from November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969
- Johnson, Thomas**, Director, Science Research Laboratory, United States Military Academy
- Jones, Thomas (T.K.)**, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Nuclear Forces
- Kampelman, Max M.**, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S. Office for Arms Reduction Negotiations in Geneva and Head, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 5, 1985; Counselor, Department of State, from January 12, 1987
- Karpov, Viktor**, Head, Soviet Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Talks until January 15, 1987; thereafter, Chief, Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Keel, Alton G., Jr. (Al)**, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 15, 1986, until November 24, 1986; Acting President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 25, 1986, until December 18, 1986; U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from December 18, 1986
- Kelley, Paul Xavier (P.X.)**, General, USMC; Commandant of the Marine Corps until June 30, 1987
- Kerr, Richard**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from April 21, 1986
- Keyworth, George (Jay)**, Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, until 1985
- Kirkland, Lane**, President, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations until April 1, 1985
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Secretary of State from September 21, 1973, until January 20, 1977
- Kohl, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Kraemer, Sven**, Director, Arms Control, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1987
- Kranowitz, Alan**, member, White House Office of Legislative Affairs
- Kryuchkov, Vladimir**, First Chief Directorate, KGB, until October 1, 1988; Head, KGB, from October 1, 1988

- Laird, Melvin R.**, Secretary of Defense from January 22, 1969, until January 29, 1973
- Lamberson, Donald L.**, Major General, USAF; Assistant Deputy Chief of Research, Development, and Acquisition, U.S. Air Force, until 1987
- Latham, Donald**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Communications
- Ledsky, Nelson**, Deputy Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from April 1987 until April 18, 1988; thereafter, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Lehman, Ronald**, President's Special Assistant and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1986; President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs for Defense Policy from January 29, 1986; Chief U.S. Negotiator on Strategic Arms, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from 1986 until 1988; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from 1988
- Levitsky, Melvyn**, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from February 13, 1987
- Linhard, Robert**, Colonel, USAF; Director, Defense Programs, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until January 29, 1986; President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1986 until 1987; President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1987
- Mahley, Donald**, Director, Defense Programs, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Mandel, Judyt**, Deputy Director, International Communications and Information, National Security Council Staff, until 1987
- Martin, William**, Deputy Secretary of Energy
- Massie, Suzanne**, Historian
- Masterkov, Lev**, Chief Soviet Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms, Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, from May 8, 1986
- Mathias, Charles**, Senator (R-Maryland); President, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly from 1985 until 1986
- Matlock, Jack E.**, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1987; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 6, 1987
- Matthews, David**, member, National Security Council Staff
- Mattke, E. Terry**, Colonel, USMC; Vice President's Military Assistant from 1985
- Matz, William**, Colonel, USA; Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
- McClure, James**, Senator (R-Idaho)
- McDaniel, Rodney**, Executive Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from January 29, 1986, until 1987
- McFarlane, Robert (Bud)**, Colonel, USMC (Ret.); President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until December 4, 1985
- McKinley, Brunson**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, until 1986
- McMahon, John N.**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until March 26, 1986
- Meese, Edwin, III**, Attorney General until July 5, 1988
- Meyer, Herbert E.**, Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence and Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
- Miller, James**, Director, Office of Management and Budget, from October 8, 1985, until October 16, 1988
- Mitterrand, François**, President of France

- Mobbs, Michael**, Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks until October 1985; Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from October 1985 until 1987
- Moellering, John H.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Assistant to the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1987
- Moreau, Arthur**, Admiral, USN, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until October 1985
- Murphy, Richard W.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Najibullah (Najib), Mohammad**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Afghanistan from May 4, 1986
- Negroponte, John D.**, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 27, 1987
- Neil, Elise**, Staff Assistant, National Security Council Staff
- Nitze, Paul H.**, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters
- Nunn, Samuel A.**, Senator (D–Georgia); Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, until January 3, 1987; Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, from January 3, 1987
- Obukhov, Alexey**, Soviet Ambassador and Deputy Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
- Palazhchenko, Pavel**, Interpreter and special assistant to Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze
- Palmer, Robie Marcus Hooker (Mark)**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Soviet Affairs
- Parris, Mark**, Director, Office of Soviet Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- Pascoe, B. Lynn**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State
- Pearson, Robert**, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from 1985 until 1987
- Pell, Claiborne**, Senator (D–Rhode Island); Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, until January 1987; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from January 3, 1987
- Pérez de Cuellar, Javier**, Secretary General of the United Nations
- Perina, Rudolf**, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1987
- Perito, Robert**, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from 1987
- Perle, Richard N.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy until May 8, 1987
- Pifer, Stephen**, Special Assistant to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control
- Platt, Nicholas**, Executive Secretary, Department of State, until February 13, 1987
- Poindexter, John M.**, Rear Admiral, USN; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until November 25, 1986
- Popadiuk, Roman**, Assistant White House Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs from July 1986 until March 14, 1988; thereafter, President's Special Assistant and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs
- Powell, Colin L.**, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from December 1, 1986, until November 23, 1987; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 23, 1987
- Primakov, Evgeniy**, Director, Soviet Oriental Studies Institute

Qadhafi, Muammar, President of Libya

Quayle, James Danforth (Dan), Senator (R-Indiana)

Rankine, Robert, General, USAF; Special Assistant, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, until 1986

Reagan, Ronald W., President of the United States

Redman, Charles E., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Regan, Donald T., Secretary of the Treasury until February 2, 1985; White House Chief of Staff from February 2, 1985, until February 27, 1987

Ridgway, Rozanne L. (Roz), Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from July 19, 1985

Rodman, Peter W., Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until May 7, 1985; Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from May 7, 1985, until March 3, 1986; President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from March 1986 until January 1987; President's Special Assistant and Counselor, National Security Council Staff, from January 1987

Rostow, Nicholas, Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser of the Department of State from July 1985 until March 1987; Counselor to the President's Special Review Board on the National Security Council (Tower Board); Deputy Legal Adviser, National Security Council Staff, from March 1987; President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Legal Adviser, National Security Council Staff, from December 14, 1987

Rowny, Edward, General, USA (Ret.); Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control

Ryzhkov, Nikolai, Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union

Sable, Ronald, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, Legislative Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1987

Savimbi, Jonas, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Shifter, Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

Schillaci, Norma D., member, National Security Council Staff

Schlesinger, James R., Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975; Secretary of Energy from August 9, 1977, until August 23, 1979

Scowcroft, Brent A., Lieutenant General, USAF, (Ret.); President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 3, 1975, until January 20, 1977; Chairman, President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission); member, President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission)

Sestanovich, Stephen, Director, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1986; Senior Director, Policy Development Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1986

Shcharamskiy, Anatoly, Soviet Refusenik denied a visa to emigrate to Israel

Shevardnadze, Eduard A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1985

Shultz, George P., Secretary of State

Simons, Thomas W., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia

Sofaer, Abraham, Legal Adviser, Department of State, from June 10, 1985

Sokolov, Sergei, Soviet Minister of Defense until May 30, 1987

Solomon, Richard, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from March 3, 1986

Sommer, Peter, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1987

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut (Hal), Counselor, Department of State, from January 7, 1974, until February 21, 1977

Speakes, Larry, President's Assistant and Principal Deputy Press Secretary until January 1987

Stafford, Michael F., Special Assistant to the Senior Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from April 1985

Stansbury, Kent, Director, Space and Defense Policy, Department of Defense

Steiner, Steven R., Director, International Communications and Information, National Security Council Staff, until 1986; Director, Defense Policy, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1987 until 1988

Stepanov, Teymuraz, Special Assistant to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Stevens, Paul Schott, Executive Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from November 1987

Stevens, Sayre, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from 1957 until 1979; member, Defense Science Board

Stevens, Theodore, Senator (R-Alaska)

Stockman, David, Director, Office of Management and Budget, until August 1, 1985

Stone, Marvin, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency

Symms, Steven, Senator (R-Idaho)

Taft, William Howard, IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Tarasenko, Sergei, Special Assistant to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Teller, Edward, theoretical physicist; Director Emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, from 1975

Thatcher, Margaret, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Thomas, Charles, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Timbie, James, Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State for Strategic Policy

Tobey, William, Deputy Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1987

Trost, Carlisle, Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations from July 1, 1986

Vance, Cyrus, Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 28, 1980

Velikhov, Evgeny, Science Advisor to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Verity, C. William, Secretary of Commerce from August 10, 1987

Vershow, Alexander, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Vessey, John W., Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 1985

Vorontsov, Yuli, Head, Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks

Wallop, Malcolm, Senator (R-Wyoming)

Warner, John, Senator (R-Virginia)

Walters, Vernon A., Lieutenant General, USA (Ret.); Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. Representative to the United Nations from May 22, 1985

Watkins, James D., Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations until June 30, 1986

Watson, Samuel, Colonel, USA; Vice President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs

Webster, William, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, until May 25, 1987; thereafter, Director of Central Intelligence

Weinberger, Caspar W. (Cap), Secretary of Defense until November 23, 1987

Welch, Lawrence (Larry), General, USAF; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, from July 1986

Whitehead, John C., Deputy Secretary of State from July 9, 1985

Wick, Charles Z., Director, United States Information Agency

Wickham, John A., General, USA; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Wilson, Peter, Senator (R-California)

Woerner, Manfred, West German Federal Minister of Defense until May 18, 1988

Wood, Lowell, Staff member, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Woolsey, James, U.S. Delegate-at-Large, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, until 1986

Wright, James, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas); Speaker of the House from January 6, 1987

Wright, Sir J. Oliver, U.K. Ambassador to the United States until 1986

Wright, William, member, National Security Council Staff

Yazov, Dmitry, Soviet Minister of Defense from May 30, 1987

Zimmermann, Warren, Deputy Head of the Delegation, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State; Head, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Conference in Vienna

SDI and Strategic Modernization

1. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 14, 1984

SUBJECT

The MX—Your Meeting with the President and Secretary Shultz, Wednesday, November 14, 1984

You will discuss the future of the MX today with George Shultz and the President.² We believe there are three basic points to keep in mind:

— President Reagan *inherited* a system that simply could not survive the kind of attacks the Soviets will be able to launch: it is too big to be truly mobile, and fixed, undefended silos for the MX will be defeated by accurate Soviet missiles.

— Because MX in silos cannot survive, it is useful only as a first strike weapon, or if we are willing to launch them on warning that will always be less than 100 percent certain. *It moves us toward a more dangerous, less stable world.*

— No President has unlimited political capital. Do we wish to fight the protracted war for MX on the Hill, in order to get a system we do not really want, or do we want to use the President's capital to work for systems that *make sense*—SDI, and offensive weapons like *Midgetman* that are either more survivable or more accurate than the MX or both. We are *not* recommending the cancellation of the MX *in isolation*. We are opposed to terminating the MX *if* we do nothing to accelerate other,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Poindexter Files, Subject File, Miscellaneous Meeting Items 1984. Secret. Sent for information.

² Reagan met with Shultz and McFarlane in the Oval Office on November 14 from 1:30 until 2:45 p.m. to discuss the global agenda and foreign policy in the second term. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found. In a diary entry for that day, Reagan wrote: "A long meeting with Sec. Shultz. We have trouble. Cap & Bill Casey have views contrary to George's on S. Am., the middle East & our arms negotiations. It's so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. I cant let that happen. Actually George is carrying out my policy. I'm going to meet with Cap & Bill & lay it out to them. Wont be fun but has to be done." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 396)

preferable U.S. strategic programs. The cancellation of the MX is recommended as a part of a coherent plan to reduce our dependence on offensive nuclear weapons while still thwarting Soviet war plans.

We understand our proposal is complicated by the argument that the *unilateral* cancellation of the MX will hurt our chances for successful negotiations. If talks on strategic weapons resume, it will be argued, we will need the MX as a bargaining chip, and the Congress will fund the MX because it will understand the need not to give up a bargaining chip in the middle of negotiations.

In particular, we might be able to trade the MX for the SS-X-24, as you suggested. The SS-X-24, like the MX, is a large, transportable MIRVed ICBM that is close to operational status, but not there yet, so there is a logical link between the two systems. If the Soviets did give up the SS-X-24, we would have achieved a very worthwhile objective—the elimination of one MIRVed ICBM system on each side. At the same time, we believe it is worth keeping in mind that:

- the Soviets have never given up or offered to give up a new weapon in any negotiations; the Soviets have *not* targeted the MX in their negotiating strategy, which suggests that they are not likely to “pay” anything in future negotiations to get rid of the MX.

- if they did give up the SS-X-24, they would still retain their other MIRVed ICBMs (and the future modernized versions of those ICBMs) that have created our strategic problem. Our current ICBMs would *still* be vulnerable. We would *still* need a good, truly mobile, small ICBM.

- If, as we believe, the Soviets refused to cancel their SS-X-24 and we went ahead with MX in silos, we would be stuck with a costly, vulnerable system that we basically do not want. We will then face pressures to *give up* SDI to make progress in negotiations.

More generally, we believe that the idea that we should build weapons as bargaining chips is profoundly wrong. It has already created a harmful cynicism on the Hill. The “bargaining chip” ploy has led people to question whether we ever recommend a strategic system because our *national security actually requires it*, or whether we are continually engaging in an expensive game of “pretend” in order to negotiate with the Soviets. It has already led people to ask if we are working on SDI only so that we can bargain it away later on. Playing the same game with MX will make it that much *harder to get money for* SDI now, and in the years to come.

Cancelling MX *can and should* be part of an arms reduction strategy, however. You will recall our suggestion for a unilateral cap on U.S. offensive megatonnage, a way to move away from a strategy based on mass destruction. Cancelling MX helps us make this cap a real, credible part of a U.S. policy to make our strategic forces more effective and less destructive.

We may wish to use the decision on the MX to help build a bipartisan consensus on the Hill. You could sit down with key Congressional leaders to discuss your strategic objective of moving away from destabilizing offensive weapons. It might then be possible to get a Congressional commitment to support our other strategic programs in return for giving up the MX. This could help make the Congress feel it has a stake in our strategic problems, and help handle the real danger that with MX out of the way, our critics will simply shift their attacks to our other offensive programs like cruise missiles and D-5. On the other hand, getting a Congressional commitment that is really worth something will be an extremely tricky maneuver. We may wind up looking like the Congress can back us down without getting any real support for SDI and other programs.

Giving up the MX, before our hand is forced by Congressional action, or before negotiations with the Soviets stall again, offers the President the opportunity to make a strong, clean decision, rather than have events force him into a corner. To take but one example, our allies may complain about this change in U.S. policy. Our allies like predictable U.S. policies and generally complain when we make *any* major change. But they will be even unhappier, and rightly so, if the President is forced to give up MX rather than suffer a defeat on the Hill. It is not just that we may fight and lose on MX, it is what such a crucial loss could mean to the President's credibility in getting other initiatives off the ground. We have to control the agenda this time around—not get consumed, as we did with AWACS, in a year-long battle that impedes other progress.

If, instead, the President announces that he is cancelling the MX because after four years no one had come up with a workable way to make it survivable, because it would move us toward a more dangerous world, and because we had militarily superior ways of defending our national security—SDI and high accuracy weapons—he will be seen as a President who will *do what is right*, who will not let the Soviet gerontocracy block his search for ways to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons, and who is willing to act unilaterally if necessary to make progress.

As you recall, other sections of our planning paper discuss ways to deter better for less. Shifting resources from MX to systems like SDI is a good example of precisely this strategy. Defenses give Soviet war planners an entirely new set of uncertainties. MX is a familiar weapon they have adjusted to. We get more deterrence from money spent on SDI and other systems than we do from MX. This must be a factor as we face constricted defense budgets.

Finally, cancelling the MX will give us a valuable lever on our own defense bureaucracy. This is a consideration Secretary Shultz has

probably not thought much about. (Does he know how the Midgetman system weight has grown under the influence of the MX mentality?) The Air Force likes the MX, and simply will not take other, better systems seriously as long as it is fighting every day to build the MX. As you suggested, I have spoken to Fred Ikle about the general tension between MX and SDI, and he agrees that this is a problem. He has spoken to Cap about this as well, and believes he has made some headway.

2. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, November 28, 1984

SUBJECT

SDI

The attached speech by Ken Adelman² raises two points concerning SDI that you will be hearing more about, and deserve comment.

The speech as a whole is more balanced than most treatments of this subject. One serious (but common) defect is that it is fuzzy on the crucial question of whether the objective of defenses is to make offensive deterrent forces more effective, or to remove the threat of mutual annihilation of societies. (Both are mentioned.) These objectives are mutually exclusive (assuming the two sides devote equal talent and resources to the task), and the goals of increased security and stability are unlikely to be realized without a clear conception of our objectives for defense. (One of the few places where this distinction is not blurred is the President's March 1983 speech;³ he came out squarely for protecting people rather than avenging them.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament Records, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Lot 01D127, Papers for DepSec Ken Dam, 1983–1985. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Dam saw it on December 1.

² Attached but not printed is a speech on “Arms Control and Space: Reducing the Risk of War” Adelman delivered at the United States Space Foundation Symposium in Colorado Springs on November 28.

³ Reference is to Reagan's address from the Oval Office, March 23, 1983, in which he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 437–443) Information about the address is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Documents 144 and 145.

One passage deserving comment reads as follows: "Some SDI research stands at the very frontier of today's scientific and technological advancements In contrast, components of strategic nuclear offensive systems have been exhaustively researched for decades. Breakthroughs here are far less likely." This statement is not as self-evident as it seems:

— Miniature electronics. One of the critical technologies being pressed in the SDI is the miniaturization of computers and other electronic devices. After all, we have known for some time how to intercept RVs with large, expensive, nuclear systems. The challenge is to find ways to do this with small, cheap, conventional systems that could cope economically with a large offensive force. Miniature electronic technology is also applicable to offensive systems. The cruise missile and the Pershing II homing RV are just two recent examples; there will be many more such applications to strategic and conventional offensive forces.

— Infra-red sensors. Another technology being pushed hard is infra-red for both surveillance and homing. IR is hardly new; it was pursued in World War II as a competitor to radar, and has been developed intensively ever since for air-to-air missiles, early warning sensors, and intelligence collection. An optical homing ABM interceptor was pursued in the 1960's. (The current ASAT MV is a derivative of this program.) The concept clearly works (the HOE test is a spectacular example), but IR is a mature subject, the result of 40 years of development, not an uncharted territory with vast unexplored potential.

— Offense against SDI. Most of the concepts being explored can directly threaten not only RVs but space-based SDI components as well. If the definition of "offensive systems" is broadened to include offense against defense components, most SDI research is directly applicable to the offense. This is one reason why survivability of space-based SDI components is such a difficult problem.

— Communications. Another critical area for the SDI is communications, since the various sensors, computers, and kill devices need to exchange large amounts of information in a hostile environment. A successful SDI deployment will require major advances in communications. By contrast, communications requirements for strategic offensive forces (while not trivial) are much more modest.

— New offensive technology. Stealth offers new opportunities for offenses (both missiles and aircraft) comparable to the opportunities the new technologies offer defenses.

— Countermeasures. In many cases, relatively low-technology concepts (balloons, decoys, MaRVs, fast-burn missiles, etc.) can counter advanced-technology defenses.

— The "breakthrough" on offense was the development in the late 1940's and early 1950's of thermonuclear weapons, which increased the explosive power carried by individual missiles and aircraft by a factor of 10 million. This revolution was much more significant than the advances in delivery systems. The "breakthrough" on offense is behind us; the "breakthrough" on defense is not in sight.

The other point deserving comment is the notion that the ultimate decision whether or not to deploy defenses will be straightforward, depending on whether or not the technology "pans out": "There is

the chance that the technology may not pan out, that systems may not prove cost-effective, or cannot be made survivable. If so, those facts alone would presumably determine the decision not to go further.”

This will not, however, be a simple technical decision. More likely, SDI will play out as follows:

- After some preliminary problems, there will be spectacularly successful demonstrations. (The HOE experience illustrates the pattern—three failures, spectacular success).

- The SDIO will then propose deployment of a system along the following lines:

- Cost in excess of 10% of the DOD budget into the indefinite future.

- Both area defense and point defense components.

- Emphasis on kinetic energy devices, with directed energy playing a smaller, later role.

- Objectives include enhanced survivability for offensive forces, protection for population and industry, protection from third country and accidental attack. This long list of objectives avoids the hard choice between defending against attack or deterring it through threat of retaliation.

- The rationale for the systems will stress defense of ICBMs, the deployments will stress area defense components.

- The system would have a plausible capability to intercept most existing Soviet RVs.

- Relatively straightforward, low-cost Soviet countermeasures could sharply reduce its effectiveness.

- The system would not be vulnerable to existing Soviet systems.

- New Soviet systems could seriously threaten the survivability of space-based defense components.

- No reductions will be proposed for our offensive forces. On the contrary, enhancements will be proposed to offset Soviet BMD.

- The arguments advanced in favor of the system will be:

- We will be better off with the ability to shoot down some RVs rather than none.

- It is stabilizing because it complicates attacks.

- It could lead to future more effective defenses of societies, and a withering away of offenses.

- All military systems have countermeasures, and if we didn't buy systems that might be countered by the Soviets, we'd never buy anything.

- If the Soviets build countermeasures, we can add counters of our own.

There will be sharp debates over this system in the Pentagon, in Congress, and in the public. But the real argument will not hinge on the technology developed in the SDI. The debate will be between those who believe deeply that defense is something we ought to be doing, even if the initial deployments are imperfect, and those who believe

defense is counterproductive in that it stimulates the offense, precludes reductions, and is destabilizing because it favors the first striker.

This debate is not going to wait until a specific system is proposed for deployment, of course; it has already started. Two kinds of experiments will be especially contentious in the immediate future:

- projects which appear more related to system development than exploration of technology, and
 - tests which arguably conflict with the ABM Treaty.
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3. Editorial Note

On Friday, November 30, 1984, President Ronald Reagan chaired a meeting of the National Security Planning Group in the Situation Room from 1:45 until 2:45 p.m. to discuss Soviet strategy on arms control, the current status of Soviet forces, and projections of future Soviet capabilities. Principals agreed to the importance of pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and obtaining Congressional support for production and deployment of the M-X missile. Toward the end of the meeting, Reagan asserted "that the Soviet goal is to protect the motherland while developing military power that they can use to blackmail the West." The minutes of this meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 323.

The following Wednesday, December 5, the National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 2:00 until 3:00 p.m. President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane introduced the agenda as a discussion of U.S. and Soviet objectives in the arms control talks set to start in January in Geneva and summarized a paper prepared by the Senior Arms Control Group. "Our goal is to get a useful process going and to achieve formal negotiations on offensive systems while we discuss the relationship of defense to offense," McFarlane said. Midway through the meeting, President Reagan "noted that we could build on the Soviet preoccupation with protecting the homeland by making clear that we have no intention of starting a nuclear war" and "have no objections to their having defenses, but we have to look at defenses for ourselves and we need to look at reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons." After meeting participants discussed anti-satellite weapons and other advanced technologies, the President concluded: "SDI gives us a great deal of leverage on the Soviet Union." The minutes of this meeting are printed in *Foreign*

Relations, 1981–1988, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 326.

The National Security Planning Group met again on December 10, in the Situation Room from 2:00 until 3:00 p.m. McFarlane introduced the agenda as a discussion of six questions concerning the U.S. position in Geneva: (1) “Do we want separate START and INF negotiations or should they be merged?”; (2) “What shall we do about Space—negotiations or discussions only?”; (3) “Should Space issues be dealt with separately or merged with START and INF?”; (4) “Should we combine everything together in one large negotiation, perhaps having separate working groups?”; (5) “How do we deal with the objectives of Umbrella discussions?”; and (6) “Should we view these as ‘Umbrella Talks’ or perhaps ‘Stability’ talks?” The President and his team debated these questions yet did not arrive at definitive answers. At the close, Reagan “noted that the situation today is like a duel between two gunfighters. Our policy of MAD could get us both killed. It is just too dangerous.” The minutes are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 331.

4. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 14, 1984

MEMO RE SDI

I asked T.K. Jones, who is in charge of strategic systems in the Office of Research and Development at the Pentagon, to brief me (Dec. 12, 1984) on his estimates of the cost effectiveness of SDI systems.

He said the SDI concept depended upon having a defense at a series of levels. The cost effectiveness of each level by itself could be estimated, but the true payoff was in the mutually supportive interaction of defense at a number of levels.

Looked at as a single level, the least cost-effective level was the boost phase interceptor level. I said that I had been led to believe that that is the level with the greatest payoff because, if successful, one could kill the missile before it had had a chance to dispense its large number of RVs. T.K. said that that multiplier was offset by the consideration that the geography of the situation meant that only approximately one-tenth

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, November–December 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Nitze.

of the array of satellite kill mechanisms would be in the right position to launch within the time limit available for a kill. Each satellite and its kill mechanisms would necessarily be quite expensive. His computations indicated a cost per RV kill of \$30 million to \$35 million per RV. He said that the estimated cost of the MX program divided by the number of RVs it would make available is approximately \$25 million per RV. He estimated the cost of the Midgetman program at \$70 million per RV. Thus, taking the boost phase interceptor level by itself is not cost effective. However, if one had a reasonable capability at the other levels, a boost phase capability would significantly increase the effectiveness of defenses at those other levels.

I asked T.K. which, in his opinion, was the most cost effective level. He said it was the high endo-atmospheric level, i.e., the level at the edge of the sensible atmosphere where chaff and balloons and other such light pen aids begin to be washed out by atmospheric resistance and where the altitude was such that a significant area of sky could be covered from a single interceptor location on the ground. His estimates indicated a cost of around \$10 million per RV kill at that level. He said the next most cost effective level was the terminal defense level, which he estimated at \$12 million per kill. He estimated mid-course intercept to be somewhat more costly than terminal defense per kill, but not as costly as boost phase intercept. He emphasized that the Soviets are much advantaged by the fact that they have already developed the base level of defense, civil defense, i.e., several thousand of hardened and dispersed facilities for communication and leadership personnel.

He said that in the Pentagon's SDI R&D efforts, he was emphasizing development of smaller and less costly non-nuclear interceptors, easily transportable airborne sensors, and mobile radars. He was trying to get the weight of the miniature vehicle, the MV, down from 30 pounds to 10 pounds.

Subsequently (Dec. 13, 1984) General Chain and I had lunch with General Lamberson who heads the Air Force program office on SDI. Lamberson said that his office deals only with boost phase and mid-course intercept systems; the Army deals with terminal and high endo-atmospheric systems. He said that the only boost phased intercept system for which the technology is currently pretty well in hand is the kinetic energy system. This is a device with a large number of small thrusters controlled by a guidance device which can maintain its accuracy of position, can give it or sub munitions acceleration sufficiently high that they can, with their high velocity, kill a missile or its post-boost stage through the force of its impact. Because space offers no resistance, the sub munitions maintain their high velocity and their accuracy over relatively long distances. The techniques involved are different from, but related to, the techniques in the MV vehicle. Lamberson said that he would need four more tests of the MV vehicle to prove out those parts

of the technology which require tests in space for such proof. He would need approximately a year to do the four tests. His current testing program is for 12 tests. He believes most of the remaining work could be done in laboratory facilities or on the ground.

With respect to the more exotic technologies such as space-based lasers, ground-based directed energy systems using mirrors in space, and neutral particle accelerators, there were important technological problems which had not yet been resolved even in concept. He did not believe that any of these systems would be ready for engineering development testing until the mid-90s, and would not be available for deployment in useful numbers until some time in the mid-21st century.

He emphasized the theoretical attractiveness of neutral particle beams because of the fact they could penetrate several inches of dense material and thus destroy heavily shielded nuclear weapons; lasers, on the other hand, merely caused intense heat at the surface of the object which they hit.

I also talked (Dec. 12, 1984) with Ron Lehman and his associate, Colonel Linhard, who is an extremely competent military planner. They emphasized the domestic political parameters within which we must consider our SDI problems. They foresee the Soviets interconnecting their phased array radars and deploying large numbers, perhaps two or three thousand, of SA-12 anti-aircraft systems with ABM capabilities, or a follow-on system they think the Soviets may be developing, which they call the SA-15. They say that in the current political climate it will be impossible for us to respond to such a proliferation of terminal defenses. We would be buried in the environmental impact statements required. They foresee a possible play on the part of the Soviets to try to have the Krasnoyarsk radar² grandfathered, and to permit us a comparable radar in the center of the United States. We would never be able to get authority to build such a radar or to exploit it in the same way and time frame as the Soviets can. They offered some useful suggestions on my suggested talking points on the offense-defense relationship, which I have incorporated therein.³

² Reference is to the longstanding point of contention over whether the Soviet phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

³ Not found.

5. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, undated

Session IV: Policy Implications for Arms Control Negotiations

General Brent Scowcroft:

Scowcroft noted that since 1967 in some ways we have come a long way and in some ways not much had changed. He was inclined to agree with Colin Gray that the Soviets had not very much changed their stripes on the question of the offense-defense relationship. From their point of view the ABM Treaty had been a cosmetic attempt to stop technical developments on the U.S. side, and one could make the same case now. Earlier the U.S. worried primarily about a Soviet ABM breakout. Now this prospect is benign because we were the ones who had this capability. The Soviets are now worried about ABM breakout in much the same way as we did earlier. Thus it would be useful to revisit our own reactions to the prospect of ABM deployments during this earlier period. Our primary reaction was MIRVs which could defeat ABMs. In the arms control negotiations we continued to argue for MIRVs, even when it was clear that we would get an ABM Treaty. We did this both to provide leverage on the Soviets to agree to the ABM limitations we wanted and to police the agreement once it entered into force.

The Soviets did not want to couple offense and defense. We could penetrate ABMs easier than they could since we had MIRVs. Thus it is instructive to look at our original reaction to ABMs.

In looking at SDI in a strategic sense, there are trade-offs that have to be considered. There is no question that SDI adds uncertainty, which can enhance deterrence; but we should also look at what SDI can provoke—i.e., a destabilizing offense-defense competition. We do not look at SDI often enough in this sense.

Johnny Foster has already pointed out that we can use SDI to get what we want. SDI may drive both sides back to assured destruction. SDI can greatly lessen the value of each individual warhead. Therefore, there will be a strong incentive to use warheads against population rather than against ICBMs because of the exchange ratio. Johnny Foster had also pointed out that booster intercept makes a highly MIRVed force relatively useless. Therefore, both sides may want to go the route

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, “Signals” [October–December, 1984]. Secret. No drafting information appears in the notes. For more information about this meeting, see Document 6 and footnote 1 thereto.

of Midgetman. Therefore, we ought to look at the possibility of trading de-MIRVing in exchange for boost-phase intercept.

We should not view the ABM Treaty as the Holy Grail. It has served a useful purpose by encouraging us to pursue useful R&D and saved us from spending a lot of money on systems that would not have worked very well. However, if we can enhance stability or gain an edge, the ABM Treaty should not prevent us from doing so. On the other hand we should not throw out the ABM Treaty if we do not know the features of the new regime which would replace it. The ABM Treaty is a good treaty. It has some loopholes, for example ASAT and the ATBM loophole, which we built in to protect SAM-D. The Soviets may be taking advantage of this loophole with their SA-12.

Turning to the question of Allies, Scowcroft said that he had seldom seen greater unity in Europe than was now present regarding the fear of SDI. European fears are traditionally of two types—that they will be entrapped in a U.S.–Soviet conflict or will be abandoned as the superpowers make a bilateral deal. SDI has the peculiar facility of stimulating both of these fears. On the one hand SDI might lead the U.S. to play the role of a cowboy, behaving recklessly around the world; or on the other hand it might lead the U.S. to withdraw and tell Europe to go it alone. Europeans are also concerned about the expense of SDI. They would like the U.S. to spend more for NATO and fear that an offense-defense race would reduce the resources available for NATO. The Europeans view the SDI as the latest crazy American fad, and they have barely gotten used to flexible response.

On the substance of negotiations,² Scowcroft said that the format to be used depends upon our goals. On the one hand, we could use SDI in the negotiations. On the other hand, our goal could be to avoid involving SDI in the negotiations, in which case we would try to separate SDI and pursue a separate agreement on offense. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are approaching the negotiations from diametrically opposite points of view. The Soviets would like to kill SDI with no cost to themselves while the U.S. hopes to keep it off the table. Thus, the sides are far apart.

Even if the Soviets are willing to pay a relatively high price, we have great problems. It is difficult to see how the Soviets would agree to any far-reaching limitations on offense (for example on warheads and throw-weight) if they have to look over their shoulder at SDI and feel the need to be able to penetrate it. One likely outcome of this situation is a cosmetic agreement. This could come about if both sides want an agreement; the Soviets agree to a modest agreement which would amount to a modified SALT II and U.S., in a rush to Detente II, agrees.

² Reference is to forthcoming Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva.

Scowcroft said he would not be at all surprised if the negotiations take that direction. He regretted having said so publicly, and hoped this would not complicate negotiations.

On the subject of Congress and the U.S. public, Scowcroft said SDI is popular with the public, and that the *fact* of negotiations reassures the public by persuading them that people are behaving responsibly and not trying to blow up the world. A sizable portion of the public believes that we already have such defenses and that the idea that we would prohibit defenses is an arms control fantasy. Thus the main problem is Congress, which definitely wants arms control and will use our strategic programs to force the Administration to pursue arms control. If the MX is killed, the Soviets will have enormous incentives to sit back and see if the same thing would happen to SDI.

Both the U.S. and the USSR have problems as far as resources are concerned. This is not a new situation. However, the U.S. SDI program means that a Soviet technician can now say to the Politburo that this confirms the priority which must be devoted to Soviet defense efforts. The Soviets have shown that they can stick to such long term efforts, but can the U.S. persevere for the one, two, three decades required? He was not optimistic on this score.

Dr. Colin Gray

Gray said that the possible dangers of the period of transition to defense dominance have frequently been noted. For example, the Left and the British and French point out that the last time the Soviets faced a situation of great inferiority they precipitated the Cuban missile crisis. Earlier, Germany during the period 1912–14, had perceived that early action was in their interest because the situation would rapidly become worse for them later. Gray said that these examples were not relevant to SDI. The Germans had plans for achieving victory in 40 days. For the Soviets, “today” will never be good enough to take action against a maturing SDI.

Gray agreed with Scowcroft’s point about Midgetman. We are soon facing major engineering decisions in the Midgetman program; before we lock ourselves in, we must think about the non-permissive environment that it could face due to a Soviet SDI.

Gray characterized the ABM Treaty as doing the wrong things badly. The Treaty forbids the establishment of a base for a nationwide defense. The Soviets are already working on such a base and the President has said that a nationwide defense is a good idea. It would be a big mistake to foreclose SDI in exchange for a START or INF agreement. The best we can get on offense will be a marginal tinkering, while at stake in the SDI program is the capability to make a major difference in the strategic situation and in damage to the US in the event of a war. If we foreclose our freedom of action in SDI in exchange for an ASAT agreement made

for political convenience, we will have traded something of major significance for something which is either of trivial or harmful significance. If we were to consider negotiating part of SDI in 1984 or 1985, the only thing of proportional value would be the relevance of the entire Soviet missile force. Thus it is absurd to consider negotiating away SDI.

Space arms control beyond some trivial Incidents In Space arrangements cannot be serious because of technical overlap. Gray presumed that the White House understands that nothing could be agreed to on ASAT beyond certain trivial arrangements. It is possible that the Administration will need some arms control agreement for expediency, but what is the likelihood that the Soviets would give us even a trivial framework which General Abrahamson could use in Congress to help support the SDI program? Gray saw no hope that this could happen—that is, that we could negotiate an agreement on offense only.

There does exist a major arms control story to SDI, but the U.S. must earn it. What possible incentive could we give the Soviets to assist us in this? As Abrahamson had pointed out, the Soviets might be made to see a growing obsolescence in their offensive forces by the early 1990s. They might see the U.S. as having a good offense and a pretty good defense, with the situation getting even worse for them in the future. This might provide such an incentive. Relative leaky defenses could favor the Soviets. They care primarily about themselves and have better access to the periphery of Eurasia than we do. On the other hand, the U.S. would have little confidence in leaky defenses, because we would place greater value on our cities than they would. He was not saying that the Soviets would buy such an arrangement, but one could make that case.

Soviet reactions to SDI will include attempting to gain the technology through spying, technological transfer, etc. as well as hints of breakout. In the near term they could put us at a disadvantage. While we might be able to field a great SDI system by 2010, the Soviets could embarrass us in the 1990s. So it is important that we make the Soviets understand that they are going to have more trouble down the road.

Returning to the question of the ABM Treaty, Gray remarked that if the President is serious about SDI, he must face the consequences for the Treaty. If we continually say that we are in compliance with the Treaty, Congress will see us as not serious. He said that he would like to know that the President will do whatever is required whenever he is told that the technology is ready. The President should understand there are no constraints on air defense, ASAT or ATBM. If alibis are needed for U.S. misbehavior, one could invoke Soviet misbehavior under the Treaty. If we are willing to take a broad interpretation of the terms of the Treaty or to piggyback SDI testing, we could do quite a lot under the terms of the Treaty. Of course, such behavior would be considered un-American.

DISCUSSION

Ambassador Rowny pointed out that the Soviets had never said that we must go back to SALT II. Early in START the Soviets had recognized that limiting launchers was not sufficient. Thus, Moscow propaganda was not supported by Soviet experts who have not pushed SALT II in the START negotiations. He also said that his guarded optimism should not be interpreted as a belief that we must give up SDI in these negotiations. On the contrary, sufficient leverage now exists to achieve an agreement independent of SDI. For example, the Soviets have over-invested in certain types of systems and are paranoid about U.S. ALCMs. Thus, the leverage provided by our offensive programs should be sufficient and we do not need SDI as trading material.

Gray asked whether this would still be the case if MX were lost.

Rowny replied that the loss of MX would not be helpful. The Soviets know the capabilities of the MX and take it seriously; so should we. The loss of MX would be important, but not fatal to our negotiating efforts.

Scowcroft, in response to Rowny's earlier comment, said that he had in mind that the Soviets would continue to advocate something which could be called "SALT II plus." He was not saying that the Soviets would insist upon a return to the SALT II Treaty itself.

Carnesale noted that both Gray and Scowcroft had found it unlikely that the Soviets would be interested in significant reductions in the near-term, and asked if there was general agreement on this point. There was no disagreement with this among the participants. However, Spahr said he could think of a scenario that might cause us problems. The Soviets might offer us something better than their previous START position, but would make it contingent upon no SDI just as they had made their earlier position contingent upon no U.S. INF deployments.

Mobbs observed that if we are the least bit interested in negotiating on SDI, we would probably be forced to use most of our leverage merely to ensure that the defensive constraints were binding on the Soviets. We would need to stop R&D and this would raise very difficult problems in terms of Soviet compliance.

Sloss said that he heartily agreed with this but did not think the Soviets wanted to shut off R&D. What they would like, of course, is to stop our R&D but not theirs. In any case, one could do a lot of R&D within the terms of the ABM Treaty. Our problem now and for the past 12 years is doing what is allowed. Thus, the problem is not Soviet violations of constraints but the asymmetry with which the two sides pursue what is allowed. The U.S. simply will not do what it is allowed to do.

Mobbs remarked that his point had been that since the U.S. would not do everything that is allowed, such R&D should be banned.

Stansbury noted that we are trying to work out some of the rough edges of the ABM Treaty. The ideal situation would be if our testing activities come up against the Treaty constraints about the same time that we make a decision to deploy. Sloss and Gardner observed that one could proceed for a time within these constraints, but there is obviously a tension between the Treaty and SDI.

Scowcroft observed that it was not true that we would have no problems if there were no limits on defense. We had pursued ABM programs because of the ABM Treaty. Safeguard was not built to protect U.S. citizens, but as a bargaining chip in the SALT negotiations.

Foster noted that the SDI bug is out of the bottle. It could either stop or it could go ahead. If it stopped, we would be worse off than if we had not started down this road in the first place. On the other hand, if SDI goes ahead, we might end up with a defensive capability against missiles and this technology might also help with air defense. It could also force offensive levels downward. However, this all depends on getting the program, and we will have no leverage if there is no program.³ This should be explained clearly to Congress at an early date. Rowny recalled that he had talked about this to certain Democratic senators last summer, and they had replied that they would like to return to this subject after the election. We ought to get back to the goal of building greater bipartisan support.

Woolsey said he was concerned that we may be defining our strategy and systems around the OSD organization chart. Boost-phase intercept may be interesting, but it is difficult to move the country on this issue as long as defenses are focused on this part of SDI. Much of the country is at odds with the concept of total defense. Perhaps we could build a coalition by unpacking SDI and looking at its components.⁴

We might make more progress in building political support by moving incrementally from the low end of SDI rather than talking in terms of perfection based upon boost-phase interception in space.⁵ We might be able to get more support over the longer term for boost-phase intercept if we can avoid clashes over the Treaty. Woolsey said he was skeptical of getting Soviet limitations in exchange for giving up boost-phase intercepts in space.⁶ But one could hypothesize that the Soviets might over the long-term agree to move away from large, liquid-fueled,

³ An unknown hand underlined much of this sentence.

⁴ An unknown hand underlined this sentence and drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin beside this paragraph.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined “political support” and “moving incrementally from the low end of SDI rather than talking in terms of perfection based upon boost-phase interception in space.”

⁶ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

MIRVed ICBMs in exchange for a ban on boost-phase intercepts in space. We could have an area/terminal or terminal/area system, some hard-site defenses or some defense against accidental launches even in the context of arms control.

Our problem is like trying to get through a set of slalom gates, some of which are set at 90 degrees to others. There might be a path through these if we can keep the ABM Treaty and build our case around terminal defense. If we allow the issue to be joined over whether one is for or against defense, when both sides understand defense to mean primarily boost-phase intercepts, we will never get anywhere.

Sloss felt that Woolsey was on the right track. Most people favor defense and favor spending money on defensive technologies. In fact we were investigating most of these technologies before SDI. One mistake we may have made is that we have attempted to describe the ultimate system before carrying out the necessary scientific exploration.⁷ People run into trouble when they try to describe a space-based, boost-phase intercept system. The other major problem is the price tag. We say that we need \$26 billion over the next three to five years to reach a conclusion. It is absolutely essential that the Administration be able to describe some intermediate goals for our efforts over the next decade.

Gray said that he also was attracted to Woolsey's ideas, but that the problem as far as OSD is concerned is that an intermediate system is a solution looking for a problem. No one is asking for this sort of intermediate help from SDI.

Garthoff said that we could not roll back the situation to the pre-SDI era. There are three alternatives for SDI—pursue it, re-define it, or abandon it. If we are going to abandon it eventually, we should negotiate some restraints on the Soviets in this area. The problem of how to formulate limitations involves much more than verification. We could ban flight testing and deployment of space weapons and ASAT and we could tighten up the restrictions in the ABM Treaty as far as testing in an ASAT mode is concerned. There would, of course, be questions as to what to do about ATBMs. Garthoff said he would not exclude the idea of opening up the Treaty in the area of terminal defenses. This would be difficult and the Soviets would probably resist it initially, but one could not rule out reaching some agreement here. Separating the two phases of SDI would open up a range of possibilities for arms control.

General Rankine remarked that he saw considerable risk in decoupling the two phases of SDI. The President had talked about a total defense and this depends upon boost-phase intercepts. If we

⁷ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

only deploy a defense of MX in order to get more survivable RVs, the Soviets will also have this defense and these additional RVs will not get through. Thus it is perilous to give up part of SDI.

Linhard said that the Soviets are pragmatists. They do not talk about SDI but about the militarization of space. If one looks at what the Soviets have done in the defensive area over the past 15 years, there are few gaps. If we are worried about Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty, we should not attempt to compete in traditional technologies. If one considers the offense, the Soviets are moving ahead with both rail and land-based mobile ICBMs, and the U.S. could probably not do the same. Thus in both offense and defense, the U.S. can compete but is not prepared to do so. However, we do have the technology to change the rules and leapfrog the Soviets. The Soviets, on the other hand, want to keep the rules as they are.

Foster remarked that he did not think that the Soviets have boost-phase intercepts in mind in their programs. They want to keep weapons out of space in order to have their own C3I.⁸

Rankine did not agree with this point, observing that the U.S. is far more dependent on space than the Soviets. Thus the Soviets have a high incentive to take out our eyes and ears in space.

Courtney observed that it is not clear whether arms control is the enemy of SDI or whether it can help SDI. If one postulates a future move to deploy an SDI system, it would be useful to begin through arms control to reduce warheads in order to get momentum for the transition period. The fact that MX is being viewed as bargaining leverage is not good, but perhaps it is necessary. Because of Congressional considerations, perhaps the same could be said for SDI.

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "remarked that he did not think that the Soviets have boost-phase intercepts in mind in their programs," and "weapons out of space in order to have their own C3I."

6. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, December 17, 1984

SUBJECT

SDI Seminar

Participants in a START delegation seminar on SDI² last week concluded that the Soviets were unlikely to agree soon to reduce offensive arms. Al Carnesale (Chairman), Brent Scowcroft, John Foster, Leon Sloss, Ray Garthoff, Colin Gray, and Sayre Stevens joined Ed Rowny and others. Key points from Carnesale's concluding remarks:

- It is uncertain whether SDI would replace or enhance deterrence. The former goal is what appeals to publics.
- Under the ABM Treaty the Soviets, who cheat and stretch agreements, can do more "research" than we.
- The Soviets oppose our approach to SDI; they won't agree now to plan a transition to a defense-heavy world, nor will they accept "meaningful reductions" in offensive arms so long as SDI looms on the horizon.
- We can't comply with the ABM Treaty forever. We need to recognize this soon, so we can get the money to carry out tests that will violate the Treaty.
- It will be hard to maintain the momentum of the SDI program; we have to prepare, however, for the long haul.

Most of the participants were sympathetic to SDI, and sought to avoid or minimize its problems. For example, they didn't address whether Congress would support SDI if this meant dashing hopes for offensive reductions and pulling out of the ABM Treaty. The participants eluded the issue of stability, yet most critics believe SDI would detract from crisis stability if space-based ABM components were vulnerable to preemptive attack.

The participants seemed uncomfortable with the idea that arms control could be a "friend" of SDI. Yet, a credible policy on strategic arms control may be as important for gaining Hill support for SDI research as for the MX (with mixed results). Also, beginning the process now of offensive reductions (however difficult) could facilitate SDI by limiting the saturation threat against it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (12/13/1984–12/17/1984). Secret; Sensitive. Armacost sent the memorandum to Shultz under cover of a December 17 note: "Mr. Secretary: I thought you might be interested in this summary of a seminar last week on SDI. Ed Rowny got together a group of senior defense experts who appeared to agree that the Soviets were unlikely to reduce nuclear arms as long as SDI continued." (Ibid.)

² See Document 5.

7. Editorial Note

On December 17, 1984, the National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 11:00 a.m. until noon. Deliberations centered on how to preserve domestic and allied support for the Strategic Defense Initiative under sustained pressure from the Soviet Union, and the possibility of the Soviets' walking out of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations if the Ronald Reagan administration proceeded with research into strategic defenses. President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane encouraged the other principals to participate in a public diplomacy campaign emphasizing the benefits of SDI toward reducing the risk of nuclear war. Participants also considered whether or not SDI would rely exclusively on non-nuclear technologies, and the advantages of approaching the Soviets with specific numerical proposals. The minutes of this meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 334.

8. Memorandum for the Record¹

West Point, New York, December 20, 1984

SUBJECT

An Arms-Control Context for SDI

The assumptions linking SDI and arms-reduction negotiations seem to be these:

(1) The President wishes to make significant gains in negotiating reductions in offensive arms.

(2) The President wishes to continue with the SDI as a strong program.

(3) The Russians will not negotiate seriously on offensive arms unless we are willing to negotiate seriously on SDI.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Subject File, SDI 84–85. No classification marking. Drafted by Johnson. Poindexter sent the memorandum to Matlock on December 28 under cover of an undated handwritten note: "Jack, this is an interesting paper—lot of good thoughts. As you stated there are some points with which I disagree but I do think substance is basically correct. JP" (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological Files, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron December 1984)

It is the third assumption which seems to make the first two logically incompatible, and to place us in a bimodal situation with regard to SDI: preserve it, and undermine the negotiations; or consider it fair territory for trading, and thus lose it. The problem, then, is whether there is a middle ground.

WHAT IS THE SDI?

I believe the key to this dilemma lies in the definition of the SDI. Is the SDI

(a) A long-range R&D program to determine whether nationwide defense is possible, and how it could be done?

Or (b) A goal-oriented development program specifically charged to produce (that is, design and deploy) a nationwide defense, either as soon as possible or within some fixed timespan?

If the correct answer is (b), then the dilemma above is real, for we cannot in good faith profess that we have anything to bargain with unless we intend to give up the whole thing. If, on the other hand, the correct answer is (a), then there are a good many things which we could realistically discuss with the Russians, things which would not materially damage the SDI or retard its success, but which would provide the Russians with real incentive to bargain (given their manifest concern over SDI).

Definition (a) is in fact consonant with the President's expressed desire on strategic defense: "... a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." The significance and wisdom of this formulation lie in the fact that it recognizes the actual state of technology: We don't know today what sort of system will accomplish the objective of nationwide defense, nor even whether it can actually be accomplished.

An important turning point in the logic is a recognition of this fact, which is a strong consensus among real experts in the field. It was said plainly in the report of the Fletcher Commission,² and it was said in the year-long DOD study of BMD chaired by Johnny Foster (which concluded about the time of the Fletcher Commission). If you accept the fact that we do not know yet about the feasibility of nationwide defense, then the logical orientation of the SDI is (a). In either case, you must begin with R&D to provide the data for analysis and evaluation of alternatives. The real difference between (a) and (b) is thus that in (b) we have already decided that some defense which satisfies our

² Documentation pertaining to the Fletcher Commission and the Department of Defense study of Ballistic Missile Defense chaired by Foster is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984.

criterion will be found and that we will deploy it. The general argument in favor of (b) is that, having decided now to go ahead full steam, we can speed up the process by doing, in parallel with the R&D to get the answers, all the advanced development and testing technology will allow. Much of that work will be wasted because it will pertain to systems that don't show up in the final solution, but we will move toward deployment faster. In fact, this argument is not correct. Parallel demos of undeveloped technology nearly always prove disastrous to the programs they belong to. The demos change the direction of work because they overrun their costs and suck up the money from the R&D. Having thus destroyed the potentially more promising options, they leave one with a commitment to a second-rate solution, engineered into a system too soon; thus we get the poor version of the poor option.

We must pause a moment in the argument to make an important distinction about demonstrations and testing. The goal enunciated by the President is nationwide missile defense. A different goal, enunciated by prominent SDI supporters from Senator Garn to Henry Kissinger, has been reinforcement of deterrence by reducing vulnerability of our military forces. This latter job is something we can do with existing technology—interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads—and we can test our systems without violating the ABM Treaty. Because of strictly numerical limitations, we can't deploy a viable system without violating or revising the treaty. I shall discuss the relevance of this near-term technology at the end of the memo. The important distinction is that when I speak of big demonstrations now I am speaking of demos of immature technology, proposals for things which, after considerable further improvement, *may* be part of solving the problem of nationwide defense, but whose pursuit now actually constitutes a danger to the success of the SDI.

Thus far I have argued that R&D is the indispensable core of the SDI in the near future, by which I mean at least five to ten years. I have also suggested that (a) is thus the logical SDI strategy. I will now make several points about disadvantages of (b) which I claim settle the case. I will then show how choosing (a) gives the U.S. a plausible negotiating position to satisfy both the President's wishes. Finally, I will address the question of what we should be doing in the near term.

Disadvantages of SDI Definition (b)

I shall enumerate five severe disadvantages of this approach.

(1) *Arms Control Dilemma* As explained above, approach (b) reduces us to the bimodal position of bargaining with the whole SDI or refusing to discuss it. If the interpretation of the Russian position is correct, we cannot keep SDI and achieve arms reductions.

(2) *Domestic Risks* The SDI has already attracted an entirely disproportionate amount of public criticism and comment. Because of

domestic politics, going ahead with (b) now means that we risk losing the entire SDI. Maintaining an R&D program as requested by the President largely defuses further criticism, since even most liberal critics admit that absolute defense would be good if it were possible, and object to various problems of transition. But announcing that we *know now* that it will work is doubly dangerous. First, this contention can be disproved to the satisfaction of any good scientist, and in debate to any intelligent congressman. Second, the Administration opens itself to a variety of criticisms based on the unstable nature of partial defenses and transitions, arguments which have been made thus far only as possibilities: in short, a highly effective rallying-point will have been created for enemies of the program. Particularly in its currently-constituted form, the SDI is not strong enough technically or programmatically to deal with either of these problems; the combination of them is very likely to permit the enemies of strategic defense to wreck the entire effort.

(3) *Poor Product* For reasons explained in the section above, demos of immature technologies are not merely wasteful, they actually lead to a poor solution to the proposed task. In short, if we get any nationwide defense at all, we will have elected to develop one which comprises a poorly integrated complex of poorly selected ideas. It won't work well, and it will rapidly become dangerously obsolete. All this also adds to the disadvantage above.

(4) *Ally problems* Our allies have expressed sizeable fears about the success and implications of SDI. Although these fears are not well-founded, they are real. If SDI is publicly elevated to demonstration-and-test status, and if any of these demos fail, the allies will become truculent in their attitude toward SDI. Thus, definition (b) places great pressure on all the demos to succeed, distorting the technical plan (degrading or delaying the objective) and needlessly risking the credibility of the entire SDI. Giving alliance politics leverage as a criterion in managing the SDI is another way of gambling with its success.

(5) *Real Soviet Responses* If we understand the Russians correctly, they are seriously worried about the SDI. So far this is fine. But if we proceed with a large program of tests and demos which may not lead anywhere, and which will certainly not lead anywhere for some time, what will be their response? Since the ABM Treaty, the U.S. has had no deployed missile defense. The Soviets have a limited BMD deployment, twice upgraded. They could proliferate this system easily. Perhaps more important, the Soviets also have an interceptor system, the SA-12, which represents a powerful, current military capability. It has performance to spare in killing Pershing II, and it probably could have (with additional acquisition radar) disturbingly good performance against SLBMs. They are building SA-12 as anti-Pershing weapons through a loophole in the Treaty. If the Soviet response to SDI(b) is to proliferate

SA-12 as an anti-SLBM, they will have a real defense capability while we have one on paper. Our lead-time to deployment of any similar system is longer than five years.

Advantages of SDI Definition (a)

Choosing (a) minimizes the problems (2), (4) and (5) and eliminates (3). The pertinent question is, what does it do for (1)? It allows us to adopt the following bargaining position with the Russians:

1. We will not violate the ABM Treaty. We are embarked on long-term R&D, and so are you. If we reach a positive answer sometime in the future, and decide that a system based upon that answer is good enough to be worth deploying, we will give the required notice before withdrawing from the Treaty. We believe that you would do the same, which is why the withdrawal clause was mutually agreed to. Meanwhile, our R&D efforts will respect the limits of the Treaty. We would like to know the character and extent of your R&D programs, since ours has been announced and yours remains a very large but completely secret undertaking.

2. We will not violate the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in space.

3. We are willing to discuss limitations on large-scale demonstration of SDI-relevant technologies, particularly demonstrations in space.

4. We are willing to discuss limitations of space battle stations for BMD.

The first two items will not interfere materially with our R&D program and can be volunteered unilaterally. The effect will be to establish our *bona fide* intent with the Russians, with our allies, and with Congress. The ABM Treaty continues to be valuable to us as a tripwire to Soviet BMD breakout or SA-12 deployments as SLBM defense, at least until we have a near-term capability of our own.

The third item comprises a large class of elaborate space demos almost all of which are premature or can be tested other ways. Specifics are complex for a memo of this length, but there are only a few limited prerogatives which we would have to retain in order for our R&D of the next ten years or so to lead us to the answers we need. Presumably the new treaty, like the ABM Treaty, would have a renewal time or withdrawal clause in case we reach a stage where big tests in space are essential. Thus, there are a large number of things here which will appear to be substantive to the Russians but whose loss would not injure SDI, and which we can bargain with in good faith, one item at a time.

The fourth item represents an apparently large restriction which, if handled properly, is none at all; thus we can appear to be offering a lot. Teller's dictum says that satellite battle stations are all cheaper to shoot down than they are to put in place. Some people may argue with this dictum, but the real experts (Johnny Foster, for example) agree with it. We should be careful to preserve special cases, however: satellites

which do not themselves house weapons systems but which may be key parts of BMD systems. Two examples are: relay mirrors for ground-based lasers and high-altitude satellites containing decoy discrimination techniques, such as particle beams.

Thus, the latter two items do contain sensitive details which must be handled carefully by experts, but they offer up what appears to be considerable ground for bargaining. None of what we are actually offering should damage the attainment of SDI's goals.

A potential disadvantage of SDI(a) will no doubt be raised, so I should comment on it here. There is a contention that a program without big demonstrations can never get sufficiently big appropriations, or maintain its technological momentum for long. As far as the appropriations go, I have already argued that the demos themselves represent a threat to the health, if not the life, of the program. The early demos constitute more of a danger than an assistance. Note that big chemical laser proponents have tried for years to get funding for big space demos. Not only have they not succeeded, but the chemical laser program has demonstrated negligible progress during the period. As far as technological momentum, it is true that some big projects are necessary, but we can build plenty of big projects in laboratories or on the ground (big ground-based lasers, for example). Such projects can serve as technological centerpieces for Congress, if such are really deemed necessary.

Near-Term Proposals

I recommend that we consider an additional position for discussion with the Russians:

5. We will consider bans on testing and deployment of space-based ASATs, but not of ground-based or air-based ASATs.

And an additional course of action, which might lead to discussion with the Russians:

6. We should revitalize our conventional hardsite BMD development program, and prototype a working system. When we have an adequate benchmark, we should consider the relative benefits of re-negotiating the ABM Treaty limits, in terms of numbers (of sites, interceptors and radars) and basing (mobility and deception), for "conventional" hardsite defense of ICBM silos.

Position 5 permits us to refine and upgrade our current ASAT and to develop and upgrade ground-based laser ASATs. It prevents the Soviets from threatening our high-altitude satellites with anything but a large ground-based laser, a technology in which we have a substantial lead. In short, there is no real reason why we would prefer space-based ASATs over the ones we have now in development. This agreement would permit the Soviets to keep the ASATs we can't verify anyhow, but stop them from developing ones we can actually verify.

Position 6 essentially argues that we close the gap on the Soviets' existing advantage in real military capability for missile defense. We can actually construct a defense that will provide sufficient ICBM survivability, but it will require changing several limits in the ABM Treaty—changing a few numbers, but leaving it qualitatively the same. The Soviets have a big lead-time-to-deployment advantage (4–7 years), because we never prototyped our system. More important, when SDI started up, conventional hardsite—the *only BMD system with demonstrated military effectiveness*—was cancelled.

Such a system could address the principal concern of Dr. Kissinger and Senator Garn, and do it sooner than any result from the nationwide defense program is likely to be ready. Everyone agrees that terminal hardsite defense of ICBMs is stabilizing. The technology to do that job, to eliminate the unstable vulnerability, is actually available. Critics will be concerned about meddling with the Treaty, but not nearly so concerned as if we embarked on SDI(b), in which we would effectively be announcing an intention to withdraw from the treaty, and for an objective those same critics regard as destabilizing rather than stabilizing.

There is absolutely no reason why we should permit the Soviets to maintain and improve their capability while we throw ours away, just because we hope to get something better. There is, however, good reason for concern about the Soviet capability, because of the linkage between offense and defense. In the interim between now and the success of the SDI effort—an interval whose length is uncertain—reductions in offensive arms will act to the benefit of the USSR unless we can have the option for an equivalent defense, to deter or match Soviet BMD breakout. At the very least, we must be able to evaluate the capability of their defense by more reliable means than paper studies.

Whether or not we pursue actually deploying hardsite, we should revive our activities in “conventional” hardsite BMD, prototype a system, keep modernizing it, and test pen-aids against it to ensure we can get through Russian defenses. We should not allow the Russians a large unilateral advantage in defensive capability in the near term. While we are looking for the better thing, let us keep the good one.

Thomas H. Johnson

Director, Science Research Laboratory

9. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, Maryland, December 22, 1984,
10:40–11:10 a.m. and 11:20 a.m.–1:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Price
Assistant Secretary Burt
Peter R. Sommer, NSC

Mrs. Thatcher
Ambassador Wright
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

PRIVATE MEETING: THE PRESIDENT AND
MRS. THATCHER, PLUS NOTE-TAKERS:

After exchanging pleasantries, *Mrs. Thatcher* praised the President's reelection, calling it a fantastic victory. She asked him how it felt to win by such an overwhelming margin. *The President* said it was an honor to win by such a margin and joked that someone had said there is only one thing he could ask for from Santa Claus—it was Minnesota, the only state he had lost. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher emphasized that the President's victory was even more impressive given that he had so significantly changed U.S. policies. Such a wide victory was an endorsement of the President's policies and a clear call for a continuation of these policies. She was pleased the President was keeping his same foreign policy, noting it made no sense to break-up a good team. *The President* agreed and observed that many serve at considerable personal and financial sacrifice. (U)

[Omitted here is Thatcher's account of Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom on December 16.]

¹Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, [Thatcher, 1984]. Secret. Drafted on December 28. Portions of the memorandum of conversation are also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 337. The morning private meeting took place in the Aspen Lodge. The expanded meeting and working lunch took place in the Laurel Lodge. Gorbachev met with Thatcher at Chequers on December 16.

Turning to the Geneva talks,² *the President* said since the Soviets had fared so poorly in recent months in the propaganda battles associated with disarmament talks, he feared that they were looking at Geneva as mainly a propaganda forum. This is one of the reasons they launched such an attack against what has become commonly known as “Star Wars.” He emphasized that Star Wars was not his term and was clearly not what he had in mind. He continued that there has never been a weapon for which another weapon against it had not been developed. Therefore, in view of all the advances in technology, he asked for a study of new defensive systems. Its aim would strictly be to strengthen deterrence. So far, initial research has been promising and, as he had stated many times, if it proves successful he would be willing to put this new technology into international hands. The President said we are not violating the ABM treaty and have no intention of doing so. The new Strategic Defense Initiative also had a moral context. We must search for ways to build a more stable peace. Our goal is to reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Chernenko now claims that this is also a Soviet goal. We have told them if they are really serious about reductions, we are ready. Gromyko had told him, said the President, that we cannot continue to sit on two mountains of weapons. The President said he replied, “let us then begin to lower and eventually eliminate these mountains.” (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that Gorbachev had implied returning to Geneva was not an easy decision for the Soviets. He also indicated the Soviets would come to Geneva with serious proposals. The President replied, “we hope so.” She continued that she had emphasized to Gorbachev that Britain supports the U.S. SDI program and told him it was not linked to a first strike strategy. (C)

The President continued that he was simply amazed how closely *Mrs. Thatcher’s* remarks to Gorbachev had accorded with what he told Gromyko. He had made similar points, said the President, on immigration restrictions, underscoring that these restrictions make it especially difficult for the U.S.—with its many political groups with ties to the old country—to improve relations with the Soviets. He had made it clear to Gromyko that he could better deal with the Soviets with the support of

² Reference is to the January 7–8, 1985, meetings between Shultz and Gromyko; the memoranda of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–1985, Documents 355, 357, 360, 362, and 363. The U.S.-Soviet joint statement, which was released on January 8, noted that “the sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.” The text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, p. 30.

the American people. The President then returned to his concern that the Soviets will use the Geneva talks primarily as a propaganda forum. He hoped, however, that the Soviets would treat these talks seriously; as he had told Gromyko the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a joint responsibility to see that war does not happen. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that she had a special interest in learning more details about the U.S. SDI program. Gorbachev had told her "tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons." He suggested if you develop SDI the Russians would either develop their own, or more probably, develop new offensive systems superior to SDI. General Keegan (former head of USAF Intelligence), whom she had seen several times, had informed her about Soviet advances and she was interested in learning more about SDI. *The President* noted it was time to join the others at Laurel Lodge. (C)

The private meeting ended at 11:10 a.m.

Expanded Session in Laurel Lodge

In opening the expanded session, *the President* said he thought it would be appropriate to quote a remark the Queen had made to him during the course of the campaign. When the Queen was in Canada and he was in Michigan, the Queen had called to say she was sure there will never be a wider divide between the U.S. and Great Britain "than the river that currently divides us." Smiling, *the President and Mrs. Thatcher* both agreed with the Queen's remark. (U)

Noting that it was her first visit to Camp David, *Mrs. Thatcher* said it was marvelous to be here and a privilege as well. She said she and the President had discussed at some length her impressions of Gorbachev. It is clear that basic Soviet policy has not changed, but Gorbachev was both willing and able to openly discuss and debate issues. He did not cry or complain when she discussed the human rights situation within the Soviet Union. She had emphasized to Gorbachev that it would be a futile effort to try to divide Great Britain from the U.S. We have a common heritage and are part of the same Western Alliance system. (C)

The Prime Minister continued that Gorbachev had spent an inordinate amount of time on SDI. He had asked me to tell the President to stop the militarization of outer space. She had replied that Britain supports the U.S. SDI research effort and it was the Soviets who had been the first to develop an antisatellite capability. The West was also trying to keep up with Soviet research into laser weapons. She had told Gorbachev that there must be balance in research and the U.S. SDI research program must go ahead. (C)

Saying he wished to extend Mrs. Thatcher a special Christmas welcome to Camp David, *the President* said he was pleased with Mrs. Thatcher's support for the oft misunderstood SDI program. He

noted that currently envisioned strategic defense weapons are not nuclear systems; many people have the mistaken impression that they are. General Eisenhower had spoken about how every advance in weapons of war is offset by another technological development. We owe it to future generations to see if we cannot develop a strategic defense that would move us away from this horrible threat of destroying the world. As he had told the Prime Minister in the private meeting, the initial research is promising, but we do not have any final answers. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher again underlined that Britain backed the U.S. research program. She said she understood that we will not know for some time if a strategic defense system is truly feasible. If we reached a stage where production looked possible we would have some serious and difficult decisions to make. There are the ABM and outer space treaties. Future technological developments and possible countering strategies must also be considered. She recalled, for example, that with the advent of heat seeking missiles the general view had been that there was no defense against them, but this proved erroneous. Avoidance devices were developed. It was her impression from her talks with Gorbachev that the Soviets were following the same line of reasoning. They clearly fear U.S. technological prowess. However, Gorbachev suggested that the Soviets would either develop their own strategic defense system or add additional offensive systems. (S)

We do not want our objective of increased security, opined *the Prime Minister*, to result in increased Soviet nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have served not only to prevent a nuclear war, but they have also given us forty years of unprecedented peace in Europe. It would be unwise, she continued, to abandon a deterrence system that has prevented both nuclear and conventional war. Moreover, if we ever reach the stage of abolishing all nuclear weapons, this would make conventional, biological, or chemical war more likely. Hitler won the race for the rocket; the U.S. won the race for the nuclear bomb. The technological struggle goes on, she observed. There are all sorts of decoys, jamming systems and technological developments such as making the missile boost phase even shorter. All these advances make crisis management more and more difficult. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher said these comments reflect concerns. We have some real worries, especially about SDI's impact on deterrence. The wretched press has tried to make out that we have major differences. This is simply not true, but we do feel it is unwise to conclude where we will go on SDI before the research program is completed. At the same time we need a sound research program if we are to maintain a balanced relationship with the Soviets. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that the President said earlier that initial indications are that a SDI program is feasible. *Mrs. Thatcher* said she

must admit that personally she had some doubts. In the past, scientific genius has always developed a counter system. Even if an SDI system proved 95 percent successful—a significant success rate—over 60 million people would still die from those weapons that got through. She again emphasized her concern with any implication of dropping our successful nuclear deterrent strategy and stressed that it was important that we work out privately what we will say publicly about SDI. She said several points appear pertinent. We must emphasize that SDI is only a research program; and that our objective is both to maintain a military balance and to enhance, not weaken deterrence. (S)

The President said we need to address the points Mrs. Thatcher had raised and to reach agreement on SDI, a program he called worth pursuing. He noted that experts continue to tell him that research is promising and SDI may be feasible. We have obviously not made a decision on production or deployment and these questions would have to be addressed at the appropriate time. We cannot and should not, however, continued the President, have to go on living under the threat of nuclear destruction. We must eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear weapons. My ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviets are now beginning to echo this same view. He said he told Gromyko that the U.S. is not seeking superiority, but we will not let the Soviets achieve superiority. He recognized that the Soviets have great respect for our technology. They also must be concerned about our economic strength. It will be especially difficult for them to keep spending such vast sums on defense. Such spending is in neither of our interests. (C)

The President continued that he also recognized the great losses the Soviets suffered in World War II—20 million or more—and accepted their obsession with security. But it doesn't make sense, as my predecessor did, to propose unilateral reductions, such as cancelling the B-1 bomber. Common sense tells us that one needs negotiating tools when bargaining with the Soviets, or anyone else for that matter. We in the West have great strength—Europe alone has four times the GNP of the Soviet Union. We must deal with the Soviets from a position of strength. But we also know that in a nuclear war there would be no winners. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher interjected that this is why she had emphasized and praised the deterrence system that has worked so well for so many years. Strength is our best deterrence. (C)

The President agreed and said he is trying to convince the Soviets that we mean them no harm. He often thought that the basic system in Russia has not changed fundamentally, i.e., that their current communist system is another form of the aristocratic system that ruled Russia under the Czar. Gandhi had once said the Soviets believe more in survival than in communism. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that it is correct to emphasize military balance, not superiority. Balance gives us security. Making a specific reference to SDI, she said research contributes towards maintaining a military balance. We need to explain to our publics that SDI is only a research program, that it does not contravene any existing treaties and if we get to the development stage, many alternative factors will have to be considered at that time. For example, the ABM treaty may have to be re-negotiated. (S)

Secretary Shultz stressed our concern is that the current situation is not balanced. The Soviets have many more offensive nuclear systems than foreseen under Salt I. The defensive side is covered under the ABM Treaty, but we have essentially dropped the notion of deploying a defensive system around cities and bases. The Soviets, however, have deployed an ABM system around Moscow—this is permitted under the treaty—and now they are also devoting considerable resources toward the development of other defensive systems. For example, they have a large phased array radar under construction, which we believe is a treaty violation.³ The Soviets have positioned themselves to break out from the conditions imposed the treaties. Their emphasis on defensive systems puts us in an unequal position. Our view is that there is an imbalance; our SDI research is designed to contribute to enhancing deterrence. (S)

Saying she didn't wish to debate strategic theory, *Mrs. Thatcher* noted that some claim SDI would be an incentive for the Soviets to produce more offensive systems and could encourage the Soviets to launch a preemptive first strike. From our point of view, said *Mrs. Thatcher*, deterrence remains our fundamental objective. And like you, we are fearful of the Soviets finding an excuse to walk out of the Geneva talks. (S)

Secretary Shultz interjected that we cannot just sit back and let the Soviets build up a significant advantage in defensive systems. *Mrs. Thatcher* said if she was a Soviet, she would take steps to improve my already significant civil defense program. (S)

At the President's request, *National Security Advisor McFarlane* expanded on the U.S. SDI program. Calling *Mrs. Thatcher's* questions and criticisms thoughtful and well-reasoned, *McFarlane* underscored that her remarks are based on the assumption that offensive deterrence in its present form can and will endure. This may not be true. In recent years the character of Soviet offensive systems have changed dramatically; they are more mobile and carry increased warheads, making verification a near impossible task. The future suggests that the Soviets will rely far more on mobile systems, as well as cruise missiles. (S)

³ See footnote 2, Document 4.

McFarlane continued that our dilemma has been what to do to restore the strategic balance. The President has underway a significant strategic modernization program but this has encountered both moral and political difficulties, as evidenced by the M-X debate in Congress. The preferred course would be to reduce offensive systems. As the President has stated, this is our goal and the President ultimately hopes to eliminate nuclear weapons. *McFarlane* observed that our current dilemma—one over which the President expressed concern several years ago—is our inability to match the Soviet offensive build up. This is why the President asked us to examine other alternatives. Emerging technologies suggest that a new defensive system may be feasible. This is a searching question: can you have an absolute defense against incoming missiles, whether they be nuclear, chemical, or biological? (C)

Mrs. Thatcher wondered if a truly impervious system was possible. She asked, “is there any such thing as a perfect defense?” Could the Soviets simply not just overwhelm any defensive system with increased numbers of offensive systems? (S)

Calling the Prime Minister’s questions good ones, *McFarlane* replied that we are concerned about nuclear deterrence becoming unstable and our goal is to strengthen deterrence. Given technological advances—there have been some remarkable technology developments—it is prudent and responsible for the President to undertake the SDI research effort. (S)

Saying SDI as she understood it seemed to suggest inherent U.S. superiority, *Mrs. Thatcher* added she was not convinced of the need to deploy such a system, particularly if it could eventually be knocked out by other technological advances. (S)

McFarlane commented that we need to better inform the British government on the extensive Soviet strategic defense effort. They have made great strides with their SA-10 and SAX-12 systems; the potential for what is called break-out is high. The President’s SDI program is designed to maintain the strategic balance and thereby enhance deterrence. *Shultz* stated that we may be moving from a situation where we have mutually assured destruction to mutually assured defense. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher again stressed the need to work out the arguments in support of SDI and to develop a better coordinated public affairs line. (C)

McFarlane agreed and noted that there still remain several points where there is a difference of nuance. We believe that there is a strategic imbalance and the President’s SDI program can contribute to strengthening deterrence. Deterrence as we know it today may no longer meet our future needs. We are willing to negotiate and discuss strategic systems with the Soviets, but neither of us can be expected to completely

restructure our nuclear forces. He reemphasized that the President's goal is to enhance deterrence by maintaining a military balance. (C)

Noting we can say in public that we support the SDI research program and the need for military balance to maintain an effective deterrence, *Mrs. Thatcher* said it would be useful if someone could come to London to give her a top-level U.S. technical briefing on the U.S. and Soviet strategic defense programs. The President nodded agreement and said it was time to break for lunch. (S)

[Omitted here are discussion not related to SDI.]

10. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Peacekeeper/MX Rationale

Following your December 22 JCS meeting,² you asked for themes and arguments to support Congressional approval of the MX. This memorandum summarizes our initial thinking; we are working with Oglesby's legislative strategy group to compile a comprehensive source of material for Administration spokesmen.

Status of Program

Current plans call for 100 MX/Peacekeeper missiles, each with ten warheads, to be deployed at F.E. Warren AFB near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Initial operational capability of 10 missiles is scheduled for December 1986. Plans now call for 100 missiles to be operational by 1990, but full deployment may be delayed. To date there have been six flight tests. All were successful and system performance, cost, and schedule goals are being met; its accuracy has exceeded expectations. Construction of necessary support facilities is well underway at the deployment site.

The first Congressional action on MX this year will be two votes in March on Resolutions of Approval to "unfence" funding for

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985, Arms Control, Geneva. Confidential. McKinley initialed the memorandum and wrote: "27 Dec."

²No minutes were found.

procurement of the 21 missiles (\$1.5 b) that were tentatively approved for FY-85. The FY-86 budget request for MX procurement will be for 48 missiles (\$3.2 b).

Military Requirement or Arms Control Bargaining Chip?

In Congressional debates on MX over the past two years, we have stressed that MX is needed for leverage at the negotiating table. After the Soviets walked out of INF and recessed START, some opponents argued that MX was an ineffective tool for keeping the Soviets at the table. Others argued that we should seek to exploit the MX/arms control linkage by delaying production/deployment if the Soviets *did* return to negotiations, and an amendment to the DoD Authorization Bill to that effect was almost adopted by the Congress.

While the relationship between MX and arms control remains a strong argument in support of MX, especially in view of a renewed arms control dialogue, we need to recognize the pitfalls of such a Congressional strategy and give more emphasis to the deterrence contribution made by MX.

Basic Themes

The Scowcroft Report³

— The Scowcroft Commission's findings were valid in 1983 when they were issued and they remain valid today.

— The Commission found that there was no one solution to all ICBM problems. They recommended that ICBM modernization consist of three interrelated elements: deployment of 100 MX ICBMs in existing silos, development of a small single-RV ICBM, and the pursuit of arms control agreements to move toward more stabilizing systems.

— No one part of the program can accomplish our objectives alone. They all point to the same objective—permitting the U.S. and encouraging the Soviets to move toward more stable ICBM deployments over time in a way that is consistent with arms control agreements having the objective of reducing the risk of war.

Specific Military Requirement

— No other system currently deployed or under development can provide in the near term the deterrent and military capabilities against Soviet military targets offered by the MX.

— The serious imbalance in hard target capabilities must be rectified. The U.S. must possess a credible capability for controlled, prompt,

³ Reference is to the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, chaired by Scowcroft, which Reagan established on January 3, 1983, to "review the strategic modernization program with particular focus on our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile system and basing alternatives for that system." For the text of the statement, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 4-5). Documentation pertaining to the President's Commission on Strategic Forces is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981-1988*, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984.

limited attack on Soviet hard targets in order to minimize any Soviet temptation to pre-empt or escalate, whatever the level of confrontation.

— It is in the interest of the NATO alliance as a whole that the U.S. not permit a situation to continue wherein the Soviets have the capability to promptly destroy a range of hardened military targets and the U.S. does not.

Foreign Policy / Arms Control

— Effective deterrence is in no small measure a question of the Soviets' perception of our national will and cohesion. Abandoning the MX now would send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviets.

— Abandoning the MX program now would weaken U.S. negotiating credibility and will add a large measure of success to Soviet efforts to limit U.S. forces without negotiating and without concessions of their own.

— Congressional approval of MX conditioned on Soviet behavior at the negotiating table allows the Soviets to dictate our procurement and deployment decisions.

— We have worked long and hard, together with our Allies, to agree upon and implement a plan to modernize INF systems to counter Soviet deployments. Abandoning our own strategic modernization programs would harm our credibility with the Allies and could be perceived as decoupling.

Arguments Against MX and Counters

There are a variety of arguments that opponents use against MX; most fall within a few general categories:

- A small mobile ICBM and the D-5 hard target SLBM are survivable and can substitute for the hard-target capability offered by MX.

— The D-5 SLBM will not be flight-tested until 1987 and will not reach IOC (one Trident SSBN with 24 launchers) before 1989; it will be deployed at the rate of about one new SSBN per year and backfitted on eight C-4 Trident SSBNs at about one per year. The small mobile ICBM will begin to be deployed by 1992; it will not be fully to be deployed by 1992; it will not be fully deployed before about 1996 or later, depending on the size of the deployed force.

— No other component of the Triad has the combination of promptness, accuracy, destructive capability, and flexibility of the MX, including the small ICBM. Each component of the Triad has unique properties not present in the others. The D-5 SLBM does not offer the necessary promptness that is provided by the ICBM leg of the Triad.

- The MX in Minuteman III silos is vulnerable to a Soviet first strike and is a more lucrative target than the Minuteman III, creating greater incentives for a first strike.

— By increasing our capability to threaten targets of high-value to the Soviets, including hardened military targets, the MX raises the disincentives to the Soviets of launching a "first strike" and thus makes nuclear war less likely.

— The Triad ensures that deterrence is maintained under any conceivable circumstances. The existence of several components of strategic forces requires the Soviets to solve a number of different problems in their efforts to plan how they might try to overcome them. Our objective is to make their planning as difficult as we can in order to increase the amount of risk they would take in conducting such aggression.

- The U.S. is developing a destabilizing first-strike force rather than a stabilizing retaliatory force, and hence spurring the arms race.

— 100 MX would not constitute a first-strike force given the extensive Soviet hard-target base. It does, however, continue and amplify the purpose of our Minuteman III ICBM force: to deter Soviet attack by assuring an unacceptable level of retaliatory damage should the Soviets dare to engage in such aggression.

- The cost of the system is prohibitive and will increase the defense budget.

— Pending release of all FY-85 funding, the MX program will be over half-way completely funded.

— At its funding peak, MX will require less than 1.5% of the U.S. defense budget. (Strategic forces as a whole consume less than 15% of the defense budget.)

11. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation¹

Washington, December 28, 1984

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH EDWARD TELLER CALLING FROM LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA

Edward Teller said he is a little worried. He was afraid that this trip on which the Secretary and I were about to embark,² would result in tying their hands at Livermore. He said that on the general lines of my approach to the problem he thought that he and I were agreed.

He said there were, however, prospective developments to which he gave a real possibility in the near future. (I asked him what he meant by the near future; he said three years.) Information as to these prospective developments he said was not readily available in Washington. The

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, December 1985. No classification marking. Drafted by Nitze. Teller was in Livermore, California.

² See footnote 2, Document 9.

Soviets have started down this line sooner than we have. To bind our hands at this time might be a bad mistake. He is suffering from colitis and is unable to leave Livermore. The ideas involved in these prospective developments came not from him but from a group of ingenious young friends in whom he has confidence. One of them, Lowell Wood, would be available to carry a classified letter to me. I said I had met Lowell Wood a year or so ago and had high confidence in him and would be happy to see him. Teller said the matter was not negligible. Many of our friends, in his opinion, take too conservative a view as to the prospects. He said that in addition to his other abilities, Lowell Wood has the exceptional ability to attract able young men to work with him.

We agreed that Wood would fly to Washington and that I would see him at 11 a.m. on January 2.

12. Letter From the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Teller) to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)

Washington, December 28, 1984

[Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, December 1985, Nitze's Arms Control Files. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pages not declassified.]

13. Editorial Note

On January 1, 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 153, "Instructions for the Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva," which enumerated six specific goals for Secretary of State George Shultz's upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva from January 6 until January 8: (1): "Establish, without concessions or pre-conditions, a sustained, formal negotiating process with the Soviet Union on offensive nuclear arms which would permit us to pursue our goal of achieving deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals"; (2) "Keep START and INF

issues substantively separate, and preferably procedurally separate if possible"; (3) "Shape the nature of future discussions or negotiations in other areas to support U.S. interests by: a. proposing negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums as appropriate; b. avoiding a 'space only' forum; c. specifically protecting the SDI program and, thus, the promise offered by SDI; and d. providing for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses"; (4) "Keep the Soviet Union on the defensive at both the private and public levels with special attention to: a. keeping the onus on Moscow to resume serious negotiations; and b. denying the Soviet Union a sustainable basis for charging that a 'failure' of the Geneva meeting was the responsibility of the U.S."; (5) "Avoid public negotiation with the Soviet Union"; and (6) "Lay the groundwork necessary in the discussions with the Soviet delegation to provide the basis for later garnering public and Congressional support for the U.S. position." NSDD 153 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 348.

Memoranda of conversation for the January 7 and 8 meetings between Shultz and Gromyko are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 355, 357, 360, 362, and 363. The U.S.-Soviet joint statement, which was released on January 8, announced a new round of negotiations, noting that "the sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability." (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, page 30)

14. Memorandum From the General Counsel to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Graham) to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)¹

Washington, January 5, 1985

SUBJECT

Relationship of the Strategic Defense Initiative to the Existing Arms Control Treaty Regime

The following discusses how the SDI program, generally, would be affected by the existing treaty regime. The agreements that are applicable are the 1972 ABM Treaty, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the unratified, but informally observed, 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

ABM Treaty

The principal effect of the Treaty is to prohibit each party from deploying ABM systems or their components, except for one ABM complex—located either at its capital or at an ICBM deployment area—with no more than 100 ABM launchers, no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and a restricted number of ABM radars. These ABM components must be fixed (non-mobile) land-based. It is also legitimate to test such components at agreed ABM test ranges.

Article V of the Treaty bans the development, testing, or deployment of ABM systems or components which are space-based, sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based. Article III bans the deployment of all other ABM systems, except the one site (with current technology) specifically permitted.

The Treaty lists the following as “currently” being components of an ABM system: ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars, i.e., interceptor missiles, launchers and radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. Although “development and testing” of space-based ABM components are banned by the Treaty, its negotiating history indicates that *laboratory* development and testing are not covered by the specific treaty prohibitions against “development.” These prohibitions begin “. . . at that part of the development process where *field testing* is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model.” Moreover, field testing of sub-components or other devices that are not components is also permitted,

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1985. Secret. All brackets are in the original.

for example in a technology demonstration. In other words, if a device is not itself an ABM interceptor, an ABM launcher, or an ABM radar as defined by the Treaty, or if it is not capable of substituting for one of those components, it can be field tested. The separate testing of sub-components that together add up to a component is also permissible. On the other hand, there is a limit on how far we can develop or test sub-components of a space-based system, in that the Treaty does not allow them to be tested "in an ABM mode."

Under the Treaty, only ABM systems, ABM components, or devices capable of substituting for ABM components are regulated. Thus, non-ABM technology that is not capable of substituting for an ABM component is not subject to the Treaty. Devices such as infra-red sensors would not be regulated by the Treaty unless they operate with other devices in a way so that they can be argued to be substitutes for ABM radars.

In addition, in subsidiary "Agreed Statement E," (in conjunction with Article III) the parties agreed that "... in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII [S.C.C.] and agreement in accordance with Article XIV [amendment] of the Treaty." The significance of Agreed Statement E is that in the event that fixed, land-based systems or components based on new physical principles are "created," deployment would be prohibited unless the parties consult and amend the Treaty. This is interpreted to mean that such components may be tested, but not deployed absent consultation and agreement on amendment.

According to the definition provided for in Article II.1, "An ABM system is a system to counter *strategic* ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory . . ." Thus, systems that can *only* counter tactical ballistic missiles or cruise missiles would not be covered. In addition, the parties agreed in Article VI.A. "not to give missiles, launchers or radars other than ABM missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars *capabilities to counter* strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." Thus, it does not matter what a party says a system or component is *for*; it is the capabilities of the system or component that matters.

The following is a discussion of some of our SDI-related programs. The Soviets have already raised the first two of these programs in the SCC, questioning whether they are consistent with the ABM Treaty:

Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE). There were four tests in the now-completed HOE program; only the fourth, on June 10, 1984 was completely successful. It demonstrated the first non-nuclear kill of an

ICBM RV. The HOE missile used the first two stages of a Minuteman I ICBM for boost. The target was tracked by radars at Kaena Point, Hawaii. The precomputed aim point and launch time for HOE were corrected using these data. HOE was steered to the pre-determined point by its inertial guidance system, and then its on-board infra-red sensor acquired the target. No radar guided the interceptor during its flight. The Kaena radar had ceased operation prior to the launch of the HOE.

The HOE was a vehicle tested in an ABM mode in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. The HOE is a fixed, land-based interceptor missile, the testing of which is allowed by the Treaty. The use of two stages of the MMI was legal—this is not giving a non-ABM interceptor missile the capability of countering a strategic ballistic missile since Soviet NTM can distinguish that the HOE is different from an MMI ICBM. The use of the Kaena Point radar does not mean that this radar was tested in an ABM mode since it did not operate in conjunction with an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar. It can also be argued that as the booster used in the HOE test series is not one that would ever be deployed, therefore this was not a test of an ABM component but simply a demonstration of technology.

Queen Match. The program will use an Aries booster to launch an optical sensor system to obtain exoatmospheric data on Soviet ballistic missiles targeted for impact on the Kamchatka Peninsula. This program does not involve an ABM component. The booster is not an ABM interceptor. The sensor cannot substitute for an ABM radar.

Talon Gold. This program is being reconfigured. As previously planned, it would have used the space shuttle to test a low power laser by illuminating specially designed targets in space, on aircraft and on the ground. Talon Gold was an experiment which would not have involved an ABM component or ABM system. No interceptor was contemplated; the laser device to have been used was of such low energy it could not damage a target, nor was it capable of substituting for an ABM radar.

Excalibur. This program, which is only in technology testing at this stage, would use a nuclear explosion in space to power a laser that would counter Soviet missile RVs. If it is based in space, the development and testing of an Excalibur-type weapon would violate Article V of the ABM Treaty. However, if it were land-based, never tested in space, and merely launched by a booster during attack, it is arguably consistent with Article V of the Treaty on the ground that although it is designed to function in space, it is not *based* in space. However, since the laser would substitute for an interceptor missile, such a land-based system could be tested, but not deployed without amendment of the Treaty pursuant to Agreed Statement E. In addition, its nuclear

explosion powering mechanism could never be tested in space without also violating the LTBT.

Kinetic Energy Devices. Space-based devices possibly could be developed that would use kinetic energy to shoot projectiles at missile RVs. Such a system would cause potential compliance problems under the ABM Treaty as it would be a prohibited space-based ABM system.

Other treaties, while not having as wide-ranging an impact on the SDI program as the ABM Treaty, may also be applicable to some aspects of it. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the parties to it from placing in orbit around the earth "any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" and from stationing such weapons in outer space. "Weapons of mass destruction" encompasses both nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons. The provision forbids placing these weapons in *orbit* or stationing them in space. This provision would preclude arming satellites or other orbiting objects with nuclear weapons and as such would prohibit the orbiting of a nuclear explosive powered laser weapon in space.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere and in outer space. The detonation of a nuclear weapon on a test interceptor in space would not be prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty because the missile would never attain orbit, but it would be prohibited by the Limited Test Ban Treaty which bans test nuclear explosions in space. Thus, for example, the Treaty provides a significant legal constraint on the testing of a nuclear-explosion-powered laser weapon in space, even if that weapon never orbits the earth. The Treaty does not, however, prohibit the development of nuclear explosive devices for use in space. The testing of the nuclear-explosive component of a laser weapon could be carried out underground, but only in a manner which will not result in venting that causes detectable fallout to be present beyond the testing party's territorial borders and, of course, consistent with the limit of 150 kilotons in the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

15. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, January 7, 1985

SUBJECT

Scowcroft and Komer on Defense Policy

Following my debate with Brookings' Mike McGuire this morning at the Williamsburg Seminar for New Members of the 99th Congress,² Brent Scowcroft, Bob Komer, and others discussed defense policy. Several comments were of interest.

Brent Scowcroft. Except for the B-1, Reagan's strategic program is almost identical to Carter's. Executive-Congressional relations are poor: Congress is not brought in early by DoD in defense planning, and it reacts by micro-managing. The Scowcroft Commission got "wonderful cooperation" from Congress, but government by commission is a "lousy way" to do business. SDI research is a good thing, but the purpose of Reagan's program is unclear. Is it to: 1) make nuclear weapons obsolete, 2) limit damage, 3) provide thin defense against small attacks, or 4) defend offensive forces? Nuclear-armed SLCMs will put the U.S. at a net disadvantage in five years since our coastline is open and our cities are near it; the opposite holds for the USSR.

Bob Komer. Actual defense spending by Reagan has been less than what Carter had planned. We are spending too much on strategic forces: we don't need a B-1 and a Stealth, nor MX on top of Trident and B-1. Defense investment by Reagan is four times greater for nuclear than for conventional forces. Congressional funding for readiness, sustainability, mobility, and bases is inadequate. Defense management under Reagan has been the "weakest in history;" Weinberger simply adds up the requests of the services. We need a thorough defense reform, including a professional defense procurement agency to replace the "amateurish" efforts of the services. Our NATO allies and the USSR have such agencies; only we don't. For 25 years we have overinvested in airlift at the expense of rapid sealift: a C-5 carries only one Abrams tank, a rapid sealift vessel carries over 150. We've got to stop thinking unilaterally, and think about alliances. In our last two unilateral efforts—Korea and Vietnam—we tied one and lost one.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-145, State Dept. Chron Files. Limited Official Use. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Armacost saw it on January 8.

² No minutes were found.

16. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Talking Points on the Offense/Defense Relationship

— In the late 1960's and early 1970's the United States developed a view on the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms:

— Missile defenses should be limited to the lowest possible level, since deployment of defenses would simply stimulate offsetting expansion of offenses, to the net benefit of no one.

— With defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comparably low limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels.

— This thinking underlay the negotiation of the ABM Treaty in 1972. It made sense then. But a number of subsequent developments have caused us to rethink this question of the relationship between offense and defense:

— First, although missile defenses have been held to a low level, we have been unable to get any meaningful constraints on offensive forces. Not only have there been no reductions, agreements have permitted Soviet offensive weapons to reach exceedingly high levels. The number and power of Soviet ballistic missile warheads has grown by a factor of four since the strategic arms talks began.

— Second, the Soviets have put special emphasis on systems which have the capability for a devastating attack on our missile silos and command and control facilities.

— Third, the Soviet Union has not only taken full advantage of the deployments permitted by the ABM Treaty and exploited technical ambiguities, but has also taken steps that are almost certainly in violation of the Treaty—particularly the construction of a large radar near Krasnoyarsk.

— Finally, in 1972 there was not much of an alternative. The defenses we could envision could be offset, at much lower cost, by expanded offenses. Today, new technologies open up the possibility of defenses that may not be easily and cheaply overcome.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament Records, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Lot 01D127, Papers for DepSec Ken Dam, 1983–1985. No classification marking. Drafted on January 15 by Timbie. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the talking points. In a January 15 handwritten note, McKinley wrote: “15 Jan Talking Points for the Secretary’s use at Lunch today. Timbie drafted, Ken Dam and Paul Nitze cleared. BMCK” A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw McKinley’s note. (Ibid.) No record was found of Shultz’s lunch on January 15.

— Taking into account this new situation, we are developing a new conception of the offense/defense relationship. Last week in Geneva we began the process of exposing the Soviet Union to our ideas.²

— Since we do not now know whether our research program will result in effective defenses and cannot predict when such defenses might be ready for deployment, our concept includes three phases:

(1) *The Immediate Future*

— The initial period will probably continue for perhaps 10 years or more. Its duration will depend on the progress of the SDI research program.

— During this period, while we are investigating SDI technologies, deterrence will continue to rest almost exclusively on offensive nuclear retaliatory capabilities.

— Our near term objective is to restore the situation envisioned in the 1970's: sharply reduced offensive forces, and full compliance with the ABM Treaty.

(2) *The Intermediate Period*

— We look forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly 10 years from now, when we move toward a more defense reliant posture.

— This transition period would begin once we successfully develop a defensive system that is effective, can survive an attack against it, and is cost-effective. Such a defense could enable us to base our security less on threatening other countries and more on defending our own.

— This period could be of indefinite duration, until both the technical and political conditions exist for the total elimination of nuclear arms.

(3) *The Ultimate Period*

— Our ultimate goal is the elimination of nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

— Even after the achievement of complete elimination of existing nuclear arms, the technical knowledge of how to make such weapons would continue, and the danger of cheating or irresponsible elements would need to be dealt with.

— For this reason, we stress the importance of development of non-nuclear forces, including non-nuclear defenses. The primary emphasis of the SDI is on non-nuclear systems.

— This approach is feasible only if we are successful in creating defenses that are survivable and cost effective (that is, cannot be offset by lower cost offensive countermeasures). Otherwise they would contribute in instability rather than stability. This is the objective of the SDI.

² See footnote 2, Document 9.

— While our approach requires a long look into the future, we have offered to begin now to discuss with the Soviets the implications of new defensive technologies.

— We believe both sides have an interest in an answer to the question of whether defensive technologies could make feasible a move away from basing security almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation.

— Indeed, the Soviet Union has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world's only operational ABM system. They also have a strategic defense research program which is exploring many of the same technologies as the SDI.

— If particular technologies prove feasible, we intend to discuss with our Allies and with the Soviets how they could be incorporated into a more stable balance before we take steps to deploy them.

— The transition to a more stable and reliable strategic relationship based upon greater reliance on defenses should be a cooperative effort between the United States and the Soviet Union.

17. Letter From Senators Steven Symms and John East to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 18, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

A crucial decision point nears for you over whether or not the United States should continue to comply precisely with the unratified SALT II Treaty, which you have already certified to Congress the Soviets are violating in multiple ways.² We believe that an historical evaluation of the purported national security “benefits” of the unratified SALT II

¹Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 20051–40100. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to McFarlane, Shultz, Weinberger, Vessey, Meese, Casey, Leonard Perroots, Adelman, Kirkpatrick, Graham, Armstrong, Campbell, Thurmond, Baker, Byrd, the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Judiciary, Intelligence, and Energy Committees, the Chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, the Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, the Members of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, and the Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Foreign Relations.

²The President's January 23, 1984, message and accompanying fact sheet are printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 72–76.

Treaty is needed. We have carefully conducted such an evaluation, and we wish to share it with the Executive Branch. In sum, we have found that there is now historical evidence that the Senate Armed Services Committee was correct in December, 1979 when it concluded by overwhelming majority vote that the proposed SALT II Treaty “was not in the national security interest of the United States.”

I. OVERALL SUMMARY

In fact, Mr. President, our analysis confirms that the Soviet Union has built up its strategic forces during the period of the 1979 SALT II Treaty through the end of 1985 to a level *much higher* than the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted in 1978 that the Soviets would have by the end of 1985, *even if no SALT II Treaty had been agreed upon*. In contrast, the U.S. will have strategic forces by the end of 1985 *even lower* than the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted in 1978 that we would have by the end of 1985, *even within* SALT II constraints.

II. SOURCES AND ANALYTICAL ASSUMPTIONS

These significant conclusions about the negative impact on American national security resulting from U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty are two of the seven conclusions we have derived from our analysis of authoritative, official, classified documents. Our conclusions confirm your own statement on August 18, 1980: “I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II Treaty, which in effect legitimizes the continuation of a one-sided arms build-up.”³

We have long had in our possession a document written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 4, 1978 entitled *Illustrative U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces Through 1985 (With and Without a SALT II Agreement)*,⁴ classified Top Secret Sensitive. This is an important historical document, because it was used in 1978 and 1979 in the U.S. decision-making and negotiating on SALT II. We can now in 1985 evaluate retrospectively how accurate U.S. intelligence and planning assumptions were in 1978, and make an overall assessment of the actual national security effects of SALT II from an historical perspective. This JCS document is Attachment A. We also have various classified DIA estimates of Soviet strategic force structures, and classified Defense Department tabulations of U.S. strategic force programs. Our chart and footnotes

³ Portions of the speech are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 8.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a paper prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “*Illustrative U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces Through 1985 (With and Without a Salt Two Agreement)*,” January 4, 1978.

based upon our classified DIA and DOD documentary sources are Attachment B.⁵

We recognize that our estimate of Soviet forces at the end of 1985 differs somewhat from agreed Executive Branch National Intelligence Estimates. This is largely because we believe we have tried to take account of certain of the military effects of some of the Soviet SALT II violations. Regrettably, we have still not received the Executive Branch's assessment of the military implications of Soviet SALT II violations which we requested last March 1, 1984. Accordingly, we have done our own assessment, which we believe to be reasonable and soundly based on classified documents.

Several assumptions underlying our charts should be specified at the outset. First and most significantly, we are counting 382 Backfire bombers and their weapons in the Soviet force totals for the end of 1985. We believe this is completely reasonable because you yourself stated in the nationally televised debate on October 30, 1980.⁶

SALT II is illegal, because the law of the land, passed by Congress, says we cannot accept a treaty in which we are not equal, and we're not equal in this treaty for one reason alone: our B-52 bombers are considered to be strategic weapons; *their Backfire bombers are not*.

This is a strong indication that the Reagan Administration should count the Soviet Backfire bomber in its SALT II estimates, as well as in START and umbrella talks proposals. Moreover, the 1981 edition of the official DOD *Soviet Military Power*⁷ states on page 63 that the range of the Backfire bomber is in excess of 8,900 kilometers, and on page 62 it states that the range of the Bison bomber is only 8,000 kilometers. The Bison counts as an intercontinental bomber in SALT II, and the *longer range* Backfire should therefore also count. Further, the Soviets tried to deceive the U.S. on whether the Backfire was an intercontinental bomber, despite its range and refueling capabilities, another reason for counting it.

Second, we are counting in Soviet forces at the end of 1985 at least 40 SS-16 mobile ICBM launchers, because on January 23, 1984⁸ you informed Congress that the mobile SS-16 ICBM is "probably deployed" operationally.

⁵ Attached but not printed is an undated chart: "Comparative U.S.-Soviet Strategic Force Structure."

⁶ The debate was on October 28, 1980; the transcript is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book III, pp. 2476-2502.

⁷ Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981).

⁸ See footnote 2, above.

Third, as *required* by Article VI 1. of the SALT II Treaty itself, we are counting at the end of 1985 those Soviet weapons “in the *final stage of construction*” and “undergoing overhaul, repair, *modernization*, or *conversion*.” There are indications of silo and mobile deployment of the SS–25, and SS–11 silo conversion for the SS–24. Thus about 100 more SS–25 mobile ICBMs and 50 SS–24 silo-based ICBMs are estimated for the end of 1985 in the final phase of construction, modernization, or conversion.

Finally, we have used the maximum demonstrated warhead capacities for MIRVed Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, because we believe that this is the only rational way to measure the real Soviet threat. It should be noted, however, that we are not counting large numbers of refire and stockpiled missiles, so our estimates do in fact significantly *understate* the full Soviet threat.

Comparing the JCS document and the DIA/DOD chart attached, we have reached the following summary conclusions expressed in tabular and in percentage statement format:

III. SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF SALT II ON U.S.
AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES AS PREDICTED
BY JCS IN 1978

1978	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces	<u>SNDVs</u> ⁹	<u>Warheads</u>
Maximum Estimated in 1978 for 1985, with SALT II	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces	[column not declassified]	[column not declassified]
Maximum Estimated in 1978 for 1985, no SALT II	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces		
End of 1985 estimated	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces		

Summary Statements

1. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet SNDVs would decrease 12% with SALT II, and increase 17% without SALT II. In actuality, they probably *increased by about 25%*.

2. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet warheads would increase by 95% with SALT II, and increase by 153% without SALT II. In actuality, they probably *increased by about 206%*. This is our most important conclusion.

⁹Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. [Footnote is in the original.]

3. In 1978, the JCS estimated that U.S. SNDVs would increase by 2% with SALT II, and increase by 18% without SALT II. In actuality, they *decreased by 9%*.

4. In 1978, the JCS estimated that U.S. warheads would increase by 51% with SALT II, and increase by 95% without SALT II. In actuality, they remained almost *constant*, rising only 2%.

Our summary conclusions are consistent with what Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in the *Washington Times* on December 20, 1984:

Improvements and additions to the Soviet missile force continue at a frightening pace, even though we have added SALT II restraints on top of SALT I agreements. The Soviet Union has built *more* of the big nuclear warheads capable of destroying U.S. missiles in their concrete silos than we had initially predicted they would build, even without any SALT agreement. We now confront precisely the situation that the SALT process was intended to prevent.

IV. DETAILED CONCLUSIONS

We would now present seven more detailed conclusions derived from a careful comparison of the 1978 JCS document and our own DIA/DOD chart. First, we estimate that by the end of 1985, when the unratified SALT II Treaty is due to expire, the Soviets will have about [*number not declassified*] Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, carrying about [*number not declassified*] warheads. But the 1978 JCS document reveals that the JCS estimated then that the *highest force levels* that the Soviets could achieve by the end of 1985, in the absence of the SALT II Treaty, was only [*number not declassified*] strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, carrying only [*number not declassified*] warheads.

The JCS were evidently relying upon CIA estimates of Soviet forces in 1985 unconstrained by SALT II. These CIA estimates, as throughout the 1960s and 1970s, turned out to significantly understate the force levels the Soviets probably will have achieved by late 1985. Comparing the JCS document to our estimate table, we find that the Soviets will probably be about 207 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 2,278 warheads *above* the *highest* levels that the JCS in 1978 estimated for the Soviets at the end of 1985 *without* a SALT II Treaty.¹⁰ We believe a new Team B critique of CIA estimates is needed because the 1976 competitive estimates evidently did not improve the accuracy of CIA estimates.

This is the clearest evidence yet that the Soviets did not allow their strategic programs to be affected in any way by SALT II, and that since 1979 they have been "Breaking Out" of SALT II. We recall [*1½ lines not declassified*] that the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972 similarly

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 136–174.

did not affect the Soviet ICBM and SLBM production and deployment plans throughout the 1970s. But some of this evidence was long suppressed within the Intelligence Community, and the analysis is not widely known. We call your attention to the June 1978 CIA intelligence study entitled *The Soviet Strategic Planning Process and SALT*, [less than 1 line not declassified]. This document has been made available to us, and we urge you to become familiar with it as well. It also indicates that the late Soviet President Brezhnev himself negotiated deceptively in order to protect Soviet programs from constraint, while at the same time misleading the U.S. into believing that SALT I would constrain Soviet programs. The JCS and Congress were not aware of this evidence in 1972, consequently the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement were ratified under false pretenses.

Second, we estimate on the basis of secret Defense program data that by late 1985, the U.S. aggregate of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles will be only about [number not declassified] carrying only about [less than 1 line not declassified]. But the JCS estimated in 1978 that if the U.S. complied with SALT II, the *lowest* our strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregate would go was [number not declassified] by 1985.

We are thus now about [number not declassified] strategic nuclear delivery vehicles *below* the *lowest* U.S. force level estimated for 1985 to be in compliance with SALT II. Moreover, this strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregate will carry only about [less than 1 line not declassified] by the end of 1985, which is only [less than 1 line not declassified] above our January 1978 level, and [less than 1 line not declassified] *below* the *lowest* U.S. warhead aggregate projected for the U.S. for the end of 1985 *in compliance with SALT II*.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

By complying unilaterally with an unratified SALT II Treaty which you have certified the Soviets have violated in four ways, the U.S. therefore *forfeited* potential deployment over the six years of SALT II of about [number not declassified] SNDVs carrying about [less than 1 line not declassified]. This is a measure of the security costs of our unilateral compliance and *de facto* unilateral disarmament and appeasement. These [number not declassified] SNDVs carrying [less than 1 line not declassified] could have bolstered deterrence and mitigated the Soviet build-up.

Fourth, it is interesting to compare these U.S. forfeitures through SALT II compliance with the force levels the Soviets will probably achieve by the end of 1985 by SALT II breakout. Considering the *highest* SNDV/warhead aggregate that the JCS projected in 1978 for the Soviets by the end of 1985 within SALT II constraints, the Soviets have *added* about [number not declassified] SNDVs and [number not declassified] warheads *above* those levels. Thus the Soviets are *much higher* than estimated even if they were adhering to SALT II. Moreover, the Soviet increment

above SALT II ceilings is comparable to the increment the U.S. forfeited by agreeing to comply unilaterally with the unratified SALT II Treaty.

Fifth, considering SNDV/Warhead levels estimated for the Soviets by the JCS as of January, 1978, the Soviets will have *added* [*number not declassified*] SNDVs carrying [*number not declassified*] warheads during the 1979–1985 period of SALT II. This is a *very* significant increase in the threat to America. As you stated in your January 9, 1985 press conference, “SALT II is nothing but a limitation on how fast you increase weapons.”¹¹

Sixth, the Carter era General Davy Jones JCS document reveals that the Carter JCS planned to retain all U.S. Titan II ICBMs and B–52D bombers in the U.S. SNDV aggregate through 1985 under SALT II. But in addition to the above forfeiture, the JCS under the Reagan Administration will have *unilaterally* scrapped almost all of these systems by end of 1985, and *in addition* all [*less than 1 line not declassified*], for a total of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the U.S. unilaterally deactivated during U.S. unilateral SALT II compliance. Moreover, the Carter JCS planned [*number not declassified*] MX ICBMs, and you plan only [*number not declassified*]. And the Carter JCS projected deployment of [*number not declassified*] SS–16s. This may turn out to be indeed accurate.

Seventh, the January 4, 1978 JCS document reveals several more important CIA underestimates. For example, the CIA estimated that by 1985, each Soviet SS–18 would carry only 10 warheads if SALT II were in force, yet DIA now estimates that each SS–18 carries 14 warheads. This is another example of important CIA underestimates of Soviet force capabilities illustrated in the JCS document, such as in the low number of warheads estimated for new Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs.

V. RESTATEMENT

In sum, the Soviet strategic build-up from 1978 through 1985 occurred ostensibly *within* SALT II, but was in fact, much greater than that projected for the Soviets *without* SALT II. Our conclusion confirms Defense Secretary Weinberger’s statement in the FY1985 Defense Posture Statement: “The SALT II Agreement would have codified that unilateral Soviet buildup and allowed additional growth in Soviet forces, thereby permitting even further deterioration of the military balance.”

As a Soviet foreign policy expert wrote in 1979:

... signing of the (SALT I) Interim Agreement (was a) *victory* of the Soviet Union in the arms race. . . (the) 1972 Moscow agreements, like

¹¹ Reference is to the President’s January 9 news conference. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 23–30.

the Vladivostok agreement, noted the *defeat* of the American strategic arms race policy.

Because the Vladivostok agreement was the basis for the SALT II Treaty and was incorporated into SALT II, the Soviets believe that both SALT I and SALT II were *victories* for the USSR and *defeats* for the U.S.

Finally, although we recognize and fully support the need to protect intelligence sources and methods and defense information about our own forces, we also believe that it is imperative for the American people to have a general understanding of the massive increase in Soviet nuclear arms which has occurred during the period of alleged Soviet adherence to SALT II, and that they know also the enormous advantages which the U.S. has denied itself through a policy of vacillation based on strict compliance with an unratified treaty our opponents are known to be violating at will. Continued silence on these matters is intolerable. The adverse balance entails both political and military risks. As relative Soviet power continues to increase, the Soviets expect the U.S. and its allies to move increasingly toward appeasement.

VI. REQUESTS

In conclusion, we have several questions and requests. First, we ask whether you and your departments and agencies are concerned about our analysis and conclusions. We request their comments. Second, we request that our analysis, data, and conclusions be incorporated into the March 1985 forthcoming unclassified fourth edition of the Defense Department's *Soviet Military Power* volume in order to more realistically portray the Soviet threat. We intend to sanitize and declassify this letter and elements of the accompanying documentation ourselves, for public release soon, before the Senate's MX debate. Third, we request that you consider our analysis, conclusions, and amendments in your forthcoming decision about whether to continue U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty. Fourth, we request that your Administration prepare witnesses to send to hearings on the Constitutional aspects of the treaty-making powers as applied to arms control. We are considering holding such hearings. We also intend to seek another Senate test vote on the merits of U.S. compliance with SALT II. (See attached amendments.)¹²

We seek to support your defense budget request and your strategic modernization program, including MX, but in the context of U.S. disavowal of unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty which you have confirmed the Soviets are violating in multiple ways. We are extremely concerned that the Soviets have built up their strategic

¹² Attached but not printed are the proposed amendments.

forces during the period of SALT II through late 1985 to a much higher level than we thought they would even without SALT II.

With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely,

Steve Symms
United States Senator

John P. East
United States Senator

**18. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President
and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to
Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, January 22, 1985

SUBJECT

Getting the MX through Congress

In connection with last Friday's discussion with Senators Stevens and Nunn,² I talked with T.K. Jones, who deals with strategic and theater nuclear forces in the Pentagon (DDR&E), about the status of planning for MX basing. I asked him whom in the Pentagon I should talk with in order to coordinate our testimony with that of the Pentagon on the subject. T.K. Jones said that no one short of Secretary Weinberger could deal with the matter since Mr. Weinberger had not yet decided the issue.

The Air Force does not want to spend the money and is against including hardening in the program. Jones tells me that the Air Force estimates 100 to 140 million dollars per super-hardened silo. He says that he and Wade think that number is too high, perhaps by a factor of two. He thinks the Air Force is inflating the figure because it does not wish to spend the money on hardening.

Chu, who handles Program Analyses and Evaluation in the Pentagon, wants to delay deciding the issue in the hopes that the

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

² January 18. No minutes were found.

Congress will take the initiative in asking the Pentagon to include hardening in the program. Russ Roark, who handles legislative affairs in the Pentagon, is strongly in favor of including hardening. T.K. Jones is also strongly in favor. Ikle is vacillating between including hardening in the program now or delaying it for four years until there is a possibility of deploying hard-site defense with it. Jim Wade, Acting Head of DDR&E, is uncertain as to which way the decision should go.

I have discussed the above with General Chain. If you have any guidance to give us, we would appreciate it.

19. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 28, 1985

SUBJECT

Update of NSDD-91, Strategic Forces Modernization

Enclosed at Tab A² is a draft update to NSDD-91.³ The draft has been circulated among the professional staff of the defense group, but not outside the NSC. The Annex at Tab C⁴ contains *Special Access* guidance on our Low Observable Programs. Our modernization plans have changed significantly in the almost two years since NSDD-91 was signed (Tab B).⁵ This new NSDD brings the President's direction up to date with the many events in the strategic arena which have occurred during the past two years in all five parts of the President's modernization program.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-090, NSDD 178. Secret. Sent for action. Douglass submitted the memorandum and attachments along with a January 29 note to Poindexter: "I have sent this package to you because of the *Special Access* Annex at Tab C. If you wish to circulate this package other than to Bud, remove the Annex at Tab C." (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed is an undated draft National Security Decision Directive, "Strategic Forces Modernization."

³ NSDD-91, "Strategic Forces Modernization Program Changes," is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated draft NSDD annex.

⁵ Attached but not printed is a copy of NSDD-91.

Publication of a new Strategic Modernization Program NSDD in the near future would serve several useful purposes. It would demonstrate the President's continuing support for modernization, lay a programmatic foundation for Geneva, and continue to emphasize to DOD and the Services that those programs must be protected in the continuing debate with Congress on resources.

If you concur, I will privately brief the appropriate people in DOD and the Services on its contents prior to our sending it over for formal coordination.

R. Lehman, B. Linhard, B. Wright, B. Wood, J. Grimes, S. Kraemer, M. Donley and D. Mahley concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That we let key officials at DOD read the draft NSDD *unofficially* on a very close-hold basis, then prepare a final draft for your review and official coordination with DOD.⁶

⁶ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

20. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 6, 1985

SUBJECT

SDI: Building Allied Understanding

We have known all along that SDI would stimulate European apprehensions and that Moscow would do its best to aggravate them. With arms control negotiations only five weeks away, I believe we *now* need to bolster our strategy for building allied understanding and consensus on SDI.

In one sense, SDI should be more peripheral to European interests than INF, since SDI is a non-nuclear research project destined for space

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/06/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Philip Kaplan (S/P) on February 4. Copies were sent to Kampelman, Nitze, Rowny, Burt, and Chain. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Platt initialed the memorandum, as did McKinley, who wrote "12 Feb" in the top right-hand margin.

while INF involved nuclear missiles set for imminent deployment on European soil. Moreover, the Soviet threat to abandon arms control over SDI appears somewhat less credible given their humble-pie return to Geneva following INF deployments.

This view is too sanguine, however:

— Allied *angst* about SDI is just below the surface and is shared by London, Paris, and others, as well as perennially-nervous Bonn.

— There is genuine fear of the unknown among the Europeans, who are shaken by high unemployment and inflation, low self-confidence and bad nerves about long-term U.S. protection.

— Soviet propaganda on SDI is relentless, and Moscow is already mobilizing the World Peace Council and others to spread the word in Europe; nor should we underestimate the impact on many Europeans of renewed Soviet threats to bust up the Geneva talks.

For all these reasons we made a remarkable effort to get our rationale across, with Thatcher at Camp David,² and post-Geneva through our extraordinary orchestration of high-level consultations with key allied and friendly countries. These exchanges were valuable and had a high pay-off. Reactions back from the Kohl-Mitterrand-Thatcher level now reveal greater understanding for our goals and approach to strategic defense.

But we still have our work cut out for us. Current discussions with several European officials indicate an acute concern on their part that there are major unanswered questions, with important risks for Europe's security:

— All our allies are disturbed by the continuing U.S. emphasis on the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The implications for British and French nuclear forces are obvious. Defense Minister Michael Heseltine, who championed INF deployments in Britain, expressed particular concern about this aspect of our declaratory policy. London and Paris want us to stress the continuing vital role of offensive nuclear weapons in ensuring deterrence, pending any results of SDI research, to avoid degrading of their own deterrent forces.

— FRG Arms Control Commissioner Ruth questioned me and others in the Department closely last week about our aim of eliminating nuclear weapons. FRG leaders worry that undue "Carteresque" talk about a nuclear-free world will resuscitate pressures for immediate de-nuclearization in Germany. Despite their commitment to arms control, Germans also know that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is the ultimate guarantee of their security. They need, and want, both that guarantee and a politically credible arms control process. They (and other Europeans) fear that a "fortress America" of the 1990's, shifting further toward a Pacific orientation, could decouple its own security from that of the nuclear defense of an increasingly weak and vacillating Europe. The

² See Document 9.

FRG, therefore, will be guided on these issues by the political slogan of a recent German election: "keine Experimenten" (no experiments).

— All our European allies will be inclined to play Geneva for their own political purposes. Unlike INF, there will be a fairly common European approach; Mitterrand and Thatcher will not be pressing Bonn for greater firmness. While most leaders understand our wish to continue SDI research, most are also skeptical about SDI's effectiveness in the face of a further buildup of Soviet offensive forces that could barrage our defenses.

— The Europeans also will be afraid that our protection of SDI at Geneva will lead to disruption or failure of the negotiations.

— Japan's Nakasone so far has been our strongest allied supporter on SDI. This is logical since the issue is not as hot in Tokyo as in Europe and SDI might make a big difference in securing Japan's relatively small territory against nuclear threat. Moreover, unlike Britain and France (and China), non-nuclear Japan need not fear degrading of any national nuclear assets. (This also explains Kohl's relaxed view.) Yet even Nakasone has publicly distinguished between his support for SDI research and his open position on the future of defensive weapon systems.

What To Do

I have my own doubts whether the European peace movement is really able to exploit our rhetoric about eliminating all nuclear weapons. To exploit it they would have to concede the genuineness of the President's intention—which I doubt they would do. Probably the nervousness of allied governments reflects their perennial condition of fragile nerves and fear of the unknown, as I have suggested. At the same time, the nervousness is real, and we need to bolster our friends.

The allies will first need to recognize that there are certain things we cannot do to assuage their concerns:

— We cannot depreciate the prospects for SDI in our declaratory policy;

— we cannot depict SDI as a bargaining chip, to be given away;

— nor can we entertain allied proposals for testing and deployment bans, even on a limited time basis.

However our ultimate national policy on strategic defense evolves, in light of the research effort and Soviet strategic programs, accommodating the allies on these points would dangerously undermine support for SDI funding. A strong Administration position on SDI is essential to gain adequate funding from Congress. The Soviets fully understand that their best shot at aborting SDI lies on Capitol Hill, where SDI funding will be a tough fight, rather than in Geneva. That is why they are pressing so hard on all fronts to build international pressure for limits on SDI testing and deployment.

At the same time, it should be possible to devise a political and public affairs strategy for building allied understanding and generating

at least a reasonable measure of consensus. Our embassies in London and Paris have appealed for an updated policy line to this end (see Tab 1).³ On one level this means a circular cable with talking points that take account of specific allied concerns. More importantly, as our embassies and Washington-based European diplomats point out, it means getting our senior people here to keep in mind the need to:

- tone down the emphasis on elimination of all nuclear weapons, while indicating our hopes for a less dangerous world in which we increasingly secure deterrence through defense, with a reduced role for nuclear forces;

- stress that continued reliance on offensive nuclear weapons is absolutely essential pending the results of SDI research;

- note, where appropriate, the continued contribution to NATO security of allied nuclear forces; and

- emphasize the importance of Carrington's efforts to strengthen NATO's conventional defense.

I realize that we already have a general public affairs approach for handling the SDI issue. We will work with EUR and PM to develop further talking points for the field that reflect these specific allied concerns. You might also want to raise this matter with Bud McFarlane and Cap Weinberger.⁴

³ Attached but not printed are telegram 2273 from London, January 30; telegram 4615 from Paris, February 2 (incorrectly dated 1984); and telegram 2383 from London, January 31.

⁴ Shultz wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "OK—and I think the time is right for a speech on this subject & other arms control, possibly before Geneva." McKinley drew a downward-facing arrow from "speech" in a typed transcription of Shultz's handwritten note and wrote: "(Austin—March 28)." For more information on this speech, see Document 27.

21. National Security Decision Directive 161¹

Washington, February 6, 1985

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (C)

On January 14, 1984, upon completion of the U.S. Government's review of seven issues of possible Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, I issued NSDD-121² which stated:

"The expanding pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements raises serious questions for U.S. national security, our Alliances, arms control, and U.S.-Soviet relations. In order to assure that these Soviet activities and their implications receive the highest level of consideration within the U.S. Government, the interagency Verification Committee was established and tasked, working with the interagency Senior Arms Control Policy Group, to provide assessments and recommendations for U.S. policy. In addition, we sought to ensure full responsiveness to concerns expressed by many members of Congress and to the request of the Congress for a comprehensive report on Soviet noncompliance activity and its implications. (S)"

During the past year, further analysis by the interagency Arms Control Verification Committee has demonstrated continued Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and new instances of questionable Soviet compliance behavior. With the forthcoming resumption of the Geneva negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on a wide spectrum of arms control issues, Soviet compliance with existing accords becomes even more critically relevant, for there can be no real arms control without compliance. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-088, NSDD 161. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon; Wnintel. McFarlane wrote in the top right-hand corner of the directive, "Mr. President, This reflects your decisions on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. You may wish to read it *over the weekend*. Bud." Reagan wrote his initials beside McFarlane's note. McFarlane distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Stockman, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Adelman, Nitze, Rowny, Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman under a covering memorandum of February 6: "The attached National Security Decision Directive reflects the President's judgments and follow-on tasking concerning issues reviewed by the Administration and which are the subject of a classified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements being submitted to the U.S. Congress in response to Congressional requests. A number of the judgments provided herewith have also been incorporated into the unclassified version of the report to the Congress on February 1, 1985." (Ibid.)

² NSDD-121, "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements," is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984.

Accordingly, in response to further Congressional requests, as set forth in the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act, and to continue to encourage understanding and support for U.S. compliance policy, I have reviewed the seven issues previously analyzed for the January 1984 report to the Congress and twelve newly analyzed issues. Judgments on nineteen issues of possible Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow. A twentieth issue, on the subject of denial of data required for monitoring agreements, should be completed on an urgent basis. (C)

JUDGMENTS

BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION AND 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL

1. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

The U.S. Government judges that continued expansion during 1984 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (S)

Although there have been no confirmed chemical and toxin attacks in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1984 according to our strict standards of evidence, there is no basis for amending the January 1984 conclusion that the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (C)

LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

2. Underground Nuclear Test Venting

The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action. (C)

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

3. *Nuclear Testing and the 150-Kiloton Limit*

The U.S. Government judges that, while ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1984, evidence available through the year confirms the January 1984 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continue despite U.S. requests for corrective measures. (U)

HELSINKI FINAL ACT

4. *Helsinki Final Act—Notification of Military Exercises*

The U.S. Government previously judged that the Soviet Union violated its political commitment to observe the prior-notification provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, which requires notification and other information concerning exercises exceeding 25,000 ground troops. A major Warsaw Pact maneuver (Zapad-81), exceeding the 25,000 troop limit, was conducted in 1981 at a time great pressure was being put on Poland, and the Soviet Union did not provide the pre-notification or other information required. The judgment in 1984 that the Soviet Union did not observe the prior-notification provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is confirmed. (U)

While the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact states have generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act that minimizes the information they provide, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was much improved in 1983. During 1984, the U.S.S.R. returned to a minimalist stance, providing only the bare minimum required under the Final Act. (U)

SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT

5. *Mobile Missile Base Construction at Dismantled SS-7 ICBM Sites*

The U.S. Government judges that Soviet activity at two former SS-7 ICBM sites does not at present violate the agreed implementing procedures of the SALT I Interim Agreement. However, ongoing construction activities raise concerns about compliance for the future, since use of “remaining facilities”—such as missile-ready buildings—to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 ICBM sites would be in violation of Soviet commitments. The U.S. will continue to monitor developments closely and will reexamine this issue whenever an ICBM, e.g., the SS-X-25, or its associated equipment is introduced into these two sites. (S/NF/WN)

6. Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines

The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's conversion of a dismantled SSBN into a submarine longer than the original and carrying modern, long-range cruise missiles is not a violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement, but it constitutes a threat to U.S. and Allied security similar to the original Yankee-Class submarine. (U)

*SALT II**7. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry*

The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the January 1984 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. requests for corrective action, continue to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment. (U)

*8. The SS-X-25 ICBM**a. Second New Type*

The U.S. Government judges, based on convincing evidence gathered from two years of Soviet testing of the SS-X-25, that the SS-X-25 is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and that its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty. (S)

b. RV-to-Throwweight Ratio

The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS-X-25 RV-to-throwweight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited "new type" of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throwweight of the ICBM. (U)

c. Encryption

The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-X-25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the U.S.S.R.'s political commitment. (U)

Despite U.S. requests for explanations and corrective actions with regard to SS-X-25 ICBM-related activities, Soviet actions continued unchanged. (S)

d. *SS-16 Descendancy*

Analysis of the issue whether the SS-X-25 is a prohibited missile of the SS-16 type has not been completed and, therefore, has not been decided. (S/NF/WN)

9. *SS-16 Deployment*

The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the January 1984 report. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, the available evidence indicates that the mobile missile activities at Plesetsk, in the four areas historically associated with the SS-16, are a probable violation of the U.S.S.R.'s legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 when the Treaty was pending ratification, and a probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to 1982. (S)

10. *Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limits*

The U.S. Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs—at the level of 2504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. Available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2504 cap in violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with this political commitment. (S/NF/WN)

11. *BACKFIRE Production*

The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 BACKFIRE bomber aircraft per year. While there are ambiguities concerning the data, there is evidence that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate has been constant at slightly more than 30 per year. (S/NF/WN)

12. *BACKFIRE Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability*

a. *Arctic Staging*

The U.S. Government judges that the temporary deployment of BACKFIRES of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) to Arctic bases in 1983 and 1984, bases used by Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) BACKFIRES since 1975, is cause for concern and continued careful monitoring. With regard to the temporary deployment of SAF BACKFIRES, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment in

the June 1979 BACKFIRE statement³ not to increase the radius of action of this aircraft to enable it to strike the U.S. territory, based on the U.S. estimate of that radius of action. (S)

b. *Engine Upgrade*

Based on the uncertain evidence available, the U.S. Government judges the U.S.S.R.'s action with respect to possible upgrades of BACKFIRE engines (which would contribute to BACKFIRE's inter-continental capability) as ambiguous in terms of the Soviet Union's political commitment in the June 1979 BACKFIRE statement not to increase BACKFIRE's radius of action to enable it to strike the U.S. (S/NF/WN)

c. *Aerial Refueling*

Based on available evidence, the U.S. Government judges the installation of refueling probes which appear to have been installed on at least some BACKFIRE C aircraft introduced into the Soviet bomber fleet after Brezhnev's 1979 statement to be a probable violation of Soviet legal obligations during the period SALT II was pending ratification (to 1981) and a probable violation of its political commitment to SALT II since 1982. (S/NF/WN)

d. *Cruise Missile*

The U.S. Government judges that, on the basis of the uncertain evidence available, the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the association of cruise missiles with BACKFIRE are ambiguous as concerns its political commitment under SALT II not to give BACKFIRE an increased radius of action that would enable it to strike the U.S. (S/NF/WN)

13. *Throwweight of an SLBM*

This finding is presented separately in an Annex.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

14. *The Krasnoyarsk Radar*

The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of evidence that continued to be available through 1984, that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction, and the absence of credible alternative Soviet

³ Reference is to Brezhnev's June 16, 1979, written statement to Carter asserting that the Soviet Tu-22M "Backfire" airplane was a medium-range bomber, and that the Soviet Union would not increase its range to strike targets in the continental United States. ("Vienna Summit Meeting: United States-Soviet Union Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Related Documents," June 18, 1979, *Public Papers: Carter*, 1979, Book I, pp. 1051–1079)

explanations, have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. (S)

15. *Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers*

The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S/NF/WN)

16. *Mobility of a New ABM System*

The U.S. Government judges that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.'s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S/NF/WN)

17. *ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems*

The U.S. Government judges that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, these and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S/NF/WN)

18. *Concurrent Testing of ABM and SAM Components*

The U.S. Government judges that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. This and other such Soviet ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate U.S. concerns, indicate the U.S.S.R. probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. (S/NF/WN)

19. *Territorial Defense*

The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent

testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload, and ABM mobility) suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S/NF/WN)

POLICY RESPONSES

U.S. policy responses to activities of the Soviet Union in violation of its arms control obligations and commitments will include the following:

— Reports to Congress

- In response to Congressional requests, an unclassified report incorporating the above findings was forwarded to the Congress on February 1, 1985⁴ and made available to the public. In view of its unclassified nature, this report did not contain issues that have not previously been raised with the Soviet Union. (S)

- A classified report, also requested by the Congress, will be forwarded to the Congress on February 7, 1985, with more detailed annexes to follow by February 20.⁵ This report, consisting of an Executive Summary and detailed classified annexes, will cover all issues analyzed by the Verification Committee, except that issues of special intelligence sensitivity may be briefed to Congress under special existing intelligence arrangements. (S)

- The classified report will form the basis for briefings and consultations with the Congress and our Allies. (C)

— Improved Security

- Existing and potential Soviet noncompliance will continue to be factored into U.S. force modernization plans in strategic and chemical weapons and in planning for the Strategic Defense Initiative research program. (S)

— Diplomatic and Public Affairs Context

- In the appropriate diplomatic channels, to include high-level demarches and discussions, the U.S. will inform the Soviet Union of our conclusions regarding issues included in the unclassified report, and will continue to press for their resolution and for corrective action terminating noncompliance activity. (S/NF/NC/OC)

- This Administration report will be handled in the context of our broader arms control and national security objectives. Compliance will be stressed as essential to the arms control process, and the importance of effective verification and unambiguous provisions in future arms control agreements will be emphasized. In this context, the report shall be made available to the arms reduction negotiators for their use in preparing for the Geneva negotiations. (S)

- The focus of public and Congressional briefings on compliance issues will be to: build knowledge and understanding about Soviet non-compliance activity; aid in maintaining pressure on the Soviet Union

⁴ See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 102–104.

⁵ Not found.

to alter its noncompliance activities; develop support for appropriate responses; and direct attention to the need for more effective verification provisions in future agreements. (S)

ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY

The following issues are to receive further study:

— The Arms Control Verification Committee will provide an analysis through appropriate intelligence channels of the issue of denial of data impeding verification. In preparing annexes to the classified report to be provided to the Congress by February 20, 1985, the Committee will also further study the issue of the consistency of the SS-X-25 with the SALT II ban on ICBMs of the type known as SS-16, the issue of concurrent testing of ABM and SAM components, and the issue of ABM territorial defense. (S)

— The Arms Control Verification Committee, working with the U.S. Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC), will assist in developing proposals for raising Soviet noncompliance activities in the SCC. (S)

— The Arms Control Verification Committee will submit recommendations on additional compliance issues of concern to the Administration and/or raised by the Congress which are to be studied and will submit a work program for completing work on those additional issues expeditiously. (S)

— As directed in NSDD-160,⁶ the Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will support the Senior Arms Control Group in assuring comprehensive assessments of verification issues associated with U.S. negotiating proposals. Such assessments should address the overall effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios), and the possibility of safeguards. As directed earlier in NSDD-121, assessments will apply to non-nuclear, as well as nuclear, arms control negotiation proposals. (S)

— Additionally, as directed in NSDD-160, the Director of the Central Intelligence and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working with other departments and agencies as appropriate, are requested to forward to the National Security Advisor a report for my review by March 15, 1985, providing a detailed assessment of the handling of verification issues in the policy development process and specific recommendations as to how the process can be strengthened. (S)

Ronald Reagan

⁶ Printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 102.

22. Editorial Note

On February 20, 1985, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze delivered an address before the World Affairs Council in Philadelphia titled “On the Road to a More Stable Peace.” In it, he elaborated on the “strategic concept” that he and Secretary of State George Shultz had developed in advance of the latter’s meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January, which would provide the basis for the U.S. position in the Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations set to begin in March and could, he said, “be summarized in four sentences: During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1985, pages 27–28)

Nitze went on to discuss the three phases of this concept—the near term, transition, and ultimate phases—consistent with the talking points prepared in the Office of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam for Shultz’s use at a lunch on January 15; see Document 16.

On February 27, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I attended the Secretary’s meeting with the arms control negotiators this afternoon. The discussions were basically procedural up to the end when we got into a very interesting discussion of what will be the central problem, not only in negotiations with the Soviets but also in explaining our position here at home: How do we square the emphasis on SDI in our programs with the argument that we are trying for deep reductions? There are various fancy theories as to how that is so, but this is obviously a difficult point in our own thinking. The fact of the matter is that SDI and deep reductions are both articles of faith with the President, and the question of how they are presented in a consistent way is being left to an interagency process which is simply unable to confront basic questions of this nature. Fortunately Paul Nitze is with us, and he has been doing some rather interesting thinking about how the future might evolve such that we could move on both fronts simultaneously. The Soviets are doing everything they can to argue that the two goals

are inconsistent and that, if SDI goes forward, they will have to build up, rather than reduce, their intercontinental ballistic missile force." Dam continued: "I attended a very interesting presentation by David Stockman to George Shultz, Charlie Hill and myself this afternoon. He came in to show us what was really involved in the defense budget. It turns out that the actual content of the defense budget increase is quite different from that discussed in the public press. Contrary to the normal assumption, the big strategic programs such as the MX and SDI do not account for any growth in the defense budget. Strategic programs will be level over the next four years, assuming that the President's budget is adopted. It is in the conventional defense category that the big buildups are going on, and there it is not so much for things like fighters and tanks but rather intangibles such as sustainability and readiness that are causing the big increases. Thus, what we are doing is raising the conventional threshold, which would reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons ever being used. It is one of the inconsistencies of political argument in Washington that the people who attack strategic weapons on the ground that their acquisition may lead to their use also attack the defense budget, quite inconsistently, because it is in fact a bigger defense budget on the conventional side that will reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons use. But if we really want to reduce the defense budget, then we ought to build more nuclear weapons, because it is a fact that nuclear weapons are cheap as a means of defense compared to conventional weaponry." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984—June 1985)

23. **Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney) to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)**¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

TRW Briefings on Superhardening, SICBM, and SDI

Following are my notes on the February 28 briefings at TRW in Los Angeles.

Superhardening

MX. [5½ lines not declassified]

The MX in a Minuteman (MM) silo will have the same rattlespace on the side and top-to-bottom as the smaller MM missile, because the MM cage is absent.

Ten launch control centers (LCCs) will control 100 MX missiles, as compared with MM, for which 5 LCCs control 50 missiles. The 10/100 arrangement is a better hedge against an SLBM attack.

In 1983 the President approved an MX program costing \$16.6 billion (in 1982 dollars). The estimated actual cost at present is a shade lower, \$16.5 billion.

Superhardening. Following is the silo damage radius for each of several silo hardnesses, assuming a one megaton burst:

<u>Type of Silo</u>	<u>Hardness (psi)</u>	<u>Silo Damage Radius</u>
MM	[column not declassified]	[column not declassified]
Superhard		
Enhanced superhard		

A useful measure of the value of alternative levels of hardening, in relation to warhead accuracies, is the “attack price,” the number of SS–18 equivalent missiles (assuming ten warheads per missile) required to attack and damage a silo with 90% confidence. The following chart summarizes the attack price estimates for varying levels of hardness and missile CEP.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. Secret. Copies were sent to Timbie and John Gordon (PM). A handwritten note at the bottom of the first page of the memorandum indicates that copies were also sent to Burt, Adelman, and Chain on March 28.

<i>[column header not declassified]</i>			
<i>CEP</i>	<i>[number not declassified]</i>	<i>[number not declassified]</i>	<i>[number not declassified]</i>
450'	0.1	0.6	0.9
300'	0.1	0.3	0.4
200'	0.1	0.1	0.2

Thus, for example, for an SS-18 having a CEP of 450', only one RV would be needed to destroy an existing silo with 90% confidence, but nine RVs would be required to damage an enhanced superhard silo with 90% confidence. The estimates in the table above exclude any survivability gains that would accrue from fratricide caused by closely spaced basing of silos. Calculations of fratricide effects for superhard silos arrayed in CSB will be completed in 6-9 months. (Comment: These will be the interesting calculations: if they show strong symbiosis between CSB and superhardening, it may be useful to reevaluate the concepts for SICBM basing, and indeed the marginal utility of the deploying SICBM versus more MX.

Past DNA estimates of crater size (never measured precisely in the past because potential hardness increases were not expected), so new estimates are being undertaken. A one megaton detonation might create a crater having a lip hard to 200-300,000 psi.

Superhard silos should be located in dry soil, but not rock or wet soil. Dry soil craters are smaller than wet soil craters. Craters in rock would be even smaller, but seismologists think rock would shear, destroying the silo. This hypothesis cannot be tested without using nuclear detonations, but scientists believe it is valid.

In small-scale tests engineers are trying to figure out where to put the steel. Radial steel appears to be better than hoop steel. Tests of the 24' scale silo model had a 7-8% steel content.

Tests show that motions and stresses on a silo from a second detonation are less than those from the first, because the first one compacts the earth around the silo. But to compact earth as a construction technique in building silos would be too expensive.

Silos built at ground level tend to be pushed partially out of the ground by the first shot, thus making them vulnerable to a second. But this can be solved by building silos slightly underground, which will also help protect them against thermal and radiation effects.

The problem of source regioning EMP effects is also being examined.

Superhard silos are doing well in tests against motion effects. The MX is capable of withstanding *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, and the SICBM can be designed without much difficulty to withstand *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. While fiber optic communications is adequate for peacetime communications with silos, antennae will be needed for wartime launch from airplanes and mobile LCCs.

Missile egress is a problem from surface bursts. Recently a successful test took place in which a multistage actuator pushed up a sleeve through debris, enabling the gas-driven cannister to surface into launch position.

SICBM

Gorman said the Scowcroft Commission timetable is what paces the SICBM program, not technology. If the MX were defeated today, an SICBM with modified AIRS guidance could be ready in about four-and-one-half years. But the current SICBM program has decelerators built into it. If the SICBM had to meet only the specifications of the Trident C-4 missile, it could be built for 25–30% less cost, but this wouldn't be salable. At present the Air Force is looking at a stellar inertial and two ring laser guidance systems as possibilities for the SICBM. Guidance is one-half the cost of the SICBM.

A mobile launcher hardened to 30–50 psi deployed in an area of 2.5–4.0 sq. mi. would exact an attack price of one SS-18 warhead. A soft truck hardened to three psi deployed over an area of 100 sq. mi. would exact the same attack price. We learned from the MX experience that we cannot get public lands, or military bases being used for something else, as basing locales for a new ICBM.

A hard mobile SICBM, mounted on a vehicle capable of doing 30 mi/hr and based along a 1,000 mile perimeter enclosing a square could move up to 4 miles inside the perimeter to protect against a short-warning SLBM attack. This potential deployment area of 4,000 sq. mi. could be doubled if missiles could move either inside or outside the perimeter.

Cost Comparisons for Missiles and Basing Modes

Assuming that \$16 billion has already been spent on the MX program, following are incremental costs (1982 dollars) for alternative 1989 basing options for both MX and SICBM:

<u>Missile/Basing Mode</u>	<u>Incremental Cost</u>
100 MX/100 Super/CSB	\$16 billion
100 MX/100 Super/MM	16
100 MX/500 Super	30
500 SICBM/500 Super/CSB	49
450 SICBM/450 Super/MM II	44
500 SICBM/Hard Mobile	44
500 SICBM/Continuous Road Mobile	43

Procurement of an additional 100 MX missiles, beyond the first 100, would cost \$3 billion (excluding basing costs).

The incremental cost for construction alone of 100 superhardened silos is about \$35 million per silo, but total incremental cost (including, for example, electronics and communications hookup) is \$150–200 million per silo.

The cost of an SICBM is one-half the cost of an MX, making the cost per warhead of the SICBM five times greater than for the MX.

SDI

Technologies. SDI requires advances in a number of technologies: microelectronics, advanced computers and netting, advanced radars and optical sensors, improved discrimination techniques, non-nuclear kill mechanisms, directed energy weapons, and improved space launch capabilities. Non-nuclear kill mechanisms are desirable both for political reasons and because they do not disrupt the battle-field environment.

Discrimination. Below 300,000 feet the Army has responsibility, and it has made a lot of progress. We have reasonable confidence also for boost phase discrimination technologies. In the last ten years, great gains have been made in optical sensors, especially for the terminal phase. We are now collecting optical data at Kwajalein on all missile flights.

Astrodome Defenses. What “miracles” are needed for us to be able to deploy an astrodome defense?

- [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a feat especially difficult for kinetic energy weapons;
- [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a difficult task, but one perhaps not so difficult as some believe since we [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
- low-leakage mid-course discrimination (we have little data on mid-course flight, and almost none on false targets in mid-course).

[*1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified*]

We need an aggressive program to collect data for SDI research,
[*1 line not declassified*]

It will be hard to develop lasers for target kill.

Deployment of sensors for SDI could, by itself, enhance deterrence. For example, non-continuously mobile ICBMs need warning to be survivable.

[*1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified*]

The nearest-term SDI layers are terminal and midcourse technologies being developed by the Army. It is quickest to deploy SDI “from the ground up.”

The concept of ground-based, blue-green lasers using mirrors in space is being considered for communications with submerged submarines.

The SDIO very much wants to keep the SDI program focused on long-term research, and not on a specific mission. But a very modest defense could be valuable against a highly-stylized Soviet attack.

At the end of the session, John Foster made a case for hard target terminal defense. He commented also that the U.S. may need a nuclear system in order to get an effective defense.

24. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikke)¹

Washington, March 11, 1985

SUBJECT

White Paper on SDI

As the debate on SDI proceeds, one subject notably absent from the discussion has been Soviet work on new kinds of weapons—including SDI-type technologies—for strategic defense. Accordingly, we have prepared the attached unclassified background paper describing Soviet work on directed energy weapons and their role in strategic defense.

We have provided the paper to the Defense Intelligence Agency with a suggestion that DIA or DoD consider publication of an unclassified White Paper. In any event, I hope you will find this material useful for subsequent public discussion, regardless of whether the White Paper is published. Needless to say, if we can be of further help, let me know.

Robert M. Gates²
Deputy Director for Intelligence

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files, Lot 85D308, Memos to/from other agencies. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Dam saw it on March 13. In a March 14 memorandum, Dam replied to Gates: "We very much appreciate your unclassified paper on Soviets efforts comparable to the SDI. It's most timely and useful. Keep up the good work." (Ibid.)

² Gates signed the memorandum "Bob" above his typed signature.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, March 5, 1985

Preface

Since the President's announcement on March 23, 1983, which marked the birth of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a controversy has arisen over it which is concerned not only with the technical feasibility and costs of strategic defense against ballistic missiles but also its impact on the strategic balance between the US and the Soviet Union, on US allies, and on arms control negotiations.

In the past few months, however, lines of argument have begun to be made which involve counterpart Soviet defensive systems. And though we believe that in the planning and development of defensive weapons attention should be directed primarily at the threat posed by the enemy's offensive systems, i.e., the numbers, characteristics, performance and vulnerabilities of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, it is becoming necessary to provide basic information on Soviet defensive, or counterpart-SDI, research and developments. Opponents and proponents alike of the SDI should have a basic understanding and an appreciation of the nature and magnitude of Soviet efforts in strategic ballistic missile defense.

This paper is intended to meet a part of that requirement. It addresses Soviet research and development in directed-energy weapons: high-power/high-energy lasers, particle beams, and the microwave or radio-frequency beams.

"Directed energy" is a term that has become popular in the past decade and is used to refer to three types of beam weapon concepts based on lasers, radiofrequency (microwave) devices, or particle beams:

- In a laser weapon, an intense beam or pulse of visible or invisible (infrared, ultraviolet, X-ray, gamma-ray) electromagnetic radiation is aimed at a target by a telescope or other aiming device. The target's surface may be damaged by explosive shock, melting, or vaporizing; optical components can be damaged and personnel injured or blinded.
- In a radiofrequency (RF) weapon, electromagnetic radiation at wavelengths close to those of conventional radars is aimed at a target by an antenna; electronic components, or possibly the target structure

³No classification marking.

itself, may be damaged or destroyed by circuit overloading or thermal effects.

- In a particle beam weapon (PBW), intense beams of electrons, protons, or atoms are produced by a high-energy accelerator and aimed at a target by magnets. In addition to thermal or mechanical damage, such beams can produce damaging secondary nuclear or X-ray radiation deep within a target.

SOVIET DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS—

Perspectives on Strategic Defense

Key Judgements

- *The Soviet Union is believed to be interested in the development of directed energy weapons (lasers, particle beams, and microwaves) for ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) applications.*

- *The Soviet Union has been engaged in research on the directed energy weapons technologies for as long as the United States. Soviet efforts are under the leadership of some of the finest scientific minds in the USSR. The resources the Soviets have applied to these efforts are believed to be greater than those which the United States has applied.*

- *In directed energy technologies, the Soviets are in a comparable, or highly competitive position with respect to the United States. In laser technologies, there is an essential equivalence, though the Soviets are pursuing some types of lasers which the US has either abandoned or has ignored for weapons applications. In particle beam and microwave technologies, the Soviets may have the edge over the US in some important areas.*

- *The Soviets are believed to have progressed beyond the stage of pure or basic laboratory research in directed energy technologies; the Soviets have begun to develop and test laser weapons. The Soviets already have a ground-based laser capable of damaging some US satellites and which may be used to investigate the feasibility of lasers for ballistic missile defense applications.*

- *Hostile Soviet reactions to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and lobbying against the SDI by high-level Soviet scientists must be tempered by the fact that the Soviet Union has not admitted to its own longstanding counterpart research and the most vocal Soviet scientists have themselves been heavily involved in that weapons research.*

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

25. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, March 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Update of NSDD-91, Strategic Forces Modernization

On February 25, 1985 I sent you the proposed NSDD at Tab III² and requested approval for a final price out of the proposed changes for yourself and the SECDEF.

As a result of your approval, OSD (PA&E) has prepared the paper at Tab II.³ The PA&E cost analysis revealed that most of the changes in the new NSDD are already funded in the five-year defense program (FY 87-91). The three elements that require additional funding are:

<u>Item</u>	<u>FY 87-91 Estimated Cost</u>
(1) Maintaining Bomber force at 350	\$250M
(2) R&D on Defense against Bombers and Cruise missiles	\$2-5B
(3) Capability to attack mobile target	TBD

This additional investment is modest in comparison to the overall modernization program cost or the cost of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The completion of the cost analysis at Tab II completes the informal coordination process. The OSD staff and the three Services have all verbally concurred with the NSDD as amended. (The final version is slightly different from the version at Tab II, but contains no substantive changes). The only major issues which remain controversial are the lower limits on the Bomber force (PA&E does not like the 350 lower

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-090, NSDD 178. Top Secret; Special Access. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed." Douglass submitted the memorandum to Poindexter under a covering memorandum dated March 21, which began: "The only personnel in the complex cleared for the Annex for this NSDD are yourself and McFarlane. For this reason the attached original is the only copy which contains the Annex." (Ibid.) Poindexter sent the memorandum to McFarlane under cover of an undated routing memorandum, writing: "Bud, This all seems very reasonable except the floor of 350 bombers. If that is for arms control negotiating position then OK. Otherwise I'm not certain it makes sense. JP" (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed are a February 25 memorandum from Douglass to McFarlane and a draft NSDD.

³ Not attached.

limit) and some general complaining about why we have NSDDs at all.⁴ I do not expect significant changes during the formal coordination of the NSDD.

On our staff, Bill Wright does not concur with the need to reissue an expanded strategic force modernization NSDD at this time. He believes that the President's five point Strategic Modernization Program (TRIAD plus strategic defense and survivable command/communications) has gained a long-term credibility and a degree of success in addressing a decade of inattention to the health of our strategic force posture. To add new priority emphases on warning, mobile targeting, ABM penetration and air defense capabilities will unduly burden the basic program with expanded priority elements, dilute its effectiveness and draw funds from non-strategic force modernization.

I do not agree with Bill on this. I believe there is strong rationale for bringing the President's Strategic Modernization Program up to date with developments within the real world of strategic modernization. In fact, the modest additions proposed to NSDD-91⁵ correct serious deficiencies in our evolving strategic posture. I find it professionally very difficult, for example, to accept a position of not addressing methods to take out mobile targets when we know the Soviets are moving to the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25, or to not study ways to defend against manned bombers and cruise missiles when we are proposing to spend so much on SDI.

Bob Linhard, Sven Kraemer, Mike Donley, Don Mahley, John Grimes, Joe Wheeler⁶ and Bob Wood concur.

Bill Wright does not concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memos at Tab I⁷ forwarding the NSDD to DOD and State for formal coordination (I will handcarry them due to the *Special Access* portions).⁸

⁴ McFarlane underlined "some general complaining about why we have NSDDs at all," and drew two short vertical lines in the right-hand margin beside this portion of the sentence.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 19.

⁶ An unknown handwrote "N/A" below Wheeler's name.

⁷ Not found attached.

⁸ McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

26. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, March 21, 1985

SUBJECT

The SS-X-24 and SS-X-25

SS-X-24

The SS-X-24 is roughly comparable to the M-X, but has smaller RVs and is less accurate, so it does not have the hard-target punch of the M-X.

Characteristics:

- medium size
- solid fuel
- 10 RVs
- Soviets have declared the SS-X-24 to be their one permitted new-type ICBM.

Basing:

- Will be deployed in fixed silos, initially as a replacement for SS-17's.
- Will probably also be deployed on rail-mobile launchers.

Timing:

- first test, October 1982
- IOC, 1986 in fixed silos, 1987 on rail-mobile launchers
- The "X" will be removed from the designator when the missile becomes operational.

SS-X-25

The SS-X-25 is roughly comparable to the Minuteman II. Previous Soviet solid fuel missiles of similar size include the SS-13, SS-16, and SS-20.

Characteristics:

- small size
- solid fuel

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament Records, 1969-1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Lot 01D127, Papers for DepSec Ken Dam, 1983-1985. Secret. Dam sent the memorandum to Shultz under a March 21 covering note: "Mr. Secretary: I found useful the attached concise description of the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 missiles. As you know, there is considerable confusion on this subject." (Ibid.)

- single-RV

- The Soviets claim the SS-X-25 is a permitted modernization of the SS-13; the U.S. takes issue with this claim on the basis of the difference in throw weight.

Basing:

- Will be deployed on road-mobile launchers. (Bases are being prepared, including conversion of former SS-20 bases.)

Timing:

- first test, February 1983

- IOC, late 1985 or early 1986

27. Editorial Note

On March 19, 1985, President Ronald Reagan released a statement: “I am pleased that the Senate today voted to support the MX Peacekeeper missile and to send a message of American resolve to the world. And I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress to build upon the consensus we achieved today. As we continue to move forward to maintain the modern forces necessary for effective deterrence, let us remember that deterrence alone is not sufficient. The MX Peacekeeper will strengthen our national security and our negotiating position at Geneva. Deterrence and arms reductions go hand in hand, and our negotiators are working hard—flexibly and with an open mind—to achieve agreements leading to deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. It is critically important that the second Senate vote and next week’s votes in the House reaffirm this demonstration of America’s determination to achieve effective deterrence and significant nuclear arms reductions.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, page 317)

On March 21, President Reagan held a news conference in which he led off with a statement: “Let me commend again the Senate of the United States for having approved production of 21 more MX/Peacekeeper missiles. The Senate has endorsed the decision of four Presidents that the Peacekeeper is a vital component of the American deterrent. Now is the testing time for the House of Representatives. The votes there will answer the question of whether we stand united at Geneva or whether America will face the Soviet Union as a nation divided over the most fundamental questions of her national security. For more than a decade we’ve debated the MX, and while we were debating, the Soviets were deploying more than 600 such missiles and

targeting them upon the United States. Now they're on the verge of deploying two new strategic land-based systems, and we're still debating. Not long ago the parliaments of four NATO countries courageously voted to accept deployment of Pershing II's and cruise missiles. And these NATO countries are now looking to see if the American Congress is possessed of equal courage—or resolve, I should say. No request by an American President for a major strategic system deemed vital to the national security has ever been denied by an American Congress. It is that tradition of bipartisan unity on national defense that brought the Soviets back to Geneva. And unless that tradition is maintained next week in the House, there's little prospect of success at Geneva." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pages 326–327)

On March 26 and 28, President Reagan released statements commending votes in the House of Representatives approving the production of the MX missiles and the release of appropriations for it. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pages 352, 360) On March 28, in an address before the Council on Foreign Affairs in Austin, Texas, Secretary of State George Shultz delivered a speech in which he began: "One of the most profound moral and political challenges facing our nation today is the effort to control and reduce nuclear weapons. In recent years, concern about the danger of nuclear holocaust has made nuclear arms control more than ever the focus of national debate. This is all to the good. In our free society, vigorous debate makes us stronger, not weaker, as we work to safeguard our security and protect the peace. But moral concern about nuclear weapons must be matched by an understanding of the underlying political and military complexities. If it is not, this moral concern can only raise false hopes—with consequences of the greatest immorality, endangering the prospect for peace. As we embark on a new round of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union—the most comprehensive and complex of any in history—such understanding is more important than ever. Today, I would like to discuss these underlying issues with you and to explain how your government is meeting this challenge." After outlining U.S. objectives at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva and the Reagan administration's aspiration that the Strategic Defense Initiative would enhance deterrence, Shultz went on to say: "The road to this safer world would have to be traveled with care. In making the transition from today's near total reliance on offense, our objective would be to deploy defensive systems which, at each step of the process, make a first strike even more difficult. By doing so, we would not only enhance stability but also provide further incentives for reducing offensive forces. The feasibility criteria we have adopted—survivability and cost effectiveness—are designed precisely to ensure that any transition period is a stable one. Thus, survivability means less temptation and incentive for either side to attack these new defensive systems at a moment of political crisis during the transition period.

Phasing in of truly cost-effective defensive systems will mean that offensive countermeasures—such as piling up more missiles to swamp the defenses—are a losing game. SDI is not a bid for strategic superiority; on the contrary, it would maintain the balance, in light of the rapid Soviet progress in both offensive and defensive systems. Nor is SDI an abrogation of the ABM Treaty. President Reagan has directed that the research program be carried out in full compliance with the treaty. He has also made clear that any future decision to deploy defenses that were not permitted by treaty would have to be a matter of negotiation.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1985, pages 24–28)

The following day, President Reagan conveyed similar themes at the National Space Club Luncheon in Washington D.C., in remarks that included: “The Strategic Defense Initiative has been labeled ‘Star Wars,’ but it isn’t about war; it’s about peace. It isn’t about retaliation; it’s about prevention. It isn’t about fear; it’s about hope. And in that struggle, if you’ll pardon my stealing a film line: The force is with us. Technology is with us as well. Twenty years ago, we simply could not build systems which would prevent ballistic missiles from reaching their targets; because of new advances in technology, that may no longer be true. That’s why we’ve embarked on a vigorous research program, a program that does not violate treaties or threaten world stability. The means to intercept ballistic missiles during their early-on boost phase of trajectory would enable us to fundamentally change our strategic assumptions, permitting us to shift our emphasis from offense to defense. What could be more moral than a system designed to save lives rather than to avenge them? What could be more peaceful than moving away from reliance on our ability to threaten global annihilation and toward reliance on systems which are incapable of threatening anyone? We’re not discussing a concept just to enhance deterrence, but rather a new kind of deterrence; not just an addition to our offensive forces, but research to determine the feasibility of a comprehensive nonnuclear defensive system—a shield that could prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pages 363–364)

On March 30, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane sent Robert Linhard of the National Security Council (NSC) staff an electronic message expressing concern about erosion of support for SDI on the part of U.S. allies, arguing the “need to restore some discipline to the community of who speaks on this issue and what they say.” McFarlane instructed the NSC staff to develop a National Security Decision Directive that would “express concern over the mixed signals being sent on what our intentions are.” It should then “go on to say what motivated the President to propose the concept in the first place—that is, concern over the destabilizing trend in Soviet offensive forces—most significantly in the development of a mobile mirv’d

system and others for which verification will become less and less certain. In short we could expect to reach a point where we would have no confidence in our knowledge of the state of the balance/imbalance. The second reason was that the state of the art seemed to make possible effective non-nuclear defense. Then it should turn to the concept for conducting research consistent with the ABM treaty and if one or more of the technologies proved feasible to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union to determine how these forces might be integrated into the force structure—indeed such negotiations would already have been in progress for years having started already in Geneva. This does not imply that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome. Secretary Shultz expressed this well in his Austin speech last week. The NSDD should also reaffirm that we will need offensive deterrence into the next century (so as to assuage our European colleagues). I also think it should also express some tentative thoughts on how the ultimate development could foster offensive arms reductions and not an offensive buildup (by giving explicit endorsement to the two criteria that Paul and I have used—invulnerability and comparative cost advantage.)” McFarlane noted that he could use the NSDD to address the concerns of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and French President Francois Mitterrand, all of whom were “in an extreme state of doubt over exactly what our intentions are.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration)

**28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the Senior Arms
Control Group¹**

Washington, April 4, 1985

SUBJECT

US Interim Restraint Policy (U)

Since 1981, the United States has pursued a policy of “interim restraint” to “not undercut” existing strategic arms control agreements. This policy was intended to foster restraint on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union while negotiations to achieve arms

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. Secret.

reduction were underway. The US policy clearly requires Soviet reciprocity as described in the President's formulation of May 1982 as follows: "As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint."² (S)

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have publicly pledged to observe such a "no undercut" policy and both sides have engaged in dismantling of nuclear weapons systems in order to avoid undercutting the terms of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the unratified SALT II Treaty. (C)

However, there is a distinction between "no undercut" and "abiding by" or "complying with" an agreement. To abide by, or comply with, means to observe all parts of an agreement. On the other hand, a "no undercut" policy could be considered to allow things that, while not in full compliance, are reversible. One question to be addressed is therefore the matter of legal interpretations of "interim restraints" and "no undercut." (S)

A number of issues have brought the question of US interim restraint policy to the fore:

— First, on the basis of available evidence as reviewed extensively by the Arms Control Verification Committee, the President determined in his February 1985 report³ to the Congress (reaffirming the 1984 report judgment) that "the expanding (Soviet) pattern on noncompliance with existing agreements raises serious questions for US national security, our Alliances, arms control, and US-Soviet relations." Soviet violations or probable violations of the ABM Treaty, SALT I, SALT II, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Helsinki Final Act, as well as numerous ambiguous situations and the increased Soviet concealment and deception, are of considerable military significance.

— Second, while it may have been fairly painless to date for the United States to pursue an interim restraint policy which restricted US military programs only marginally and which required the dismantling only of relatively aged and obsolescing systems, such as the Titan ICBM and older Polaris submarines, there is potential that continued US interim restraint (which would be unilateral in view of massive continued Soviet military buildup and Soviet noncompliance) could become increasingly painful militarily. This fall's sea trials of the 7th Trident submarine, as well as deployment of subsequent Trident submarines, would require the compensatory destruction of functional and relatively modern weapons systems such as Poseidon submarines or Minuteman III ICBMs. Similarly, by June 1986, when the 121st B-52 is planned for deployment with ALCMs, the US would have to dismantle

² Reference is to Reagan's May 31, 1982 "Remarks at Memorial Day Ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 708–710)

³ See footnote 4, Document 21.

additional modern submarines or land-based MIRVed missiles for each ALCM-carrying bomber. Longer-term adherence to limitations beyond the scheduled date of expiration of the SALT II agreement would also mean that the US could not test or deploy both the MX Peacekeeper and the smaller Midgetman ICBM.

— Third, the Congress has increasingly raised questions about the status of US interim restraint policy in the face of Soviet noncompliance, with some members recommending that the restraint be implemented unilaterally and with others recommending that the reciprocity requirement be applied and the US thus no longer bound by limitations or agreements that the Soviet Union is violating. The Congress has, *inter alia*, expressed the sense that the US “should through December 1985 refrain from undercutting provisions of existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union does the same,” and has, in addition, asked that “the President shall provide to Congress on or before June 1, 1985 a report that describes the implications of the *USS Alaska’s* sea trials for the no-undercut policy, assesses potential Soviet responses to the termination of the US no-undercut policy, makes recommendations regarding the future of US interim restraint, and reviews Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic arms agreements.”

— Fourth, the ongoing nuclear and space arms negotiations in Geneva provide an additional context and possible forum for consideration of the interim restraint policy. (S)

Whether or not the United States will continue to limit its own forces even in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance behavior is an issue that merits very careful consideration by the USG. In order to facilitate a comprehensive and timely review of the issues involved, I am therefore establishing herewith an Interdepartmental Group on Interim Restraint Policy under the co-chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and the Director of the Department of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs to address the issue of US interim restraint policy and to develop policy recommendations for consideration by the Senior Arms Control Group and the National Security Council. (S)

Pursuant to this requirement, the Interdepartmental Group on Interim Restraint Policy will prepare a paper identifying alternative interim restraint policy options to include major elements, and lead agencies for each element, as follows:

— The Director of Central Intelligence shall prepare analyses of: (1) likely Soviet qualitative and other violations of SALT I and II if a unilateral US restraint policy is continued; (2) likely Soviet force postures from 1986–1991 and beyond if US interim restraints are discontinued in the absence of Soviet reciprocity; and (3) likely Soviet force postures under alternative US interim restraint options that are developed by the interagency group.

— OSD and JCS shall prepare analyses of: (1) US dismantling requirements under SALT I and II and resulting US force postures under alternative interim restraint options, taking account of the projected Soviet forces; (2) the comparative capability of the US to match

or redress any surge or increase in Soviet forces identified in the intelligence analyses above; (3) the implication of alternative interim restraint options on the survivability of US strategic forces; and (4) alternatives to dismantling, such as caretaker status, for selected systems.

— The Department of State and ACDA shall prepare a review of: (1) implications of alternative legal interpretations of “no undercut,” “abiding by,” and “irreversibility” standards; (2) presentation and handling of alternative interim restraint approaches vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (3) likely Allied reactions to an alteration of US interim restraint policy, and to specific options, and a strategy for dealing with such reactions; (4) Congressional handling; and (5) a public affairs strategy. (S)

The co-chairmen of the Interdepartmental Group on Interim Restraint Policy shall provide a work schedule to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by April 12, 1985 with the report, including recommendations, to be forwarded by May 27, 1985. (C)

Robert C. McFarlane

29. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 5, 1985

SUBJECT

Nitze–Linhard Meeting, April 5, 1985

Nitze gave Linhard a paper² with themes the USG should use when addressing SDI and a memo noting his problems with the President’s March 29 speech.³ Linhard scanned the themes and said they looked fine; he would undertake to turn them into “policy” from the NSC. Regarding the President’s speech, Linhard understood Nitze’s concerns but there were strongly held views in the White House; he had done what he could to improve on the original draft.

With regard to the transition paper, Linhard said he had some basic problems. While he wanted to reflect further on the paper, he offered three preliminary comments:

(1) the paper’s focus on terminal defense was inconsistent with recent NSDDs which focused on “high-leverage” defenses, i.e.,

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. Secret. Drafted by Pifer.

² See footnote 6, Document 30.

³ For Nitze’s memorandum, see Document 30; for Reagan’s March 29 speech, see Document 27.

space-based systems that would attack ballistic missiles in the boost and mid-course phases;

(2) he was unsure about the paper's focus on doing away with hard target kill systems; and

(3) the offensive force levels needed to be considered in light of US targeting requirements.

Nitze emphasized that the paper was a first cut and was premised on a cooperative transition between the US and USSR. The USG would have to think about the uncooperative scenario, which was the more likely case.

Linhard doubted that ground-based terminal defenses were politically doable in the US, e.g., "the dump trucks full of environmental impact statements." He was concerned the Soviets might agree to a cooperative transition but restrict it to terminal defenses (in which he felt they might have a competitive advantage). Moreover, terminal defenses were more appropriate for a hardened target set, an area where the Soviets were clearly ahead.

Linhard promised to send over his detailed comments on the transition paper. In the meantime, he strongly urged that the paper not be sent to the IG.

30. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, April 5, 1985

SUBJECT

President's National Space Club Speech

Per your conversation with Norm Clyne on Tuesday,² this memorandum provides my concerns about the treatment of SDI in the President's speech of last Friday.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Clyne wrote on the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "MFR: Given to Linhard by Nitze this date as 'Informal' paper. NGC"

² April 2. No memorandum of conversation was found.

³ March 29. See Document 27.

The substantial misgivings that our allies harbor about SDI present us with one of our most significant problems. Many of these misgivings are shared by numerous members of Congress. It is thus important that we take pains in all our public statements about SDI to respond to their concerns. To this end, we should:

- restate our commitment to the four points agreed upon by the President and PM Thatcher at Camp David;⁴
- stress the criteria we will use to judge the feasibility of defensive technologies;
- emphasize our intention that a transition to a more defense-reliant balance be a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets;
- make clear that we do not intend to abandon deterrence but rather to shift the means and objects of deterrence;
- demonstrate that we recognize the need, should nuclear weapons be greatly reduced or eliminated, to deter and counter the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both conventional arms improvements and arms control efforts; and
- point out the need, for the foreseeable future, to continue to rely on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation for deterrence, and thus both to maintain modern, flexible, and credible offensive nuclear forces and to strive for radical reductions in destabilizing offensive arms.

The President's speech touched on some of these points but omitted several others. In addition, it included a few statements that could exacerbate concerns. It alludes to the superior morality of our intentions, a concept which makes the allies, especially the British and French, extremely uncomfortable. This is because such talk tends to denigrate, implicitly or explicitly, deterrence through nuclear retaliation, a policy we must follow for the foreseeable future. It also undermines support for British and French nuclear modernization programs. I think we should take the following approach:

— Our basic aim is to live in peace with freedom. To maintain peace it is necessary to deter those who would wish to gain by war or the threat of war. Deterrence requires that the potential aggressor be faced with the prospect of effective resistance and the risk of unacceptable damage. Deterrence and defense are moral. Otherwise the prospect of maintaining freedom would be extinguished. The defender should, however, strive to deter and defend with the minimum level of violence consistent with that purpose. If there is no available alternative other than the threat of nuclear retaliation, then this is the necessary and moral course. If, through adequate defenses one can deny the potential aggressor any hope of military success and thus deter him from aggression, then that becomes the preferable and the moral course.

The President's speech also emphasizes boost-phase intercept systems and appears to denigrate atmospheric and mid-course intercept

⁴ See Document 9.

systems. This tends to stress the space aspect of the program, when SDI is exploring ground-based and atmospheric intercept systems as well. Granted, he was speaking to the National Space Club, but in future speeches, I think it wise not to stress the space angle, given the Soviet propaganda focus and the pejorative nature of the “Star Wars” label.

I also think it unwise to place *sole* emphasis on our ultimate hope—rendering obsolete ballistic missiles, MAD, etc.—or to stress a goal of a leak-proof defense or nuclear shield. We may want to deploy defensive systems even if we cannot meet these standards. After all, even an imperfect defense could create excessive complications for an aggressor contemplating a first strike, thereby strengthening deterrence, while providing incentives for reductions of offensive arms. Similarly, even a balance that retained some ballistic missiles on each side could be safer and more stable than today’s situation.

Finally, I note an apparent discrepancy between the President’s statement that an essential element of SDI research is the eventual ability to defend against both long-range and short-range ballistic missiles and Cap Weinberger’s interview with *Le Monde*.⁵ Cap said SDI is designed to defend against intermediate-range missiles but not against shorter-range missiles. He went on to specify the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 as systems the program is not designed to defend against. We need to get our story straight on this point.

I am mindful of the public diplomacy group on SDI—indeed, this group puts out some good products. However, there seems to be little attention paid to these products by some senior spokesmen and/or their speechwriters. It is *imperative* that we *all* sing the *same* song with the *same* music. Accordingly, I understand Bud is planning to put out a policy paper that will outline in more detail the themes we should all stress on SDI. Attached are some suggestions as to the possible content of such a paper.⁶

⁵ In telegram 13026 from Paris, March 29, the Embassy transmitted Weinberger’s interview that appeared in the March 29 edition of *Le Monde*. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850216–0817)

⁶ Attached but not printed is a paper listing bullet points in support of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

31. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, April 25, 1985

SUBJECT

Update to NSDD-91, Strategic Forces Modernization

As I mentioned to you at Staff meeting the NSDD I prepared (Tab A)² has run into serious problems at DOD from the JCS. Despite the extensive coordination and the several drafts which preceded the formal coordination, the Navy led a JCS fight to stop the NSDD. The OSD staff, on the other hand, have supported the NSDD with some minor changes and one significant change in the Bomber portion.

JCS arguments against the NSDD range from worries about too much funding for strategic programs during the lean years we expect ahead to not-invented-here feelings about aggressive NSC staffers like me taking what some consider too aggressive a role in pushing for the modernization program (this latter feeling is compounded by perceptions in the Navy that I am following a parochial Air Force view of modernization).

My judgment of all of this is that SECDEF will agree with his staff in the end because he has personally endorsed all the new portions of the NSDD at various times in the past.

It is also important to remember that Secretary Shultz has concurred with the NSDD as written.

Finally, I believe we must bear in mind that one of the original reasons for updating NSDD-91³ now was to ensure that the Strategic Modernization Program is not undercut during the FY 87 POM process. Unfortunately, that is exactly what is happening in all three Services this spring.

It might be helpful for you to mention the subject next Monday⁴ in your breakfast meeting with the SECDEF and SECSTATE.⁵

Bob Linhard concurs.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-090, NSDD 178. Top Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates McFarlane saw the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed. See footnote 2, Document 25.

³ See footnote 3, Document 19.

⁴ April 29.

⁵ On the NSC routing slip for the memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "Put in breakfast folder." (Ibid.) No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found.

RECOMMENDATION

That you mention to the SECDEF the need to get on with the update of NSDD-91 in the near future.⁶

⁶ McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

32. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 26, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

At yesterday's luncheon meeting² you put your finger on the major European fear about SDI. Our allies worry that if we succeed in missile defense we would be able to reduce our own offensive missile force and this would leave them open to Soviet conventional attack. Everybody has forgotten that you provided the answer to this concern in your March 1983 speech launching SDI.

The label "Star Wars" and the attention given to missile defense have obscured the fact that you were not merely proposing a gadget but you were pointing the way to a new Western defense strategy based on a recognition that technology has brought us to an era in which a unit of defense will cost less than a corresponding unit of offense.

In that speech, in addition to missile defense, you called for a massive effort to develop and deploy high-tech conventional weapons, and by doing so to further raise the nuclear threshold. You said, "America does possess now the technologies to accomplish very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional non-nuclear forces."

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R, Box 17, Folder: DCI Memo Chrono (1-3 Apr '85). Secret. Casey sent the letter to Weinberger under cover of an April 26 note: "Dear Cap, I had a talk with the President today in which I gave him this letter. I think you will be interested in the London *Times* editorial which is also attached." According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Casey, Regan, and McFarlane in the Oval Office from 9:52-10:12 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found.

² On April 25, Reagan participated in a lunchtime briefing for the May 2-4 Bonn G-7 Summit in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, 12:16-1:45 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

We have technology which would enable the Europeans to modernize their conventional forces to a higher level, and at less cost, than they are doing now. (Example: a Hell-fire anti-tank rocket costs about \$500,000, versus \$60,000 for one of those Boeing RPVs that can find and hit a Soviet tank.) Today we are selling the Europeans weapons and technologies that in our own country are now obsolete. At some point they will discover and be upset about this.

Reminding Europe of this conventional aspect of your 1983 proposal would both reduce opposition and give new impetus to SDI by shifting the discussion to technology which can be demonstrated in the near future. The financial strain of force modernization would be eased. And the large technology gap between Europe and the US—which we are all coming to recognize as a looming threat to the alliance—would be swiftly and sharply narrowed. And as Europe's conventional power grows, concerns over the strategic aspect of SDI should lessen.

The attached London *Times* editorial³ shows that a perception is just beginning to take hold that there is more to SDI than merely an anti-missile gadget, and that the conventional aspect holds much promise for Europe. You got the conventional/strategic combination exactly right. Now it's time to remind people of what you said and bring forward some of what we have to back up the conventional aspect of your 1983 initiative.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey⁴

³ Attached but not printed is "Geneva Intermission," *The Times*, April 23, 1985, p. 13.

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates Casey signed the original.

33. **Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**¹

Washington, May 6, 1985

SUBJECT

Strategic Modernization (Update to NSDD-91)

The memo at Tab III from Secretary Weinberger contains his comments on the draft NSDD which we sent to State and DOD for formal review on March 28, 1985.

Secretary Shultz did not respond in writing, but indicated verbally via General Chain that he concurred with the draft NSDD as written.

The only major issue which surfaced in the final review was the size of the bomber force. I concur with Secretary Weinberger's proposed approach of calling for a new bomber study rather than setting limits at this time. This approach would be consistent with Congressional requests for a new bomber study contained in the SASC mark-up. The final NSDD has been changed to reflect this approach (see Tab A).²

In the final version of the NSDD I have incorporated all of Secretary Weinberger's proposed changes except for the addition of two paragraphs regarding non-strategic programs and cost overruns which I feel are inappropriate at this time (see highlighted material at Tab II).³ These paragraphs (they are similar to wording contained in NSDD-12,⁴ the original Strategic Modernization NSDD) were recommended by the JCS who opposed the new NSDD on the general grounds that the timing was poor (in their view) and that it would require more resources.

I would recommend against the incorporation of the two paragraphs. We are now drafting a conventional modernization NSDD which will hopefully be well received by the JCS which should cover part of the Services concerns. The paragraph on financial resources appears to be more appropriate to an internal DOD document, but was placed in NSDD-12 in the fall of 1981 to point out that NSDD-12 was part of the original Administration's five year plan—not an addition to it. Mike Donley and Al Keel see no utility in adding such a paragraph at this time.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-090, NSDD 178. Top Secret; Special Access. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed are the draft NSDD and Annex One.

³ Not attached.

⁴ NSDD-12, "Strategic Forces Modernization Program," is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984.

On our staff, Bill Wright still does not concur with the need to reissue an expanded strategic force modernization NSDD at this time. He believes that the President's five point Strategic Modernization Program (TRIAD plus strategic defense and survivable command/communications) has gained a long-term credibility and a sustained degree of success in addressing a decade of inattention to the health of our strategic force posture. To add new priority emphases (and implicitly fenced funding) on warning, mobile targeting, ABM penetration and air defense capabilities will unduly burden the basic program with expanded priority elements, dilute its effectiveness and draw funds from non-strategic force modernization in a period of more difficult budgets.

Please return the entire package to me after the NSDD and Annex One are signed by the President; I will arrange for the NSDD to be distributed through normal channels and the Codeword Annex through Codeword channels.

Bob Linhard, John Grimes, Mike Donley, Ken deGraffenreid, Don Mahley and Sven Kraemer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I⁵ forwarding the NSDD to the President for signature.⁶

Tab III

**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane)⁷**

Washington, May 2, 1985

SUBJECT

Update of NSDD-91, Strategic Forces Modernization (U)

(U) We have reviewed carefully the subject draft NSDD, and my line-in, line-out comments are attached for your use in preparing a final version for signature by the President.⁸

⁵ Not attached.

⁶ McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

⁷ Top Secret; Special Access. Weinberger wrote "Bud" above the recipient line.

⁸ Not found.

(TS) I do not consider my recommended changes significant enough to warrant a special NSC meeting; however, I would like to point out my rationale for one of the recommended changes. In the paragraph on bomber forces, I strongly urge you to delete the last two sentences that direct us to maintain a force of at least 350 heavy bombers as the ATB is deployed. That guidance would require either the procurement of more than 100 B-1Bs or a further delay in the retirement of aging B-52Gs. I do not believe we should pursue either of these options. We would, however, be willing to study the bomber force structure issue and report the results later this year.

Cap

34. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, May 7, 1985

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint Policy (U)

(S) The Interagency process is moving forward quickly in its analysis and recommendations concerning extension of our current interim restraint policy. A report on this issue is to go to the White House at the end of the month.²

(S) It is clear that extension of the fatally flawed and unratified SALT II agreement beyond the end of 1985 is not in our interest. This is particularly true in light of the multiple Soviet violations of the provisions of that agreement.

(S) The Joint Chiefs are in the final stages of determining their position on this critical issue. Unfortunately, it appears that they may favor some sort of continuation of the key limits of SALT II—despite the fact that these limits would require us to dismantle from two to four times the number of warheads as the Soviets over the next five or six years.³

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 837, Subject File, "1985" U.S.S.R. #42-63 (5). Secret; NoFORN. Sent through Ikle. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on Ikle's behalf.

²Weinberger underlined "at the end of the month."

³Weinberger underlined "the fact that these limits would require us to dismantle from two to four times the number of warheads as the Soviets over the next five or six years."

(S) I recommend that you take the opportunity of your meeting with them this morning to impress upon them the severe political and military disadvantages of continuing the interim restraint regime. The attached talking points and background paper might be useful in this regard.

Richard Perle⁴

Attachment

Talking Points Prepared in the Department of Defense⁵

Washington, undated

Talking Points on Interim Restraint

- As the President has repeatedly made clear, this Administration finds the SALT II agreement to be fundamentally flawed and unequal. This is a very strongly held belief.

- US policy of not undercutting SALT I and II was contingent upon the Soviet Union exercising equal restraint.

- The Soviets have violated numerous provisions of SALT II, however, as documented in the President's 1984 and 1985 reports on Soviet non-compliance.

- It would be very dangerous and unwise for the United States to declare that we will continue to observe indefinitely the provisions of a fatally flawed, unratified agreement—*despite* multiple Soviet violations, and *despite* the fact that it would have expired at the end of 1985.

- To continue no undercut, ignoring these facts, would totally undermine our credibility. It would tell the Soviets that they could violate agreements with impunity, and that we are unwilling or unable to respond.

- In addition, continuing to observe SALT I and II is not in our net military interest.

- If no undercut is extended, we would have to dismantle 240 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs through FY 1991.⁶ This represents between

⁴ Gaffney signed the memorandum on Perle's behalf.

⁵ Secret.

⁶ Weinberger underlined "would have to dismantle 240 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs through FY 1991."

1500 and 2400 ballistic missile warheads, depending on how the reductions are split between Minuteman IIIs and Poseidons.

- The Soviets, however, would have to take down only about 112 MIRVed launchers by 1991⁷ to stay within SALT limits. This would represent about 550 to 600 warheads, or about one-third to one-fourth the number we would have to dismantle.

- It is clear that SALT II would require us to take down more systems than the USSR, and much earlier as well.⁸

- It should also be recognized that Soviet force projections with and without SALT are not drastically different. This is no surprise, given the high limits allowed under SALT, and given that its limits favor Soviet force structure.

- For example, it is estimated that even by 1995 the difference between Soviet SALT and no-SALT missile warheads might be as little as 2,600.⁹ Even observing SALT, the Soviets could amass up to 13,800 RVs by 1995—or an increase of 50 percent over today's level.¹⁰

- Given that Soviet strategic forces can very adequately cover US military and economic targets, it is unclear what military benefits the USSR would derive from such an increase over today's levels. It would be a waste of resources.

- In the absence of no undercut, we have no plans to increase strategic forces beyond those already planned. The strategic modernization program selected by the President will fulfill our strategic needs in the foreseeable future. The absence of constraints does nothing to change this.

- Instead, ridding ourselves of the vestiges of a fatally flawed and unratified agreement—one the Soviets are violating—will allow us to make more rational decisions about retiring older forces as newer ones are phased in.

- This will not, however, result in any significant increases in the strategic forces budget, which could detract from needed conventional forces modernization.

⁷ Weinberger underlined "Soviets" and "would have to take down only about 112 MIRVed launchers by 1991."

⁸ Weinberger underlined "It would require us to taken down more systems than the USSR, and much earlier as well."

⁹ Weinberger underlined "by 1995 the difference between Soviet SALT and no-SALT missile warheads might be as little as 2,600."

¹⁰ Weinberger drew two vertical lines in the right-hand and left-hand margins beside this sentence.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹¹

Washington, undated

SALT II and Interim Restraint

(S) Even prior to the discovery of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the SALT II Treaty was largely discredited within the U.S. Senate. While many would have voted for SALT II simply on the basis of party identification, a rather typical reaction was that of Senator Cohen: “Unhappily, I conclude that the treaty, while paying homage to the arms control process, not only fails to achieve any substantial reductions in arms, but also permits and codifies serious inequalities in our respective strategic capabilities.” The accuracy of 1979 criticism of SALT II has been proven by history and affirmed by this Administration. “Since the SALT I talks started in 1969,” Assistant to the President for National Security Robert McFarlane stated in 1984, “the Soviets have added over 7,000 nuclear weapons to their arsenal; since SALT II was signed, over 3,800.”

(U) A fundamental characteristic of the SALT II Treaty is that it permits a very large expansion in strategic forces by both sides, but is particularly suited to Soviet force expansion. President Reagan noted this fact in 1984: “Today, the Soviet nuclear arsenal can grow to over 15,000 nuclear weapons and still stay within all past arms control agreements, including SALT I and SALT II guidelines.”

(S/NF) SALT II contains many fundamental inequalities in the Soviet favor—a monopoly on “heavy” missiles and the exclusion of Backfire bombers from the limitations, for example. The MIRV ceilings of SALT II are equal on their face but dramatically unequal in effect. They treat large and powerful Soviet ICBMs on the same basis as small U.S. ICBMs. The U.S. Minuteman III with three warheads and about 2,300 pounds of throw-weight is counted as equal to a Soviet SS-18 with 10 warheads and 17,500 lbs. of throw-weight. The combination of the unequal limits on numbers of warheads on existing ICBMs and the MIRV ceiling assured that the Soviets would have at least a two-to-one advantage in ICBM warheads for the period of the SALT II Treaty. *For the period after 1986 the MIRV ceilings will result in much larger U.S. dismantling requirements than those expected for the Soviet Union despite the fact that the Soviets will have a much more capable strategic force. U.S.*

¹¹ Secret; Noform.

dismantling between 1986 and 1991, for example, will involve two to four times as many warheads as required of the Soviet Union. Thus the unequal nature of the SALT II constraints will tend to increase the strategic disparity that currently favors the Soviet Union.

(U) The SALT II Treaty, even if fully complied with, cannot place any significant constraint upon Soviet strategic capabilities. It has not prevented the Soviet Union from obtaining strategic counterforce disarming capabilities against the U.S. ICBM force. It places no limits on the improvement of Soviet air defenses, civil defenses or ASW capabilities. The Soviets can deploy up to 18,000 strategic warheads, plus refire missiles in unlimited numbers, under SALT II.

(S) The fundamental issue concerning the extension of SALT II beyond its expiration date is not the merits or demerits of the agreement, however, but the fact of multiple Soviet violations of the Treaty. Extending an unratified and "fatally flawed" agreement beyond its expiration date in the wake of multiple Soviet violations of that agreement would be a virtually unprecedented act.

(S) President Reagan has determined the existence of four violations and several probable violations or actions inconsistent with the SALT II Treaty by the Soviet Union. In NSDD 121¹² the President stated that: "The expanding pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements raises serious questions for U.S. national security, our Alliances, arms control, and U.S.-Soviet relations." This judgment was recently reaffirmed in NSDD 161.¹³

(S) The USG now faces a major decision concerning the future of our interim restraint policy. The SALT II Treaty has been violated by the Soviet Union and we have indications of future violations. The Soviet Union has refused to take corrective action when requested by the United States. Soviet activities in the ABM arena threaten a breakout from the ABM Treaty as well. Continued compliance with the SALT II Treaty entails near-term military consequences which were not present when the initial decision to "not undercut" SALT II was made in 1982. Soviet violations of SALT II represent a fundamental change in circumstances. The United States therefore must formulate a policy to deal with these new and unpleasant realities.

(S) United States interim restraint policy was always based upon the condition that the Soviet Union would "exercise equal restraint." The Soviet Union clearly has not. Multiple violations of SALT II, continued over a number of years, with no corrective action by the Soviet Union,

¹² NSDD-121, "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements," is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984.

¹³ See Document 21.

must fundamentally determine the nature of the interim restraint decision now facing the United States. Paul Nitze recently observed that the argument “. . . that SALT II was better than no agreement . . . was a defeatist criterion . . .” If advocating a “bad agreement” is “defeatist,” how much more defeatist is it to comply with one that is being violated by the other side? Paul Nitze continued by observing that advocacy of a bad agreement as better than nothing, “. . . suggested loss of confidence in our ability to maintain an adequate deterrent posture without arms control and implied that we must, therefore, accept more or less what the Soviets had agreed to.” If this is true, then what can be said of a policy of unilaterally complying with SALT II in the face of significant Soviet violations of the agreement? Would the Soviet Union regard as a serious competitor a nation that accepted Soviet violations of major arms control agreements and even extended a “fatally flawed” agreement beyond its expiration date?

35. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 20, 1985

SUBJECT

US Policy on Interim Restraint

A decision on whether to continue interim restraint should be taken in light of its impact on the military balance, the overall US-Soviet relationship, the Geneva negotiations, Soviet noncompliance, Congressional support for US military programs and SDI, and public and Allied reactions.

On balance, it is in our interest to continue the basic regime. We should adopt a modified policy of restraint, under which we would: (1) no longer be bound by the one new ICBM type rule (and so free to pursue Midgetman), and (2) remove Poseidon SSBNs from the active force to caretaker or mothball status in order to stay under the SALT ceilings, but *not* dismantle them pending changes in Soviet compliance practices.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, May 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pifer.

Military Factors

Impact on US. Were we to cease observing interim restraint, between 1986 and 1995 we would exceed the SALT I ceiling on SLBM launchers, and the SALT II subceilings on MIRVed ballistic missiles and MIRVed ballistic missiles plus ALCM-carrying bombers; after 1995 US strategic nuclear forces will be below all SALT limits. To stay within those limits, what is required is mainly an acceleration of the dismantlement of Poseidon SSBNs. The Poseidons have a planned hull life of thirty years; accelerated dismantlement would mean dismantling them in the late 1980s vice the first half of the 1990s.

Were we to dismantle Poseidon SSBNs to stay within SALT, we should still be able to meet our targeting needs. While the Poseidon carries a considerable number of RVs, we would maintain about the same number of total warheads as at present—and they would be far more effective—as we deploy Trident C-4, and later D-5 and MX.

Were we to abandon interim-restraint, it is unlikely we could accelerate new strategic programs to any significant degree, given the long lead times and the difficulty of obtaining additional funds from Congress, particularly in view of budget-cutting pressures. The primary military gain from abandoning interim restraint would thus be retention of Poseidon SSBNs armed with C-3 missiles and their small and relatively inaccurate warheads. They are ineffective against hard targets, and we may now have more than we could rationally employ.

Impact on Soviets. The Soviets will be able to increase the number of their missile RVs over the next ten years, even within the principal SALT ceilings and subceilings. However, absent any restraints, they could increase their RVs to much higher levels. This could result from several factors:

- retention of older ICBMs and SLBMs as new missiles such as the SS-X-24 and SS-X-23 are deployed;
- increasing the number of RVs on SS-18s and the SS-18 follow-on; and
- acceleration of production of new systems (something the Soviets probably can do more easily than we).

Rick Burt sent you a paper² showing how the Soviet Force 3 projection—which assumes SALT constraints are abandoned and the Soviets engage in a “higher level of effort”—could mean 7000 more Soviet RVs in 1995 than if the Soviets abided by the SALT limits. Even the Soviet Force 2 projection—which assumes SALT constraints are abandoned but no “higher level of effort”—would mean an increase of some 3000 RVs over the case in which the Soviets abide by SALT.

²Not found.

In sum, while continuing interim restraint would mean that we would have to dismantle launchers for more RVs *in the near term* than would the Soviets, these would be Poseidon RVs on our side. The gain would be holding Soviet forces down to a level considerably below that to which they could otherwise build.

US-Soviet Relations

Our interim restraint policy has been an element of stability in what has been a sometimes turbulent period in US-Soviet relations, and has been seen as such by Congress, the public and our Allies. We will want to think carefully about ending it, an action which could be seen as signaling a reversal of the President's goal of building a more constructive relationship with Moscow.

Geneva Negotiations

The US in 1982 declared a policy of interim restraint to foster a good atmosphere for the new START talks. Abandoning interim restraint altogether now would be seen as inconsistent with—and would complicate achievement of—our objective of radical reductions in nuclear arms in Geneva. If there are no constraints on strategic forces and the Soviets expand their current warhead advantage (beyond what they can do within SALT), it would be even more difficult to achieve the kinds of reductions we are seeking.

Ceasing to observe interim restraint would also open us to charges of “poisoning” the atmosphere for the NST talks. The Soviets would take this propaganda gift and be that much more inclined to engage in public, posturing—exploiting the latest US “blow” against arms control—rather than real give and take at the bargaining table.

Soviet Noncompliance

Soviet noncompliance is a serious factor to which we must respond, but we should bear two points in mind. First, the SALT II provisions the Soviets have abided by are considerably more significant than those which they have violated. Second, pulling out of the interim restraint regime means giving up any hope of bringing the Soviets into compliance and also means giving up part of the basis for beating them up on compliance.

Congressional Factors

While there is a conservative group on the Hill strongly favoring abandonment of the SALT limits, my guess is that that group is outnumbered by those who favor continued observance of interim restraint as providing a measure of control over the arms competition. If we abandon interim restraint, we would provoke concern over the Administration's intentions regarding arms control. In particular,

it may be seen as a step towards abandoning the ABM Treaty, which would increase Congressional resistance to SDI.

Congressional concern—combined with budget-cutting pressures—would be such that we would be unable to exploit the absence of constraints to accelerate our strategic modernization program. Indeed, it may be more difficult to maintain support for Trident, the MX and B-1, and we may encounter Congressionally mandated limits restricting US forces to within SALT limits.

Public and Allied Reactions

The public would share many of the concerns of Congress. Skeptics of Administration arms control policy would seize upon a move away from interim restraint as another example of our “lack of seriousness” about arms control.

We could expect problems with the Allies, who generally support interim restraint as a positive element for stability in the US-Soviet relationship and are skeptical about our charges of Soviet noncompliance. This is not the sort of problem we need now, when we are trying to maintain Allied support for our approach in Geneva and SDI.

We could also expect Soviet efforts to exploit our abandonment of interim restraint to drive wedges between the USG and both domestic opinion and the Allies.

Recommendation

The interim restraint regime provides important limits on future Soviet force developments at a price—in terms of the forces that we would have to give up—that is marginal. Moreover, abandoning that regime would entail severe political costs with Congress, the public and our Allies and would raise even greater obstacles to the achievement of our objectives in Geneva. Thus, we should seek to maintain the basic regime.

At the same time, we should not let Soviet noncompliance go unchallenged. I therefore recommend we modify our policy of interim restraint along the following lines:

— As the Soviets are proceeding with both the SS-X-24 and SS-25, the US should no longer consider itself bound by SALT II's limitation of one new ICBM type and therefore be free to proceed with Midgetman. (This might have the bonus of giving an impetus to the Midgetman program.)

— Given the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the US would not dismantle Poseidon SSBNs in excess of SALT limitations, but would instead remove their missiles and place the boats in port in caretaker or mothball status. The missile tube hatches would be left open so that the Soviets could verify the missiles had been removed (we could also offer on-site inspection). We would state that we would reconsider ultimate disposition of the SSBNs in view of changes in Soviet compliance

practices. (This means we would be observing the SALT limits in principle but would also have a breakout capability if needed in view of Soviet actions and as a hedge against Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. This also provides a “carrot” for the Soviets to change their ways.)

With the above modifications, we should extend our policy of observing interim restraint until the end of 1986, at which time we would again review that policy in view of the overall US-Soviet relationship, developments in Geneva, and Soviet compliance practices. I see several advantages to a limited duration extension of our interim restraint policy. A time-limited extension maintains some pressure on the Soviets to negotiate in Geneva for a replacement regime. Moreover, the first three Poseidon SSBNs that would have to be placed in caretaker status need reactor refueling and other work (at a cost of at least \$200 million each, funds for which have not been programmed); after 1986, continuing interim restraint could mean retiring SSBNs that may not be in need of such work.

While we should inform the Soviets in advance of our decision, I see little utility in trying to negotiate a new regime with them. It would only divert attention from our effort to negotiate reductions, and the likely Soviet response would be to refuse to agree to any modification of interim restraint, leaving us in the position of demandeur with little to offer for their agreement.

36. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, May 21, 1985

I-85/23800. Subject: (U) Upcoming Decisions on Congressional Strategy on the Peacekeeper Missile.

(S) At your request, I am writing to convey to you my view on the appropriate strategy to pursue in the course of upcoming Congressional deliberations on the FY1986 request for Peacekeeper missile funding. The decisions the President will make on this strategy are of enormous

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 828, Subject File, 1985 President—memoranda to #149–197 (4). Secret.

importance insofar as three areas of vital concern to me will be directly and, perhaps, critically affected. The approach we adopt toward the MX must be considered in light of its implications for: the strategic balance with the USSR, the prospects for sound and equitable arms control, and the risks to the national security which might result from perceived erosion of the President's political leadership.

Implications for the Strategic Balance:

(S) As you know, I regard the Peacekeeper missile program of 100 missiles deployed in Minuteman silos as the centerpiece of the President's Strategic Modernization Program (SMP). The SMP is, in turn, the single most important determinant in calculating our future ability to deter the Soviet Union and preserve the security of the United States.

(S) Put in other words, without the *full* MX program—a program, it should be remembered, designed to respond to Soviet strategic developments of the 1970's—serious and possibly irreparable harm will be done to the Nation's deterrent posture. Even if one were to assume that an interruption or cessation of Peacekeeper deployments will not have untoward repercussions on other elements of the SMP, our inability to respond *even in small measure* to the Soviet build-up of prompt, hard-target kill capability would make permanent the existing imbalance in this vital measure of strategic power. You can readily appreciate the profound and adverse consequences such a development would have both for stability and for our influence as a world power.

Implications for Arms Control:

(S) You are well acquainted with my thinking on the indispensability of the full strategic modernization program to our negotiating strength at Geneva and to the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in the Nuclear and Space Talks. It is worth noting in this context, however, one other way in which the SMP, in general, and the Peacekeeper, in particular, contribute critically to our negotiating posture.

(S) Every one of the outcomes we seek at Geneva is assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its ability to satisfy our national security requirements. The positions we have tabled to date have all been found to be acceptable in this respect in the expectation that U.S. strategic capabilities would include under each regime the forces planned under the SMP. Consequently, if we are unable to secure Congressional approval for the full MX program and/or other SMP elements, the adequacy of our negotiating positions will have to be reappraised.

(S) It goes without saying that such a reappraisal could be time-consuming, difficult and, ultimately, might produce recommendations at odds with current Administration negotiating goals. For example, in the absence of vital strategic modernization, we may be unable to feel

confident that we could satisfy our strategic requirements at radically reduced levels of forces.

(S) In short, both our ability to induce the Soviets to join with us in achieving meaningful arms reductions and our ability to strive for such a laudable and desirable goal depend directly upon realization of the complete Peacekeeper and strategic modernization programs.

Implications for Presidential Leadership:

(S) The next Congressional votes on the MX program come at a critical time in our nation's history. It is a time of testing for President Reagan—testing by our principal adversary, by our Allies and by the Congress.

(S) General Secretary Gorbachev, still a relative newcomer to national leadership, is clearly preoccupied with consolidating his authority and preeminence. If he can do so without serious risk, he may well seek to use the assertion of Soviet power as a means of enhancing his personal standing with the military. Gorbachev's assessment of such risk may depend to a considerable extent upon his perceptions of the President's political strength domestically and internationally.

(S) Allied leaders are facing important political challenges of their own. Several are reading the tea-leaves of recent electoral defeats as part of the process of deciding how best to position themselves for their own turn at the polls. As ever, their willingness to be identified with American policies will be a function in some measure, at least, of their perception of the U.S. President's political health.

(S) Finally, as you well know, notwithstanding President Reagan's sweeping mandate of last November, many in Congress are anxious to reduce him at the outset of his second term to the status of a feckless "lame-duck." Nowhere are the stakes likely to be higher and the effort of his opponents more concerted than in the challenges to his leadership on national security matters.

(S) The uncontested rejection by the Congress of the President's Peacekeeper missile program would be regarded by these three parties as encouragement for each of them to move in directions contrary to our interests. It is impossible to know at this point in what way each might react or with what effect; it is sufficient to say we should try to avoid finding out.

Conclusion and Recommendation:

(S) In my judgment, for the reasons outlined above, the MX program *must be* fully funded by the Congress. While I could support, extremely reluctantly and only if deemed absolutely necessary, a tactical decision to agree to the reduced procurement rate for FY 1986 recommended

by both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees (i.e., 21 missiles), that should be the *only* compromise contemplated by the Administration. Under no circumstances should serious consideration be given to a “pause” in Peacekeeper procurement, a cap on deployment of MX, or—it should go without saying—to the termination of this vital program.

(S) While there will doubtless be intense pressure to find such a “face-saving” compromise, I feel strongly that the national security would be seriously and adversely affected were the President to agree to do so. The strategic balance would shift markedly and probably permanently against us; our prospects—and even our positions—at the arms control talks would be undermined; and the President’s critical leadership on national security matters would be dangerously degraded with unknown consequences for U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Allied and executive-legislative branch relations.

(S) In particular, with respect to the last of these considerations, I believe the record of the past few months argues persuasively for firm, unflinching Presidential leadership. We simply can no longer afford, in the face of reverses on Nicaragua and the defense budget, to treat with the most implacable of our Congressional adversaries on an equal—if not preferential—footing to that afforded our friends.

(S) Now, as never before, is the moment to “hang tough.” The President should make it clear to the Congressional leadership that he will veto without hesitation any bill providing funds for the Department of Defense (DoD authorization, appropriation or continuing resolution measures) if it fails to provide the requisite funds for the Peacekeeper program leading to the scheduled Full Operational Capability of this system. The President knows that there is no point in sending his negotiators to Geneva if the program is not funded as requested (or with SASC/HASC amendments); he should give serious consideration to announcing he will not do so if his MX program is not approved.

(S) This approach will, of course, generate controversy and criticism. It is not only the principled and right course of action, however; it is also the sole strategy with a realistic chance of supporting our manifold national security objectives and requirements.

Cap

37. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Kelley) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, May 23, 1985

JCSM–208–85. Subject: Interim Restraint Policy (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have analyzed the military implications of the options available to the United States with regard to interim restraint policy. In conducting the analysis, we examined each option against the requirement of the four military objectives for deterrence: (a) continuation of the Strategic Modernization Program; (b) support for strong conventional forces; (c) protection of the Strategic Defense Initiative; and (d) maintaining strong alliances including continued support for INF deployments.

2. (S) The review of each interim restraint option has led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that two options offer the best possibility for maintaining the necessary support and backing. The first option would be to continue the present interim restraint as we have over the past several years. This would be linked to continued use of the Standing Consultative Commission and public fora to highlight Soviet noncompliance. For the next 2 to 3 years, it would have little effect on our ability to carry out our Strategic Modernization Program under the restraints. The second option would be to declare that the United States no longer will be bound by unverifiable treaties which have had only selective Soviet compliance and which have not limited Soviet nuclear weapons, but that the United States will pursue independent and prudent restraints of its own nuclear weapons. Such independent US restraints could be along the following lines:

The United States would announce a commitment independently to restrain proliferation of nuclear weapons in lieu of being bound by past commitments to observe SALT I and II limits. The United States would instead determine the size of its strategic forces based on Western security needs. The United States would cease using SALT dismantlement procedures and when strategic systems are withdrawn, the Executive Branch would certify their inactivation to Congress and the public. The Soviets would be invited to inspect inactivated systems in addition to use of Soviet NTM. Under this option, the United States would begin the new policy on 1 January 1986.

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 837, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R. #64–73 (6). Secret.

3. (U) With respect to these two remaining options, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the selection should be made only after consultation with congressional leaders and US allies, and that whichever option is selected must be supported with a carefully developed public diplomacy plan.

4. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request you forward these views to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

P. X. Kelley
General, USMC
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

38. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, May 24, 1985

SUBJECT

Long-Range Peacekeeper Strategy

Now that the Senate floor debate is behind us, I felt it might be helpful to spell out for you what I think needs to be done after the House deals with the M-X authorization in early June.

In your press briefing yesterday you noted the President's intention to examine (in the course of the next year) the full range of issues that affect the deployment level and basing concepts for M-X.

As we take a new look at these issues, I'd like to suggest to you that we first do so on a very close-hold basis. I envision an NSSD on this subject to be released about mid-June, asking DOD to report to the President on a close-hold, classified basis, about mid-August, what they believe our options to be. I would also ask them for a recommendation as to how we should deal with the issue on a public basis, i.e., Report to Congress, another Scowcroft review, and so forth. I also believe we should encourage DOD to rethink the issue from stem to

¹ Source: Reagan Library, W Files, Special Programs (1985) [Folder 3]. Secret. Sent for action.

stern in making their private assessment to us. We should let them tell us how many missiles we need and what can be done to base increments beyond the first 50.

An event bearing on this is the January 1986 Defense Science Board's report on M–X basing, which has been mandated by the SASC. This could be the report we need to make our plans public.

I also believe we should review the small missile as a part of this process. I can't envision a report on future basing of M–X that doesn't come to grips with our latest analysis on the basing issues and costs we see ahead for the small ICBM.

Finally, it's important to remember that if we do recommend a new basing mode, we need to [get] started on RDT&E as soon as possible. In my view, the DOD Report to the President should also cover ways to get started on new basing research next year, if appropriate.²

Bob Linhard, Ron Sable, and Don Fortier concur.

Recommendation

That I prepare an NSDD on future M–X options for release to DOD in mid-June.³

² Fortier wrote below his name: "believe review should indeed be far-reaching!"

³ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

39. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, May 28, 1985

Interim Restraint: Talking Points for Meeting with the President

— Decision on whether to continue to abide by SALT I and II will be one of most important of your Presidency, with major impact on Geneva negotiations and overall US-Soviet relationship.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 May 29 Mtg. w/ the PRES. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the talking points. Burt and Chain forwarded the talking points to Shultz under cover of a May 28 memorandum, in which they wrote: "Attached are talking points on Interim Restraint you may wish to draw upon in your Wednesday meeting with the President." (Ibid.) According to the President's Daily Diary, Shultz met with Reagan and McFarlane in the Oval Office from 2 until 2:30 p.m. on May 29. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes have been found.

— Monday's NSC meeting² is important opportunity to look at the issue in all its aspects, and to air different viewpoints.

— I will be departing for NATO Ministerial after the NSC. Allies have made clear their interest in discussing Interim Restraint issue, and I would like to have opportunity to consult and personally report their views before final decisions are taken.

— In weighing our decision on Interim Restraint, have to balance two competing considerations:

- On one hand, can't ignore Soviet violations of certain provisions of SALT I and II, appear to sweep them under rug.

- On other hand, must take into account adverse military and political consequences of potential unraveling of existing limits.

— Soviet violations are serious, and erode confidence in arms control. Most clear-cut violations of SALT are testing of second new-type ICBM and encryption of telemetry.

— Krasnoyarsk radar also represents gross disregard for spirit and letter of ABM Treaty. While radar is separate from Interim Restraint and should continue to be pursued in SCC and Geneva talks, it is part of larger problem of Soviet non-compliance.

— Clearly, something needs to be done in response. At NSC meeting you will hear full spectrum of views, including recommendation that we end all further observance of SALT limits.

— In my view, however, we must not throw out baby with bathwater.

— Soviets have continued to dismantle systems to comply with SALT ceilings on numbers of launchers (see table). Their increased military threat is due largely to the permissive SALT II limits, not Soviet violations.

— Intelligence Community estimates Soviets could expand to 16,000–19,500 missile warheads by mid-90s if not bound by SALT constraints, or 30–55 percent more than likely if they continued to abide by the SALT launcher and warhead limits.

— We should avoid actions that give Soviets license for a further build-up, while we take blame for scuttling arms control and provide Soviets with major propaganda tool.

— Perception US was abandoning current restraints would cause serious concerns on part of Allies and many in Congress, undercut support for our positions in Geneva. For example, British Foreign Secretary Howe told me it would be difficult to obtain Allied support for SDI if it appeared existing restraints were unraveling.

²June 3.

— On balance, it is in our net interest to maintain existing framework largely intact, as we pursue better arrangement in Geneva. We must, at same time, respond to Soviet violations to maintain our credibility and continue to hold Soviets accountable for their non-compliance.

— I see two realistic courses of action:

— My first choice would be to continue to adhere to the provisions of SALT I and II, and to seek a supplemental defense authorization to accelerate our strategic modernization program as a measured but meaningful response to Soviet actions.

◦ This would address current and potential military significance of Soviet violations, deny Soviets pretext for a further breakout from SALT limits, while we continued to press for corrective action to reverse erosion of SALT restraints.

◦ The supplemental would need to encompass measures that look beyond the strategic modernization program. Joint Chiefs should decide where additional efforts should be made.

◦ We will, in any case, want to press for funding for those programs curtailed by Congress.

— I recognize that it will be extremely difficult to build support in Congress for a supplemental, particularly post-MX.

— My second choice would be to continue to adhere to main SALT I and II provisions, but with certain modifications to offset Soviet violations.

— Specifically, we would remove Poseidon missiles from the active force to stay under the MIRV missile limits, but deactivate rather than dismantle the boats.

— Likewise, we would claim right to an appropriate response to the SS-25. This might entail going forward with Midgetman as a second new-type ICBM. (Paul Nitze also suggests the possibility of proceeding with a Multiple Protective Shelter system, as encouraged by Senator Nunn; this was judged earlier as consistent with SALT II.)

◦ This approach might be seen as more direct response to Soviet violations, yet still demonstrate US desire to maintain framework of restraint while Geneva negotiations proceed.

◦ It could, however, pose greater risk of an unraveling of remaining limits, if the Soviets selectively abandoned other provisions, or deactivated systems in unverifiable ways.

Attachment

Table Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

SALT Dismantlements Since 1972

	<u>U.S. Launchers</u>	<u>USSR Launchers</u>
ICBM	18	229
SLBM	<u>128</u>	<u>221</u>
Total	146	450

◦ The USSR also has converted 800 launchers of SS-9s and SS-11s into launchers for SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s. Without SALT I the Soviets could have retained the old ICBMs as new ones entered the force.

◦ SALT I does not limit heavy bombers. No formal procedures exist for the dismantlement, destruction, or conversion of heavy bombers accountable under SALT II. The U.S. has dismantled 42 B-52s which remain accountable under SALT II. The Soviets have converted 2 Bison bombers to tankers, and deactivated 35 Bisons, which also remain accountable under SALT II.

³ Secret.

40. National Security Decision Directive 172¹

Washington, May 30, 1985

PRESENTING THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (U)

In my speech of March 23, 1983, I presented my vision of a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program is designed to determine whether, and if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision. (U)

The purpose of this directive is to insure clarity and precision in our public and diplomatic presentation of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Assuring public, allied and congressional support is key to any hope of realizing the military and arms control potential of this initiative. It is absolutely essential that all who are perceived to speak for the United States present a coherent and accurate picture of the program's nature and objectives. Failing to do so will create misunderstanding and suspicion of our intentions. This undermines the support that we seek, provides the Soviets additional propaganda opportunities, and adds to the difficulty of the task that our negotiators face in Geneva. This directive provides my guidance on the manner in which I want the Strategic Defense Initiative and the SDI research program presented. (C)

The Strategic Context (U)

The support that we are currently receiving for SDI research is due, in large part, to our ability to present U.S. intentions in the proper strategic context. As we do so, we must consistently emphasize that the U.S. SDI research program is wholly compatible with the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to research permitted by the ABM Treaty which the Soviets have been conducting for many years, and is a prudent hedge against Soviet breakout from ABM Treaty limitations through the deployment of a territorial ballistic missile defense. These important facts deserve emphasis. However, the basic intent behind the Strategic Defense Initiative must continue to be explained

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 172, [Presenting the Strategic Defense Initiative]. Secret. McFarlane distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Casey, Vessey, Adelman, and Keyworth under a May 31 covering memorandum: "Attached is the Decision Directive on Presenting the Strategic Defense Initiative." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis and Exdis Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D092, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: June 1–30, 1985)

and understood in terms of the strategic environment we face for the balance of this century and into the next. (U)

The Challenges We Face. Our nation and those nations allied with us face a number of challenges to our security. Each of these challenges imposes its own demands and presents its own opportunities. Preserving peace and freedom is, and always will be, our fundamental goal. The essential purpose of our military forces, and our nuclear forces in particular, is to deter aggression and coercion based upon the threat of military aggression. The deterrence provided by U.S. and Allied military forces has permitted us to enjoy peace and freedom. However, the nature of the military threat has changed and will continue to change in very fundamental ways in the next decade. Unless we adapt our response, deterrence will become much less stable and our susceptibility to coercion will increase dramatically. (U)

Our Assumptions About Deterrence. For the past twenty years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. Our idea of what our forces had to hold at risk to deter aggression has changed over time. For example, we have moved away from simply holding at risk significant portions of Soviet industry and population. Today, we do not target population *per se*. Instead, our current strategy focuses on being able to deny basic Soviet war aims by holding at risk the military, industrial and C3 capabilities needed to carry out and exploit aggression. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation provided by offensive nuclear forces, as the essential means of deterring aggression, has not changed over this period. (C)

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process of the 1970's. At the time that process began, the U.S. concluded that deterrence based on the capability of offensive retaliatory forces was not only sensible, but necessary, since we believed at the time that neither side could develop the technology for defensive systems which could effectively deter the other side. (U)

Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. Scientific developments and several emerging technologies now do offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist and could hardly have been conceived earlier. The state of the art of defense has now progressed to the point where it is reasonable to investigate whether new technologies can yield options, especially non-nuclear options, which could

permit us to turn to defense not only to enhance deterrence, but to allow us to move to a more secure and more stable long-term basis for deterrence. (U)

Of equal importance, the Soviet Union has failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process began. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as the growing pattern of Soviet deception and of non-compliance with existing agreements, if permitted to continue unchecked over the long-term, will undermine the essential military balance and the mutuality of vulnerability on which deterrence theory has rested. (U)

Soviet Offensive Improvements. The Soviet Union remains the principal threat to our security and that of our allies. As a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its military capabilities, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the survivability of forces we have deployed to deter aggression. It has posed an especially immediate challenge to our land-based retaliatory forces and to the leadership structure that commands them. It equally threatens many critical fixed installations in the United States and in allied nations that support the nuclear retaliatory and conventional forces which provide our collective ability to deter conflict and aggression. (U)

Improvement of Soviet Active Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development and improvement of active defenses. These active defenses provide the Soviet Union a steadily increasing capability to counter U.S. retaliatory forces and those of our allies, especially if our forces were to be degraded by a Soviet first strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are extensive. For example, the Soviet Union possesses the world's only currently deployed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, deployed to protect Moscow. The Soviet Union is currently improving all elements of this system. It also has the world's only deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive air defense network and it is aggressively improving the quality of its radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. It also has a very extensive network of ballistic missile early warning radars. All of these elements provide them an area of relative advantage in strategic defense today, and, with logical evolutionary improvement, could provide the foundation of decisive advantage in the future. (U)

Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. The Soviet Union is also spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership. These efforts range from providing rail

and road mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to extensive hardening of various critical installations, including the construction of a network of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership. (S)

Soviet Research and Development on Advanced Defenses. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a wide range of strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive elements. The resulting trends have shown steady improvement and expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current patterns of Soviet research and development, ranging from demonstrating a capability with their SA-X-12 surface-to-air missile against some ballistic missiles to a long-standing and intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas which our SDI program will address, indicate that these trends will continue apace for the foreseeable future. If unanswered, continued Soviet defensive improvements will further erode the effectiveness of our own existing deterrent, based as it is now, almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation by offensive forces. Therefore, this longstanding Soviet program of defensive improvements, in itself, poses a challenge to deterrence which we must address. (S)

Soviet Non-compliance and Verification. Finally, the problem of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in constructing their new phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in Central Siberia, has very immediate and ominous consequences. When operational, this radar, due to its location, will increase the Soviet Union's capability to deploy a territorial ballistic missile defense. Recognizing that such radars would make such a contribution, the ABM Treaty expressly banned the construction of such radars at such locations as one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty. The Soviet Union's activity with respect to this radar is in direct violation of the ABM Treaty. (U)

Against the backdrop of this Soviet pattern of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements, the Soviet Union is also taking other actions which affect our ability to verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their increased use of encryption during testing, are directly aimed at degrading our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Other actions contribute to the problem we face in monitoring Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet increases in the number of its mobile ballistic missiles, especially those armed with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles, and other mobile systems, will make verification less and less certain. If we fail to respond to these trends, we should also expect to reach a point in the foreseeable future where we would have little confidence in our assessment of the state of the military balance or imbalance, with all that implies for our ability to control escalation during crisis. (S)

Responding to the Challenge. In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet offensive and defensive improvement, the United States is compelled to take certain actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near-term, and to ensure these conditions in the future. We must act in three main areas. (U)

Retaliatory Force Modernization. First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in the near-term, and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue complementary actions in the areas of arms reduction negotiations and defensive research. For our part, in 1981 we embarked on our strategic modernization program aimed at reversing a long period of decline. This modernization program was specifically designed to preserve stable deterrence and, at the same time, to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. (U)

In addition to the U.S. strategic modernization program, NATO is modernizing its Longer-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (LRINF). Our British and French allies also have underway important programs to improve their own national strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI research program does not negate the necessity of these U.S. and allied programs. Rather, the SDI research program depends upon our collective and national modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we explore options for future decision on how we might enhance security and stability over the longer term. (U)

New Deterrent Options. However, over the long run, the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that pattern of activity, suggest that continued long-term dependence on offensive forces may not provide a stable basis for deterrence. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition could destroy the theoretical and empirical foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation. (U)

Therefore, we must now also take steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and stability over the long-term, and we must do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces and to channel long-standing Soviet propensities for defenses toward more stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is specifically aimed towards these goals. (U)

In the near term, the SDI program also responds directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the

existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its anti-ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. However, the overriding, long-term importance of SDI is that it offers the possibility of reversing the dangerous military trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing offensive nuclear arsenals. (U)

The Soviet Union recognizes the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, post-boost, and mid-course defenses—to change the strategic situation. In our investigation of the potential these systems offer, we do not seek superiority or to establish a unilateral advantage. However, if the promise of SDI technologies is proven, the destabilizing Soviet advantage can be redressed. And, in the process, deterrence will be strengthened significantly and placed on a foundation made more stable by reducing the role of ballistic missile weapons and by placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one. (U)

Negotiation and Diplomacy. During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defense arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and also free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree. (U)

To support these goals, we will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve these reductions, but will judge these mechanisms on their ability to enhance the security of the United States and our allies, to strengthen strategic stability, and to reduce the risk of war. (U)

In the ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union, we will protect the potential offered by the SDI research program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent in the future. This specifically involves protecting our legitimate right to conduct research on those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, mid-course and

terminal elements. Not only is such research necessary and appropriate, but restrictions on research—research in many areas long explored by the Soviet Union itself, and of a nature fully permitted by the ABM Treaty—have long been recognized as unverifiable. (S)

At the same time, the SDI research program is and will be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies about the potential next steps. We would then, consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union, pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. This commitment does not mean that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome anymore than the Soviets have a veto over our current strategic and intermediate-range programs. Our commitment in this regard reflects our recognition that, if our research yields appropriate results, we should seek to move forward in a stable way. We have already begun the process of bilateral discussion in Geneva needed to lay the foundation for the stable integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations may make it desirable to do so. (U)

The Soviet Union's View of SDI (U)

As noted above, the USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment. (U)

The Soviet Union also fully understands that the SDI program—and most especially, that portion of the program which holds out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and mid-course portions of their flight—offers the prospect of redressing Soviet offensive advantages, accumulated over years of investment. In response, even while continuing its own pursuit of improved defenses, the Soviet Union will likely continue to emphasize its propaganda theme of “preventing the militarization of space.” In doing so, it can be expected to continue to attempt to block certain advanced technologies associated with the SDI research program in order to confine the potential for future defensive developments to more traditional areas which are consistent with the long-term pattern of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage. The Soviet Union is likely also to propose restraints on U.S. anti-satellite capability to inhibit or block related SDI technologies. (C)

Allied Views Concerning SDI (U)

Our allies understand the military context in which the Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the SDI research program. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following my meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, to the effect that:

— first, the United States and Western aim was not to achieve superiority, but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments;

— second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;

— third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine deterrence; and,

— fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. (U)

This common understanding is also reflected in other statements since then—for example, the principles suggested recently by the Federal Republic of Germany that:

— the existing NATO strategy of flexible response must remain fully valid for the Alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war; and,

— the Alliance's political and strategic unity must be safeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of security in the Alliance, and Europe's security must not be decoupled from that of North America. (U)

Presenting the SDI Program (U)

In presenting the SDI research program, U.S. officials must draw upon the information provided above to ensure that U.S. intentions are correctly understood. In addition, all U.S. officials describing the SDI research program should stress the following themes. (U)

1. *The aim of SDI is not to seek superiority, but to maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable deterrence.* (U)

A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI is designed to secure military superiority for the U.S. Put in the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is certainly not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses—defenses that threaten no one. (U)

2. *Research will last for some years. We intend to adhere strictly to ABM Treaty limitations and will insist that the Soviets to do so as well.* (U)

The SDI research program is a complex one that must be carried out on a broad front of technologies. It is not a program where all resource considerations are secondary to a schedule. Instead it is a responsible, organized research program that is aggressively seeking cost-effective approaches for defending the United States and our Allies against the threat of nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed ballistic missiles of all ranges. We expect that the research will proceed so that initial development decisions could be made in the early nineties. (U)

Soviet propagandists attempt to contrast the U.S. and Soviet strategic defense programs by claiming that the SDI research program is a violation of the ABM Treaty while similar Soviet research is not. This is based upon their false assertion that the U.S. has already decided to deploy a territorial defense. To support this allegation, they assert: "that the U.S. has already decided to abrogate the ABM Treaty; that the U.S. is emphasizing Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty and other obligations in order to justify this action; and that abrogation will occur in the near future." (C)

We should take every appropriate opportunity to make clear that we are conducting a broad-based research program, in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made to proceed beyond research. Some of the themes below build upon this critical point. (U)

With respect to Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty and with other obligations, we have made it clear that we have expressed our legitimate concerns because such actions threaten U.S. and allied security and significantly undermine the prospects for genuine progress in negotiated arms reductions. Our concerns about Soviet noncompliance should be presented in this context. Care must be exercised that they not be linked to SDI in such a way as to appear to reinforce the Soviet propaganda line. (C)

3. *We do not have any preconceived notions about the defensive options the research may generate. We will not proceed to development and deployment unless the research indicates that defenses meet strict criteria.* (U)

The U.S. is pursuing the broad-based SDI research program in an objective manner. We have no preconceived notions about the outcome of the research program. We do not anticipate that we will be in a position to approach any decision to proceed with development or deployment based on the results of this research for a number of years. (U)

We have identified key criteria that will be applied to the results of this research whenever they become available. Some options which could provide interim capabilities may be available earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we maintain options against a range of contingencies. However, the primary thrust of the SDI research program is not to focus on generating options for the earliest

development/deployment decision, but options which best meet our identified criteria. (U)

4. Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective at the margin. (U)

Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment of defensive systems would harm crisis stability and that it would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We have identified specific criteria to address these fears appropriately and directly. (U)

Our survivability criterion responds to the first concern. If a defensive system were not adequately survivable, an adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike first at vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this criterion will ensure that such a vulnerable system would not be deployed, and, consequently, that the Soviets would have no incentive nor prospect of overwhelming it. (U)

Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while others can discourage such a counter effort. We seek defensive options which provide clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces. (U)

In addition, we are pressing to reduce offensive nuclear arms through the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles to equal levels significantly lower than exist today. (U)

5. It is too early in our research program to speculate on the kinds of defensive systems—whether ground-based or space-based and with what capabilities—that might prove feasible and desirable to develop and deploy. (U)

Discussion of the various technologies under study is certainly needed to give concreteness to the understanding of the research program. However, speculation about various types of defensive systems that might be deployed is inappropriate. The SDI is a broad-based research program investigating many technologies. We currently see real merit in the potential of advanced technologies providing for a layered defense, with the possibility of negating a ballistic missile at various points after launch. We feel that the possibility of a layered defense both enhances confidence in the overall system and compounds the problem of a potential aggressor in trying to defeat such a defense. However, the paths to such a defense are numerous. (U)

Along the same lines, some have asked about the role of nuclear-related research in the context of our ultimate goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our current research program certainly emphasizes non-nuclear technologies, we will continue to explore the promising concepts which use nuclear energy to power devices which could destroy ballistic missiles at great distances. Further, it is useful to study these concepts to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of similar defensive systems that an adversary may develop for use against future U.S. surveillance and defensive or offensive systems. (U)

6. The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear—to find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they can reach any of their potential targets. (U)

We ultimately seek a future in which nations can live in peace and freedom, secure in the knowledge that their national security does not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, the SDI research program will place its emphasis on options which provide the basis for eliminating the general threat posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal of our research is not, and cannot be, simply to protect our retaliatory forces from attack. (U)

If a future President elects to move toward a general defense against ballistic missiles, the technological options that we explore will certainly also increase the survivability of our retaliatory forces. This will require a stable concept and process to manage the transition to the future we seek. The concept and process must be based upon a realistic treatment of not only U.S. but Soviet forces and out-year programs. (U)

7. U.S. and Allied security remains indivisible. The SDI program is designed to enhance Allied security as well as U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered. (U)

Although this has been a fundamental part of U.S. policy since the inception of my Strategic Defense Initiative, and U.S. statements have been consistent on this point, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and to be sensitive to the manner in which we present and defend the SDI program before allied audiences. We have made a serious commitment to consult, and such consultations will precede any steps taken relative to the SDI research program which may affect our allies. (U)

8. If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive deployments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to initiate a discussion

of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the Defense and Space Talks underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations. (U)

If, at some future time, the U.S., in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for U.S./Soviet consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own expansive defensive systems research program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union. (U)

9. It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance. (U)

Soviet propagandists have accused the U.S. of reneging on commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is just the opposite—a cooperative approach designed to maintain, at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems of both sides, and thereby increase the confidence of all nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic balance. (U)

10. SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring war and enhancing stability. (U)

Successful SDI research and development of defense options would not lead to abandonment of deterrence, but rather to an enhancement of deterrence and an evolution in the weapons of deterrence through the contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one. *We would deter a potential aggressor by making it clear that we could deny him the gains he might otherwise hope to achieve rather than merely threatening him with costs large enough to outweigh those gains. (U)*

U.S. policy supports the basic principle that our existing method of deterrence, and NATO's existing strategy of flexible response, remain fully valid, and must be fully supported, as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war. It is in clear recognition of this obvious fact that the U.S. continues to pursue so vigorously its own strategic modernization program and so strongly supports the efforts of its allies to sustain their own commitments to maintain the forces, both nuclear and conventional, that provide today's deterrence. (U)

We must avoid denigrating current western nuclear deterrent strategy. The U.S. objective is to explore better ways of maintaining deterrence and the strategic balance in the future. The purpose of the SDI research program is to generate options for future decision that will permit us to do more than simply threaten offensive retaliation. We seek options that would let us move to a more stable and secure deterrence

of all war based upon the contribution of defenses that threaten no one. However, our research will take time. (U)

Since we will be living with reliance on offensive retaliation for deterrence for many years to come, it does us and our allies a significant disservice to question the morality of our current deterrent. Given the realities of the situation we face, including the limited options we currently have for maintaining peace and freedom, deterrence based upon the threat of nuclear retaliation is both necessary and moral. However, we do hope that our research will extend the range of options available to us and, thus, the fundamental nature of the situation. Until it does, we should not fail to recognize fully the necessary contribution that deterrence based upon the threat of nuclear retaliation makes and will be required to make for some time to come. In this regard, we strongly support efforts by our allies to strengthen their forces, just as we as strongly support basic Alliance military strategy. (U)

11. *For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible and credible strategic nuclear forces.* (U)

This point reflects the fact that we must simultaneously use a number of tools to achieve our goals today while looking for better ways to achieve our goals over the longer term. It expresses our basic rationale for sustaining the U.S. strategic modernization program and the rationale for the critically needed national modernization programs being conducted by the United Kingdom and France. (U)

12. *Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements, and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence building measures.* (U)

We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means. (U)

Managing the Presentation of the U.S. SDI Program (U)

To ensure that we are indeed clear in presenting U.S. policy in this critical area, all of our presentations on the SDI program must be coordinated effectively. Therefore, all major public statements, briefings, reports, speeches, articles, op ed pieces, etc. which are generated by officials of this Administration and which involve the U.S. SDI program will be cleared in advance by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. No statements by officials of this Administration will

be made publicly, or in diplomatic, military, or scientific channels, that have not been so cleared. (C)

In addition, major public or diplomatic contacts on SDI shall be fully coordinated on an interagency basis and cleared in advance with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (C)

Ronald Reagan

41. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 1, 1985

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

I. PURPOSE

To review the options for future Interim Restraint Policy.

II. BACKGROUND

U.S. policy regarding the SALT agreements is that we will not undercut them so long as the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. Upcoming U.S. dismantlement decisions and Soviet noncompliance as well as a Congressionally mandated report due June 1 dictate a review of our Interim Restraint Policy at this time. In an interim response to the Congress, we have indicated that we intend to forward the report by June 10. The agenda for the NSC meeting, which will review the policy options, is at *Tab A*.² A description of the various policy options is at *Tab C* and a summary of dismantlement requirements, should we continue a policy of not undercutting SALT I and II, is at *Tab D*.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at *Tab B*.³

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-104, NSC 00118. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Prepared by Wright and Kraemer. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it. Reagan wrote his initials in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. The meeting was scheduled to take place on June 3 from 11:00 a.m. until noon in the Cabinet Room.

² Attached but not printed is the agenda.

³ Attached but not printed is the list of participants.

IV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject by way of background and review of the issues. Next I will outline the Interim Restraint Policy options and we will devote about 40 minutes to general discussions. No specific decisions are being requested at this meeting. After the meeting and after Secretary Shultz's consultations with our European Allies, we will recommend an NSDD to be issued before the end of the week which will form the basis of the June 10 report to the Congress.

Tab C

Options Paper ⁴

Washington, undated

INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY OPTIONS

CURRENT POLICY	<i>We will take no actions which undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint.</i>
OPTION A	<i>Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II and continue current strategic programs.</i> Continue no undercut; depends on the full Strategic Modernization Program; continues US commitment not to undercut existing agreements; keeps open future force options.
OPTION B	<i>Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II, but with a programmatic response to Soviet violations.</i> Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II; request a supplemental appropriation to increase US deterrent capability; continue to condemn Soviet violations; review policy periodically.
OPTION C	<i>Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II, but with exceptions.</i> Continue not to undercut launcher limits of SALT I and SALT II but respond to Soviet violations by flexibility re dismantling Poseidons, etc.
OPTION D	<i>Discontinue no undercut of SALT I and SALT II.</i> Discontinue policy of not undercutting SALT I and SALT II; the US will size and configure its strategic offensive forces to provide an effective deterrent to aggression.

⁴Secret; Sensitive; Noform. A summary and presentation of Option C is missing in the original.

OPTION E Adopt a new policy of US independent restraint.
Discontinue policy of not undercutting SALT I and SALT II; maintain adequate strategic forces for Western security; continue SDI research; independently exercise restraint concerning increases in nuclear forces.

Option A: Continue Current Policy and Strategic Programs

This option, which depends on the Strategic Modernization Program to address the strategic nuclear balance, would continue U.S. commitment to not undercut existing arms control agreements. At the same time, it would keep open future force options to go beyond SALT limits if lack of progress at Geneva or Soviet behavior so warranted. This option is intended to maintain an arms control posture which is supportive of the President's commitment to deep reductions of strategic nuclear forces. To allow the U.S. to maintain stable deterrence with potent and flexible forces capable of responding to Soviet aggression at any level of conflict, the option is intended to promote and sustain broad support from the U.S. public, Congress and the Allies for the Strategic Modernization Program, strong and modernized conventional forces, continuing improvements to NATO's defenses and the promise of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Finally, it proposes addressing the Soviet Union's violations of existing arms control agreements in such a way that allows the United States to exert leverage on the Soviet Union to observe its commitments to abide by the provisions of those agreements. It could also create the circumstances by which we can continue to call national and international attention to these violations.

Presentation

This reaffirmation of current policy should be announced in a major Presidential speech. The speech should be made when it could best affect the Geneva negotiations, influence key defense votes in Congress, and garner support from our Allies. In it the President would stress the following points: The United States remains firmly committed to deep reductions in strategic forces and to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. We will continue to make every effort to achieve these goals in negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The U.S. has continued to abide by our political commitment not to undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the USSR shows equal restraint. It is now evident that this restraint has been increasingly one-sided as the Soviets have selectively violated provisions of SALT II as well as other arms control agreements. Such behavior, should it continue, undermines the prospects for meaningful arms control and could threaten deterrence. The U.S. believes in equal restraint and will move forward with the elements of the Strategic Modernization Program permitted to us by the SALT agreements. We also reserve the future right to test

and deploy Midgetman, currently prohibited by the Interim Restraint Policy, in the absence of suitable progress in US/USSR bilateral arms control talks or successful resolution of U.S. concerns with Soviet non-compliance. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to dismantle strategic systems to meet SALT I/II limits. This show of good faith should serve to encourage the USSR to observe its arms control commitments while insuring progress toward our mutual goals of deep reductions and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Option B: Continue to Not Undercut SALT I and SALT II, but with a Programmatic Response to Soviet Violations

This approach would: 1) maintain no undercut policy on SALT I and SALT II; 2) request a supplemental appropriation to increase U.S. deterrent capability, consistent with SALT I and SALT II, as a proportionate response to Soviet violations; 3) continue to condemn Soviet violations and seek corrective action in diplomatic channels; and 4) review periodically the new policy in light of the Soviet compliance record. The defense supplemental would accelerate and/or increase selected strategic programs as a response to Soviet actions. It reflects a judgement that, if the U.S. were to selectively or completely abandon restraints (however flawed they may be), we would offer the Soviets a pretext to substantially increase their own forces, while the U.S. would take the blame—here and with the Allies—for destroying arms control. We would find Congress legislating arms control and dictating how we could respond to the unconstrained growth in Soviet strategic capabilities. This approach would enhance deterrence, demonstrate to the Soviets that non-compliance entails real costs, put the onus on them for any unraveling of existing restraints, strengthen our position in ongoing negotiations and promote Congressional consensus on a response to the Soviet violations and the maintenance of restraints pending a new agreement.

Presentation

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I decided that the U.S. would not undercut the expired SALT I or the unratified SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. The reasons behind my decision were clear:

- *First*, this policy would not adversely affect our security, provided we and Congress took steps necessary to modernize our strategic deterrent and to offset Soviet strategic advantages obtained over the past decade.

- *Second*, I believed then and continue to believe that a framework of mutual restraint was an important contribution to stability as we sought to negotiate substantial reductions in the nuclear threat.

◦ *Third*, this policy was conditioned on Soviet exercise of equal restraint.

In adopting this policy, I hoped that the Geneva talks would by this time have produced a new and more equitable agreement providing for substantial reductions. The Soviets, however, have blocked success thus far. Moreover, as noted in my two reports to Congress, the Soviets have failed to comply with several provisions of existing commitments. They have neither taken corrective actions nor provided any information that might have alleviated our concerns.

For the present, I have decided that the prospects for achieving agreement in Geneva will be greater with mutual restraint. The U.S. will continue not to undercut the provisions of SALT I and SALT II. We cannot however, close our eyes to Soviet cheating. Thus, I have also requested the JCS to recommend those additional steps that need to be taken, within SALT constraints, to counter Soviet violations. On the basis of their recommendations, I will submit a supplemental appropriations request to the Congress so that these steps can be taken and the danger posed by Soviet violations redressed. For now, we can take the necessary steps within the provisions of existing SALT agreements. However, this new policy will require continuous review of Soviet compliance and the status of the Geneva negotiations. We hope that the Soviet Union will take arms control and compliance as seriously as we do, so that genuine and significant reductions in nuclear weapons can begin.

Option D: Cease Interim Restraint of SALT I and SALT II

On May 31, 1982, the President stated: "As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint." The United States has scrupulously adhered to this commitment. By contrast, the President has found and reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control obligations. Consequently, the USSR is not exercising equal restraint. The United States regards such Soviet behavior as fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and that of its allies. In accordance with the President's announced policy the United States is, therefore, no longer bound to refrain from actions which might undercut the existing strategic arms agreements. Until an acceptable strategic arms reduction agreement can be negotiated, the United States will size and configure its strategic offensive forces exclusively on the basis of our longstanding national policy necessary to provide an effective deterrent to aggression.

Presentation

The US government has determined that the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control agreements and hence has not exercised equal restraint. The integrity of the arms control process would be damaged if the US unilaterally complied with agreements the Soviets are violating. We cannot condone Soviet cheating. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance.

The United States remains committed to the goal envisioned in its proposal tabled at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva. This proposal calls for both sides to make sharp reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals and, in particular, to eliminate large numbers of the most destabilizing weapons—ballistic missiles—by agreeing to a ceiling of 5,000 warheads on such missiles. We are interested in making rapid progress toward this goal with the Soviets in Geneva.

By contrast, the Soviet Union has shown little interest in achieving meaningful reductions or in making progress toward a verifiable, equitable accord which requires them. To the contrary, the Soviet Union has actually regressed from positions previously taken and instead adopted a largely intransigent posture which severely impedes progress.

In accordance with the policy I announced on May 31, 1982, the United States is, therefore, no longer bound to refrain from actions which might undercut the SALT strategic offensive arms agreements. Until an acceptable strategic arms reduction agreement can be negotiated, the United States will size and configure its strategic offensive forces exclusively on the basis of our longstanding national policy necessary to provide an effective deterrent to aggression.

The Administration will shortly begin consultations with the Congress regarding means of ensuring that options for this undesirable—and, we would hope, avoidable—contingency are credibly preserved. In the event the USSR chooses to amass ever more threatening kinds and numbers of strategic weapons, the United States reserves the right however, to respond appropriately.

Option E: Adopt a new Policy of U.S. Independent Restraint

This new concept for security and stability would allow the United States to continue to maintain adequate strategic forces for Western security while we continue to research under the Strategic Defense Initiative and independently refrain from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the 1990's the U.S. would begin the transition to a strategic defense posture with a corresponding reduction of offensive nuclear weapons. This new course is, therefore, independent of Soviet cooperation or their strategic military posture. Specifically, the U.S. would announce a commitment to Independent Restraint, that is, we would independently

restrain the proliferation of further nuclear weapons in lieu of being bound by past commitments to observe the limits of the flawed SALT agreements. We will continue all elements of the President's Strategic Force Modernization Program while refraining from needless proliferation of nuclear weapons. We will independently remove older weapons from service and certify these actions to the Congress and the American public. By restraining needless proliferation, the inventory of U.S. strategic ballistic missile weapons will remain essentially constant over the next decade, then begin substantial decreases at a time when strategic defense may become a reality. However, we would reassess and be able to modify our strategic forces in the face of a Soviet strategic breakout, either offensive or defensive. We will continue our commitment to transition to strategic defense and do it in an open manner. And we will seek a renewed dialogue with the Soviets to reduce the risk of war through meaningful measures to improve stability and predictability.

Presentation

Independent Restraint should be announced in a major Presidential speech. The speech could occur following the coming round of Geneva negotiations, assuming the talks are unproductive, or following a Reagan-Gorbachev summit, assuming no agreements of substance can be extracted from the Soviets. Independent Restraint would take place on January 1, 1986. Key Administration figures should be immediately prepared to brief Congress, the press, and our Allies to explain the rationale and the implications of the new course. To demonstrate U.S. resolve not to proliferate offensive nuclear weapons, the President would state that the compromise resulting in a pause after authorizing deployment of 50 Peacekeeper missiles represents a degree of U.S. restraint. He would also state that a Poseidon ballistic missile submarine would be removed from strategic service. The President could offer the Congress and the press the opportunity to inspect inactivated submarine and ICBM systems to verify removal from strategic service. Such an inspection offer could also be made to the Soviet Union, if appropriate, as a confidence-building measure. Our public presentation should emphasize that Independent Restraint offers the choice between: (1) continuation of agreements which have not constrained the expansion of nuclear forces, which are facing increasingly difficult verification problems due to technological developments and which are subject to Soviet violations, or (2) U.S. actions that do not hinge on Soviet cooperation and, ultimately with strategic defense, will lead to greater security and true nuclear arms reductions.

Tab D

Draft Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, January 16, 1985

ILLUSTRATIVE
SALT I AND II U.S. DISMANTLEMENT OPTIONS

SALT I — 656 SLBM launcher limit or up to 710 as TITAN dismantled

SALT II — 1,200 limit on MIRV'd ICBM + SLBM launchers

1,320 limit on MIRV'd ICBM + SLBM launchers

+ Heavy Bombers with ALCMs

EVENT/DATE/ LIMIT	ILLUSTRATIVE COMPENSATION OPTIONS	FEASIBILITY OF OPTIONS
TRIDENT SIX (ALABAMA) FEB 12, 1985 <i>SALT I—2 BELOW LAUNCHER LIMIT</i>	(1) 16 TITAN ICBMs + 8 SLBM tubes remaining from SSBN dismantlement	(1) No problem; SALT I compensation only, SALT II limits not yet exceeded.
TRIDENT SEVEN (ALASKA) SEP 17, 1985 <i>SALT I—22 OVER LAUNCHER LIMIT</i>	(1) 8 TITAN ICBMs + 1 POLARIS SSN + 14 MM-III ICBMs <i>or</i> (2) 24 TITAN ICBMs + 14 MM-III ICBMs	(1) TITANs on track; POLARIS means cancellation of swimmer delivery vehicle ⁶ ; MM III may impossible due to lack of sufficient time to plan. (2) Neither may be achievable. (TITANs due to fuel disposition/safety problems, MM-III due to lack of suffi- cient time to plan.)

⁵ Secret.

⁶ Swimmer delivery vehicle refers to two converted, but SALT accountable, ex-POLARIS SSBNs. [Footnote is in the original.]

EVENT/DATE/ LIMIT	ILLUSTRATIVE COMPENSATION OPTIONS	FEASIBILITY OF OPTIONS
<i>or</i>		
SALT II—14 OVER MIRV LIMIT	(3) 8 TITAN ICBMs + 1 POSEIDON SSBN	(3) TITANs on track, SSBN 635 planning accomplished; <i>only achievable option.</i>
TRIDENT EIGHT (NEVADA) MAY 20 1986	(1) 8 TITAN ICBMs + 1 POLARIS SSN + 24 MM-III ICBMs	(1) TITANs achievable; POLARIS means cancellation of swimmer delivery vehicle ⁷ ; MM-III achievable. ⁸
SALT I—24 OVER LAUNCHER LIMIT	<i>or</i>	
SALT II—22/24 OVER MIRV LIMIT DEPENDING ON OPTION FOR TRI- DENT SEVEN ¹⁰	(2) 8 TITAN ICBMs + 1 POSEIDON SSBN + 6–8 MM-III ICBMs	(2) All achievable. ⁹
	<i>or</i>	
	(3) 2 POSEIDON SSBNs	(3) Achievable. ¹¹
	<i>or</i>	
	(4) 24 TITAN ICBMs + 22–24 MM-III ICBMs	(4) Achievement of TITANs question- able w/o major influx of funds; MM-III achievable. ¹²

⁷ Swimmer delivery vehicle refers to two converted, but SALT accountable, ex-POLARIS SSBNs. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ Specific numbers in options for TRIDENT #8 depend on which option is selected for TRIDENT #7. MM-III achievable for TRIDENT #8 only if *planning* begins no later than May 1985. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ Specific numbers in options for TRIDENT #8 depend on which option is selected for TRIDENT #7. MM-III achievable for TRIDENT #8 only if *planning* begins no later than May 1985. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ In June, 1986, when the 121st B-52 is converted to carry ALCM, the SALT II, 1320 limit of MIRV plus ALCM heavy bombers is operative. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹¹ Specific numbers in options for TRIDENT #8 depend on which option is selected for TRIDENT #7. MM-III achievable for TRIDENT #8 only if *planning* begins no later than May 1985. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹² Specific numbers in options for TRIDENT #8 depend on which option is selected for TRIDENT #7. MM-III achievable for TRIDENT #8 only if *planning* begins no later than May 1985. [Footnote is in the original.]

42. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 3, 1985

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting, June 3, 1985,—US Interim Restraint Policy concerning the SALT Agreements

ISSUE

Future US policy concerning “Interim Restraint” and the SALT I and SALT II strategic arms agreements. A report on this issue will be transmitted to the Congress on June 10, 1985.

BACKGROUND

Since 1981, it has been US policy, known generally as “Interim Restraint,” not to “undercut” the SALT I Interim Agreement which expired in 1977 or the SALT II Agreement of 1979, which would have expired at the end of 1985 had it been ratified, *so long as* the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. The policy requires reciprocity and was intended to foster mutual restraint on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States while negotiations were underway on new agreements to achieve significant arms reductions. In adopting this interim policy, you made clear that the flawed SALT II Agreement (which was withdrawn from Senate consideration by President Carter following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) was not an acceptable foundation for a final, equal and verifiable arms agreement. You indicated that it would be a major mistake to attempt to formalize SALT II’s high ceilings, numerous inequities and verification problems.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have publicly pledged to observe the “no undercut” policy, and both sides have dismantled nuclear weapons systems to remain within specific SALT limits. However, the scale of the Soviet strategic buildup, much of it permitted under SALT, and the increased pattern of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT Agreements and with other arms control agreements have raised fundamental questions about a policy built upon a standard of reciprocity but wherein we increasingly appear to be in unilateral compliance.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-104, NSC 00118. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Kraemer and Wright. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it.

DISCUSSION

Soviet Military Forces: Concerning Soviet forces, while the SALT agreements may have helped set some limits, the high ceilings and ambiguities of SALT appear to have largely validated rather than constrained the Soviet force configuration and the unparalleled Soviet strategic buildup. SALT limits have been breached by such actions as Soviet testing of a second modern ICBM and possible deployment of the SS-16 ICBM, and by an excess in deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In addition, Soviet denial of data required for verification and Soviet development of mobile missiles and cruise missiles which are extremely difficult to locate have greatly complicated our ability to verify Soviet compliance.

US Military Forces: It has been fairly painless to date for the United States to pursue the "interim restraint" policy. Such a policy restricted US military programs only marginally and required the dismantling only of relatively aging systems such as the Titan ICBM and the older Polaris submarines that had reached the end of their useful life.

Now, however, there is potential that a continued US interim restraint policy could become militarily more painful. Beginning in September of this year, when the seventh Trident submarine, the *USS ALASKA*, begins sea trials, and subsequently with each new Trident submarine, the United States would have to destroy (rather than trying to overhaul or retain) weapons systems such as Poseidon submarines or Minuteman III ICBM launchers in order to remain within the SALT limits. Similarly, by June, 1986, when the 121st B-52 is deployed with Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), the US would have to dismantle additional submarines or land-based MIRVed missiles for each new ALCM-carrying bomber. Longer-term adherence to SALT II will also mean that the US cannot deploy both the M-X and the smaller "Midgetman" ICBM, as only one new ICBM is permitted under that agreement.

The strategic modernization program undertaken by your Administration was designed, along with modernization programs for conventional forces, to assure effective deterrence across a broad spectrum of threats in the face of the Soviet buildup. Recent Congressional cuts in that program—especially with regard to M-X "Peacekeeper" ICBM—and Soviet noncompliance, have raised fundamental questions about the wisdom of continuing SALT restraints on US forces. These factors have led most US agencies to propose that in applying the reciprocity standard of current policy, we should exercise the right to respond appropriately to Soviet violations, taking account of US national security requirements, and seeking additional support, including possible extra funds, for US military programs from the Congress.

The Congress: Within the Congress, the Senate begins debate on US interim restraint policy on June 4, and views are sharply divided about

the wisdom of either continuing or not continuing any or all US interim restraints. Of those pressing for a “continuation of current policy,” most choose to neglect the fact that current policy requires reciprocity and that in the face of Soviet noncompliance, current policy therefore would seem to require that we lift self-imposed restraints on US forces in cases such as the USS ALASKA, a 121st ALCM-carrying bomber, or the Midgetman ICBM.

Those opposing a continuation of current US restraints in fact invoke current policy as requiring that we have the right to respond appropriately, outside of the SALT limits. They argue that we must not be in a position of applying a double standard by which the Soviets are allowed to cheat, while we remain restricted by agreements which are being violated and are deeply flawed. They quote your Lisbon statement of May 10 that: “We have tried . . . that we would both seek to abide by the terms. There’s considerable evidence now that that has been rather one-sided. If it has been, then there’s no need for us to continue.”²

On the Senate side, Senators Bumpers, Leahy, Chafee, Heinz, Gore, Pell, Cranston and Proxmire are in the lead in urging that the US continue current SALT restraints at least through December 1986, i.e., one year beyond the date the SALT II Treaty would have expired had it been ratified. On the other end of the spectrum, Senators Symms, East, McClure, Quayle, Denton and Wilson are among those who believe we should cease or modify our restraints and should avoid dismantling a Poseidon submarine. In the middle ground are Senators Stevens, Nunn and others, who are looking for some formula of “proportional deviation,” to use Senator Stevens’ words. On the House side there are similar divisions and views.

With regard to next week’s Senate debate, it is quite possible that those opposed to continued US limitations will at some point request that the Foreign Relations Committee release the SALT II agreement (which was withheld by the Committee from Senate consideration in 1979 at President Carter’s request) and send it to the Senate floor for a vote on ratification. Those making this request appear to have the votes to force such a release from the Committee, and in addition, to have the 34 votes required to defeat the treaty outright. In their argumentation supporting rejection, they can invoke not only the Senate Armed Services Committee report of 1979 condemning the agreement as against the national security, unequal, unverifiable, etc., but also many statements by you and other senior officials of your Administration opposing SALT II. In any case, if this course of events occurs, opponents of US interim restraint under current circumstances,

² Reference is to Reagan’s remarks during a news conference on May 10, 1985. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, p. 600)

will have won a major political victory with substantial impact on the future Congressional and public debate on this issue.

Diplomatic Considerations: Next week George Shultz will review the context of our interim restraint policy with key allies in Europe. Most of our allies are concerned about any potential changes in the US restraint policy (with many ignoring the policy's reciprocity requirement). Many are skeptical about our assertions concerning Soviet noncompliance and fearing negative repercussions at the Geneva arms reductions negotiations, they are likely to urge "no change."

At the same time, the Soviet Union seeks to restrict the US modernization program, while maintaining its own buildup. The Soviets clearly prefer US interim restraints and can be expected to react with strong rhetoric against any lifting of US restraints, no matter how justifiable from the US view. At that point we will need to counter that it is the Soviet arms buildup and Soviet noncompliance which have led us to this point, but that our negotiating proposals for deep and equitable nuclear arms reductions offer a sound basis for future mutual constraints.

The Options: It is in the above context that next week's deliberations and decisions are taking place concerning future US policy with regard to the SALT agreements. After months of interagency effort, including extensive discussions by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, agencies have arrived at five different options in roughly three broad categories, as follows:

- *Option A:* would continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II and would continue current strategic programs. It would, in effect, remove the reciprocity requirement from the current policy and is thus not identical with current policy or the status quo.

- *Option B:* would continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II but would permit or propose programmatic US responses, within SALT limits, in response to Soviet violations. It proposes a supplemental request to the Congress.

- *Options C, D and E:* would in practice all discontinue "no undercut" of SALT I and II, though with different degrees of explicitness. *Option C* states that it would continue "no undercut", but proposes not to dismantle POSEIDONS, which would contradict SALT provisions. On the other hand, *Options D and E* would explicitly discontinue "no undercut" of SALT I and II, thus permitting the US to develop the forces it considered essential for national/Western security.

Whatever the decision, we will need to remind the Congress, the public, our allies and the Soviets that we have restrained our strategic buildup while the Soviets have not, that we have complied with agreements while the Soviets have not, and that we have on the table in Geneva negotiating proposals for increased stability and deep cuts to equal and verifiable levels. We need to stress that the best constraint possible—one which could give full confidence to both superpowers and to the entire world—would be for the Soviet Union to say yes to our Geneva proposals.

43. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 3, 1985, 11 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint Policy

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:

Craig Fuller

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz

Lt. General John T. Chain, Jr.

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Richard Perle

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese, III

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

Douglas George

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

Vice Admiral A. S. Moreau, Jr.

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward L. Rowny

White House

Mr. Donald T. Regan

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Mr. David Chew

Mr. Sven Kraemer

Colonel Robert E. Linhard

Captain William Wright IV

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-104, NSC 00118. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Wright and Kraemer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. In a personal diary entry for June 3, Reagan wrote: "An N.S.C. meeting dealt with what to do about the SALT II unratified treaty which expires in Dec. So far the Soviets & us have operated on an agreement that even though the treaty had not been officially adopted we'd both conduct our arms policies within the treaties restraints. We've done so but they have cheated a number of times. Now we are coming to a time when we'll have to dismantle Poseidon sub's. as we add Tridents to our Navy. Question do we do that even though they are cheating or do we announce that we'll no longer abide by the agreement? I've had 5 options presented to me & now it's up to me & frankly I dont have the answer yet." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 466)

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting with a short explanation of why it was important to review our interim restraint policy now. That policy, established in 1981, was based on reciprocity and there is clear evidence of Soviet violations and little restraint. In our examination we need to consider the impact of the restraint policy on the military balance, and whether promoting the notion that even the flawed SALT arrangements serve the national interest is valid or whether we should return to a more fundamental approach—determining force requirements exclusive of such arms control. We have a report due to Congress and finally, the intangible, political framework vis-a-vis our Allies, the Geneva negotiations and with regard to sustaining defense programs in Congress must be weighed. He then asked General Vessey to provide a brief overview of the military implications before turning to the options.²

General Vessey used a series of charts (TAB A) to explain US weapon capabilities, asymmetries in US/Soviet targeting tasks and the need for prompt hard target capability in the US modernization plan. He added that capping MX at 50 would be very bad but that keeping 50 MMIII and C-3 missiles in the force could help. However, the latter only contributed in the case of soft targets. With a fully generated force we can cover all soft targets today; whereas the day-to-day coverage was only 50% today rising to 100% by 1994. The Chairman indicated that the military implications of retaining or removing Poseidons/MMIII didn't make much difference in the outcome of a war, assuming the full strategic modernization plan to include 100 MX is realized. He thought one could do some useful things to hedge against loss of MX by abandoning restraints and opined that interim restraint policy was largely a political decision with the JCS not clearly favoring one or another of the alternative options before the NSC.

Mr. McFarlane then reviewed each of the five options in detail as shown on the options chart TAB B,³ before asking for cabinet officers' views.

Secretary Shultz stated it would be a great error to give up some sense of constraint associated with the two treaties since that would drastically change the environment. At the same time given clear violations, some response is called for. The Krasnoyarsk radar strikes people most strongly and although not directly involved with interim restraint we need to figure how to get mileage out of these types of

² Attached but not printed at Tabs A and B are a series of charts prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

³ Attached but not printed are a series of charts prepared in the Interagency Group. For the options, see Tab C, Document 41.

Soviet violations in terms of realizing our strategic force modernization program. Experts are saying a supplemental as proposed in *Option B* won't be achievable, but if it is worked with Congress we might get it. The Secretary then indicated that if a supplemental was truly out of the question, he would recommend *Option C* with two specific aspects; when Midgetman is ready, field it and at this time only make a decision on one SSBN. The next Poseidon, the Sam Rayburn should be taken out of service and "laid up to be reactivated at a later date." To abandon constraints completely could lead to an unraveling of arms control, to our disadvantage. The asymmetries (open production lines, demonstrated mobile ICBM) mean that having a treaty regime operates to our advantage. We should try for the supplemental and make the decision on one submarine—giving a definite but moderate signal about non-compliance.

Secretary Weinberger cited the basic issue as one of our continuing to adhere to a fatally flawed and unratified treaty which is scheduled to expire, even as serious Soviet violations continue. Beyond that he felt there is much speculation on how valuable such arms control is. The Soviets can add 7,000 warheads right now within SALT. However, SALT bars us from responding with; Midgetman, putting MMIII into MMII silos or in simply setting aside rather than dismantling SSBNs. However, this latter is not practical since the submarines must be modernized. He recommended that we observe our own (independent) restraint program, to involve no surge and to assure our Allies that we were not talking about an unlimited arms race. Further, we have a built in interim restraint format whereby we don't go any further than what is needed to deter. Secretary Weinberger felt that *Option A* was unacceptably unresponsive to Soviet violations, *Option B* unrealistic in that no supplemental would be granted, and that *Option C* represented the worst of all worlds since we would be forced to admit to violations ("exceptions") openly while the Soviets don't admit to anything; thus weakening the moral basis of our position. He felt that a combination of *Options D and E* would be viable whereby we would not announce we were abandoning SALT now but most would consider ourselves no longer bound by SALT II after its expiration in December 1985. We would thus be substituting our own independent form of restraint. Our Allies must be told we can't continue, while the Soviets violate and that we would emphasize our Geneva arms reductions efforts.

Director Adelman felt that from an emotional stand he favored *Option D*, but his common sense dictated *Option C* which permits exceptions to not undercutting agreements. He felt that we need to use compliance issues to maximize mileage on the Hill—in that regard the supplemental proposed in *Option B* is phony since the violations were first catalogued two years ago and we asked for no compensation from

Congress. Additionally, the Soviets won't think much of our resolve; we send the wrong signal if we simply accept their violations. He recommends that we not revoke our interim restraint policy but *invoke* it with regard to Soviet reciprocity. *Option C* is a measured response; future US actions will depend on Soviet compliance.

Director Casey referred to Saturday's⁴ PDB article in citing a Soviet preference to continue interim restraint; he believes their motives are to impair US growth and politically to divide US public opinion and Allies. Soviet missions have been told to spread the word that if we leave SALT, onus will be on US. In doing so, they will be let off the hook on violations. When Secretary Shultz expressed concern for unravelling of restraint, Casey stated that continuing interim restraint would do little to restrain Soviets—they have broken the bank—they can have 12,000 warheads by 1990 and we can do little to change that in near term. Their decisions have always been based on their needs, right now they already have all that they need. Casey expressed a preference for *Option E* "independent restraint" as the Soviets need to know there is a political price associated with violations.

Attorney General Meese reviewed the original decision on adopting interim restraint which hinged on the JSC view that we were better off going along with a mutual restraint regime and with the two criteria of Soviet reciprocity and not inhibiting the US strategic modernization programs. Neither condition is being met. Since these treaties are not legally binding, the issue is how to get into the best propaganda position. This is achieved by recognizing that the treaties have expired and invoke a new leadership strategy in which, although not legally bound, we will apply a policy of (independent) constraints to contribute more fully to a stable world and in hope of progress in the Geneva negotiations.

Ambassador Nitze felt that the only real decision involved one US submarine this fall. We can take it out of service. The important matter is how we describe this action. *Option B* could draw in Congress on the problem of dealing with noncompliance. We could describe our action under *C* or it could be under *D*. The issue is really a matter of how you fashion the words.

Secretary Weinberger disagreed with making just a short-term decision saying we will face the issue continuously and it is better now to deal with the longer term.

Ambassador Rowny stated a preference for *Option C*, but felt that if *E* could be presented in a positive manner, i.e., we are not discontinuing restraints, then we are sending the right signal to the Soviets and can

⁴ June 1.

help the public perceptions, as well. Key will be how best to achieve our defense programs in Congress. We can tie up the Poseidon in August and see how the Soviets respond in Geneva before final decisions on dismantlement.

The President asked how we answer the question about the fact that the Soviets have dismantled 2½ times the number of systems that we have (755 versus 294).

Chairman Vessey answered that it was a matter of packaging—since we MIRVed first, they have been taking down much older non-MIRV systems. He referred to a chart that showed the pattern of Soviet modernization which resulted in extensive dismantling to make room for modern systems. (SECDEF observed that future US dismantlements under SALT would be far greater for the US than for the Soviet Union.)

The meeting closed at 12:06 p.m.

44. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 4, 1985

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint

I know that you have already heard much more than you want to on this topic, but I would like to make a few observations before you give your final advice to the President. I have given long thought to the impact of the decision on the Alliance, on the Soviet reaction, and on our own public posture here. With these factors in mind, I strongly favor Option B, while feeling that Option C is second best and Options D and E would cause major problems both in the Alliance and eventually with our own public.

I believe the basic fact that we must bear in mind for the future is that the Soviets have far more capacity to break out of the numerical limits than we do. To argue that they have no military need to

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological Files, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Sent through Poindexter, who did not initial the memorandum. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “I agree. M.”

do so and therefore will not represents a total misreading of Soviet psychology: they will in fact be determined to do so just to make a political point, if they can blame the break-out on us. And I believe both European publics and eventually our own will blame us for discarding these restraints if we adopt Options D or E. This could cause serious disruption in the Alliance and much greater pressure on SDI. (Take a look at the chart in this week's *U.S. News & World Report*—Tab I²—to get an idea of how the press, even some friendly to us, is likely to portray the issue.)

I understand the argument that there is not much we can put into a supplemental or a beefed up FY87 defense budget. But this argument defies logic: either the cuts forced on us in the 86 budget are meaningless, or else there is something more that can usefully be done. What that is need not be defined right now.

My problem with Option C is that it will be undermining a very precise agreed procedure which, since it is easily verifiable, is in our interest. We should have no illusion that the Soviets will accommodate us to send persons to look down the tubes, or that they will refrain from fudging on other dismantlement procedures, using this as a justification, if it suits them. And the option is likely to have this effect without the advantage of a clear military justification, in the sense that what is gained seems to be marginal at best in military terms, and could actually divert funds from more effective uses. Nevertheless, this option is clearly more easy to manage politically than D and E.

Finally, regarding communicating the decision to the Soviets, I would recommend a letter from the President to Gorbachev if Option A or B is chosen, making the point that it was a difficult decision in view of Soviet performance, but was made in order to encourage progress in arms reduction negotiations and in the hope that it would facilitate resolution of compliance issues. If any other option is chosen, I would recommend communicating it to the Soviets by diplomatic note, and thus avoid personalizing the issue.

² Not attached. A copy of Robert S. Dudley, "New Soviet Arms Buildup: How Big a Threat," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 10, 1985, pp. 37–38, is attached to another copy of Matlock's June 4 memorandum to McFarlane that is *ibid*.

45. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 5, 1985

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint Options.

From 1982 to the present, your policy toward SALT II has been conditional: we would adhere to it so long as the Soviets did—and, by implication at least, no longer. It is now nearly two years since we reported to Congress that the Soviets are violating SALT II and several other agreements, including the ABM Treaty. Moreover, we have intelligence that several new Soviet strategic systems, whose testing or deployment would constitute additional violations, are being readied. So the expanding pattern of violations is likely to continue.

Even without violating its terms, the SALT II Treaty continues to legitimize Soviet force increases. The Soviets have added some 4,000 new strategic warheads since SALT II was signed in 1979 and, as I mentioned on Monday,² the Treaty permits them to add thousands more. While supporters of SALT II argue that it has required the Soviets to dismantle several hundred weapons (and would oblige them to dismantle more in the future), the fact is that these “dismantlements” have consisted of the conversion of obsolete launchers for single warhead missiles into new launchers for multiple warhead systems or sea-launched cruise missile submarines. These “dismantlements” account for nearly all of the 4,000 strategic warheads the Soviets have added since SALT II. In other words, their “dismantlements” have actually been part of their modernization plans whereby they have substituted new, more effective warheads and systems for older and, in some cases, obsolete warheads and systems.

By contrast, continued adherence to the SALT II Treaty will require the U.S. to dismantle as many as 2,500 warheads in the next several years, nearly twice as many as the Soviets would be required to retire—if they were fully to comply, which is doubtful at best. (See attached chart.)³

This is the essential background which has led me to recommend against continuing the SALT regime after December 31 when the unratified SALT II treaty will expire.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL828, Subject File, 1985, President—Memoranda to # 149–197 (4). Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “Signer’s Copy.”

² June 3. See Document 43.

³ Attached but not printed is an undated chart entitled “Projected Dismantling Under SALT I and II.”

In my judgment, the case against continuing the SALT regime after its expiration is overwhelming. SALT has been the antithesis of your approach to arms control with its rightful emphasis on deep reductions. The Treaty was, and is, "fatally flawed." Whatever merit there was in interim adherence on a reciprocal basis has been swept away by the wave of Soviet violations and their intransigence at Geneva.

Ending what has become virtually our unilateral adherence to SALT would be a clear, direct and understandable answer to Soviet violations and an essential signal to the Soviet leadership that, while we have no plans to exceed the modernization you have requested from the Congress, we will not propagate the myth that SALT has led to Soviet restraint or full compliance. By contrast, a decision along the lines of Option C, to respond to Soviet violations by violations of our own, retaining in force the main body of the SALT "constraints," would be a half-hearted and contradictory policy. We would yield the high ground of our past strict compliance. We would place in Soviet hands the initiative to choose those provisions they find convenient to retain, while casting aside those that might impinge on their ambitious buildup. A clear change in policy as in a combination of Options D and E—brought on by the Soviets themselves—could be explained and justified in a way that a policy of "exceptions," which would be understood around the world as U.S. violations, could not. Adoption of Options D/E would put the spotlight where it belongs—on Soviet violations and U.S. restraint.

A decision not to continue SALT beyond December 31 should, I think, be accompanied by a statement that we are not proposing increases to U.S. forces beyond our present modernization plans, plans that have been explained in detail to the Congress and our allies, many of which have their roots in prior administrations.

This statement would describe a new policy of *independent restraint*. There would be no surge on our part. And, because the SALT limits fully accommodate Soviet building plans, we would not expect a surge (beyond what they are at work on now—ostensibly within SALT—which is considerable) from the Soviet side either. We would, of course, reiterate our strong desire to achieve reductions in the nuclear forces on both sides—reductions that have been resisted by the Soviets even as they wrap themselves in the mantle of SALT-type arms control.

You have proposed far-reaching reductions in Geneva. The accomplishment of a treaty entailing deep and real reductions, unlike SALT I and II, would set a standard of arms control of which we can be proud and would give a level of security, for both sides, that would make the world vastly safer. The Soviets will cling to agreements like SALT that permit substantial increases for as long as they are able to gain our concurrence. We should clear the path to genuine arms reductions by permitting SALT to expire into the past.

You and the many Senators who opposed ratification of SALT II were right in 1979. When SALT's inherent flaws are deepened by Soviet cheating and the prospect of more to come, you have an opportunity—and perhaps a unique one—to let it expire as the Treaty itself provides.

I have attached a proposed statement concerning our own restraint program in the event you should wish to use it.⁴

Cap

⁴ Attached but not printed is a draft presidential statement.

46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 8, 1985

SUBJECT

U.S. Interim Restraint Policy

ISSUE

Should the United States continue, modify or abandon current U.S. interim restraint policy?

BACKGROUND

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiation, you decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. For several years, the United States has scrupulously adhered to this commitment and

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-088, NSDD-173. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original. Poindexter initialed the memorandum on McFarlane's behalf. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed." In a personal diary entry for Saturday, June 8–Sunday, June 9, Reagan wrote: "N.S.C. kept sending intelligence memos having to do with P.M. Gandhis visit & SALT II & our allies position. They want us to continue abiding by it. Tomorrow Mon. I forward my decision to the Cong. We will abide by SALT II to the extent the Soviets do—which means we wont destroy a Poseidon Sub when the next Trident is launched in September." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 468)

lived within these agreements. By contrast, the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control commitments.

Although Soviet noncompliance certainly warrants a regular, critical review of current policy, you face a decision at this particular time because the Congress has required a report on this subject which is due on next Monday, June 10. Were it not for this Congressional requirement, you would not face this issue until the seventh TRIDENT SSBN goes on sea trials this September. Thereafter, certain other events could necessitate revisiting U.S. policy on a regular basis.

— In September, 1985, the seventh U.S. TRIDENT SSBN will begin sea trials. At that time, unless current policy is modified, we would be required to retire and disassemble according to agreed SALT procedures either a POSEIDON SSBN or 14 MINUTEMAN III ICBMs to stay with the SALT II ceiling of no more than 1200 MIRVed ballistic launchers.

— On December 31, 1985, the unratified SALT II Treaty would have expired. If current policy is continued, this milestone will raise the question of whether we need continue to refrain from undercutting an agreement that would have expired.

— In June, 1986, the eighth TRIDENT SSBN enters sea trials and the 121st ALCM equipped B-52 would be deployed. Both these actions would drive further reductions in older POSEIDON SSBNs or MINUTEMAN III ICBMs. The eighth TRIDENT will require us to retire either 2 additional, older POSEIDON SSBNs or 22 MINUTEMAN IIIs. Once we exceed 120 ALCM carrying bombers, we will have to retire one additional MIRVed ballistic missile launcher (either POSEIDON launch tubes [16 per sub] or MINUTEMAN III silos) for each ALCM carrying bomber over the first 120 deployed.

DISCUSSION

In approaching this decision, there are both military and political factors to be considered.

Military Considerations. Continuing interim restraint will have an impact on the number of U.S. forces. Up to now, we have been able to stay within the applicable SALT I constraints by dismantling rather aged systems. Among these were the remaining U.S. POLARIS submarines and the TITAN II ICBMs, both non-MIRVed systems. However, as the next TRIDENT submarines put to sea this September, we will hit the SALT II MIRV limits for the first time. As a result, should we continue our interim restraint policy without modification, we will have to begin dismantling existing MIRVed missiles like the POSEIDON C-3 SLBM (which carries roughly [less than 1 line not declassified] and the MINUTEMAN III ICBM [1 line not declassified].

The real issue is whether the reductions involved affect needed military capability. Given our shortfall in capability to target Soviet hard installations, and the age of a portion of our POSEIDON fleet, it is most likely that the U.S. military would choose to retire POSEIDON SSBNs. While each POSEIDON SSBN dismantled would mean a reduction of

[less than 1 line not declassified] (the 16 missiles carried by each submarine, each in turn carrying [1 line not declassified]). The JCS assesses the overall loss of military capability to be marginal. The civilian leadership of the Department of Defense does not fully share this view.

With respect to the impact on Soviet forces, the Department of Defense feels that while the Soviets will also have to retire existing systems to stay under SALT limits, given the nature of the SALT limits, the way that the Soviets have adapted to these limits, and Soviet military requirements, the overall impact of SALT constraints (or lack thereof) on Soviet military capability will also be marginal.

In the next few years, to comply with existing agreements, the Soviets will have to draw down significantly greater numbers of missiles, but these will be non-MIRVed systems. The U.S., on the other hand, will draw down significantly more total warheads, although these will largely be the older POSEIDON C-3 warheads described above.

The overall assessment provided to you by General Vessey at last week's NSC meeting² was that given the marginal nature of the impact the constraints will have on the overall military capability of both sides, the military factors involved should not drive this decision. However, the Chairman was equally quick to point out that it is essential that the U.S. strategic modernization program proceed as planned, and that the impact of any change in support for this program must be carefully factored into your decision.

Political Considerations. The political situation is quite different. Views on this issue are very strong both here at home and abroad. We must carefully consider the impact that retaining some interim restraint framework has both on the Congress and on our allies.

With respect to the Congress, the most important task we face is to maintain support for our critically needed strategic modernization program and for an adequate overall level of defense spending to meet national security needs. In dealing with our allies, we must focus our efforts on maintaining their collective and individual support for:

- the NATO LRINF modernization program and continued support for deployment of PERSHING II and GLCM as required;
- the SDI program;
- the U.S. position in the Geneva negotiations; and
- overall efforts to sustain the cohesion of the NATO alliance and the associated military capability needed to give the alliance meaning.

It would be easier to maintain the support identified above if we had an interim framework of mutual restraint supported with equal sincerity by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not joined us in such a framework. We have tried to better educate both Congress

² See Document 43.

and our allies about the extent of the Soviet noncompliance problem. Appreciation of the significance of the problem is growing—especially of the obvious fact that you simply can't have effective arms control unless you are serious about compliance. All reasonable parties would like us to do something to resolve the problem caused by Soviet noncompliance. The political argument revolves around what we should do.

Options. The interagency community has provided to you a series of five options.

- *Option A* would continue not to undercut SALT I and II.
- *Option B* would continue not to undercut SALT I and II, but with a programmatic response to Soviet violations.
- *Option C* would continue not to undercut SALT I and II, but with exceptions.
- *Option D* would discontinue not undercutting SALT I and II.
- *Option E* would adopt a new policy of independent restraint.

Observations. You have had the benefit of the NSC discussion last week. You have also had subsequent discussions with a number of key players on this issue, and additional written inputs from others. Secretary Shultz has reported to you on the views of our allies as recently sampled at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon this week.³ Finally, on last Wednesday night, the Senate passed a resolution⁴ on this subject that also is a useful input. I will not try to resummairize these views. After reviewing all of these, however, it is my judgement that, even in the face of the serious problem posed by Soviet noncompliance, the critical tasks we face requiring the assistance of the Congress and the allies will be inestimably more difficult if we set aside the SALT regime.

Draft NSDD. In light of the above, we have carefully reviewed and drawn upon each of the options suggested for your consideration and developed the draft NSDD provided at *Tab A*. It attempts to balance our concern about Soviet noncompliance while calling for the Soviets to join us in establishing an interim framework of true, mutual restraint. It also mandates that we take actions which represent proportionate response to specific instances of Soviet noncompliance. I would recommend the approach outlined in this NSDD.

RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

_____ _____ That you approve the draft NSDD provided for your consideration at *Tab A*.⁵

³ Reference is to telegram Secto 11044 from the Secretary's Delegation in Lisbon, June 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

⁴ An excerpt from the June 5 Senate Resolution on Interim Restraint Policy is *ibid*.

⁵ Printed as Document 47. Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation and placed a checkmark next to his initials.

47. National Security Decision Directive 173¹

Washington, June 10, 1985

*BUILDING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR
MUTUAL RESTRAINT (U)*

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. My assumptions in taking this action were threefold. (U)

— First, I believed then, as I continue to believe now, that mutual, verifiable constraints on nuclear arsenals are important, especially as we try to move the Soviets toward our goal of greatly reducing and eventually eliminating the nuclear threat, which the SALT agreements did not do. I saw the START negotiations as the path to the equitable and verifiable deep reductions in the size of nuclear arsenals, that we seek. The United States was prepared to, and has offered the Soviet Union the elements for such agreements in Geneva. However, at that time, we recognized that negotiation of good agreements takes time. Therefore, I made the commitment not to undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint as an *interim* policy to provide what we hoped would be a framework of mutual restraint as we pursued agreements that would put the arms control process on a better, more sound, long-term foundation. (U)

— Second, at the time, I hoped that the leaders of the Soviet Union would indeed show equal restraint. (U)

— Third, I judged that this policy of interim restraint would not adversely affect our national security interests, provided that, with the Administration and the Congress working together, the United States undertook those steps necessary to counter the strategic advantages the Soviet Union had been building over the previous decade. (U)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-088, NSDD-173. Secret. McFarlane distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman under cover of a June 10 memorandum: "Attached is NSDD-173, the Decision Directive on Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint." (Ibid.)

Unfortunately, in certain key respects, these assumptions have not stood the test of time. (U)

In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy, the United States has scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II agreements governing strategic offensive arms. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. (U)

By contrast, we have found and reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control obligations, as fully documented in comprehensive reports to the Congress on this subject in January 1984 and February 1985. While the Soviets have observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they have violated important elements of those agreements and associated political commitments. (U)

— With respect to the unratified SALT II agreement, these violations include the testing and deployment of a second new ICBM, the SS-X-25, and the encryption of telemetry during missile testing which impedes verification of agreements by national technical means. The Soviet Union has also probably violated this same agreement regarding the prohibition on deploying SS-16 ICBMs. Serious concerns also remain unresolved with respect to the overall numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDVs) maintained by the Soviet Union, the RV-to-throwweight ratio of the SS-X-25 demonstrated during testing, improvements in the intercontinental capability of the BACKFIRE bomber, and the throwweight associated with a Soviet SLBM. (S)

— Additionally, the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing agreements extends well beyond SALT II. The Soviet Union is engaged in the construction of a large phased array radar in central Siberia in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. When added to other Soviet ABM related activities, including concurrent testing of air defense and ABM components and the development of mobile ABM components, the U.S. has cause for concern about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM defense. The Soviet Union has also engaged in significant violations of both the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We also judge that it has violated both the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the terms of the Helsinki Final Act. It is also likely that the Soviets have also violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (S)

— Even with respect to SALT I, where we have found the Soviets have complied with the letter of the agreement, we have concerns about their compliance with the spirit of the agreement. For example, after dismantling YANKEE class nuclear ballistic missile carrying submarines to comply with SALT I constraints, they have already converted one such submarine into a submarine longer than the original, and

carrying modern, long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. While not a violation of the letter of SALT I, the resulting submarine constitutes a threat to U.S. and Allied security similar to the original YANKEE-class submarine. (S)

These are very crucial issues, for to have effective arms control requires seriousness about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security and raises uncertainty about the forces the United States will require in the future. But, perhaps even more significant than the immediate military consequences of the violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. (U)

The United States has consistently employed all appropriate diplomatic channels, including the U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), to press the Soviet Union strongly to explain or cease those activities which are of concern to us. In doing so, we have made it absolutely clear that we expect the Soviet Union to take positive steps to correct their noncompliance and resolve our compliance concerns in order to maintain the integrity of existing agreements and to establish the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of new agreements. (U)

Unfortunately, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union has neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations have continued and expanded as the Soviets have continued to build their strategic forces. Consequently, the Soviet Union has not been, and is not now, exercising the equal restraint upon which our interim restraint policy has been conditioned. Such Soviet behavior is fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and that of our allies. (U)

The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. In this effort, rationalization of such Soviet activities can only encourage further violations by the Soviet Union. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance. (U)

As a minimum, in the case of irreversible Soviet violations, we must make appropriate and proportionate responses that deny the military benefits of these violations to the Soviet Union. In the case of Soviet violations that the Soviets can correct, we should develop and keep available comparable proportionate responses that both provide incentives to the Soviets to take positive steps to correct the situation, and which

allow us to hedge against the military consequences of Soviet violations should the Soviet Union fail to take the necessary corrective actions. (U)

In this context, the United States will develop and, as needed, implement proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance as necessary to ensure the security of the United States and its allies and to provide real incentives to the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps required to resolve our concerns. (U)

To ensure our fundamental national security and as a baseline for further U.S. action, the integrity and continuity of the U.S. strategic modernization program must be maintained. If the modernization of the ICBM leg of our strategic TRIAD is not fully implemented, as called for in our comprehensive strategic modernization program and recommended by the Scowcroft Commission, we will have to reassess all aspects of our plans to meet our basic national security needs. (U)

While recognizing the seriousness of the problems cited above, we must not lose sight of basic U.S. goals which remain unchanged. During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the levels and the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective on which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree. (U)

I continue strongly to believe that the path to achieving these goals would be an agreement based on the far-reaching nuclear arms reduction proposal we have tabled at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva. The best approach to rapidly moving to a safer, more stable and more secure world would surely be for both sides to make sharp reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals and, in particular, to eliminate large numbers of the most destabilizing weapons—strategic ballistic missiles—by agreeing to a verifiable aggregate ceiling of 5,000 warheads on the land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles of both sides. (U)

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union to date has shown little real interest in restraining the growth of its nuclear arms—let alone in achieving meaningful reductions or in making progress toward a verifiable, equitable accord which requires such real reductions. To the contrary, in spite of the seriousness and flexibility demonstrated by our negotiators in Geneva in the new negotiations begun this year, the Soviet Union has actually regressed from negotiating positions it had previously taken and has adopted a largely intransigent posture which severely impedes

progress. We must, however, remain determined to pursue a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing the risk of war through the adoption of meaningful measures which improve security, stability and predictability. (U)

It remains in the interest of the United States to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone. It will require the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps called for above to correct their noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce their unparalleled and unwarranted military build-up. So far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to move in this direction. However, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, I am prepared to go the extra mile in the direction of trying to establish an interim framework of true, mutual restraint. (U)

Therefore, to provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, I have decided that the United States will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reductions agreements in the currently ongoing Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. The United States will constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies. In doing so, we will consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations. (U)

As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, we must also take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are also called for to make it perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. Therefore, the United States will develop appropriate and proportionate responses and it will take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. (U)

Certain Soviet violations are, by their very nature, irreversible. Such is the case with respect to the Soviet Union's flight-testing and deployment of the SS-X-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited by the unratified SALT II agreement. Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point,

be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States, therefore, reserves the right to respond appropriately, and the United States will do so in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The MIDGETMAN small ICBM program is particularly relevant in this regard. (U)

Other Soviet activities involving noncompliance may be reversible and can be corrected by Soviet action. In these instances, we will go the extra mile and provide the Soviet Union additional time to take such required corrective action. As we monitor Soviet behavior for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I direct the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to accelerate or augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program in proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct. (U)

In addition to the development of appropriate and proportionate U.S. military responses in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, this review should also consider the consequences of continued Soviet force growth as indicated in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on this subject, the alterations to the ICBM portion of the U.S. strategic modernization program which have resulted from recent Congressional action, and the issue of how the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles should appropriately be based. Soviet behavior during rounds II and III of the Nuclear and Space Talks should also be taken fully into account. (U)

In this context, as potential U.S. future actions are assessed, certain criteria will be used. The options should be designed as proportionate responses to specific instances of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, hedging against the military consequences of such Soviet noncompliance. They need not necessarily be equivalent types of actions. In fact, such tit-for-tat responses are less useful. Rather, options should attempt to deny the Soviets the potential benefits of their noncompliance, and, to the extent possible, provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliant activity. In all cases, the primary focus must and will remain upon options that underwrite deterrence, enhance stability, and can be directly tied to the specific requirements of our national security. In this regard, the U.S. goal is not, per se, to build additional forces, but to use these options to ensure our security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance and to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance and join us in establishing a meaningful interim framework of mutual restraint. (U)

The results of this review should be provided for my consideration by November 15, 1985. This should provide sufficient time for me to consider U.S. options with respect to our policy as we approach the date at which the unratified SALT II Treaty would have expired

on December 31, 1985, and subsequent milestones that would occur under a “no undercut” policy. It should also provide sufficient time to consider U.S. programmatic options in direct response to instances of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, if needed, in submitting the FY 87 Defense Program to the Congress in early 1986. (U)

To provide adequate time for the Soviets to demonstrate by their actions a commitment to join us in an interim framework of true mutual restraint, and unless the strategic situation changes, the U.S. will plan to deactivate and disassemble according to agreed procedures an existing POSEIDON SSBN as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine puts to sea later this year. However, as a part of the report required above, the Department of Defense will review and evaluate the range of options available to the U.S. for handling similar milestones (including the sea trials of additional Ohio-class submarines and the deployment of the 121st U.S. ALCM carrying heavy bomber) in the future. The Department will keep open all future U.S. programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur. As these later milestones are reached, I will assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation and Soviet actions in meeting the conditions cited above. (U)

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm, lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the currently ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined above involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor. My hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will jointly be able to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would begin the process of reducing the size of these arsenals. (U)

This directive supersedes the guidance with respect to U.S. interim restraint policy provided in National Security Decision Directive Number 36, *U.S. Approach to START Negotiations—II*, dated May 25, 1982.² (S)

Ronald Reagan

² NSDD-36, “U.S. Approach to START Negotiations—II,” is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 24. On June 10, the White House released a public statement and transmitted a message to Congress on Soviet and United States compliance with arms control agreements. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 743–745)

48. Memorandum From the Science Advisor to the President and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (Keyworth) to the White House Chief of Staff (Regan)¹

Washington, June 11, 1985

SUBJECT

Dr. Edward Teller's Visit With the President (11 June 1985)

Edward Teller will see the President this afternoon at 3:45. He will most likely discuss the SDI-related accomplishments of his parent laboratory, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory—keying on the bomb-pumped laser. Although the meeting is supposedly to be “alone” with the President, I must assume that you or Bud will be there as well.

Livermore has done some remarkable work on a “free-electron” laser, and a reactor-pumped laser. Both of these devices are breakthroughs that could permit demonstration of the feasibility of the SDI by 1988-89. As a result, I have recommended the President call Livermore's Director, Roger Batzel, and commend him on his work. This may have already occurred as of the meeting with Dr. Teller this afternoon.

My greatest concern, however, is that Edward will largely dwell on tentative developments in the bomb-pumped X-ray laser, or “Excalibur.” There have been some rather startling claims made for this device by Dr. Teller's protege, Lowell Wood.

If Excalibur were to work as advertised it would be an incredible weapon. Dr. Teller will most probably extol this as “. . .the dawn of a new age which will eclipse the creation of the atomic bomb,” and make the case that just *one* of these devices could destroy every Soviet missile, every Soviet warhead, and every decoy they might ever try to deploy.

Edward may also make the case that while the Soviets are working on this bomb-pumped X-ray technology, we are not. In fact, we *are* funding investigation of this technology through DOE. Edward's difficulty is that we have not made it centerpiece option within the SDI.

Were it to work (its feasibility is uncertain), this device would be a powerful preemptive attack weapon—and destabilizing. It therefore tends to run counter to the spirit of the President's SDI, as well as the capabilities of all other technologies now under development

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Keyworth Files, Subject File, SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative (June 1985) (06/01/1985–06/16/1985). No classification marking. A copy was sent to McFarlane.

by the SDIO which can only be effectively used in a defensive mode. For this reason, and because it is nuclear, we have deliberately kept this program out of SDI's limelight. At the same time we *do* know the Soviets are working on it. And because almost all the work is wrapped up in underground nuclear tests and pure laboratory research, it is quite unverifiable by either side.

Dr. Teller will want increased funding for Excalibur, and probably ask for sufficient money (\$50–80 million next year) to fund a series of underground experiments. This money could, and should, be available within DOE. Our continued work on any device of this type should quite rightly always be separate from SDI, and continue to be referred to as a “hedge” against Soviet breakthroughs.²

² On June 11, Reagan met with Teller and McFarlane in the Oval Office from approximately 3:45 to 4 p.m.; earlier that day from 12:02 to 1:17 p.m., Reagan had met with Teller, Keyworth, and other U.S. officials and scientists in the Roosevelt Room to discuss space exploration and space technology. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes of these meetings have been found. Reagan wrote in his personal diary for June 11: “Lunch was with 5 top space scientists. It was fascinating. Space truly is the last frontier and some of the developments there in astronomy etc. are like science fiction except they are real. I learned that our shuttle capacity is such we could orbit 300 people. Later in my office one of the guests Dr. Edward Teller reported on where we are on our Defense research for a way to halt Nuclear missiles. The bad news is that our Congressional advocates of lower defense spending are cutting our research funds at a critical moment that will be very hurtful to the program.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 469)

49. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 27, 1985

SUBJECT

Strategic Modernization NSDD (Follow-on to NSDD-91)

After the Senate vote on MX, Admiral Poindexter sent the new Strategic NSDD back to me for redo of the ICBM portion (see note at Tab II).²

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-090, NSDD 178. Top Secret; Special Access. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Signed.”

² Attached but not printed. See Document 33.

I have, accordingly, rewritten that portion to reflect the situation we now face on MX and to make the NSDD compatible with the no undercut NSDD (NSDD-173).³

I have informally coordinated the change with OSD (General Powell), State and the Air Force. In view of the extensive prior coordination on the NSDD and the fact that the summer POM cycle is rapidly passing, I feel strongly that you should move the NSDD on to the President if you still concur with its contents.

I have held the NSDD pending the House floor vote on MX. Now that the House has made its decision I see no point in further delay. We need to regain the offensive on MX and I believe the new MX wording will help achieve this.

By laying out the process for the selection of a new basing mode for more MX, we will clearly be signaling to the Congress that we do not accept the House attempt to permanently cap the program and that we are moving forward on the survivability issue. This opens the door for the continuation of the program and creates a strong rationale for us to use in support of Nunn and the Senate position during conference. It also lays the foundation for denying our critics their strongest argument (that MX is not survivable).

Finally, you asked me to point out in my memo where all the skeletons are buried in the NSDD. The memo at Tab II which sent the last version to you notes that we took all but one or two of DOD's suggested changes in the final version (the ones we did not take were administrative in nature). There is, of course, more here than appears on the surface. While few objections to the NSDD were raised during the extensive, informal coordination I did this spring, the Navy began to object during the formal coordination cycle. While one can describe their position in various ways, I believe it is fair to say that they felt in their final analysis that it would divert more money into the strategic line and hurt other areas of the budget. They argued this strongly within the JCS and succeeded in getting the JCS to come out against the new NSDD (some factions in the Army and Air Force are sympathetic to this argument). The SecDef reviewed all of this and finally came down in favor of the NSDD with the changes noted at Tab II which we accepted. I would fully expect the JCS to continue their opposition if we were to recoordinate the entire NSDD at this time.

In this regard, it is important to note that I have reordinated only the *new* portion of the ICBM language. OSD and State have both agreed to the new language.

³See Document 47.

Quick action on the NSDD is important because further delay will cause the new portions of the NSDD to miss the summer POM cycle. The delays to date are now sending a signal to those who oppose the modernization program that their efforts to delay the program are succeeding. In fact, my contacts in OSD expressed surprise that the NSDD was still alive. The general conclusion they had drawn was someone had killed it and, therefore, we did not plan to continue the new portions of the program. A failure to move forward with the NSDD in the near future will have broad impact on the resources allocated to strategic forces, especially in the areas where new work is needed to link the program to SDI (air defense, targeting of mobile missiles, etc.).

Bob Linhard, Mike Donley, and Sven Kramer concur.

Bill Wright's concerns at Tab II still apply.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I⁴ moving the NSDD to the President for signature.⁵

⁴ Printed as Document 50.

⁵ Printed as Document 51. McFarlane approved the recommendation.

50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 9, 1985

SUBJECT

Update to NSDD-91 (Strategic Modernization)

Issue

Whether or not to sign a new NSDD which updates your Strategic Modernization Program guidance to the Department of Defense.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-090, NSDD 178. Top Secret; Special Access. Sent for action. Prepared by Douglass. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

Facts

NSDD-91² (Strategic Modernization) is now more than two years old. A number of significant changes to our programs and the world situation have occurred since NSDD-91 was published. This new NSDD³ integrates these changes into your modernization program.

Discussion

This new NSDD directs the Department of Defense to begin work on several important new programs which have become more important due to recent Soviet advancements in research and weapons deployments. These new U.S. programs include warning of attack by air and sea-launched cruise missiles, research and development on defense against cruise missiles and bombers (to complement our work on defense against ballistic missiles in your SDI program) and the development of capabilities to attack relocatable targets like the Soviets' new SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs.

The new NSDD has been coordinated with both Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you sign the attached new Strategic Modernization NSDD and Annex One.⁴

² Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984.

³ Printed as Document 51.

⁴ Reagan indicated his approval by writing a checkmark and his initials. Tabs A and B are printed as Document 51.

51. National Security Decision Directive 178¹

Washington, July 10, 1985

STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION (U)

NSDD–12² dated October 1, 1981 outlined the overall U.S. Strategic Modernization Program. NSDD–12 was supplemented by NSDD–91³ dated April 19, 1983. The following guidance supersedes both NSDD–12 and NSDD–91, and supplements NSDD–119⁴ which sets out the Strategic Defense Initiative and NSDD–78⁵ which relates U.S. force structure to the START negotiations. (U)

The modernization program outlined in this directive will guide the continued high priority long-term modernization of our strategic forces. The objective of this directive is to ensure that our national technological resources are fully utilized to develop and deploy strategic systems which ensure the endurance of our national strategy to deter nuclear war and to provide for strategic stability. (U)

1. *Strategic Communications.* The improvement of our strategic command, control and communications continues to be the first priority of our modernization program. Strategic connectivity that can survive and endure before, during and after all conditions of severe stress including nuclear attack is essential. Low-cost, backup systems will be funded and deployed. Particular emphasis should be placed on the development and deployment of warning systems which can provide timely and unambiguous warning to national command authorities of impending strategic attack by ICBMs, SLBMs, air and sea-launched cruise missiles, and manned aircraft. Connectivity to the SLBM force will be modernized as rapidly as practical through the deployment of E–6A aircraft. (S)

2. *Bomber Forces.* Continue modernization of our bomber force through the development and deployment of the B–1B, the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), and the Advanced Cruise Missiles. The

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–090, NSDD 178. Top Secret. McFarlane distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman under cover of a July 11 memorandum: “The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on the Strategic Forces Modernization Program.” (Ibid.)

² NSDD–12, “Strategic Forces Modernization Program,” is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

³ NSDD–91, “Strategic Forces Modernization Program Changes,” is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

⁴ NSDD–119, “Strategic Defense Initiative,” is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

⁵ NSDD–78, “U.S. Approach to START Negotiations—V,” is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 53.

B-1B will have the capability to launch both ALCMs and Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACM). One hundred B-1Bs will be deployed with the first squadron to be operational in 1986. During the development of the ATB, design options will be preserved to ensure that the ATB could ultimately have the capability in conjunction with other national assets to locate and attack relocatable targets within the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries. Also, the ATB should have the ability to deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons. The numbers of ATBs and Advanced Cruise Missiles to be deployed and their initial operational capability (IOC) dates are set forth in Annex One to this NSDD. The ACM should be produced and deployed on B-52Hs as rapidly as practical. Bomber modifications and rotary launcher schedules should be developed to support this schedule. NSDD-78 established 350 heavy bombers as a lower limit on the bomber force structure for purposes of the START negotiations. Previous force structure projections have not been compatible with this level. The Department of Defense should recommend an appropriate heavy bomber force structure plan to the National Security Council by December 1, 1985. (TS)

3. *Sea-Launched Missile Forces.* Continue the Trident II (D-5) and Trident submarine programs. The D-5 will be developed and deployed so that the first D-5/Trident SSBN will be deployed no later than 1989. While the final force structure of Tridents and D-5's is not determined at this time, acquisition of Tridents should occur at the rate of at least one every year until a final force structure decision is made. (S)

4. *Land-Based Missile Deployment*

a. *The Peacekeeper Program—Phase I.* Continued development and production of the Peacekeeper missile will be accomplished on a priority basis. Sufficient missiles and associated ground support equipment will be produced to support an operational deployment of 100 missiles. At least 50 of these 100 missiles will be deployed in existing Minuteman silos in Wyoming, supported by Francis E. Warren Air Force Base. Specifically, the first 50 missiles will replace the Minuteman missiles in the 400th Strategic Missile Squadron (SMS). If the second 50 are deployed in Minuteman silos, they will replace Minuteman missiles in the 319th SMS in Wyoming and Nebraska. The IOC of the Peacekeeper missile in this basing plan will be achieved in 1986. The full operational capability of the 100 missiles will be achieved as soon as possible thereafter depending on the basing mode selected for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. Full operational capability for the first 50 Peacekeeper missiles in silos will be accomplished by the end of calendar year 1988. The Department of Defense should ensure that the production of Peacekeeper missiles is not interrupted until the 100 Peacekeeper missiles and associated test missiles and spares are produced. (S)

b. *The Peacekeeper Program—Phase II.* The DOD should develop a plan for determining the best basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. The plan should include an orderly process for identifying a preferred basing mode or modes for the second 50 Peacekeepers as soon as possible based on the military requirement, considering the unique capabilities of both the Peacekeeper and Small ICBM, the technology advancements achieved since the President's Commission on

Strategic Forces report in early 1983 and developments in the Soviet ICBM force structure. The plan should include a proposed rationale for developing the consensus necessary to gain required funding for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles and ground support equipment. The DOD should provide a report on the proposed plan to the President by September 15, 1985 and a progress report on the status of the plan by November 15, 1985. The progress report should be consistent with the assessment of specific actions that could be taken to respond to Soviet noncompliance directed by National Security Decision Directive 173,⁶ but should be separate from it. The DOD should ensure that sufficient progress has been made by January 1986 so that the Secretary of Defense can recommend a proposed new basing mode or modes for further research or to enter full scale development, if required, in fiscal year 1987 for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. (S)

c. *Small ICBM*. Continue the engineering design of a small, single warhead ICBM. Such a missile should be ready for full scale development in 1987 and potential deployment in the early 1990's. Special emphasis will be given to development of low-cost components designed to reduce the life cycle cost of mobile systems. The Department of Defense should establish a baseline program for the small ICBM by July 15, 1986 and should report this baseline with associated cost and progress made to date on low-cost basing concepts for the small ICBM, to the National Security Council. (S)

d. *Survivability Enhancements*. Continue programs to resolve uncertainties regarding silo and shelter hardness applicable to Peacekeeper and small missiles, studies of fratricide effects, and investigation of different types of land-based vehicles and launchers, particularly hardened vehicles. Research on Deep Underground Basing will continue because of its application to a secure reserve force, and its potential for survivable C³. Particular emphasis should be placed on the study of combinations of superhard silos and other survivability enhancements as possible alternative future basing modes for land-based ICBMs. Research should also continue on Ballistic Missile Defense systems compatible with other survivability enhancements for land-based ICBMs. This research should draw from and be closely coordinated with research conducted on the Strategic Defense Initiative program. (S)

5. *Strategic Defense*. Guidance on the Strategic Defense Initiative program is provided in NSDD–119. Increased attention should be placed on separate research to ensure that defenses against manned aircraft and cruise missiles are developed concurrently with defenses against ballistic missiles being developed by the SDI program. This research should allow for a possible future deployment decision for defenses against advanced low observable air-breathing threats to occur in the same timeframe as a possible deployment decision for defense against ballistic missiles. (S)

6. *ICBM/SLBM Penetration Aids*. Given the intensity of Soviet development of ABM technologies, a program will be pursued to develop penetration aids, decoys, and maneuverable RVs for U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs. These programs should be structured so as to allow

⁶ See Document 47.

the deployment of penetration aids and decoys by the early 1990s and MARVs as soon as practical thereafter if required. (S)

7. Capability to Attack Relocatable Targets. On an urgent basis, develop a program to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with U.S. strategic forces. The Department of Defense should recommend to the National Security Council by April 2, 1986 an appropriate program to develop as soon as possible the sensors, C³I assets, and strategic force structure required to attack relocatable targets. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Annex

Annex One to National Security Decision Directive 178⁷

Washington, undated

Annex One to NSDD 178

ATB. One hundred thirty-two ATB's will be procured for deployment in a manner that will support an initial flight in 1987 and an initial operational capability for the first ATB squadron in 1991. Additional procurement of ATB will be examined at a later date in light of overall bomber force structure requirements and a later assessment of the long term utility of maintaining the B-52 force. (TS/SA)

ACM. A total available inventory objective of 1,461 missiles for B-52H and B-1B aircraft is established. Additional procurement of ACM's will depend on a later review of the bomber force structure and cruise missile carriage requirements. The ACM will attain an Initial Operational Capability on B-52H aircraft in mid-1988. (TS/SA)

Ronald Reagan

⁷Top Secret; Special Access. McFarlane distributed the Annex to Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman under cover of a July 11 memorandum: "The President has approved the attached Special Access Annex to NSDD-178."

52. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 20, 1985

SUBJECT

SDI and the Allies

Summary

The transatlantic debate over SDI is less acrimonious than it was a few months ago. Nonetheless, SDI in all its dimensions—strategic, technological and political—will remain a profoundly difficult issue for the Alliance for years to come. Keeping our political objectives to the fore—even at cost to economic efficiency—and publicly endorsing cooperative European efforts can help alleviate these tensions.

The Strategic Dimension

Though temporarily in abeyance, strategic concerns about SDI—particularly its alleged deviation from traditional nuclear deterrence—remain at the heart of our problem with the Allies. Although their reaction is overlaid with a characteristic European resistance to change, the Europeans are genuinely uneasy at what they see as another unilateral American change in NATO strategic doctrine which advertises their dependence; and they fear that its strategic implications will weaken public support for the British and French nuclear deterrents. They also see a prolonged negotiating stalemate in Geneva over SDI as producing political complications for them. These concerns are real even if we are right on the merits.

In recent months, Paul Nitze's speeches,² the Camp David points³ and NSDD 172⁴ have put our SDI objectives in perspective and provided reassurance on certain key points. Most Allies—always reluctant to challenge the U.S. frontally on security issues—have been happy to endorse SDI research as a prudent hedge. An implausible Soviet position in Geneva has muted pressures for arms control. However, several developments—for example, our testing of ABM components or a more plausible Soviet negotiating position—could reopen the debate.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Records, Memoranda and Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals, Lot 89D149, S/P CHRONs 7/1–31/85. Confidential. Drafted by Avis Bohlen and Barry Lowenkron (S/P).

² See Document 22.

³ See Document 9.

⁴ See Document 40.

The Technological Dimension

With the strategic debate momentarily on a back burner, the Weinberger offer of Allied participation in SDI research has moved the technological and economic implications of SDI to the forefront of Alliance discussion. Unless we put our political objectives up front, this aspect of SDI could compound rather than alleviate our differences with the Europeans.

Part of the problem stems from the unrealistic expectations entertained by the Europeans themselves—the Germans especially. The Weinberger offer was thus initially perceived as a kind of high-tech Marshall Plan which would allow the Europeans simultaneously to overcome years of technological lag, to be more positive about SDI and to influence our eventual decisions on SDI deployment. However, it has become apparent that the opportunities for European participation will be extremely limited—primarily because of predictable built-in constraints: superior and more numerous U.S. research and development capabilities, congressional and OSD preferences for having work done in the U.S., security controls which—quite apart from the technology transfer problem—will place large areas of SDI research off limits to the Allies, etc.

Moreover, even in those areas where the Europeans have research capabilities relevant to SDI—and there are several of interest to SDIO—the terms of European participation present problems. *Our programmatic need to make maximum progress as rapidly as possible on SDI research is to some degree in conflict with our political objective of using Allied participation to give them a stake in SDI.* Thus, SDIO's preference would be to use European scientists or consortia or industries selectively, plugging them into our program as appropriate—that is, in precisely the subcontractor role to which Mitterrand so objected. The Europeans are apprehensive of such arrangements, which, in their view, could result in a brain drain of their best scientific talent in precisely those fields where they are the most advanced; at the same time, controls on technology transfer would severely restrict the flow of derived technology back to Europe and its civil sector. In sum, they now perceive—as Kohl has said—risks as well as opportunities. These concerns have increased the attractiveness of EUREKA and other European options—though not to the exclusion of bilateral cooperation.

Our SDI program should not be run to accommodate the Europeans. At the same time, it is not in our interest that the Weinberger offer be perceived as a device to exploit Europe's meager technological resources. Given that the Allied contribution to our SDI objectives will be marginal, *we should keep our political objectives to the fore—even if this means some loss of efficiency.* We should continue to accommodate their

preferences, and not rule out some form of multilateral European effort if this is what they prefer.

The Political Dimension

SDI—in particular the debate over European participation in SDI research—has exacerbated political divisions not only between the U.S. and Europeans but among the Europeans themselves, and in some cases, within individual countries. These strains have been particularly acute for Germany, stretching Bonn between its increasingly valued relationship with France and its more important relationship with the U.S. It has accentuated differences between Kohl, Genscher, and Strauss, while creating a new rallying point for the SPD. While the private sector has been generally enthusiastic about participating in research, the defense and foreign ministries have been more cautious about the implications of participation on the ultimate question of deploying strategic defenses. The result has been a series of positions that can only be described as schizophrenic. Similar though less acute divisions exist in the UK; even for Britain, SDI has created a tension between the “special relationship” and its new-found post-Fontainebleau European vocation.

The resulting disarray has been a galling reminder to the Europeans of how easily US policies can evoke European responses that reinforce perceptions in this country of a weak, carping and greedy Europe. Paradoxically, SDI has also provided a strong impulse to formulate coordinated European positions—though a single unified position is not within reach. Indeed it is hard to think of a recent security issue where the Europeans have so clearly and unanimously felt the need to coordinate their responses to a U.S. initiative.

We should encourage this trend. Though it is often easier to deal with the Europeans individually, it is hard to argue that the intra-European divisions have increased support for SDI, have silenced the doubters, or have isolated the French. More generally, *further divisions within Europe would work against our long-term interest in a strong and self-confident Europe with the Franco-German relationship at its core.* It is increasingly evident that the Germans will not take a position that does not have some degree of French acquiescence. When Bonn is faced with a choice between ourselves and the French, nobody wins. A situation which puts such strains on Germany’s special vulnerabilities is also not in the long-term Western interest. In the defense field, U.S. and European interests are essentially parallel—more so, at least, than in the economic field where we have long supported European unity as a matter of principle.

In my view, therefore, encouraging greater European initiative and self-reliance in a defense-related field is in our interest. Admittedly the

European record is not impressive. EUREKA still lacks concrete content, primarily because of intra-European differences rather than U.S. opposition. Nonetheless, the Europeans remain acutely sensitive to our views on joint European efforts and a publicly forthcoming attitude could somewhat ease the strains. Finally, our political strategy must take account of the reality that France will play a central role.

Steps We Can Take

While our basic differences with the Europeans over SDI cannot be resolved at the present time, there are some steps we can take—and to some extent are taking—that will help:

— Our public statements should continue to emphasize the present importance of nuclear deterrence, as well as assurances that SDI will also protect Allied security. We should also focus more sharply on how we would deal with the European conventional imbalance in a non-nuclear world. Conceivably, we should make the elimination of nuclear weapons conditional on the elimination of the conventional threat.

— We should take a hard look—and soon—at the potential merits of anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs). (PM and EUR will be sending a memo to you shortly.)⁵ At first glance, they have much to recommend them: they could offer the Europeans a stake in SDI directly relevant to their own security, and permit a joint European effort—conceivably even bringing along the French. Further study may reveal serious disadvantages for the U.S. in European leadership in ATBM research. But the study should get under way rapidly.

— Although a strategy for Allied participation in SDI research has proved elusive, in part because of the numerous institutions and interests involved, we should establish, as a matter of policy, the primacy of our political objectives. Such a strategy should be aimed at encouraging coordinated European efforts—EUREKA or the creation of various consortia—rather than at dividing the Europeans.

⁵Not found.

53. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 30, 1985

Mr. Secretary:

Although I have been “out of the loop” on arms control and strategic topics for more than a week now (a long time for Washington), I wanted to send you some ideas on this broad subject before departing for Bonn. In this memo, I will step back a bit from the current negotiating situation in Geneva and analyze the evolving US-Soviet strategic balance. I then will ruminate on what these trends mean for our negotiating strategy in Geneva. Finally, I will make a few suggestions on how to relate our negotiating posture to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

Strategic Trends

Despite the overall success the Reagan Administration has had over the past four years in accelerating the modernization of US strategic offensive forces, the momentum of the Soviet offensive buildup has continued unabated. Thus, the Administration still faces basically the same problem it confronted when it entered office in 1981: The Soviet buildup is gradually, but steadily undermining the US strategic deterrent—the lynchpin of American defense policy and NATO’s strategy of “flexible response.” In particular, the vulnerability of US fixed ICBMs (the *Minuteman* force), bomber forces, SLBM ports and command, control and communications facilities to increasingly accurate Soviet ICBMs has grown, and thus remains the principal weakness of the US deterrent. Looking ahead, the Soviet acquisition of less vulnerable strategic systems (mobile ICBMs like the SS-24 and 25), combined with increased vulnerability of US systems, means that the credibility of the US deterrent will be further eroded over the next decade.

It is, of course, debatable what this means for strategic stability and East-West relations in the 1990s. I do not believe that the shifting strategic balance foreshadows, at some stage, a Soviet nuclear “bolt from the blue” designed to disarm the United States and to thus secure, for the USSR, worldwide domination. Nor do I believe that, on the basis of a Soviet perception of nuclear advantage, we are likely to experience a “nuclear ultimatum” issued by Moscow, designed to force us to back

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the letter. Shultz wrote on the top right-hand corner of the letter: “PN, FYI. G.” A typed transcription of Shultz’s note bears the date August 5. Michele Bova also initialed the letter and wrote “1 Aug.”

down from "front line" positions around the world. (We should recall that the high-point of Soviet nuclear diplomacy—Khrushchev's "saber-rattling" in the late 1950s and his installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962—were a function of strategic weakness, not strength.) Instead, the emergence of what Sam Nunn has called a condition of "parity-minus" is likely to have two critical implications: First, in intense regional crises of the future, the United States will be deprived of its own ability to play the nuclear card, as for example, President Nixon skillfully did in ordering a nuclear alert to deter direct Soviet military intervention in the 1973 Middle East war. Second, the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear power will gradually, but inevitably lead to a loosening of Alliance ties, with Europeans increasingly questioning the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee and Americans, reflecting on the danger attached to the commitment to NATO, increasingly seeking to circumscribe that commitment. Indeed, some Americans, on both ends of the political spectrum, will assert that the time has come to shuck Alliance responsibilities altogether. Thus, in the next decade, the Soviet strategic buildup could mean (a) that the United States will be deprived of an important tool for crisis management and (b) that the United States and its key Allies will drift further apart.

The Potential Role of SDI

There are, of course, a number of theoretical ways we could cope with this problem. The United States, in close consultation with the Allies, could begin a process of disengagement from Western Europe and Northeast Asia with the understanding that the Europeans and the Japanese would pick up the slack. As superficially attractive as such an option would be for some, it is neither politically nor economically feasible. How would the US nuclear umbrella over Germany and Japan be replaced? Would these nations, together with other Allies, spend what was necessary to sustain credible conventional defenses? The net result of pursuing this option would most likely be an unprecedented crisis within the West and a weakening of overall military capability—a situation that Moscow would be only too willing to exploit.

Another, more realistic option is for the United States to respond to growing Soviet offensive nuclear capability by accelerating its own offensive programs; in particular, reducing the vulnerability of existing US systems by deploying more survivable replacements. Of course, this is largely what we are attempting to do right now: The ALCM and the ATB are meant to enhance bomber survivability and penetrability, the longer-range *Trident* SLBMs give submarines greater ocean-operating area and thus greater protection and the Midgetman SICBM would be mobile, thus escaping the vulnerability of fixed-site missiles. The problem here is not our technical capacity to respond to increasing strategic

vulnerability, but our political and economic willingness over the long haul to take the necessary steps. The MX is a sad case in point. It has been under development for more than a decade and when it finally is deployed, it will be in numbers too small to affect the overall balance (the Carter Administration wanted 200!) and, of course, it will also, mainly for reasons of domestic politics, be as vulnerable as the *Minuteman*. I am pessimistic, then, about the US ability to keep pace with the Soviet offensive by offensive improvements of our own. Already, an arms race “weariness” is setting in among the American public and on Capitol Hill, not to mention the Allies. The President has done a magnificent job in explaining why the strategic balance must not be permitted to worsen further, but can we count on future Presidents to be so courageous and persuasive?

Obviously, this is where SDI comes in. Whatever the potential for strategic defenses to render nuclear weapons obsolete in the 21st century, it is clear, as the President said in his Strasbourg speech,² that the near-term promise of SDI is to enhance deterrence, not to replace it with some alternative strategic doctrine. I have seen enough analytical work to convince me that if coupled with a prudent program of offensive modernization (cruise missiles, *Trident* and the MX), a moderately-sized, layered defense system (perhaps not even utilizing boost-phase intercept) would, in the mid-1990s, neutralize Soviet offensive advantages. As a number of SDI advocates have pointed out, even with an increase in Soviet warheads, Moscow’s ability to convincingly threaten fixed ICBM and other high-value military targets would be vastly degraded if we possessed the ability to complicate—to a significant degree—Soviet nuclear targeting plans. This, in turn, would strengthen the US hand in future crises and strengthen the credibility of US and NATO strategy. Given our technological strength in competing in the area of strategic defense and our political weakness in competing in other areas, SDI seems the way to go.

Needless to say, SDI—like offensive force improvement—also faces tough political sledding. The idea that we are moving the arms race into a new realm continues to have currency, in Europe and at home. And the fact that SDI deployment would require wholesale changes to the ABM Treaty, if not its abrogation, makes a serious effort at strategic defense all the more controversial. The home-grown concern over SDI has not escaped the Soviets and is one reason they have made it Public Enemy Number One. Another, more important reason is undoubtedly that we have plunged onto technological terrain on which the Soviets know they will find it difficult to keep pace. But whatever the reason, the Soviet decision to vilify SDI as an impediment to arms control and

² Reagan’s May 8, 1985, speech in Strasbourg, France, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 240.

as an American attempt to regain strategic superiority has only compounded the pressure on the program from those in the West who worry about irritating the Soviets.

SDI and Geneva

Is there a way out of this dilemma? In theory, arms control could provide an answer. If we are able with the Soviets to negotiate substantial reductions in both sides' offensive systems, then the requirement for strengthening deterrence through the judicious exploitation of strategic defense would decline and, depending on the characteristics of any actual agreement, could even disappear. The question is whether an agreement covering offensive forces, one that significantly reduces the vulnerability of US systems, is really negotiable. On this, the jury is still out. In the 1982–83 START negotiations, the Soviets showed little inclination to discuss reductions in the most threatening component of their strategic forces, land-based ICBMs. But the United States, for its part, was equally unwilling to address tradeoffs that might have made an offensive arms agreement possible.

Two developments have emerged that may have changed this situation. The first, of course, is SDI. It is possible that in confronting a race in new strategic defense technology that they fear they will lose, the Soviets are now finally ready to accept balanced cuts in offensive forces in order to place constraints on SDI. It is not the purpose of this memo to describe in detail what such a deal might look like (I have outlined some specific ideas in an earlier memo to you), but a plausible arrangement might consist of (1) 30–40 percent reductions in overall offensive forces (SNDVs and warheads), including appropriate sublimits on fixed and heavy ICBMs and (2) a ten-year ban, excluding research, on SDI and ASAT testing and deployment, coupled with an extension of the six-month notification requirement to abrogate the ABM Treaty to two to four years. Under the logic of such a proposal, the near-term necessity of SDI deployment would be obviated by the constraints placed on the Soviet offensive buildup and the United States, over the longer term, would preserve the option, through continuing SDI research, of transitioning to a greater reliance on defense. That said, in making such a proposal we could also tell the Soviets that rather than simply reaffirming the existing ABM Treaty, it could be modified to permit both sides to deploy defenses to protect their offensive forces. To enhance our leverage in negotiations, I would also explicitly state that in the absence of an agreement that reduced the threat to our offensive forces, we would abrogate the ABM Treaty in the not-too-distant future.

The second new factor is Mr. Gorbachev's ascendancy. Gorbachev, after years of stagnation in Soviet policy, is an activist and, as Oleg Sokolov told me recently, we should not underestimate his plans to transform both Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It is unclear,

however, whether Gorbachev is serious about achieving a meaningful agreement in Geneva or is more interested in utilizing sophisticated propaganda and public diplomacy in an effort to pressure us to abandon SDI unilaterally. Gorbachev's possible penchant for the latter course—nuclear grandstanding—is perhaps revealed by his recent nuclear testing initiative. However, in truth, there is no way of telling how Gorbachev would respond to a US proposal linking substantial offensive cuts to limits on SDI. I believe that Gorbachev is most likely to try to have it both ways: Early on, pressuring us through a propaganda offensive into unilateral concessions while preserving the option for real negotiations later should his arms control gamesmanship fail.

Under these circumstances, a strong case can be made for continuing to fence off SDI from the Geneva bargaining process and waiting Gorbachev out while engaging in active arms control gamesmanship ourselves. After all, didn't this strategy serve the Administration well over the last four years or so? While the answer to this question is essentially yes, there are several reasons to believe that this approach will not work now. As sketched out above, we are moving into a period of greater Soviet activism. Soviet hints of flexibility in START, combined with suggestions that they are prepared to live with SDI research, will reinforce Western voices calling for negotiations on strategic defenses. Secondly, as much as we try, it will not be possible to keep expectations surrounding the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November completely in check, particularly if, as I expect, the unfolding Soviet peace offensive is meant to put the President on the defensive in Geneva. And even if we make it through Geneva without putting SDI on the table, over the longer haul fencing off SDI in the negotiations will pose considerable political risks here at home and abroad. The Soviet campaign is sure to continue and more importantly, the SDI program will sooner or later bump into the ABM Treaty, which will only serve to strengthen the claim that SDI spells the end of arms control.

Seizing the Initiative

Accordingly, I favor a different course. We should seize the arms control initiative and force the Soviets to put their money where their mouth is. By this, I mean formulating an approach, like the one outlined above, which would hold out the possibility of fixed-duration limits on SDI deployment in return for meaningful offensive arms reductions. Would the Soviets go along with such an arrangement? In a way, it doesn't matter, because we should be able to profit both from Soviet acceptance and intransigence. If Gorbachev is willing to play ball, we would be in the position—for the first time—to curb the growing Soviet offensive threat. By agreeing to permit continuing SDI research, we would also keep the strategic defense option alive. Politically, meanwhile, the President would be in a strong position in Geneva because

it would be he, rather than Gorbachev, that was seen as taking the lead in the negotiations.

If, on the other hand, it becomes clear that Gorbachev isn't interested in a deal along these lines, we would then be in a far stronger position to proceed with SDI on our own, including the eventual abrogation of the ABM Treaty. The problem we face now is that SDI is viewed by many as an excellent bargaining chip that so far we have been unwilling to use in the negotiations. Thus, if we came forward with a proposal that envisaged constraints on strategic defense and the Soviets then turned us down, we would be in the strongest possible position with the Allies and the Congress to proceed with near-term SDI testing and deployment. Although there would still be those that opposed SDI under any circumstances, I think we could make a convincing case that having tried the arms control route and failed due to Soviet obstinacy, there was no other responsible alternative to pursue.

The kernel of my argument, then, is that the INF experience is relevant for SDI. Our ability to deploy controversial systems is directly dependent on our being seen as making a serious effort to achieve an arms control solution. My worry is that by failing to heed the INF lesson, we will not only lose whatever opportunity exists for achieving a good agreement in Geneva, but that we could also lose the opportunity to create a strong consensus around SDI. Ironically, then, rather than posing a threat to SDI, Geneva may be an indispensable element in saving it.

Needless to say, there are potential pitfalls in the approach outlined here. It is always possible, and indeed likely, that the Soviets could avoid a direct response to a new US proposal and by temporizing, push us to agree to more prohibitive SDI constraints and/or less significant offensive reductions. Such attempts must be strongly and publicly resisted. We must be able to explain to the Congress and the Allies the overall concept of a new negotiating approach—responding to the Soviet challenge to stable deterrence—and why a second-rate agreement would not meet this objective. But having watched this Administration cope before with Soviet negotiating tactics, I'm sure you could succeed in this task. In sum, there are strong arguments for formulating a new position in the coming weeks that could be previewed in the meetings here and in New York with your new Soviet counterpart. I believe that such a proposal would: (a) give the President the high ground in November; (b) allow us to take the initiative in the Geneva negotiations; (c) create a strong foundation of public support for SDI and (d) contribute ultimately to the stabilization of deterrence through the end of the century.

It's worth a shot.

Richard Burt³

³ Burt signed the letter "Rick" above his typed signature.

54. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 18, 1985

SUBJECT

PEACEKEEPER Basing Options (U)

(U) This letter describes our plan to develop a basing mode proposal for the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles. In struggling with this problem of PEACEKEEPER basing over the years we have learned a great deal about what not to do, and we must take advantage of this experience.

(S) The need for the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles is predicated upon a set of strategic factors that continue to favor the Soviet Union. In the more than two years since your Scowcroft Commission advocated moving ahead with PEACEKEEPER and a small missile deployment, the Soviet Union has increased the numbers of its most modern ICBM warheads, has deployed one new ICBM (SS-X-25), is preparing to deploy a second new ICBM (SS-X-24), and has continued to harden and expand its target base. For the reasons outlined in the Report of the Scowcroft Commission, the United States continues to have a critical military requirement for 100 PEACEKEEPER missiles, complemented in the far term by Small ICBMs. In order to obtain the 100 PEACEKEEPER Missiles required, the Administration is required by the Congress to demonstrate that it can offer a basing mode for the second 50 missiles that provides increased survivability.

(U) Ever since the prospect of a Congressional restriction on the deployment of fewer than 100 PEACEKEEPER missiles arose last June, we have been reevaluating permanent and more survivable basing modes for the PEACEKEEPER missile. In an effort to ensure that sufficient survivability for the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles is realized, we have reviewed more than 30 basing modes factoring in three areas of change since the Scowcroft Commission reported their results in April 1983.

(U) First, because of the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, the Air Force and the Defense Nuclear Agency have been vigorously pursuing follow-on basing technologies to improve our understanding of nuclear effects and the hardening of structures against

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 828, Subject File, 1985 President—Memoranda to #249–332 (6). Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Signer's copy."

nuclear effects. After two years of effort we can confidently say that for reasonable cost, structures can be built that are very much harder than previously projected. These technology advances dictate that we reexamine those basing modes that rely on hardening for their survivability.

(U) Second, our findings, while applicable to developing a small missile in a mobile basing mode, may be translatable to certain mobile options for the larger PEACEKEEPER missile. We are pursuing mobility for the Small ICBM; however, the Soviets have carried matters one step further. They are deploying ICBMs in mobile ground and rail modes. These developments dictate that we reexamine mobile basing modes as possible means of securing additional survivability for PEACEKEEPER.

(U) Third, a major shift in policy has occurred since 1983. As a result of your Strategic Defense Initiative this shift dictates that when we examine fixed and mobile basing concepts, we consider the potential for incorporating a strategic defense to enhance the survivability of the nation.

(S) We will evaluate all candidate proposals on a schedule that could permit a full-scale development decision late next year. Interim reviews have been scheduled in October and December 1985. We will provide progress reports resulting from these reviews this November and in January 1986. If sufficient progress has been made by January 1986, we will recommend intensive research and development of candidate basing modes to begin in Fiscal Year 1987.

Cap

55. Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹

Washington, undated

Article V of the ABM Treaty and Future ABM Systems

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The question presented is whether Article V, paragraph 1 of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based,

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret.

air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components based on physical principles other than those on which ABM systems were based at the time of signature of the ABM Treaty.

CONCLUSION:

Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an ABM system as a “system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.” It states that ABM systems “currently consist of” ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Thus, Article II indicates that there could be other types of ABM systems developed in the future. Article III of the Treaty prohibits the deployment of ABM systems except that fixed land-based ABM systems utilizing technology current in 1972 can be deployed at specific sites under specific limitations. Agreed Statement D associated with Article III provides that should future types of ABM systems appear in the future, they cannot be deployed at these permitted sites without amendment of the Treaty—otherwise the balance established by Article III would be upset. Article V, paragraph 1, prohibits the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems. *Like Article III, Article V is all encompassing.* Article II makes clear that Article III and Article V apply to all types of ABM systems regardless of the technology utilized. In agreeing to the language of Article V, 1, the Soviet negotiators also agreed that the text covers “any type of present and future components.” Thus, the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems or components based on other physical principles is prohibited by Article V, 1.

TREATY PROVISIONS:

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles . . .
- (b) ABM launchers . . .; and
- (c) ABM radars

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: . . .

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land based.

Agreed Statement D

In order to insure fulfillment of the objective not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

ANALYSIS:

In determining the obligations created by a treaty, one first looks to the plain meaning of the words and provisions that comprise the text of the treaty. Only if the plain meaning of the provisions of the treaty is ambiguous is recourse made to the negotiating record.

Article II, paragraph 1, of the ABM Treaty states that an ABM system is a "system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." This is an unambiguous definition of the term ABM system. Any grouping of weapons and devices that have the *capability* of countering strategic ballistic missiles in flight trajectory falls under the definition of the term ABM system. There is nothing in that definition that restricts the application of the term to systems based on a specific type of technology. The test of whether an ABM system exists is one of capability, not technology. Thus, the term ABM system would cover a system using technology that was not even imagined in 1972, as long as that system has the requisite capability. This conclusion is strengthened by the further language of Article II, paragraph 1. It states that ABM systems "currently consist of" ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. If the term ABM system only applied to systems utilizing technology current as of 1972, there would have been no reason to use the phrase "currently consisting of." Therefore, when the phrase ABM system is used in the ABM Treaty, it covers systems based on both existing and future technology.

Article II, paragraph 2, provides that the term "component" includes ABM missiles, launchers, and radars. Agreed Statement D states that ABM systems can be "based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars . . .". This reference indicates that the term ABM components also covers devices using other than current technology.

Given the meanings of the terms ABM systems and ABM components, the scope of the limitations placed on these systems and components is without ambiguity. Article III provides that ABM systems and components cannot be deployed except as specifically provided in

that Article. Article III of the ABM Treaty, along with the ABM Protocol, limits the deployment of an ABM system to a numerically limited number of fixed land-based ABM missiles, launchers, and radars situated in one geographically limited deployment area. Since the Article specifies the type of ABM components that can be deployed, any other types—including those based on other physical principles—cannot be deployed without amendment of the Treaty. The purpose of Agreed Statement D is simply to clarify this point. Deployment of 100 large, fixed land-based lasers in place of 100 fixed land-based ABM interceptor missiles would create a different balance than that established by Article III.

Article V, paragraph 1, provides that neither Party shall “develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.” Again, the Article refers to ABM systems and components which, as defined in Article II, include systems and components based on both current and future technology. There is nothing in Article V to imply that the definition of ABM system or component has changed since Article II. The word component in Article V carries the same meaning as it does in Article II, and the same Russian word which was agreed to embrace present and future ABM components is used in both places in the Russian text. Therefore, Article V, paragraph 1, provides a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of any ABM system or component which is other than fixed land-based, whether it is based on other physical principles or on “current” technology. Since a complete ban is contained in Article V, as opposed to limited deployment pursuant to Article III, a formal Agreed Statement such as Agreed Statement D was not necessary.

It can also be argued that acceptance of the assertion that Article V does not prohibit the development and testing of other than fixed land-based ABM systems would provide a means of circumventing Article I. This would be the fact because large-scale development and testing of systems such as land-mobile ABM systems could have the effect of providing the base for a territorial defense, which Article I prohibits.

The above demonstrates that the plain meaning of the provisions of the ABM Treaty in question is unambiguous. Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems and components based on other physical principles. It is with this plain meaning that the parties are obligated to comply. Unequivocal obligations cannot be nullified by the negotiating record.

It has been asserted that if Articles II and V covered future systems, there would be no purpose served by Agreed Statement D, and thus that the presence of that Agreed Statement indicates that Articles II and V do not cover future systems. This argument is refuted by a

simple reading of the language of the Treaty. It is also refuted by the relevant sections of the negotiating history. As explained above Agreed Statement D does have a purpose even though Article V applies to future systems.

On August 17, 1971, the U.S. delegation tabled a draft Article 6 (which later became Article V) that provided in part that:

1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop or produce for or test or deploy in sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based modes,

- ABM interceptor missiles,
- ABM launchers,
- ABM radars, or
- Other devices to perform the functions of these components.

At first, the Soviet delegation objected to covering future systems in the treaty because these systems could not be technically described and determined, and thus the parties would not know what they had limited. However, on September 8, 1971, the Soviets proposed alternative language for this Article:

“Each Party undertakes not to construct, not to test, and not to deploy mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems or their components specially designed for such systems.”

On September 15, 1971, the following significant exchange took place:

The discussion started with Article 6(V). Karpov argued that the new formulation of Soviet paragraph 1 (U.S. paragraph 2) of Article 6(V) obviates the requirement for the phrase “other devices for performing the functions of these components” appearing at the end of U.S. paragraph 2. The Soviets were proposing to eliminate specific listing of ABM system components (launchers, interceptors, and radars) and substitute the word “components” (using the literal Russian word (*komponenty*) for this instead of the word for “components” (*sredstva*) used in Article 2 when referring to launchers, interceptors, and radars. *Karpov agreed with Graybeal’s interpretation that the Soviet text meant “any type of present or future components” of ABM systems. (Emphasis added.)*

Here the Soviet negotiators acknowledged that the Russian word “*komponenty*” used in what was to become Article V, paragraph 1, meant any type of present or future component of an ABM system. It was specifically contrasted to the Russian word then used for component in Article II, where specific, current technology components were listed. Article V, paragraph 1, states that neither side shall “develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based,

space-based, or mobile land-based". The word used in the official Russian language version of the text is "*komponenty*," which the Soviets acknowledged covers present and future components. The appearance of this word in the official Russian text reinforces the interpretation of that Article discussed above.

The United States in obtaining Soviet agreement to the language of Article V, paragraph 1, containing the word "*komponenty*" had achieved a prohibition on all types of ABM systems other than fixed land-based systems, including future systems based on other physical principles. The draft of Article V, 1. in this form was inserted in the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty on September 23, 1971 as agreed text. However, the scope of Article V, 1. still depended somewhat on the definition of ABM systems contained in Article II. The Soviet version of that Article referred only to ABM interceptors, launchers and radars following the general definition of ABM systems. Future systems were not explicitly acknowledged. This situation was corrected on December 20, 1971 when the United States suggested that the phrase "currently consisting of" be added to connect the general definition with the specific current components listed. This was accepted by the Soviet side and was incorporated in the Joint Draft Text of December 22, 1971. This settled the issue of the applicability of Article V to future systems based on other physical principles. There remained the United States proposal for a third paragraph of draft Article V which would have banned the deployment of future ABM systems based on other physical principles. Since the deployment of such systems which were other than fixed land-based was already prohibited by draft Article V paragraph 1, there followed discussion concerning limits to be placed on deploying future systems in the context of Article III which regulates fixed land-based ABM systems. This led to Agreed Statement D which is related to Article III. Agreement on the text of Agreed Statement D was reached on February 2, 1972.

The interpretation of the coverage of Article V, 1. set forth above has been the consistent United States interpretation of this provision since 1972. It has been the Soviet interpretation as well.

The above discussion of the negotiating record of the Treaty supports the plain meaning of the language of the ABM Treaty. However, generally speaking, even if there are ambiguous points in the negotiating record, it is not consistent with the rules for interpreting treaties to delve into a negotiating history in order to re-interpret treaty text that is unambiguous. Further, such a practice could establish a bad precedent in that by this means doubts could be raised about the legally binding effect of any treaty language ever agreed upon. In the give and take of a long negotiation many views are expressed; it is what the Parties agreed upon and signed that matters. In this case the meaning of Article V,

1. is unambiguous. It was designed to, and does, prohibit the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or components of all types which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based, whether utilizing "current" technology or technology based on "other physical principles."

56. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikke)¹

Washington, undated

*THE MEANING OF AGREED STATEMENT D OF THE ABM
TREATY BASED ON THE NEGOTIATING RECORD*

This memorandum examines the record of negotiations of the ABM Treaty in order to shed light on the purpose and meaning of Agreed Statement D. Agreed Statement D deals with future ABM systems "based on other physical principles" and was annexed to the Treaty when it was signed.

The memorandum begins with an overview of the issues and a summary of conclusions, followed by a chronology of statements and events which bear on the interpretation of Agreed Statement D. The chronology is not exhaustive but contains the most significant items. Interpretive comments contained in the chronology are enclosed in brackets.

Introduction

There are three key provisions of the ABM Treaty: (1) the definition of "ABM systems" and ABM "components" (Article II); these terms are the subject of the Treaty limitations and prohibitions; (2) the prohibition on deployment of ABM systems, except for permitted deployment of one hundred fixed, land-based systems located in a circumscribed area (Article III, as amended); and (3) the prohibition on testing, development and deployment of mobile ABM systems (Article V, para. 1). In addition, there is an agreed statement, annexed to the Treaty (designated "Agreed Statement D"), which expressly pertains to future ABM systems.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret. All brackets are in the original.

In pertinent part, these provisions are as follows:

Article II

. . . an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, *currently consisting of*:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles . . .
 - (b) ABM launchers . . . ; and
 - (c) ABM radars. . . .
- (Emphasis added.)

Article III

Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: . . . within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers. . . a Party may deploy . . . no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites [with associated radars]. . . . (Emphasis added.)

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Agreed Statement D

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that *in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles* and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars *are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion* in accordance with Article XIII (establishing the Standing Consultative Commission) and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty [providing for amendment].

(Emphasis added.)

On their face, these provisions raise a number of issues with respect to future ABM systems. The use of the phrase “currently consisting of” in Article II can be read to mean that all future variants of existing ABM systems are covered by the Treaty. In that case, Article V would prohibit testing, development, and deployment of all mobile systems using new technologies. On the other hand, if Articles II and V had this effect, there would be no need for the undertaking in Agreed Statement D to *discuss* “specific limitations” on future ABM systems “based on other physical principles.” The fact that “specific limitations” on future systems remain “subject to discussion” indicates that the Treaty by itself does not limit these systems. Furthermore, the text of Agreed Statement D

is unclear as to what rules, if any, apply before the Parties reach agreement on "specific limitations" and amend the Treaty accordingly.

After the Treaty was signed, United States spokesmen unilaterally interpreted Agreed Statement D as a ban on development, testing and deployment of future ABM systems "based on other physical principles," unless the Treaty were amended to permit them. As demonstrated below, this interpretation is not supported by the negotiating record.

Specifically, the Soviet Union persistently refused to agree to Treaty provisions proposed by the United States which would have clearly restricted future types of ABM systems. Hence the Soviet Union might well choose not to abide by the restrictive U.S. interpretation, in order to develop and test new technologies for ballistic missile defense more rapidly and more efficiently. If our intelligence later on indicated that the Soviet Union had in fact not observed the restrictive U.S. interpretation, the negotiating record and the ordinary meaning of the language of the Treaty and of Agreed Statement D would not justify a finding that the Soviet Union had violated the ABM Treaty. The U.S. Government would then be forced to recognize that the United States had unilaterally observed critical restrictions in its strategic defense program that the Soviet Union was not legally bound to observe.

Summary

The negotiating record of the ABM Treaty supports the following conclusions:

— The plain meaning of Agreed Statement D—that "specific limitations" on future ABM systems remain "subject to discussion"—is the meaning supported by the negotiating record. In other words, the issue was left unresolved. If there had been agreement to ban future ABM systems "based on other physical principles" (unless the Treaty were amended to permit them), then the Soviet Union presumably would have accepted express language in the Treaty to that effect. The United States repeatedly proffered explicit Treaty provisions to include all future systems within the Treaty limitations. The Soviet Union consistently rejected those proposals.

— Paragraph 1 of Article V, which prohibits the development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based ABM systems, was not intended to cover future ABM systems "based on other physical principles." The negotiators originally considered the question of future ABM systems as supplemental to this prohibition, in the form of a separate paragraph under Article V. They reached agreement on the text of paragraph 1 while they were still at an impasse as to whether future technologies should be regulated.

— The Article II definition of "ABM systems" as "*currently consisting of*" specified "components" (ABM interceptor missiles, ABM

launchers, and ABM radars) was not intended to encompass substitute components “based on other physical principles.” Again, the negotiators reached final agreement on the language of Article II at a time when they did not agree to limit future systems using new technologies.

— Agreed Statement D was intended to create obligations only with respect to *deployment* of systems “based on other physical principles,” as opposed to testing and development of such systems. For this reason, it was linked to Article III, dealing with permitted deployments.

The United States has unilaterally interpreted the ABM Treaty to impose the same restrictions on ABM systems “based on other physical principles” as on ABM systems and components expressly covered by the Treaty. The Soviet Union would have a sound legal basis to develop and test new ABM technologies, in all basing modes, on the grounds that they reserved this right in the Treaty negotiations and never agreed to the restrictive U.S. interpretation.

57. Memorandum for the Record¹

September 23, 1985

SUBJECT

Issues in the SDI

I. TECHNICAL STATUS

The SDI Organization itself has both felt and exerted strong pressures to plan early tests of systems components and to give priority to concepts which putatively can be deployed earlier. Associated with this attitude has been a public campaign to establish an aura of rapid progress on all fronts in key SDI technologies, and hence a vague but pervasive expectation of the possibility of early deployment. This campaign is entirely explicable given the hostile atmosphere in which the SDI has had to compete for funds, particularly if one accepts the postulate (which has the status of law within the program) that only impressive large-scale technology demonstrations will ensure congressional support.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981–1986, Johnson, Tom Papers [Strategic Defense Initiative]. No classification marking. Drafted by Tom Johnson.

Unfortunately, the facts do not reinforce this sense of rapid progress toward early deployment. For instance: the biggest single success of the past two years, the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), had been planned for several years by the Army; the experiment was fully designed before President Reagan even took office. For instance: the Navy's MIRACL laser was transferred to the Air Force, moved to White Sands, and recently accomplished there a (well publicized) kill demonstration not significantly different from the one it did at the San Juan Capistrano test range in 1978. It is true that the beam quality of MIRACL was improved markedly in the past two years, but that improvement finally brings it up to the design criteria it was supposed to have had in 1978; during the same time, the Air Force's Sigma laser (same power as MIRACL, but of the design type planned for extrapolation to very high-power) failed completely to meet beam quality criteria and was quietly abandoned. For instance: the Army's Airborne Optical Adjunct has continued to make progress in design of multi-channel infrared tracking systems; but it too is behind original expectations, and is a program several years old. More importantly, work with passive IR techniques has now convinced most SDI workers (and, in a formal report, the Army Science Board reviewing the work) that use of such sensors to discriminate decoys from re-entry vehicles is not likely to work.

Further specific instances will be quoted in support below. The general view is that very little in the way of new technology has actually been developed, although a great many paper studies have been performed. Most of these paper studies have revealed the problems associated with continental BMD to be more difficult than had previously been thought. In short, in many areas the "progress" has actually been negative. Boost phase defense provides a good example of this.

1. *Boost Phase*. The Fletcher panel² emphasized the importance of boost phase for two reasons: the high leverage of killing missiles rather than RVs, and the necessity of multiplying kill probabilities over several levels of defense in order to produce a 99% effective system. The panel clearly favored Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) for this task. More careful studies since have shown that none of the currently available candidates is likely to come close to this mission, a result well understood in the Foster study.³ Thus, DEW priorities have been changed within SDIO to reflect the fact that lasers are now expected to play a role in boost-phase kill only in the distant future, if at all.

² Documentation of the Defensive Technology Study Team led by James Fletcher is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984.

³ "National Security Implications of BMD," (Secret), June 1983. A year-long study chaired by John S. Foster for OSD. The study employed more people than the Fletcher Panel and lasted 4 times as long. [Footnote is in the original.]

Within the DEW part of SDIO, only one technology to address boost-phase kill remains in the main line of priorities; all others have been “re-scoped” and officially declared “back-ups.” The remaining priority project is ground-based, induction LINAC free-electron lasers (FELs). The project was recently advanced from basic research level to second priority in DEW on the basis of an experimental result at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) last Spring, in which 40% of the electron beam energy was converted to one centimeter microwave radiation at powers of megawatts. In fact, until May of this year, a ground-based FEL boost-phase killer did not exist even as a concept. In this respect, progress has been tremendous: great expectations have been raised by great extrapolation. But the LLNL result, although certainly an impressive piece of physics and a great advance in FEL milestones, remains very far from meeting even the closest parameters of an FEL weapons system. The wavelength demonstrated at LLNL is 10,000 times longer than that proposed for an FEL weapon; the accelerator must be scaled up a factor of six in energy, while increasing a factor of ten in brightness (a longer accelerator—six times as long—increases the difficulties in simply maintaining brightness, far less improving it); the light beam of the laser must be perfectly trapped by the electron beam, a process not yet demonstrated or even studied experimentally; and the mirrors must be protected from destructive harmonics of the laser light. But even if the laser does work, it will not be 40% efficient, or anything close to that: that number leaves out the efficiency involved in creating the electron beam in the first place; and LLNL concedes that one micron radiation from the e-beam will be much less efficient than one centimeter radiation. Los Alamos estimates that their FEL will operate at 2–3%, and considers FELs’ low efficiency a problem to be overcome in design, rather than an asset. Finally, the LLNL design for a boost-phase FEL killer is for an impressive-sounding 100 megawatt laser. But this power can easily be seen (using LLNL’s own parameters) to be too low by a factor of ten to thirty to accomplish boost-phase kill against the SDIO’s official responsive threat (that is, the threat in the timescale on which FEL could be deployed).

Thus, for boost phase the only DEW remaining in SDIO’s main line is a promising technology with far to go to demonstrate fundamental physics, and much farther yet to reach weapon-scale engineering.

This leaves small rockets (either with HE charges or hit-to-kill) in satellites as the only contender remaining active for boost-phase. The systems architecture studies recently completed typically plan to deploy over 60,000 of these rockets on over 12,000 satellites, about 5% of which would actually be engaged in the boost-phase battle. This notion has been carefully critiqued before (since 1962) and always found wanting; it has great problems of cost, command-and control, complexity,

effectiveness and countermeasures, but the key difficulty has always been survivability. Edward Teller and his Livermore staff analyzed this system during the High Frontier studies (of which Teller was originally part; he resigned over this issue) and demonstrated that it was unworkable because the killer satellites can be effectively attacked. This analysis, in fact, resulted in the "Teller Dictum," that large, expensive space platforms are always cheaper to shoot down than to protect.

The Teller Dictum, of course, applies to all space battle stations, not just KEW ones. Consider only the most likely option: Soviet attack of the defensive system with direct-ascent rockets carrying nuclear weapons (or, cheaper, *some* of which carry nuclear weapons). Within three years the Soviets will already have more than 3500 such missiles without expending any additional funds at all. Suppose that we now spend \$100 billion to put up a 90% effective (SDI optimistic number) boost-phase layer. This layer will neutralize 90% of the Soviets' total investment in ICBMs, which is greater than \$200 billion. Hence, on a cost-effectiveness basis, the Soviets can afford to expend about \$300 billion to buy *additional* interceptor missiles, and they only have to succeed in knocking down between 5% and 10% of our satellites. Their cost effectiveness leverage is gigantic. No system proposed by or studied by SDIO can stand up to such an attack. Note that this argument does not apply to the critical sensor satellites of a generic SDI, because these satellites are cheap enough to proliferate at many altitudes and small enough to be effectively hidden in space.

Summary: Boost-phase kill is still interesting, but no current proposal seems credible in addressing its critical difficulties. Major breakthroughs in several areas will be necessary.

2. *Mid-course* ICBMs spend about 3 minutes in boost-phase, and warning and decision time must be subtracted from that. But they spend over twenty minutes in mid-course, with warning and decisions accomplished. The difficulty is that we must discriminate RVs from decoys in the midcourse: this has been the central problem of BMD since the late 50s. If one can identify the RVs uniquely, one might kill them by a variety of means. The HOE demonstrated this, and SDI studies have come up with other promising KEW concepts.

Discrimination remains an unsolved problem, but the most promising thing about "new technology" is that it offers new ways of discriminating. Indeed, many new and interesting ideas have been proposed and superficially studied in the last year or two. Most of them, and all the best ones, involve some form of "active" discrimination: one actually illuminates or perturbs the decoy cloud rather than passively watching it. Many such techniques involve DEWs. Unfortunately, the SDIO has selected neutral-particle beams in space as its central discrimination technology. Such beam generators would be large and

expensive, hence subject to the Teller Dictum. And the neutral beam demonstration program is expanding so rapidly it will soon absorb the funds for more ingenious prospects, which are funded at very low levels as it is.

A further part of the problem is that mid-course battle management is the most stressing part of the overwhelming software problems accurately summarized by Professor John Parnas in his letter of resignation as an SDIO consultant. This doesn't mean that the problem is intractable: discrimination techniques which allow direct identification and homing by interceptors (without keeping track of all the decoys separately) have been proposed. The intractability arises from the form in which the problem is currently posed.

In summary: Mid-course discrimination is the key problem. Solving it will certainly make it possible to breakup structured attacks and defend most military targets; this is also a necessary step in constructing a true continental defense. Many new solutions may be possible using novel technology or even nuclear weapons. The current SDIO is not vigorously encouraging and exploiting these solutions: its current mainline approaches are, at best, unpromising.

3. *Terminals.* We can now do hard-point terminal defense using interceptors with small nuclear weapons. This is the only BMD technology which has ever demonstrated any military effectiveness; it is by far the least technologically stressful problem in SDI. It is also the one area in which we have totally given up R&D, apparently for political reasons.

Non-nuclear terminal kill, on the other hand, is one of the most difficult of SDIs challenges. It is extremely unlikely that a solution to the problem will be available within the next decade, and quite possible that no solution will be found. The essence of the problem is that incoming RVs are capable of executing extremely sharp turns (ours have done 250 "G" turns and better), much faster than any interceptor can follow. Our engineering has never been able to reduce to zero the miss distance between interceptors and non-maneuvering RVs in clear skies; the possibility that we will solve this problem in the realm of the real responsive threat—maneuvering RVs and nuclear environments—seems remote. We can, on the other hand, probably track and kill RV's just outside the atmosphere, as the Army's ERIS program is designed to do, but only if we can first solve the discrimination problem, since the decoys will be present in full effectiveness until the RVs pass down through about 100km altitude.

4. *Conclusion.* The SDI must be thought of as precisely what the President specified, an R&D program. We do not yet know with any confidence how to accomplish military BMD missions that were not already essentially in hand three years ago. We must protect and

nurture the innovative parts of the SDI program to give us the highest chance of finding these options. There are many promising things to work on, particularly in mid-course discrimination and associated kill mechanisms.

II. Soviet Responses and Domestic Politics

1. Terminal Defense The Soviets now have the only program in state-of-art R&D in terminal defense using nuclear weapons. Their SA-12, which begins deployment soon [*1½ lines not declassified*]. Since they are fully-tooled with essentially open production lines, they hold a lead-time-to-deployment advantage over the U.S. of about 6–8 years (CIA/Army estimate) in proliferating such defenses outside the Treaty. To the extent that we convince them that SDI will produce an effective national defense, we provide them with a strong incentive to break the ABM Treaty and cash their defensive advantage now.

The most critical part of this problem is that we have no prototype state-of-art terminal system against which to test our penetration aids; so we can have no confidence of defeating Soviet defenses if they proliferate. We should have an operational prototype at Kwajalein.

2. Domestic A strong R&D program has been publicly endorsed even by SDI critics; so have hard-point terminal and even the President's concept of total damage denial. In fact, three of the SDI's most effective scientific critics (Richard Garwin, Sidney Drell and W.K.H. Panofsky) signed a document supporting these things. The problems arise from the perceptions of a rush to deploy an imperfect system, or to demonstrate publicly the elements of an imperfect system.

The solution is to emphasize the R&D nature of the program, and to avoid demonstration projects. This does not mean canceling large-scale experiments, but it suggests that they be restricted to actual useful experiments, focused on the most serious technical problems. This focusing will have a far more salutary effect in Congress than any big demonstrations, which actually detract from the SDI's credibility.

3. Geneva There are several ways in which we can bargain seriously and to advantage in Geneva. We cannot hurt the essential R&D of SDI by reaffirming the ABM and Outer Space Weapons Treaties. We can certainly bargain over (and afford to give up) several different kinds of space-based demos and even kinds of space-based battle stations, for instance space chemical lasers above certain powers. Whether this would be verifiable is not a matter of concern to us: we don't think such things are workable anyhow. But the Soviets are still worried about them, and this would allow us to place the verification shoe on the Bear's foot for a change. We can demonstrate good faith and gain much public leverage by bargaining for a range of space-based technologies individually. We should also ask the Soviets to specify what their

frequent references to space-based “strike weapons” actually refer to. It’s likely there is something here we could use to advantage too.

III. Management

The SDIO is sorely lacking in staff, both in size and facilities. It also lacks the power to keep the Services from using its funds to satisfy their own prerogatives; this problem is actually getting worse.

Most critically, the SDI lacks a unified doctrine on political, military and arms-control issues, and the SDIO has demonstrated itself incapable of producing one. The OSD level board currently advising LGEN Abrahamson has been totally ineffective in resolving any of these issues. A Presidential-level Advisory Board is clearly required.

Thomas H. Johnson

Director, Science Research Laboratory

58. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (George) to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 25, 1985

[*number not declassified*]. SUBJECT: Discussions by Soviet Officials of the SDI and Other Arms Control Issues.

Introduction

1. This information, [*2½ lines not declassified*]. The report covers two presentations on the arms control issues, one made by Geneva arms control talks negotiator Yuliy A. Kvitsinskiy at KGB headquarters and another by Soviet officials at the Soviet embassy in London. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Kvitsinskiy’s Assessment of the Geneva Arms Negotiations

2. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Yuliy A. Kvitsinskiy, the chief Soviet negotiator for SDI, addressed 800 senior KGB officers at their Moscow

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, Subject File, NSPG—Soviet SDI Briefing for the President—1985. Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*].

headquarters on the Geneva arms control negotiations. Kvitsinskiy surprised many of his audience by the harshness of his accusations against the United States for their alleged failure to engage in serious negotiations. Although Kvitsinskiy's words were sharp, he spoke without emotion. He seemed to want to show that he was realistic in his assessment of the Americans as being sophisticated and cunning adversaries.

3. Kvitsinskiy said that the SDI remained the central problem in the negotiations. If agreement could be reached on SDI, it would not be difficult to deal with strategic arms and INF. Kvitsinskiy gave his audience the impression that not only was there a rough equivalence in Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, but each also had a massive overkill capability. As both sides were due to replace some of their older systems, it was realistic to think in terms of deep cuts. Kvitsinskiy also gave the impression that the Soviet leadership recognized that INF deployment would continue, but did not think that it would be an irreversible process. Because the Soviet Union had so many SS20's, it should be possible to negotiate an accord. For the time being, the Soviets would keep this card in their pocket.

4. Despite these possibilities, Kvitsinskiy's tentative conclusion was that, for the time being, the United States was not interested in achieving real progress in the negotiations. The United States, he pointed out, was not just working on the development of its SDI program, but it also needed another one to three years to complete work on other new weapons systems—MX, Midgetman, Trident II (D5), more accurate cruise missiles, and the stealth bomber. There was, therefore, little hope of achieving progress during the rest of the Reagan Administration's term of office. His successor might be more disposed to negotiate.

5. After Kvitsinskiy's 45 minute talk, there was a 20 minute question period. Kvitsinskiy was asked why the Soviet Union should, given his assessment, continue to take part in the negotiations. He replied that the Soviet leadership believed that it was important to continue to explore the possibilities of a settlement and at the same time expose the fact that the United States was simply using the negotiations as a facade behind which it wished to prepare to negotiate from a position of strength. For these reasons the Soviet Union would stay at Geneva.

6. Another member of the audience asked for Kvitsinskiy's impressions of his American counterparts. He said that they were extremely polite and highly civilized. By these devices they sought to conceal their true objectives which were, as he had said, to enable the United States to negotiate from a position of strength. He added that on one occasion his counterpart had dropped the mask of politeness. The American negotiator had said "he hated the Soviet Union and if he was in power

he would eliminate us. But he had been sent to negotiate with us and as a man loyal to the President he was simply following his instructions.”

GRU Officer's Briefing on SDI

7. [1½ lines not declassified] spoke to diplomatic staff about SDI and its implications for the Soviet Union. [name not declassified] presentation was based on guidance from GRU headquarters, supplemented by work done by his own staff. It was a typical military briefing complete with slides and viewfoils to illustrate the main points.

8. [name not declassified] emphasized the following points:

A. Although the SDI system was very complicated, it was not unrealistic to think that the US would be able to implement it, sooner or later.

B. The main problems which the Americans faced in developing SDI were creating enough energy, and storing it, for space based lasers to be effective. These technical problems meant that it was particularly important for the Americans to increase the accuracy of the systems so as to minimize the energy required to destroy Soviet missiles.

C. It was possible that SDI would eventually be able to intercept 90 percent of the Soviet Union's strategic missiles.

9. Although [name not declassified] had pointed to difficulties that Americans would have in developing SDI, he was pessimistic about the Soviet ability to match the United States. It was an illusion, he said, to believe that Soviet nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines could hope to get under the SDI umbrella by launching their missiles from close to the US coast. SDI would be a three-tiered system, and the third tier would still be able to intercept missiles launched in this way.

10. [less than 1 line not declassified] although it would probably be possible in due course for SDI related systems to protect Western Europe from Soviet SS20 missiles, much important European territory would remain vulnerable to the SS22's.

11. After [name not declassified] briefing, and a certain amount of discussion the Soviet ambassador, Viktor I. Popov, told the audience that [name not declassified] had proved that the SDI was a serious threat to the Soviet Union. Every effort was to be made, therefore, to gather information about the development of the SDI program and the views of different groups within the US and Western Europe on it. Particular attention was to be paid to differences of opinion between the US and Western Europe.

12. From what [name not declassified] and the ambassador had said, and the guidance which the embassy had received from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the diplomatic staff knew that they were to make the following points to their contacts:

A. SDI represented a dangerous leap forward in the arms race in general, but especially in the nuclear arms race. SDI could disarm the Soviet Union of its strategic nuclear forces, thus leaving it without a real deterrent.

B. SDI represented an aggressive act by the United States, aimed at creating conditions in which the US could blackmail the Soviet Union and even possibly eliminate it.

C. SDI makes the threat of a nuclear war more likely.

D. The American intention to press ahead with SDI research and development and their refusal to talk seriously in Geneva were a violation of the Shultz-Gromyko accord of 8 January 1985.

E. SDI is a violation of the ABM treaty.

F. The Soviet Union would be forced to match American developments related to SDI or, more likely, find ways of rendering the US system ineffective.

G. Western Europeans had to realize that the SDI could only protect the US, not Western Europe. This meant that the US would be prepared to wage a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, knowing that Western Europe would be destroyed in retaliation even if SDI gave the Americans considerable protection. For this reason there was a fundamental conflict of interests between the US and Western Europe concerning SDI.

13. The ambassador ended by insisting that minutes of all conversations with British and foreign contacts had to include what had been said to them about the Soviet position and their response.

14. This report is being made available to the chief US arms control negotiators in Geneva.

Clair E. George²

Deputy Director for Operations

² An unknown hand signed the memorandum on George's behalf.

59. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 27, 1985

SUBJECT

Weekly Report of Defense Activities (U)

Congressional Activities: After several delays, in part because of the continued hospitalization of Chairman Joe Addabbo,² we expect the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to begin on Tuesday³ markup of our FY 1986 Defense Appropriations Bill. I will meet with members of the Subcommittee next week at the Pentagon for a working breakfast, during which we will make a strong case to fund our Defense program, particularly SDI, adequately.

On Wednesday,⁴ I spoke before the Senate Republican Committee Staff Directors and Administrative Assistants. I stated our belief that the SDI offers mankind the greatest hope of any strategic concept in at least 100 years and that it offers us the opportunity to eliminate strategic offensive ballistic missiles. In response to a question, I explained that the budget request for defense should be based only on an analysis of the Soviet Union's programs and capabilities and the threats they pose to the United States. I also assured them that I am "the same stubborn and intransigent person" that I have always been as far as getting what is needed for defense. Reaction seemed very positive, and it was a useful get-together.

Also this week, General Abrahamson and I went to the Hill to meet with Senator Pete Wilson at his request for a general discussion of the SDI. Pete, a strong SDI supporter on the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed concern that the opponents of SDI are continuing and increasing their opposition. General Abrahamson pointed out that much of the opposition was the result of lack of knowledge of the current status of the SDI program and requested that Senator Wilson gather an appropriate group for an SDI update. As a result, a group of Senators will receive a series of thorough SDI briefings this weekend. (U)

[Omitted here is material not related to the Strategic Defense Initiative.]

Cap

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 829, Subject File, 1985 President—reports to #43–57 (4). Secret.

² Congressman Addabbo spent several months in Walter Reed Army Medical Center in 1985.

³October 1.

⁴September 25.

60. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 30, 1985

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting, Tuesday, October 1, SDI Briefing

We have an NSC meeting scheduled for Tuesday, October 1, on SDI. The explicit objective of the meeting is to permit a fairly broad cross section of all those in the senior leadership within the Executive Branch who have responsibility for any part of the SDI effort to get an update on the progress being made in the SDI program from General Abrahamson (20 minutes) and on the status of actions involving allied participation from Richard Perle (5 minutes). Our implicit objective is to permit all assembled to see how committed the President is to this program so as to invigorate support for it throughout the Administration.

The memorandum provides the following material in support of Tuesday's NSC meeting:

Tab I—Presidential Meeting Memorandum

A—Agenda²

B—List of Participants³

C—Proposed Presidential Remarks

Tab II—Proposed Talking Points for Mr. McFarlane

Recommendation

That you approve the Presidential Meeting Memorandum at *Tab I* and forward and *Tabs A–C* to the President.⁴

Concurrence: Lehman, Wright, Steiner

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Steven Steiner Files, Arms Control File, AC/SDI (09/20/1985–09/30/1985). Unclassified. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed is the agenda.

³ Attached but not printed is the list of participants.

⁴ McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

Tab I

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan⁵

Washington, undated

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

I. PURPOSE

To review the progress that has been made in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

II. BACKGROUND

With the budget discussions continuing and your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev approaching, it is essential that you and all your senior advisors who have any association with SDI have a full understanding of the progress that is being made in this critical program. The meeting agenda is at *Tab A*.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at *Tab B*.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject. Secretary Weinberger will then introduce the briefers. General Jim Abrahamson, the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), will give a program update briefing (20 minutes). Richard Perle will follow with a short briefing on the status of allied participation. These briefings are informational. No specific decisions are being requested.

After the briefings, we will have time for general discussion. We would recommend that you close the meeting with some summary remarks. A draft of proposed remarks for your consideration is attached at *Tab C*.

⁵ Unclassified. Prepared by Linhard. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for October 1 from 11:00 until noon in the Cabinet Room.

Tab C**Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁶**

Washington, undated

*MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**STATUS OF THE SDI PROGRAM**Proposed Talking Points for Mr. McFarlane**Agenda Item I: Introduction (5 minutes)*

- Today's subject is the President's Strategic Defense Initiative.
- A special welcome to many of you who normally are not at NSC gatherings, and to our new Chairman, Admiral Crowe, who is at his first of many such meetings.

[At this point, you may wish to add your views of the importance of the program to U.S. national security. Your remarks could parallel the remarks proposed for the President's use later in the meeting (*Tab C*).]

- All who are at this unusually large NSC meeting have some direct role in managing or supporting SDI.

— Given the activity that we anticipate on the Hill, in the press, and in Geneva in the next several weeks, the President felt it would be good to gather this group together to review the status of the SDI program and to hear about the progress we are making in the program.

- Our agenda for today calls for:

— a briefing by General Jim Abrahamson, the director of the SDI program office;

— a few short follow-up remarks by Richard Perle on the status of Allied participation in the program; and

- a chance for questions and discussion.

Agenda Item II: Status of the SDI Program (30 minutes)

— To get us started in our update, Secretary Weinberger, would you like to introduce the briefings for us?

⁶ No classification marking. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for October 1 from 11:00 until noon in the Cabinet Room. Brackets are in the original.

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STATUS OF THE SDI PROGRAM

Proposed Presidential Remarks

— In 1983, I announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a program of vigorous research in advanced defensive technologies designed to investigate options for increasing the contribution of defenses, with a focus on eliminating the threat currently posed by ballistic missiles.

— In the near term, the SDI research program certainly responds to ongoing Soviet activity which is far more extensive than our own.

— This, in itself, is important since SDI provides both a needed hedge and a deterrent against any Soviet decision to expand its ballistic missile defense capability in the hope of gaining unilateral advantage.

— But, it is in the long-term promise that SDI offers to us that we find the real reason for the priority I want placed on this program.

— The long-term promise provided by this research is the possibility of moving towards an enhanced means of deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies—and doing so through the increased contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

— In this regard, SDI research is like cancer research. It is something that we must do, and do well.

— Finally, the Soviets have long recognized that our two nations will compete. Over time, they have developed a momentum in the growth of their offensive forces, and active and passive defenses, that will provide real advantages to them. SDI also is critical to the security of the U.S. in that it offers the hope of “changing the rules of the game” so that we can increase the likelihood of competing in peace, and on a level playing field.

⁷ No classification marking. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for October 1 from 11:00 until noon in the Cabinet Room. All brackets are in the original.

— I want to make sure that all in this room understand fully that this program is critical to the future security of our nation. Therefore, it has my highest priority, and should receive your personal support.

[After a short introduction by SecDef, we should go directly into the SDI program briefing by Jim Abrahamson.]

[Following the program brief, Richard Perle should make a few remarks about Allied participation.]

[After Perle completes his remarks]

— Thank you, Richard and Jim, Secretary Weinberger, do you have any concluding observations before we throw this open for discussion?

[After SecDef's remarks, if any]

Agenda Item III: Discussion (20 minutes)

— Secretary Shultz, do have any observations about the program or about the status of Allied participation that you would like to share?

[After SecState's remarks]

— Secretary Herrington, the Department of Energy and the National Laboratories certainly are making a critical contribution to this program. Do you have any observations that you would like to add?

[FYI: DoE may note that their budget for defense programs (e.g., nuclear testing, weapons development, etc.) has remained fairly constant while supporting an increasing SDI research requirement—and that this is beginning to affect the ability to sustain the technical support for other nuclear programs. The national security account in DoE does need more funds. We are trying to work this problem, but the Secretary of Energy is torn between trying to meet deficit reduction goals for his agency budget and the increasing national security demands being placed on DoE.]

[After Secretary Herrington's remarks]

— Dr. Keyworth, do you have anything that you would like to add to the briefings we have just heard?

[After Keyworth's remarks]

— Admiral Crowe, do you or any of the Chiefs have anything you may wish to add?

[After the Chiefs' remarks]

— Others comments?

[After any other comments you wish to entertain]

[Depending upon the time, you can use the next point to get a little bit about the corresponding Soviet program into the discussion.]

— Mr. President, we also have an excellent briefing on the Soviet strategic defense program which we will be getting to you shortly. Mr. Casey, do you have anything to add on the presentation of the U.S. program or a few words on the corresponding Soviet program that you would like to give to us?

[After Mr. Casey's remarks]

Agenda Item IV: Summary and Closing Remarks (5 minutes)

— I think that this has been a very useful set of briefings and discussion.

— Mr. President, would you like to make any closing remarks?

[Here we would anticipate that the President would draw upon the remarks at *Tab C*. It is important that the meeting end with no confusion about the President's desire for a firm, united push for SDI.]⁸

⁸ The National Security Council met in the Cabinet Room from 11:04 to 11:58 a.m. on October 1. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found. Weinberger's handwritten notes from the meeting are in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appt and Diary File, Box 10, Notes Set B, 1985, 2. #21–44. Reagan wrote in his personal diary for October 1: "An N.S.C. meeting—a report on S.D.I.—it really is showing promise. There have been some remarkable break throughs." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 501)

61. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, October 1, 1985

[Source: Reagan Library, George Keyworth Files, Subject File, [Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)] Star Wars (03/24/1983–07/05/1983). Top Secret; Sensitive. 4 pages not declassified.]

62. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

*JOINT OPERATION OF DEFENSES**Strategy*

The President's repeated offer to share SDI with the Soviet Union represents an important opportunity for the upcoming Geneva Summit. Sharing technology is complex, difficult to codify and likely to lead to differences of interpretation. But sharing *control*, through joint operations of global defenses, exposes both today's strategic dilemma and the solution—the SDI. A proposal to share control would:

- 1) Directly negate the Soviet propaganda slogan of SDI driving an "arms race in space";
- 2) Make crystal clear the difference between offense and defense—that defense is not a weapon—and by doing so restore the true essence of SDI to the international political debate;
- 3) Focus the arms-control debate on managing the transition from offense-based deterrence to a deterrence based upon mixed offense and defense; and
- 4) Above all, enhance both crisis instability and deterrence by removing the possibility of a preemptive advantage.

The President would propose that we and the Soviets form a special negotiating group to develop the mechanics of exactly how to achieve joint operations of future defenses. Such a team could include other NATO or Warsaw-Pact countries, as well as other non-aligned nations.

Proposing at Geneva the joint control of global defenses would serve to further establish the SDI. Having survived both the assaults of Soviet propaganda and political diatribe surrounding the Summit, the SDI will no longer be a fragile fledgling. And with establishment of an SDI negotiating group, the arms control process would begin to serve U.S. national interests.

We believe that a proposal along these lines would achieve two additional Presidential goals:

- It would build on an idea the President launched during the 1984 campaign; and
- It would satisfy the President's repeated intention to assure the Soviet Union that they have nothing to fear from the U.S.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Keyworth Files, Subject File, Graef File, [Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)] Star Wars (03/24/1983–07/05/1983). No classification marking. Meyer sent the paper to Casey under cover of an October 3 memorandum: "Here's the paper that Jay and I worked up. We thought about inserting a paragraph on the technology of joint control, but decided not to do so on the grounds that it would confuse and divert the reader. Our basic point is that this is a political proposal." (Ibid.)

63. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Sofaer) to the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)¹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Extent of U.S. Flexibility Under the ABM Treaty to Develop, Test and Deploy SDI Components

The differing positions of OSD² and ACDA³ may obscure significant areas of agreement. Both agencies agree on the following propositions:

— Compliance must be based on objective assessments of capabilities that support a single standard for both sides, not on subjective judgments as to intent that could lead to a double standard.

— The ABM Treaty permits research short of field testing of a prototype ABM system or component, which is the research being conducted under the initial phase of the SDI program.

— The ABM Treaty restricts defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, but not defenses against cruise missiles or non-strategic ballistic missiles (provided they are not given ABM capability).

— Fixed land-based ABM systems may be developed and tested, subject to the restrictions of Articles IV and V(2); and fixed land-based ABM launchers, interceptors and radars may be deployed, subject to the limits of Articles III and V(2).

The issue that you asked me to address is whether the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of SDI systems or components that have ABM capability and which are “based on other physical principles” than those current when the Treaty was ratified in 1972.⁴ ACDA contends that the Treaty unambiguously prohibits development, testing, and deployment of such systems or components; in addition, it argues that the negotiating record and subsequent U.S. statements establish that such development, testing, or deployment would violate the Treaty. OSD contends that the text of the Treaty is ambiguous with respect to systems or components based on new physical principles. OSD apparently concludes that the negotiating history demonstrates that development, testing, and deployment of such

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, October 1985. Secret. All brackets are in the original.

² See Document 56.

³ See Document 55.

⁴ Another important issue that may remain disputed is the scope of permissible research on, and impermissible testing of, traditional ABM interceptors, launchers or radars in the employment modes proscribed by Article V(1). [Footnote is in the original.]

systems or components are not controlled by the Treaty, except for the requirement in Agreed Statement D that the parties discuss specific limitations on such systems and components.

This memorandum analyzes three textual arguments regarding U.S. flexibility under the ABM Treaty to develop, test, and deploy an SDI system: ACDA's and OSD's readings, as well as a third interpretation that construes the Treaty to allow testing and development, but not deployment, of an SDI system or components. In the near future, I will be sending you a memorandum analyzing the negotiating history of Agreed Statement D and the post-negotiation statements of the parties.

Textual Analysis

The central feature of the Treaty is the commitment not to deploy a territorial ABM system. Article I(2) provides that: "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense . . ." of its territory. Article III prohibits deployment of ABM systems or components, except for certain fixed land-based systems and components. Article II(1) defines "an ABM system," "for the purpose of this Treaty," in functional terms ("a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory") and immediately thereafter refers to contemporaneous technology: "currently consisting of" ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, which are defined in terms of both function and mode of testing.

1. ACDA's Interpretation

ACDA's textual interpretation rests on two lines of argument. First, ACDA argues that, because Article II(1) defines ABM system functionally and then goes on to state that it is "currently consisting of" interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, the definition necessarily was meant to include *all* systems, present and future, that have the requisite capability. "If the term ABM system only applied to systems utilizing technology current as of 1972, there would have been no reason to use the phrase 'currently consisting of.'" (Graham Memo, 9/20/85, at 3.) ACDA argues that, a fortiori, the commitment not to deploy (contained in Articles I and III) applies to *all* ABM systems as functionally defined in Article II and to their components, whether or not specifically listed in Article II(1). ACDA also relies on the agreement in Article V(1) "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." ACDA contends that the functional definition of an ABM system in Article II(1) applies to Article V(1) as well, and that the U.S. thereby has agreed not to develop, test, or deploy any system or component that could serve an ABM function, based in the sea, air or space, or mobile land-based.

This argument does not establish unambiguously that all future systems are covered by Articles II(1) and V(1). Article II(1) may, as OSD

contends, use the words “currently consisting of” simply to describe what systems are covered by the other provisions of the Treaty, in which case Article V(1) could be said to relate only to current systems and components. Indeed, Article II(2) supports this view. That paragraph provides as follows:

The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

This enumeration is limited to existing types of ABM system components. Components are included within the Article II(1) definition even if they are not yet fully operational (*e.g.*, because they are being tested or constructed). But the paragraph omits devices as to which only research is under way, as well as devices that have not yet been envisioned or designed. Had the negotiators intended to bring future technologies within the purview of Article II(1), they easily could have added “undergoing research” or “developed in the future” to the litany in Article II(2).

Moreover, as OSD contends, ACDA’s reading would render Agreed Statement D superfluous. If Article III deals with all land-based systems or components based on present or future physical principles, and if Article V(1) absolutely prohibits development, testing, and deployment of all systems, present or future, with other basing modes, then nothing is left for coverage by Agreed Statement D. OSD argues that it is in Agreed Statement D that the parties “treated separately” the problem of future systems and components, and its language lends facial support to OSD’s position:

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII [establishing the Standing Consultative Commission] and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty [providing for amendment].

ACDA responds to this argument as follows:

Article III of the ABM Treaty, along with the ABM Protocol, limits the deployment of an ABM system to a numerically limited number of fixed land-based ABM missiles, launchers, and radars situated in one geographically limited deployment area. Since the Article specifies the type of ABM components that can be deployed, any other

types—including those based on other physical principles—cannot be deployed without amendment of the Treaty. The purpose of Agreed Statement D is simply to clarify this point. Deployment of 100 large, fixed land-based lasers in place of 100 fixed land-based ABM interceptor missiles would create a different balance than that established by Article III. (Graham Memo, 9/20/85, at 3.)

Treaties are sometimes read to contain statements intended “to clarify” a point covered by other provisions. But such redundancy tends to undermine the viability of a proposed construction—especially where no clarification is needed. A reading that renders a provision redundant or superfluous cannot be said to make the treaty unambiguous. ACDA might respond that redundancy is to be expected in an “Agreed Statement,” which appears along with other “Common Understandings.” This observation lacks force here, however, because Agreed Statement D—unlike Agreed Statements A, B, and C—does not contain the word “understand.” Rather, it is written with the operative phrase “the Parties agree,” which is closer to the language in the Treaty itself that “the Parties undertake.” Similarly, the Statement’s phrase—“In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy”—is close to the analogous phrases in Article VI (“To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations”), and Articles IX, XII (1), and XIII. In short, Agreed Statement D looks more like a substantive obligation than like merely another shared interpretation.

Even if “ABM system” in Article II(1) should be read to mean more than just the particular systems in existence when the Treaty was signed, it does not follow that Article II(1) should be read to include all future systems or components. The phrase can be read to go beyond those systems currently consisting of interceptors, launchers, and radars, but to fall short of all future systems. In particular, the definition could be understood to include all systems other than the current ones that could be developed through the application of existing physical principles, but not those systems that could be developed only by resort to other physical principles.

ACDA’s second argument also rests in part on its construction of Article II(1), but is a more comprehensive analysis based on the Treaty’s other provisions and purposes. ACDA views Article III(1) as prohibiting any deployment of fixed, land-based ABM systems except in accordance with that paragraph’s specific limitations. It reads Agreed Statement D as permitting the development and testing of fixed land-based ABM systems and components, based on other physical principles, but precluding their deployment until after discussion and agreement on specific limitations. This interpretation presents Agreed Statement D as the Treaty’s means of ensuring implementation of the fundamental purpose of Article III, which (according to ACDA’s view) is to prevent the deployment of any number of ABM systems, of any

type, in any place, except for the fixed land-based systems in the places and numbers specifically authorized.

Though ACDA's interpretation is strengthened by this attempt to harmonize Article III(1) and Agreed Statement D, it nevertheless remains only one possible construction of the relevant provisions. ACDA's reading is not *necessary* to ensure implementation of the Treaty's fundamental purpose. In Article I(2), the Parties agree not to deploy ABM systems for territorial defense, except as provided in Article III. Article III also limits deployment, and Agreed Statement D was specifically adopted "to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III . . ." This central purpose of the Treaty—to limit deployment—is satisfied by any reading that prevents the deployment of future systems and components; it does not also require a prohibition on their development and testing. Nothing in the structure or stated purposes of the Treaty requires an absolute prohibition against the development and testing of all systems or components, other than those described by Article III.

2. OSD's Interpretation

OSD makes no claim that its interpretation is the only plausible one of the Treaty's language, and it therefore acknowledges that resort to the negotiating history is appropriate. Substantial doubt exists, however, as to whether one of OSD's claims is plausible enough to require reference to the negotiating record. The Treaty on its face casts grave doubt on OSD's contention that the Parties are permitted to deploy systems or components based on other physical principles after discussion but without agreement on specific limitations. The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration (Article XV(1)), and its most fundamental objective is to prevent deployment of systems that can serve the function defined in Article II(1). To read Articles II(1) and V(1) to apply only to current systems or components, and to read Agreed Statement D to require only *discussion* prior to deployment of future systems or components, would tend to undermine the Treaty's essential purpose.

Agreed Statement D states, moreover, that its purpose is "to insure fulfillment of the objective not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III," and it requires both discussion of "specific limitations" for future systems or components under Article XIII "and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty," upon the creation of any such systems or components. The text suggests a general prohibition against deployment of such systems or components, as well as a commitment to discuss and to agree on specific limitations such as those contained in Articles III, IV, and VI.

Nevertheless, OSD's theory is not absolutely precluded by the text of the Treaty: one could reasonably claim that parties are often reluctant

to enter into legally binding obligations with respect to hypothetical, future problems. The Parties may have assumed that the same factors that led them to agree on limits for current land-based systems and components, as well as to prohibit all otherwise-based current systems and components, would ultimately have led to agreement on limiting the deployment of future systems and components. The Treaty contemplates, moreover, that agreement about fundamental issues might not be possible, and each Party retains the power to terminate in order to protect its supreme interests.

3. An Alternative Interpretation

The problems identified with respect to both ACDA's and OSD's interpretation suggest a third construction that is at least as plausible as the other two. Neither ACDA nor OSD adequately deals with the different degree of concern reflected in the Treaty with respect to deployment, on the one hand, and with respect to activities short of deployment (development and testing), on the other. A powerful argument can be made, based on Articles I(2) and III(1) and Agreed Statement D, that the Treaty prohibits deployment of any ABM system or component, current or future, other than as provided in Article III, but that it permits the "creation" of systems or components based on other physical principles and would require discussion of and agreement on "specific limitations" on such systems or components before deployment.

This interpretation is consistent with the textual argument based on the Treaty's express and fundamental purpose: to prevent development of systems or components other than as specified by Article III. It adopts OSD's approach to Article V(1), in which each Party undertakes "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." The theory rests, therefore, on the proposition that Article II(1), and therefore Article V(I), relate only to "current" systems and components (with the word "current" encompassing any system or component based on physical principles known at the time the treaty was signed).

The Treaty in fact consistently uses a definition of "ABM systems or their components" that is at odds with ACDA's expansive view of Article II(1). To begin with, Article II(2) includes in its description of covered systems or components only those that were already developed and undergoing testing prior to the Treaty's adoption. Article III(1) uses the phrase "ABM systems" to describe systems consisting of missiles, launchers, and radars, the components of "current" systems. Likewise, Article IV, which makes clear that Article III does not apply to systems and components used for development or testing at agreed ranges, limits to fifteen the number of "launchers" at those ranges, thereby suggesting that it is addressed only to current technology. Even Article V(2) is written with current technology in mind, as it controls the development,

testing, or deployment of launchers of multiple ABM interceptor “missiles” and automatic or rapid reload “launchers.” In short, the Treaty is permeated with references to, and concern about, current systems or components. One can therefore argue plausibly that the Treaty also refers in Article V(1) to current systems and components, prohibiting the development, testing, or deployment of such current systems or components “which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”

In sum, both ACDA’s and OSD’s constructions of the Treaty present textual difficulties. Both are logically defensible, although OSD’s claim that deployment of future systems is permitted borders on the untenable. The view advanced here—that the Parties agreed not to deploy future systems or components, but that they permitted development and testing of future systems or components—is also a reasonable interpretation. Reference to the negotiating record is therefore necessary to determine which of these three views best reflects the Parties’ understandings.

64. Memorandum From William Wright and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

SACG, Friday, October 4, 4:30–5:30 P.M.

Purpose. This package provides the agenda and some supporting material for the SACG meeting scheduled for Friday, October 4. Because each of the agenda items is currently in a fluid state an update including your talking points will be provided tomorrow morning.

Objectives. The objectives of this SACG meeting are to:

1. (*Agenda Item 2—Paris Developments*) The Gorbachev announcements today from Paris,² revealed new elements at the Soviet

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SACG (Senior Arms Control Group) Meeting—10/04/1985. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates McFarlane saw the memorandum. Handwritten notes of the October 4 meeting are *ibid*. No minutes were found.

² Reference is to Gorbachev’s joint press conference with Mitterrand, October 4, in which the Soviet leader called for a fifty percent reduction of strategic weapons. (Telegram 39858 from Paris, October 4; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850709–0417)

propaganda campaign in Europe. A short five-minute assessment of the new elements and our response will be useful to keep everyone up to date and solicit comments. A preliminary set of press Qs and As is at *Tab C*.³

2. (*Agenda Item 3—Special Paper on Options*) As directed, the Support Group has produced a rough draft based on the outline at *Tab D*.⁴ Your talking points will support a discussion focused on the outline only—we expect to have a more mature paper completed this weekend.

3. (*Agenda Item 4—ABM Treaty Terminology*) The Support Group has produced a draft decision document (*Tab E*) but OSD participation has been limited by a fundamental belief, as expressed by Fred Ikle in today's memorandum to you (*Tab F*) that no decision be taken pending a complete legal and technical analysis. The issue needs a decision because failure to agree to a standard set of terminology gives the impression that we are hedging; spokesmen and negotiators are hesitant to reaffirm existing interpretations for fear that it will prejudice the outcome.

4. (*Agenda Item 5—Pending Actions*) You asked Ken Adelman to be prepared to lead a discussion on the intended use of the "transition" paper and Mike Guhin is prepared to do so in his stead. Also, Fred Ikle, who objected strongly to the ABM Treaty "erosion" paper, at *Tab G*, is prepared to offer views on why that paper should not be approved for use.

Agenda and Talking Points, The agenda (*Tab A*)⁵ and proposed talking points (to be provided) (*Tab B*)⁶ are to support your chairmanship of the meeting.

Recommendation

That you use the approach outlined above, and the supporting agenda (*Tab A*) and talking points (*Tab B*), in conducting the SACG on Friday, October 4.⁷

Concurrence: Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard, Steve Steiner and Jack Matlock⁸

³ Not attached.

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ Not attached.

⁶ Attached but not printed.

⁷ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁸ An unknown handwrote "Not available" below Matlock's name.

Tab E

Paper Prepared in the Senior Arms Control Group⁹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Terminology

Issue: Should the U.S. change its longstanding interpretation that the ABM Treaty's prohibition on "the development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems and components" applies to systems based on "other physical principles" as well as those on which ABM systems were based at the time the ABM Treaty was signed?

Introduction: A standard set of terminology is required now for internal guidance and, to handle both public inquiry and Geneva negotiating tactics. Since 1972, the U.S. has publicly and privately maintained that Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits development, testing and deployment—but not research on—ABM systems and components that are not fixed, land-based and regardless of whether they are based on new or older technologies or principles. The central choice is between retaining this "customary" interpretation and introducing a "new" interpretation which would maintain that the Treaty permits development, testing and deployment of non-fixed ABM systems or components which are based on other physical principles.

This paper addresses the generally accepted Treaty terminology, the two interpretations and their supporting rationale, and three options for decision. Relevant ABM Treaty provisions are at *Tab A* for reference.¹⁰

ABM Treaty Terminology

The ABM Treaty provisions regarding "components" can be most clearly understood by considering the three categories of ABM systems contemplated by the Treaty.

a) "*Current*" systems. These are systems consisting of fixed, land-based components that composed the "current" systems at the time the Treaty was negotiated. Article II defines such components as ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The deployment of such components is limited to locations and numbers specified in

⁹ Secret; Sensitive.

¹⁰ Not found.

Article III and such components may be tested in conformity with Article IV.

b) *Article V systems*. These are ABM systems with components that are mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based. Such components would include ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars as defined by Article II and devices capable of substituting for one or more of such ABM components. Article V, paragraph 1 provides that such systems or components may not be developed, tested or deployed; research on such systems or components is not prohibited.

c) *ABM systems based on "other physical principles" addressed in Agreed Statement D*. These are ABM systems with components based upon physical principles other than those used in ABM systems "current" at the time the Treaty was negotiated. These would be devices capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars. Articles III and IV and Agreed Statement D allow the research, development and testing of such *fixed, land-based components*, but prohibit their deployment absent prior discussion pursuant to Article XIII and agreement to amend the Treaty in accordance with Article XIV.

The term "development" under Article V of the Treaty does not extend to tests of devices that (1) are not ABM systems or components based on then-current technology; or (2) are not devices capable of substituting for such components. Development and testing of such non-ABM devices are not limited by the Treaty whether such development and testing is observable or not.

The distinction between permitted research and prohibited development of an ABM system or component is generally related to the ability of NTM to detect the prohibited activity. "Laboratory research" generally cannot be observed by NTM. In contrast "field testing" is more amenable to observation by NTM. Thus, the prohibition on development of ABM systems or components prohibited by Article V becomes applicable with the commencement of field testing of a prototype of such a system or component.

For a "prototype" to be limited by the ABM Treaty it must be a prototype of an ABM system or ABM component or of a device capable of substituting for an ABM component. Regardless of whether a device is labeled "prototype", "breadboard", "test bed", or "preproduction model", or any other term of art, the determination of what treaty restrictions apply is based on whether it constitutes an ABM component under the Treaty, or is capable of substituting for an ABM component. Neither the Treaty nor the relevant negotiating record refer to the terms "subcomponent" or "breadboard model."

Customary Interpretation

Under the customary interpretation, with the above terminology as background, the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components based on physical principles other than those on which ABM systems were based at the time of signature of the ABM Treaty (as well as ABM systems and components based on then-current technology).

This interpretation is supported by the following argumentation:

Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an ABM system as a “system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.” It states that ABM systems “currently consist of” ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Thus, Article II indicates that there could be other types of ABM systems or components developed in the future. Article III of the Treaty prohibits the deployment of ABM systems except that fixed land-based ABM systems utilizing technology current in 1972 can be deployed at specific sites under specific limitations. Article V, paragraph 1, prohibits the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems. Like Article III, Article V is all encompassing. Article II makes clear that Article III and Article V apply to all types of ABM systems regardless of the technology utilized. In agreeing to the language of Article V, 1. the U.S. and Soviet negotiators also agreed that the text covers “any type of present and future components.” Thus, the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems or components based on other physical principles is prohibited by Article V, 1. Agreed Statement D is by its terms associated with Article III and provides that should types of ABM systems appear in the future based on other physical principles, they cannot be deployed at these permitted sites without amendment of the Treaty—otherwise the balance established by Article III would be upset.

New Interpretation The new interpretation holds that the ordinary meaning of Agreed Statement D is that “specific limitations” on ABM systems “based on other physical principles” will be “subject to discussion.” Moreover, by implication, the Treaty—apart from Agreed Statement D—does not provide “specific limitations” on sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems, based on physical principles other than those current at the time the Treaty was signed.

This new interpretation is supported by the following argumentation:

The use of the phrase “currently consisting of” in Article II can be read to mean that all future variants of existing ABM systems and components are covered by the Treaty. In that case, Article V would prohibit testing, development, and deployment of all mobile systems using new technologies. On the other hand, if Articles II and V had this effect, there would not be a need for the undertaking in Agreed Statement D to *discuss* “specific limitations” on future ABM systems

“based on other physical principles.” The fact that “specific limitations” on future systems remain “subject to discussion” indicates that the Treaty by itself does not limit these systems. Furthermore, the text of Agreed Statement D is unclear as to what rules, if any, apply before the Parties reach agreement on “specific limitations” and amend the Treaty accordingly.

The ambiguity should be resolved by looking at the negotiating record, *not* at subsequent unilateral statements by U.S. officials. The negotiating record contains conflicting evidence, but the dominant evidence is that the Soviets never committed themselves to limitations on future systems.

Options: Based on the foregoing and given that a standard set of ABM terminology is needed in the near term, the U.S. is faced with the following three options to resolve the issue at hand:

Option One: Retain the customary interpretation now

Advantages

- consistent with past public, Congressional and allied presentations
- avoids exacerbating public controversy on SDI
- retains credibility of U.S. claim that SDI is consistent with Treaty

Disadvantages

- this interpretation will inhibit achievement of SDI milestones sooner than the new interpretation
- gives up near term opportunity to interpret ambiguity in our favor

Option Two: Introduce the new interpretation now

Advantages

- greatly facilitate progress of SDI beyond currently identified program
- shows resolve for the fulfillment of the program
- could force a discussion with the Soviets which might lead to mutual agreement on a resolution of the ambiguity

Disadvantages

- could be seen by some as abandoning the Treaty
- undercut our case on Soviet non-compliance
- no immediate need for the less restrictive interpretation now to proceed with current SDI program

Option Three: Do not volunteer any interpretation on how Article 5 applies to future ABM systems but, if pressed, fall back to the customary interpretation.

This is a variation of and has basically the same advantages and disadvantages as Option 1 above *except that* it has an advantage that may leave the door more open to the possible future review. As a disadvantage, this option may not diminish public controversy.

Tab F

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikke) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹¹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Preparing for Presidential Decisions on Interpreting the ABM Treaty (U)

(S) I understand that the Arms Control Support Group has been asked to provide comments to your staff on a draft decision paper on "ABM Treaty Terminology." I wanted to convey to you my personal views on this subject in the hope that we might adopt a somewhat different approach to senior-level review of, and Presidential decisions on the matters nominally covered by the paper in question.

(S) As you know, I regard the question of whether or not we continue to espouse the conventional approach to interpreting and defining our commitments under the ABM Treaty as one of the most critical SDI-related decisions the President will face. It is hard to exaggerate the long-term impact our actions on this question may have on future options for the SDI program, and indeed on the very viability of that program. The President's choices in this area could also have major import for our stated requirement for full and equal Soviet compliance with existing arms control accords and for the negotiation of future agreements with the USSR.

(S) Given these high stakes, it is crucial that principals be given an opportunity to discuss the issue of ABM Treaty interpretations with the President before any decision is made. Such a discussion must be informed by the best possible legal analysis of the Treaty and its associated, agreed documents. As you know, we have done a preliminary analysis which strongly suggests that—notwithstanding past U.S. Government statements to the contrary—the Soviet Union never agreed to our interpretation of Treaty language regarding mobile systems exploiting "other physical principles." Our General Counsel is now engaged in a review of this assessment with the Department of State's Legal Advisor.

(S) A further important consideration in such a discussion must be the actual implications for the SDI program, over the near- and

¹¹ Secret.

longer-term, of adherence—*especially unilateral adherence*—to a “strict construction” of the Treaty. Decisions on treaty interpretation will affect the pace and design of planned experiments as well as the long-term level of effort devoted to specific technologies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is now preparing on an extremely close-hold basis such an analysis.

(S) In my view, the completion of these legal and technical analyses must precede senior-level decision on the approach for us to take to Treaty interpretations. It would be irresponsible to precipitate a decision by the President uninformed by such assessments.

(S) Still another factor argues for caution and thoroughness in our review and decision-making on this issue: if the Soviets in fact did not agree to a “strict construction” approach comparable to our own in the past, anything we say from now on to reinforce the conventional interpretation is tantamount to giving them a potentially significant constraint on SDI without the United States getting anything in return. I am not sure we should accept such constraints under any circumstances; to do so as a result of some hastily-prepared and ill-considered effort to further define ABM “terminology” seems to me both unnecessary and unwise.

(S) In short, I urge that you direct your staff and the Arms Control Support Group to stand down on the preparation of the aforementioned decision paper. In addition, I recommend that planning and preparations begin promptly for an NSC meeting at which all of the relevant materials and analyses can be reviewed. Only in this way will we be able to ensure that a decision of this importance, when ultimately addressed by the President, is made with the benefit of the necessary, full understanding of its implications.

Fred C. Ikle¹²

¹² Ikle signed the memorandum “Fred” above his typed signature.

Tab G (1)

Paper Prepared by the Standing Consultative Commission¹³

Washington, undated

Avoiding Further Erosion of the ABM Treaty

I. Introduction

According to the President's February 7, 1985 Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance, the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The Treaty prohibits, *inter alia*, providing a base for such a defense.

Concerns with respect to the totality of Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities are:

- the construction of a network of large-phased-array radars (LPARs), including one at Krasnoyarsk, which might constitute the deployment of a major long lead-time component of a nationwide ABM defense;
- the apparent development and testing of a rapidly deployable ABM system;
- the probable concurrent testing of air defense radars and ABM radars;
- the development of a modern air defense system (SA-X-12) which may have capabilities against certain types of ballistic missiles; and
- the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a shorter period of time than previously observed.

This paper briefly examines some possible measures to address all of these compliance issues except the last. The suggested measures would not resolve these issues definitively, but would help alleviate our concern about further Soviet erosion of the ABM Treaty.

II. Structural Problems with the ABM Treaty

Actions that in their aggregate suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory may in some instances constitute exploitation of "structural problems" with the ABM Treaty. These structural problems include imprecise language and the absence of restraints in certain areas. For example, the large-phased-array radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk can be used

¹³ Secret; Noform.

for ballistic missile detection and tracking as well as space-track. The Soviets have taken advantage of this capability, which is characteristic of all LPARs, and the absence of Treaty limitations on the location of space-track and NTM radars to create a pretext for the Krasnoyarsk radar.

In addition, some Treaty provisions may need further definition or clarification as a consequence of technological developments since the Treaty entered into force in 1972.

Other Treaty language problems related to questionable Soviet activities include:

- the phrase “mobile” ABM components is not defined in the Treaty. This problem is compounded by the technological advances that have permitted the modularization of components;

- a distinction between prohibited ABM and permitted anti-tactical-ballistic-missile (ATBM) components is not made in the Treaty. This problem too is exacerbated by technological advances that have blurred the distinction between ABM, ATBM, and air defense components; and

- a prohibition on concurrent testing but not concurrent operation of ABM radars and air defense components, which permits the Soviets to claim that concurrent operations which US NTM detects are not prohibited concurrent testing. (Note: The June 1985 common understanding on concurrent operations prohibited the operation of air defense components concurrently with strategic ballistic missile reentry testing or ABM missile testing. It did not prohibit the operation of ABM radars concurrently with SAM launches, SAM target flights, or SAM radars.)

The following discussion of possible measures addressing all but one of our ABM Treaty compliance issues responds to some of these problems.

III. *Possible Measures on LPARs*

1. Ban future non-ABM LPAR construction.
2. Remove the space-track and NTM exemption for LPAR location and orientation from Agreed Statement (F).
3. Limit construction of future non-ABM LPARs to replacement radars at the sites of pre-existing LPARs and for the same purpose.
4. Require mandatory prenotification and consultation in the SCC, to include an exchange of pertinent technical characteristics, for future proposed replacement non-ABM LPARs, and limitations on such LPARs to the same operational frequency and power range.
5. Restrict the number of non-ABM LPARs permitted to each side for all purposes or for each purpose.
6. Restrict the total number of planar-array faces on non-ABM LPARs.

These possible measures could prevent exacerbation of our compliance concern. In particular, limits on further construction of LPARs,

or on their total number, might reduce our concern as to the utility of a Soviet LPARs if called upon to contribute to an ABM territorial defense. However, these measures would not remove the concern we already have about Soviet LPAR construction. Restrictions on the number of non-ABM LPARs and non-ABM planar-array faces, for example, would not deprive remaining LPARs/faces of any inherent potential they might have to contribute to ballistic missile defense.

IV. Possible Measures on Mobile/Transportable ABM Components

1. Destroy radars on both sides which have raised concern about mobility.
2. Restrict the mobile/transportable radars in question to those in existence and prohibit their modernization or replacement.
3. Ban operation of these radars even at test ranges for any purpose whatsoever.
4. Define “mobile” in the 1972 Common Understanding to include or exclude modular components.

None of the proposals would divest the Soviets of whatever “mobile/transportable ABM component” knowledge or technology they may have acquired by developing three Pawn Shop and three Flat Twin radars. However, these measures would ease concern as to the ABM utility of whatever knowledge/technology the Soviets may have acquired, and could add “long-lead-time” requirements like new development, test, and production cycles to any future decision to “break out” of the ban. A ban on the operation of these radars would be much easier to monitor than a ban on their production.

V. Possible Measures on SAM Upgrade and Concurrent Testing

1. Ban development, testing and deployment of SAMs with ATBM capability by:

- prohibiting at the same test range concurrent operations of air defense missiles and radars, and all ballistic missiles;
- banning ballistic missile activity at test facilities, where the SA-X-12 is tested;
- restricting tactical SAM testing to specific test facilities; and
- restricting strategic SAM testing to Sary Shagan, where they are tested at present.

2. Define SAMs with ATBM capability and circumscribe permitted testing and deployment of them by:

- adding definitions of air defense and ATBM missiles to the definition of an ABM interceptor missile we now have, which has been blurred by technological advances;
- prohibiting mobile ATBMs;
- limiting total numbers of ATBMs deployed;
- restricting geographic areas of deployment; and

— requiring notification in the SCC prior to flight-testing and deployment of ABM or ATBM systems, and of the type to be tested or deployed.

3. Limit the number of certain types of SAM systems, possibly coupled with agreement to provide notification of the deployment of any new SAM systems.

4. Ban the concurrent operation of ABM radars and air defense missiles and radars.

Banning ATBM-capable SAMs will not divest the Soviets of whatever relevant knowledge/technology they may have acquired as a result of their development of the SA-10 and SA-X-12. However, a ban could deprive them of the ability to make use of that knowledge, and could add “long-lead-time” development, test, and production cycles to any future decision to “break out.” The desirability of developing a US/Allied ATBM capability is at present under study in the SDI IG.

Merely circumscribing testing and deployment of ATBM-capable SAMs does not erase the concern of some that the difference between systems designed to intercept SRBMs and those designed to intercept ICBMs is not as significant as those designed to intercept aircraft and those designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, limitations on the numbers, mobility, location and testing of such missiles could serve to ease concern as to their ABM utility.

A prohibition on the concurrent operation of ABM radars and SAM components could preclude the use of ABM radars either to guide SAM interceptors—presumably an initial step in providing those interceptors with an ABM capability—or to develop/assess the ABM capabilities of SAM radars.

VI. *Legal Form of Possible Measures*

Each of the measures discussed above would require individual analysis before specific recommendations as to the language to be used and the form the measure would take could be given.

Tab G (2)

**Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹⁴**

Washington, undated

OSD/JCS Memo on SCC Paper "Avoiding Further Erosion of the ABM Treaty"

The office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to pursuing any of the "possible measures" outlined in this paper and recommend that no further work on this topic be undertaken at this time.

First and foremost, proposing changes to the ABM Treaty to solve Soviet non-compliant behavior would undermine the President's position that the responsibility for compliance lies with the Soviet Union. In fact, even suggesting that treaty language either by omission or ambiguous language is causing some of our compliance concern, would be tantamount to forgiving or grandfathering the violations and ignoring the other serious concerns we have.

Second, amending even a single provision of the ABM Treaty would open the entire treaty to review and would afford the Soviets an opportunity to seek restrictions on activities that would be inimical to our interests; for example, restrictions on SDI research. Moreover, negotiations to amend the treaty would likely take considerable time and might put the US in the position of finalizing a provision which the US could not comply with were SDI to result in a decision to develop certain systems.

The guidance from the NSC regarding the SCC work program specifically rejected proposals aimed at "increasing the viability" of the ABM Treaty. Most of the measures proposed in the SCC paper go far beyond "increasing the viability" to renegotiation.

Any decisions on amending the ABM Treaty must be considered in the context of all the arms control negotiations occurring between the two parties. Proliferating amendments, with no guarantee of compliance, would be a meaningless exercise.

¹⁴ Secret.

65. **Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan**¹

Washington, October 4, 1985

SUBJECT

Weekly Report of Defense Activities (U)

Congressional Activities: After weeks of delay, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee began their markup this week of our FY 1986 Defense Appropriations Bill. In preparation for the markup, I invited all the subcommittee members to a working breakfast at the Pentagon on Wednesday² at which time we made a hard push for several of our key programs. Of particular concern was the expected cut in our SDI program. Several members have talked of reducing our \$3.7 billion request to \$1.9 billion. The Defense Authorization Bill, which is still awaiting final House approval, reduced the program to \$2.75 billion. We believe that, at least partly as a result of our breakfast and our intensive briefing program, we were able to stave off a cut to \$1.9 billion and have \$2.5 billion approved by the subcommittee on Thursday. We face another hurdle when the full House Appropriations Committee considers the Defense bill on October 24. Another effort will be made at that time to cut the SDI program to a totally unacceptable level. We will be making additional calls to members and providing classified briefings to gain support for our position. We may need your assistance on this as we refine our targets and get closer to the actual vote.

On other issues related to the subcommittee markup, we received approval for the full MX compromise of 50 deployed missiles, having successfully avoided thus far an attempt to cut back to 40 missiles. However, the committee voted to place a moratorium on ASAT weapons, similar to the ban the House approved earlier this year in the Defense Authorization Bill, which was later modified in conference to permit three tests. We are working to lift the ASAT restriction in the House, and at the same time we are working in the Senate to win this one back in conference. The House subcommittee reinstated restrictive language on chemical weapons that had been dropped by the authorization conference. Again, we will work hard with the Senate to prevail in conference.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to SDI or the MX missile.]

Speech before Philadelphia World Affairs Council: Yesterday I spoke to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council on "Strategic Defense and

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 829, Subject File, 1985 President—reports to #43–57 (4). Secret.

² October 2. No minutes were found.

American Strategy.”³ This talk was designed to contribute to public diplomacy efforts preceding your meeting with Gorbachev next month.

I described how we see our research into defensive technology fitting into our overall strategy for peace and stability, why we consider it a bright hope for mankind, and why we cannot regard SDI as a bargaining chip to be negotiated away. I wanted to show that, as a democratic and peaceful nation, we cannot rest easily with a deterrence policy that depends exclusively on the threat of mass destruction or mutual suicide. (U)

[Omitted here is material not related to SDI or the MX missile.]

Cap

³ Weinberger’s October 30 speech is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1985, pp. 63–67.

66. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 4, 1985

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting, Monday, October 7, Briefing on Soviet Strategic Defenses

We have an NSPG meeting scheduled for Monday, October 7. The purpose of this meeting is to give the President the briefing on Soviet strategic defenses that we gave to the Congress last week.

This memorandum provides the following material in support of Monday’s NSPG meeting:

Tab I—Presidential Meeting Memorandum²

A—Agenda³

B—List of Participants⁴

Tab II—Proposed Talking Points for Mr. McFarlane

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–110, NSPG 118 7 Oct 1985. Unclassified. Sent for action.

² Printed as Document 67.

³ Attached but not printed is the agenda.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a list of participants.

Recommendation

That you approve the Presidential Meeting Memorandum at *Tab I*.⁵

Concurrence: Lehman, Wright, Steiner

Tab II**Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁶**

Washington, undated

*MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY
PLANNING GROUP*

STATUS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Proposed Talking Points for Mr. McFarlane

Agenda Item I: Introduction (5 minutes)

- Today's subject is Soviet strategic defenses.
- Our agenda for today calls for a briefing by Dr. Larry Gershwin, the National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Strategic Programs, followed by a few minutes for questions and general discussion.
- The background for this briefing is that several members of Congress who support the SDI program suggested to the President that the Administration provide a classified briefing on the Soviet defensive program to the Congress for their information.
- This suggestion resulted in briefings to both the Senate and the House by Larry on October 3.
- These briefings were followed by the release of a joint, State/Defense unclassified publication on Soviet strategic defenses.⁷
- Mr. President, as you know, we had hoped to get you to see this before you made the request for the Congress to schedule time for the briefing.
- Unfortunately, your schedule did not permit this to occur.

⁵ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

⁶ No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. A stamped notation at the top of the document indicates McFarlane saw it. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for October 7 from 2 to 3 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

⁷ Reference is to *Soviet Strategic Defense Programs* (Washington, Department of Defense and Department of State, 1985).

— However, the Congressional briefings went well (although the turn-out in the Senate was a bit thin).

— The NSPG session today permits you to review the classified, detailed presentation that was given to Congress.

Agenda Item II: Status of Soviet Strategic Defenses (35 minutes)

— To get us started, Bill (Casey), would you like to introduce the briefings for us?

[After a short introduction by the DCI, we should go directly into the briefing by Larry Gershwin.]

[After Gershwin completes his briefing]

— Thank you, Larry, Bill Casey, do you have any concluding observations before we throw this open for discussion?

[After the DCI's remarks, if any]

Agenda Item III: Questions & Discussion (15 minutes)

— Mr. President, do you have any specific questions that you would like to ask of Bill Casey or our briefer, Larry Gershwin?

[After the President has a chance to ask anything he wishes]

— Do others have questions?

[After questions are exhausted]

— How about any general observations or discussion? George (Shultz), would you like to start us off?

Agenda Item IV: Summary and Closing Remarks (5 minutes)

— I think that this has been a very useful briefing and discussion.

— I think that we should also thank Larry, and his colleagues in the Intelligence Community involved, for the good work done here and in briefing the Congress.

— Mr. President, would you like to make any closing remarks?

67. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 5, 1985

*MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY
PLANNING GROUP*

I. PURPOSE

To review the briefing on Soviet strategic defenses provided to the Congress at the President's request on October 3.

II. BACKGROUND

Several members of Congress who support the SDI program suggested that the Administration provide a classified briefing on the Soviet defensive program to the Congress for their information. This suggestion resulted in briefings to both the Senate and the House on October 3. These briefings were followed by the release of a joint, State/Defense unclassified publication on Soviet strategic defenses. The NSPG session permits a review of the classified, detailed presentation that was given to Congress. The meeting agenda is at *Tab A*.²

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at *Tab B*.³

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject. Bill Casey will then introduce the briefer, Dr. Lawrence Gershwin. The briefing is informational. After the briefing, we will have time for any questions that participants may have and some general discussion. No specific decisions are being requested.

¹Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 118 7 Oct 1985. No classification marking. Poindexter initialed the memorandum on McFarlane's behalf. A copy was sent to Bush. Prepared by deGraffenreid and Linhard. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for October 7 from 2 to 3 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

²Attached but not printed.

³Attached but not printed.

68. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 5, 1985

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting at 2:00 p.m., Monday, October 7, 1985

Monday's NSPG will be devoted to an Intelligence Community codeword briefing on Soviet strategic defenses. It is our understanding that the briefing will be identical to the one given on the Hill on Thursday² prior to the public release of the pamphlet "Soviet Strategic Defense Programs." (Tab 3)³

As indicated in the attached INR memos (Tabs 1 and 2), the Soviets have been researching laser, particle beam, radio frequency, and kinetic energy technology for the last 20 years. Although we cannot precisely identify the size and scope of Soviet research efforts in technologies applicable to ballistic missile defense, there are SDI-type technologies in which Soviet research is progressing and in which we can identify or hypothesize links to BMD.

In INR's view, the Soviets are ahead of the U.S. in some basic SDI-related technologies, but well behind in the key supporting technologies of any SDI weapons system (e.g., electronics and computer software). The area where the Soviets are probably furthest along is ground-based lasers.

Points to Raise

— You may want to solicit CIA's estimate of who is ahead in the area of space-based strategic defense. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet program relative to the U.S. program?

— What are Intelligence Community projections for the Soviet program five or ten years from now? What are IC estimates on who will be ahead then?

— The IC has stressed the difficulty of obtaining information on Soviet programs. What are the possibilities of being able to monitor the Soviet program in the future?

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (10/05/1985–10/07/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Steven Coffey (PM/SNP); cleared in PM and in INR (in substance).

² October 3.

³ Attached but not printed; see footnote 7, Document 66.

Tab 1**Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz⁴**

Washington, August 9, 1985

SUBJECT

Advanced-Technology Weapons and Soviet Strategic Defense

Recent Soviet statements have led some to believe that they are exploring our receptivity to a proposal that would limit SDI deployment, but would permit some types of research. We have assumed their motivation for such an approach would be to allow some US research as a “face-saving” way for the US to agree to an SDI limit. Actually, the Soviet motivation in allowing some research may be to permit their own programs to go ahead. This memorandum briefly sketches what we know about the Soviet programs.

The Soviets have been working with directed-energy (laser, particle beam, and radiofrequency) and kinetic-energy technologies for about the last twenty years. A portion of those technologies is applicable to BMD, and part of the Soviet effort is believed to be focused on that goal.

We cannot precisely identify the size and scope of Soviet research efforts in these areas, nor can we pinpoint the status and goals of any related weapon development programs. These technologies can have both weapon and nonweapon applications, making it difficult to determine the purpose of any detected research effort. These limitations, in turn, would make it difficult to monitor any future restrictions on research.

Using Kvitsinskiy’s terminology, some Soviet advanced-technology research could be construed as “fundamental” or “purely scientific.” But in at least one case, ground-based lasers, the “purposeful and directed” label seems more appropriate. Intelligence indicates that the Soviets are interested in ground-based laser BMD, and at least one Soviet facility is judged to house a high-energy laser that might support BMD testing. To protect their ground-based laser research from restrictions on advanced-technology strategic defenses, the Soviets could attempt to

⁴ Secret; Noform. Drafted by Mark Sigler (INR); cleared in INR.

exempt ground-based weapons from such restrictions, or could simply try arguing that the research in question is only “fundamental.”

- *High-Energy Lasers*: In a laser weapon, an intense beam of light is aimed at a target by an optical device. The target is damaged by explosive shock, heating, melting, or vaporizing.

The Soviets have a military-sponsored program to develop high-energy laser weapons. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the existence of a Soviet project to develop a ground-based laser weapon for terminal defense against ballistic missile warheads. While there are doubts about the possibility of using ground-based lasers for BMD, the Soviets could conduct feasibility tests during this decade, perhaps using the high-energy laser at Sary Shagan. If that proved successful, a prototype ground-based weapon could be tested in the early 1990s. A fully operational weapon is unlikely before 2000.

The Soviets may also have plans for a space-based laser. While ASAT would be the probable initial application of such a weapon, subsequent BMD use is possible. In the 1970s, this “project” was reportedly in its early stages. We have had no evidence of its status since then, and do not know where the effort stands. To develop a space-based BMD laser, the Soviets would have to achieve a number of major technological advances. The Intelligence Community estimates that, even if this can be accomplished, no prototype will be available before the mid-1990s, and no operational system before 2000.

- *Particle Beam Weapons (PBWs)*: In PBWs, intense beams of electrons, protons, or atoms are produced by a high-energy accelerator and aimed at a target by magnets. Damage results from thermal, mechanical, and secondary radiation (nuclear or X-ray) effects.

Our intelligence on Soviet work on PBW technologies is limited. We believe they are conducting research under military sponsorship for the purpose of acquiring the ability to develop PBWs. We have no evidence that they actually are developing such weapons. We lack firm knowledge as to the size or scope of their efforts, and do not know whether it is comparable in scale to their laser program. We believe they are capable of testing the feasibility of some PBW concepts but not others. It is not clear whether they have actually succeeded in demonstrating the feasibility of any. Indeed, it is not clear that PBWs are technically feasible at all.

The Intelligence Community believes the Soviets are at least 10–15 years away from testing any long-range, ground-based particle beam weapon for terminal BMD. A prototype space-based PBW, for damaging ballistic missile electronics, is also at least 10–15 years away, assuming the Soviets pursue development of such a system. Eventually, PBWs might be refined for use in RV or booster destruction.

◦ *Radiofrequency (RF) Damage Weapons*: In an RF weapon, electromagnetic radiation is aimed at a target by an antenna. Electronic components or the target structure may be destroyed by circuit overloading or thermal effects. The Soviets have conducted research in the use of strong RF signals, which have the potential to interfere with or destroy components of missiles and warheads. We do not know if a Soviet RF weapon program exists. If they were to pursue such a program, the Soviets probably could develop an RF weapon which could destroy the unprotected electronics of missiles at a range of up to one kilometer. A prototype capable of doing this over ranges of tens of kilometers could be possible by the late 1980s.

◦ *Hypervelocity Kinetic-Energy Weapons*: In a hypervelocity kinetic-energy weapon, a mass ranging from a stream of microscopic particles to a solid projectile is directed at a target. Impact causes melting, vaporization, and chemical decomposition.

While we know that the Soviets have conducted research and development on kinetic-energy technologies with potential applications for strategic weapons, we have no information indicating that they intend to develop long-range kinetic-energy weapons. The Intelligence Community estimates the probability of a Soviet prototype for such a weapon in the next ten years to be very low.

Tab 2

Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz⁵

Washington, September 20, 1985

SUBJECT

How the Soviets Look at SDI: Your Query

The Soviets probably do not know what they “really think” about SDI, and will not know for some time. They have called it destabilizing, a violation of the ABM Treaty, and part of a US attempt to gain superiority. At the same time, the Soviets have been researching SDI-type technologies for about 20 years. They currently are behind the US in such key supporting technologies as electronics and computer software. They are ahead of the US in some basic weapon-related technologies

⁵ Secret; Drafted by Vann Van Diepen and Mark Sigler (INR); cleared in INR.

and behind in others, but probably believe the US soon will pull well ahead.

In response to SDI's deployment, the Soviets could bolster their offensive forces, move to a counter-city strategy, or deploy nationwide BMD of their own. For the near-term they appear to have decided against moving toward "defense dominance." A major reason for this probably is that, compared to the present situation, effective US defenses—no matter how the USSR might respond—would make Soviet deterrence of the US much more uncertain, and clearly more expensive.

You wondered the other day at the Casey⁶ briefing how the Soviets view SDI. This is a distillation of what the Soviets say about SDI, what research and development they are undertaking in SDI-type systems, and our assessment of what the Soviets really think about SDI.

Soviet Pronouncements on SDI

In public and at Geneva, the Soviets have characterized SDI as destabilizing and a violation of the ABM Treaty. They have taken the view that SDI will only provoke Soviet counter-measures, and thus will result not in greater security but in increased military expenditures and levels of arms. Gorbachev has also warned that SDI will cause a breakdown of the Geneva arms control process. In essence, the US and USSR have exchanged scripts—the Soviets are making much the same arguments about BMD now that the US made in the 1960s.

The Soviets profess to view SDI as part of an overall US first strike strategy aimed at obtaining strategic superiority. They consider new US offensive weapons—MX, Trident II, cruise missiles, and the Pershing II—as intended to destroy as many Soviet offensive weapons as possible in a first strike, with SDI cleaning up the remaining Soviet weapons. (This is essentially a mirror-image of the Soviets' own strategic concept.) Since, the Soviets say, SDI cannot provide a leakproof defense against a large, coordinated strike, its only logical role is against a "ragged retaliation."

Soviet SDI-Type Research and Development

The Soviets have been researching laser, particle beam, radiofrequency, and kinetic-energy technology for about the last 20 years. We cannot precisely identify the size and scope of Soviet research efforts in technologies applicable to BMD, nor can we pinpoint the status and goals of any related weapon development programs. These technologies can have both weapon and nonweapon applications, making it difficult to determine precisely the purpose of Soviet R&D efforts. Nevertheless, there are SDI-type technologies in which Soviet research

⁶ Not further identified.

is progressing, and in which we can identify or hypothesize links to BMD.

High Energy Lasers. The Soviets have a military sponsored program to develop high-energy laser weapons, including a ground-based weapon for terminal BMD. A facility at Sary Shagan is believed to house a high-energy laser which may have a BMD application. The Soviets may also have a project for a space-based laser—while ASAT would be the probable initial use for such a weapon, subsequent BMD use is possible.

Particle Beam Weapons (PBWs). We have limited evidence on Soviet PBW research. While we believe they are conducting research under military sponsorship in an attempt to acquire the ability to develop PBWs, we have no evidence that they actually are developing *weapons*. We believe they are capable of testing the feasibility of some PBW concepts, but not others, and it is not clear whether they have succeeded in demonstrating the feasibility of any.

Radiofrequency (RF) and Kinetic-Energy Weapons. The Soviets have conducted research in the use of strong RF signals, which have the potential to interfere with or destroy missile components, and on kinetic-energy technologies with potential BMD applications. But we do not know the extent, if any, of Soviet RF and kinetic energy weapons programs.

Who's Ahead? We don't know where the Soviets currently think they stand vis-a-vis the US in SDI-type technologies. In our view, they are ahead of the US in some basic technologies and behind in others, but well behind in the key supporting technologies of any SDI *weapons system* (e.g., electronics and computer software). Wherever they think they stand now, the Soviets probably believe the US soon will be well ahead.

What Do They Really Think?: An Assessment

Even the Soviets probably don't know what they "really think" about SDI, and are unlikely to know for some time. A meaningful Soviet evaluation of SDI, and of the USSR's ultimate position toward it, will depend on a number of factors, many of which—such as the effectiveness of future US and Soviet defenses and countermeasures, as well as the costs involved—are not known at this time. We can, however, illuminate the key doctrinal factors likely to affect the Soviet view of SDI, based on Soviet military writings and programs, and the USSR's positions in past arms control fora.

SDI's Threat. An effective US SDI system would make the Soviets' counterforce strikes less effective. In order to continue their present strategy of deterrence through war-fighting, the Soviets would have to bolster their counterforce capability to penetrate US defenses, and deploy additional defenses of their own to compensate for their lessened counterforce capability.

Alternatively, the Soviets could move to a counter-city strategy, which is easier for the attacker and very demanding for the defender (only one warhead would have to penetrate the defenses to destroy a city). This strategy would require many of the same offensive force improvements as war-fighting, but would be less costly. Some increases in defenses also probably would be required, if only to complicate US attack planning.

SDI's Promise. The Soviets could choose to respond to SDI by deploying missile defenses of their own. Indeed, "defense of the homeland" is the keystone of Soviet planning. An effective nationwide BMD system is the most important defensive "missing link" in their current strategy, which explains why the Soviets have been conducting their own SDI-type research.

However, the Soviets do not have a fixation on defense for its own sake. While they clearly would prefer a world in which only the USSR had effective defenses, the Soviets almost certainly regard this as unrealistic since the US would respond by deploying defenses of its own. As pragmatists, they would therefore weigh the risks as well as the benefits of competing with the US in an SDI race.

The Soviet SDI Dilemma. Would the Soviets prefer a situation in which both sides have nationwide BMD, or in which there are no such defenses? For the near term—and neither we nor the Soviets know what they'll decide over the long term—the Soviets apparently have chosen the latter. They may have taken this stance for some of the same reasons they signed the ABM Treaty in 1972: they perceived the US as having a technological lead, and decided that it was more feasible to limit damage to the USSR by offensive counterforce strikes (which could be hindered relatively easily by US defenses) than by nationwide BMD (which was essentially impossible).

The Soviets have political reasons for opposing SDI; it plays well as part of the "peace" campaign, since many see SDI as a major reversal of US strategy and a threat to arms control. Nonetheless, their position that SDI is dangerous and destabilizing also is due to the fact that, compared to the present strategic environment, effective US defenses—no matter how the USSR responds—would make Soviet deterrence of the US much more uncertain, and clearly more expensive to attain. Today, the Soviets can be highly confident that their ballistic missiles will reach their targets; US defenses would make this much more uncertain. At the same time, the Soviets would have crucial doubts about the inherent effectiveness of their own defenses which would be compounded by US offensive countermeasures. The Soviets would be reticent to give up a known situation, in which they probably believe they are doing well, for an unknown "defense dominant" world of increased strategic uncertainty.

69. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 7, 1985

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Interpretation

1. *ISSUE.*

Statements given to the Congress and to our Allies up until your television appearance yesterday,² have taken the position that the prohibitions of Article V apply to ABM systems and components and that those components are ABM components as defined in Article II and components capable of substituting for such ABM components whether or not they are based on "other physical principles." Your statement yesterday could be interpreted as taking the position that Agreed Statement D approves and authorizes research, testing, and development of defensive weapons based on "other physical principles" regardless of the prohibitions of Article V. The issue is which of these interpretations, and in what context, it would be wise for the US, at this time, to adopt.

2. *CONTEXT.* There are several contexts in which the issue is pertinent:

a. From the legal point of view the issue is ambiguous. Agreed Statement D on its face contemplates the "creation" of "ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars which are created in the future . . ." The Soviets and the US agree that the word "create" can include research, development and testing. One body of lawyers asserts that the general sense of the Treaty as a whole dictates that the permission "to create" in Agreed Statement D is linked by the intent of Articles I, II, III, IV, and V that ABM components, and components capable of substituting for them, whether or not based

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, October 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

² Reference is to McFarlane's October 6 appearance on *Meet the Press*, in which he stated: "I think that the President is guided by the ABM Treaty, and the terms of that treaty are very explicit in Articles II, III, IV, and V, plus Agreed Statement D. They make clear that on research involving new physical concepts, that that activity, as well as testing, as well as development, indeed, are approved and authorized by the treaty. Only deployment is foreclosed, except in accordance with Articles XIII and XIV. So our program is compatible with the treaty and will remain so." For the transcript of his remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1985, pp. 32-34.

on other physical principles, should not be developed or tested unless they are fixed land-based systems tested in accordance with provisions of Articles III and IV. Another body of lawyers says that this does not legally follow from the language of the Treaty or from the negotiating record.

The negotiating record demonstrates that the US wished strict controls on futuristic systems and the Soviet Union resisted that attempt and only reluctantly agreed to the limitation on deployment of futuristic systems as provided by Agreed Statement D. It is further evident that the Soviet Union has not accepted as binding anything beyond the obligation assumed by it under the Articles of the Treaty and understandings to which it has specifically agreed in writing. The US has fostered a broader interpretation of the Treaty linked to the general intent of the Treaty, particularly the intent expressed in Article I, and spokesmen for the Executive Branch have in the past advocated a broader reading than a narrower one.

It should be noted that Agreed Statement F specifically permits large phased array radars which have as their purposes tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. There is no qualification in Agreed Statement F on this exception. Our assertion that the Krasnoyarsk Radar is a violation depends upon a broader reading of Agreed Statement F within the intent of the treaty as a whole; the Soviet interpretation rests upon a narrower reading of Agreed Statement F by itself. It is therefore not self-evident that the US will gain by a reading of the Treaty that narrowly focuses on the wording of individual sentences isolated from a consideration of other provisions of the Treaty.

b. In the context of negotiating with the Soviet Union, it would be prudent at this stage to use an interpretation of the Treaty which permits the planned \$26 billion, five-year research and testing program, outlined in the 15 March 1985 report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative.³ However, the traditional interpretation suffices for this purpose, even if the Congress provides all of the funds requested. It would also be advisable to preserve at this time the basis for asserting that the Krasnoyarsk Radar is an evident violation of the Treaty which must be corrected. If in the future the Soviets do not come into compliance with the ABM Treaty, we may wish to rely upon a reading of the Treaty that gives us greater freedom with respect to systems based on other physical principles that that which was the basis for the March 15th report to the Congress.

c. There is a question whether or not this is the time in our relations with the Congress and our allies formally to change our position

³ Reference is to *Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative*. (Washington: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense, April 1985)

from the past reading to a new and more permissive reading as to the limitations of the Treaty. Clearly, a more permissive reading could give greater scope and freedom to the SDI testing and development program than that contemplated by the March 15th report. OSD is strongly in favor of asserting such flexibility now. The opposing view is that there is no sense in causing a major issue with the Congress and our allies and with the Soviet Union at this time by insisting upon a reading which we will not need to use for some time in the future.

3. *CONCLUSION.* I believe we should assure the Congress and our allies that we do not intend to expand the SDI program beyond the scope described in the March 15 report to the Congress. I believe we should take the position that the limitations on that program illustrate the conservative position we are taking in order to be sure that the SDI program is fully within the limitations of the Treaty. The continued support of the Congress and our allies is essential in the period ahead of us.

Paul H. Nitze

*Special Advisor to the President
and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters*

70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany¹

Washington, October 10, 1985, 0451Z

312448. Subject: Interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Eyes Only for AMB. Nitze and Norman Clyne From Timbie.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This subject was discussed inconclusively at the SACG on Friday.² Roz and Allen supported the approach in your paper.³ Bud directed the following.

— Each agency is to provide its view to the NSC on this question.

— The State Legal Adviser is to provide his opinion.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-IRM Special Caption Files, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Timbie; cleared in in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Timbie.

² October 4; no minutes were found.

³ See Document 69.

3. The *Washington Post* today has an Oberdorfer article headlined “White House Revises Interpretation of the ABM Treaty.”⁴ It says that a senior White House official confirmed McFarlane’s Sunday television remarks.⁵ The article goes on to address this subject at some length, quoting Gerard Smith, anonymous officials etc.

4. This morning at the Shultz-Weinberger breakfast Bud raised this subject with the Secretary in a manner that showed some emotion. The Secretary defended his ground, saying this is too enormous an issue to be decided at the SACG, and must be addressed by the President. Bud responded that it would go to the President, but he knew how it would come out.

5. We have just heard that the NSPG on Friday⁶ at 11:00 a.m. will probably address the ABM treaty and SDI. As you know only the Secretary normally attends but you are on the list for this one so you might try to advance your arrival Friday in order to attend.

6. Text follows of an excerpt from Bud’s backgrounder yesterday:

Q. On Sunday, on the television program in connection with the Soviet offer and the Strategic Defense Initiative, you stated that it was your view that testing and development of ABM systems which are in the category of other physical principles is permitted by the ABM treaty. Is that the position of the administration now? Is that its fixed position?

A. Yes.

Q. And, if it is, how do you justify or explain how that position was reached when the person who negotiated the treaty, Ambassador Smith, says that was not the understanding when it was done and when the administration itself in its arms control impact statements for several years—the last one last year—seems to say the opposite?

A. I think, first of all, the Soviet Union has never accepted such an interpretation that foreclosed what I have said, research testing development of systems based upon other physical principles. They have never tolerated that.

Now it is true that there have been unilateral statements periodically that have stated, under the circumstances at the time that we should seek to limit those systems and that the ABM Treaty ought to encompass that. Never have the Soviets bought that. And the conditions today are substantially different from conditions at the time that speculation was offered.

Different in their sense of these many, many Soviet programs that have, in some cases, matured rather dramatically.

Shultz

⁴ See Don Oberdorfer, “White House Revises Interpretation of ABM Treaty,” *Washington Post*, October 9, 1985, pp. A21, A24.

⁵ October 6. See footnote 2, Document 69.

⁶ October 11.

71. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 10, 1985

SUBJECT

Handling the ABM Issue Before and After the NSPG

This memorandum makes recommendations and seeks guidance on handling the ABM Treaty Interpretation Issue both before and after Friday's² NSPG. As you will see, it drives us to the clear conclusion that it is absolutely essential that the lag time between the NSPG and the President's decision be cut to as close to zero as possible. We are working the NSDD as quickly as we can and will have that for your review by late COB tonight at the latest. Based upon the situation outlined in the following paragraphs, the outcome that we really need is for the President to "decide" at the NSPG, announce his decision, and release the NSDD by COB on Friday to guide the weekend's work.

We are currently building the needed package to permit the NSPG paperwork to be available to administratively fill that square if needed this afternoon. With a largely vanilla piece in the can, we will continue to improve and add to the package so that we have a good final by COB (whenever that is tonight).

Before the Meeting.

1. *Meeting with Paul Nitze.* It would probably be most useful if you could find the time to spend a few minutes with Paul Nitze privately before the NSPG. It would be a much better meeting if you knew exactly where he stands and had the chance to hear this from him. He will be back from Europe tonight at about 9 pm. He could be available in the morning. In getting information on his availability, we gave no indication of any interest on your part in such a meeting.

Recommendation. That you arrange to see Paul privately before the NSPG.³

2. *Private Discussions With SecState and SecDef.* It would also be useful for you to find an opportunity to discuss the state of play with

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original.

² October 11.

³ McFarlane approved the recommendation. No minutes of a meeting with Nitze were found.

respect to public affairs with SecState and SecDef today. A suggestion from them to their staffs to keep this issue from going any further in the press at this time could be very useful insurance—but likely very necessary insurance. (I did talk once again to Ed Djerejian and he made it very clear today in his conference call that no additional comment on ABM Treaty interpretation is authorized.)

Recommendation. That should the opportunity arise [or could appropriately be generated], you get SecState and SecDef to pass this instruction to their staffs.⁴

After the Meeting.

1. *Speech on Decision.* You had asked us to work towards a speech by Paul or Sofaer on the decision after the NSPG. Steve Steiner and I agree that the forum in San Francisco is wrong for what we want. Steve feels that provided we give notice Friday after the NSPG, and assuming the Press Club is not already booked, we could likely get the platform we need for a Nitze speech there on Tuesday⁵ (Monday being a holiday). If this is the way that you wish to go, we would recommend that your talking points for the NSPG suggest such a speech so that the tasking for such an event results from the meeting. Nitze's staff can then have Saturday to work on a text and we can review it on Sunday and work with them as needed on Monday to finalize it.

— We are approaching this action from the perspective that it is more important to get on the record, in Washington, early (and without preemption) than to delay to increase the press coverage of the speech. In short, the objective is getting on the record with the interested community—not necessarily getting to the general public.

— Steve has suggested that an alternative approach, which may be more effective for these purposes, would be an “on the record” briefing for press on Tuesday at State. This could be given by Paul with Sofaer assisting in the legal aspects. This may allow us to be a bit more focused in achieving our objective while avoiding any undue hype in public—making this more of a public interest item than we need. To do this, we could set the preparations en train on Friday afternoon, but delay announcing the briefing until Monday or Tuesday morning at State. If we go the speech route, we will need to go outside the Executive Branch to set up the appropriate forum much earlier (i.e., on Friday) which would, of itself, create more visibility and could arouse speculation about our intentions.

— I find this alternative approach (of the Nitze/Sofaer briefing) very attractive and I agree that it would be helpful to have State's top

⁴ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁵ October 15 (October 14 was Columbus Day).

legal expert take part. It can also serve as a fallback should you decide to have us pursue the speech options and we then find we can't get the right forum for the speech.

— Nitze is scheduled to give an address to the North Atlantic Assembly on Tuesday in San Francisco (which Jack Matlock arranged with Mathias). All of the above would require he cancel and have someone else give his prepared (and cleared) speech. We can ask Ken—Mathias didn't want Adelman, but the situation calls for Nitze to be here.

Recommendation. That you consider the alternative and provide guidance on which approach you want us to pursue as primary.⁶

Nitze Speech on Tuesday _____

Nitze/Sofaer Briefing on Tuesday _____

Other _____

2. *Meetings with Congress.* After the NSPG, we should recognize that the real battleground on the issue will be in the Congress. (Ron Sable is sending you a PROFS note on a conversation he has already had with Norm Dix that you should read.)

a. At the NSPG, the President should hear the views of his advisors as to how best to present the USG position to the Congress. Based on the NSPG discussion, we will need to charge State, Defense and ACDA to come up with a coordinated plan to anticipate and handle the requests for briefings and hearings that will come. Nitze and Sofaer should play a major role in this, especially if you choose to have them brief the press on this on Tuesday afternoon. It would likely, therefore, be best if State were charged with developing and coordinating the drafting of the plan, but it should be made clear that it would be most useful if Paul assisted in the orchestration of this effort. This plan will be needed quickly (for your review on Monday).

b. In addition to this plan, initial contacts should be made with key members as soon as possible. Warner and Nunn have expressed an interest in this subject. Fascell is reported to be planning hearings. You should consider a call from you to Warner—and perhaps Nunn. Contacts to the leadership and other key members prior to Monday needs to be considered in the context of the NSPG discussion (i.e., Warner, Nunn, Aspin, Dole, Byrd, Fascell, Lugar, Michael and O'Neill). *It is essential that consultations with key Congressional players occur before any speech or briefing is given to the press.*

Recommendation. That we adjust your talking points for the NSPG to include the proposal that a Congressional plan be developed by State

⁶ McFarlane approved the option "Nitze/Sofaer Briefing on Tuesday," crossed out "Nitze" and wrote "Paul is in San Fran" in the left-hand margin beside the recommendation.

and coordinated with Defense and others so that it can be reviewed and implemented on Monday.⁷

3. *The Allies*. We also need to consider how we can give the allies any appropriate information about this development. The best course would be to ensure that a cable informing posts of activities planned for Tuesday is released on Monday, so that posts have time to brief Allies at least a few hours before we go public.

Recommendation. That we plan to have State draft such a message for release at COB Monday.⁸

4. *The US NST Delegation*. Finally, the US NST delegation will need to have warning of Tuesday's events. A separate cable to the US NST delegation will be needed. This should be followed later next week with more detailed instructions on how to handle Soviet questions.

Recommendation. That we plan to have State draft an initial message for the delegation on Monday and plan on having the IG/Backstopping Group meet and develop more detailed instructions on Tuesday for transmission to the delegation as soon as possible later that week.⁹

⁷ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁸ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁹ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

72. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 10, 1985

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

I. PURPOSE

To review how the USG should interpret the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Prepared by Wright. Martin initialed the memorandum on McFarlane's behalf. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for October 11 from 11:00 until noon (mistakenly typed as 12:00 a.m.) in the White House Situation Room.

II. BACKGROUND

You have received recent briefings on the SDI Program and the efforts that the Soviet Union has undertaken in the area of strategic defense.² It is important at this juncture that you have the opportunity to hear the personal assessments from your senior advisers of the interpretation to be applied to Treaty constraints on research, testing and development of the exotic technologies under the program. The meeting agenda is at *Tab A*.³

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at *Tab B*.⁴

IV. PRESS PLAN

None planned.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject and provide an overview covering the ABM Treaty article-by-article, highlighting an interpretation that specifically addresses the issue of constraints on future, exotic technologies. This interpretation came to light as we recently explored the Treaty and negotiating record for the boundaries of our SDI research program. Secretary Shultz will follow with a legal assessment and his views on implications for Allies. Secretary Weinberger and the rest of your senior foreign policy and arms control advisers will provide their assessments on the implementation and timing of our interpretation. Specific decisions are being requested on these aspects of the issue.

² See Document 67.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

73. Memorandum From William Wright and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 10, 1985

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting, Friday, October 11, 11:00–12:00, ABM Treaty Interpretation Issues

This evening, we provided a draft package of additional background material that you could either discuss with the President or provide to him for his review prior to the meeting tomorrow. Based on our discussions the following package is submitted for your use:

- Tab I — Memorandum for the President;²
 - A — NSC staff summary issue paper;³
 - B — Legal opinions of State, OSD and ACDA;⁴
 - C — Draft NSDD supporting our interpretation of the ABM treaty;⁵
- Tab II — Proposed talking points for your use at the meeting;⁶ and
- Tab III — Proposed talking points for the President's use.⁷

With respect to this material, we would recommend the following:

— At a minimum, you forward the memorandum at *Tab I* with the NSC staff developed issue paper (*Tab A*) and the various agency legal briefs (*Tab B*) to the President for his review; the briefs have been highlighted.

— In accordance with your instructions this evening, we have prepared a draft NSDD which could be used to record the decision taken at the NSPG. This is at *Tab C*. Since this document is critical to moving quickly to cut off both speculation and end runs, we recommend that it be forwarded with the President's package in the morning to familiarize him with the substance, but that he not sign it until after the NSPG.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² Printed as Document 74.

³ Printed as Tab A (1), Document 74.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 74.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 74.

⁶ Printed as Tab II, Document 74.

⁷ Printed as Tab III, Document 74.

— We feel that it would also be useful to provide the President with your talking points (*Tab II*) for his study. They lay out the legal basis for a broader interpretation of the Treaty in more detail and it may be useful for the President to have this in advance. They also outline your approach to gathering consensus at the meeting and handling the tasking of steps necessary in implementing a decision if one is reached at the NSPG itself.

— Finally, we have also drafted some proposed talking points for the President's use at the meeting (*Tab III*). These track closely with the NSDD decision and are consistent with your guidance. If you agree with the points, we would recommend that you provide them to the President when you have your final preparatory meeting with him on this meeting.

Recommendation

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at *Tab I* which forwards *Tabs A, B and C*, along with *Tab II* and *Tab III* if you see fit, to the President for his review as early as possible on Friday.⁸

⁸ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

74. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 11, 1985

SUBJECT

Background Material for the NSPG Meeting, Friday, October 11, on ABM Treaty Interpretations

The NSPG today will focus on the question of whether or not the US should adopt a broader interpretation of the restrictions on non-traditional ABM systems (like those at the heart of SDI) posed by the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The short issue paper at *Tab A* describes two alternative options available. Legal opinions from the

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Wright and Linhard. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it. Reagan initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

General Counsels of State, OSD and ACDA are highlighted at *Tab B*,² for your background.

One alternative is a narrower interpretation of the Treaty which has been generally asserted by the US since the Treaty's ratification. This interpretation, which we hold today, would permit research, but restrict some large scale testing and prohibit development of many SDI systems based on newer technologies under the Treaty. This interpretation would not inhibit us from pursuing our SDI research as currently planned for a number of years, albeit at some price in terms of additional program cost, time and increased uncertainty. On the other hand, it does impose restrictions that we will have to face at some point if the research is successful. There is little evidence that the Soviets have ever agreed to this interpretation—although they may wish to grasp it now in an effort to block SDI. The Congress and our allies are familiar with this interpretation, and any change from it will surely cause problems with which we will have to deal.

The other alternative is a broader, and somewhat more literal interpretation of the Treaty text. If adopted, it would permit us to go beyond research to testing and development (but not deployment) of defensive systems based on new technologies. The benefits to increased flexibility in pursuing the SDI program are clear and it is more consistent with your stated view of your intent with respect to the SDI program. On the other hand, should we move in this direction, even if handled well, it is very likely that certain elements of Congress will react strongly and attempt to place legislative restrictions on our freedom of action, attacking SDI funding or strategic force modernization funding in retaliation. We should also expect that some allies will make an issue of this.

Timing is important if we are to accept a new, more broad interpretation. Should we move towards a broader interpretation at this time, we will face handling the likely objections of members of Congress during the appropriation cycle. We may also face a debate in the alliance on this issue just prior to the Geneva meeting. The Soviets will attempt to feed this debate to drive wedges where possible. On the other hand, there will never be a good time to step up to this. There is merit in the argument that if we are to shift to a broader interpretation, we should do it well before the research program demands that we do. And since, unfortunately, the issue is already in the press, we may never recover the opportunity to shift to this broader interpretation if we fail to seize this moment.

² Attached but not printed are the legal opinions of the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. See Documents 63, 56 and 55.

The long and short of this is that I feel that there is sufficient ambiguity in the Treaty and the negotiating record to support the broader interpretation should you choose to pursue it. This does not mean that there will not be some legal challenges made, but that there are sufficient grounds to legally fight these challenges. At the NSPG I will go through the articles of the Treaty and explain how the broader interpretation could be presented.

The critical issue that you must decide is whether this broader interpretation is necessary to achieve the goals you have set for the program under the ABM Treaty, and if so, if now is the time to take this step.

I believe that there is general consensus at the senior levels of the Administration that the legal case for the broader interpretation exists and that, if supportable, it would put us in a much better position to pursue the SDI research. I also believe that this interpretation is fundamentally more consistent with your views of the program. However, the broader interpretation is not necessarily needed now to permit the research we plan (and likely not needed for a few years at least). It is on this last issue that my recommendation hinges most importantly because it is very unclear whether we can sustain the needed support for the SDI program were we to publicly adopt this new interpretation now.

My recommendation is contained in the Draft NSDD at *Tab C*³ and essentially makes moot the issue of which interpretation is chosen. The program has been charted to provide the answers we need under the current, more restrictive interpretation. The talking points I intend to use in setting the stage for your decision on this issue are at *Tab II* for your information. Also, provided are proposed talking points for your use (*Tab III*).

Tab A (1)

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, October 10, 1985

INTERPRETING THE ABM TREATY RESTRICTIONS

Issue: How should the U.S. interpret the ABM Treaty's restrictions on systems based on "other physical principles" (i.e., systems other

³ Attached but not printed. For the final version, see Document 76.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive.

than traditional ABM interceptor missiles, launchers and radars)? Should the USG interpret the Treaty as applying the prohibition on “the development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space based or mobile land-based ABM systems and components” to systems based on “other physical principles” as well as those on which ABM systems were based at the time the ABM Treaty was signed?

Introduction: Since 1972, a variety of U.S. officials have publicly and privately maintained that Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits development, testing and deployment—but not research on—ABM systems and components that are not fixed, land-based and regardless of whether they are based on new or older technologies or principles. It is not clear that the Soviets shared this view when the Treaty was signed.

Recent study of the Treaty and the negotiating record suggest that a broader interpretation (more literal) of the Treaty is appropriate. This interpretation maintains that the Treaty permits research, testing and development (but not deployment) of non-fixed ABM systems or components which are based on other physical principles.

The central choice is whether we should move to this broader interpretation at this time.

This paper addresses the generally accepted Treaty terminology, the two interpretations and their supporting rationale. Relevant ABM Treaty provisions are attached for your reference.

ABM Treaty Terminology

The ABM Treaty provisions regarding “components” can be most clearly understood by considering the three categories of ABM systems contemplated by the Treaty.

a) *“Current” systems.* These are systems consisting of fixed, land-based components that composed the “current” systems at the time the Treaty was negotiated. Article II defines such components as ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The deployment of such components is limited to locations and numbers specified in Article III and such components may be tested in conformity with Article IV.

b) *Article V systems.* Article V deals with ABM systems and components that are mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based. Such components would include ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars as defined by Article II and devices capable of substituting for one or more of such ABM components. Article V, paragraph 1 provides that such systems or components may not be developed, tested or deployed; research on such systems or components is not prohibited.

c) *ABM systems based on "other physical principles" addressed in Agreed Statement D.* These are ABM systems with components based upon physical principles other than those used in ABM systems "current" at the time the Treaty was negotiated. These would be devices capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars. Articles III and IV and Agreed Statement D allow the research, development and testing of such fixed, land-based components, but prohibit their deployment absent prior discussion pursuant to Article XIII and agreement to amend the Treaty in accordance with Article XIV.

Narrower Interpretation

Under the interpretation generally held since 1972, with the above terminology as background, the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components based on physical principles other than those on which ABM systems were based at the time of signature of the ABM Treaty (as well as ABM systems and components based on then-current technology).

This interpretation is supported by the following argumentation:

— Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an ABM system as a "system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." It states that ABM systems "currently consist of" ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Thus, Article II indicates that there could be other types of ABM systems or components developed in the future.

— Article III of the Treaty prohibits the deployment of ABM systems except that fixed land-based ABM systems utilizing technology current in 1972 can be deployed at specific sites under specific limitations.

— Article V, paragraph 1, prohibits the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems. Like Article III, Article V is all encompassing. Article II makes clear that Article III and Article V apply to all types of ABM systems regardless of the technology utilized.

— In agreeing to the language of Article V, 1. the U.S. and Soviet negotiators also agreed that the text covers "any type of present and future components." Thus, the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems or components based on other physical principles is prohibited by Article V, 1.

— Agreed Statement D is by its terms associated with Article III and provides that should types of ABM systems appear in the future based on other physical principles, they cannot be deployed at these

permitted sites without amendment of the Treaty—otherwise the balance established by Article III would be upset.

Broader Interpretation The alternative, broader interpretation holds that the ordinary meaning of Agreed Statement D is that “specific limitations” on ABM systems “based on other physical principles” will be “subject to discussion.” Moreover, by implication, the Treaty—apart from Agreed Statement D—does not provide “specific limitations” on sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems, based on physical principles other than those current at the time the Treaty was signed.

This broader interpretation is supported by the following argumentation:

- The use of the phrase “currently consisting of” in Article II can be read to mean that all future variants of existing ABM systems and components are covered by the Treaty.

- In that case, Article V would prohibit testing, development, and deployment of all mobile systems using new technologies.

- On the other hand, if Articles II and V had this effect, there would not be a need for the undertaking in Agreed Statement D to *discuss* “specific limitations” on future ABM systems “based on other physical principles.”

- The fact that “specific limitations” on future systems remain “subject to discussion” indicates that the Treaty by itself does not limit these systems.

- Furthermore, the text of Agreed Statement D is unclear as to what rules, if any, apply before the Parties reach agreement on “specific limitations” and amend the Treaty accordingly.

- The ambiguity should be resolved by looking at the negotiating record, *not* at subsequent unilateral statements by U.S. officials. The negotiating record contains conflicting evidence, but the dominant evidence is that the Soviets never committed themselves to limitations on future systems.

Tab A (2)**Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵**

Washington, undated

*RELEVANT TREATY PROVISIONS:**Article II*

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles . . .
- (b) ABM launchers . . . ; and
- (c) ABM radars

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

- (a) within one ABM system deployment area

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land based.

⁵ Secret; Sensitive.

Agreed Statement D

In order to insure fulfillment of the objective not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

PROPOSED TALKING POINTS

INTRODUCTION

— Mr. President in the past two weeks you have received briefings on our own SDI research program and, more recently, on the considerable effort that the Soviet Union has made in the area of strategic defense. Both of these perspectives have been accompanied by an underlying set of constraints which derive directly from the ABM Treaty.

— Today, I would like to provide an overview of the various provisions of the ABM Treaty. As you know, the SDI program, from its inception, has been designed to be fully in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

— At the conclusion of my overview I will provide you with a staff interpretation, and rationale therefore, which addresses the Treaty's limitations on research, testing, development and deployment of ABM systems or components based on other physical principles—that is—based on technology which was not current in 1979 when the Treaty was signed.

— This interpretation has been long overlooked, and it probably would never have come to light if we hadn't honestly been searching

⁶ Secret. All brackets are in the original. A stamped notation at the top of the document indicates McFarlane saw it. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for October 11.

for the boundaries of the Treaty, within the context of the newly emerging technologies of SDI.

OVERVIEW OF TREATY TEXT

— The overview will be in order by Treaty articles, so you may want to follow along with the texts in your red folders (*Tab A*).

— *Article I* of the ABM Treaty of 1972 states its central purpose—to prohibit *deployment* of “ABM systems” which are defined in *Article II*, except for certain deployments specifically permitted by *Article III*, or deployments otherwise agreed upon in accordance with provisions for ongoing review and amendment of the Treaty. Thus, *Article I*(2) states:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems . . . except as provided for in *Article III* of this Treaty.

— *Article II* defines the terms “ABM system” and ABM “component.” These terms are the subject of limitations set forth in other provisions of the Treaty. Under *Article II*(1):

an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles . . .;
- (b) ABM launchers . . .; and
- (c) ABM radars. . .

— Paragraph 2 of *Article II* identifies the listed elements—ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars—as “ABM system components.”

— *Article III* of the Treaty specifies the permitted deployments of ABM systems, consisting of two complexes, one to defend a “Party’s national capital” and the other to defend an area containing “ICBM silo launchers.” A 1974 Protocol reduced the number of permitted complexes from two to one for each Party at their choosing. In pertinent part, *Article III* states that:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: . . . within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers . . ., a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars [with specified limits on the number and characteristics of these radars].

— Other provisions of the Treaty allow upgrading of these permitted ABM systems, subject to certain restrictions: “modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out” (*Article VII*), except that “Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor

missile at a time from each launcher . . . or semiautomatic or other systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers” (*Article V(2)*).

— Parenthetically I would only note that the Soviet Union has constructed and continuously upgraded an ABM defense of Moscow and has violated the restrictions on radars by construction of a large, phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk. Meanwhile, the United States in 1975 deactivated its only deployed ABM systems at Grand Forks, North Dakota.

— *Article IV* clarifies that the *Article III* limitations on deployment do not “apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.”

— *Article V(1)* of the Treaty provides that:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

— *Article V* prohibits development, testing and deployment of mobile systems. I will be returning to the issue of whether this provision applies to only the systems or components current when the Treaty was signed or also applies to the creation of new systems or components based on other physical principles. In either case, *Article V* restricts permitted deployments of ABM interceptor missiles, launchers and radars under *Article III* to fixed, land-based systems.

— *Article VI* deals with prohibitions on giving non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars capabilities of ABM components and places restrictions on future early warning radars.

— *Articles VIII through XII* of the Treaty deal with matters of implementation and compliance, including dismantlement of deployed ABM systems “in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty” (*Article VIII*), a prohibition on “transfer to other States” and deployment of ABM systems “outside the national territory” of the Parties (*Article IX*), agreement “not to assume any international obligations which would conflict” with the Treaty (*Article X*), and agreement to “continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms” (*Article XI*).

— *Article XII* provides that, to monitor Treaty compliance, “each Party shall use national technical means of verification.” Further, under *Article XII*, “Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of the other Party” and “not to use deliberate concealment measures.”

— *Article XIII and XIV* create a mechanism for ongoing review and amendment of the Treaty. *Article XIII* provides for the establishment

of an SCC which serves as a forum for representatives of the Parties to meet regularly and consider matters of compliance, interpretation, exchange of information, amendment, as well as "possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty."

— *Article XIV* states that "Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty" and further provides that "the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty" at five-year intervals for as long as the Treaty remains in force. Thus, the ABM Treaty is expressly made an adaptive instrument. The Parties are not locked into a regime which proves to be destabilizing or obsolete.

— Finally, the Treaty contains a safeguard against non-compliance or a shift in the strategic balance which threatens the vital security interests of either Party. *Article XV* provides that:

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

— In this quick overview of the Treaty provisions I have tried to deal with the plain meaning of the Articles. The plain meaning certainly represents—at a minimum—the agreement which was reached by the U.S. and Soviet Governments—uncluttered by unilateral interpretations, individual expectations or just plain wishful thinking.

— I mentioned wishful thinking because in my own mind, this is unique to the U.S. ratification process. It is entirely conceivable that in the interest of "bringing home the bacon" some of our negotiators read well beyond the printed Treaty text in an effort to try to convince the Congress—and themselves that they had achieved mutual agreement.

THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES ISSUE

— Permit me now to present the case for the plain meaning of what limitations are to be applied to systems based on "other physical principles"; technologies which were not current at the time that the treaty was signed in 1972.

— The ABM Treaty provisions dealing with "current" and future technology can be most clearly understood by considering the two broad categories of ABM systems contemplated by the Treaty.

— "*Current*" systems. These are systems and components that comprised the "current" systems at the time the Treaty was negotiated. *Article II* defines such components as ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The deployment of such components is limited to locations and numbers specified in *Article III* and

such components may be tested in conformity with *Article IV* and these components cannot be made mobile—sea, land or air based (*Article V*).

— In the category of future technology, ABM systems based on “other physical principles” are only addressed in Agreed Statement D. These are ABM systems with components based upon physical principles other than those used in ABM systems “current” at the time the Treaty was negotiated. These would be devices capable of substituting in the future for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars.

— Agreed Statement D seems to imply that future systems based on other physical principles may be “created” and therefore may be developed and tested. However, in order to insure the fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III, the Agreed Statement imposes a duty on the Parties to confer and agree to “specific limitations” on these future systems before they are deployed.

— The use of the phrase “currently consisting of” in *Article II* could be read to mean that all future variants of existing ABM systems and components are covered by the Treaty. In that case, Article V would prohibit testing, development, and deployment of all mobile systems using new technologies.

— On the other hand, if *Articles II and V* had this effect, there would not be a need for the undertaking in Agreed Statement D to discuss “specific limitations” on future ABM systems “based on other physical principles.” The fact that “specific limitations” on future systems remain “subject to discussion” indicates that the Treaty by itself does not limit these systems.

— The negotiating history on this issue may be illustrative of what I referred to earlier as wishful thinking. The U.S. had long sought a ban on deployment of future systems, but did not seek to preclude development and testing. The Soviets resisted any restrictions on future systems. After months of negotiations they finally agreed to proscribe deployment of future systems in *Agreed Statement D* since, without it the Treaty would *not* operate to ban deployments of future systems.

— The negotiating record has no significant support for the proposition that *Agreed Statement D* limits the development or testing of future systems. On the contrary, since it begins with the prospect of their creation, these steps in bringing a system into existence appear to be sanctioned.

— What is far from clear is the public record prior to ratification and since. It is for this latter reason that we need to focus on the Treaty text and the negotiating record to find the mutually agreed interpretation.

DISCUSSION

— In my estimation, we have a strong legal case and should not hesitate to take it to the Congress and our Allies—on its own merits.

— At this point I would like to ask each of you in turn to focus on the interpretation I have just given, and provide your views on how we should transition to this operative interpretation as it applies to our own SDI program.

— George, would you care to lead?

— Cap, I believe you have some views on this.

— Paul, you have been most intimately involved with the ABM Treaty from the beginning. What do you think?

— Ken, your views?

— Bill (Crowe), it seems to me that you have studied a little law; do the Chiefs have anything to add?

[After the discussion we would recommend that you summarize before proceeding]

[If consensus is reached, as it may well be, recommending the simple assertion of a broader interpretation use the following remarks to permit the President to acknowledge this consensus and announce his decision modifying the consensus along the lines of the draft NSDD if he agrees]

— Mr. President, it appears that we have consensus that we have a strong case to announce the broader interpretation. Do you agree with a decision to do so now?

[If no consensus is reached, turn to the President for his views]

— Mr. President, we don't have consensus here, do you need additional time to consider this or do you have a decision?

IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION

— As we all are keenly aware, execution is 95 percent of the solution. In this instance delay can only hurt our case, because we will be viewed as being unsure of ourselves.

— I think that we need to inform Congress, our allies and the press about this on our own terms; they must be informed of our deliberations on this matter and the decision that the President has made.

— With respect to the press, what do you all think about an on the record briefing by perhaps the State Department Legal Adviser, Judge Abe Sofaer, on Tuesday? Perhaps Paul, you could consider capturing the decision in your talk next week in San Francisco?

— With the Press briefing, next week the real interest will be on the Hill. We will need a good plan to manage that activity. George, would you be willing to put some of your best people on this, and get, working with Defense and others, a plan for handling this in Congress over for the President to review Monday so that we can implement Tuesday?

— We will also need to inform our allies. I think this should be done via message on Monday. Views?

— Between now and Tuesday though we will have to move out in two very important directions. Before getting to the details of the Congressional and Allied gameplans though let me spend a few minutes on the real necessity of maintaining internal control and Administration cohesion on this issue.

— This has been a very contentious issue. Any time that you call into question something that has stood unchallenged for 13 years, you are going to have to overcome a certain amount of bureaucratic momentum to continue to view things the same way. In this instance I hope that we can capture the high ground and actually improve the prospects for the program on the Hill.

— For this reason it is very important that those of us in this room get quickly to our staffs and lay out the arguments and announce the decision. This is not the time to debate the points over again; it is time to march off smartly together.

CLOSING REMARKS

— Mr. President do you have anything further to add? Fine, thank you all for coming, an NSDD recording the decision will be issued shortly.

Tab III

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL TALKING POINTS

— The fundamental purpose of the SDI program is to determine whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision.

⁷ Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the document indicates McFarlane saw it. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for October 11.

— It is an objective worthy of our nation and a goal that I intend this nation pursue with all deliberate speed.

— At the same time, when we embarked on our SDI research, I directed that this research be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty as we then understood it.

— What this discussion has led me to believe is that the assertions we have made for some time about what the ABM Treaty restricts with regard to advanced defensive technologies are not clearly demonstrable in the terms of the treaty as written, nor in the associated negotiating record.

— These assertions are a legacy which reflects more our hopes for the Treaty, made in the context of our assumptions about the future at the time the Treaty was negotiated and ratified.

— They do not appear to be an objective assessment of what was achieved and mutually agreed by the signed Treaty document.

— All this being said, over the last two years, and working under the constraints as we interpreted them at the inception of the program, our technical community designed our SDI research program to conform to a more restrictive view of our ABM Treaty obligations.

— This has entailed some price with respect to the speed of our progress, the overall cost of the program, and the level of technical uncertainty we face at each step in our research.

— But, nonetheless, they have crafted a program which, if consistently supported with the appropriate funding as requested, will permit us to achieve the goals set for it.

— Therefore, as long as the program receives the support needed to implement its carefully crafted plan, I don't see the need to authorize the restructuring of the U.S. SDI program further towards the boundaries of Treaty interpretation which we could legitimately observe.

— This being the case, the issue of where exactly these boundaries lie is moot.

75. Memorandum Prepared by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney)¹

Washington, October 11, 1985

Today's NSPG on ABM Treaty

CH tells me the Secretary returned from the NSPG thinking he had argued persuasively that we should: 1) say the treaty is ambiguous,² 2) say we intend to pursue SDI within the framework of the customary interpretation³ of the ABM Treaty, and 3) assert ambiguity in the Geneva talks⁴ as a means of arguing the need for clarification of the Treaty. Nitze also seems upbeat. He predicts the President will announce, quite soon, an even stricter position: there is ambiguity, but we see no necessity to change the Treaty guidelines.

I don't know whether the Secretary's private talks with the President bear out the optimism, but the drift of the meeting was not clearly in our direction. Only Baker backed the Secretary.⁵ Crowe and Adelman waffled. Weinberger and Meese wanted to change the interpretation now; Casey seemed to agree, but stressed withdrawal from the treaty. Nitze thinks Bud's comments were balanced, perhaps leaning slightly our way. The President said nothing, but noted he had received a message from Mrs. Thatcher (we don't have).⁶

Specific Comments (in order).

McFarlane. The issue is the interpretation you (the President) wish to place on the treaty. It is a political and legal matter. In the past we have had a narrow interpretation, but that was taken in the hope the Soviets would adopt this stance. Both the Soviet and our SDI programs will run up against the treaty. The issue is whether to reinterpret it now.

Article II defines the then current technology (interceptor missiles, launchers, radars). One argument is that Agreed Statement D allows

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-145, State Dept. Chron Files. Secret. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Armacost saw it on October 17. The National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 11:03 to noon on October 11. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found. Linhard's handwritten notes are in Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, NSPG Meeting—10/11/1985.

² Armacost underlined "is ambiguous."

³ Armacost underlined "SDI within the framework of the customary interpretation."

⁴ Armacost underlined "assert ambiguity in the Geneva talks."

⁵ Armacost underlined "Only Baker backed the Secretary."

⁶ Armacost drew a bracket in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.

the “creation”⁷—research, development, and testing—of future types of systems. The opposing argument is that Article II covers future types of systems. But if that were true there would be no need for Agreed Statement D.

The negotiating record shows that the narrow view was meant to limit mobile (including space-based) systems. You backed the narrow interpretation in the March 15 SDI Report to Congress. This is compatible with the Camp David four points. If we alter the interpretation now, we will evoke “criticism.” You want to know whether we can have effective SDI defenses, and the SDI program is designed to answer this question.

Shultz (summary attached.)

Weinberger. What is our goal? Do we want SDI, or the treaty? We shouldn’t spend too much time arguing about this. If we wait to change our interpretation, then it will seem to have been done just for our SDI program. Abrahamson’s work has moved faster than expected. He is now bumping up against the treaty. Eventually we will have to pull out of it anyway. Asking the Soviets for clarification of the treaty is a mistake. Lawyers could argue all day long on its meaning. I’ve never seen such passions as on this treaty. We should define it the way we want.

Crowe. If we need to make a change, our lawyers say there is a basis for doing so. More flexibility is always helpful. We are upset with Soviet interpretations. There is a public perception problem. If we can, we should make the reinterpretation more palatable.

Casey. We think SDI is vital and can be done. The treaty should not stand in the way. If the Soviets say we are in violation, then they were in violation long ago. Fortunately, the negotiations provided an amendment procedure. We have a propaganda problem. We should not let the treaty get stronger. We should exercise the amendment and withdrawal procedures. The public should know this now. We should not let this simmer.

Adelman. There are upsides and downsides. The Soviets won’t help us. There are good legal arguments on both sides. The question is whether the Congress will give us the funds for SDI. I suggest a one-month search of the files by a commission of lawyers. I’m not sure what SDI work cannot be done now. (Weinberger: “Field testing.”)

Meese. We should not call a panel of lawyers. It would create doubt about our own interpretation. The Department of State legal advisor is probably right. We should not give up Article XV (the withdrawal clause). We should say that Article V permits testing.

Baker. We do not want to go to the Geneva meeting with Alliance disunity. We should finesse the issue for the time being.⁸

⁷ Armacost circled “creation.”

⁸ Armacost drew a bracket in the left-hand margin beside this sentence.

Nitze. A broad interpretation of the treaty will undercut our argument on the Krasnoyarsk radar.

The meeting ended.

WHC

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁹

Washington, undated

FOUR POINTS

1. The Treaty is subject to considerable ambiguity

— There is room for maneuver for us
— and concern about the Soviets' interpretation; ours should not be stricter than theirs

So there is a real need for clarification

2. We have adhered to a relatively restrictive view, as in the March 15 document and Hicks' testimony in late September.

3. While any researcher would like a free field, our scientists tell us that the SDI program is designed so that the President's question (can we have a defense against ballistic missiles?) can be answered without changing the familiar interpretation of the treaty.

4. These last two points have created expectations and have been used to sell the SDI program in the Congress and with the Allies.

So if we change our interpretation that support will be called into question. We would find ourselves going to Geneva on the winds of a hurricane.

Therefore, we should:

— state the fact of the treaty's ambiguity
— state our intention to pursue SDI within the framework of the familiar interpretation
— assert the fact of ambiguity at Geneva as a means of arguing the need for clarification of the treaty.

In this way we can have our cake and eat it too.

⁹ No classification marking.

76. National Security Decision Directive 192¹

Washington, October 11, 1985

THE ABM TREATY AND THE SDI PROGRAM (U)

When I announced the initiation of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), I presented my vision and hope for a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. The fundamental purpose of the SDI program is to determine whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision. This is a moral and noble purpose. It represents the best hope that we have for a future free of dependence on the threat of retaliation to underwrite our own security. It is an objective worthy of our nation and a goal that I intend this nation pursue with all deliberate speed. (U)

At the same time, to our credit, we are a nation which respects law and meets its commitments. When we embarked on our SDI research, I made the commitment that this research would be conducted in full compliance with all our legal treaty obligations, and I directed, from its inception, that this program be planned to meet that commitment. Recently, we reexamined the ABM Treaty and the associated negotiating record in great detail. In the process, we have gained new insights into how this Treaty can objectively be interpreted. This, however, does not signal any lessening in resolve that this nation will remain in full conformity with its treaty obligations. (U)

What our recent analyses have led me to believe is that, while the ambiguities involved could permit the technical, legal debate to continue, our initial and unilateral assertions about what the ABM Treaty did restrict concerning advanced defensive technologies is not clearly demonstrable in the terms of the treaty as written, nor in the associated negotiating record. Our assertions about this portion of the Treaty were not, at the time, shared by our negotiating partner. Rather, the record indicates that they were resisted by the Soviet Union. These assertions reflected more our hopes for what could result from the Treaty, made in the context of our assumptions about the future at that time, than an objective assessment of what was achieved and mutually agreed by the signed Treaty document. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret. Reagan initialed the top of the document. McFarlane distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Meese, Casey, Crowe, and Adelman under cover of an October 11 memorandum: "The President has issued the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-192) providing his decision on the ABM Treaty and the SDI Program." (Ibid.)

All this being said, over the last two years and working under the constraints as we interpreted them at the inception of the program, our technical community met my guidance and has designed our SDI research program to conform to a more restrictive view of our ABM Treaty obligations. This has entailed some price with respect to the speed of our progress, the overall cost of the program, and the level of technical uncertainty we face at each step in our research. But, nonetheless, they have crafted a program which, if consistently supported with the appropriate funding as requested, will permit us to achieve the goals set for it. (C)

I have carefully evaluated the price that the U.S. must pay for keeping our SDI program within the bounds of our current plans. I have weighed these costs against our overall national security requirements. Based upon this I have decided that, as long as the program receives the support needed to implement its carefully crafted plan, it is not necessary to authorize the restructuring of the U.S. SDI program towards the boundaries of Treaty interpretation which the U.S. could observe. This being the case, the issue of where exactly these boundaries should lie is moot even though in my judgment a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. (S)

The U.S. SDI program will continue to pursue the course currently set for it by my previous guidance. Under this course, there can be absolutely no doubt of the U.S. intention to fully meet its treaty commitments. As we do so, we will continue to demand that the Soviet Union correct its behavior and come into full compliance with its obligations, especially in those cases like the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar and their telemetry encryption, among others, in which there are no grounds for doubt about their non-compliance. In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, our clear and principled restraint with respect to our own SDI program, and the price we are prepared to pay in exercising that restraint, demonstrates by our deeds, our sincerity towards negotiated commitments. (C)

I can envision that in the future the day will come when our research will have answered the questions necessary to permit us to consider going beyond the restrictions that we have and will continue to observe under the current research program. At that time, based upon the conditions that we and our allies face and the behavior of the Soviet Union in the interim, the United States will have the opportunity to reassess the guidance that I have set forth in this document. At that time, in accordance with long-standing U.S. policy and after consultation with our allies, we will discuss and, as appropriate, negotiate with the Soviet Union in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty. (C)

Ronald Reagan

77. **Note From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**¹

Washington, October 11, 1985

SUBJECT

Discussion with UK Embassy.

After finally returning the call from Sir Oliver Wright to you, I began to get a series of calls from John Kerr (Political Officer at the Embassy) who, it was clear, was under instructions to make sure HMG's views were known tonight!

He offered the following points:

1. Sir Oliver very much wished to talk to you since he was directed to do so by Howe—and also to go to State—to inquire about your remarks last Sunday on *Meet the Press*.² Sir Oliver did not want to give the impression of going around you—but he did have to contact State (Armacost). He wants to talk to you as soon as possible to explain.

2. Kerr provided HMG's views, as he did State (Holmes), as follows:

— Your remarks on *Meet the Press* have caused increasing concern in that it appears they signal a new interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— HMG welcomed the assurances of the President that the SDI program would be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. This welcome reflected certain understandings underlying the 4 Camp David points and reflected in the second point (SDI deployment is a matter of negotiation).

— HMG had not expected any reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty; nor had it been aware that one was under consideration.

— HMG sees two immediate disadvantages in such a reinterpretation:

1. It could reopen debate within the Alliance, including about Allied participation in SDI just when consensus appeared to have been reached on the basis of the 4 Camp David points. This new and potentially contentious debate would come just prior to the Gorbachev meeting.

2. It would hand the Soviets a new propaganda weapon and could be perceived as calling into question the US commitment to preventing the erosion of the ABM Treaty—at least suggesting the commitment was not as firm as it had been thought.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² October 6. See footnote 2, Document 69.

3. HMG would hope that it, and other SDI supporting allies, would have been able to consult before such a step is taken. HMG's legal experts would be interested in understanding the legal basis for such a reinterpretation—but the real issue is Allied unity on the run up to the summit.

3. Kerr concluded that the Ambassador is particularly worried about his personal relationship to you based on what he was instructed to do today and his inability to contact you. He asked again, in Sir Oliver's name, for a call at your earliest today.

78. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, undated

NON-ZERO-SUM GAME/41 (PER NGC)

On Friday, October 4, at a meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group chaired by Bud, Fred Ikle and Richard Perle pushed hard for an SDI program that, in my opinion, would go beyond the broad interpretation of the provisions of the ABM Treaty.² In particular, they argued that deployment, not just development and testing, of systems and components based on OPP was permitted.

An extended discussion ensued, in which I argued that the broad rather than the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty was fully justified but that that did not mean complete freedom from all constraints on the testing, development and deployment of systems and components based on other physical principles. Bud indicated that he supported my position, and in particular decided that deployment was not permitted, but also said that we would return to the subject the following Tuesday. During the night I worried about my part in the discussion of that day. What worried me was that, though I had won the non-deployment issue, I had not made clear another concern. That was that, even though I was confident the Soviets had never committed themselves to the narrow interpretation in a manner which they would consider binding on themselves, as a result of our recent report to Congress and discussions with Mrs. Thatcher and other Allies, we were in a position where we should not implement a decision on the

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal File 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. No classification marking. Prepared by Clyne.

² See footnote 1, Document 64.

broad interpretation without full prior discussion with the Congress and with our Allies. On Saturday morning I drafted a memorandum to Bud clarifying my position. This was in anticipation of the Tuesday meeting, to which Bud had referred the previous day, and at which I would not be present; I had already been directed to be in Europe for Allied Consultations on the day of the meeting.

The next day, Sunday, October 6, Bud appeared on "Meet the Press." He announced, in response to a question, that only deployment of SDI was foreclosed. The ABM Treaty, he said, "does indeed sanction research, testing, and development of these new systems."

I immediately informed Secretary Shultz of what happened. I also revised my Saturday memo to take account of Bud's TV appearance. In the revised memo I recommended that we assure the Congress and our Allies that we would not implement an expansion of the scope of the SDI program beyond the narrow interpretation.

At a meeting of the National Security Planning Group later, the Secretary persuaded the President to adopt an amended position; i.e., that the permissive interpretation of the Treaty was fully justified, but that the United States would continue to observe the more traditional interpretation. NSDD 192 was issued accordingly.³

³ See Document 76.

79. Editorial Note

On October 14, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz delivered an address, "Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security," before the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco. In describing the relationship between the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva and the Strategic Defense Initiative, he asserted: "Our research program is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles. The treaty's text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since that time are subject to differing interpretations. Because of the great potential contribution that SDI could make to our security, and because of our interest in a rigorous implementation of the ABM Treaty by both sides, we have devoted much attention to the question

of how to interpret the treaty. It is our view, based on a careful analysis of the treaty text and the negotiating record, that a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. This is, however, a moot point; our SDI research program has been structured and, as the President has affirmed last Friday, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultations with our allies and to discussion and negotiation, as appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty." (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1985, pages 21–25) President Ronald Reagan had signed NSDD-192, "The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program," on Friday, October 11. (Document 76.)

On October 15, at the same forum in San Francisco, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze delivered an address, which included a section on the nature of SDI: "Let me be clear as to exactly what SDI is. SDI is a research program that is investigating the feasibility of new defensive technologies, both Earth and space based. The program is and will continue to be conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty. The treaty's text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since 1972 have been variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing, as well as what kinds of research, are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principals." "Should SDI prove new defensive technologies feasible, by indicating that defensive systems can meet demanding criteria of survivability and cost effectiveness, we believe the strategic balance could be made more stable by greater reliance on such defenses. Survivable and cost-effective defenses could so complicate a potential attacker's planning for a first strike that such an attack could not be seriously contemplated and deterrence would thus be significantly enhanced. Additionally, such defenses could render a continued offensive buildup futile. Looking to the more distant future, strategic defenses might make an important contribution toward the eventual elimination of nuclear arms. Achieving that ultimate objective would, of course, presuppose a much more cooperative overall East-West relationship, one in which, for example, efforts to establish conventional force balances at lower levels and to enhance mutual confidence should also prove fruitful. Even should all nuclear arms be eliminated, the technical knowledge required to make such weapons would remain, and we would need to deal with the danger of cheating or exploitation by irresponsible elements. Non-nuclear defensive systems would serve that purpose." ("SDI: Its Nature and Rationale," Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1985, pages 69–71)

80. **Memorandum From Robert Linhard, William Wright, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**¹

Washington, October 15, 1985

SUBJECT

SACG, Tuesday, October 15, 4:30–5:30 p.m.

Changed Agenda. We had planned to devote the majority of today's SACG to an update on the DoD Report originally tasked for November 15.² In fact, at three previous meetings you had asked DoD to complete its work by today (October 15) so that we could have time for other agencies to comment on the report prior to its submission to the President. This early submission could also serve to defuse any "event" being created by the arrival of the report just prior to the meeting in Geneva in November. Richard Perle has informed us that the report is not yet ready (or written), and that he has nothing more to add with respect to an update today. This being the case, we have reshaped the agenda for today's SACG.³

Objectives of the SACG. The objectives of today's restructured SACG would be to:

1. clear the air concerning the ABM interpretation issue and discuss how the President's decision can be best presented to the press and Congress (especially in upcoming Congressional hearings);
2. discuss the most recent Soviet proposals (especially the radars issue) and how the USG should evaluate these ideas; and
3. reestablish an agreed and firm schedule for coming to closure on certain outstanding actions, notably the DoD Report and the MBFR decision.

Agenda. The agenda for a SACG meeting today would simply include the three major items cited above: (a) presenting the President's decision on the *interpretation of the ABM Treaty*; (b) evaluating the most recent Soviet proposals; and (c) finalizing a plan for *closing on outstanding actions*.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SACG (Senior Arms Control Group) Meeting—10/15/1985. Secret. Sent for action. An unknown handwrote at the top of the memorandum: "RCM Has Original." Linhard's handwritten notes of the October 15 meeting are *ibid*. No minutes were found.

² See Document 51. On the report, see Document 83.

³ Poindexter drew a bracket in the left-hand margin beside this paragraph and wrote: "Bob Linhard. My bet is that Perle will never be ready. I believe Cap plans to send this report direct to Pres. without any interagency review. JP"

— An agenda is provided at *Tab A*.⁴ Supporting talking points are at *Tab B*.⁵

Agenda Item 2—ABM Treaty Interpretation. The intent is to use this time to clear the air regarding the NSDD. Defense (Perle) has indicated that his debrief of last Friday's⁶ NSPG included consensus with adopting the broader interpretation. We feel that it will be useful to meet this head on by reviewing the decision and the public handling aspects before any misperception develop.

— We would suggest that you review the NSDD (*Tab C*)⁷ to ensure that all concerned understand the content of the decision. We can anticipate that there will be some complaints about the decision and the problems caused by this decision. Richard Perle will be most vocal on this score. You need to hear these and attempt to use this discussion as an opportunity to put this issue behind us.

— This done, you can solicit ideas on how best to present the decision to the press, allies and Congress. A copy of the Q&As which you approved for use is provided at *Tab D*.⁸ You may wish to review these also. Additional guidance to the NST delegation should also be discussed.

Agenda Item 3—Soviet Informal Proposals. Yesterday Karpov provided two informal proposals (*Tab E*)⁹ to Ambassador Tower on an "urgent" basis. The first involved an offer to halt construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar in return for a halt to the Thule/Fylingdales upgrades. The second was an interim INF missile agreement in which the U.S. would limit GLCMs to 100–120 in Europe and the Soviets would reduce LRINF warheads in Europe to the sum of U.S., U.K. and French warheads, plus freeze SS–20s in the Eastern USSR. Backstopping guidance (also at *Tab E*) is negative on both proposals. It will be useful to discuss this approach with SACG principals.

Agenda Item 4—Pending Items. At today's meeting, we need to arrive at a firm plan for moving forward on two key actions.

— The November 15 report from OSD should have been ready in draft today. Our reading is that Richard Perle will not be prepared to distribute the draft. This being the case, we recommend that you ask for a status report and indicate that if the report is going to have any impact prior to the November 19 meeting it must be worked before November 15.

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ Not attached.

⁶ October 11.

⁷ Not attached. See Document 76.

⁸ Not attached.

⁹ Not attached.

— The MBFR IG's Option Paper should be arriving during the day (State now supports UK/FRG position) and SACG should have MBFR discussion at next meeting, with NSC meeting probably required to follow.

UNGA Speech. With only 9 days remaining until the UNGA speech, you may receive questions about its status.

Recommendation

That you use the approach outlined above, and the supporting agenda (*Tab A*) and talking points (*Tab B*), in conducting the SACG on Tuesday, October 15.¹⁰

Concurrence: Ron Lehman, Steve Steiner and Jack Matlock

¹⁰ Printed from a copy on which McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

81. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 16, 1985

Dear Bud:

Attached is the proposed revision to NSDD 192² on the ABM Treaty that you and I have discussed. I will be glad to try to respond to any questions or points you may have in connection with it.

I do think it is important that we try to correct some of the various versions of the President's decision that seem to be surfacing now.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Cap

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-87-0008, Box 4, USSR 388.3 (Jul-Oct) 1985. Secret.

² See Document 76.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, undated

In NSDD–192 I gave further guidance with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the relationship between our obligations under the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the SDI program. I sought therein to make clear that (1) the ABM Treaty does not restrict the research, development or testing of ABM systems or components based on “other physical principles”; (2) that the Treaty itself and the record of negotiations, both of which have been carefully analyzed by government counsel from several executive branch departments, support this interpretation; and (3) that more restrictive interpretations of the ABM Treaty, whose validity had previously been argued, had never been accepted by the Soviet side during the ABM Treaty negotiations.

I also consider the question of Treaty interpretation to be irrelevant to the immediate issue of American compliance since the SDI program, as currently constituted, was made to conform to the earlier interpretation. Thus the U.S. SDI program, consisting of research, development and testing now funded and programmed, is fully consistent with both interpretations of the ABM Treaty including even the more restrictive interpretation which I do not accept as correct.

The issue has arisen as to which interpretation will be applied as the progress of the SDI program offers opportunities to advance toward a successful conclusion through development and testing activities prohibited by the restrictive, and no longer followed interpretation, but permitted under the less restrictive interpretation that government counsel have advised me is valid and proper.

Therefore I have concluded the following:

First, all presently planned activities will continue to be made to conform to the earlier and more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Second, future planning, short of actual programmatic activity, need conform only to the less restrictive interpretation identified in point (1) of paragraph one of this directive.

Third, programmatic activity pursuant to the above point, as distinct from planning for such activity, will be approved in future only upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense with my concurrence.

³ Secret.

The fundamental purpose of the SDI program remains the earliest practicable determination of whether advanced technologies ultimately can provide for us all freedom from attack by nuclear ballistic missiles.

82. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, October 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Implementing NSDD 192 (U)

I have read and considered your short note and proposed revision to NSDD 192.² You are right that we should ensure that everyone sings from exactly the same sheet of music with respect to this decision. However, I don't want to add either additional complexity to the score or volume to its performance at this time. (C)

There should be no doubt that my goal is to achieve the objectives which we have set out for the SDI program, and to do so efficiently. NSDD 192 makes clear that I intend to pursue the US SDI program as currently planned. (S)

The priority that both you and I have placed on this vital program has not, must not, and will not change. I intend to ensure that the SDI program succeeds, and that we pursue the program in a sensible manner. (U)

I announced my intent to exercise the restraint specified in NSDD 192 based upon the judgment that the program, as currently structured, will permit us to answer the technical questions necessary to achieve the objectives set for it. I also recognize that conditions (Congressional funding, Soviet behavior, etc.) do change, and new technical opportunities will arise. I take your point that we certainly must guard against failing to consider the opportunity costs that may be involved as we follow the path of restraint that I have laid out. (C)

Therefore, while the primary focus of planning should remain on successfully pursuing the SDI program as currently structured, I would

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-87-0008, Box 4, USSR 388.3 (Jul-Oct) 1985. Secret. A stamped notation indicates Weinberger saw the memorandum on October 21.

² See Document 81.

like you to provide a regular appraisal of the costs that we can anticipate as a result of our continuing to operate under the guidance provided in NSDD 192. These appraisals should be provided to me on quarterly basis during the last month of each quarter. (C)

Ronald Reagan

83. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 13, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

On June 10, 1985, when you announced that the U.S. would go “the extra mile” to give the USSR time to correct its Treaty violations,² you asked us, in National Security Decision Directive 173,³ to give you an analysis of Soviet violations of arms control and other treaties. You also asked me to recommend incentives we might provide to the Soviets to correct their violations and, should such corrective action not be forthcoming, to effect appropriate and proportionate responses to those violations.

I am attaching Part One⁴ of this report you requested, together with an executive summary covering its main points. The report’s principal conclusion is that Soviet violations are continuing and require an appropriate and proportionate response on our part. The Joint Chiefs generally feel that your Strategic Modernization Program, as announced by you in October 1981, and the conventional and readiness improvements requested in your budgets would constitute the “appropriate and proportionate response” if fully funded by the Congress. I tend to agree with this opinion but, of course, Congress has made many cuts in your requests.

The Soviet violations put us in a particularly vulnerable and dangerous position when these violations are compared with the sharp reductions in our requests for Strategic Defense funding. We all feel

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 838, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R #158–169 (12). Secret. The letter was printed in full in the November 16 edition of the *New York Times*.

²Reference is to Reagan’s “Message to Congress Transmitting a Report on Soviet and United States Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,” June 10, *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 744–745.

³See Document 47.

⁴Attached but not printed is “Responding to Soviet Violations Policy Study, Part I,” undated.

that it is essential to move as rapidly and effectively as possible on SDI because Soviet violations do give them an advantage which makes it very difficult for us to maintain a deterrence balance with them.

Of course, their violations also constitute a powerful argument for getting the deepest possible cuts in nuclear arms by agreement, if we can secure agreements that bring us to parity at these lower levels and are thoroughly verifiable. Also, as we approach budget time for next year we may want to consider a supplemental for this year of more than 3 percent growth next year to compensate in specific ways for these violations. We will present to you on your return from Geneva a range of options for appropriate responses. I will be glad to take up with you the responses we can make within various classified programs.

If I may be permitted, I would like to mention a few other points here:

In Geneva, you will almost certainly come under great pressure to do three things that would limit severely your options for responding to Soviet violations:

- One is to agree to continue to observe SALT II.
- The second is to agree formally to limit SDI research, development, and testing to only that research allowed under the most restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, even though you have determined that a less restrictive interpretation is justified legally. The Soviets doubtless will seek assurances that you will continue to be bound to such tight limits on SDI development and testing that would discourage the Congress from making any but token appropriations.
- Third, the Soviets may propose *communiqué* or other language that obscures their record of arms control violations referring to the "importance that both sides attach to compliance."

Any or all of these Soviet proposals, if agreed to, would sharply restrict the range of responses to past and current Soviet violations available to us. A pledge to continue to adhere to SALT II, even though the Soviets are violating it, could make it difficult, if not impossible, to do other things we should do to make up for their violations. We can, of course, continue to observe parts of SALT II, at your option, but a pledge to continue observing it all, could put rigid constraints on your ability to respond to Soviet violations.

Also, such a pledge would require us to dismantle far larger numbers of modern weapons than the Soviets over the near-term. (See pages 1–4 of the attached Annex A.⁵ This annex indicates the dramatic disparity between our respective dismantling requirements. Essentially, the U.S. would have to dismantle between 1320 and 2240 MIRVed ballistic missile warheads by 1991, whereas the Soviets would have to dismantle only

⁵ Annex A to "Responding to Soviet Violations Policy Study, Part I" is attached but not printed.

about 558 ballistic missiles, of which just 112 would be MIRV systems. Because Soviet modernization processes can go on, the net effect would be thousands of additional USSR warheads by the early 1990s.)

Any agreement to limit the SDI program according to a narrow (and, I believe, wrong) interpretation of the ABM Treaty—a Treaty which the Soviets are violating under any interpretation—would diminish significantly the prospects that we will succeed in bringing our search for a strategic defense to fruition.

Communique or other language that enables the Soviets to appear equally committed to full compliance—even as they continue to enlarge their pattern of violations—will make the difficult task of responding to those violations even more problematic.

Geneva offers the opportunity to underline the importance we attach to strict compliance with arms control agreements previously made. And it will help to build the foundation on which any proportionate response must be based.

My report to you emphasizes that our failure over the years to respond promptly to Soviet violations can only encourage them to commit more—and more significant—violations. It is significant that you are the *first* President to report to Congress violations by the USSR that have continued for 20 years. The verification the Soviets have agreed to in the past is no substitute for actual compliance. This simply emphasizes that determined action to avoid a double standard, in which we comply and the Soviets do not, is as necessary as it is difficult.

Very respectfully,

Cap

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan⁶

Washington, November 13, 1985

SUBJECT

Responding to Soviet Violations Policy (RSVP) Study

This memorandum responds to the several issues on which you requested comment in National Security Decision Directive 173. It is an executive summary to which is attached the full report. As I mentioned

⁶No classification marking.

in my cover letter to you of today, I will be glad to discuss with you some specific things we might do to respond to these violations. The most important thing we can do is press for full funding for SDI in the Congress. The report is an analysis of the pattern and significance of Soviet violations, the prospects for reversing them in Geneva, and some lessons of the past and for the future.

First, if I might be permitted, a preliminary word about history, Soviet violations, and what they mean to us. The full report makes clear that the Soviet Union has been violating with impunity its principal arms control agreements with the United States. From the beginning, many felt that the Soviets used the arms control process to obscure their planned offensive buildup, weaving into the fabric of the SALT I and ABM Treaty the loopholes and ambiguities that they would later rely on to becloud or extenuate their violations. That pattern of Soviet behavior continues to this day.

LESSONS

The lessons that I believe emerge from our analysis are as follows:

First, our original assumptions that the Soviets would not violate agreements, because the political repercussions would not be worth any possible gain, have been proved false. The Soviets have, in many cases, violated treaty provisions for small, even marginal gains. The deployment of several dozen SS-16 missiles at a test facility is a case in point. So is the insignificant number by which the Soviets have exceeded the SALT II ceiling on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the protracted delays in dismantling systems as required by the Treaty.

Second, there will always be very strong pressures to ignore violations rather than abandon treaties—or even to respond proportionally, and the Soviets know this.

Third, a failure to respond immediately to small infractions often encourages larger ones.

Fourth, verification is not a substitute for compliance. It is vital to know what the Soviets are doing and to be able to judge when violations take place. But verification does not guarantee compliance. Some of the most troubling violations are also the most easily verified. The Krasnoyarsk radar and the SS-25 are examples of violations that the Soviets must have known we would detect.

Fifth, the Standing Consultative Commission, the body assigned to deal with violations, has failed to gain Soviet compliance and will continue to do so. Indeed, it has, I think, generally discouraged more effective measures to gain Soviet compliance by pushing compliance issues into the recesses of a languid, confidential and ineffective forum.

Sixth, as we attempt to negotiate deep reductions in offensive forces the advantages to be gained by cheating will become proportionally greater.

Seventh, it is essential to recognize that the Soviets will exploit loopholes and ambiguities and that their presence in even carefully drafted agreements is unavoidable. This is because the Soviets resist precision and we have a history of acquiescing when they do so.

Eighth, it is easier to fall into a double standard of compliance than to avoid it. Without fear of contradiction at home the Soviets are able to deny violations. We are not. As a democracy we are rightly unwilling (and unable) surreptitiously to violate agreements. Even the decision to make a response proportional to Soviet violations requires great political courage, particularly if violations are not challenged early. Indeed, you are the first President to decide to do so and you can expect considerable controversy over any specific proportional response that you choose to make.

Ninth, violations can only be deterred by responding to them in ways that are more costly to the Soviets than the gains they expect to achieve through cheating. Establishing that we will respond, that we will impose costs at least equal to the benefits of Soviet violations, has been made more difficult by years of indifference and Congressional preoccupation with defense cuts. None of this is to say we should not try urgently and patiently to get the arms reductions agreements you and others want. It is to say there are many problems ahead.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

Following is a more detailed summary of the report itself, which, while long, is so because it traces the history of our arms negotiations relationships with the Soviets, and it does provide, I believe, useful background for any new set of negotiations. I hope you will not consider it too negative, or too lacking in hope. I have great hopes myself, based on my certain knowledge of how much you want agreements that will reduce arms.

Your Veteran's Day address at Arlington⁷ was a most eloquent statement of why we must continue to try to secure agreements for real and deep reductions that preserve our ability to maintain deterrence at much lower levels, and leave us free to pursue your better way to peace—the SDI—and, above all, agreements that are truly verifiable.

⁷ Reference is to Reagan's "Remarks at Veterans Day Wreath-Laying Ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery," November 11, *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 1366–1368.

This is a noble quest and you are rightfully pursuing it with my total support. But it is essential, I believe, that we all be aware of how many pitfalls there are, based on the history of Soviet past behavior. We have called attention to their behavior, trying (with only moderate success) to stimulate interest and understanding on the part of Congress, the American people, and the allies, and urging (with no success) the Soviet government to cease and desist.

In our current negotiations with the Soviets, we have worked to devise positions that take account of the verification and compliance problems we have faced in connection with existing treaties. But these steps, however sensible, cannot impose a substantial cost on the Soviet Union for its violations; even more important, they have not negated the special military advantages the Soviets have created for themselves through their violations.

A failure on the part of the United States to respond strongly to the Soviet Union's policy of treaty violation would damage our interests in various ways. It would signal the kind of uncertainty and political weakness that invites adversaries to put one further to the test, and it could be taken as recantation of our findings of violation, thereby undermining our credibility. A more tangible ill effect would be the consolidation of the military gains the violations have afforded the Soviet Union in fields such as offensive strategic weaponry, strategic defense, and biological warfare.

Moreover, a less than forceful response to the violations would undermine any serious diplomatic endeavor to improve the U.S.- USSR relationship, in the arms control and other arenas.

It may appear paradoxical that the key to improved U.S.- Soviet relations is a vigorous response by us to Soviet treaty violations. But it is no more so than the observation that the key to domestic peace is a police force ready to exert itself to preserve the law.

THE PAST AS PRELUDE

History has repeatedly demonstrated that violations of international obligations feed on themselves; the violator tests and judges the reaction to each violation before moving on to the next. This was certainly the experience of the Allied Powers in the period between the wars as Hitler probed to its abject limit the unwillingness of France and Britain to respond to a widening pattern of German treaty violations.

Thus was massive German rearmament permitted to take place, on the land, at sea and in the air, in violation of legally binding treaties. From small German violations great battleships grew.

The failure of the democracies in the 1930s had little to do with the verification of illegal Nazi rearmament. The transformations of

Boy Scout troops and police precinct units into Wehrmacht divisions, or the conversion of flying clubs into Luftwaffe squadrons, were not deceptions put over on an unsuspecting allied intelligence establishment. They were, on the contrary, clever devices to give those bent on appeasing the Nazis a pretext for inaction.

To those, like Churchill, who saw the consequences of acquiescing in German rearmament, the evidence was clear enough. But for those who were not prepared to act because action required sacrifice and large defense expenditures, always unpopular in democracies, there was ample scope for inconclusive debate over the interpretation of law and intelligence.

And so there is today. Failure to object or respond to violations will invite further violations, many of which are already foreshadowed by national intelligence estimates.

THE PATTERN OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS AND U.S. RESPONSES

The failure of the Johnson,⁸ Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations to respond seriously to the many Soviet violations that took place during their tenures led to the situation you confronted when, in 1984, you became the first President in five Administrations to find the Soviets in violation of a number of important provisions of several arms control agreements, many of which had gone on for years before you called attention to them.

The United States might not be faced with the Krasnoyarsk radar today if, more than a decade ago, we had effectively protested the construction, also illegal under the ABM Treaty, of a Soviet radar at Kamchatka. Although the two violations are quite different in nature (Kamchatka was not nearly so serious militarily), it is likely that the ease with which the U.S. Government acquiesced in the Kamchatka violation in 1975 emboldened the Soviets to approve the Krasnoyarsk project probably in 1977 or 1978.

In concluding and implementing treaties with friends and allies we assume good faith. Our friends and allies rarely craft loopholes, ambiguities, or definitional imprecision as devices to distort the plain intent of the parties and recapture concessions apparently made by them during the negotiating process. Disputes, when they do arise, are

⁸ During the Johnson Administration the Soviets began the practice of conducting underground nuclear tests in a manner that frequently caused venting of radioactive material into the atmosphere in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. American protests, some 32 of which have been lodged with the Soviets since 1965, became a secret ritual scorned by the Soviets. The most recent such Soviet violation of the LTBT took place on 27 October 1984. Twenty years passed from the time of the first unequivocal evidence of Soviet venting before you, in February 1985, publicly disclosed these chronic violations. [Footnote is in the original.]

generally settled by negotiation in which the original intent of the parties is a crucial factor in the resolution.

In dealing with the Soviets, however, our experience has been quite different. In SALT I and II and the ABM Treaty, the Soviets insisted on formulations calculated to excuse subsequent actions of precisely the sort the agreements were understood to curtail. And since the agreements were signed, the Soviets have made prodigious use of the loopholes and ambiguities they argued for.

None of this is to say that it will never be possible to get a good arms reduction agreement with the Soviets that is in our interest. Indeed, I think you are in a better position to do this than any previous American president because we *are* strong and the Soviets know you are perfectly able and willing to work for good agreements and not be pressured into bad ones.

EXPLOITING LOOPHOLES AND AMBIGUITIES

The most important example of Soviet exploitation of loopholes, drawn from SALT I, has to do with the deployment of the SS-19, a large, MIRVed Soviet ICBM. Central to the SALT I agreement was a prohibition on the conversion of launchers for light missiles into launchers for heavy missiles. The Soviets successfully resisted U.S. efforts to nail down the definition of the terms "light" and "heavy," claiming that the distinction was "obvious to everyone." Because there then existed one missile, the SS-9, vastly larger than any other deployed on either side, the Soviets encouraged the view that since both sides understood the SS-9 to be "heavy" and the several smaller missiles then deployed to be "light," there would be no problem of distinguishing the two types during the period of the Interim Agreement.

While this issue was under discussion the Soviets delayed (in order to conceal it from the U.S.) the flight test and silo construction program of a new ICBM. Once the agreement was signed, the Soviets launched the first test flights of the SS-19, which turned out to have three times the destructive potential (throw weight) of either side's largest "light" missile. It was as if one party to an agreement limiting the sides to specified numbers of feathers and bricks secretly piled up stones and then argued that because stones are not bricks they must be counted as feathers. We now know that the aura of good faith with which the Soviets enveloped the American negotiators was intended to allay the sort of skepticism that might have led us to insist on precise definitions of such terms as "light" and "heavy."

In building a loophole large enough for the SS-19, the Soviets calculated that the U.S. would eventually acquiesce in a *fait accompli*. They could not have anticipated how scant a protest we would make or how readily the Nixon Administration would plead the Soviet case in order to contain the complaints of Senators who had been told in hearings

that the United States would regard as “heavy” any missile larger than the “light” missiles deployed when the agreement was signed.

Looking back on the deployment of the SS–19 in 1975, it would be hard to fault the Soviets for concluding that the United States would accept without effective protest any Soviet action that could be excused, however disingenuously, by invoking a convenient loophole or ambiguity. And if one can call a rock a feather and get away with it, why not say an early warning radar with a substantial ABM potential is a radar for space tracking and build it at Krasnoyarsk? Such has been the evolution of Soviet non-compliance.⁹

VIOLATIONS THAT EXPLOIT U.S. INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS

In 1985, the Soviet Union commenced deployment of the mobile SS–25 and thereby violated a provision of the SALT II Treaty limiting each side to the deployment of only one new type of ICBM.¹⁰ [3 lines not declassified] The SS–25 is a new type of ICBM in every respect, including measurable characteristics by which the Treaty defines new types. Particularly troubling is the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS–25 since it is likely to be applied to additional new types of ICBMs identified by U.S. intelligence but not yet flight tested. For this reason, a failure to respond effectively to this violation will almost certainly invite additional violations in the future.

In 1979, proponents of the SALT II Treaty stressed the importance of the new-type limit on modernization. They argued that, with the Treaty, the Soviets would be limited to one new type of ICBM while, without a Treaty, several were expected. A third possibility—that the Soviets would sign the Treaty, violate it and wind up with several new types nonetheless—never figured in the ratification debate, although there was a good deal of discussion about whether the new-type limitation was verifiable.

The evolution of the one-new-type limitation in the SALT II negotiations is instructive. The United States proposed banning all new types of ICBMs. The Soviets insisted that one be permitted and that provision be made for the modification of older types. We conceded both points. There followed a lengthy negotiation aimed at defining the sort of modification that would be allowed for older types of ICBMs.

⁹ A new CIA report confirms that the Krasnoyarsk radar is *not* suited for the purposes claimed for it by the Soviets but is indeed an early warning radar. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ The Soviets had earlier formally notified us that the SS–X–24 was to be their one permitted new type of ICBM. [Footnote is in the original.]

The constraints finally agreed to under Soviet pressure were narrowly defined. All along, our intent for the one-new-type limit and the associated rules covering allowable modification was to restrict severely the Soviet freedom to bring out a new missile in the guise of modifying an old one. In the end, the Soviets twisted the Treaty's intent and then violated it so as to permit the development of at least two new types. What had begun as a *cul de sac* ended up a superhighway leading to the development of a whole generation of new and substantially more capable intercontinental ballistic missiles.

VIOLATIONS EXACERBATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS

We think U.S. efforts to obtain a Soviet pledge to refrain from the encryption of test data telemetry almost certainly alerted Moscow to the importance of telemetry as a source of intelligence about Soviet military programs. [4 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

During the SALT II ratification debate, the Senate was particularly forceful in asserting the importance it attached to Soviet compliance with the limitations on telemetry encryption. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Treaty included the following statement:

. . . Any practice with regard to the transmission of telemetric information during the testing of strategic arms limited by the Treaty, including but not limited to the failure to transmit relevant telemetric information, which results in impeding of verification by United States national technical means of any provision of the Treaty, will be raised by the United States in the Standing Consultative Commission and if the issue is not resolved to the satisfaction of the United States, the United States reserves the right to exercise all other available remedies, including, but not limited to, the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

The Administration and Congress alike understood that a violation of the encryption provision would have profound consequences for U.S. intelligence and could undermine the many Treaty provisions whose verification depended on access to Soviet test data. Here again we are faced with a violation which, unless reversed, is certain to diminish still further our ability to monitor Soviet activities and to verify their compliance with Treaty obligations.

KRASNOYARSK AND TERRITORIAL DEFENSE

Of the many violations of the USSR's arms control obligations, the most serious includes, but is not limited to, the large Soviet phased-array radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk. For associated with that radar is a variety of other violations, some of the spirit or intent, others of the letter, of the complex constraints in the ABM Treaty aimed

at preventing the deployment of a territorial defense involving a nationwide anti-ballistic missile system.

While the evidence is not conclusive, there is good reason to be alarmed at the combination of Soviet development of readily-transportable radars, significant upgrading of the Moscow ABM system, the testing of air-defense components in an ABM mode, the development (and testing) of air-defense missiles capable of intercepting ballistic missile warheads and the completion of a network of large phased-array radars of which the radar at Krasnoyarsk is a part. Taken together, these activities, some reaching back into the early and mid-1970s, could indicate the beginning of Soviet territorial defense against ballistic missiles.

The central restriction of the ABM Treaty is the limit it places on the deployment of large phased-array radars. Because they typically take five-to-seven years to build and are the pacing element in an integrated defense system, these highly visible large radars were severely constrained in the 1972 Treaty. Once deployed, these radars form the essential infrastructure to which interceptors and smaller radars might be added, expanding incrementally the capacity of the system as a whole to detect, track and intercept U.S. or allied warheads launched in retaliation against Soviet targets.

That the Soviets are today poised for such a development is a consequence of a pattern of violations, many of which must have been planned during and in the period immediately following the ABM Treaty negotiations. It is likely that the Soviets will continue further to refine the air defense components and transportable radars necessary to make full use of the large phased-array radar base that is now nearing completion—a base that greatly exceeds that planned by the United States for deployment of the Safeguard ABM system abandoned in the aftermath of the ABM Treaty.

THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

SALT I and II and the ABM Treaty all provided for a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for the drafting of technical implementing agreements and the resolution of compliance issues. It consists of representatives of the U.S. and Soviet Union who negotiate on the occasion of their meetings. Its deliberations are secret.

Contrary to the claims often made for it, the SCC has failed to resolve any significant compliance issue in the approximately 1,500 days that it has been in session over the last 13 years. A less productive forum for the resolution of disputes would be difficult to find.

Far from resolving disputes over compliance, the SCC has become a diplomatic carpet under which Soviet violations have been continuously swept, an Orwellian memory-hole into which our concerns have

been dumped like yesterday's trash. Unwilling to face up to a mounting record of Soviet violations, successive administrations have consigned our concerns to the SCC where they have been "discussed," often for years on end, with wholly unsatisfactory results.

Violations raised by the U.S. in the SCC were dealt with in slow motion while they continued and until they had run their course, at which time they were declared to have been resolved. A good case in point is the Soviet program for testing air defense components in an "ABM mode" in violation of the ABM Treaty. Well over 100 suspicious tests were conducted over twelve years while the SCC painted an attenuated arabesque that served to obscure their continuation. When their tests were completed the Soviets announced, and the United States gratefully received, the news that they would cease. Even this dismal result proved ephemeral; after a brief interval, the Soviets resumed the prohibited tests—and back we went to the SCC.

Our Administration has been the first to acknowledge the ineffectiveness of the SCC, and the first one willing to report publicly Soviet violations.

There are those who believe that the inadequacies of the SCC can be overcome by a redoubled effort. I believe this misses the essential point about the SCC. If the Soviets comply with agreements, the issue of violations will not arise in the SCC or anywhere else. If they wish to violate them, they will not be deterred by semi-annual meetings of the SCC. The SCC is merely a forum for discussion, a date and place and list of attendees. While, in theory, it could be used to dispel misunderstandings, misunderstanding is not the source of Soviet behavior; rather, Soviet behavior is motivated by a desire to gain advantage and the SCC is powerless to affect it.

A constituency has developed around the SCC composed, as is the SCC itself, of Soviets and Americans who believe that violations of agreements must not be permitted to become prominent features of the arms control dialogue. Only a clear declaration from the President that the SCC has failed offers any prospect that we will find the will and opportunity to make the appropriate responses that will create incentives for Soviet compliance and disincentives to Soviet violations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PATTERN OF VIOLATIONS

The current and future Soviet violations pose real risks to our security and to the process of arms control itself.

The Krasnoyarsk radar together with other indications suggesting a possible future territorial defense could have a profound impact on our strategic deterrent forces. Even a *probable* territorial defense would require us to increase the number of our offensive forces and their ability to penetrate Soviet defenses to assure that our operational

plans could be executed. The deployment in significant numbers of the SS–25 (which is now well underway) will erode deterrence by allowing the Soviets to contemplate a first-strike using their fixed ICBMs, while retaining intact a reserve force of mobile systems resilient to counter-attack. [4 lines not declassified]

These few examples are illustrative. For each of the violations that you have reported to the Congress there are associated risks to our security. When violations of the spirit of past agreements are added to the list—the deployment of the SS–19, the conversion of ballistic missile launching submarines to cruise missile launching submarines, and the like—the cumulative impact on our security is deeply troubling.

We believe modernized strategic and conventional forces and vigorous SDI research present the strongest message to the Soviets in response to their treaty violations. Such U.S. forces and research also provide the best hedge against future Soviet threats. There are a number of military programs which have been cancelled or reduced due to budget constraints. These reductions could have a significant effect on our deterrent capability. Thus, our priority response should be to implement fully these programs. I will be prepared to discuss our options for proportionate responses upon your return from Geneva.

I think it is still possible to obtain, by patient negotiation with the Soviets, verifiable agreements that make sharp reductions, down to parity, in the nuclear arsenals. Both powers' strategic defense remains, however, as the greatest single long-range hope of mankind.

Cap Weinberger

84. Editorial Note

On November 14, 1985, President Ronald Reagan convened a meeting of the National Security Planning Group in the White House Situation Room from 11:05 to 11:56 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) An agenda and draft talking points for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane are in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, NSPG: 1985. No formal minutes were found. Preparatory memoranda and studies in advance of the summit are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 116, 117, 119, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, and 132. On November 16, President Reagan flew to Geneva, where he visited the meeting facility and called upon the

President of Switzerland, before meeting Gorbachev for the first time on November 19. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Memoranda of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev's encounters that day are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, and 155.

On November 20, Reagan and Gorbachev met privately from 10:15 to 11:25 a.m. and in a plenary session from 2:45 to 3:30 p.m. at the Soviet Mission. Memoranda of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 156, 157, and 158.

Following the final plenary session between the U.S. and Soviet delegations the afternoon of November 20, 1985, President Reagan and Nancy Reagan hosted Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev and Raisa Gorbacheva for dinner at the Maison de Saussure in Geneva, from 8:00 to 10:30 p.m. After-dinner conversation among President Reagan, Secretary General Gorbachev, Secretary of State George Shultz, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko focused on the content of the joint communiqué to be issued the following morning. According to the memorandum of conversation, "Gorbachev said he thought he did not completely understand all the differences with all of the documents, but in any event he spoke to his people to the effect that he wanted everyone to get his act together and somehow iron out these last minute difficulties in regard to these issues. President Reagan said that he and Gorbachev were meeting for the first time at this level. They had little practice, since they had never done it before. Nevertheless, having read the history of previous summit meetings he had concluded that those earlier leaders had not done very much. Therefore, he suggested that he and Gorbachev say, 'To hell with the past,' we'll do it our way and get something done. Gorbachev concurred." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 159.

Throughout the night of November 20, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway and Soviet Foreign Ministry official Aleksandr Bessmertnykh negotiated the substance and wording of a joint statement. No formal memorandum of conversation was found. According to Shultz's memoir, this negotiation lasted until approximately 6:00 a.m. on November 21. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 605) Later that morning, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan delivered remarks to reporters upon issuing the "Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva," which noted their earlier agreement "to improve U.S.-Soviet

relations and the international situation as a whole,” and “to meet again in the nearest future.” The statement also noted: “The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint U.S.-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability. Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pages 1407–1410)

On November 21, President Reagan flew from Geneva to Brussels to brief North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies on his meetings with Gorbachev, and then to Washington that evening. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

JCSM-410-85

Washington, November 26, 1985

SUBJECT

Response to Soviet Violation Policy (U)

1. (S) On 24 September 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided² initial military advice regarding responses to Soviet violations of arms control agreements. We stated that the Strategic Modernization Program (SMP) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) were developed with

¹Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC-330-87-0008, Box 3, USSR 388.3 (Nov-Dec 1985). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Weinberger saw it on November 27. Printed from an unsigned copy; however, another copy of the memorandum indicates that Crowe signed it. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 838, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R 169-180 (14))

²JCSM-329-85, 24 September 1985, “Response to Soviet Violation Policy.” [Footnote is in the original.]

full recognition of past and foreseeable Soviet violations. Therefore, adequate funding to support the full capability of the SMP and the potential of the SDI, coupled with continued modernization of US conventional forces, would constitute a proper and effective response to Soviet violations.

2. (S) Since 24 September 1985, the OJCS has reviewed an extensive list of options developed from Service inputs requested³ by ASD (International Security Policy). The review confirmed that balanced and modernized strategic and conventional forces, which are designed to overcome future Soviet defenses (with or without violations) and to deter for the long term, continue to offer the best military response to Soviet violations. For example, there are a number of high technology programs in research that could be accelerated by full funding into production. Additional responses, even those that may offer a measure of military utility, must not be adopted at the expense of the President's balanced overall modernization program.⁴

3. (S) Further, if additional funding is expected from Congress, priority should be given to the restoration of the full SMP. If properly orchestrated, restoring these programs would send a strong and appropriate signal to the Soviets and to US allies that the United States will take the steps necessary to ensure deterrence in the face of Soviet violations even during periods of budget austerity. The full SMP will be particularly important if arms control negotiations should result in greatly reduced strategic force levels. It should be noted that JCS certification of the US proposal for a 50-percent arms reduction was based on the assumption that the SMP will be executed essentially intact.

4. (S) We recognize the political controversy associated with responding to Soviet violations and the temptation to express US anger in a dramatic fashion. Nevertheless, in the face of the significant FY 1986 budget cuts being considered by the joint conference on defense appropriations, we cannot support additional programs at the expense of the long-term, coordinated strategic and conventional modernization.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

³ ASD (ISP) memorandums, 20 June 1985, "DOD Group on Mutual Interim Restraint." [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ Weinberger underlined and drew two short vertical lines to the left and right of the sentence: "Additional responses, even those that may offer a measure of military utility, must not be adopted at the expense of the President's balanced overall modernization program."

86. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 27, 1985, 12:30–1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze's Meeting with Richard Perle

We first discussed the RSVP report.² I said my original reaction to the Kamchatka radar section was that it differed entirely from my memory of the episode; I had asked my staff to dig out the records; to my surprise the record fully supports the RSVP statements, not my recollection. Perle said he had had exactly the same experience. This resulted in extended interchange concerning the strange and complicated methods of Kissinger's scheming.

We then discussed the origins of the SCC's conception. I stressed the point that neither the Soviets nor we wished to surrender to any independent body decisions vital to its security and that I continued to support this position. I had also wished to make the discussions in the SCC confidential; that did not mean governments couldn't take their full case to the public; but they should not in public quote what had been said in the SCC. As I saw it the failures re compliance were in the nature of the problem, budgetary problems, congressional problems, shortcomings in our own handling of the problems and Soviet intransigence and trickery. I did not see what the point was in belaboring the nature of the institution; I did not see an organizational solution to the problem. Perle seemed to agree.

Perle then turned to Part II of the RSVP report which has not yet been prepared (or at least circulated). He wanted my ideas as to what should be done. I said I had not given much thought to the matter; I had just finished reading Part I.

He then outlined a number of things which could be done. One was to go to the Congress with a list of supplemental budgetary requests to cover programs necessary to offset, at least in part, Soviet violations. Another was to not phase out, but to recore, Poseidon submarines. This would cost something like \$160,000 per R.V. per year over a ten-year operational life, as opposed to ten to twenty times as much for MX or D-5 RVs. He said the Services were opposed because the Poseidon had no prompt hard target kill capability. This got us into an extended discussion of the issues involved. Another idea was that of using the

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis and Exdis Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D092, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: November 1–30, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Metropolitan Club.

² See footnote 4, Document 83.

100 or so “excess” MM IIIs which are stored and will not be used unless deployed. If deployed they could free up MM IIs which have a variety of uses for space launch.

We then had an extended discussion of why he thinks the Soviets are preparing for an ABM breakout to a territorial defense and the steps we should be taking to counter this possibility.

I then got into a step-by-step discussion of my thoughts as to an NST strategy for preparing for the second summit. He agreed with the British and French point, the INF point, the START point, the verification point, and most of the points related to SDI. He continued to differ with me about heading into a clarification of the dividing line between permitted and prohibited development and testing. He thought we would run a danger of cutting off work necessary to keeping defense industry interested in the program.

87. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Taft)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Further Actions on Soviet Arms Control Violations (U)

1. (S) Following our discussion this morning, I convened the JCS and we met with Mr. Perle and Dr. Ikle.² We discussed at some length possible responses that go beyond the objectives the JCS had previously considered. Some promising possibilities may exist that blend the Chiefs’ concern for military effectiveness with the diplomatic impact that is necessarily of interest to the Administration.

2. (S) We intend to proceed in the following way: the Joint Staff will work with Richard Perle’s people as they formulate the second part of the RSVP paper owed to the President. That way we all are assured that the DoD paper has the benefit of the considerations that seem most pertinent to the JCS. At the same time, we intend to develop a JCS

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 838, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R. #169–180 (14). Secret. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Taft saw it on November 29.

²No formal minutes were found for either discussion.

Memorandum that supplements our JCSM 410–85 of last Tuesday³ and responds explicitly to your expressed interest in responses to Soviet violations that are themselves noncompliant.⁴

3. (U) The Chiefs and I have discussed this at length and are of one mind. Admiral Watkins will be the Acting CJCS next week, and I will be in touch and will remain helpful in any way that is necessary.

William J. Crowe, Jr.

³ November 26. See Document 85.

⁴ An unknown hand inserted the handwritten notation “including some” between the words “violations” and “that.”

88. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Watkins) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

JCSM–415–85

Washington, December 6, 1985

SUBJECT

Response to Soviet Violation Policy (U)

1. (S) In accordance with your recent request,² the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed possible responses to Soviet violations. Two previous JCSMs³ on this subject described our thoughts on the importance of modernization.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff find several options which provide military utility and potential leverage to influence Soviet behavior:

a. (S) Accelerate penetration aids and antitactical missile (ATM) program funding to move from research to production as soon as feasible. In light of the potential for Soviet ABM territorial defense and the clear violation of the ABM Treaty by the Krasnoyarsk radar, these compliant measures could be taken to frustrate Soviet efforts to counter our strategic and theater nuclear deterrent posture.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 838, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R. #169–180 (14). Secret.

² Not found; see, however, Document 87.

³ References: JCSM–329–85, 24 September 1985, “Response to Soviet Violation Policy” JCSM–410–85, 26 November 1985, “Response to Soviet Violation Policy”. [Footnote is in the original.]

b. (S) Implement telemetry encryption of future tests of strategic reentry and PENAIID systems. This noncompliant measure would impede Soviet monitoring of system testing.

c. (S) Place POSEIDON SSBNs in decommissioned, defueled and inactive status for up to 1 year rather than following the dismantling procedures in the SALT I agreement. This would violate central limits of SALT I and SALT II. This would, in turn, give the United States the flexibility, conditioned on Soviet actions, to redeploy SSBNs, dismantle the SSBNs later, or use the SSBNs for other military purposes.

d. (S) Deploy 50 additional MINUTEMAN III missiles in MINUTEMAN II silos. While this would violate a central MIRV limit of SALT II, it is reversible. Limiting deployment to 50 missiles is necessary to maintain the MINUTEMAN III assets required for a balanced reliability testing program.

e. (S) Provide accelerated funding for chemical protective measures to include shelters, alarms, clothing and masks to protect ground forces in the field. These measures have military utility in countering Soviet violations of international conventions on the use of chemical weapons.

3. (S) While POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN launchers may prove to have utility in Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) Programs, there are significant technological and service-life problems to be resolved, and it is too early to confirm that these are viable options. However, while evaluating SDIO usefulness of these launchers, we could delay the dismantlement of POSEIDON.

4. (S) We know that you will consider the following factors:

a. (S) Implementation of any option that would violate the central limits of the SALT agreements, limits which the Soviets have observed during force modernization, could be viewed by many as an escalatory reaction rather than an appropriate and proportionate response. In short, the political risk associated with being the first to noncomply with these central limits could be significantly greater than the leverage accrued by maintaining these systems. This is particularly noteworthy in light of their marginal military utility, in the overall force context.

b. (S) Noncompliant options could place public, congressional and allied support for modernization programs at risk. Retention of older systems, which provide only a marginal addition to US warfighting capabilities, could impact on force modernization plans, and allied backing for needed intermediate-range nuclear force and conventional force modernization could be damaged by undercutting central limits.

5. (S) It should be noted that FY 1986 supplemental actions could create binding, long-term financial obligations which would affect the desired balance between strategic and conventional programs. The impact of such supplemental actions could be seriously exacerbated by future budget reductions.

6. (S) In summary, although our fundamental position remains that continued, balanced force modernization provides the most effective military response to Soviet noncompliance, the compliant

and noncompliant responses cited above are feasible and offer some military utility. The question remains whether the influence of these responses on Soviet behavior will be offset by political ramifications and ultimate erosion of our modernization program.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

James D. Watkins
*Acting Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff*

89. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 10, 1985

SUBJECT

Meeting with Richard Perle

Perle met with me for 1-1/2 hours Monday² morning. Max Kampelman joined us during the latter portion of the discussion.

I began by raising with Perle the question of how the Pentagon proposed to take the cuts in the defense budget which were implied by probable Congressional action on the deficit. I said I raised this issue first because I thought it important that our arms control policy be coordinated with our military acquisition and deployment policy. I suggested that the importance of maintaining our strategic deterrent justified giving it a certain priority over our conventional forces which represented some 85% of the defense budget.

Perle said he thought reductions were possible in the strategic budget. I asked him for details. He said he thought the acquisition of the advanced technology bomber could be stretched out and that the Midgetman program, which could cost some fifty billion, could be cancelled. He argued that the MX could be carried in a hardened canister and moved amongst a large number of cheap silos and that this would

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis and Exdis Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D092, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: December 1–31, 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

² December 9.

be more cost effective than the Midgetman. I expressed my doubts as to the reliability of that solution.

We then turned to the issue of "appropriate and proportionate response" to the Soviet SALT violations. He described the discussion that he and Weinberger had had with the JCS on the issue.³ Weinberger had proposed a package including recoring the two Poseidon submarines which otherwise will have to be deactivated and dismantled this coming year and eventually using them as SLBM submarines, deploying 50 of our excess Midgetman IIIs in place of Midgetman IIs and releasing Midgetman IIs for use as needed operational test vehicles, a start of a needed chemical weapons program, and a supplemental budget request of one billion dollars. The budget request had originally been thought of as a three billion dollar request but Weinberger thought that it was unlikely the Congress would restore funds that they had previously cut; the one billion dollar request is what remained after that portion of the request representing restoration of previous cuts had been eliminated.

Perle said that Admiral Watkins did not wish to decide now what will eventually be done with the two recored Poseidon submarines; the options were eventually to restore them for use as SLBMs, to use them for purposes that Abrahamson had in mind in connection with SDI the program, or to fit them out as SLCM carriers.

I said that I thought one should pay careful attention to the political aspects of the decision, including the probable impact on the Congress, with our allies, and vis a vis the Soviet Union. Perle agreed. I said I proposed to discuss these matters with Allen Holmes.

We then turned to certain of the NST issues.

I asked him whether he had talked to Abrahamson about a solution to the "offensive weapons in space" problem. He said he had and that Abrahamson thought there were solutions to the problem. I asked whether I could speak to Abrahamson about that during his (Perle's) absence from Washington. Perle agreed. We then had an extended discussion about the problem of the transition after which I gave him a copy of the paper that I had given to McFarlane last June. At that point we ran out of time. We agreed to meet when he returns from Europe for the entire morning of December 23rd.

³No formal minutes were found.

90. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 16, 1985

SUBJECT

Midgetman Briefing

Brigadier General Edward Barry, Program Manager for Midgetman, and Greg Hulcher, his principal analyst came in to brief us on the current status of his program. He first briefed us on the missile; it would weigh from 30–37 thousand pounds and carry a payload of 1,000 to 1,300 pounds, to a range of 6,000–7,700 nautical miles. The Congress has specified a maximum weight of 30,000 pounds but probably would approve 37,000 pounds. The higher weight would permit not only a high precision guidance system for a single re-entry vehicle but also throw-weight adequate for the addition of penaids or a MARV. Baseline deployment would be on Department of Defense/Energy (DoD/DoE) land in Southwestern United States. It would involve a mobile transporter/erector/launcher (TEL) vehicle capable of speeds up to 50 mph and whose hardness would be 7 PSI when in motion; its hardness would be 30 PSI when the TEL was in “protect” position. In peacetime the TELs would be located randomly on DoD/DoE installations on a road network covering 5,500 square miles. With 6–9 minutes of tactical warning, they could be deployed over an area of 11,000 square miles by moving at least a mile in or a mile out from that road network. With strategic warning of 23–32 minutes they could be dispersed over a wider area of at least 22,000 square miles.

The attached chart² summarizes General Barry’s analysis. The costs are stated in terms of acquisition and annual operating costs and are in 1982 dollars; costs would be approximately 20% higher in terms of 1986 dollars. Related to these dollar costs are estimates in personnel required to operate the system. The analysis considers various assumptions as to size of the deployment area, warning time, concurrent Soviet allocation of SLBMs to attack, CEP’s, etc.; it analyzes the cost to the Soviets to achieve 90% damage expectancy in terms of SS–18 equivalents; each SS–18 is assumed to be capable of carrying 14 RVs.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986, Arms Control Mtg. Secret; Sensitive. Michele Bova (S/ES) initialed the memorandum and wrote “17 Dec.”

² Attached but not printed is a November 29 chart, “Basing and Operation Alternatives.”

You will note that the baseline case, assuming a 10 to 30-minute warning time (which we should receive from a large scale SLBM plus ICBM attack), would cost the Soviet Union 560 SS-18 equivalents plus 8 submarines fully loaded with depressed trajectory SLBMs—700 SS-18 equivalents without submarines. Thus, the Soviet requirement would be 7,800 high performance ICBM RVs plus some 1,600 SLBM RVs. Under any of the reduction proposals put forward by either side, this would be an impossible requirement for the Soviets to fulfill. The other alternatives in this analysis, either for basing the Midgetman or the MX, did not perform as well. Super hardened silos for a small missile are too expensive for the large numbers involved. A “carry-hard” deployment mode for 500 small missiles, dispersed among 3,000 holes can be defeated by increased accuracy, optimum fractionation and by imperfections in the deceptive basing involved. The alternative basing modes for 50 Peacekeepers can also be defeated with a smaller Soviet allocation of SS-18 equivalents, but the combination of dense-pack and MPS would demand an attack spread over from 3 to 7 hours for the Soviets to place two RVs on each silo timed to avoid fratricide. There are several 20-minute gaps in these time periods during which our missiles might be able to launch while Soviet attacking missiles couldn’t get through the ejected debris which had not yet come down. In all cases, the risk of pin-down needs to be considered.

Our briefers thought the best option for the basing of 50 Peacekeepers was in the revised “shallow tunnel” scheme. The tunnel would be twice as deep as that considered and rejected during the Carter Administration.

Barry’s analysis indicates that the baseline Midgetman deployment could impose a requirement for 20 times as many offensive RVs dedicated to the attack as the number of the defender’s RVs it could expect to destroy. An analysis based on throw-weight used and destroyed produces comparable results.

The next day I discussed these issues with John Stenbit of TRW. TRW holds the systems engineering contract for MX, but also works on the Midgetman program.

Stenbit put more emphasis on the political and cost problems associated with General Barry’s baseline case. He emphasized that it calls for four separate deployment areas. He doubted whether four states would support such a deployment; the defection of one or two would significantly weaken the scheme. He also emphasized that the mobile missiles must be kept on virtually continuous alert. Their deployment would be comparable to aircraft alert, not silo alert. The Air Force wouldn’t be happy with tying down 14,000 to 17,000 competent drivers and technically trained people on this type of task and, over time, would skimp on maintaining readiness. He preferred the carry-hard scheme because it required only one to two thousand square miles and degraded gently to delays in moving missiles from one silo to another.

He also argued that it was, in principle, difficult to defeat a highly MIRVed system with a single RV system. The single RV system would be preferable to a MIRVed system if both sides got rid of their MIRVs, but, if the Soviets refused to give up their MIRVs, it would cost us twice as much per survivable RV for a single RV system than for a protected MX deployment mode. He did not present a detailed analysis to support that analysis.

He made the additional point that a carry-hard MPS deployment mode could get a twenty-to-one multiplier effect from preferential terminal defenses. The mobile deployment mode is vulnerable primarily to a barrage attack which degrades only on a one-to-one basis as terminal interceptors are added.

We will check further to refine this analysis. I would appreciate questions which you would wish us to clarify.

91. Letter From the Science Advisor to the President and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (Keyworth) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 17, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Beginning with your second, foreign-policy debate with Walter Mondale and, again, in many of your public comments before the Geneva talks, your repeated emphasis on “sharing” the fruits of the SDI with the Soviets has prompted me to explore the implications of that concept with our White House Science Council, Bill Casey and a number of defense experts. Before I conclude as your science advisor, I want to offer you my thoughts on this subject. I believe sharing the SDI represents an opportunity to bring about the new stability you seek and to banish the cobwebs of tortured logic that have encumbered so much of the public debate on strategic defense.

A trend of eroding stability began in the 1960s with the advent of the counter-force era—the introduction of missiles so accurate that the opponent’s hardened silos could be targeted with confidence. This new precision, combined with large numbers of warheads deliverable

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Steven Steiner Files, Arms Control File, 51—AC/SDI (01/25/1986–01/31/1986) (VI). No classification marking.

with MIRV'd missiles, ushered in the "window of vulnerability" and the attendant perception that a preemptive first-strike is possible.

Modernization of U.S. strategic forces was an essential step toward stemming—but not toward repairing—the eroding stability. Your SDI offers today the only opportunity to repair the diminished stability that counterforce weapons introduced. To fully appreciate the role of the SDI in this picture, one need only imagine a world where strategic defenses are prohibited. One could only attempt to stem the erosion, with no hope of repair. Without the SDI, the situation would be analogous to entering a competition with plans only to avoid losing, rather than planning to win!

Let me now be more specific about how SDI could be shared. And pardon my brief lapse into a technician's perspective.

Imagine strategic defenses to be divided into two types—what I will call "global" and "sovereign". Global defenses are the main thrust of the SDI program, the so-called boost-phase defenses that are designed to destroy the missiles themselves, shortly after launch. The term "global" is chosen because all targets on the globe would share in the protection, wherever they may be—whether Washington, Moscow, Peking or Baghdad. In contrast, sovereign defenses are those more traditional defenses—terminal defenses—that are designed to protect silos or, perhaps, cities. The U.S.S.R. is currently developing both types, whereas the principal emphasis of the SDI is to explore opportunities for the global, boost-phase defenses that could make ballistic missiles effectively obsolete by making them simply unreliable as delivery systems. And it is these global defenses that, to me, capture the essence of your original purpose for beginning the SDI, as well as providing tools that could be shared to repair the erosion in the nuclear balance.

You have proposed to share the technology of SDI, the components of SDI and, more directly, to share strategic defenses. I suggest that your goal can best be met by sharing the *control* of strategic defenses—and by using the Summit discussions with Mr. Gorbachev to develop *joint management of global defenses*. And this could be put forth as a logical extension of Paul Nitze's Strategic Concept as the *Joint Strategic Concept*.

The objective of the Joint Strategic Concept would be to ensure that neither side perceive the adversary to possess a first-strike capability. The tools of joint management would not be the defenses themselves, but rather their control mechanisms. Let me elaborate.

Any global defense system presently envisioned would comprise a number of elements, including those for launch detection, aiming and tracking, battle management and interception. But the *control* mechanism would require an enablement switch, presumably under control of the chief executive—you. That is, you would possess the authority to enable those defenses if and when heightened tensions or indications

of actual attack preparations should be indicated. Upon enablement, control would be transferred to computers, whose instructions are codified as “software”—a set of pre-defined instructions that determine the nature and extent of a missile attack and how best to deploy the defenses to negate the attack. A U.S.-U.S.S.R. project to jointly develop the software to use their and our global defenses to destroy any missiles that represented an act of aggression, be they U.S., U.S.S.R. or third-country in origin, would ensure that any act of nuclear aggression would be deterred. Further, accompanying a proposal for joint oversight or joint development of the control software with a proposal to share the enabling switch itself—so that you, Mr. Gorbachev or other national leaders could, if threatened, enable those shared defenses—would serve to place ballistic missiles in a category with smallpox. Just as sharing smallpox vaccine has made smallpox virtually obsolete, sharing global missile defenses could render ballistic missiles obsolete.

Such a proposal, radical as it may at first appear, can be achieved simply by recognizing that defenses are not threatening. Each side could continue to possess and control its own defenses while achieving additional benefit from participating in joint management of all global defenses. That is, each side could only benefit from compliance. And compliance could be readily verified by random tests. A number of test launches, simulating real attacks, would permit any party to enable the global defenses and to exercise the defenses to verify the jointly developed control software. Thus, sharing defenses in this manner can be accomplished safely, without risking our own security. And the fundamental difference between the non-aggressive nature of defenses and the more threatening nature of our present dependence on offense for deterrence would be starkly revealed.

I believe the lack of appreciation of the significance of your proposal to “share SDI” arises from an emphasis upon not losing, rather than upon your emphasis upon seeking stability. And it is further encumbered by “fuzzy” thinking about arms control, resulting from decades of failed expectations, and from inattention to just how easily and practically sharing could be accomplished. Your own recent accomplishments at Geneva have shown to many skeptics that a new beginning in arms control is possible. You have refocused the negotiations onto the essential, but often obscured, goal of achieving nuclear stability. The message that I received was that you are committed to restoring a *stable* balance and to reducing the awesome role that nuclear weapons play today in our view of the world—not just in a relative-number-of-missiles game. In your future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev, sharing SDI can, I believe, maintain focus on that sole essential—stability. It can allay, or even negate his expressed fears of an

eventual U.S. first-strike capability. And it can capture the support of free people at both ends of the political spectrum by clearing away the cobwebs that flexible response, SALT I, the ABM Treaty and a generation of failed expectations for arms control have woven.

Mr. President, I believe your offer to share SDI with the Soviets and further, with the world, would both strike at and remedy the moral dilemma that the nuclear age presents and that the counterforce era has worsened. I also believe that the present emphasis upon developing global, or boost-phase, defenses to destroy whole missiles shortly after launch, rather than to attempt to intercept warheads among thousands of decoys during just seconds before they strike, offers us the opportunity to manage jointly with the U.S.S.R. the inevitable obsolescence of the very ICBM's that have so eroded the stability our citizens expect. You have an opportunity to retain the arms control focus where it belongs—on stability—and to step up to the line and truly manage the nuclear dilemma.

With great respect,

G. A. Keyworth, II²

P.S. It has been an honor and a pleasure to serve you, and to be even a small part of what Dave Packard called “possibly the most important act of genuine leadership in the twentieth century”—the SDI. I only regret that I was unable to convince Patti that nuclear energy is safe and reliable. Perhaps my successor could be more convincing.

² Keyworth signed the letter “Jay Keyworth” above his typed signature. An unsigned and undated memorandum from Poindexter to Reagan, drafted by Steiner, includes a paragraph: “We certainly agree, as Jay suggests that the primary focus of SDI should remain on the high leverage, boost/post-boost defenses that provide wide area (perhaps global) protection. However, need to think of the consequences of encouraging the Soviets to join with us in a joint development effort which is focused tightly on software development (our strongest suit and the Soviets’ weakest area.) This could be a real one-way street and a significant tech transfer problem. We also need to ensure that such a joint project does not allow the Soviets to embed in it an Achilles’ heel or to learn enough to either negate its use by us or reduce our confidence in our ability to use it if needed.” (Ibid.)

92. Memorandum From Sven Kraemer, Robert Linhard, and William Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, December 17, 1985

SUBJECT

Noncompliance Report—NSDD

The NSDD attached at Tab A² reflects your decisions and notes on the Verification Committee's Decision Memo for the latest report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements to be transmitted Friday, December 20.³ If you approve it, it is ready for you to discuss it tomorrow with the President for his approval and signature.⁴

Presidential decisions are needed urgently at this time in order that we can retrofit his findings and the introductory policy framework into the classified and unclassified reports, as well as to finalize public affairs/diplomacy materials. Such retrofitting requires very substantial additional work and preparation during the next few days, and should be initiated by tomorrow, Wednesday afternoon, December 18. FYI: The Verification Committee is continuing its daily 4–6 hour meetings to meet the December 20 deadline.

Concerning four issues indicated in your notes as awaiting further NSC staff or DCI information, we have checked back with the DCI's representative (Doug George) on each of the issues and have incorporated appropriate recommendations of NSC staff and DCI into the text of the attached NSDD. Specifically:

1. SA-X-12. You had already checked the NSC staff (plus State, ACDA, JCS) recommendation on the issue of ABM capabilities of Modern SAM Systems. The basic finding is not affected by the DCI's note that it was too early to decide the specifics of the SS-X-12 issue since there is more than enough in terms of other systems and agreed SA-X-12 evidence to support the proposed reaffirmation of the February 1985 finding on the SAM ABM capabilities issue.

2. *Use of Facilities at SS-7 Sites* and 3. *Aerial Refueling of Backfire*. In both cases, we confirmed DCI views and earlier NSC staff recommendations.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Staff, Box SR-91, NSDD 202. Secret; Sent for action.

² Printed as Document 94.

³ Not found.

⁴ Poindexter drew two vertical lines in the right-hand margin beside this paragraph.

4. *Throw Weight of an SLBM*. A sentence in NSDD indicates finding on this sensitive issue will be transmitted separately. This involves a codeword issue, handled the same way in the February report, and all agencies have agreed to affirm the February finding.

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

Two other aspects of the attached NSDD deserve special mention. First, the *Introduction* is essentially the same as the chapeau to the report attached to the Decision Memo and represents language almost totally agreed by all agencies. Second, the *Tasking* section at the end of the NSDD picks up on February tasking formulations and adds new tasking formulations worked out by NSC staff (Kraemer) during today's Verification Committee meeting.⁵

While we urge earliest possible Presidential approval and signature of the proposed NSDD at Tab A,⁶ and while we are providing a distribution memo at Tab I for your signature to distribute the approved NSDD to appropriate agencies and officials, we strongly recommend against actual distribution upon the President's signature tomorrow. Instead, NSC staff (Kraemer) will have its elements retrofitted into the report and, as appropriate, worked into (still classified) draft public affairs materials while we double check for typos and possible small inaccuracies on Wednesday, prior to its distribution late Thursday.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you review the proposed NSDD attached at Tab A and if you approve, that you discuss it with the President for his approval and signature.⁷

That if you and the President approve and the President signs the proposed NSDD at Tab A, you let NSC staff know as soon as possible so that we can work with the Verification Committee to complete the text of the classified/unclassified report, appropriate public affairs materials, etc., but that you not sign the distribution memo at Tab I transmitting the report to agencies and officials until Thursday, December 19, giving us an opportunity to check for any small inaccuracies, etc.⁸

⁵ No minutes were found.

⁶ Attached but not printed. See footnote 1, Document 94.

⁷ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

⁸ Poindexter underlined "transmitting the report to agencies and officials until Thursday, December 19," and approved the recommendation.

93. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 18, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

(C) I am attaching the second part of the assessment you asked us to make of Soviet arms control violations and appropriate US responses.² In this report, I am recommending a package of US responses that not only help to ensure our security in the face of Soviet non-compliance but also provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their non-compliance and to abide by future arms control agreements.

(U) Your decision not to impose a double standard—by which we continue to comply with agreements that the Soviets are violating—is essential to protect the future of arms control. If we failed to respond forcefully to the growing pattern of Soviet violations, we would encourage the Soviets to plan and carry out future violations of increasing scope and gravity.

(S) My recommendation to you is that you submit to Congress a supplemental Defense Appropriation, called the Arms Control Compliance Act of 1986, which would provide for four specific initiatives:

- preserving two Poseidon submarines that would have to be cut up in 1986 if we continued to abide by unratified, expired SALT agreements,
- replacing 50 older Minuteman II ICBMs with the more capable Minuteman III missile now in storage,
- implement telemetry encryption of future tests of strategic systems, to deny the Soviets the information they increasingly deny to us, and
- intensify our research for countermeasures to the Soviet biological and chemical warfare effort.

(S) The first three measures would not be compliant with SALT restrictions. We estimate the total cost of these measures is in the range between 480 and a bit over 500 million dollars.

(U) I believe this response to Soviet arms control violations is a measured and prudent way for the United States to react and that it is vital to do to protect the integrity of the arms control process.

Respectfully yours,

Cap

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC-330-87-0008, Box 3, USSR 388.3 (Nov-Dec 1985). Secret.

² For the first part, see Attachment, Document 83.

Attachment**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan³**

Washington, December 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Responding to Soviet Violations: Part II—Programmatic Responses (U)

(U) As I sought to convey in Part I of this report, our previous efforts to persuade the Soviets to comply fully with their arms control obligations have not succeeded. Indeed, the failure of past administrations to respond forcefully to an enlarging pattern of violations has only encouraged the Soviets to violate arms control agreements between us with increasing frequency and in increasingly important ways. We must not tempt the Soviet military leadership to plan on violating future agreements whenever those would interfere with their preferred military programs.

(U) Your statements that we would not permit a double standard—in which we comply with agreements that the Soviets are violating—is fundamental to protecting the integrity of arms control. You have already done much to restore the credibility of our arms control policy. In 1981, you broke with the mistaken but accepted approach that merely legitimized the Soviet build-up, by insisting that the United States focus on meaningful and verifiable reductions. Even the Soviets have now been forced to embrace your concept of sharp reductions, at least in principle, as evidenced at your recent meeting with Gorbachev. Yet, I recall that many critics then used to complain your stance would destroy arms control negotiations.

(U) Today, the time has come to reaffirm that arms control agreements cannot be violated with impunity. By responding meaningfully to Soviet violations we can make clear that cheating is incompatible with real arms control. By demonstrating to the Soviet leadership that they are expected to abide by treaties they sign—or pay the price accordingly—you will have taken the only action which can induce the Kremlin to respect agreements. Our critics, I am sure, will once again warn that this step will “imperil the future of arms control,” or even “subvert the summit.” I am confident they will be proven wrong this time as well.

³ Secret; Formerly Restricted Data.

Designing a U.S. Response (U)

(U) In considering appropriate and proportionate response options available to the United States, we employed several criteria. We concluded that our response must:

- be militarily significant so as to impose costs which the USSR would not have faced had it abided scrupulously by its treaty commitments;
- be consistent with our fiscal realities;
- demonstrate that the United States will not accept a double standard of arms control compliance;
- at the same time, be of a nature such that non-compliant U.S. actions can be reversed and full U.S. compliance re-established if warranted by Soviet action; and,
- be perceived as a measure responding to the Soviet violations, not as an effort merely to restore DoD funding requests previously cut by the Congress.

(C) The JCS, the Services, and OSD, at my direction, reviewed nearly 30 different programmatic responses to Soviet violations. Based on the above criteria, I have decided against recommending further consideration of most of these. We have identified several measures, however, that can be combined to make for an effective and timely response, both by reducing the military danger we and our allies face from those violations, and by providing a meaningful incentive for Soviet compliance in the future.

An Appropriate and Proportionate Response (U)

(S) I recommend that the Department of Defense develop, for your submission to the Congress, a supplemental Defense Appropriation entitled the Arms Control Compliance Act of 1986. A supplemental request would make clear to the Congress that this package represents a special response and must not result in a further diminution of the overall defense budget. To distinguish it further from the “business-as-usual” approach, I propose that we not subject this response to the vagaries of the annual budget process and instead we use multi-year contracting where appropriate, to ensure that funds are provided to cover the entire proposed programmatic measure.

(U) If you approve this recommendation, we will work with OMB to develop legislation in a way so as to manage any problems that might arise because of the Gramm-Rudman Amendment.

(S) The supplemental would include four major initiatives:

- preserving the Poseidon submarines that would have to be cut up in 1986 if we continued to abide by unratified, expired SALT Agreements;
- replacing 50 older Minuteman II ICBMs with the more capable Minuteman III missiles that are now in storage;

- intensifying our research and development effort to understand potential and suspected Soviet biological and chemical warfare agents, and to develop antidotes to and protection from these;
- implementing data denial of future tests of strategic systems, to deny the Soviets the kind of information they have increasingly denied us.

(S) The overall cost of this entire package will amount to about half a billion dollars, and breaks down as follows:

Preserving Poseidon Options	\$334 to 400M
Minuteman Replacement	\$33M
Biological and Chemical Warfare R&D	\$120M
Data Denial	TBD

Rationale of the Proposed Programs (U)

(S) *Preserving Poseidon Options*: The proposed measure preserves the [less than 1 line not declassified] Poseidon boats that would have to be cut up in FY 1986 if we continued to abide by the SALT provisions. At least [less than 1 line not declassified] Poseidon boats are reaching the end of [less than 1 line not declassified] life and these submarines would have been dismantled if the United States continued to abide by the SALT limits on the total number of deployed MIRVed missiles and SLBM tubes (our deployment of the [less than 1 line not declassified] Trident submarine will bring us over these limits).

(S) Instead of cutting these submarines up, they would be defueled and the ships' systems maintained to allow future overhaul. Within [less than 1 line not declassified] after the Poseidons commence shipyard availability, a decision must be made either to reactivate the ships as SSBNs, reactivate and convert the submarines for other military uses, or dismantle/inactivate the ships. This would provide you with considerable flexibility to respond to future Soviet behavior on arms control compliance.

(S) The submarines could not only be used to deploy the [less than 1 line not declassified] that they now carry, but also could be converted by about 1992 to deploy the [less than 1 line not declassified]. Moreover, they could also be converted to a launch platform for SDI. This role would be recognized by the Soviets as militarily meaningful. The flexibility for an SDI role thus could provide significant leverage to encourage the Soviets to reverse their non-compliant behavior. We are, as a matter of priority, undertaking a study to determine the timing and specific merit of these uses of the Poseidon boats.

(S/FRD) *Replacing 50 Minuteman II with Minuteman III*: [15 lines not declassified]

(S) *Intensified R&D on Biological and Chemical Weapons*: In the face of Soviet violations of their treaty commitments concerning chemical and biological weapons, it is appropriate that we enhance our defensive capability. It is not proposed here that we abandon any of the treaty restrictions in this area. In particular, we do not wish to produce biological weapons. But the massive Soviet research and development program, including their testing of new toxic agents, necessitates a greater effort on our part to prepare countermeasures. I am recommending an acceleration in our program to investigate the chemistry and effects of the new Soviet agents, including efforts to identify and synthesize biological and chemical agents or penetrants capable of defeating our current defensive equipment. The objective would be to find countermeasures against these threats.

(S) *Denial of Data from our Tests of Strategic Systems*: We should implement telemetry encryption for our future tests of strategic systems, notably ballistic missile systems, to deny the Soviets the kind of information they have increasingly denied us. Since the Soviets have now resorted to almost total encryption of their tests, in violation of SALT, it is timely and appropriate that we no longer provide the Soviets with our unencrypted test data.

Potential Soviet Reactions (U)

(S) We cannot predict specifically how the Soviet Union will react if we responded to Soviet violations in ways that fall outside of SALT limits. Most probably, the USSR would refuse to dismantle launchers to remain within numerical SALT constraints, in which case their forces would increase slightly, in terms of the retention of older, less effective weapons. While the USSR might take some highly visible action to dramatize the “costs” to the United States of exceeding SALT boundaries, it seems likely that the military threat to the United States would not differ significantly from that which we might face if U.S. responses to Soviet violations all stayed within SALT limits.

(S) Frequently in the past, arms control agreements have been justified which contained inordinately high limits on forces, on the grounds that there would be massive increases in Soviet forces in the absence of such limits. These arguments, however, have not reflected actual estimates by the U.S. Intelligence Community.

(S) For a variety of reasons, it is unlikely that the absence of SALT constraints would cause a surge in Soviet capabilities. For the Soviet Union, the costs of such an expansion would not be matched by increased military benefits. A major surge in strategic systems would not appreciably alter the Soviet Union’s existing capability to destroy the U.S. target base. Investment of the same resources in other areas of Soviet military power could have a much greater practical return.

Conclusion (U)

(S) Responding to Soviet arms control violations with meaningful steps, such as those described above, is consistent with and fully supportive of your proven strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. By demonstrating that we will not accept a double standard for arms control compliance, you will influence not only current Soviet behavior, but future behavior. A response which makes clear that Soviet arms control violations entail real penalties will not only provide leverage to get the Soviet leadership to adopt policies bringing the USSR back into compliance with *existing* agreements—it will also send an important signal to them regarding negotiation and observance of *future* arms control pacts. Finally, a strong response will clarify to our friends as well as to our adversaries that we will not allow Soviet violations to continue unchallenged.

(C) A further attraction of this package is the fact that all of the activities we recommend which are non-compliant, can be reversed should a decision be made to do so in the event the Soviets become fully compliant.

(C) I believe the supplemental package described above offers such a response. It is militarily significant, fiscally prudent, and—if necessary—reversible in those areas involving U.S. selective non-compliance. This package of responses, combined with vigorous efforts towards realizing the potential of SDI and fielding the planned capabilities of the Strategic Modernization Program, would underwrite your goals for the arms talks in Geneva and provide the strength to hedge against the military consequences of Soviet behavior. I recommend that you approve it and instruct us to prepare the necessary legislative initiative.

Cap

94. National Security Decision Directive 202¹

Washington, December 20, 1985

*SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (C)*

In reporting to the Congress on February 7 of this year on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, I stated that:

“In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.” (U)

I further stated that:

“Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.” (U)

The important role of treaty compliance for future arms control was recently recognized by the United Nations. On December 12, 1985, the General Assembly passed by a vote of 131–0 (with 16 abstentions) a resolution on arms control compliance which had been introduced by the United States and other co-sponsors. The resolution urged all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions and called upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament. (U)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–91 NSDD 202. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon; Wnintel. Reagan wrote his initials on the top right-hand corner of the NSDD. Poindexter distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Stockman, Casey, Walters, Crowe, Adelman, Nitze, Rowny, Kampelman, Tower, Glitman, and Ellis under cover of a December 20 memorandum: “The attached National Security Decision Directive reflects the President’s judgments concerning issues reviewed by the Administration and which are the subject of a classified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements being submitted to the U.S. Congress in response to Congressional request. A number of the judgments provided herewith will also be incorporated as appropriate into the unclassified version of the report submitted to the Congress.” (Ibid.)

At the request of the Congress, I have in the past two years provided three reports to the Congress on Soviet compliance issues. These include the Administration's reports of January 1984 and February 1985 and the report of the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. (U)

Public Law 99-145² requires the Administration to provide on an annual basis by December 1 of each year a classified and unclassified report to the Congress containing the findings of the President and any additional information necessary to keep the Congress informed on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. (U)

The current report responds to this Congressional requirement. It is the product of months of careful technical and legal analysis by all relevant agencies of the United States Government and represents the Administration's authoritative updated treatment of this important matter. (U)

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE (U)

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. Through its noncompliance, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. If the yields of Soviet nuclear tests have been substantially above 150 kilotons, then Soviet testing would allow proportionately greater gains in nuclear weapons development than the U.S. could achieve. The possible extent of the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance in the area of strategic defense also is of increasing importance and serious concern. (U)

In a fundamental sense, all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. As violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control, and they darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere. (U)

In another sense, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. While some individual violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some issues that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in the aggregate. (U)

² PL 99-145 is the Department of Defense Authorization Act, which Reagan signed into law on November 8, 1985.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE (U)

At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels. I expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my recent meeting with him in Geneva. (S)

All of the violations, probable violations, and ambiguous situations included in this report and previously reported on have been raised with the Soviets, except for two sensitive issues. The Soviet Union has thus far not provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on these issues, nor has the Soviet Union taken actions needed to correct existing violations. Instead, they have continued to assert that they are in complete compliance with their arms control obligations and commitments. (S)

U.S. POLICY (U)

In contrast with the Soviet Union, the United States has fully observed its arms control obligations and commitments, including those under the SALT I and SALT II agreements. As I stated in my message to the Congress on June 10 of this year concerning U.S. interim restraint policy:

“In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.

“Since then, the United States has not taken any action which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. However, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.

“The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.” (U)

On June 10, I invited the Soviet Union to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive

arms and to pursue with renewed vigor our top priority of achieving deep reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. I noted that the U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone and that it would require the Soviet Union to take positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, to resolve our other compliance concerns, to reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup, and actively to pursue arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations. (U)

In going the extra mile, I have made clear that as an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure our national security and that of our Allies that were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Thus, as I indicated to the Congress on June 10, "appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs." (U)

As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions that the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of those Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements which the Soviets fail to correct. We will carefully study this report as soon as it has been completed. (U)

As we press for corrective Soviet actions and while keeping open all programmatic options for handling future milestones as new U.S. strategic systems are deployed, we will continue to assess the situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance, reversing their military buildup and promoting progress in Geneva. (U)

As we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements, I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress. (U)

THE FINDINGS (U)

A. ABM Treaty (U)

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar (U)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no

corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

2. Mobility of ABM System Components (U)

The U.S. Government judges that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.'s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components (U)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgement made in the February 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM related activities. [1½ lines not declassified] operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate U.S. concerns, indicate the U.S.S.R. probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases, this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. It should be noted that in June 1985, a Common Understanding was signed relating to certain events of this type that may preclude future concerns if observed. (S)

4. ABM Capabilities of Modern SAM Systems (C)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers (C)

The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

6. *ABM Territorial Defense* (U)

The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

B. *SALT II Treaty* (U)

1. *SS-25 ICBM* (U)

a. *Second New Type—Testing and Deployment*: The U.S. Government judges, based on convincing evidence gathered from nearly three years of Soviet testing of the SS-25, that the throw weight of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM exceeds by more than five percent the throw weight of the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and cannot therefore be considered a permitted modernization of the SS-13 as the Soviets claim. The SS-25 (a derivative of the SS-16 ICBM) is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT Treaty. The deployment of this missile during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM. (S)

b. *RV-to-Throw-Weight Ratio*: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS-25 RV-to-throw-weight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-25 is not a prohibited "new type" of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM. (S)

c. *Encryption*: The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the U.S.S.R.'s political commitment. (S)

Despite U.S. requests for explanations and corrective actions with regard to the SS-25 ICBM-related activities, Soviet actions continue unchanged, and the Soviet Union has proceeded to deployment of these missiles. (S)

2. *Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limits* (C)

The U.S. Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs—at a level of 2504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2504 cap in violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with this political commitment. (S)

3. SS–16 Deployment (U)

The President's February 1985 Report to Congress, which noted that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, found the mobile missile activities at Plesetsk in the areas historically associated with the SS–16 to be a probable violation of the U.S.S.R.'s legal obligation and political commitment under SALT II. Soviet activity in the past year at Plesetsk seems to indicate the probable removal of SS–16 equipment and introduction of equipment associated with the SS–25. (S)

4. *Backfire Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability* (C)

a. *Arctic Staging*: The U.S. Government judges that the temporary deployment of Backfires of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) to Arctic bases in 1983, 1984, and 1985, bases used by Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) Backfires since 1975, is cause for concern and continued careful monitoring. By such temporary deployment of SAF Backfires, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment in the June 1979 Backfire statement not to give Backfire the capability to strike targets on the territory of the United States. (S)

b. *Engine Upgrade*: Based on the uncertain evidence available, the U.S. Government judges the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to possible upgrades of Backfire engines (which would contribute to the Backfire's intercontinental capability) as ambiguous in terms of the Soviet Union's political commitment in the June 1979 Backfire statement not to increase Backfire's radius of action to enable it to strike the United States. (S)

c. *Aerial Refueling*: The U.S. Government judges that since the Backfire C is not believed to have a refueling probe, and since those on the Backfire B have been removed, only potential refueling capabilities exist at this time. (S)

d. *Cruise Missile Capability*: The U.S. Government judges that, on the basis of the uncertain evidence available, the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the association of cruise missiles with Backfire are ambiguous as concerns its political commitment under SALT II not to give Backfire an increased radius of action that would enable it to strike the United States. (S)

5. *Backfire Bomber Production Rate* (C)

The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 Backfire bomber aircraft per year. There are ambiguities concerning the data. However, there is evidence that the Soviet Backfire production rate was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until January 1, 1984 and decreased since that time to slightly below 30 per year. (S)

6. *A Soviet SLBM (S)*

This finding is being transmitted separately.³ (C)

7. *Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association (C)*

The U.S. Government judges Soviet activities related to the SS-25 to be a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by the SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing. (S)

C. *SALT I Interim Agreement (U)*

Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites (C)

The U.S. Government judges that Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs at Yurya and Yoshkar-Ola is in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Should the Soviets use "remaining facilities" in the future at other former SS-7 sites where the SS-25 is now in the process of being deployed, such use will also constitute Soviet violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement. (S)

D. *Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol (U)*

The U.S. Government judges that continued expansion during 1985 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 and February 1985 reports that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (S)

There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1985 according to our strict standards of evidence. However, there is no basis for amending the February 1985 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (S)

E. *Threshold Test Ban Treaty (U)*

While ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1985, the U.S. Government reaffirms the February 1985 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the

³ Not found.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continued despite U.S. requests for corrective measures. (S/NF)

F. Limited Test Ban Treaty (U)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action. (S)

G. Helsinki Final Act (U)

The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing prior notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." While the U.S.S.R. has generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information it provides, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was improved in 1983. In 1984 the Soviets returned to a minimalist approach providing only the bare information required under the Final Act. The Soviet Union continued this approach during 1985. (S)

U.S. POLICY RESPONSES (U)

U.S. policy responses to activities of the Soviet Union in violation of its arms control obligations and commitments will include the following: (U)

Reports to Congress (U)

In response to Congressional requests, an unclassified report incorporating a number of the above findings is being forwarded to the Congress and made available to the public. In view of its unclassified nature, this report does not contain issues that have not previously been raised with the Soviet Union. (C)

A classified report, also requested by the Congress, is being forwarded to the Congress simultaneously with more detailed supplementary material to follow as appropriate.⁴ This report, consisting of an Introduction and detailed findings, will cover all issues analyzed

⁴Not found. Reagan transmitted unclassified and classified reports to Congress on December 23. ("Letter to the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate Transmitting a Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements," December 23, 1985, *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, p. 1504)

by the Verification Committee, except that issues of special intelligence sensitivity may be briefed to Congress under special existing intelligence arrangements. (C)

The classified report will form the basis for briefings and consultations with the Congress and our Allies. (C)

Improved Security (U)

Existing and potential Soviet noncompliance will continue to be factored into U.S. force modernization plans in strategic and chemical weapons and in planning for the Strategic Defense Initiative research program in terms of proportionate and appropriate responses to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance as required for national and Alliance security. (C)

Diplomatic and Public Affairs Context (U)

In the appropriate diplomatic channels, to include high-level demarches and discussions, the U.S. will inform the Soviet Union of our conclusions regarding issues included in the unclassified report, and will continue to press for their resolution and for corrective action terminating noncompliance. (C)

This Administration report will be handled in the context of our broader arms control and national security objectives. Compliance will be stressed as essential to the arms control process, and the importance of effective verification and unambiguous provisions in future arms control agreements will be emphasized. In this context, the report shall be made available to the U.S. negotiators in the nuclear arms reduction and space talks in Geneva. (C)

The focus of public, Congressional, and Alliance briefings on compliance issues will be to: build knowledge and understanding about Soviet noncompliance activity; aid in maintaining pressure on the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance activities; develop support for appropriate responses; and direct attention to the need for more effective verification provisions in future agreements. (S)

ISSUES FOR FURTHER WORK (U)

The Arms Control Verification Committee, working with the U.S. Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC), will assist in developing proposals for raising Soviet noncompliance activities in the SCC. (C)

As directed in NSDD-160,⁵ the Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will support the Senior Arms Control Group in assuring comprehensive assessments

⁵ NSDD-160, "Preparing for Negotiations With the Soviet Union", January 24, 1985, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985, Document 369.

of verification issues associated with U.S. negotiating proposals. Such assessments should address the overall effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios), and the possibility of safeguards. As directed in NSDD-121,⁶ the Committee's assessments will apply to non-nuclear, as well as nuclear, arms control negotiation proposals. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will prepare a report on the implications of recent studies of changes in the correction used in the formula relating yields and seismic signals of Soviet yields. This report, to be commented on by the Interdepartmental Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy, will report how these changes affect U.S. policy relating to the Threshold Test Ban and our judgment about Soviet compliance with that treaty. In addition, the Arms Control Verification Committee shall identify new studies and work they deem necessary to satisfy questions concerning compliance and verification aspects of the treaty. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will undertake additional work to resolve outstanding issues discussed in the current report concerning:

- The existence of refueling probes on Backfire C bombers.
- Concurrent operation of:

- (a) ABM radars and ABM missile testing or strategic ballistic missile reentry testing;
- (b) ABM radars and SAM launchers or target flights; and
- (c) SAM radars and ABM radars.

— The role and function of the PAWN SHOP radar to answer the question whether the PAWN SHOP is a true radar. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will provide an analysis through appropriate intelligence channels of the issue of denial of data impeding verification. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will submit recommendations on additional compliance issues of concern to the Administration and/or raised by the Congress which are to be studied. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will submit no later than February 1 a work program for completing work on above issues. (S)

Ronald Reagan

⁶ NSDD-121, "Soviet Noncompliance With Soviet Arms Control Agreement," January 14, 1984, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

95. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Hawes) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 29, 1985

SUBJECT

Proposed Responses to Soviet Noncompliance

SUMMARY

RSVP, Part II, was personally delivered to the President by Secretary Weinberger December 19² and was forwarded to you for comment December 24. The NSC staff has asked for your views by January 10. We have analyzed the OSD proposal and have attached a precis and some preliminary ideas of our own at Tab 1.³ We are preparing separately a Platt/Poindexter Memorandum for your approval. The latter also will address the question of presentation of the President's decision to foreign governments and publics.

Weinberger recommends that the President decide, now, that the U.S. will violate SALT limits in three areas, as a response to Soviet violations. To codify this policy, he proposes that the President request congressional approval of supplemental appropriations to fund the specific steps involved. We believe that:

— There is no need for the U.S. to take any decisions at this point on programmatic steps which might breach SALT limits; the next decision point in this regard will not be met until May when the next Trident SSBN goes on sea trials;

— It is both possible and desirable, on military and political grounds, to design proportionate responses to Soviet violations which do not cause the U.S. to breach SALT limits; some of these are suggested in the attachment;

— It would be politically damaging to supplemental funding to take steps specifically in violation of arms control agreements. In addition to almost certain defeat in the Congress—on both arms control and fiscal grounds—we would hand the Soviets a ready-made propaganda victory; and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Dec. 20 Mtg w the PRES. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Richard Davis and Debra Stogdale in PM/SNP; cleared by Ralph Hallenbeck (PM), James Holmes (PM/SNP), Burton, Thomas, and in substance by Michael Stafford (S/ARN) and Timbie.

² See Document 93.

³ Attached but not printed.

— Any decision which seemed to place us unnecessarily outside SALT limits would erode significantly the current high degree of allied support for our arms control policy. At the NAC Ministerial two weeks ago, your colleagues made clear their interests in continued U.S. treaty compliance.

RSVP Part II

Weinberger recommends that the President adopt a policy which would openly violate SALT numerical limitations and in effect, ask Congress to approve such violations. The vehicle would be a supplemental defense appropriation, called the “Arms Control Compliance Act of 1986”, funding four initiatives. These would:

- Preserve two Poseidon Submarines tentatively scheduled for dismantlement in 1986 to abide by SALT;
- Replace 50 Single-Warhead Minuteman II ICBMS with the MIRVed Minuteman III;
- Implement telemetry encryption of future tests of strategic systems to deny the USSR the information they deny the U.S.; and
- Intensify our research for countermeasures to the Soviet biological and chemical warfare effort.

The total cost of these initiatives—less the cost of encryption which is left undetermined in the OSD proposal—ranges between \$480–500 million.

Weinberger candidly recognizes in his covering letter that the first three recommended measures would not be compliant with SALT. In fact, our analysis indicates the programmatic recommendations were deliberately designed to go beyond the bounds of SALT, and that proposals within treaty limits were discarded. Such a demonstrated willingness to break with SALT restrictions in view of Soviet violations is, in Weinberger’s words, “fundamental to protecting the integrity of arms control.”

Our view is that the President need make no decisions now with respect to interim restraint. Our policy of last June continues until the President determines otherwise. Further, it is not in our interest to scuttle the limits that SALT places on Soviet forces, especially when our own defense budget is coming under increasing pressure. Finally, the legislative course Weinberger proposes would likely prove to be a politically costly battle with Congress—one which the administration probably would lose. Support in Congress for continued interim restraint remains strong, and willingness to increase defense spending in the context of Gramm-Rudman will be limited even for less controversial programs. The joint chiefs will likely agree with our view.

White House Deputy Press Secretary Speakes’ December 23 statement denying the need for an end-of-year Presidential decision on our interim restraint policy should have removed any expectation that the

approach of December 31—when SALT II would have expired—would elicit a change in our interim restraint policy now. However, while the U.S. will not have to make another dismantling decision before late Spring 1986, OSD will continue to argue, as Weinberger suggests in his memo, for an early decision on both interim restraint policy and appropriate and proportionate responses.

We agree that appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet violations are necessary. However, because no decision is necessary now, we believe more careful consideration can and should be given to other programmatic options. When a decision is made on specific measures, it should:

- Not require the President to abandon his overall interim restraint policy, nor weaken our NST negotiating position;
- Be related to the specific military impact of Soviet violations and comprise the steps we need to take to offset that impact; and
- Reflect our willingness to “go the extra mile” so as not to breach treaty obligations. (We do not want to compromise our positions on key issues of Soviet non-compliance, nor diminish the prospect that the Soviets will become compliant in areas of reversible violations, e.g., Krasnoyarsk.)

Criteria for evaluating “appropriate and proportionate” responses are attached at Tab 2.⁴

Preliminary State Ideas

We generally agree with OSD that two specific strategic nuclear issues need to be addressed in our proportionate response—territorial defense and SS-25. However, we have other ideas on how this can be done which are summarized below and addressed in more detail in Tab 1.

Higher profile for anti-ABM programs, Current programs (about \$150 million annually) to develop sophisticated penetration aids, decoys and maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs) as a hedge against future Soviet ABM deployments are appropriate in view of current Soviet ABM efforts; however, their disparate nature makes them vulnerable to the budget process. Increased priority and additional funding, if needed, for these current development programs is an appropriate response to current Soviet ABM development efforts. We should also continue to cite SDI as a necessary response to Soviet ABM development. Another possible response would be to redirect some SDI efforts toward nearer-term ABM deployments to protect our ICBM fields.

Increased profile for counters to the SS-25, The military significance of the SS-25 lies far more in its mobility and its enhancement of the overall Soviet strategic posture than in its status as a prohibited second

⁴ Attached but not printed.

new type of ICBM. Our response to the SS–25 (one already indicated on June 10 as part of our interim restraint decision) should be to continue the development of the Midgetman and other improvements to ICBM survivability. The programs are in place, but they could be drawn together publicly and given higher priority by the President. Calling public attention to the development of the Midgetman would add an element of activism and shield us from accusations that our approach was a “do-nothing” one. Another direct military response to the SS–25 would be to develop the sensors, command and control elements and forces, possibly including additional B–1Bs, to attack mobile or relocatable targets. Such an effort is under study and DOD recommendations in this regard are due to the NSC in April 1986.

Other additions to our strategic offensive forces are possible (e.g., accelerating Trident, converting Poseidon to SLCM carriers, accelerating ALCMs) but the options are expensive and difficult to relate militarily to the SS–25. Self-serving additions to existing programs, especially programs that have already been cut by Congress, would be more difficult to sell on the Hill, e.g., re-selling MX deployments in existing silos. Many of these approaches also have negative implications for our NST proposal. Potential arms control considerations could make service support and Congressional funding problematical.

96. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Whitehead)¹

Washington, December 30, 1985

SUBJECT

Responses to Soviet Non-Compliance

You have both the OSD paper² (called “RSVP” for Response to Soviet Violations Paper) and the EUR/PM commentary on it.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1984. Secret. Whitehead wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “JPT, I agree with your analysis. How should we let these views be known? Should you write a memo to S thru me? JW”

² See Attachment, Document 93.

³ See Document 95.

Weinberger recommends four actions:

- Not dismantle two Poseidon submarines next spring as the eighth Trident submarine goes on sea trials, but refuel them for some future mission.
- Replace 50 single warhead Minuteman II's with MIRVed Minuteman III's.
- Encrypt US missile tests the same way the Soviets encrypt theirs.
- Intensify research on countermeasures to Soviet chemical and biological warfare.

The proposal with respect to CBW deserves our support. In my view, the encryption proposal also deserves our support. We have little to lose by encrypting, since the Soviets already encrypt most telemetry on their new missiles. A US encryption program could lead to a more realistic look on both sides at the question of what test data is necessary for verification of constraints on warhead numbers, throw weight, etc., and how it should be provided. This view is at variance with the EUR/PM memo, and I have conveyed it to Allen Holmes, who will raise it with his people.

The other two proposals (keeping two Poseidon subs and adding 50 MM-III) cause problems:

- Both would violate the 1200 ceiling on MIRVed missiles, one of the central limits of the agreement and one which the Soviets are respecting.
- The OSD paper does not assess the consequences of lifting the constraint on the number of Soviet MIRVed missiles, including the SS-17's, 18's and 19's and submarine launched MIRV missiles.
- The Poseidon refueling would be expensive (over \$300 million) add only small, inaccurate, soft target weapons which are not in short supply, and the boats will reach their 30-year hull life in the early 1990's anyway. The JCS, for this reason, is cool to this idea.
- The MM-III conversion is relatively cheap, but would add a net of only 100 warheads. Its primary purpose would be to break the treaty rather than add significantly to our strength.

A better idea would be to respond to Krasnoyarsk with an intensified program to develop penetration aids (decoys, maneuvering RVs etc.) to hedge against the possibility that Krasnoyarsk may be the beginning of a nationwide Soviet defense. And as the President mentioned last June, our response to the SS-25 as a second new-type ICBM is Midgetman, which could be accelerated.

97. **Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, January 10, 1986

SUBJECT

Meeting Re SLBM Conversion

I had a meeting today with Rear Admiral R. F. Bacon (Navy Staff), Rear Admiral T. E. Lewin (Navy Staff), Colonel R. G. Toye (JCS), and Major R. C. Bogstie (JCS) regarding SLBM conversion. Admiral Lewin first reviewed the history of the SLBM program. 41 ballistic missile submarines were originally deployed. Of those, 9 were deactivated according to SALT rules, including one which last year was deactivated and is being converted into a training ship; *[number not declassified]* others have been converted for use as *[less than 1 line not declassified]* attack submarines and have not been relieved from SALT counting. *[2 lines not declassified]*.

[number not declassified] Trident submarines have been built, of which 5 are in active service *[1½ lines not declassified]* are to be equipped *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. The *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Trident SSBN will go on sea trials in May; this is the event driving the SALT constraint issue. The *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Trident will be the first which will carry *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. The beginning of the *[less than 1 line not declassified]* run is in 1987, with *[number not declassified]* test flights from Cape Canaveral scheduled for 1987–1988. The *[less than 1 line not declassified]* has an IOC of December 1989.

Poseidon submarines were originally scheduled for a *[1½ lines not declassified]* years nominally—nominally means +/- *[1½ lines not declassified]*. The Navy has scheduled *[less than 1 line not declassified]* for overhaul *[less than 1 line not declassified]* of these will take place this year and *[number not declassified]* later. The cost of overhaul *[less than 1 line not declassified]* is approximately *[less than 1 line not declassified]* per boat. The average lifetime *[less than 1 line not declassified]* is estimated to be *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. The actual remaining hull life may be more/less than that *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the actual figure can be determined only after the ship has been opened up for *[less than 1 line not declassified]* overhaul.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986, Arms Control Mtg. Secret; Sensitive. McKinley initialed the memorandum and wrote: "13 Jan."

The Navy has stopped producing [less than 1 line not declassified]. To deploy [less than 1 line not declassified] in the overhauled boats beyond those already programmed would require restarting production line at a cost of \$2 billion. By 1992, however, [less than 1 line not declassified] from those Trident submarines originally fitted [less than 1 line not declassified] which by then would begin [less than 1 line not declassified].

The options and time schedule for preserving for future use the two Poseidon SSBNs now earmarked for dismantling is outlined on the attached chart.²

In the discussion of that chart, the following point came up. The [less than 1 line not declassified] service life noted at the end of the lines might possibly be extended or contracted by [less than 1 line not declassified] depending upon what is learned in the process of [less than 1 line not declassified] overhaul.

The Navy will not certify for continuing safe operation any submarine that had been in an "inactivated" status for more than one year.

With respect to the conversion option, the Navy is not interested in conversion of those submarines for use by the Navy for training purposes. The Navy does not need more training submarines; for cruise missiles, they would prefer to refit [number not declassified] 688 Class attack submarines (SSNs) [less than 1 line not declassified], rather than converting one SSBN [less than 1 line not declassified]—the cost would be about the same [less than 1 line not declassified] and [less than 1 line not declassified] or more remaining hull life could be expected for each SSN against [less than 1 line not declassified] for the SSBN (illustrative only—Navy has no plans for any submarines to be converted for cruise missiles). They would be prepared to convert the SSBNs to such use as the SDI program might have for them.

We also asked Colonel Tøye about the option of deploying an additional 50 Minuteman III in Minuteman II silos. [3 lines not declassified]. Estimated target damage expectancy against hardened targets from the MARK 12 is some [less than 1 line not declassified].

² Attached but not printed is an undated chart, "Preserving Poseidon Boats for Future Use."

98. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 30, 1986

SUBJECT

Kinetic Energy Weapons Experiment

I was briefed today on the SDI Kinetic Energy Experiment scheduled for mid-August. The briefing team included Michael Rendine and Pete Engstrom from the SDI Organization and Lee Minichiello from Larry Woodruff's staff.

It seems clear that this test does not require movement from the narrow to the broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

The project, code named *Vector Sum*, involves the use of mostly "off the shelf" hardware in carrying out the experiment, the basic objective of which is to reduce ambiguities in many areas of SDI technology from 10^3 to about 10. A Delta booster will be used to launch from Cape Canaveral two payloads into separate orbits 120 miles up and about 120 miles apart. One payload will be a target package, the other a sensor package with a slightly modified Navy Phoenix air to air radar and missile as the interceptor. After the payloads are in their orbits on their first pass over the U.S., a solid fuel Aries instrumentation rocket will be sent aloft from White Sands for certain observations; this rocket falls back to the range after sensings are taken. At a point on the next orbit the interceptor is guided to intercept the target package; the experiment could not work without the "cooperation" of the target in the form of a beacon and a large corner reflector.

The entire experiment is deemed not to involve the ABM Treaty, primarily because no part of the experiment consists of an ABM component or device capable of substituting for such component, and nothing is tested in an ABM mode. More importantly, there is no capability against a ballistic missile RV because the relative engagement velocity of this interceptor is less than 3 kilometers per second, below that required for capability against a ballistic missile RV. Additionally, the "cooperative" target in its travel must not deviate more than one degree from a straight line. The point of this is to ensure the experiment stays within the capabilities of the Phoenix radar and other sensors.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. McKinley initialed the memorandum and wrote: "31/1."

A related point is that the kinetic energy vehicle is not deemed to fall into the category of "other physical principles" within the meaning of Agreed Statement D; it is based on technology which existed even prior to beginning the negotiations of the ABM Treaty.

While deemed not to be within the purview of the ABM Treaty, it could be termed an ASAT or ASAT defense weapon. It could therefore be of interest to those on the Hill who would cut off funds for tests of ASAT weapons. The current law precluding tests of ASAT weapons against an object in space applies only to the F-15 MHV program according to Defense lawyers, Abe Sofaer and Tom Graham. Some senior key staffers have been briefed on the program.

Some added points:

— The scheduled test was not included in the SDI report of last March; it was not anticipated. It will be included in the new draft annual report to be distributed by Defense in the next few weeks.

— After the upcoming test, nothing further is planned at present. SDIO is thinking of other tests but at much slower velocities (less than 1 kilometer per second) depending on the outcome of the current test; this would likely be some years away in any event.

99. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 24, 1986

SUBJECT

Tuesday's NSPG on the U.S. Response to Soviet Violations of Arms Control

Background. Last June, you faced the issue of whether the US would continue to not undercut SALT I and SALT II when the 7th US TRIDENT SSBN, the Alaska, went to sea later that summer. You decided that the US would continue to show restraint and dismantle POSEIDON SSBNs as needed to offset the sea trials of the Alaska and stay within SALT I and SALT II numerical limits. You also announced that, while going the extra mile, that the US would consider appropriate and proportional responses to uncorrected Soviet violations of

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-104, NSC 00118. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard, Kraemer, and Wright. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

arms control commitments; and you asked the Department of Defense to produce a report providing its recommendation on US options to do just that. This decision was reflected in NSDD–173 (attached at *Tab A*).²

In December, the Secretary of Defense provided his recommended programmatic options. Since then, the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG) has been reviewing the options recommended by Defense in addition to a few others suggested by other agencies. The options are described in the ACSG paper provided at *Tab B*.³

Upcoming Decision. The unratified SALT II Treaty expired on December 31, 1985. The Soviet Union has not corrected major violations that we have cited. Moreover, we see new potential violations on the horizon—including the testing of what may be a new heavy ICBM which the Soviets will likely claim is a modification of their current SS–18. Against this backdrop, the 8th TRIDENT SSBN, the Nevada, will begin sea trials on May 20th.

US interim restraint policy has been not to undercut agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. You have stated that you will not accept a double standard on compliance. With the Nevada going to sea, you face the decision whether the US should continue to adhere to the SALT I and SALT II ceilings in spite of uncorrected Soviet violations. You will need to make this decision by mid-to-late April to give time for consultation with allies prior to the Nevada going to sea and to put some distance between this subject and the Economic Summit in Tokyo.

Tuesday's NSPG. This Tuesday⁴ we will have the first of two planned NSPG sessions on the future of US Interim Restraint Policy and on US options for responding to Soviet violations of arms control commitments. The primary purpose of Tuesday's NSPG is to review these specific options so that you can see what programmatic steps are available to add concreteness to any policy decision you wish to take. As the paper at *Tab B* indicates, we have relatively few immediate options, and even these have drawbacks that should be recognized. Therefore, this first session is designed to be an informational meeting. With this information about the programmatic options as a foundation, the second NSPG on this subject, scheduled for April 16, will be designed to address the broader political issues and frame the policy decision that you will then face.

The Options. At the NSPG on Tuesday, we will discuss eight specific programmatic options that have been developed. These are described in detail in the paper at *Tab B*. Since you will have supporters of each

² Attached but not printed. See Document 47.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ March 25.

option highlighting its virtues at the meeting, it may be well to review some of the downsides of each, prior to the meeting.

Option A—Preserve POSEIDON SSBNs. Under SALT I and II ceilings, when the next TRIDENT ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Nevada, puts to sea in May, we would be required to begin the dismantlement of two older POSEIDON submarines using agreed procedures. Under this option, rather than dismantle two POSEIDON submarines, the Secretary of Defense would recommend that we simply tie these submarines up to the dock, remove the missiles, defuel the nuclear reactors, and maintain the ships' systems to preserve the option for their future overhaul or conversion to other missions.

The provisions of the SALT agreements give us six months to complete the dismantlement of these submarines. However, under this option, we would make clear that we do not intend to follow these dismantlement provisions. While it would be equally clear that these submarines were not capable, in their defueled condition, to perform any combat mission, failure to dismantle them fully would still be in technical violation of the SALT II limits on MIRVed systems and the SALT I limits on submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers.

The main military problem with this option is that the POSEIDON submarines involved, even after a complete overhaul, are very near the end of their useful life. To put them back to sea, each will need an overhaul that takes some 27 months to accomplish (at a cost of \$167 million)—and even then, we could have as little as three additional years of service with them carrying the older, POSEIDON C-3 missile which has limited capability against all but soft targets. In short, even without SALT, we would be considering retiring these submarines in the near future (though we might save some money by not fully dismantling them according to SALT procedures).

Option B—Replace 50 Minuteman II with Minuteman III Missiles. This option, also proposed by the Secretary of Defense, would put 50 Minuteman III ICBMs that we now have in storage into Minuteman II silos. This could be done relatively quickly at modest cost (about \$33 million). This would put us in violation of SALT II MIRV limits.

The idea of deploying additional Minuteman III missiles has often been suggested. It is not a new idea. The question we must face is whether we could get the funding through Congress for this purpose.

Option C—Encryption of Data from Strategic Systems. The original version of this idea, suggested by the Secretary of Defense, called for the US encryption of data on both the TRIDENT D-5 missile and the MIDGETMAN, as well as taking other steps to tighten control on data on US strategic systems in general. The Senior Arms Control Group review of this option reached the consensus view that we should not call for the encryption of the TRIDENT D-5 since this would delay the flight testing of this critically needed program. At the same time,

the SACG agreed that we should be prepared, in the context of a broader decision on overall US restraint policy, to make the point that, given Soviet encryption, the US will evaluate its denial practices on a case-by-case basis in light of US national security requirements and the uncorrected pattern of Soviet encryption. The MIDGETMAN program already provides for data encryption during flight testing should we decide to exercise that option when flight testing begins in 1988.

Option D—Intensified R&D on Biological and Chemical Countermeasures. This option, suggested by the Secretary of Defense, calls for an additional \$120 million for the acceleration of research and development on countermeasures to Soviet biological and chemical weapons. The SACG review of this option led to consensus that this should be dropped as a response option to Soviet violations, but pursued as a normal programmatic activity. Everyone agrees that this type of activity warrants consideration. The problem is that it was designed to be part of what was initially thought to be an FY86 supplemental request. If not part of such a supplemental request, it can be addressed in a more routine fashion. Additionally, if made a part of a package framed as a response to Soviet violations, it would be difficult to describe in a simple, understandable fashion to the general public the research that would be pursued for the \$120 million.

Option E—Small ICBM. This option, suggested by the Secretary of State, would reaffirm our commitment to pursue ICBM modernization and the Small ICBM (SICBM or MIDGETMAN) program. It is framed to not foreclose the possibility that the small ICBM could have either a single warhead or 2–3 MIRV warheads. The main drawback associated with this option is that we already pointed to the MIDGETMAN as a response to the Soviet development of their SS–25 mobile missile, so this may be considered by some as old news. On the other hand, the SACG review of this option led to consensus that in the context of a decision on US policy, a reference to the need for ICBM modernization and to the pursuit of the small ICBM program (without prejudice to the issue of whether it carries one or more warheads) should be made.

Option F—Penetration Aids for US ICBMs. The Department of State also suggested an option of pursuing additional funds for penetration aids (decoys or maneuvering reentry vehicles) for US ICBMs to counter the threat of a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. The Department of Defense is already pursuing some penetration aid capability. The main problem with this option is that Defense feels that the specific programs being suggested by State do not represent the best use that could be made of the funds involved. Defense feels that the threat simply doesn't warrant this level of spending on the types of penetration aids proposed.

Option G—Equip Additional Attack Submarines with SLCMs. State suggested that we do something to accelerate the deployment of SLCMs. The option suggested would have us backfit up to 31 LOS ANGELES

class attack submarines with a vertical launcher for SLCMs. Our cruise missile program is certainly a matter of concern to the Soviets, and this would get their attention. The downsides of this option are that the first actual backfit would not occur until 1989. Also, this would spotlight the SLCM, a system about which we have not made any arms control proposals because of the difficulty in verifying limits on such systems. If there is interest in a SLCM option, we may wish to ask the Department of Defense if we could accelerate the deployment of SLCMs on other ships (perhaps additional surface combatants) so that the impact would be felt earlier than in 1989.

Option H—Accelerate Procurement of Advanced Cruise Missiles. ACDA and Ambassador Rowny suggested that we consider an option to accelerate the procurement of advanced (stealthy) air-launched cruise missiles (ACMs). The specific option described in the paper at *Tab B* talks about using the additional advanced cruise missiles to arm 69 B-52G bombers that we intend now to convert for conventional warfare missions. SACG review of this option noted that this would involve the procurement of additional KC-10 tankers to support the B-52G bombers at considerable cost. It would also mean that we can't count on these 69 bombers to support conventional forces if needed. The SACG directed that staff reframe this option so that it would call for the acceleration of ACM procurement with the idea that we would replace the current, less capable air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with the newer, more capable ACMs. This reframed option may have merit.

The Broader Problem. The problem that we face is much broader than simply the selection of options from the above list. It is how to maintain a principled policy of restraint as we pursue a new START agreement while not allowing the Soviet Union to operate under a double standard with respect to compliance. Actions that appear to indicate compliance with the expired SALT II Treaty will be strongly protested by some of your staunchest supporters as inconsistent with your position on this flawed and unratified treaty. On the other hand, actions which move us beyond SALT limits will likely generate considerable concern not only from domestic critics, but from a number of Allied leaders.

At this point, we think that the best answer lies in a policy that not only rejects unilateral compliance with critical elements of existing Treaties but also advocates a system of restraint that is equal, fair, and protects US security. Ken Adelman has suggested an approach which describes what he calls "elements of a new restraint policy." While we think that the details of such an approach need additional thought, the general idea that Ken Adelman suggests is worth pursuing. With some carefully crafted discussion, it may provide the path to an Administration consensus on how to handle the difficult, broader problem. We intend to use the period between this first NSPG and the next meeting in April to work on this and refine the elements of such a declaratory policy.

Conclusion. The entire process will come together when we can build upon Tuesday's discussion of concrete programmatic options by putting them in a broader political context at the NSPG planned for April 16. It is essential that you hold your cards as close to the vest as you can until that time. Because of the depth of feeling on this issue, advocates will attempt to interpret your every remark to support their position over the critical next few weeks. To best serve you, we need to maintain maximum flexibility in pulling together not only a decision package for your use, but a plan for first consulting as needed about the decision and then for presenting it in the best possible manner. If we let any element get out in front of your decision, the risks of a significant problem increase rapidly.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you use Tuesday's NSPG to gain information about the programmatic options, staying in the listening mode and avoiding being drawn into providing your views at the meeting.⁵

⁵ Reagan initialed his approval and placed a checkmark next to his initials.

100. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 25, 1986, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

Minutes of the National Security Planning Group Meeting on RSVP Options (S)

PARTICIPANTS

See *Tab A*² (C)

The meeting began at 11:10 a.m. with *Admiral Poindexter* providing a contextual introduction to the evolving U.S. interim restraint policy along the following lines: (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–110, NSPG 0130. Secret. Prepared by Wright. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Attached but not printed is the list of participants.

— Mr. President, we are meeting today to review the policy of US interim restraint in the face of the continued pattern of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. We need to consider what appropriate and proportionate responses the United States would be prepared to undertake in response to these Soviet violations. (S)

— Today's meeting will focus discussion on possible military program options, but setting aside for now decisions on such options. We will be having a second meeting on this issue in mid-April to step up to the decisions required at that time. (S)

— As you know, the specific event requiring your early decision is the fact that our 8th Trident submarine begins its sea trials on May 20. Unless we dismantle other US strategic systems such as Poseidon submarines, this new Trident will exceed numerical limits under SALT I (SLBM ceiling) and under SALT II (MIRVed ballistic missile and MIRVed SNDV ceilings). (S)

— Mr. President, before we begin a review of the specific programmatic options before us today, I believe it important to briefly summarize the policy on the issue of US interim restraint that you have set forth during your Administration—most comprehensively in your report to the Congress on June 10 of last year. (S)

— In May, 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, you decided that the US would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. You stated that in spite of serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, you were taking this action to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on strategic forces as we entered serious new negotiations. (S)

— You indicated that this policy was an interim policy to help provide a framework of mutual restraint as we pursued effective arms reductions agreements. You made clear that it required Soviet reciprocity, and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military build up. (S)

— Unfortunately, our hopes and assumptions of 1982 concerning Soviet behavior did not withstand the test of time. The US scrupulously refrained from any actions which would undercut existing agreements; we kept our part of the bargain. But, as you have detailed in three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance (most recently last December 23),³ the Soviets have repeatedly violated important provisions of these agreements in spite of our requests for corrective action. At the same time, they have maintained their massive military buildup and, notwithstanding the summit agreement to seek common

³ See footnote 4, Document 94.

ground, they have failed to make substantial progress in the Geneva negotiations. (S)

— In your report to the Congress on Interim Restraint last June 10 you stated that you were prepared to go the extra mile in terms of interim restraint, by deactivating an additional Poseidon submarine later in the year, but that you would not accept a double standard of compliance and would not accept an adverse impact of Soviet violations on our national security. (S)

— In your June report, you informed the Congress, as well as the Soviet Union, that the United States would take proportionate and appropriate responses to Soviet violations and that you would consider future deployment milestones of US strategic systems on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation and Soviet actions regarding: 1) correction of their noncompliance, 2) a reversal of their unparalleled and unwarranted arms build up and 3) their active pursuit of arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations. (S)

— To help determine such proportionate and appropriate US responses, you asked Secretary Weinberger to provide his recommendations to you. The recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of State and the Directors of ACDA and the CIA are before us today. They include specific military responses as well as considerations of a more general nature. (S)

— We intend to focus today on the specific, programmatic military options, rather than on broader issues. We need to understand what specific actions we are capable of taking before fashioning our overall declaratory policy context. (S)

— We will proceed in order with the eight programmatic options as shown on the boards of matrices at your right and left, Mr. President. (S)

At this point in the meeting *Admiral Poindexter* briefly covered the eight options along the following lines while referring to the matrices (*Tab B*):⁴ (S)

— Secretary Weinberger has the first four original options that were reported to you last December. Each of these were conceived under the assumption of an FY 86 arms control supplemental and in a pre-Gramm-Rudman-Hollings environment. Some of the funding for those options is now contained in the FY 87 budget submission as indicated on the funding matrix. (S)

Secretary Weinberger entered a clarification that the money was in the budget but it would have to be better defined. (S)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

— Under *Option A* OSD would preserve the two Poseidon SSBNs that would have to be cut up when the eighth Trident—the Nevada—goes on sea trials in May, 1986, if we were to continue to comply with SALT. (S)

◦ Within a year we could decide what, if anything, is to be done with the submarines. We could overhaul them, convert them or simply leave them as is. The funding line in the matrix covers the overhaul of five Poseidons to return them to service as C-3 missile SSBNs; it was included in the 86 and 87 budget submission. (S)

◦ Under this approach we would violate both SALT I and SALT II limits in May, 1986, by not commencing required dismantlement activity. (S)

— Under *Option B* 50 Minuteman III missiles that are now kept in storage would replace 50 of the older, non-MIRVed Minuteman IIs and we would add 150 (MK-12) warheads to our forces—a net increase of 100 warheads. (S)

◦ This option is reasonably cheap and could be achieved within a relatively short time; it seems to have some military utility. (S)

◦ It would violate the SALT II MIRV limits. (S)

— *Option C* involves encryption on future ballistic missile flight testing. I understand this capability is already planned for the Small ICBM, so there is no additional cost on that system. The D-5 would incur additional cost and a possible IOC slip. (S)

◦ At the SACG on this subject last Friday⁵ no agency favored encryption of the D-5. Further, a consensus emerged on dropping this option as an RSVP response, but keeping our options open to deny information, including encryption, on future ICBM tests. (S)

— The last of the original DOD options is the one involving an intensified CBW research and development program, *Option C*. This type of activity is currently underfunded and represents a real area for technological surprise. (S)

◦ The funding seems reasonable, but the SACG members had trouble relating this response to the overall thrust of Soviet noncompliance. As a consequence, we feel that this program should compete in a normal manner for funds in the DOD budget and not be an element of a response to violations. (S)

— *Option E* was not so much a matter of accelerating the Small ICBM milestones as it was one of ensuring that they are met in a timely manner. State originally felt that the Administration's support for Midgetman was beginning to wane on the Hill. (S)

⁵ March 21. No minutes were found.

◦ At the SACG last Friday we concluded that the Small ICBM—Midgetman—was moving about as fast as programmatically possible. We have some big decisions regarding its size and basing mode that are coming up next winter and that forcing the system into the limelight might derail the orderly selection process. (S)

◦ The Midgetman was part of your June interim restraint policy in that it was cited as the US response to the SS-25 violation. We reached consensus at the SACG to include a reference to the Small missile in the declaratory policy that would go along with our RSVP decisions. That reference should not prejudice the MIRV status or basing mode outcome. (S)

— *Option F* is a State sponsored response which pushes for earlier IOCs on PENAIDs and MARVs as a treaty compliant answer to Soviet ABM Treaty violations. There are several ways we can go in this area, and most are very threat specific. (S)

◦ We have highlighted two possible excursions—RADAR only and MARV—to illustrate the IOC and funding tradeoffs. (S)

◦ These options simply accelerate ongoing programs that are paced to the evolving Soviet ABM threat. (S)

— *Option G* was a late entry supported by both State and ACDA in which we would backfit the first half of the SSN-688 class of attack submarines with Vertical Launch Systems for SLCM. There are some costs here, but we would not have to commit to the full 31 boat line. (S)

◦ The conversion could be accomplished during the regular overhaul cycle at about \$92M per unit. This option would be compliant with all US treaty obligations. (S)

— The last military response option, *Option H*, originally involved turning the 69 B-52Gs, that are planned conventional assets, into ACM carriers in the near term. There was strong resistance to putting these assets into a SIOP-role due to unplanned tanker shortfalls. (S)

◦ We discussed this fully at the SACG and changed the option to simply accelerate the ACM program. Mr. President, as you know the ACM is the new stealth model that will be a big improvement over the present ALCM it will eventually replace. (S)

◦ Our funding estimate on this option is rough since it relies heavily on how quickly the ACMs replace the ALCMs and what platform they are retrofitted on. (S)

— Mr. President, I know you agree that this has been most helpful. We more fully understand the programmatic options. The matrix on funding (and the eventual method we choose to get those funds) is very important and should be carefully refined as we move toward an April programmatic decision. (S)

— Besides the funding issue, this decision will turn on *both* the military significance of the Soviet violations and the appropriateness of our chosen response. (S)

— Mr. President, I will now turn over the discussion of the options to your Cabinet members. Secretary Weinberger, would you care to lead off? (S)

Secretary Weinberger stressed that our declaration about SALT II would be important. We need to state firmly that the U.S. will not continue to comply and what we do thereafter will be done in the most militarily efficient manner possible. As OSD looked at the programmatic actions we used four criteria to narrow the field. The first was the military significance of the options. Second, they were interested in its affordability. Third, it should be distinguishable from our current programs and, finally, it should be reversible in case the Soviets return to compliance. With those criterion in mind, he chose to preserve two Poseidons from dismantlement as a visible demonstration that we are no longer bound by SALT. The Minuteman switch to 50 more MIRV systems was chosen because of the low cost and the relatively quick achievement of military capability. Option C, encryption, is now being undertaken with the Small ICBM and the CBW option he agreed could be included in the regular program. He stressed that according to the most recent draft of Soviet Military Power, chemical weapons in the Soviet Union were on the rise. He mentioned the recent explosion of an SS-18 follow on missile as evidence that the Soviet violation pattern continues. (S)

Admiral Crowe spoke next and essentially agreed with the SECDEF on the choice of options. The four OSD options have more merit than any others. He stated that the JCS has consistently argued that the most important response is full funding of the strategic modernization program since it is designed to deal with Soviet cheating. If we go with the first four options, these must be funded on top of the full strategic modernization program. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings will make this all the more difficult. The JCS are sensitive to funding for older systems and don't believe that we should spend money unnecessarily. But at the bottom line, the JCS view this decision as a political judgement call. (S)

Under Secretary Whitehead, substituting for the Secretary of State, disagreed with the choice of options A and B. He stated that the Department opposes a U.S. violation of SALT numerical limits. If we are to do so we would start a process of escalation in responses. State is not unmindful of Soviet violations, however, believe we must look at costs and benefits of options. There is no benefit in returning two old SSBNs to sea and if we would simply add 100 warheads to the current inventory of 7,000 that would not be a large increase. In contrast, there are costs; the Geneva NST attempt to reduce nuclear arsenals would

be seen as inconsistent, Congressional reaction on the Defense budget would present severe problems and these options would further handicap us on the Hill. Our Allies would be distressed with violations of numerical limits and finally, the public will question our rights to these measures. For all these reasons, the costs outweigh the benefits in violation of numerical limits. State is not soft on violations but we need proportionality and they therefore favor options C, D, E, F and G. As a last thought, *Whitehead* stressed the need to consult with Allies and mentioned communications this week from Thatcher and Carrington, to that end. (S)

Director Casey stressed the need to communicate clearly to both the Soviets and our own people that we are concerned with the violations by undertaking those action which are feasible. We should stress that the U.S. is free to take any steps necessary; Defense should develop contingency plans that go beyond these options. It is most important that we remain resolute in our backing of the strategic modernization program and SDI. With regard to the specific programmatic options *Casey* was agnostic, but felt our exercising the encryption option would lose a moral initiative and be counterproductive since we seek to reverse the Soviet compacity to encrypt. (S)

Director Adelman noted that the U.S. can take a measure of pride in that we have called out Soviet violations and these are now widely accepted—the question is what we should do about it. Worst of all worlds would be, after highlighting issues, not to do anything. It's a matter of our word. We will lose credibility if we continue to live under an equal restraint regime including the fatally flawed SALT II Treaty. The longer this Administration abides by that treaty the more it becomes the Reagan treaty and less the Carter treaty. Returning to the question of what to do, *Director Adelman* indicated that we should proclaim that we are no longer bound by SALT and then substitute some form of equal restraint framework. We can look at military options later in an orderly fashion but we should not exclude breaching numerical limits since the Soviets have been in violation of this provision for the past five years. In fact, today they are over the limit by about two Poseidons worth of SNDVs. (S)

Ambassador Rowny said he agreed and that if we decide to continue with SALT the Soviets would “laugh all the way to the bank.” We need to change now to something that gets their attention. He put in a special plug for option H stating the Soviets are particularly concerned with ACMs and the sooner we get them the greater the signal we will be sending. (S)

SECDEF disagreed with Adelman in that he felt it was not desirable to have an interim restraint framework. He disagreed with the State options as being too expensive and fully compliant. However, he

agreed with the need for consulting, but stated the Allies should not tell us what to do. (S)

The President observed that we may be shooting ourselves in the foot by keeping two old Poseidons which do not represent a productive military solution. He was concerned also that we are in the midst of a public debate on reducing arsenals and our options should be consistent with that theme and not sound extravagant. He indicated that our policy should be one in which we reduce in one area if they reduce in another. The problem here is that the Soviets do not destroy their weapons. (S)

SECDEF—Options allows us to keep and use things we already have. They do provide some military advantage. Our strategic modernization program helps us keep up. We should simply state we no longer adhere—and take whatever steps necessary. (S)

Secretary Baker observed that most of the options were merely symbolic. Our new policy needs to focus on what you, Mr. President, want to obtain from the Summit. But what is the magic of doing it now? Why symbolism now? (S)

Admiral Poindexter answered—because the next Trident goes to sea in May. (S)

The President then stated that he still had a problem with the Poseidons (why use something on its last legs?) but that he would prefer option B since the missiles are in storage and they can be used to help even up the balance. The public could understand that we don't need to keep good missiles in storage. (S)

Admiral Crowe observed that option B provided you the greatest military return on your investment. (S)

The President asked if we were to take all of the options and tie them together, then would we still stay even with the Soviets? He felt it was hypocritical to stay with a treaty they are violating, and asked if we can give them a choice to join us now to reach mutual equality before assuming a no restraint policy. (S)

SECDEF answered that the Geneva program was doing just this. What you need to decide is what is to be done when the eighth Trident goes to sea. He still felt the declaration was most important, and that we could couple that to urge them to join us in Geneva. (S)

The President then suggested that we replace the interim restraint framework with our new START position and failing that the U.S. would undertake further programmatic options. (S)

Whitehead stated that it was not true the Soviets had violated all provisions; they had shown restraint to their numerical levels. If we breach the limits it will give them an open excuse to observe no limits. He felt that, feeble as they were, the limits were useful. (S)

The President felt that the Soviets have more to gain by exercising restraint now from an economic standpoint. He had learned this during the “fireside chat” in Geneva.⁶ If we use the thrust that the agreement on the table is what we want to replace interim restraint, we won’t be permitting a dangerous superiority to develop. We are just playing catch up. (S)

Director Adelman observed that Soviets may not have violated all provisions of SALT but it’s like the tax code—no provision should be violated. He continued by noting that since SALT II was signed the Soviets have fielded 4,500 warheads, doubled their bomber weapons and deployed two new SSBNs and three new ICBMs. He continued to stress the need for a sub ceiling on warheads. He continued to differ with SECDEF, stressing the need to replace the restraint of SALT with our START proposals—we must be seen as not just shredding treaties but simply not being bound by SALT II, if violated. (S)

SECDEF said he didn’t have any problems being limited to no more than they have in warheads and throw weight—our formulation must be positive—we will be free to buildup. (S)

Secretary Baker agreed with this approach but stressed that we don’t need to couple it with new funds. (S)

The President asked what we are doing now in strategic modernization and *SECDEF* answered that we have submitted funding for MX and Midgetman. *The President* went on to observe that anything that we do will have funding problems. Also we will need to explain that new systems are replacements and do not represent an increase in the numbers of weapons. (S)

Adelman felt that a good solid set of military options would be the key—we can go to the American people with our plan. (S)

Admiral Crowe said that the immediate problem is the two SSBNs—we don’t have to destroy—just tie them up, their tubes may have some utility as SDI platforms as the technology matures.

The President observed that it makes more sense to tie up rather than cut up these old boats. (S)

SECDEF suggested the subs could be used for mobilization. (S)

At 12:01 *Admiral Poindexter* closed the meeting, reminding the members that we will return to the subject for a decision in mid-April. (S)

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 153.

101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 15, 1986

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP

I. PURPOSE

To review and discuss the policy options available to the US in responding to Soviet arms control violations.

II. BACKGROUND

Last June, you decided to continue the policy of not undercutting the SALT agreements to the extent that the USSR exercised equal restraint. In doing so you decided that the US would take appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet violations and that you would consider future US deployment milestones on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation and Soviet actions including correction of their non-compliance, a reversal of their arms build-up and progress in Geneva. The next milestone occurs on May 20 as the NEVADA commences sea trials. At the March 25 NSPG you heard from your Cabinet on a range of program options we could use in responding to Soviet violations.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of Participants is at *TAB B*.²

IV. PRESS PLAN

None planned.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will provide a brief review of existing policy, summarize Soviet violations and describe two declaratory policy alternatives. We plan to have 25 minutes of discussion, in which you will have the opportunity to hear appropriate Cabinet members views on the matter.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 0131. Secret. Prepared by Wright and Linhard. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Regan saw it on April 16. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for April 16 from 10:15 a.m. until 11:15 a.m. in the White House Situation Room.

² Attached but not printed.

Agenda is at *TAB A*³ and appropriate background material is at *TABs C through I*.⁴ A decision is not needed at the meeting, and we would strongly recommend against taking and announcing such a decision at that time. Following the NSPG, we will provide a decision package reflecting the NSPG discussion and recommending a course of action.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

**102. Memorandum From William Wright, Robert Linhard,
and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff
to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Poindexter)¹**

Washington, April 15, 1986

SUBJECT

Wednesday's NSPG Talking Points on RSVP

Today we forwarded under System II 90293 a package of RSVP background material for the President's use prior to the meeting on Wednesday.² This meeting is now scheduled for 10:15 a.m. to accommodate SECDEF's schedule.³

The talking points for your use in the meeting are at *Tab A*. They have been scoped to provide a short introductory history of the interim restraint policy evolution, a review of Soviet violations and the relationship to an abbreviated review of two possible declaratory statements that could form the basis of a change in the current policy. Recall that the last NSPG on this, March 25, focussed primarily on programmatic options. The minutes of this meeting are at *Tab B*⁴ for your review.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 0131. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Poindexter saw it.

² See Document 101.

³ April 16.

⁴ Attached but not printed. See Document 100.

You will note in the talking points, reference to display boards (*Tabs C and D*)⁵ which will be available at the meeting.

Recommendation

That you draw upon the talking points at *Tab A* in your conduct of the meeting.⁶

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

National Security Planning Group Meeting

DRAFT TALKING POINTS

I. Introduction (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, today we are meeting for the second time in recent weeks to review the policy of U.S. restraint in the face of the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.

— Today's meeting will provide a final NSC-level review before you make your tentative decision that can serve as the basis for necessary consultation with key Members of Congress and our key Allies. As you know, the specific event requiring your early decision is the fact that our eighth Trident submarine begins its sea trials on May 20.

— Unless we dismantle compensatory strategic systems such as Poseidon submarines, this new Trident will exceed numerical limits under SALT I (656 SLBM launchers) and under SALT II (the 1,200 MIRV ballistic missile launchers ceiling).

— This decision has received increasing attention in the media, on the Hill and with our Allies which will increase in volume as the date draws near.

◦ Last week some 53 Senators wrote asking that you continue not undercutting SALT I and SALT II through 1986.

◦ Some 34 other Senators, including some of your strongest supporters on defense, foreign policy and arms control issues have been

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

⁷ Top Secret; Sensitive. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for April 16 from 10:15 a.m. until 11:15 a.m. All brackets are in the original.

equally forceful in expressing support for programmatic responses to Soviet violations. Some ask that the U.S. not dismantle the two Poseidon submarines.

◦ The Allies are, on the whole, sympathetic to the need to respond to Soviet noncompliance. However they will be looking carefully at our response for any signal that would be seen as diminishing U.S. interest in arms control progress and a more stable U.S.-Soviet relationship.

◦ Prime Minister Thatcher in a letter to you characterized the current policy as “an important act of statesmanship”. She counselled continued restraint.

— Within the Administration we have labored over appropriate and proportionate programmatic options to employ in response to Soviet violations of various agreements; some of which are ratified and in force, others not ratified and still others which are being observed past their stated duration.

— In some sense, these agreements can be viewed like any other complex contractual arrangement in which two individuals should only continue to shape their actions into conformance for as long as the contract remains in their net best interests.

— Preliminary to the discussion with your Cabinet, I will briefly review the existing policy, summarize Soviet violations and describe two alternative policy options in the form of a declaratory statement. The declaratory policy that you eventually choose, Mr. President, whether it is to continue with the existing policy or adapt an alternative formulation, must be seen as logical and proportionate and it also should be viewed as being in the net U.S. national interest.

II. RSVP Policy Review (25 minutes)

— Mr. President, as we begin our discussion today, let us be sure we all understand the essential elements of your “no undercut” or “interim restraint” policy as you have stated it during your Administration.

◦ *First, the basic policy is that the United States would not undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises equal, or comparable, restraint.* You first stated this in May, 1982, as the START negotiations were about to begin. You indicated that you were proposing such interim U.S. restraint in spite of the inequities in the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws in the unratified SALT II agreement, in the hope that it would foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to the new arms reductions negotiations.

◦ *Second, the policy requires Soviet reciprocity.* You have rejected a double standard, which would permit the Soviets to choose what they violate, while we fulfill all of our contractual commitments. You have stated that such a situation amounts to unilateral disarmament and could undercut U.S. national security and the integrity of the arms control process.

◦ *Third*, the policy has required that we continue to raise our concerns about noncompliance with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (the SCC).

— (*Soviet Violations*) In that regard, you have issued three detailed reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance (most recently last December 23) The two chart boards here (*Tab D*) indicate the scope of the problem.

— As you can see, the Soviets are violating major agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements, the ABM Treaty, the Geneva Conventions on chemical weapons, etc. [FYI. There may be two more SALT II compliance issues which mentioned, one involving the possible testing, recently, of a follow-on SS-18 (a third new ICBM type) and a second issue, a violation which we have reported to the Congress, but not discussed with the Soviets due to sensitive sources and methods, involving an SLBM (the SS-X-23 throw weight ratio). End FYI.]

◦ *Fourth*, in your report to the Congress last June 10 on the Interim Restraint policy, you stated that *you were prepared to go the extra mile, deactivating a POSEIDON submarine* later in the year in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to respond to the serious US concerns.

◦ *Fifth*, as an integral part of the policy announced last June you informed the Congress that the *United States would take proportionate and appropriate responses* to Soviet violations.

— You indicated that you were asking the Secretary of Defense to recommend specific programmatic responses.

— And you made clear that you would consider future deployment milestones of U.S. strategic systems on a case-by-case basis to be reviewed in light of Soviet actions in three areas: (1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, (2) a reversal of the unparalleled and unwarranted Soviet military buildup, and (3) active Soviet pursuit of arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations.

— At the November summit you expressed your concerns about Soviet noncompliance directly to Secretary General Gorbachev. You pointed out that the United States has scrupulously kept its part of the bargain, undertaking no actions which would undercut existing agreements.

— Mr. President, as we now approach the next U.S. deployment milestone, the Soviet Union has made little progress in meeting the three criteria you set forth last June. First, they have provided insufficient explanation or correction of their violations. Second, as the intelligence briefing you received last week demonstrated, they have continued their military buildup. And, third, in spite of their public rhetoric, and their summit commitment to seek common ground, they have generally not moved forward at the Geneva negotiations.

U.S. Policy Options

— At our last meeting (March 25) we focussed on possible programmatic military options to be considered as proportionate and appropriate responses to Soviet violations. We considered eight specific options at that time. Since then, agencies have continued to review and to refine these options as well as to consider the broader declaratory policy framework in which any programmatic military options should be undertaken.

— Let me now turn to describe one such policy alternative and programmatic actions supported by the *Department of State* and *Ambassador Nitze*. The boards (*Tab C*) contains the elements of our current policy and the alternatives.

- Under this approach, we would report the lack of progress, emphasize that the strategic modernization program should be fully implemented, with adjustments—in order to respond most efficiently.

- We would announce the retirement from service of two of the oldest Poseidons on military and economic grounds, and commence dismantlement prior to the May sea trial date.

- At the same time, we would announce certain additional adjustments to the modernization program to include:

- Equipping three additional Los Angeles class SSNs with SLCMS,

- PENAIDs development,

- And, accelerating the small ICBM. The Midgetman was specifically cited in your June decision, Mr. President, as an appropriate response to the irreversible Soviet violation of flight testing the SS-X-25. Under State's plan we would reemphasize our commitment to this ICBM.

- *State* and *Ambassador Nitze* would not exceed numerical limits of SALT I or II.

- Next I would turn to the single—but bracketed—policy statement from *Defense*, *ACDA*, and *Ambassador Rowny*.

- The convergence that they have reached is really quite remarkable, but there are significant differences in the text as highlighted by the brackets.

- All would have the U.S. take actions which exceed SALT II numerical limits by not dismantling two Poseidons. The differences affect what other limits are exceeded.

- *OSD* would not begin dismantling the two Poseidons but would defuel and “preserve” them for a future overhaul/conversion option within a year at a cost of about \$23M per boat.

- *ACDA* and *Ambassador Ed Rowny* would dismantle one Poseidon at a cost of \$22M and dismantle five Titans to stay within SALT I, but not the SALT II limits.

— Essentially, *OSD* is up front in saying we would no longer be bound by SALT II or the SALT I Interim Agreement while *ACDA* and *Ambassador Rowny* would not explicitly cite any future obligations with regard to SALT I but would explicitly comply with the SALT I Interim Agreement by dismantling only enough launchers to do so.

III. Discussion (25 minutes)

— In a sense, the key issue is whether—at this time—the proportionate and appropriate U.S. responses should include any which exceed the numerical limits of SALT II and/or SALT I.

— If the *OSD* approach were taken, some limits would be exceeded. The issue would be decided now for future milestones, as well.

— If the *ACDA/Rowny* approach were taken, SALT II limits would be exceeded now. We would have to again address SALT I limits in September 1988 when the ninth Trident goes on sea trials, and we once again face the SLBM launcher ceiling.

— If the *State* option were taken, the dismantling of two SSBNs would postpone the issue of SALT II limits until November of this year when the 131st ALCM-carrying heavy bomber (AHB) is produced. At that time, we will face either a stop in AHB production, an SSBN dismantlement, some MM III dismantlement or some other ALCM bomber dismantlement.

— The question is *what to do*, and *when*.

— Mr. President, if you have no questions, I'd like to proceed around the table asking for the views of your cabinet.

— Secretary Weinberger, would you care to lead? Secretary Shultz? etc

IV. Summary

— Thank you all for coming.

103. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, April 16, 1986, 10:45–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Options in Responding to Soviet Violations (C)

PARTICIPANTS

The President	ACDA:
The Vice President	Mr. Kenneth Adelman
<i>State:</i>	<i>White House:</i>
Secretary George Shultz	Mr. Donald Regan
Ambassador Paul Nitze	VADM John Poindexter
Ambassador Edward Rowny	Mr. Larry Speakes
<i>Defense:</i>	Mr. Craig Fuller
Secretary Caspar Weinberger	Mr. Don Fortier
<i>Justice:</i>	Colonel Robert Linhard
Attorney General Edwin Meese III	Captain William Wright
<i>CIA:</i>	Mr. Sven Kraemer
Mr. William Casey	
<i>JCS:</i>	
Admiral William Crowe	

Minutes

The meeting opened at 10:45 a.m. in the Situation Room. The agenda was as shown at *Tab A*.² Admiral Poindexter began the agenda and framed the issue for discussion using the talking points attached at *Tab B*.³ [Note: During this presentation, Secretary Weinberger interrupted to note the cost of the OSD option was \$17M, not \$23M.] (TS)

After Admiral Poindexter's introduction, the following discussion ensued (not verbatim): (U)

Weinberger: The issue should be settled now. We should simply state we are no longer going to observe the treaty. We should make clear we are not breaking out for the purpose of conducting an arms race, but we will no longer conform to the treaty. The least cost option is to drydock Poseidon submarines. We can save them for future options. Such options will cost about \$132M later, but we don't have to identify this now. Putting the ships in drydock is the least expensive approach. We don't have to do anything else like change Minuteman warheads [Note:

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG 0131. Top Secret. Prepared by Linhard and Brooks. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed. See Tab A, Document 102.

Secretary Weinberger was referring to converting existing Minuteman II missiles to Minuteman III.] Such an approach will show the Soviets what the costs of violations are. (S)

Shultz: (Complained about not having access to military advice.) (S)

Shultz: Ceilings do have impact. Since 1972 they have dismantled [garbled] launchers compared to 144 on our side. By all analyses of military measures we are winning. Freedom and democracy are on the march. We have the advantage everywhere. They do have two perceived advantages: conventional forces and the ability to produce nuclear systems. I doubt their superiority in conventional forces; they could not have done the Tripoli raid. With regard to producing nuclear systems, yes it is an advantage; they have the technology and no political restraint. (S)

Shultz: There are three areas of violations that have the most significance: Krasnoyarsk radar, the second new ICBM, and encryption. Responses are needed. The best response is to get the budget where it ought to be. A flamboyant announcement to break numerical SALT limits is unwise. It will hand the Soviets a propaganda windfall. They are ready to expand. Such a step will cause us problems with the Alliance. (TS)

Crowe: The Chiefs understand Soviet cheating and the flaws in the treaty, but the best thing to do is to complete the strategic modernization program. That program takes into account Soviet cheating. We also feel strongly on the conventional budget. If we can get the money, SALT I and II are irrelevant. The proposals being considered are a wash. We doubt they will affect the military equation. They may serve as signals, but they will not affect the military balance. Failure to get strategic modernization *would*. (S)

Crowe: There are three options the Chiefs could support: the Poseidons, converting more Minuteman III (which is a good return on an investment), or encrypting telemetry on future systems. That aside, when you talk about options, where do we get the money for doing these things if we have problems with the modernization program, problems with money for existing systems? The treaty does have flaws but not overriding ones. We are in a chess game between the Allies, the Soviets, etc. We want the President to be in the best position to get the money he needs on the Hill. We should not make decisions based on legalistic interpretations of the treaty. (S)

Casey: As long as the Soviets are in violation we are forced to take whatever steps are needed. We need to get the message out that if there is no compliance then there will be no sustained treaty. We are winning because we are calling the Soviets on their transgressions. The Soviets are moving to deploy new mobile MIRVed systems and a nationwide defense. We need to have R&D to develop penetration aids. If we don't reaffirm the treaty, however, it could slow down SDI. The Soviet

SA–X–12 could become the basis of a nationwide defense. Any attempt we make to clarify the ABM Treaty will be ambiguous and let them creep out. The Soviets could move beyond SALT II, but I’m not sure it makes a difference. (TS)

Adelman: The political options are not expensive. If we breach a numerical limit we will do it once and for all; if we stay under SALT II we will come up on this decision every year. The Allies will be squeamish. They need leadership. The man on the street will understand. You can’t keep abiding by SALT II. (S)

The President asked about the relationship of SALT II to the strategic modernization program. Secretary *Weinberger* reviewed the strategic modernization program. (C)

Shultz: The key is the strategic modernization program. (C)

Weinberger: We don’t ask for anything beyond the strategic modernization program. We just want to make it clear we will not be bound by a meaningless treaty. Carrington [NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington] said he expected us to stop complying with SALT II. (S)

Shultz: The State option is an appropriate response to the Soviets. We hold the numerical limit, but we do other things. (S)

The President: What if we finesse SALT II by saying that our goal is some specific other limit? (S)

Weinberger: We will have to return to the SALT II issue repeatedly. (C)

Meese: Our audience must be Congress and the Allies. Can’t we eclipse the whole issue of SALT I and II? We should announce a new doctrine, say what we will do if the Soviets do “x”. Make it the basis for bargaining with the Congress. In this approach we would get beyond the SALT II debate by indicating certain restraints, by withdrawing systems from service but not destroying them, by monitoring violations, and by seeking arms reduction measures. We are always battling this issue on the Hill; this would be a way to get a change in the terms of the debate. (S)

The President: Modernization must be seen as modernization, not as a build up. I’m willing to bring the number of missiles down if the Soviets will reduce. We can come down to any equal levels if they join us. (S)

Weinberger: This new policy of restraint isn’t your policy. (S)

The President: We should say in hearings on the modernization program if that puts us above the Soviets we will reduce. (S)

Rowny: Modernization gets the Soviets attention. We should not give credibility to a flawed treaty. We can still show restraint by adhering to SALT I. We must show SALT II is dead. (S)

The President: People should be reminded that SALT II could not be passed by the Democrats. (S)

Messe: We need to avoid a SALT debate. (C)

Nitze: There is nothing in the State option about complying with SALT. We are not saying we would be restricted in the future. We are just saying that it's not economic today to overhaul these submarines. There is no point in alienating Congress and our Allies. (S)

Weinberger: Carrington is not expecting us to remain within SALT II. The State approach also has us continuing to abide by ABM Treaty. That will kill SDI. (S)

The President: We need to say to people that both sides are modernizing, not engaging in an arms race. The Soviets are ahead in modernization, we are not. This isn't a race to achieve numerical superiority. The end result is no increase in total numbers. Such an approach to modernization lends itself to reductions in warheads and delivery vehicles. We shall eliminate systems as we modernize. (S)

Shultz: The key is what we do about the submarines. (C)

Weinberger: Put them in drydock. (C)

The President: Everyone should be able to understand drydocking, and that that means they are not in service. (C)

Shultz: But it's still a violation. (S)

Poindexter: [Drawing the meeting to a close.] We still have a few days to think about this.

Admiral *Poindexter* then closed the meeting at approximately 11:45 p.m. (U)

104. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 18, 1986

SUBJECT

U.S. Interim Restraint Policy

ISSUE

What should be the content of the consultations with our Allies and the Congress on a tentative U.S. interim restraint policy?

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-092, NSDD 222. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Prepared by Linhard, Wright, and Kraemer. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "SIGNED."

BACKGROUND

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiation, you decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Last June you decided to continue this policy by dismantling a POSEIDON SSBN coincident with the sea trials of the seventh TRIDENT. This particular SSBN is being converted to a moored training ship. You also decided to review Soviet actions with regard to their compliance and negotiating records and the state of their strategic buildup on a case-by-case basis as additional U.S. milestones are reached.

Since those decisions, the United States has scrupulously adhered to its commitments and lived within these agreements. By contrast, the Soviet Union has violated major arms control commitments, showed little progress in Geneva and its strategic modernization programs have continued unabated. They have, however, continued to dismantle strategic MIRVed systems as compensation for new forces in accordance with SALT procedures, with the exception of the limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which they have exceeded.

On May 20, 1986, the eighth U.S. TRIDENT SSBN will begin sea trials. At that time, unless current policy is modified, we would be required to retire and dismantle two POSEIDON SSBNs to stay with the SALT II ceiling of no more than 1200 MIRVed ballistic launchers and the SALT I limit on SLBM launchers. The two older, candidate POSEIDONs have been long planned for retirement due to age and the exhaustion of their reactor cores and economic and military realities argue for this retirement at about the time that the TRIDENT goes on sea trials.

If the above compensation is undertaken, the next milestone will occur in November, 1986, when the 131st heavy bomber is fitted for ALCM carriage. At that time, we will not have an SSBN coming to the end of its planned service life to offset the additional cruise missile carrying bombers under the SALT II 1320 MIRVed limit. In fact, we are already within the normal timelines (15 months lead-time) for such a retirement. Therefore, to continue to observe the 1320 limit, the U.S. will likely either have to delay bomber conversions (or retire already modified B-52G aircraft as B-52Hs are converted to cruise missile carriage) or retire existing MINUTEMAN III MIRVs on a one-for-one basis as bombers are converted.

DISCUSSION

In approaching this decision, there are both military and political factors to be considered.

Military Considerations. Continuing interim restraint will have an impact on the number of U.S. forces. Up to this point, we have been able to stay within the applicable SALT constraints by dismantling

rather aged systems as the new TRIDENTs come online. This will still be the case in May, but not necessarily so in November.

The real issue is whether the reductions involved affect needed military capability. Given our shortfall in capability to target Soviet hardened installations, and the age of a portion of our POSEIDON fleet, it is most likely that the U.S. military would choose to retire POSEIDON SSBNs in any event. While each POSEIDON SSBN dismantled would mean a reduction of 160 nuclear warheads (the 16 missiles carried by each submarine, each in turn carrying about 10 warheads), the warheads retired can only effectively cover soft targets.

The overall assessment provided to you by Admiral Crowe at this week's NSPG meeting² was that given the marginal nature of the impact the constraints will have on the overall military capability of both sides, the military factors involved should not drive this decision. However, the Chairman was equally quick to point out that it is essential that the U.S. strategic modernization program proceed as planned, and that the impact of any change in support for this program must be carefully factored into your decision. (We do not lack ballistic missiles for soft targets but we do need hard target kill capability. The way we get that is through MX, D5 and SICBM.)

There may have been some confusion at the NSPG on the costs associated with the POSEIDONS. Secretary Weinberger stated that the inactivation cost per unit was on the order of \$17M but we have been unable to confirm this figure. The OSD option is to preserve the option to overhaul, convert or scrap the submarines for one year, at which time a decision would be made on their ultimate status. The cost of this procedure is \$23M which is the sum of \$14M, to defuel, plus \$25,000 per day to keep the submarines in a condition that would permit us to undertake any one of the three configurations. The *cost of an overhaul*, without the delay, is \$167M per unit and conversion to some other platform would be additive to the overhaul cost and depend on the type of conversion chosen. The Navy has never sold a nuclear submarine for scrap because of the problem of ensuring that all irradiated metals were removed and the hull was demilitarized before turning it over to a civilian contractor. The cost of doing this would be additive to the defueling cost of \$14M, and probably fall in the \$20M range. The unit *cost of dismantling* under agreed procedures is between \$20M and \$22M thus, cost savings are not a major issue.

Political Considerations. Political views on this issue are very strong both here at home and abroad. We must carefully consider the impact that retaining some interim restraint framework has both on the Congress and on our allies.

² See Document 103.

With respect to the Congress, the most important task we face is to maintain support for our critically needed strategic modernization program and for an adequate overall level of defense spending to meet national security needs. The Congress also expects us to undertake some form of concrete action in response to Soviet violations. In dealing with our allies, we must focus our efforts on maintaining their collective and individual support for:

- the NATO LRINF modernization program and continued support for deployment of PERSHING II and GLCM as required;
- the SDI program;
- the U.S. position in the Geneva negotiations; and
- overall efforts to sustain the cohesion of the NATO alliance and the associated military capability needed to give the alliance meaning.

It would be easier to maintain the support identified above if we had an interim framework of mutual restraint, which you outlined last June, supported with equal sincerity by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not joined us in such a framework. We have tried to better educate both Congress and our allies about the extent of the Soviet noncompliance problem. Appreciation of the significance of the problem is growing—especially of the obvious fact that you simply cannot have effective arms control unless you are serious about compliance. All reasonable parties would like us to do something to resolve the problem caused by Soviet noncompliance. The political argument revolves around what we should do and how effectively we communicate our intended response to each of these important audiences.

Observations. You have had the benefit of two NSPG discussions over the last month. You have also had subsequent discussions with a number of key players on this issue. The real programmatic response options are few, largely because of fiscal and Congressionally-related constraints and the paucity of overriding military rationale. After reviewing all of these it is my judgement that, even in the face of the serious problem posed by Soviet noncompliance, the critical tasks we face in requiring the assistance of the Congress and the allies will be inestimably more difficult if we set aside the SALT numerical limits without a strong military rationale. At the same time, some concrete form of response is warranted.

Draft NSDD. In light of the above, we have carefully reviewed and drawn upon the policy options presented for your consideration and developed the draft NSDD provided at *Tab A*.³ It attempts to balance our concern about Soviet noncompliance with the need to sustain the current strategic modernization program while at the same time

³ Printed as Document 105.

adjusting it to apply a greater pressure on Soviet behavior between now and November. It also mandates that we take actions which represent proportionate responses to specific instances of Soviet noncompliance.

What, in effect, the decision contained in this NSDD does, is to adjust the timeframe for when we reach the end of the "extra mile." Instead of calling the Soviet mortgage due now, by retaining submarines that are really too old to be militarily useful, we lay the marker clearly down now that the extra mile will end at the next U.S. deployment milestone, which will occur in November, if the Soviets do not take the positive actions required to meet your established policy criteria. In short, we would dismantle the two older POSEIDONs, that we had planned to retire anyway, on schedule. We would call for additional ICBM options to be ready by November and accelerate the advanced cruise missile program. Finally, we would indicate that the conditions we will face in November are very different from today's and would signal our resolve to move beyond the 1320 MIRV limit, if needed at that time. While this does kick the can down the road to November, the situation in November will be much better for us in providing economic and military rationales for moving.

By pushing the likely breaking of SALT numerical limits off until November, we should recognize this could impact any plans for a November or December summit. However, as outlined above, the November milestone would be signaled now as an incentive to constructive Soviet behavior and is a much better one to use for the purpose of making an appropriate response if needed. The NSDD makes it clear that unless the Soviets meet your conditions by November, the U.S. will exceed the 1320 SALT II MIRV limit. By making this point early, we shift the burden onto the Soviets' back and make it something they must factor into their summit plans.

The NSDD does break some new ground in calling for an options paper on the U.S. ICBM modernization program by November, 1985. This is a packaging of work that is already largely in progress in DOD. The *new* elements are that it raises the possibility of a new mobile MIRVed missile and a program involving *both* a small, single warhead mobile missile (our MIDGETMAN) *and* a slightly larger, MINUTEMAN-like MIRVed mobile missile as a follow-on.

The added military utility of a survivable, mobile MIRVed ICBM is obvious. The increased cost effectiveness of such a system is equally clear. (It results in less cost per warhead because it is missiles and mobile launchers, not warheads, that drive the costs up). What may be less clear is the leverage that would be exerted on both the Soviets and the Hill by just the idea that you might really pursue two new mobile missiles, in addition to MX.

On the Hill, as long as you are seen as calling for more options and the rebuilding of bipartisan consensus, we should have a positive tool which adds bargaining leverage for our ICBM modernization and the strategic modernization program, in general. We must avoid giving the impression that we have already decided on a specific path.

By clearly stating your intention to focus on a full range of ICBM modernization decisions in November and by asking the Hill to join you in a bipartisan approach to this decision, you will have affirmed a direct association between our modernization programs and arms control that will be difficult for our opponents to attack. This important advantage can be achieved at little programmatic cost, since the work between now and November will consist of studies not actual development work.

Cabinet Views. I have not coordinated this draft NSDD with either George Shultz or Cap Weinberger. Their positions on this issue are clear. George feels that we should take some responses now, but strongly opposes anything that breaks the SALT II numerical limits. Therefore, he wants us to dismantle the two POSEIDON submarines on schedule. Cap, on the other hand, thinks we should not dismantle the submarines and should thus break the SALT numerical limits *now*. However, the problem with Cap's position is that the mechanism he uses to break the limits does not provide a degree of military utility that is sufficient to balance the political costs involved. All this being said, the solution offered in the NSDD meets George's requirements for now by dismantling POSEIDONs in response to the May milestone while, at the same time, committing us to satisfy Cap's requirements by not dismantling any more U.S. systems at the next milestone in November, if the Soviets have still not met your criteria. Neither George nor Cap will likely be happy, but I believe this is the best, most prudent course under the circumstances.

Recommendation. I would recommend the approach outlined in this NSDD be used as an appropriate vehicle for consulting with the Congress and our Allies. Their reactions to this approach will be important to consider in your taking the final decision (both the timing and the substance).

Recommendation:

OK NO

— — That you approve the draft NSDD provided for your consideration at *Tab A*.⁴

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval, and wrote a checkmark beside his initials.

105. National Security Decision Directive 222¹

Washington, April 21, 1986

CONSULTATIONS ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY (U)

I have completed my review of the extensive reports provided to me by the Secretary of Defense and the analyses prepared by the Arms Control Support Group and the Senior Arms Control Group. I have also profited from the advice given to me by Members of Congress and by various Allied leaders. Based upon this advice and a number of National Security Planning Group discussions of this issue, I have reached some tentative judgments on how to proceed with respect to U.S. policy concerning interim restraint and near-term U.S. responses to the continuing pattern of Soviet non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. (U)

Before taking any final decisions, however, I would like to share my tentative judgements with key Congressional and Allied leaders and once again have the benefit of their views. Therefore, I direct that these leaders be consulted and briefed along the lines outlined below. Further, these consultations should be completed by April 25 so that I have the option of making and announcing a final decision on this matter before the upcoming Tokyo summit, if I so choose. (S)

1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a policy commitment not to undercut these agreements. (U)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-092, NSDD 222. Secret. Poindexter distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Crowe, Adelman, Nitze, and Rowny under cover of an April 21 memorandum: "The President has directed consultations be conducted with appropriate Allies drawing upon the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-222). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the approach, it is directed that the NSDD-222 document be held by the addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.)

1985 Decision. In June, 1985, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy in light of the continuing pattern of Soviet non-compliance with its arms control commitments. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain and scrupulously complied with the terms of its commitments. (U)

By contrast, I noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly violated some of its arms control obligations. My reports to the Congress over the past three years on Soviet noncompliance enumerate and document in detail our serious concerns about Soviet violations of the SALT II, and other arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The overall judgment I reached in June, 1985, was that while the Soviets had observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had violated important elements of those agreements and associated political commitments. (U)

In June, I noted that these are very crucial issues, for to be serious about effective arms control is to be serious about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. (U)

I also noted that the United States had raised our serious concerns with the Soviet Union many times in diplomatic channels, including the US/Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. Unfortunately, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, my assessment was that the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations had expanded as they continued to modernize their strategic forces. Consequently, in that June assessment I was forced to conclude that the Soviet Union was not exercising the equal restraint upon which our policy had been conditioned, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and that of our allies. (U)

At the same time, given our goal of reducing the size of nuclear arsenals, I made the judgment that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. However, the U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone. It requires the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance,

resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted military build-up. While the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a willingness to move in this direction, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, I announced that I was prepared to go the extra mile to try to establish an interim framework of true, mutual restraint. (U)

To provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, I decided that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. I also indicated that the Soviet Union should reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military build-up. Further, I decided that the United States would constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long term security interests of the United States and its allies. In doing so, we would consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations. (U)

As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, I announced that we would take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are also called for to make it perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. Therefore, I stated clearly that the United States would develop appropriate and proportionate responses and it would take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. (U)

Finally, I decided that, to provide adequate time for the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the U.S. would deactivate and disassemble, according to agreed procedures, an existing older POSEIDON submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine put to sea in August, 1985. However, I directed that the U.S. keep open all future programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur. I made it clear that, as these later milestones are reached, I would assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation and Soviet actions in meeting the conditions cited above. (U)

The 8th TRIDENT. On May 20, the eighth TRIDENT submarine will begin sea trials. As called for by our policy, I have assessed our options

with respect to that milestone. I have considered both Soviet behavior since my June, 1985, decision and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both that behavior and our programmatic options. (U)

With respect to the criteria that I established for gauging Soviet movement to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint, (i.e., correction of Soviet noncompliance, reversal of the Soviet military build-up, and effort to move forward in negotiations), the situation is not encouraging. (U)

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in some areas of U.S. concern, for example with respect to the production rate of BACKFIRE bombers, there has been no real progress in meeting U.S. concerns in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new ICBM type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing. (U)

We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force improvement program. In fact, we have recently observed the Soviets' attempt to launch what probably is another new follow-on heavy ballistic missile. The test failed in an accident that destroyed the missile and its silo—but certainly the program associated with this missile will continue. (S)

Finally, after a hopeful meeting in Geneva, we have yet to see the Soviets follow-up in negotiations on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to seek common ground, especially through the principle of 50% reductions appropriately applied and through an INF agreement. (U)

In light of these circumstances, it is my judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of mutual interim restraint. At the same time, as we consider options associated with the milestone next month of the sea trials of the eighth TRIDENT, we must also look at the programmatic options available to the U.S. and judge these in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security. (U)

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face, makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources. (U)

We had long planned to retire two older POSEIDON submarines when the NEVADA, the eighth TRIDENT submarine entered sea trials.

It is my judgment that military and economic realities argue that the common sense path to pursue at this milestone is to retire and dismantle these submarines, according to agreed procedures, as planned at this particular milestone. (S)

In the near-term, I believe the most essential response to the continued pattern of Soviet non-compliance with its commitments remains the full implementation of our carefully planned strategic modernization program. My decision to retire these two older POSEIDON submarines is fully in accordance with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our security and that of our allies—nothing more and nothing less. This goal ensures that the appropriate, best and proper use is made of our national resources. It also attests to the fact that we do not seek to retain nuclear forces for their own sake, but only if they clearly contribute in a direct way to our national security and that of our allies. This is the heart of my judgment that, at this particular milestone, the proper course with respect to these two older POSEIDON submarines is to retire them in the manner planned. (S)

Additional Steps. On the other hand, last June I announced that the U.S. would take appropriate and proportionate actions when needed. It is my view that certain additional steps are now warranted by the lack of Soviet movement up to this point. (U)

First, our highest priority remains the full implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program, to underwrite our deterrence today, and the pursuit of the SDI research program to provide better alternatives in the future. The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, was called for by the Scowcroft Commission and is fully supported by our military leadership. This program was very carefully crafted by our best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S. options and provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. It is absolutely critical that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance, would increase the risk to our security and that of our allies, would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing arsenals that we seek, and thus, send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership. (U)

Secondly, Soviet actions to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of great concern. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing and deployment of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation. I noted that since the noncompliance

associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States, therefore, reserved the right to respond appropriately. At that time, I also noted that the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard. Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the deployment of over 75 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, I intend to call upon the Congress to join with me in restoring bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program. (S)

The program we require should include the full deployment of the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. The PEACEKEEPER is fully permitted by existing arms control agreements. Furthermore, it was originally designed specifically to meet U.S. security needs under these agreements. It simply makes both good military and economic sense to fully exploit the great technical success that we have had with this missile. But, our program must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future. Our small ICBM program makes a significant contribution not only in this regard, but also as an appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet violation associated with their SS-25 mobile missile. (S)

To ensure that I have a more robust range of options as I approach future milestones, I intend to direct the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. In doing so, and in light of continued Soviet ICBM development, this assessment should address options to:

- exploit more fully the success of the PEACEKEEPER program to include recommendations on the basing of the next 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles;

- accelerate, if I so choose, the current small ICBM in roughly its current configuration;

- institute an alternative program focused on a MIRVed mobile MINUTEMAN-like ICBM; and,

- consider programs which build upon the PEACEKEEPER deployment but also include in an appropriate mix with the PEACEKEEPER deployments *either* a small, single warhead mobile ICBM with a relatively early initial operational capability *or* MIRVed mobile MINUTEMAN-like ICBM which could be deployed with a later initial operational capability, *or both*. (S)

Finally, I also intend to direct the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, working with the Congress, to reallocate funds currently in the Defense budget to permit us to accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruise Missile. I would not, at this time, direct any increase in the total program procurement, but rather establish a more

efficient production rate that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future. (S)

Implications for the Future. In addressing U.S. deployment milestones as they occur on a case-by-case basis, we must look primarily to the future rather than the past. In implementing the judgments that I have just outlined, we should fully recognize that, while our policy remains under constant review, we will face the next programmatic milestone near the end of this year as the 131st U.S. heavy bomber is modified for cruise missile carriage. (U)

By that late-1986 milestone, the Soviet Union will have had about one and one-half years to demonstrate by deeds its desire to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint. Also, under current U.S. plans, we will not have an older POSEIDON readily available due for scheduled retirement at that particular time. The conditions that are associated with this milestone in late 1986 will be significantly different than those faced as the NEVADA begins sea trials. (S)

When we approach the conversion of the 131st U.S. heavy bomber to cruise missile carriage, near the end of this year, under the SALT II limit of 1320 total MIRVed delivery systems, the U.S. would either have to halt the conversion of U.S. heavy bombers or to take extraordinary action to begin dismantlement of one of our MINUTEMAN III ICBM silos; or one of our cruise-missile carrying heavy bombers; or yet another POSEIDON submarine. Some of these alternatives may be unavailable or involve the loss of badly needed military capabilities. In short, significantly increased military costs will come directly to bear at that point. (S)

The United States has exercised considerable restraint in the face of Soviet behavior. It should be recognized clearly, by all concerned, that I can not prudently continue dismantling U.S. systems if the criteria, which I outlined in June, 1985, are not met before the milestone associated with the conversion of the 131st U.S. heavy bomber to cruise missile carriage is reached. I state this as a simple fact, not as an ultimatum. Acknowledging it directly now is necessary to ensure that none miss the implications of the actions I am prepared to take as the NEVADA enters sea trials. It also provides both strong military and political incentives to the Soviet Union to join us in establishing the interim framework of truly mutual restraint that remains our preferred course. (S)

Conclusions. The United States has been exercising, and will continue to exercise, greater restraint than the Soviet Union in modernizing its nuclear deterrent. However, we will take those actions needed to provide sufficient, modern forces to underwrite our security and that of our allies. (U)

In June, 1985, I committed to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take

the steps necessary to join us in establishing a mutual framework of interim restraint. It is my judgment that, in light of the circumstances I have described, we should undertake the immediate responses outlined above. The end of the “extra mile” is now in view if the Soviet Union does not take the positive steps required. We must, together with our friends and allies, face this reality and call upon the Soviet Union to take the necessary, positive steps *now*. (U)

Closing Observation. I closed my June, 1985, decision document with the following paragraph.

“I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm, lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the currently ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined above involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor. My hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will jointly be able to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would begin the process of reducing the size of these arsenals.” (U)

Time has not altered the basic truth of this statement. Even if the Soviet Union does choose to join with us in establishing such a framework of truly mutual restraint, as I hope that they do, this is at best an interim step. It is not a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. (C)

It remains my hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary steps to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50 percent reductions in nuclear arms, appropriately applied, and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the Soviets take those steps, together we can achieve greater stability and a safer world. (C)

An Afterword on Encryption. My guidance on the content of consultation is contained in the paragraphs above. This guidance does not include any discussion of the issue of encryption. I have reviewed the recommendations made by the Senior Arms Control Group on this issue, and I approve those recommendations. (C)

The U.S. will continue to press the Soviets to resolve our legitimate concerns and to cease their encryption practices which impede U.S. verification of compliance. However, we will not discuss the option of the encryption of U.S. ballistic systems as a programmatic response to Soviet non-compliance in this area. (S)

Ronald Reagan

106. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Watson) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, April 22, 1986

SUBJECT

President's Tentative Decision on Interim Restraint

Attached is the April 18 memo² from John Poindexter to the President and the draft NSDD on interim restraint consultations. The very damaging leak to Associated Press yesterday started the cavalcade towards the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* stories this morning. Larry Speakes was forced yesterday afternoon to respond even before Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny had a chance to consult with allies and to hear their views.

The President's tentative decision is to continue for the time being our "no undercut" policy by dismantling and destroying two Poseidon submarines, but also deciding now and serving notice now that in November the United States will exceed the SALT II limit of 1320 MIRVd systems.³ In John's memo to the President he clearly states that neither Shultz nor Weinberger will be happy with the decision, but sees it as the "best, most prudent course under the circumstances."

The President's tentative decision is about as clear a statement as could be made that he has now decided where the end of the "extra mile" will be—November/December 1986. It is also clear that the President's patience with Soviet behavior has run its course.

Why this decision now?⁴

— In June, 1985, the President decided on the "extra mile" interim restraint policy.⁵

— Soviet violations continue with little abatement.⁶

— No effort by the Soviets to come back into compliance.⁷

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Sam Watson Files, Country File, OA/ID 19865-020, Arms Control-Interim Restraint. Secret; Sensitive.

² Not attached. See Document 105. Also not attached are the Associated Press story and Speakes's Statement.

³ Bush underlined much of this sentence.

⁴ Bush underlined "Why this decision now?"

⁵ Bush wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.

⁶ Bush wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.

⁷ Bush wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.

— Some of their violations, such as the SS–25 single warhead mobile are irreversible. (Though at the same time, the Soviets deny that they have violated what we cite as examples.)⁸

— Because we have two submarines available now for D&D, we can continue our “no undercut” policy (N.B., not the same as abiding).

— Come November, the Soviets will have had one and a half years to make the effort to return to compliance;⁹ have had seven months notice of our intent. But, most importantly to the USG decision-making structure—we will have no submarines or other MIRVd systems available to trade for the 131st ALCM heavy bomber. (A side comment: This could put the test to the JCS to see how they would resolve having to cut up perfectly good systems for the 131st AHB if the President were to reverse this decision.)

— We need Congressional support now for continuance of the President’s Strategic Force Modernization Program.

In reality, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviets to return to compliance. Thus, the President’s tentative decision makes it a foregone conclusion that we will go beyond the SALT II limit of 1320 MIRVd systems.¹⁰

Given that the Summit meeting with Gorbachev appears to be slipping to the end of the year, our policy announcement now lets the implications soak in both here, abroad, and with the Soviet leadership. Does it endanger the Summit? Doubtful—the Soviets will scream and kick, but Gorbachev needs the Summit for domestic political reasons.¹¹

One could read into the decision that the President has decided against Weinberger’s views.

Finally, I would think there is some possibility that we will take flak for commissioning yet another study on ICBM requirements and their basing. The truth is DOD has been unable to get its act together over the years on an ICBM requirements policy and this is yet another attempt by the White House to flush out a recommendation. In asking DOD to study requirements for Minuteman-like mobile MIRVd ICBMs, we will at some point have to consider walking back the U.S. November 1985 START negotiating position banning mobile MIRVs.¹²

⁸ Bush placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.

⁹ Bush underlined this clause.

¹⁰ Bush underlined this paragraph. An unknown hand wrote an X in the left-hand margin beside it.

¹¹ Bush underlined the last two sentences of this paragraph. An unknown hand wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside it.

¹² Bush underlined the last two sentences of this paragraph.

107. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 23, 1986

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD on Interim Restraint

Issue

Should you approve the draft NSDD on U.S. interim restraint policy at *Tab A*?²

Background

The draft NSDD is based upon the draft Presidential statement which we discussed on Wednesday.³

Discussion

The NSDD differs from the Presidential statement only in that it adds some additional detail to some of the taskings and addresses the issue of encryption which should be kept out of the public record.

Recommendation

OK NO

— — That you approve and sign the draft NSDD at *Tab A*.⁴

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-093, NSDD-227. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² Printed as Document 108.

³ May 21. Reagan met with Shultz and Poindexter in the Oval Office from 1:28 until 1:56 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval and wrote a checkmark next to his initials.

108. National Security Decision Directive 227¹

Washington, May 23, 1986

U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY (S)

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I interim offensive agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup. (C)

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. One simply can not be serious about effective arms control unless one is equally serious about compliance. (C)

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded at that time that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union additional, adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-093, NSDD-227. Secret; Noform. Poindexter distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Crowe, and Adelman under cover of a May 27 memorandum: "Following Allied and Congressional consultations, the President has signed and issued the attached NSDD. In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the approach, it is directed that until a formal White House statement on this subject is issued, the NSDD-227 document be held by the addressees and that no copies be made. It is further directed a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document prior to the White House statement be maintained by the office of each addressee." (Ibid.)

future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements. (C)

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. As called for by our policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both that behavior and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging. (C)

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas of U.S. concern, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new ICBM type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force improvement program. Finally, since the Geneva summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow-up constructively on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). (C)

Based on Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security. (C)

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources. (C)

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were

exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I direct their retirement and dismantlement as planned. (C)

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations. (C)

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet non-compliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one. (C)

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet non-compliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their non-compliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs. (C)

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of their massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I will call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also

look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I direct the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. In doing so, this assessment should address options to: exploit more fully the success of the PEACEKEEPER program to include recommendations on the basing of the next 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles; accelerate, if I so choose, the current small ICBM in roughly its current configuration; consider a MIRVed mobile ICBM; and, consider programs which build upon the PEACEKEEPER deployment but also include in an appropriate mix with the PEACEKEEPER deployments *either* a small, single warhead mobile ICBM with a relatively early initial operational capability *or* MIRVed mobile ICBM which could be deployed with a later initial operational capability, *or both*. (S)

Third, I direct the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, working with the Congress, to reallocate funds currently in the Defense budget to permit us to accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruise Missile. This does not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather is intended to establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future. (S)

Fourth, I direct the Department of Defense to undertake a systematic effort to reduce the availability of militarily sensitive information about critical strategic programs which could be of use to the Soviet Union in reducing the effectiveness of these programs. Moreover, the Department will preserve options to deny sensitive data. These options should be designed to support a decision concerning the encryption of telemetry at a future time. This guidance does not apply to the TRIDENT D-5 missile which will not be encrypted. There will be no public statement concerning this initiative or discussion of it with foreign nationals or governments. Finally, the Department of Defense will provide to me not later than June 30, 1986, a short report laying out its recommendations for U.S. policy on encryption of U.S. telemetry affecting U.S. military programs which would have been constrained by the SALT II Treaty, taking into account future arms reduction regimes. (S/NOFORN)

This brings us to the question of the SALT II Treaty. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and

its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it. (C)

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and SLBMs) even though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the ineffectiveness of SALT II in constraining ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint. (C)

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have undercut SALT II Treaty. Last June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and additional, adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose. Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in a flawed treaty which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and, in addition, which has been violated by the Soviet Union. (C)

The United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, and the United States will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, at that time, I intend to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate

response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time, even now, to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account. (C)

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the past Soviet build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. The United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. (C)

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting our strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. (C)

However, no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union does so, we can together immediately achieve greater stability and a safer world. (C)

This directive supersedes NSDD 222.² (C)

Ronald Reagan

²See Document 105.

109. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, May 24, 1986

SUBJECT

SALT I Issue

In working the Q&As associated with this decision,² due to the concentration of effort on addressing SALT II, there was some confusion with respect to the impact of the decision on SALT I.

*Tab A*³ provides a quick summary of the SALT I limits and a comparison of the legal status of both SALT I and SALT II. The SALT I Interim Agreement which covers offensive forces was never a Treaty per se. It was an Executive Agreement with a specific 5 year limited duration which was subsequently endorsed by a Joint Resolution of the Congress. It expired as a legally binding document in 1977. At that time, observance of it was continued by political commitments made by Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko for the duration of the SALT II negotiations. In making those commitments, side intentionally did not use exactly the same statements so that there would be no question of these commitments having the weight of legally binding international agreements. After SALT II was negotiated, SALT I was in a rather ambiguous status, especially after our clarification provided to the Soviet Union in 1981 that the U.S. did not intend to ratify SALT II—which also ended any formal obligations we had under customary international law with respect to SALT II. In 1982, when the President announced his policy of not undercutting existing agreements, SALT I and SALT II were both again included together in that political commitment. We have no legal impediment to ending observation of the expired SALT I agreement at this time if we so choose.

*Tab B*⁴ provides the text of both Article 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act and the Jackson Amendment. Article 33 provides the basis of the Hollings' suit that has bothered the President. The Jackson Amendment was spurred by the basic inequities in the SALT I Agreement. In considering what we do, we should not forget that while SALT I does provide some protection for the U.S. (i.e., limits growth of heavy missiles to some extent, provides some constraint on Soviet

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-093, NSDD-227. Secret. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Poindexter saw it.

² See Document 108.

³ Attached but not printed is an undated paper.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

systems, provides dismantlement procedures), it does so at the price of letting the Soviet Union retain more SLBM and ICBM launchers than the United States. Given the nature of the President's decision with respect to SALT II, this would have indicated to us that he would want to distance himself from the risk of institutionalizing the inequities of SALT I at the same time—rather than extend them.

*Tab C*⁵ shows the likely impact of SALT I on US forces. The bottom line here is that if no additional POSEIDON submarines are retired after JACKSON and GREENE, we will once again hit the SALT I limit on SLBMs in May/June 1989.⁶

*Tab D*⁷ addresses Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreement. We have found them to be in unambiguous violation on one issue (the use of "remaining facilities" at former SS-7 sites). We have also expressed our concern about the conversion of a YANKEE to cruise missile carriage.

Although not addressed directly in either the Presidential Statement or in NSDD 227, we were postured to distance ourselves from *both* SALT II and SALT I in implementing this decision. If asked about the SALT I agreement, the proposed response we have developed is as follows:

— *Alternative A*: U.S. interim restraint policy since 1982 has always involved both the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms and the SALT II Treaty. Both agreements have expired, and both have been violated by the Soviet Union. As the President announced, we will make future decisions about our strategic forces on the basis of U.S. and Allied security needs as affected by the size and magnitude of Soviet forces, rather than on the basis of the terms of the expired SALT I or SALT II agreements. However, in doing so, the President has emphasized that the U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, does not anticipate appreciable U.S. force growth, and will not deploy more Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

The alternative would be to attempt to isolate the President's decision to SALT II. Ken Adelman has long supported this approach, and the JCS would likely also be more comfortable with this. If accepted by the Soviets in practice, it would provide some continuity with the past and some constraint on Soviet action. On the other hand, it does risk institutionalizing a very unequitable set of limits. If the President wished to reverse our view of his intention, the way we would characterize the U.S. position on SALT I would be as follows:

⁵ Attached but not printed are an April 1986 paper prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; an undated paper, "SALT I and II Dismantlement Requirements;" and an undated paper, "Strategic Modernization vs SALT II Fact Sheet."

⁶ Linhard wrote "TENTH TRIDENT" below this sentence.

⁷ Attached but not printed is a paper, "Unambiguous Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements."

— *Alternative B*: The SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms has expired, but the United States will, for the time being, continue its policy of not undercutting this agreement to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint. We do so noting that the Soviets have violated this agreement, and we call on them once again to correct these violations. [If asked, we are continuing our policy with respect to SALT I because the Soviet violations are less significant than those associated with SALT II.]

Recommendation

Having taken the step with respect to SALT II, and given the considerations outlined above, that we attempt to put this entire matter behind us by using the approach outline in Alternative A; and that you seek Presidential approval for this approach.⁸

⁸ Poindexter approved the recommendation on May 27 and wrote below the “approve line”: “President agrees.” Linhard wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “UNODIR—I will set up the material with *SALT I* included with *SALT II*.” Later that day, the White House released a statement from President Reagan announcing that “in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty, which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.” (“Statement on Soviet and United States Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,” May 27; *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 678–681)

110. Electronic Message From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to Stephen Sestanovich of the National Security Council Staff and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (McDaniel)¹

Washington, June 4, 1986, 9:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

S—W—P Breakfast: Arms Control Discussion

This was the exciting part.

Cap asked if anyone had seen the vaunted new Soviet proposal for 50% cuts, in return for which we were to extend the ABM treaty for 20

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 2615. Secret. Copies were sent to Linhard, Matlock, and Sestanovich. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found.

years;² i.e., did we know what kind of cuts they were now talking about? Shultz said no, there was a general proposal to discuss a 15–20-year extension plus refinement of certain definitions in the treaty, in return for which they would discuss 50% cuts. Weinberger lit into this, saying it was just a backdoor attempt to kill SDI after all frontal efforts had failed. If we were just patient and firm, eventually the Soviets would agree to deep cuts; the President had to educate the American people—even if he had sometimes to put out new language that essentially repackaged our present proposals. SDI wasn't doing too badly in Congress even though we would end up with less than our request.

The Admiral pointed out the need to institutionalize SDI so it would survive this Administration; we weren't there yet. Everyone agreed with this—but there was sharp disagreement on how to accomplish it. Cap argued that if we agreed to any restrictions of any kind we would undercut the sense of urgency and commitment and undermine public and congressional support for SDI—in exchange for Soviet promises that probably weren't worth a lot. Shultz offered an alternative line of thinking (“at the risk of ruining your day,” he said): The decision to deploy was in the hands of a future President in any case; an agreement not to deploy before, say, 1990–1992 wasn't giving anything away. In exchange we would get deep reductions and a continuing SDI research program that was at the very least a hedge against Soviet offensive cheating. Cap repeated his view that our SDI program would be undermined while the Soviets charged ahead with theirs.

Before silverware started to be thrown, Shultz deflected the conversation by smiling and saying he had to leave early to deliver a speech on the Philippines.³

NOTE TO BOB LINHARD: The Admiral asked me afterward if you could do a paper on what we could safely agree to on the ABM treaty. He feels that reopening the treaty is not necessarily a loser for us; it could legitimize SDI, and the Soviets too should have an interest in preserving this option. He said he was waiting for an answer from SDIO about when our research would become stymied under the broad or the restrictive definitions of research. He could foresee some agreed refinements in the treaty having to do with research, development, testing, and deployment—once we were clear about the practical implications.

² Reference is to Gorbachev's June 1 “Oral Communication to the President and Other World Leaders,” which the Department transmitted to all OECD capitals in telegram 174582, June 3.

³ Reference is to Shultz's address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York. The text of the address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1986, pp. 26–30.

111. Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

TALKING POINTS FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

INTRODUCTION

— Mr. President, the agenda today is a review of the current status of U.S.-Soviet relations and our objectives.

— The U.S. position vis a vis the Soviet Union is now very strong. We need to exploit this subtly but effectively so that we can lock the Soviets into some agreements which protect U.S. interests.

— To do this, we need a strategy which will allow us to:

- (1) keep the high ground in public opinion both at home and abroad on the issue of the pursuit of peace;
- (2) bring the Soviets out of their shell regarding arms control; and
- (3) get down to real give-and-take bargaining in Geneva.

— Our plan for today's meeting is to ask George to provide his view of the current state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and where we are going.

— With this as a foundation, I will then offer an assessment of where we might consider focusing work, particularly in the area of arms control, over the month of June to provide greater leverage and options as appropriate for your consideration and use before the summer break in Europe.

— Different approach. Top down versus bottom up.

[*Secretary Shultz makes his remarks.* Immediately after, pick-up with the following points.]

— Thank you, George.

— The area that is likely to provide the key to a successful U.S. strategy remains arms control.

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 843, Subject File, 1986, General Arms Control: Set B. Secret; Extremely Sensitive. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for June 6 from 11 a.m. until 11:45 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original. Poindexter sent the talking points to Shultz, Weinberger, and Crowe under cover of a June 7 memorandum: "Here are the talking points I used yesterday. Because of their sensitivity I am having them delivered directly to you. Please protect. We have tentatively scheduled a follow-on meeting for Tuesday, June 10, 1986, at 10:45 a.m. in the Situation Room." (Ibid.) For a record of the June 6 NSPG meeting, see Document 112.

— This is due to many factors, ranging from the compelling Congressional and public interest this subject generates both at home and abroad to the simple fact that it is in this area in which the Soviets will continue to offer to us the greatest immediate public challenge.

— Since the November summit, the Soviets have attempted to shift the focus from seeking common ground by offering the January 15th plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and then backfilling details in many areas.

— This has resulted in a fairly steady Soviet drum beat that gives the impression of steady Soviet movement on arms control across a broad front.

— So far, the basic soundness of our positions have permitted us to stand up relatively well against what largely has amounted thus far in a constant repackaging by the Soviets of a few basic Soviet initiatives.

— However, over time, this Soviet tactic will have an effect—especially if they add new elements every so often and as other international events unrelated to arms control (Libya, trade, etc.) temporarily weakening the cohesiveness of our relations with critical allies.

— The Soviets are certainly going to use the SALT decision to their advantage.

— Therefore, the *first proposition* that I would like to place on the table for discussion today is that the United States should take steps before the European summer break to both counter the Soviet arms control offensive and to better position ourselves to go on the offensive and achieve U.S. objectives in this area in the fall.²

— Carrying this a step further, and given the broad front upon which we are being challenged by the Soviet Union, the *second proposition* I would like to offer for discussion is that the U.S. strategy must be equally comprehensive, effectively addressing six general areas: the Defense and Space area and especially the status of the ABM Treaty, START, INF, nuclear testing, conventional force reductions, and confidence building measures.

— In each of these areas, to construct U.S. strategy, we should consider whether we need a priority reexamination of our current position in light of the recent Soviet maneuvers to see if:

(1) a repackaging/restatement of our current position would best serve our interests; and

(2) to see if there are new elements or options that we should consider.

² Weinberger drew a curved vertical line in the right-hand margin beside this paragraph and placed an X to the right of it.

— This done, we also need to consider how the President can present a comprehensive picture, encompassing all these elements to *some* degree, both to counter the broad front initiative that Gorbachev has launched and to use the linkages implicit in this type of initiative *to our advantage*.

— I would like to take just a few more moments to talk a bit about a few of the six areas. Not all offer the same challenges, opportunities and risks.

— *Defense and Space*. Probably the most difficult area we will face is the area of Defense and Space, and especially the treatment of the ABM Treaty, its relationship to SDI, and the linkage that the Soviets are trying to establish between the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty and progress in reductions in offensive forces.

— As we all know, the Soviets recently surfaced the offer that if we will agree to negotiate a mutually acceptable definition of what is permitted research under the ABM Treaty and then commit to remain in compliance with the Treaty under this definition for some 15–20 years, they are prepared to move forward with implementing the principle of 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms using roughly the SALT definition of those arms. Of course, this is an unacceptable position for us.³

— Our task is to determine how we can best position ourselves to:

(1) not only maintain near-term support in Congress for SDI, but institutionalize that support so that the program lives beyond this Administration;

(2) avoid commitments that constrain realistic U.S. options for SDI;

(3) press forward with immediate reductions in offensive forces;

(4) establish the foundation for a stable transition to a more defense dominated deterrence; and

(5) figure out a way to share the benefits of strategic defense with the Soviets as the President has said he wants to do.

— In addressing this problem, there are a number of factors—some facts of life, some assumptions—which we need to consider.

— In some sense, these factors are the pieces which we need to rearrange to determine if there is an opportunity here for the U.S.

— First, it is clear that the President's vision for the SDI program cannot be achieved during this Administration. We are several years away from reaching any deployment decisions. Therefore, we have roughly two years left to ensure that SDI is sufficiently institutionalized so that the President's vision has a life of its own in subsequent Administrations. This argues for some active strategy being put in place as soon as possible.

³ See footnote 2, Document 110.

— Second, the Soviets have publicly challenged our program expressing concern about its impact on an arms race and stability, and accusing us of violating and preparing to abrogate the ABM Treaty. We must be in a position to handle these charges publicly to be able to maintain support for the program in Congress and in Europe.

— Third, the Soviets also have other concerns which may privately drive their actions (e.g., fear of success in X-ray lasers, fear of technical competition, fear of expense of competition, concern about effectiveness of mixed US offensive/defensive force). We must be in a position to use these concerns as levers to achieve effectively US objectives with respect to SDI and in offensive force reductions.

— Fourth, during this period of deficit reductions there will be continuing pressure to cut budgets.

— Fifth, the Soviets are proceeding with their own version of a strategic defensive system.

— Sixth, the relationship between the future of the SDI program and the ABM Treaty is complex—subject to opposing assumptions which must be sorted out in a fairly objective fashion.

— Some hold the assumption that a future Administration will not be able to make a decision to move beyond research to full-scale development if the program continues to be constrained under the limitations of either the narrow or broad interpretations of the ABM Treaty as we now know it. Many who hold this view would argue that we should get out from under this treaty *now*, while this President's latitude for action is maximized.

— At the same time, others feel strongly that, for the foreseeable future, the SDI program could not survive politically the U.S. abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

— Seventh, the President has committed that before deployment, and without giving the Soviets a veto, we would discuss and *negotiate as appropriate*.

— These factors all tend to point to the conclusion that if we remain under the ABM Treaty, at some point, we will have to discuss testing and deployment with the Soviets.⁴

— At some point the Soviets will also come up against the Treaty restrictions.⁵

— Therefore, in this area, we should quietly and seriously evaluate whether we should agree to talk to them now about the ABM Treaty in an attempt to establish conditions under which the program could

⁴ Weinberger underlined "will have to" and "testing and deployment with the Soviets."

⁵ Weinberger underlined "Soviets will also come up against the."

support a full-scale engineering decision within the Treaty, thus protecting the President's vision and permitting institutionalization of the program—*provided that we can use this to get something significant in terms of offensive reductions for this movement on the ABM Treaty.*⁶

— We need to see if there is an option which would permit us to reach an agreement which would permit us to:

(1) begin significant reductions in an equitable and verifiable fashion;

(2) accept an understanding of the ABM Treaty that would not restrict research and testing necessary and sufficient to support a full-scale engineering decision;

(3) Accept restrictions on deployment of SDI (e.g., only deploy a system after some notification or negotiating period of fixed length);

(4) remove restrictions if there is non-compliance with agreed offensive reductions or with the ABM Treaty; and

(5) account for Soviet violation of the existing ABM Treaty as a quid pro quo.

— *Nuclear Testing.* In the nuclear testing area, we face a similar challenge.

— The US position clearly specifies the conditions under which the US can view a CTB as a long-term goal.

— We have also made it clear that we believe the first step should be to work to resolve the verification aspects of the TTBT and PNET—and have proposed CORTEX to do this.

— Still, we also should be prepared to discuss what we intend in the period between a ratification of TTBT and the achievement of conditions that would permit a CTB.

— The ideas that have long been proposed tend to group themselves either in limits on the number of tests conducted each year linked to reductions in nuclear arsenals or a gradual lowering of the TTBT threshold over time also linked to progress in offensive force reductions.

— Both of these require analysis.

— *Other Areas.* Similar work can be done in the other areas mentioned (START, INF, conventional forces and confidence building measures).

— The basic idea is to see if Presidential guidance should be provided the Arms Control Support Group, and the Senior Arms Control Group to work out the details of some proposals and forward them to the NSPG for the President's use by the end of the month.

⁶Weinberger placed two short vertical lines in the left-hand and right-hand margins of the underlined portion of this sentence.

— The next round in Geneva ends on June 27th.

— Whatever the result of the quick analysis, the product could be used to make a decision on how to position the U.S.—whether to make a substantive move or just go on a public affairs attack and repackage.

— This could be done perhaps by a letter to Gorbachev, or a Presidential speech, or some combination of diplomatic and public gestures, all of which would be followed up in the appropriate negotiating channels.

— The point, though, is that we need to quietly set the analyses in train so that we move out of the reactive mode and onto the offensive with the Soviets in a manner that:

(1) maintains the high ground needed for public and allied support, and for support of our own programs in Congress;

(2) maximizes the possibility of moving the Soviets in ways that both allow us to institutionalize SDI *and* pursue reductions; and

(3) clearly positions us to shift the onus onto the Soviets if they fail to respond positively to our initiatives.

— Mr. President, unless you have remarks at this point, I would propose we open the floor for discussion.

112. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting, White House Situation Room, 6 June 1986 on US/USSR Relationships, the President and the Vice President both in attendance

George Shultz made a long opening statement about how well the general struggle with the Soviets was going, and the recognized bankruptcy of the Soviet policy, and the ascendancy of Democracy in

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 843, Subject File, 1986, General Arms Control: Set B. No classification marking. Drafted by Weinberger. All brackets are in the original. The official NSPG minutes are in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG), NSPG 0134 06/06/1986 [US-Soviet Relations]. Casey's readout of the meeting is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 239. An image of Shultz's handwritten notes from the meeting are in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Appendix A, with a transcription of the notes at Document 272.

various parts of the world. He concluded that militarily they were basically somewhat weak, having as their only forward bases, “Cuba and Cam’ranh Bay”, and that really they were only good at one thing and that was building very large numbers of ground based Intercontinental Nuclear Missiles.

His recommendations follow:

(1) We must restore funding for Defense and Foreign Aid. We cannot achieve what we need to by giving up this funding.

(2) We must work to keep and to strengthen our relationships with our allies.

(3) We must keep on working and devising proposals that will give us good arms reduction agreements.

John Poindexter then followed with a statement that:

(1) The most hopeful field that we can work in with the Soviets is arms control. It is necessary to do this to secure support at home, as well as among our allies abroad.

(2) There has been a steady flow of Soviet proposals which give them diplomatic and public opinion high ground. They present proposals as having new elements even though they are simply replacing old ones. But this does give them (?) an advantage with our allies and public opinion, and some of our own actions help the Soviets to maintain that advantage—actions such as our decision on the SALT Treaty, passing of protectionist trade bills by the Congress, and the attack on Libya, etc.

Poindexter continued that, therefore, we must take steps to counter the Soviet proposals. Our proposals must be comprehensive, and cover nuclear matters relating both to Defensive Space Weapons and Intermediate Nuclear Force testing, and arms reductions, and confidence building measures.

He said one of the big questions would be should we change any of our existing proposals, or replace them simply because of the favorable presentation of the USSR’s proposals. He asked if we felt we needed to counteract Gorbachev’s proposals.

With respect to Defense and Space, he said that one possibility would be for us to agree to define research and “strengthen the ABM Treaty, and then comply with that in future SDI work. In return, we should get the Soviets’ agreement to move forward with a 50% reduction in offensive weapons, defined by the SALT definition.” He said much of this may be necessary to assure Congressional support for SDI. He wants to avoid any constraints that might restrain research for the Strategic Defense, and he said it was important to institutionalize Strategic Defense to try to bind the next Administration and future Congresses.

He said it was important to bear in mind that the President's vision of SDI could not be achieved by the end of the term. He said research would go on for several years, and we are getting domestic pressure to cut the budget, but we cannot verify or stop the USSR's program to acquire their own SDI. He said that some feel the restraints of the ABM Treaty hurt Strategic Defense, but others feel that SDI could not survive in Congress if we abrogated ABM now. He said eventually the Soviets in their research will come up against the ABM Treaty, so they may want to consider modifying it too. [I don't think the Soviets would "come up against the ABM Treaty". I think they would simply brush through it and set it aside when it gets in the way, as they have done with it and the SALT Treaty. I also believe once we start negotiations on the existing ABM Treaty, we can never retreat or end the matter without some type of agreement, because of public and Congressional opinion, and that such an agreement is bound to be worse than the situation we have now.] Poindexter concluded by saying that we are being hurt on testing. The Soviets apparently have stopped testing, and we should at least negotiate on testing, and work out various means on tests of missiles so we could agree to some form of verification that would enable us to stem some of this.

He said we need to get the high ground, and we need to instruct the bureaucracy to produce new programs and proposals, and to do something that will prevent SDI from being cut badly by Congress.

The President intervened at this point, saying he would have to leave in a moment or two, but he felt the image of Gorbachev as having great and unlimited power was wrong, that he was still feeling his way and trying to consolidate his position. The President implied the Soviets are confused. He told Gorbachev that there was a need for meetings to eliminate mutual mistrust that arises from the continued growth of their offensive strength, and that they have never really changed their stand from their original position, which was world domination and a one-world Communist state. The President recalled that he told Gorbachev we wanted no superiority, but we would not let them increase their margin of superiority.

The President then inquired as to whether we shouldn't send Gorbachev a message thanking him for the few things he has done in connection with Ms. Bonner coming to the U.S.; letting a few people out of jail; and helping a few families; our thanks being predicated on the theory that Gorbachev may be in trouble at home, and may need some ammunition. The President also asked if we should not propose progress in connection with an international group on nuclear power safety (not nuclear weapons), that would try to prevent accidents, and

would provide for immediate dissemination of facts about any accident that did occur.

The President said then we should press for a definite plan leading to reductions of weapons, perhaps starting with INF, since they do agree that could go down to 50%. The President said we should press for that first, and express an understanding of the deep mistrust that SDI arouses.

The President added there is mistrust between us because of the ABM Treaty, but we cannot under any circumstances make SDI a bargaining chip, but we should think of anything we could offer for the future to show we do not want a first strike capability. [I believe we could perfectly well offer to the Soviets and the world promises that Strategic Defense kills weapons, not people, and we could promise we would never develop or deploy in space a system designed to kill people on earth.] SDI is needed and we must continue our research, but would it not be possible to find agreement with respect to those above measures.² Then if and when we can get a system deployed, we will invite them over to view our tests, and then tell them deployment depends on total elimination of nuclear weapons, fully verifiable. We would make the Defense available to them and to the world once we knew it could work to defend against, not the missiles we would eliminate, but any proposed or manufactured by a third country. If we have these defenses, no mad man could use nuclear weapons against us.

Cap Weinberger³

² Weinberger drew a short vertical line in the left-hand and right-hand margin beside this sentence and the previous one.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

113. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 10, 1986

SUBJECT

Eisenhower Seminar, June 6, 1986

The Eisenhower Seminar was formed by Milton Eisenhower during the years when he was President of Johns Hopkins and his brother was President of the United States. It has had a revolving membership of some 20 people drawn from the Executive Branch, Johns Hopkins, business, the Congress, and from the military. It meets 2–3 times a year on Saturdays to discuss foreign and defense policy issues, economic issues, and domestic/political issues. The most recent meeting took place on Saturday, June 6th. The meeting was chaired by Andy Goodpaster; others present were, Harold Brown, Brent Scowcroft, Joe Fowler, Bob Bowie, Jim Billington, Dick Helms, Sol Linowitz, Bob Harvey, Chairman of the Hopkins Board of Trustees Bill Martin, Kenneth Rush, Walter Stoessel, Steve Soulner [*Raymond "Steve" Saulnier*], President Eisenhower's Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Chris Phillips, General William Y. Smith, Admiral Moody, Senator Russell Long, Senator Harry Byrd, and I.

Goodpaster, Scowcroft and Stoessel reported on a recent trip to Moscow. I could find little new in the information they brought back. Billington criticized their trip on the basis that it included only members of Arbatov's Institute, Velekov and some of his scientists and other Soviets specifically tasked to deal with foreigners.

In the ensuing discussion I was heavily pressed on the President's May 27th decision and your and my support of that decision.² I said the argument that we had had with others in the Executive Branch was principally over the method of presentation and that everyone had agreed that the 131st B–52 bomber conversion should go forward. The question was whether to describe that decision as a necessary "appropriate and proportionate response" pursuant to the President's 1985 policy statement on Interim Restraint or to use the occasion to announce our freedom from SALT II constraints. The latter formulation was bound to create problems with the Congress and with our allies.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, June 1986. No classification marking.

² See footnote 8, Document 109.

As far as the Soviets were concerned, I said I thought it was indeterminate whether the positive results of lifting our feet from the fly paper of SALT II would be more than an offset by the opportunity presented to the Soviets to exploit the resulting fissure between our position and that of our allies. I ran into heavy flack from everyone there on this defense.

I then tried a more fundamental line of explanation. I noted that the President was faced with four concurrent sets of considerations: (1) his concern for the Republican Party and its prospects after 1988; (2) his concern for support for his policies from the Congress; (3) his relations with the allies; and (4) his concern for success in negotiating with the Soviets. I said it was difficult to see how one could have success with the Soviets unless the Executive Branch commanded a degree of support from the Congress and from its allies. Furthermore it was difficult to envisage maintaining support from the Congress in the absence of a consensus within the Executive Branch. The fact was that there was not such a consensus. The President had decided in favor of the decision which he thought would most favor unity of the Party beyond 1988. The Democrats also were exhibiting signs of being affected by the 1988 election. Their leading candidate, Hart, was taking positions wholly inconsistent with bipartisan support of a constructive defense and foreign policy. Therefore, the crucial immediate problem was that of developing a consensus behind a constructive policy within the Executive Branch, and then achieving bipartisan support for it in the Congress. A number of voices together asked whether it was not precisely the responsibility of the President to assure such a consensus.

Russell Long said he was convinced that at least nine Democrat senators would side with the Executive Branch in favor of such a line of approach. The situation in the House he said is much more difficult but if the Senate were firmly behind the President, the situation there should be manageable.

The group strongly supported Russell Long's position.

Paul H. Nitze³

³ Nitze signed "PHN" over his typed signature.

114. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikke) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, June 10, 1986

SUBJECT

NSPG on "US-Soviet Relations": Follow-up Meeting
June 12, 1986 (S)

A. General Points on US-Soviet Relations.

(S) Time permitting, you should try to fit in the following, broader points, to correct some of the mistaken assumptions implicit in last Friday's NSPG discussion:²

(1) (S) *Longer-term trends*, you could note, are in favor of democracy ("as George Shultz said in last meeting"). Hard currency shortages and other economic problems force Gorbachev to make careful choices on military/foreign policy expenditures. Hence, this is a good period to bring the Soviets gradually around to reducing their military effort. But we won't accomplish this by making early tactical concessions; rather we must convey our position with conviction and consistence.

(2) (S) *Arms control* is but a part of the larger US-Soviet relationship. The Carter Administration made the mistake of turning US-Soviet arms negotiations into the be all and end all of our relations—till Afghanistan caused a rude awakening.

(3) (S) *As to the Soviet propaganda gains*, we must guard that we do not inadvertently stimulate such gains. If the Western media and Allied governments keep saying that "the Soviets are winning the propaganda battle," they make this assertion self-fulfilling. If we in the Administration appear to react nervously to such stories, we give them more weight. If we keep revising our arms control proposals "to demonstrate flexibility," we instead demonstrate a lack of conviction in our position. It is self-confident repetition that gains plausibility for our proposals.

(4) (S) *Timing* of a possible new US initiative: a move before the summer recess may not be a good idea.³ By the time Europe returns

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 843, Subject File, 1986, General Arms Control: Set B. Secret. The National Security Planning Group met in the White House Situation Room from 2 until 2:45 p.m. on June 12; minutes are in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 243.

² June 6. See Document 112.

³ Weinberger underlined "a move before" and "summer recess may not be a good idea."

from vacation, our initiative would be forgotten and the Soviets could recapture public attention by another repackaging of their old proposals. To strengthen Congress now, we can accomplish more by articulating the good rationale for our present position, than by creating headlines about some new position.

B. The Question of the ABM Treaty.

(1) (S) It would be a likely strategy for the Soviets, to slow down our SDI as much as possible by insisting on a most restrictive interpretation of the Treaty and by complaining publicly as to how our specific SDI actions violated the Treaty. At the same time, the Soviets could plan to violate most of these actual or alleged treaty restrictions themselves, counting on concealment and denial to delay a US reaction to their Treaty violations for many years. Thus, they could gain a significant head start in ballistic missile defense.

(2) (S) Some years hence, when our SDI comes up against the Treaty limits and/or when we are ready for deployment, it is therefore most unlikely that the Soviets would agree on a Treaty revision that would authorize such additional SDI development or deployment. They might pretend willingness to negotiate such a Treaty revision, in order to string us along. But they almost certainly would proceed with their initial deployment steps as far as possible while holding us to the Treaty and denying that they are deploying.

(3) (S) In sum, for the US the decision on SDI deployment in the next decade is likely to come down to three choices:

1. to use the withdrawal clause in the Treaty relatively early (citing, among other reasons, Soviet violations such as Krasnoyarsk).

2. not to deploy SDI and seek to deter more *massive* Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty by the threat of deployment.

3. Failing the above, to wait until the Soviets have violated *massively*, and then declare the Treaty voided by the Soviets and try to catch up.

(4) (S) The Soviets have been trying to convince us that they need reassurance on our good motives on SDI. However:

1. They don't need reassurance that we will not suddenly break out of the ABM Treaty and deploy, for they know full well we can't do so for many years. Hence, their expressed interest in a commitment not to use the withdrawal clause for a period of time suggest that they want to lure us into an "interim agreement" which will be extended—till they have *begun* to deploy.

2. They don't need much reassurance that SDI will not include offensive "space strike arms" that can do substantial damage on the ground, for their experts know that it would be foolishly expensive for us to put such systems into orbit for doing damage on their territory.

And to the extent that there might be gray areas, the President has already assured Gorbachev we would be pleased to address those.

C. Summary.

(S) You should try to gain time in the NSPG

— to prevent a bad proposal (such as locking us more into the ABM Treaty) from being rushed forward.

— to develop better approaches that the President could use next fall, or in conjunction with a summit, truly supportive of SDI.

(S) *Zero Ballistic Missiles*—One of the proposals on which I initiated some work quietly is *the total elimination of all ballistic missiles* (not just INF); that is to say reductions down to reach the zero over a number of years (say 15 years). There are some pitfalls and definitional questions that must be watched (in particular, how to permit missiles for space launches and for air- and missile-defense). But based on the reactions of some “hard boiled” critics, it appears we could construct a proposal that is responsible and yet effective in the public arena.

(S) Max Kampelman, with whom I discussed this idea, likes it and wants to lend his support. Bill Crowe also indicated he was sympathetic. If you want us to pursue it, we need to figure out the best timing and context.

(U) The ultimate success or failure of the Strategic Defense Initiative—President Reagan’s most far-reaching and most innovative decision on strategic arms—depends largely on whether our arms control policy will help SDI or will hobble it. Our arms control policy can help SDI by inducing the Soviets to move away from their reliance on offensive missiles, and by convincing the American people that SDI—complemented by arms control—offers a plausible road to a safer future. Our arms control policy can hobble SDI by tightening the restrictions of the ABM Treaty, or by proposing a future that is contradictory to SDI (such as a return to a “stable” relationship of mutual assured destruction).

Fred C. Ikle⁴

⁴ Ikle signed the memorandum and wrote “Fred” above his typed signature.

115. Editorial Note

At the conclusion of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting on June 12, 1986, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs John Poindexter informed participants that he would summarize President Ronald Reagan's views and circulate them to NSPG principals. Attached to the official minutes of the meeting is a paper summarizing Reagan's position: "The President has provided the following guidance with respect to our arms control process: 1. The USG should act positively towards Soviet proposals put on the table at Geneva during this round. We should take their proposals seriously and develop appropriate counter-proposals within existing policy guidelines. Our public posture should project this positive/serious stance. 2. I believe that the Soviets oppose our development of SDI because they genuinely believe that we seek a first-strike advantage. Accordingly, I propose the development of a new initiative designed to counter this fear and to lead as rapidly as possible to a system of mutual deterrence based on defense. Development of this dramatic new proposal should commence now and be introduced at the next Geneva round in September. The basic elements of this initiative should include: —Continue our SDI research at our current pace. Acknowledge that the Soviets are free to continue their ABM research. —Agree that, when either side reaches the point in their ABM research that testing is required, then the other side will be invited to observe the testing. —Agree that there will be no deployment of an ABM system by either side until agreement is reached on reductions of ballistic missiles by both sides. Actual deployments of ABM systems would be linked and phased to actual ballistic missile reductions by both sides. —Agree that either side will share its ABM system with the other side, after the mutually witnessed testing has demonstrated that the system works. Eventually, our goal would be sharing the ABM systems with all responsible nations of the world." (National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-110, NSPG Meeting 135)

On June 13, Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff sent Poindexter an electronic message at 6:02 p.m. reporting on a meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Reagan earlier that day. Although the White House Daily Diary states that Reagan met with Shultz and Poindexter from 1:39 until 2:16 in the State Dining Room, (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Rodman's message suggests that he attended the meeting in Poindexter's stead. Rodman wrote: "On arms control, Shultz said he wasn't sure he was effectively communicating his view of the issue so he wanted to go over again what he had said at the NSPG. The key aim, he said, was 'how to lock in SDI' for succeeding administrations. He felt the Soviets had 'reopened the

bazaar' in both START reductions and in conceding SDI research. He thought we could live with a 5–6 year pledge not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty since it would be 5–6 years until a deployment decision; the Soviets have also said it would take 5–6 years to phase in deep reductions. We could match these up, link the two, and 'turn SDI into a compliance mechanism that keeps the reductions going.' The President said this seemed 'akin' to what he had said at the NSPG: Both sides could keep on with SDI research and, at the moment of a deployment decision, share the knowledge, observe each other's tests, and deploy based on the elimination of ICBMs. A treaty to this effect would lock SDI in. Shultz interpreted this as consistent with what he had said, and told the President he was 'reassured' by this conversation. I made no comment, but told Shultz afterwards that you too thought these concepts could be merged and that you would have a paper next week." (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration)

116. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, June 13, 1986

SUBJECT

Disarray on Arms Control Issue

From a variety of people at State, the NSC, and particularly Nick Platt, the following picture emerges of the state of play on arms control.

Shultz sees our decision on SALT II as a loss and a defeat. Right-wing Senators (Symms among them) got to the President and urged him to scrap the SALT Treaty. This tipped the balance. The President is now somewhat confused on the issue as was evidenced in his press conference.²

The Wednesday morning breakfast with Shultz, Weinberger and Poindexter was bitter on the issue of coordination.³ Shultz hit

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Don Gregg Files, Subject File, OA/ID 19865–020, Foreign Policy Issues. No classification marking. Personal; Eyes Only. An unknown hand wrote "Don, p. 2" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Reference is to Reagan's question-and-answer session with reporters in the Cabinet room on June 12. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 759–760)

³ June 11; no minutes were found.

Weinberger hard on Perle's remarks to Congress and on Cap's own public criticism of the Soviet ABM proposal.

What has happened is that Poindexter is more even-handed than McFarlane. As a result, Weinberger has now been granted private time with the President, something which Shultz has had for many months, and which Cap had hankered after. Shultz is very upset at this, feeling he has lost his edge.

The future prospects for an arms control agreement are very murky. DoD opposes any major agreement. Shultz feels that there is an opportunity to reach a significant agreement on at least some aspects of arms control. With regard to SDI, Shultz feels strongly that it needs to be woven into a U.S.-Soviet agreement to protect the ongoing research programs from changes in Congress and/or changes in an Administration. Weinberger wants to stonewall all efforts to limit SDI in any fashion. Shultz believes that we will not know the feasibility of SDI until around 1992 and that it had better be enshrined in an agreement that would permit essential research to continue until that time.

The view at State is that the Soviets still want a Summit and that an arms control agreement may be possible if we move this year. The control of Soviet policy toward the U.S. has been moved back to Moscow from Washington and is being centralized under Dobrynin and Gorbachev. The Soviets seem more unified in their view toward us than we are in our view toward them.

Shultz' personal relationship with Weinberger is as bad as it has ever been and he is privately furious at both Weinberger and Perle. Perle's testimony on Capitol Hill, in which he said that the Members either stood with the President or the Soviet Union, has stirred a growing storm of resentment which Shultz believes may in the long run benefit those who seek some sort of arms agreement. Shultz feels strongly that we need to significantly limit the Soviet ability to deploy mobile, accurate long-range ICBMS. This would be the center of any agreement that he would seek.

At the NSPG meeting yesterday, Weinberger came up with a far-fetched scheme designed to abolish all ballistic missiles.⁴ Shultz did not oppose the idea, hoping through dialogue to engage DoD in a discussion which could lead to a more sensible proposal (Nitze feels Cap's idea is ridiculous). Nick Platt feels it is "chaff." The idea comes from Fred Ikle.⁵

⁴ See Document 115.

⁵ See Document 114.

NSC staffers say the President is somewhat isolated and confused on the arms control issue. It is clear from talks with everyone that Shultz needs all the help he can get at this point.

Comment: My own feeling is that the President would welcome an input from you on this issue. I certainly come down on the side of those who feel that we ought to look for some sort of verifiable arms reduction agreement. If the Administration remains split and confused as it is now, you are going to get a series of increasingly difficult questions as to where you stand. If we move toward an agreement, your answer can be that the President is in control of the process and that you stand with him. Unfortunately, he does not seem in control at the moment.⁶

[Omitted here is material not related to arms control.]

⁶ An unknown hand wrote below this paragraph: "Reaction to the decision from our NATO allies continues to be very bad. This is one of Shultz's major concerns, & mine as well."

117. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, June 19, 1986

SUBJECT

ICBM Modernization

Part of the unwritten understanding that emerged from last year's Peacekeeper fight was that we would let the issue "cool" for a year. Because of this we have, for the past year, been implementing a low-key strategy on ICBM modernization. The decisions that we face in December, however, on the basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeepers and the full-scale development of the small ICBM (SICBM), will require that we abandon this approach in the near future. We must soon shift to a more visible and vigorous campaign to lay the foundation for the solution we desire, if we hope to eventually win approval for the decisions we announce in December after the November elections.

Although the small ICBM could be a problem, (The SASC cut FY 87 funding by 50% and fenced the other half, pending our decisions at the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, ICBM Modernization. Secret. Sent for action.

end of this year, and any movement away from single warhead at this point, could lead to the defeat of the program.) the issue that will require a major White House campaign is the second 50 Peacekeepers. We have tied the two together because the beginning of full-scale development for the small ICBM is probably the last leverage point where we can salvage the second 50 Peacekeepers. If we let this event pass without a decision on Peacekeeper, the second 50 Peacekeepers will most likely fade away unless some unforeseen event occurs which we cannot now predict (i.e., major confrontation with the Soviets, etc.). The purpose of this memo is to outline to you how we may be able to develop a consensus for both the SICBM and the second 50 Peacekeepers.

Happily, the situation is not hopeless. The flaw in Peacekeeper has always been survivability. We may have lost a few votes to the hard core Left for other reasons, but the main issue has been that the poor survivability of fixed silos breeds instability in the nuclear balance.

With this in mind, it is important to note that the SICBM has been popular for the same reason. The Hill equates mobility with survivability. The single warhead issue is important to Aspin and some others (Scowcroft), but again, the main issue is survivability. The articles at Tab A² by Les Aspin and Pete Wilson are good summaries of how the Hill looks at survivability in a historical and perspective context.

It's important to realize before we start that we face a very significant challenge. As of today, there is insufficient support in Congress for a second 50 Peacekeepers, regardless of basing mode. This is important to bear in mind, because you must weigh the risk of setting up a possible major loss for the President in 1987 (the votes on this would most likely come in the Spring and Summer of 1987) when the election atmosphere will begin to dominate the issues.

Thus, we can look back on these past ten years and note that little has changed for ICBMs. In the mid-1970s, everyone felt basing survivability was the key challenge, not the missile's design, and that's exactly what happened as time passed. We now have an excellent missile, but the Air Force is still foundering around looking for a survivable basing mode. Those who postulated that accuracy could defeat hard targets were essentially correct. I've taken you through this short digression because it forms an essential background to the decisions that lie ahead. The Air Force and DOD have eight candidate basing modes:

Hardened Minuteman Silos

Superhard Silos

Superhard Silos with Deception

Hard Mobile

² Not found attached.

Rail Mobile
 Carry Hard
 Shallow Tunnel
 Deep Underground

The first three can be dismissed summarily, in my judgment. Without real atmospheric tests, hard silos will never sell and probably shouldn't, anyway. But the Air Force missile people will cling to them because that's the world they know best.

Deep Underground and Shallow Tunnel are both too expensive and too exotic.

The three that remain all involve mobility. Carry Hard is a kind of MPS with a very hard capsule. It won't sell out West, and it probably will look too much like MPS to SecDef and the President to be acceptable. You should know, however, that it looks good on paper and may be the DOD technical community's first choice.

That leaves Rail Mobile and Hard Mobile. Hard Mobile is the same basing concept as the SICBM. It works well for a small missile, but probably is not practical for a missile the size of the Peacekeeper.

Thus, by process of elimination, *I believe* we end up with Rail Mobile. While there are genuine problems with this concept (nuclear weapons safety and security, for example), our initial problem with Rail Mobile is that the Air Force will resist its serious consideration because it's doctrinally repugnant to them. I lived through the invention of GLCM (I was one of the Deputies in the Joint Cruise Missile Project), and I can tell you first-hand that the Air Force does not want to take on these mobile ground missions. Once we get past the initial kneejerk responses (you know how the Services hate for us to invent programs), we will then face political problems of basing scenarios (we will need to be skillful to postpone announcing where we will base the launchers), and the charge that we are simply copying the SS-x-24 (so here comes a new arms race, etc.).

Finally we will face the inevitable argument that the D-5 will give us all the prompt hard target kill we need. This argument will be heard more often as we approach the D-5 IOC in 1989.

While these problems are important, they can be overcome if we design the package deal skillfully. For example, we can avoid having the opposition focus on certain basing areas by expanding the number of possible rail routes to include many states. Our plan must begin with a strong campaign by the Air Force and DOD to sell mobility. At the same time we will need external support from individuals of the stature of those on the Scowcroft Commission for the concept of a large mobile ICBM. We will have to be *very* careful to avoid any appearance that we are rejecting the SICBM in favor of increasing to more than 100 Peacekeeper. There will be plenty of people ready with glib arguments

that deploying a total of 100 mobile and 50 silo-based Peacekeeper will be cheaper/better/more cost-effective than the SICBM; accepting that position risks losing *both* Peacekeeper and the SICBM. We will also need a sophisticated argument which supports deploying large MIRVed ICBMs after D-5's IOC without leading to questions about submarine survivability.

Despite these problems, if we build on the work already done (and the support that already exists) for the SICBM to link mobility and survivability, then a package deal of SICBM and Peacekeeper can be sold, just like we sold the B-1B—ATB. A phased approach to stability in ICBMs where the transition to Mobile systems starts now and ends where Arms Control or SDI dictate a stop, is a good theme to use. If we can wrap that idea with a sensible program that is affordable, we can win. If not, the best we can hope for on Peacekeeper is to keep the production line open to produce test missiles and hope for better times.

In taking stock of the Administration's assets as we plan ahead, it becomes quickly evident that there are few veterans left from the original big Peacekeeper push. The Air Force has an entire new team which, unfortunately, is both less supportive and less skillful at working the Hill. OSD has suffered the loss of Russ Rourke and will soon lose Don Hicks, and in general has suffered a sharp decline in credibility. Here we've lost Bud, Ron Lehman, B. Oglesby, Chris Lehman, and Max Friedersdorf. Only yourself, Ron Sable, Bob Linhard and myself remain as veterans. Given Bob's enormous workload with running the Defense Group and looking after Arms Control and SDI, it pretty much leaves Ron and me with the ball. With that in mind, we need to solicit your views on how far you want us to go with raising the stakes on this issue.

Ron and Bob and I need to talk this over with you before you go to California with the President. After we talk, we envision the development of a detailed game plan that will cover the 150 days between August and December. We need to walk you through this issue as soon as possible because we need to then lay the groundwork with DOD and the Air Force so they can bring the issue to the SecDef in a proper forum. Ron also feels strongly that we must not become too visible with a "solution" prior to the November elections, or we run the risk of having the DOD effort perceived as being "front loaded", thereby eliminating any credibility that might otherwise be present.

Bob Linhard, Ron Sable, Mike Donley, and Lint Brooks concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you take 30 minutes to meet with us on this in the near future.³

³ Poindexter marked neither approval nor disapproval of the recommendation.

118. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 27, 1986

SUBJECT

Assortment of Meetings

1. Yesterday Bob Linhard from the NSC Staff came to see me. He had a draft of the letter from the President to Gorbachev as it had emerged from a meeting on Wednesday between the President, Cap Weinberger, and John Poindexter.² He asked me to read it and write my comments on it, but said he was instructed not to leave it with me.

I questioned the wisdom of permitting SDI testing during the first five years without setting any standard governing the nature of testing and without making it clear whether such testing would be within the limitations of the ABM Treaty or not. I questioned the wisdom of permitting each side to observe the others' testing without clarifying the purpose and nature of such observance. I doubted whether we wished to give the Soviets an unlimited right to observe what's going on in our labs, even prior to an agreement concerning reductions, and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. I questioned the advisability of setting what appeared to be an ultimatum that suggest we would denounce the ABM Treaty in seven years in the event the Soviets had been unwilling to agree to the total abolition of all ballistic missiles. I asked how one could avoid immense problems with our Allies if we made any proposal for total elimination of ballistic missiles without the prior agreement of the British, French, Chinese and our other Allies and friends.

Linhard then showed me the draft of the paper which he had prepared,³ which had been the subject of the Wednesday meeting, and the modifications of that paper which had emerged from the Wednesday meeting. He indicated that the modifications had come more from the President than from Cap. Linhard's primary objective was to obtain reasonable working instructions for the SACG and its support group so the difficulties in the proposal would emerge from their analysis. After that had happened he hoped serious work on a revised draft of the

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, June 1986. Secret; Sensitive.

² June 25. No minutes were found.

³ Not found.

letter could be initiated in time for a revised and more sensible letter to be sent, hopefully as early as July 15th.

2. Yesterday afternoon I had a one-hour meeting with Admiral Crowe. His mind was particularly focused on the Packard Defense Reorganization legislation. After we got through that subject, I went over with him the main elements of the State Department's proposed comprehensive counter-proposal and the difficulties I saw in the approach Linhard was about to explain to him in a meeting scheduled to begin immediately after my meeting with him. He commented that it was difficult to change Cap's view on any matter, although it is sometimes possible; on matters concerning SDI, however, he did not believe it possible at all.

3. This afternoon I had a one-hour discussion with Ed Teller. He is persuaded that the project for a pure fusion reactor is bound to be unsuccessful because the cost of making such reactor safe would be impossibly high. He explained why he thought a different approach involving a hybrid fission/fusion reactor would be inherently safe and would not be excessively expensive. He said that the Soviets had given much thought to a hybrid approach including some ideas of Sakarov of some 20 years ago.

4. I had lunch today with Jim Wade who is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement. Among other things he said was that at current yield rates of 1%, the mercury/cadmium/tellurium crystals used for infrared sensors in the SDI program would cost \$35 billion over five years. They need a \$500 plus million program to develop the technology to increase the yield to 20 to 30 percent and thus reduce costs to a tolerable level. They have not yet found a way of getting this into the SDI budget.

119. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 30, 1986

*MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL***I. PURPOSE**

To review the progress that has been made in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program and to discuss other issues related to SDI.

II. BACKGROUND

With the difficult budget discussions continuing on SDI, it is essential that you and your senior advisors have a full understanding of the progress that is being made in this critical program. There also are some significant program milestones ahead that merit discussion, most importantly the Vector Sum experiment tentatively planned for September. The meeting agenda is at *Tab A*.²

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at *Tab B*.³

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject. General Abrahamson will give a program update, and I will then lead a discussion of arms control and other non-programmatic issues. No specific decisions are being requested, but we want to ensure that all pertinent Cabinet level officials are familiar with the progress we have made and are comfortable with the steps ahead. We recommend that following my summary, you close the meeting by emphasizing your commitment to the program and the importance of obtaining Congressional support for fullest possible SDI funding levels. Proposed remarks are at *Tab C*.⁴

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-105, NSC 00132 07/01/1986. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Prepared by Neil. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for July 1 from 11 a.m. until noon in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

120. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, July 1, 1986, 11 a.m.–12 p.m.

SUBJECT

Program Briefing on SDI (C)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President's Office:

Mr. Craig L. Fuller

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz

Special Advisor to the President and
Secretary of State for Arms Control
Matters Paul Nitze

Special Advisor to the President and
Secretary of State for Arms Control
Matters Edward Rowny

Assistant Secretary for Politico-
Military Affairs H. Allen Holmes

Treasury:

Secretary James A. Baker, III

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

The Director, Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization

Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson
Lt. Gen. John F. Wall, Commander, U.S.
Army Strategic Defense Command

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese, III

Energy:

Secretary John S. Herrington

Assistant Secretary, Defense Programs,
Admiral S.R. Foley, Jr.

OSTP:

Acting Science Advisor to the Presi-
dent and Acting Director Dr. Richard
G. Johnson

NASA:

Associate Administrator Office of Space
Flight Admiral Richard H. Truly

OMB:

Director James C. Miller, III

Acting Associate Director National
Security and International Affairs
Philip A. DuSault

CIA:

Director William J. Casey
National Intelligence Officer for Strate-
gic Programs Lawrence K. Gershwin

USUN:

Ambassador Vernon A. Walters

JCS:

Admiral William J. Crowe

Assistant to the Chairman Lt. Gen John
H. Moellering

ACDA:

Director Kenneth L. Adelman

Assistant Director Michael Mobbs

White House:

Mr. Donald T. Regan

Admiral John M. Poindexter
Mr. David L. Chew

NSC:

Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel

Colonel Robert E. Linhard

Mr. Steven E. Steiner

Mr. William Tobey

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–105, NSC 00132. Top Secret. The meeting took place in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. Steiner and Tobey sent the minutes to Poindexter under a July 3 covering memorandum, recommending that Poindexter approve the minutes. A handwritten notation indicates that Poindexter approved the minutes on July 5. (Ibid.) According to an NSC correspondence profile, McDaniel approved the minutes on behalf of Poindexter. (Ibid.)

MINUTES

Admiral Poindexter began the meeting, noting the importance of a program update for participants in view of progress to date, the vital nature of the program, and the need for support from Congress. He continued that the upcoming Vector Sum experiment (classified Top Secret) may draw allegations, albeit incorrect, that it is contrary to the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Senator Gore had already expressed such concerns, but apparently had been reassured by a discussion with General Abrahamson and Ambassador Nitze. (TS)

Secretary Weinberger introduced the briefing and noted the importance of boost phase intercept, saying that those who favor exclusively terminal defense only want to kill the SDI program by eliminating its potential to protect people. (C)

General Abrahamson delivered a program briefing describing progress in technologies applicable to boost, mid-course, and terminal phases of ballistic missile defense. He also introduced Lt. Gen. John Wall, who described a successful experiment (known as FLAGE) involving technologies applicable to theater missile defense. General Abrahamson concluded by describing the upcoming Vector Sum experiment. (TS)

Secretary Weinberger noted that the Congressional actions threatened the SDI program by trying to force concentration on terminal defense through both legislative directive and funding cuts. (C)

Admiral Poindexter asked if the new definitions proposed by the USSR relating to the ABM Treaty would restrict only tests in space. (C)

General Abrahamson answered that the Soviet proposals would prohibit all laboratory simulations which would give confidence that a space-based system or component would be feasible. (C)

Secretary Weinberger observed that the Soviets were attempting to destroy the U.S. program with their new definitions. (C)

Mr. Regan noted that the briefing had mentioned four possible surveillance systems and seven possible weapons. He asked whether ultimately we would choose to pursue certain systems while dropping the others. (C)

General Abrahamson answered that the program was designed to prevent an Achilles's heel and that meant devising two means for each function. (C)

Mr. Regan asked if this meant that for each function there would be six systems, two for each phase of a ballistic missile trajectory. (C)

General Abrahamson answered that the multiple systems would not be necessary immediately, but would be designed to deal with a responsive offensive threat. (C)

Mr. Regan asked how many missiles out of 100 would be knocked down during the boost phase. (C)

General Abrahamson answered that the goal was about 60–80 percent for each phase and that this would contribute significantly to deterrence. (C)

Mr. Regan observed that if the layers of defense were each 80 percent effective one missile would get through. (C)

General Abrahamson noted that the SDIO was working to find means for preventing even one missile from getting through and also observed that the likelihood of any attack would be diminished because Soviet planners would have little confidence that missiles would reach their targets, even if defenses were not perfect. (C)

Secretary Weinberger said that the challenge facing SDI becomes easier once the boost phase eliminates 80 percent of missiles launched, making the job for other phases simpler. He continued that pursuing several concepts for each function is important as a hedge against failure and also because it allows faster progress. (C)

Mr. Regan asked at what point choices would be made to narrow alternatives. (C)

Secretary Weinberger answered that it is a function of funding. (C)

General Abrahamson continued that last year's cuts had already forced him to narrow options by scaling back three of four laser projects. (C)

Admiral Crowe asked if the Soviet proposed definitions are not accepted, would the SDI be constrained by the ABM Treaty in the early 1990's. (C)

General Abrahamson answered that this would indeed be the case. (C)

Secretary Baker asked which Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee voted with Democrats to force SDI to concentrate on terminal defense. (C)

Secretary Weinberger answered that it was Senator Cohen. (C)

Secretary Weinberger noted that those who sought to force SDI to focus on point defenses through legislation or funding cuts would kill the program and play into the Soviets' hands. (C)

Admiral Poindexter asked Ambassador Nitze to brief the group on the conversation with Senator Gore. (C)

Ambassador Nitze said Senator Gore was troubled because the Vector Sum experiment seemed to resemble an intercept of a Soviet missile in boost phase and to look like an ABM Treaty violation. Ambassador Nitze explained that this is not the case because the object being intercepted will be in orbit rather than in a ballistic missile

trajectory, while [*which?*] satisfies the Treaty requirement that tests not be “in an ABM mode,” and because the planned interceptor will not have ABM capability. (TS)

Mr. Miller asked how much is known of relevant Soviet activities. (C)

General Abrahamson answered that we have some information which forms the basis for analysis of potential Soviet countermeasures and that work is underway to analyze other possible tactics the Soviets might pursue. (C)

Secretary Weinberger observed that the Soviets are vigorously pursuing both strategic offenses and defenses and that both are a cause for concern. (C)

Mr. Adelman asked what effect the loss of space launch capability would have on SDI’s timetable. (C)

General Abrahamson answered that one experiment will be delayed two years, although some of the results have been attained through other means, while another experiment will be delayed at least a year. (S)

Mr. Adelman asked if this applied to Vector Sum. (TS)

General Abrahamson said this experiment will be delayed at least two months because of problems with Delta rockets. (TS)

Attorney General Meese observed that SDI offers many potential commercial by-products and asked whether this could be used as a selling point with Congress. (C)

Secretary Weinberger said that this argument is very persuasive with foreign governments. (C)

The President asked if there is not some way to convince the program’s critics on the Hill. (C)

Secretary Weinberger said that the Administration had gone out of its way to make sufficient information available to Congress; he ascribed opposition to SDI to basic philosophical differences. (C)

The President congratulated General Abrahamson and his staff on progress to date. He described SDI as a strategic necessity and a crucial part of our three part response to the Soviet strategic threat: modernizing our retaliatory forces; negotiating deep, equitable and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons; and taking steps now to provide future options for the possible introduction of strategic defenses. (C)

In closing the meeting, the President asked all those present to do everything possible in public and in private to obtain the needed political support for the program. (C)

121. Electronic Message From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, July 9, 1986, 9:39 a.m.

SUBJECT

S-W-P Breakfast: SDIO Study of ABM Treaty

Whitehead raised this subject, complaining that Perle was not allowing anyone at State to see any of the results or progress of SDIO's study of the effects of the restrictive vs. broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (The Admiral noted that this was a study he had asked for.) Will Taft replied that so far it's only a preliminary study; Cap got a preliminary briefing in March and sent it back for more work; no results would be in until next month. Whitehead said fine; could they have an interim briefing? Ikle noted that the study had been treated as very close-hold because of the danger of leaks.

Taft said he would "take the question" and get back to them.

On the substance, Ikle said the study was likely to come to the common-sense conclusions that under the restrictive interpretation we would bump up against the limits earlier and have less information on which to base a deployment decision. The Admiral noted that the main difference had to do with the possibilities for integrated testing of systems.

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 28677. Secret. Copies were sent to McDaniel, Matlock, Sestanovich, Kraemer, and Mahley. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found.

122. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 22, 1986

SUBJECT

Interagency Study on Sharing Strategic Defense Benefits with the Soviets

On December 17, 1985, Jay Keyworth sent you a letter suggesting how the United States and the Soviet Union might share the benefits of strategic defense.² His idea was to have joint U.S.-Soviet control over space-based ballistic missile defenses.

An interagency group has completed a study of Jay's idea.³ We believe his idea has served a very useful purpose, in that it gave initial impetus to our study of the concept of sharing and led to the development of objective criteria to develop and evaluate a wide range of proposals for sharing the benefits of strategic defenses with the Soviet Union. These criteria address important strategic, technological, and cost issues.

Our interagency study also identifies a very broad spectrum of potential methods for sharing the benefits of strategic defense with the Soviet Union. This spectrum ranges from limited methods of sharing, such as sharing research program results, to far more extensive methods such as sharing defense system technologies.

In regard to Jay's specific concept, however, our interagency study found a number of serious deficiencies that we believe make this particular idea an unsuitable method for sharing the benefits of strategic defense with the Soviet Union. We are concerned that, depending on how it might be implemented, the Keyworth concept could either give the Soviet Union the ability to circumvent the defense system covertly so that it would not operate as intended, or could give the Soviet Union information that it could use to develop countermeasures to the defense system.

The criteria on sharing the benefits which we have developed are:

1) *Strategic-Based Criteria*

— Consistent with U.S. strategic concept, crisis stable, and verifiable.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Tobey Files, Subject File, SHARING II (1 of 3). Secret; Wincey. Sent for information. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Steiner and Tobey sent the memorandum to Poindexter for his signature under cover of a July 18 memorandum. (Ibid.)

² See Document 91.

³ The interagency study is *ibid.*

- Does not reduce the security of our allies or the strength of our alliances.

- Does not adversely affect U.S. national intelligence capabilities; protects sources and methods.

- Does not undermine our ability to achieve effective strategic defenses.

- Should credibly express that the United States does not seek superiority or other unilateral strategic advantage through strategic defenses.

2) *Technology-Based Criteria*

- Consistent with U.S. technology transfer policy.

- Where appropriate, mutuality of access to technological advances.

- Capable of being executed technically.

- Invulnerable to circumvention or countermeasures.

3) *Cost-Based Criterion*

- Does not increase cost of a deployed strategic defense beyond the benefits that we would receive from it.

Using these criteria, we plan now to evaluate very carefully and as expeditiously as possible several other potential concepts and methods for sharing the benefits. This will include further study of potential ways to share the actual control of strategic defense, which is the premise on which Jay's concept was based. Our overriding objective now will be to identify for you as soon as possible the best way to demonstrate to the Soviets that the U.S. does not seek any unilateral advantage through strategic defenses.

My staff will continue to oversee this high priority examination in order to ensure that this effort to develop and evaluate proposals for sharing the benefits of strategic defenses are far-reaching and creative.

123. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 24, 1986

SUBJECT

ICBM Modernization

Several weeks ago I sent you the memo at Tab II.² On 21 July we met briefly to discuss my memo in more detail. At the close of our meeting you asked for some time to consider the issue further and directed that I raise the issue with Bill Cockell. The purpose of this memo is to follow-up our discussions with several specific proposals.

Since the 21st I have had an opportunity to discuss this fall's ICBM decisions on MX and SICBM with Don Hicks, Bill Cockell and General Larry Welch, the new Air Force Chief of Staff. These discussions have led me to believe that unless we begin to activate a senior interagency group to coordinate the decision process, the Pentagon will not produce a timely or politically acceptable decision this fall. Bill and General Welch agree with this assessment. The IG would be program oriented now with a later shift to congressional support orientation.

The problems with timing relate to the natural decision process within the Air Force and OSD. Both have differing decision schedules and both tend to structure their decision sequences later than we directed in NSDDs 178 and 227.³

The problems of "sellability" relate to my views that neither OSD nor the Air Force are likely to choose a politically acceptable basing mode if left to their own devices and neither proposed decision process has allowed time for the consensus building needed to sell a new basing mode to the public or the Hill.

My views of where to go from here are somewhat clouded by your reactions to our discussions on the 21st. I came away from that discussion troubled by the concern that you might have felt that I was trying to get you to endorse rail mobile basing at this time. I am not. In fact, I believe any White House endorsement of a single basing mode at this time would be counterproductive.

I do believe, however, that our best hope for keeping the basing effort alive is to propose a solution that is analytically easy to understand

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, ICBM Modernization. Top Secret. Sent for action. Keel drew an arrow point to Douglass's name in the "From" line and wrote: "from AK—see note."

² Not found attached. See Document 117.

³ See Documents 51 and 108.

and one that can pass the same survivability criteria imposed on the SICBM. The democratic opponents of MX have committed themselves to the SICBM and the concept that mobility equates to survivability. By proposing a similar basing mode for MX, we can deny them their traditional argument that MX is not survivable and is therefore destabilizing.

I further believe that at this time the only feasible basing mode that can do all this is rail mobile. General Welch agrees with this, but told me his staff talked him out of supporting rail mobile based on worries about protests blocking the rails.

I fully realize, however, the undesirability of the NSC imposing a basing solution on the Pentagon. We must lead them to the right solution or we cannot hope to have a successful resolution of this issue in the fall. I believe that this can be done (I'd rate our chances of success at about 40–50%), but to do it we must begin now to change the views of several important interest groups.

First, we must convince the OSD and Air Force leadership that rail mobile is demographically feasible. The Air Force has not taken rail mobile seriously since the early 1960's (when it was abandoned due to cost and technical problems by McNamara) because they have assumed it was not politically or demographically feasible. The Peacekeeper community continues to believe this, but General Welch told me he would press them for a better look at the program.

I believe (from my experience with the SICBM) that we could propose, develop, and deploy a rail mobile system without a serious challenge from the public *provided* we win the support of the liberal left (like we have done on SICBM). Thus, we may find ourselves, having outgrown the people problems of the 1970's, in an environment where we can clearly take advantage of our technical progress since the 1960's to solve any remaining technical problems with the concept.

Second, we must convince the arms control community that a U.S. move away from fixed silos towards the stability of mobile systems (large or small) is worth the risks or problems that may arise in the area of verification. Right now the common logic is that it is difficult to verify mobile systems so let's not have any. I believe that it is unrealistic to expect the Soviets to abandon either the SS-25 or the SS-24 because of verification even if they want a new arms control agreement. We might be far better off by moving quickly towards mobility ourselves and concentrating on ways to verify mobile systems so we can be perceived as leading the way away from the instability of fixed silos versus the other way around.

Thirdly, we must be able to convince the Congress that these first two rather abrupt turns of policy are genuine and may lead towards an arms control solution that both the U.S. and the Soviets could endorse in the critical years of transition from offense only deterrence to an

offense/defense mix. Also, we must, of course convince them that we should get started on all this in the two years we have left.

These are formidable tasks. As formidable as these efforts may seem, we have few alternatives.

The two great technological challenges that are reshaping the ICBM force structures of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are defense and the need for mobility to offset accuracy. You are well versed on the defense issue through your involvement with SDI so I will say no more there except to note that DOD is working hard to find near-term defense options to mate with the various basing modes. We may hear more from this as the summer passes.

We have been reluctant to pursue the issue of ICBM mobility for a variety of reasons. As a result, the Soviets have moved out ahead of us with this concept. Their move in this direction and our own reluctance to do so has raised one of the least known but potentially most important strategy dilemmas of our time. The stock answer of our military planners is that Soviet mobile systems are almost invulnerable, but U.S. mobile systems are not. This contradiction has never been adequately addressed.

To cast light on this contradiction last summer, I wrote into NSDD-178 a requirement for a DOD study on relocatable targets. This was done with the specific intent of forcing some attention to this dilemma prior to this fall's ICBM decisions. The DOD report is at Tab III.⁴

In NSDD-178 we asked for a specific program including recommendations for force structure. One year later we received the fuzzy report at Tab III that promises to study the issue further and keep us informed. I spoke to Don Latham on this and he told me that despite the poor quality of the report they sent us (essentially a brush-off report), real work is taking place within the Pentagon to define a program.

Thus, we find ourselves with two alternatives. First, we can let the ICBM issue continue as is with the expectation that we will not get the solutions we need in time to influence events on the Hill next year. Or we can return to a more active posture through the reactivation of the senior MX working group. This latter course will not ensure success, but is, in my opinion, essential to achieving a successful outcome. In my discussions of this issue with Bill Cockell and General Welch, both agreed that now is the time for us to become more active and suggested that a short NSDD which outlines our views regarding the structure of the decision process would be helpful. The NSDD at Tab A has been drafted with this in mind.⁵

⁴ Not found attached.

⁵ Attached but not printed is a draft National Security Decision Directive.

Bob Linhard and Ron Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the activation of the senior MX interagency group (chaired initially by Bill Cockell and later co-chaired by Will Ball or Ron Sable as appropriate).⁶

That you sign the memo at Tab I which forwards the draft NSDD⁷ to DOD for comment.⁸

⁶ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

⁷ Not found attached. The undated, unsigned memorandum to Weinberger is attached to another copy of this memorandum in Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, ICBM Modernization. The memorandum reads: "As you know, this fall we must select a basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeepers and approve the configuration and the start of a full-scale engineering development for the SICBM. These two decisions will form the foundation for our ICBM program for the next decade. I have prepared the draft NSDD at Tab A in order to structure this fall's decision process. I would appreciate any comments you may have by 15 August."

⁸ Poindexter approved the recommendation and wrote below the "Approve" line: "But connect NSDD to memo from me to Cap saying this is the way I would like to handle these issues and asks for his comments." Keel wrote below Poindexter's comments, on July 31, 1986: "John D—As we discussed, I'm very much interested in this issue and agree it needs immediate attention plus NSC coordination. Please send cy of paperwork to Wilma for me until I come on-board. When I get on-brd you, Bill C. and I can discuss. Perhaps cover note (if not NSDD) shld put more emphasis on need for WH coord legis strategy, etc. AK"

124. Electronic Message From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 24, 1986, 1:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Letter: Problems Ahead

I had a long phone conversation and argument with Richard Perle, who expressed grave concern about the President's letter² and what he thought it represented. I did not succeed in easing his fears, and

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 30168. Secret. Copies were sent to McDaniel and Linhard.

² Reagan's July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 254.

I am worried about his line of thinking spreading among conservatives on the Hill. In your Congressional briefing this afternoon, think there are things you can do to (a) protect yourself against erroneous charges of “sell-out” and (b) make clear the correct interpretation of the President’s letter.

To my amazement, Richard was convinced that Cap got rolled on every issue in the letter. He thinks a 7½-year nondeployment pledge is enough to reduce SDI to a mere bargaining chip and undermine Hill support by demoralizing its supporters. I disputed his interpretation—adding that SDI supporters would be very much influenced by what they heard from DoD. He is disturbed by the way Nitze is briefing and by all the press stories in which State is claiming a great victory over Cap; this bothers me too, but I said it was hardly in DoD’s interest to go along with State’s tendentious interpretation! To me it looked like Cap had gotten his way on most disputed points.

A lot of what Richard said was an implied criticism of the procedure that was followed; he suggested that Cap was taken advantage of. This is clearly nonsense, but it’s a forewarning of the political problem that lies ahead. You should probably talk to Cap at some point to make sure that DoD is solidly out there defending the letter.

Nor should we forget that State is indeed part of the problem. Their tendentious briefing may be helpful in soothing allies but it is only provoking a problem on the right, as well as misinterpreting our policy.

Operationally, this means that in your briefings you should lay down markers about what the policy is NOT as well as what it is:

- We have not pledged to “delay” SDI in any sense; the time scale corresponds to the schedule we expect to be on anyway (indeed, may understate it).

- SDI is NOT a bargaining chip; it’s something we believe in.

- The President is determined to move ahead with a program (including testing) that brings us all the way to the point of an informed decision on deployment. That’s the bottom line.

- The ABM treaty stands. But we’re talking about a new agreement that accommodates OUR program as set forth in the letter.

I have talked to Bob Linhard about all this. He will get you some supplementary talking points along these lines.

125. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 25, 1986

SUBJECT

Relocatable Targets

The report at Tab II from the SecDef to you was prepared in response to NSDD–178.² Don Hicks and Don Latham have both told me privately that they are embarrassed by the report's vagueness and that the report is not indicative of the real concerns in OSD or the Air Force about the relocatable target problem.

The difficulty the DOD technical staff and the Air Force face is that the long-term response needed to solve the mobility problem is very expensive and not properly assessed at this time.

As I noted to you in a separate memo,³ this has broad implications for our strategic force structure requirements and for the basing of our future ICBMs. We must come to grips with the dilemma that allows U.S. analysts to rate Soviet mobile targets as very survivable and similar U.S. systems as not very survivable.

Despite my disappointment with the DOD report, I have prepared an upbeat reply that tells the SecDef that I should be a member of their steering group.

Bob Linhard and Jack Matlock concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the SecDef at Tab I.⁴

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–090, NSDD 178. Top Secret. Sent for action.

² See Document 51.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

Tab I**Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger⁵**

Washington, July 31, 1986

SUBJECT

Relocatable Targets (U)

I appreciate your recent report on relocatable targets in response to NSDD-178. (C)

The difficulty of attacking mobile targets in both the Soviet Union and the United States has profound implications for the future of our deterrent force structure. (S)

As you develop your relocatable target master plan, I feel it would be appropriate for a member of my staff to work with your team that is writing the plan. (C)

I have asked John Douglass on my staff to contact Don Hicks with this in mind. (U)

Thanks again for the report. I'm sure the President will find it most helpful as we make the ICBM basing decisions which we plan to make this fall. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:⁶**John M. Poindexter⁷**

⁵ Secret. Poindexter crossed out "Caspar" in the recipient line and wrote "Cap" above it.

⁶ Poindexter crossed out "FOR THE PRESIDENT:"

⁷ Poindexter signed the memorandum "John" above his typed signature.

Tab II (A)

**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Poindexter)⁸**

Washington, July 21, 1986

SUBJECT

Relocatable Targets (U)

(S) The attached report, "Initial Report on Attacking Soviet Relocatable Targets," responds to NSDD-178 tasking of the Department of Defense to develop a program to identify the sensors, C³I assets and strategic nuclear force structure necessary to attack Soviet mobile forces and support elements. Our studies to date have made it clear that the problem of holding these Soviet relocatable targets (RTs) at risk is a difficult one. Development of a viable solution will require sizable expenditures of time, effort and resources.

(S) The forthcoming revision of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) in October will contain dedicated operational resources—albeit a very limited number—to attack selected relocatable targets. Although modest in terms of committed warheads and operational sophistication, this first step is the product of an extensive study and test effort by DoD and the intelligence community to bound the Soviet RT problem and to identify the operational procedures, equipment and force structure necessary to place more of these targets at risk. As the attached report indicates, much has been done to date but much remains to be done in the future.

(C) I have established a senior-level steering committee to guide and oversee DoD RT efforts to develop a master plan that will guide our future efforts to meet the RT challenge. We will provide the NSC with updates on our progress as we identify, evaluate and implement additional measures to cope with these targets.

Cap

⁸Secret. Weinberger wrote "John" over the recipient line.

Tab II (B)

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁹

Washington, June 2, 1986

Initial Report
on
Attacking Soviet Relocatable Targets

Introduction (U)

(S) This report responds to NSDD-178 tasking which directed the DOD to "...develop a program to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with strategic forces..." and to recommend "...an appropriate program to develop as soon as possible the sensors, C³I assets and strategic force structure required to attack relocatable targets." The report which follows: (1) defines what is meant by the term "relocatable target" (RT) and bounds the problem as we understand it today; (2) briefly summarizes efforts to date by the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community; (3) outlines ongoing actions being taken to place at risk certain RTs in the near term (remainder of the 1980s); and (4) describes our initial approach for solving—to the extent possible—the problem of locating and striking RTs in the 1990s and beyond.

(U) The concept of "mobile" weapon systems is as old as warfare itself, and the effective use of mobility as a tactic historically has been a major contributor to battlefield success. Over the past few years, we have become increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union's introduction of new forms of mobility onto the strategic nuclear battlefield, particularly with the deployment of mobile ballistic missiles and command elements.

(U) The deployment and proliferation of such Soviet forces do not require a change in U.S. nuclear policy. Our national policy continues to state that U.S. nuclear forces (both strategic Triad and theater forces) must hold at risk the full range of enemy military capabilities that threaten the United States and its Allies. What must change, however, if we are to comply fully with this policy, is our capability to hold this growing relocatable element of Soviet forces at risk.

What are RTs? (U)

(S) RTs (which tend to mean different things to different people) represent a category of targets—just as hardened ICBM silos, nuclear

⁹ Top Secret.

capable airfields and submarine ports represent categories of targets—that must be held at a certain level of risk. To maintain nuclear deterrence, we must be able to threaten retaliation against mobile strategic targets just as we threaten fixed strategic targets. The specific level of risk at which we should hold Soviet RTs is yet to be determined. However, our capability must be realistic in terms of being sufficient, achievable and affordable.

(S) RTs include those enemy forces or war-supporting functions that are expected to relocate and, in some cases, “fractionate” in crisis or wartime. Targets that fractionate are those that divide into multiple RTs. Examples are SS–25 road-mobile units, which could separate into units of three missiles or fewer on transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and armies out of garrison which would disperse into smaller and smaller units.

(S) RTs can generally be classed as one of two types: predictable—those basically limited to certain known dispersal locations, such as bombers to airfields, submarines to known dispersal areas and leadership elements to underground bunkers; and unpredictable—those with a virtually unlimited set of possible deployment locations—such as mobile ICBMs. [2 lines not declassified]

(TS) To appreciate fully the magnitude of the problem posed by this overall class of targets, one must first understand the size of the RT target base. [6 lines not declassified]. The RT threat also includes, among other things: dispersed long-range aircraft; airborne, road-mobile and rail-based command and control units; dispersed naval facilities; imprecisely located underground leadership bunkers; army forces dispersed beyond the reach of tactical forces; and other mobile strategic targets.

(S) Because of the variety of RTs and the differences between their operational modes, there is no single force employment option suitable for placing all of these targets at risk. It is a difficult, multifaceted problem for the intelligence community as well as the operational forces—but it must be addressed now if we are to deny the Soviets sanctuary and to ensure a continued high level of Soviet uncertainty in achieving their warfighting goals.

Previous and Ongoing Investigations of the RT Problem (U)

(C) The Department of Defense and the intelligence community have been working for the past several years to define and to develop concepts for solving the RT problem. Senior-level managerial, technical and operational involvement has fostered a dialogue as well as investigative efforts by a number of key groups—such as the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI’s) Critical intelligence Problems Committee, a Defense Science Board Task Force and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. These initiatives complement ongoing work by the individual Services and by organizations across a wide spectrum.

(S) A number of studies have been conducted which address the RT problem from various complementary perspectives. Some of these studies are fairly comprehensive. *[13 lines not declassified]*

(S) Of particular significance is the fact that the RT issue is being addressed not only by extensive study efforts but also through practical applications, experiments and demonstrations in the *[2 lines not declassified]*. For example, the Air Force has conducted such tests using *[1½ lines not declassified]*. The targets used in the tests included Pershing IIs during maneuver and concealment exercises and Minuteman transporter-erectors. More recently, sensors were tested against *[less than 1 line not declassified]* designed and built to simulate operational configurations. The Air Force also has completed a proof-of-concept demonstration of Minuteman flexible targeting that could significantly reduce the time required for replanning and retargeting (see "Engaging Mobile Missiles with ICBMs" on page 5 for further details).

(S) In addition, we are pursuing experimental development and testing of supporting systems in the areas of mission planning, data base fusion, predictive target planning, command support and targeting sensors. As these efforts mature and prove effective, we will modify our programs and budget requests accordingly.

Current and Near-Term Capabilities and Far-Term Possibilities (U)

(S) Our current ability to hold RTs at risk is limited, and there appears to be no quick fix to the problem. To hold Soviet RTs of all types at risk, a coordinated, funded effort will be required to improve a number of intelligence and operational elements:

- Peacetime and wartime intelligence collection by national systems.
- Near-real-time fusion of various kinds of intelligence information.
- Rapid replanning of strategic offensive forces employment.
- Rapid relay of retargeting data to the forces.
- Improvements in strategic weapon systems and military reconnaissance forces, coupled with viable operational plans and exercises to tie all elements together.

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

(S) Despite these difficulties, positive action is already being taken to improve our ability to attack certain RTs using all three legs of the Triad. The next revision of the SIOP (to be implemented this fall) will contain provisions to strike selected RTs *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. In addition, *[7 lines not declassified]*.

(U) A more detailed description of the operational actions being undertaken by the Air Force and the Navy follows:

- (S) *Engaging Mobile Missiles with Bombers.* The Air Force is planning to use B-52s to search out visually and attack selected known

SS–25 operating areas during daylight conditions. This capability could be enhanced with [10 lines not declassified].

- [1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]
- (TS) *Engaging Mobile Missiles with ICBMs*. This concept—to be implemented in the FY87 SIOP revision—[2½ lines not declassified]. The Air Force is considering an additive program (Minuteman Flexible Targeting) that would improve this approach by shortening the time required for ICBM retargeting [less than 1 line not declassified]. Presently, real-time data needed to retarget ICBMs against RTs comes from collection devices with limited search capability. In the future, advanced intelligence collection and planning systems (coming on line in the early 1990s) will allow us to improve our ability to take full advantage of the rapid retargeting flexibility and time-on-target responsiveness of ICBMs. In the mid-to-late 1990s, [9 lines not declassified].

- [1 paragraph (21 lines) not declassified]

(TS) Finally, as with SIOP planning, important “first steps” are also being taken in the C³I arena. New high technology reconnaissance and intelligence collection satellites are being developed and placed (in very limited numbers) into orbit. New initiatives in the areas of intelligence collection, exploitation and fusion—as well as adaptive planning and battle management—are ongoing. [3 lines not declassified]. In the operational planning area, [6 lines not declassified].

Conclusion (U)

(S) Although these are substantial efforts, much remains to be done so that we will have the necessary capability to hold all classes of RTs at risk in the 1990s and beyond. There are many questions still to be answered before we can develop a comprehensive, long-term approach to the RT problem, and it is therefore premature to recommend a unified program at this time. However, sound planning and extensive coordination among all elements of the DoD and the intelligence community promise to bring a viable and enduring solution within our reach—both from a technical as well as resource point of view.

(S) In summary, our approach to solving the RT problem will consist of three phases and, as mentioned earlier, it will be evolutionary in nature:

- (S) For the near term, we will use the capabilities we currently have to increase steadily our ability to hold all Soviet RTs at risk. In the next SIOP revision, [2 lines not declassified].

- (S) For the mid-term, we will continue to test and exercise alternative operational concepts and technologies to determine the most promising ways to improve our capabilities. At the same time, we will develop an RT Master Plan to guide our longer-term efforts, incorporating data from tests and exercises as they become available. Because of the enormity of the potential tasks associated with attacking RTs, it is important not to commit large expenditures until we understand the advantages and disadvantages of alternate methods and technologies.

• (S) For the longer term, we will use the RT Master Plan as a point of departure for a comprehensive program that integrates all of the essential elements (sensors, C³I, platforms, weapons, etc.) and provides a time-phased development and procurement plan for achieving a survivable capability to attack RTs.

(U) This three-phased approach takes into account where we are today and what we can do with available assets; it recognizes the difficulty of the RT problem and adopts a deliberate, incremental approach to finding the optimum solution; and it is geared to consider fiscal realities carefully. Thus, it is a reasonable plan which, given the necessary priority, will provide the capabilities to maintain deterrence in the face of the expanding Soviet relocatable target base.

126. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikke) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, August 19, 1986

SUBJECT

The Vance, Laird, Scowcroft, et al, Paper on SDI, Arms Control, and such

Attached for your information is the paper made available to members of Congress, which was "endorsed" by Brown, Laird, Schlesinger, Scowcroft, and Vance, and which got front page coverage in last Sunday's *New York Times*.²

On the small missile, this "consensus" paper is driven by the Scowcroft-Les Aspin position; on MX it's a bit more supportive; but on the ABM Treaty and SALT, it's left of center.

Given that these kind of "consensus" papers are bound to emerge—perhaps with increasing frequency—it is all the more important that the Administration have an effective and coherent articulation of its own approach. To this end, we are moving ahead on the effort ("task force") that I am co-chairing with Albert Wohlstetter which, as you will recall, is designed to produce such reports *for you and John Poindexter*. I will

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 843, Subject File, 1986, General Arms Control: Set A #52-72 (3). For Official Use Only.

² Reference is to Charles Mohr, "5 Former U.S. Officials Urge Delay in 'Star Wars' Testing," *New York Times*, August 17, 1986, pp. 1, 10.

provide you further information on this “task force” with a separate memo in a few days.

I have meanwhile spoken with Mel Laird to probe why he co-signed this paper with Hal Brown, Brent Scowcroft, et al. Mel said he got together with this group at the request of Senators Warner, Nunn, and Lugar, who apparently wanted to see whether there could be an agreed view among these former officials.

Mel sort of complained that this effort was a lot of work; that Brent Scowcroft was stubborn on the small missiles and they had to give in a bit to him, and that they got into real problems with Cyrus Vance. However, Mel Laird argued he finally got Cy to be supportive of the Trident, and Mel thinks the agreement on increasing SDI spending by 10% annually was an accomplishment, given the further to the left position of Vance and others. (He, Laird, would have wanted a 25% increase.)

I asked Mel why we had to bother including Cy Vance in a “consensus” and got no clear answer.

Mel also seemed to be somewhat defensive when I pressed him why he signed off here, on supporting continued adherence to SALT and re-emphasizing the ABM Treaty. He argued he had to do this, given his previous involvement. I offered to send him excerpts from his own testimony back in 1972, to remind him that his support for SALT and the ABM Treaty was based on anticipations that have not been realized.

Mel Laird also opined the Administration had been shifting its position on these issues, and that Paul Nitze, for example, wants to keep the ABM Treaty. He volunteered that he had seen the report on what Nitze said in Moscow³ and was struck by Paul’s emphatic defense of the Treaty. He also knew that Paul Nitze has an interview soon to be published in the *New York Times* which will reaffirm Nitze’s pro ABM stance.⁴

All in all, it seems to me that we need to spend some time with Mel Laird. I told him I would get in touch with him again. It seems to me that our policies will suffer if former Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administration officials should keep “ganging up on us.” And one may wonder why our Republican friends in Congress should ask for a “consensus” defense position that includes Cy Vance. It seems to me, the American electorate has spoken on that.

I welcome your guidance.

Fred C. Ikle⁵

³ Memoranda of conversation of the Nitze-led U.S. delegation to Moscow are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Documents 142, 143, and 144.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Ikle signed the memorandum “Fred” above his typed signature.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by Former Government Officials⁶

Washington, undated

Introduction

The U.S. is faced with a set of interconnected decisions—about relations with the Soviet Union, about U.S. nuclear strategy and nuclear forces of intercontinental and of intermediate range, about arms control, and about the Strategic Defense Initiative. All of these policy issues are influenced by Soviet behavior, by the present strategic balance and by trends in that balance, and by the perceptions of the allies and of the U.S. public. The time seems ripe for a combination of negotiated agreements and unilateral decisions on force structure and programs. One reason for this is the present state of U.S. military capabilities and technological potential. Another is the future uncertainties—of different sorts—in the U.S. and Soviet economies. A third is the juxtaposition of a new, more vigorous Soviet leader who may be able to adopt new policies with a popular U.S. president who has put into effect a military buildup and an assertive foreign policy.

The Soviets continue to develop and deploy a large force of ICBMs, with increasing counterforce capability, while reducing the vulnerability of their own strategic forces through hardening and mobility for ICBMs, and modernizing their ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the missiles (SLBMs) that they carry. They are also modernizing their heavy bomber force, and introducing long-range cruise missiles launched from aircraft, submarines and the ground. The Soviets retain and modernize their air defense forces, continue to develop the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) forces allowed in the ABM Treaty, and carry on a large research program on advanced technologies applicable to ground-based and space-based ABM. We hold a spectrum of views about the nature of Soviet intentions and future capabilities, and each of us might emphasize different aspects of what follows. We nevertheless agree on these prescriptions, and commend them to the Administration and the Congress as a basis for U.S. policy and programs.

⁶ No classification marking. Brown sent the paper to Ikle under cover of an August 12 letter, which is attached but not printed. Also attached but not printed is an August 1 covering note by Brown that reads: "The attached is a talking paper that includes recommendations on strategic nuclear policies and programs, arms control, and SDI. Its general thrust is endorsed by Messrs. Laird, Schlesinger, Scowcroft, Vance, and myself."

Specific Points

1. Strategic Offensive Forces (SOF). The overall purpose is to convince the Soviets that, whatever the situation, they would be worse off if they initiated a strategic nuclear exchange than if they did not, because U.S. forces would not be greatly degraded by a preemptive attack, so that a Soviet first strike would not achieve its objective: the U.S. retaliation would cost the Soviet Union much more than it could possibly gain.

a) The U.S. should maintain a triad of forces—SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers/cruise missiles. The purpose is to preserve and strengthen deterrence and enhance the stability of the strategic balance by assuring the capability of U.S. forces in the face of the Soviet force posture. Stability against the threat of preemptive strike, which would be greatest in times of crisis, is enhanced by avoiding overall force vulnerability to a single threat, be it antisubmarine warfare (ASW), ABM, accurate ballistic missile warheads targeted on ICBM silos, or a barrage of missiles aimed at blanketing the areas around bomber bases so as to destroy the alert bombers during their early flight.

b) U.S. strategic offensive forces should include a highly accurate and responsive capability that is not highly vulnerable to a preemptive attack and that is seen by the Soviets to be capable of fulfilling our national commitments. In practice that translates to land-based ICBMs, since they have a short response time and can be communicated with fairly easily. The size of that component of the U.S. force need not be equal to that of the Soviet ICBM force, in view of U.S. advantages in other force components. The objective is to encourage a move towards a world of survivable forces. The objective is promoted by reducing the number of warheads on both sides (and reducing also the ratio of each side's warheads to the number of aim points on the other side required to be attacked in a preemptive strike), and especially by discouraging Soviet concentration of their capabilities in heavy fixed ICBMs carrying multiple warheads. Such concentration erodes stability because it is so much less valuable in a second strike than in a preemptive strike. A situation in which a large Soviet ICBM payload cannot be threatened by U.S. ICBMs but U.S. fixed targets (including ICBMs) are threatened by Soviet ICBMs could encourage imprudent Soviet behavior in a crisis.

The value of the M–X program to U.S. security is contained in two roles: to reduce a potentially destabilizing imbalance in Quick Hard-Target Kill (QHTK) capability and to encourage Soviet willingness to negotiate sharp reductions in such capability. The basing and other characteristics of the M–X deployment should promote these two objectives while maximizing stability and U.S. negotiating leverage. The numbers should reflect the degree of success in achieving these M–X related objectives. At a minimum, U.S. leverage should be maintained through keeping open a production line.

The U.S. should conduct R&D on a follow-on SSBN to the Trident, to provide an option that avoids an indefinite continuation of the concentration of 200 warheads in one aim point. Work should proceed so that a decision can be made on whether to produce more Tridents or an alternative with fewer warheads per submarine after the 12th Trident.

c) The U.S. should assure that its strategic C³ system can survive a preemptive strike. It should be made enduring insofar as a reasonable investment allows.

d) In terms of force structure, this corresponds to introduction during the next seven or eight years of the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile to modernize the SLBM force, and of the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) (and the advanced ALCM-air-launched cruise missile) and the Midgetman as needed to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. bomber and land-based ICBM forces respectively to Soviet air defense and Soviet high-accuracy ballistic-missile attack. The options for deploying a new M-X basing mode (e.g. multiple protective shelters, tunnels, super hard, hard-carry) and a new submarine carrying fewer warheads than Trident during the following decade should be kept open. To these ends, B-1B production should be terminated at 100 and, M-X production should be continued at a low rate. The Midgetman performance specifications should emphasize mobility in a hardened mobile deployment. A 37,000 pound Midgetman missile weight could initially be deployed with a payload of one warhead plus penetration aids; some of the same force could, as later decided, carry two warheads without pen aids. This course would avoid the delay of up to two years and other drawbacks (such as decreased mobility) attendant on a substantially higher payload weight.

2. SDI.

a) The ABM Treaty has been a means of enhancing stability. It should be preserved until and unless very strong reasons appear for changing it, e.g.: if Soviet preemptive capability appears likely to become such that a U.S. nuclear strategy of deterrence by the threat of retaliation, holding at risk what the Soviet leadership values, could not be maintained under the Treaty; if the Soviets were to break out (or creep out) of the Treaty; or if an offense-defense mix could be demonstrated to provide significantly enhanced stability.

b) It might at some future time be necessary for the U.S. to adopt some form of strategic defense to maintain the credibility of U.S. nuclear strategy. A program of research and technological development (not systems development), applicable to defense against ballistic missiles and airbreathers (aircraft and cruise missiles), should therefore be pursued:

i) to explore the technologies and potential designs applicable to strategic defense.

ii) to judge the cost-exchange ratios for defending various targets to various levels of survival in the face of a responsive threat including countermeasures, to determine the vulnerability of the defenses to direct attack, and to analyze the stability of various configurations of defensive and offensive deployments.

iii) to deter and if necessary to respond to a Soviet ABM breakout.

iv) to preserve possible options for active defense of selected retaliatory forces and strategic C³, for limited population defense against certain small attacks, or otherwise to complicate Soviet strategy.

c) Deterrence of nuclear attack by maintaining survivable offensive forces and C³ will remain the only feasible strategy for the foreseeable future. A transition to greater dependence on active defense for the protection of retaliatory forces could probably be implemented by the end of the century, but its desirability is not clear. A significant degree of protection of population, if feasible at all in the face of countermeasures, would be decades away.

Given these considerations:

d) the U.S. should

i) Abide by the historical (“restrictive”) interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

ii) Protect fully, in any negotiations, the ability of the U.S. to do research (as described in 2 b) above) under the Treaty.

iii) Continue to evaluate SDI by the criteria of cost-exchange ratios at the margin, degree of vulnerability of the defensive system to direct attack, effect on stability, and impact on the strategic balance. The cost and value of SDI must also be weighed against those of other military programs for both strategic and general purpose forces.

e) The SDI research program should:

i) Avoid spectacles carried out for their own sake;

ii) Emphasize ground-based terminal defense of mobile or hard points, ground-based and space-based sensors, and advanced directed energy weapons (such as ground-based free-electron lasers and space-based chemical lasers). Insofar as space-based kinetic-energy weapons appear to be vulnerable to straightforward countermeasures, that approach should be deemphasized.

iii) Proceed at a measured technological pace, increasing annual TOA from the FY 1986 level of \$2.76 billion (in the Department of Defense—the Department of Energy program contains separate funding of \$300 million) over the next two or three years at a rate consistent with efficient progress; we judge that to be on the order of 10 percent per year.

iv) Divert some of the funds thus made available to high-technology conventional force initiatives in order to reduce the risk that the rapid rise in SDI R&D funding may have starved U.S. conventional forces of the technological edge they need to offset Soviet advantages in conventional force size.

v) Not make any decision on full-scale engineering development of a multi-tier SDI system before the early 1990s at the earliest.

f) The U.S. should continue active efforts to enforce Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty.

g) In maintaining SDI options, the U.S. should:

i) Seek constraints on antisatellite systems (ASAT), to avoid their becoming a loophole for evasion of the ABM Treaty (see 4b).

ii) Examine an anti-tactical ballistic missile system (ATBM) as a possible way to protect NATO forces and C³ from a Soviet non-nuclear attack. Such a system will be feasible politically only if governments and publics can be convinced that it is more effective than other methods (such as dispersal, hardening, and mobility) by themselves, and also affordable. If so, and ATBM is pursued, it will be important to define constraints that will prevent it from becoming a loophole or an easy route for Soviet creepout from the ABM Treaty.

iii) Keep technologies open but avoid foreclosing arms control options. At present it appears that this is best done by being very cautious about space-based weapons systems because: their effects might be destabilizing; strategic offensive forces can be defended without space-based weapons; and in a possible transition to heavier reliance on defensive systems, space-based defensive systems are likely to be appropriate at a later time than ground-based ones.

3. SALT II. The general U.S. policy should be to continue not to undercut the Treaty, especially its numerical limits. Response to Soviet transgressions should be first to pursue the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) route. Where the results of that approach are unsatisfactory, the adequacy of programmed U.S. forces should be reviewed in the light of such Soviet actions. In deciding on U.S. responses, whether political in nature or in the form of a change in strategic force structure, both the likely effect on future Soviet compliance and the range of possible Soviet political or force structure response should be considered. U.S. force structure responses to perceived⁷ payloads of ballistic and air-breathing systems can be defined. Submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will also have to be dealt with. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. would then be limited to common ceilings on the numbers of warhead equivalents and on payload equivalents, at about 50 percent of the present (higher of the U.S. or Soviet) numbers. A common ceiling on payload equivalents can be approached either directly or through certain warhead or other subceilings. Since U.S. deployments for active defense of its strategic offensive forces (for example ICBMs) are limited under the ABM Treaty, and would presumably also be limited under

⁷ Page 6 is missing in the original.

any modification of it, there should be limits on the Soviet forces that threaten them. To that end, a sublimit of 3000 to 4000 ICBM warheads would be appropriate. Mobile ICBM deployment should be permitted consistent with adequate verification of numbers.

b) Dedicated ASAT operational capabilities should be limited to their present level on both sides. This includes existing U.S. MHV/F-15 and Soviet coorbital SL-8. Development of ground-based laser ASATs should be allowed (to allow SDI technology development, and insurance in the form of development of defense suppressors against a Soviet space-based SDI breakout) but not testing against targets or mirrors in space.

c) The U.S. and U.S.S.R. should have equal rights to a reduced number of INF: equal numbers in Europe; U.S. rights to a number (in U.S. or Asia) equal to Soviet numbers in Asia; British and French systems neither frozen nor included in totals; U.S. may choose not to exercise rights fully.

d) The U.S. should ratify the Threshold Test Ban and work for a reduction of the Threshold to lower values as verification improves; a level on the order of 10KT is a reasonable near-term target. We should continue negotiation on the possibility of a Comprehensive Test Ban.

127. Memorandum From Sven Kraemer and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, August 22, 1986

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint Policy

As the Administration prepares for a new series of U.S.-Soviet meetings in September/October (including NST experts, Shultz-Shevardnadze, NST resumption, and SCC) and in the face of Congressional legislation seeking to mandate arms control by

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-093, NSDD 236. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

legislative fiat, we need to consider more specifically how future U.S. restraint, and the interim framework of truly mutual interim restraint we have proposed, can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with established policy guidance and supportive of our objectives and our approach in the START negotiations.

In particular, we need to be clear on what our interim restraint policy is, and on a close-hold and timely basis, to have a study prepared on possible interim limitations on strategic arms (including limitations that might be drawn from SALT and some that might be new) consistent with U.S. policy and with the START negotiations.

We believe such work would best be tasked through an NSDD and worked through a special group. Accordingly, we have prepared an NSDD at Tab A² for the President's signature, summarizing established U.S. interim restraint policy and tasking preparation of a study on the above elements through the Arms Control Support Group by mid-September. Because the document includes a statement of policy, and to give it more weight, we have titled it as an NSDD rather than as an NSSD.

We have touched base informally on the tasking aspects of this NSDD with appropriate CIA and OSD reps and will do so with other agencies soon. We propose to have a special subgroup of the Arms Control Support Group work this study (probably in a compartmented channel) and will try for a first draft for Support Group review by Labor Day, with the final product due to the NSC by September 17. We propose to kick off the effort with a meeting of such a group next Tuesday, August 25, starting with an inventory and assessment of SALT limitations, definitions, counting rules, notifications, etc., that to be considered for carrying forward if consistent with the U.S. proposal on START and with U.S. policy on interim restraint.

A memorandum explaining the purpose of the NSDD and recommending the President's signature is attached for your approval at Tab I.³ A memorandum of transmittal to agencies is attached at Tab II,⁴ for use if and when the President signs the NSDD.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding the proposed NSDD for his signature.⁵

² Printed as Document 129

³ Printed as Document 128.

⁴ Attached but not printed is the letter of transmittal; see footnote 1, Document 129.

⁵ Poindexter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

128. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint Policy

Issue

Whether you should sign the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)² summarizing U.S. interim restraint policy and requesting an interagency study on its further development and implementation consistent with our objectives and our proposal in the START negotiations.

Background

In June, 1985, you decided to go the extra mile with the SALT I and SALT II agreements in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint by: (1) correcting its noncompliance; (2) reversing its military buildup; and (3) negotiating seriously in Geneva. On May 27, 1986 you decided that in view of Soviet failure during the preceding year to allay our concerns and to make progress in these three areas, the United States would base future U.S. strategic force decisions on the magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which was being undermined by continued Soviet noncompliance, and which involved two agreements that had expired and, in the case of SALT II, were unratified.³ You indicated that while the United States would remain in technical observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty for some months because of two Poseidon submarine retirements this summer, you intended later this year to continue deployment of U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the SALT II Treaty.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-093, NSDD 236. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the top of memorandum. An unknown hand wrote on the NSC routing slip for the memorandum: "date NSDD & JMP's outgoing memo 8/25 per RBM." (Ibid.) Reagan was at Rancho Del Cielo from August 16 to September 7. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

² Printed as Document 129.

³ See footnote 8, Document 109.

At the same time, you urged a priority focus on achieving an equitable and verifiable agreement on significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms. While pledging utmost *U.S.* restraint, you invited the Soviet Union to join us in an interim framework of truly *mutual* restraint pending achievement of such an agreement. In addition, as matters of unilateral restraint, you indicated that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

At the Special Session of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) held in Geneva at the end of July, the Soviets asserted that they were in full compliance, rejected your call for an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, and characterized as unfair your position on SNDVs and strategic ballistic missile warheads. Meanwhile, the Congress, in particular the House, is seeking to impose SALT limits on the United States through legislative fiat.

Discussion

In light of the above considerations and as we approach major U.S.-Soviet meetings this fall, we need to consider more specifically how future U.S. restraint, and the interim framework of truly mutual restraint we have proposed, can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with established policy guidance and supportive of our objectives and our approach in the START negotiations.

Accordingly, as we seek Soviet correction of their noncompliance and a reversal of their strategic arms buildup, we also believe it helpful to have a study prepared on possible interim limitations on strategic arms, including limitations that might be drawn from SALT and some that might be new, consistent with U.S. policy and with the START negotiations. The NSDD attached for your signature at Tab A summarizes established U.S. interim restraint policy and requests preparation of such a study through the Arms Control Support Group by mid-September.

Recommendation

OK NO

— — That you sign the National Security Decision Directive at Tab A.⁴

⁴ Reagan approved the recommendation.

129. National Security Decision Directive 236¹

Washington, undated

*INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY (U)**U.S. Interim Restraint Policy*

In my August 19 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD–232) on “Preparing for the Next NST Round,”² I stated that I remain fully committed to my May 27 decision that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance. I noted that SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union, while the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union. (S)

Concerning future U.S. actions, I noted that, as I indicated on May 27, I intend to continue deployment of U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, as an appropriate response, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Since the United States is retiring two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance with the terms of the SALT II Treaty until that event near the end of the year. I have requested that the Secretary of Defense inform me in advance of the exact timing of any action that would result in exceeding SALT II limits. (S)

In my May 27 decision I stated that the United States will exercise utmost restraint, seeking to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–093, NSDD 236. Secret. On the dating of the NSDD, see footnote 1, Document 128. Poindexter distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Crowe, and Adelman under cover of an undated memorandum: “The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing guidance on U.S. Interim Restraint Policy and requesting a study on how future U.S. restraint, and the interim framework of truly mutual restraint we have proposed, can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with the established policy guidance and support of our objectives and our approach in the START negotiations. Due to the sensitive of this subject, this NSDD should be restricted to those who must have access in support of the requested study.” (Ibid.)

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 149.

permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces and assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program. Additionally, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. (C)

My basic message has been that the two sides need to build a sound new foundation of truly mutual restraint and real arms reductions. I have emphasized that we continue to seek constructive Soviet action as we work to substitute a truly mutual framework of restraint for one that was not working and that was increasingly obsolete. We therefore continue to seek Soviet action in each of three major areas which I initially identified in June, 1985, i.e.: (1) the correction of Soviet noncompliance; (2) the reversal of the Soviet military buildup; and (3) serious Soviet negotiations in Geneva. At the same time, I have made clear that no policy or framework of interim restraint is a substitute for an arms reduction agreement, and that my highest priority remains the achievement of an agreement on significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. (S)

Interim Restraint Study

We hope that our interim restraint policy will put the arms control process on a more constructive foundation and will make the best use of the promise provided by the ongoing arms reduction negotiations in Geneva. We do so even though at the Special Session of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission this July, the Soviet Union rejected my call to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint and criticized our approach as unfair. (S)

As we put SALT behind us and look to the future with a focus on the Geneva negotiations, and notwithstanding the Soviet Union's regrettable rejection, we need to consider more specifically how the interim framework of truly mutual restraint we have proposed can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with the established policy guidance above and supportive of our objectives in the START negotiations and the conceptual approach we have presented in those negotiations. (S)

I therefore request that a study be conducted on a closely held, priority basis that addresses the following questions:

1. In the context of a proposal for a *mutual* interim restraint regime, what numerical limitations (in addition to, or as substitutes for, the two measures that I have proposed as unilateral steps) and conceptually consistent with our START reductions proposals could the U.S. consider?

2. In addition to these numerical limits, what supporting definitions, counting rules, notifications, and procedures (to include dismantlement and destruction procedures) should the U.S. consider?

3. Should the U.S. consider other qualitative limits and restrictions on new types of systems in the context of an arrangement that the U.S.

views as intended to be of very limited duration, i.e., until we can, in the near future, implement a START agreement, from which it should not divert the two sides.

4. If such elements were considered appropriate and if agreement, in principle, on any of these elements were reached with the Soviet Union, would the U.S. prefer documenting such agreement in the form of a treaty, an executive agreement, or by parallel political commitments (such as were made regarding SALT in 1982)? (S)

In answering the above questions, the study should also include the following:

1. An assessment of the answers to each of the above questions in terms of their precedential implications both on our ability quickly to conclude a START agreement and on our ability to obtain the terms we seek in such an agreement;

2. An assessment, led by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the answers in terms of their impact on U.S. and Allied security and military sufficiency;

3. An assessment, led by the Director, Central Intelligence, of the answers in terms of the problems of verification posed by Soviet non-compliance; and

4. An assessment, led by the Director, Central Intelligence, of the answers in terms of their impact on our ability to assess the level and quality of Soviet forces under such arrangements. (S)

The study, to be conducted under the direction of the Arms Control Support Group, should be submitted to the National Security Council by September 17. (C)

Ronald Reagan

130. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV-M-86-20076X

Washington, August 28, 1986

Soviet Proposals to Restrict SDI Activities [portion marking not declassified]

Summary

Since the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks opened in March 1985, the Soviets have sought to ban the development of space-related weapons. At the outset they proposed that such a ban should include scientific

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—D&S—July/Aug 1986. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis with contributions from the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research.

research and apply to all “space-strike arms”—a term the Soviets use to cover all space-based weapons as well as earth-based weapons capable of striking orbital objects in space. There is evidence, however, that over time the Soviets became convinced that their position calling for a ban on scientific research was politically ineffective. Research on space-based weapons was not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, and the idea that scientific work and technology development should be banned lacked political credibility in the West. *[portion marking not declassified]*

In a proposal made during the spring 1986 session of the talks, the Soviets omitted any reference to “scientific research” and changed their approach on restricting weapons development activities. They proposed that the United States and the USSR agree to “strengthen” the ABM Treaty and to this end tabled a series of proposed definitions for terms related to space-based weapons. Their proposal allowed each side to conduct research to develop technologies for space-based antiballistic missile (ABM) weapons up to the point of construction of mockups or models of such weapons or their components. The Soviets also proposed separate bans on antisatellite weapons and space-based weapons capable of hitting targets in the atmosphere or on the ground. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Taken together, the latest Soviet proposals still encompass the activities that would have been affected by the comprehensive ban on space-strike arms that Moscow had called for earlier. Moreover, despite claims by the Soviets that their proposal to strengthen the ABM Treaty represents a concession allowing US research activities, their proposed definition of development proscribes the same activities that earlier they had sought to ban—the construction and testing of mockups and models of space-based ABMs. *[portion marking not declassified]*

We believe that the Soviet definition of the boundary to be drawn between permitted and banned activities is derived from the Soviet weapons development process. This is particularly evident in the use by Soviet negotiators of specific Russian-language terms to distinguish between permissible and banned weapons development activities: these terms have precise meaning and content in the Soviet weapons design process. There are some ambiguities in the negotiating record that can be interpreted as Soviet efforts to curtail development activities for space-related weapons systems far short of the physical construction of mockups or models of specific weapons or components. For the most part, however, these ambiguities appear to stem from efforts by Soviet negotiators to describe phases of the US weapons development cycle using Soviet terms which are not analogous in meaning in the US and Soviet weapons development process. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Since the President’s March 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Moscow has been calling for a ban on all space weapons. The first Soviet SDI-related arms control initiative was announced

by then General Secretary Andropov in August 1983. He proposed a multilateral treaty to prohibit the use or threat of force in, to or from space and announced that the USSR would not be the first country to put ASAT weapons in outer space. The second Soviet initiative came in a June 1984 Soviet Government statement proposing space weapon talks with the United States and a bilateral moratorium on ASAT tests. A US counterproposal to discuss ASAT limitations and to resume START and INF talks was rejected by Moscow. At a meeting between Secretary Shultz and then Foreign Minister Gromyko in January 1985, agreement was reached to begin nuclear and space talks (NST) in March 1985. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Banning Research

In a press interview held soon after his meeting with Secretary Shultz, Gromyko indicated that the activities on which Moscow would seek constraints included research. He rejected the US demand to continue SDI research but acknowledged the difficulty of verifying a ban on such research, particularly—as he put it—the preparation of papers inside a laboratory. He noted, however, that testing areas usually are located next to laboratories and suggested that the Soviets might propose a ban on research beginning with verifiable outside testing activities. [*portion marking not declassified*]

In the opening two NST rounds, held in March–April and May–July 1985, the Soviets introduced a proposal that called for banning the “development (including scientific research), testing and deployment of space-strike arms” and destroying any such systems already in existence:

— Development was defined as any kind of activity, including scientific research and experimental design work, that leads to the testing and deployment of space-strike arms and their components.

— Space-strike arms were defined as all space-based weapons and those land-, sea-, or air-based weapons capable of striking orbital objects in space. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet negotiators offered inconsistent descriptions of the kind of research activities they were proposing to ban. We believe this resulted at least in part from an attempt to characterize the stages of the US weapons development process and the products of these stages in terminology derived from their own process, which involves a somewhat different sequence of activities. For example, early in the negotiations they used the term “eksperimental’nyy obrazyets” (experimental model) in defining what they proposed to ban. This term usually is associated with research work done in Soviet scientific institutes where devices often must be constructed to demonstrate the feasibility of a technology or a weapon concept. However, when the Soviets sought to describe in detail the stage when their ban would begin, they said it would begin “when the design principles and technical features of

future space-strike weapons take place, and the mockups, models, and experimental models of the weapons and their components are produced." With the exception of "experimental model," these terms are usually associated by the Soviets with the development of weapons that have been approved for future production and deployment, which in the Soviet system is done in weapons design bureaus, not research institutes.² *[portion marking not declassified]*

In discussions held outside plenary sessions, it frequently appeared that the Soviet negotiators were not confident about or familiar with the terms used in the formal presentation of their proposal. What emerged from their statements, however, is an understanding that the key distinction was between basic or exploratory research and goal-oriented or "purposeful" research. Basic research was not necessarily related to weapons development, they said, and exploratory research, even though it might include testing the feasibility of applying particular technologies to weapons use, was not directed toward developing a specific weapon system. Purposeful research, on the other hand, was described as work aimed at creating specific types of arms for production and conducted under instructions and contracts issued by and concluded with the military. It was this kind of research activity, they said, that the United States was conducting and that ought to be banned. *[portion marking not declassified]*

This Soviet definition of the line to be drawn between permissible and banned activities appears to be based on the Soviet process for developing weapons. In the Soviet process, mockups are the first exemplars of a weapon system or component for which full-scale development has been approved. They are intended to test the validity of its design and its ability to operate according to military specifications. (See figure 1,³ attached, for a diagram and description of the phases of the Soviet process.) By contrast, in the United States construction and testing of mockups of weapon systems or components often occur before the weapon design has been selected and before full-scale development has been approved. (See figure 2⁴ for a comparative description of the major phases of the US and Soviet weapon system acquisition processes and figure 3⁵ for a brief description of Program 6 of the US Defense Program.) *[portion marking not declassified]*

The Soviets linked their proposed ban on research activities to verification requirements, stating that they wished to address US concerns

² Similarly, in the Soviet weapons development process, the stage referred to as the "design" stage is when mockups of actual weapons are built to production specifications. In the United States, however, "design" generally denotes a much earlier stage of research on weapons concepts. [Footnote is in the original.] *[portion marking not declassified]*

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

about verification and that the tests of mockups and experimental models that take place outside a laboratory could be observed by national technical means (NTM). By making this linkage, they seemed to be suggesting that although they wished to ban inside design, construction and testing of mockups and models, they would be willing to accept a ban that began only at the stage of their outside testing. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The most authoritative statement made about the Soviet position on research was made by General Secretary Gorbachev in a *TIME* magazine interview conducted in late August 1985. His statement on what areas of research ought to be banned did not differ in substance from what the Soviets had been presenting at the Geneva talks. It probably was made to counter US press statements that the USSR was proposing to ban all research, including basic research. In response to a question claiming the Soviet Union was proposing to stop all research, he said:

When we speak about research and the need to ban it, we naturally do not mean fundamental sciences. This research is going on and, obviously, will continue. What we speak about is development projects in the United States carried out under assignments and contracts from the Pentagon; moreover, about those which have reached a point when there are bound to appear models and experimental prototypes and when out-of-laboratory, field experiments, and tests are to be conducted—in short, when everything necessary for the subsequent stage of designing and producing appropriate systems is being done. When the United States asks us if it is possible to verify compliance with an appropriate ban, we say it is. Verification with the help of national technical means is possible at the stage I have just described. If we now can discern car license plates from space, we will most certainly be able to monitor out-of-laboratory, field tests. The main point here is that if the process is stopped in the initial phase of the so-called research, any interest in the subsequent stages of the development of space weapons will evaporate. (*Pravda*, 2 September 1985.)

According to US Embassy reporting from Moscow, a few days after he talked with the *TIME* editors, Gorbachev complained to visiting Senators Byrd and Thurmond that the Soviet proposal to ban SDI research had been exploited by the White House, Congress and the US press:

You say that one cannot verify what is inside a scientist's brain when he fiddles with equations or studies problems in space. This is one side of the question. I am told there may be a terminological problem here. We call this "fundamental" or "basic" research. But as soon as this kind of work goes beyond the walls of the laboratory and involves the fashioning of scale models and mockups and the handing out of military contracts, verification is possible. So it is possible to verify the research stage. We therefore emphasize the need for a ban on the design stage of research. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Suggestions of a Revised Approach

Toward the end of the second NST round, the Soviets seemed increasingly concerned that their position calling for a ban on scientific

research lacked political credibility. After all, "research" on space-based weapons was not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, and the idea that scientific work should be banned lacked political appeal in the West. In addition, they probably were concerned that a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty was under consideration in the United States which, if accepted, would clear the way for extensive testing of SDI weapons. In what was probably an attempt to influence US deliberations on the ABM Treaty, Soviet officials began to call in public for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty and to hint in private comments that Moscow was adjusting its position on SDI research. *[portion marking not declassified]*

In both an informal conversation at the negotiations and in other discussions involving Soviet diplomats who expected their remarks to reach US officials, Soviet officials began implying that the removal of Gromyko from the Foreign Ministry would result in a change in Moscow's position on banning research. On 5 July, three days after Gromyko was replaced as foreign minister, General Secretary Gorbachev issued a letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists that called for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty and—for the first time in an official Soviet statement on this subject—omitted the call for a ban on scientific research. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Despite the fact that in the negotiations the Soviets continued to call for a ban on research, there is evidence that Moscow was reconsidering the wisdom of continuing to pursue this line. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* during the summer of 1985 indicated Soviet officials were hinting that Moscow was considering a proposal which would call for a ban on research and new verification measures. For example, *[1½ lines not declassified]* banned included some that would have to be verified by "expanded means of verification." *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the USSR would be open to expanding verification to include an enlarged realm of open telemetry, on-site inspections and even joint missions in space using the US shuttle and Soviet space stations. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Soviets wanted to ban research that leads to prototype vehicles and testing and that such a ban could be verified by on-site means if necessary. Other reports suggested the Soviets were considering a strategy that included revising the ABM Treaty as a way to constrain SDI:

— *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Soviets were considering a proposal that would combine a loosening of the ABM Treaty restrictions on terminal ground-based ABM defenses to allow the use of advanced technology with a strengthened ban on all space-based weapons, including those for ABM defense, antisatellite missions, and space-to-earth systems.

— *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Soviets would agree to changes in the ABM Treaty to allow research, development, testing and deployment (at two sites) of ground-based kinetic-energy and directed-energy ABM weapons, but that for space-based weapons only research would be allowed. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Changing Tactics

These hints of a different approach were followed by a series of tactical moves made by the Soviet delegation during the third and fourth rounds. At the third NST round, which was held in September–November 1985, the Soviets continued to pursue their proposal for a ban on all space-strike arms, but they also called for an ASAT ban, which they depicted as a “partial measure” leading to a comprehensive agreement. This was the first time the Soviets had broken out an idea from their comprehensive proposal. In informal discussions, the Soviets also suggested consideration of General Secretary Gorbachev’s call for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. By differentiating among types of weapon systems, the Soviets seemed to be suggesting that discussions could proceed at different rates in different areas. [*portion marking not declassified*]

A further adjustment in Moscow’s position came in response to a US “open labs” proposal made during the third round. The United States had proposed to permit mutual inspection of US and Soviet space weapons research facilities to provide opportunities to resolve differences in perceptions of each side’s research. In an effort to turn the US proposal to Soviet advantage, Gorbachev announced at the conclusion of the Geneva summit in November 1985 that the USSR would agree to open its laboratories for on-site inspection, but only to verify an agreement banning an “arms race” in space. (Moscow has long held that verification measures must be directly linked to the arms control provisions they are meant to verify.) [*portion marking not declassified*]

During the following round of talks, which was held in January–March 1986, Soviet negotiators in Geneva formally stated that they were now proposing—in addition to banning out-of-laboratory testing—to ban the “appearance” of mockups and test models of components of space-strike arms, and they claimed that the opening of laboratories would allow verification of this ban. One Soviet negotiator explained that the Soviets were proposing to open laboratories to verify whether mockups or test models had been built. In putting forward this position, the Soviets used terms that are associated only with work conducted on the development of weapons in design bureaus, not with research conducted in scientific institutes. [*portion marking not declassified*]

There are two noteworthy points about this position. It is more restrictive than that taken by the Soviets during 1985, when they had indicated they wanted to ban mockup construction and testing inside laboratories but would settle for banning outside activities verifiable by NTM. Also, the lack of any mention of terms associated with Soviet scientific research work suggests that the Soviets were not seeking to ban “research” prior to the physical construction of mockups of weapons or weapon components. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet negotiators also continued to pursue other approaches to constraining SDI research. In contrast to calling for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, Soviet negotiators now called for strengthening the ABM Treaty, suggesting that they were looking for something more than a statement of continued adherence with the treaty obligations. They also offered for consideration a proposal to prevent the appearance of what they called "offensive space arms," which they defined as all space-based arms capable of striking targets in space or from space. Specifics of these proposals, however, were not tabled during the round. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Most Recent Soviet Position

During the fifth round, held in May–June 1986, the Soviets proposed that the United States and the USSR strengthen the ABM Treaty by agreeing not to withdraw from the treaty for a period of 15 to 20 years, to comply with all obligations contained in the treaty (including bans on "large-scale" ABM systems and on the development, testing and deployment of space-based systems and components) and to agree on definitions of key terms "to avoid difficulties in understanding the treaty provisions." In this proposal they dropped the term "scientific research" from their description of what would be banned and suggested the following definitions:

- The obligation not to develop space-based ABM systems or components, they said, would mean banning the construction and testing of mockups and test models of space-based ABM systems or components inside or outside of laboratories.

- A component would be understood to mean any space-based device capable of being part of an ABM system and capable of being used for tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, guiding kill systems toward them, or actually destroying them.

- A mockup "could" mean a simplified version of a weapon being developed that is used to check out the operational characteristics of the weapon design.

- A test model (a term the Soviets said could be considered virtually synonymous with the US term prototype) "could" mean a device that is exactly like the actual weapon being developed and that is used to verify the operational and design specifications of the weapon.

The proposal calls for each side to use NTM to monitor whether mockups or test models of space-based ABMs have appeared outside the laboratory for testing and to open relevant laboratories to allow the other side to verify that no work on the construction of mockups or test models of such systems or components is being conducted inside. *[portion marking not declassified]*

In informal discussions Soviet negotiators admitted that there were ambiguities in the proposed definitions. They stated that none of the

proposed definitions were final Soviet positions and that they should be considered as “guidelines” for discussion. The use of “could” in the definitions for mockup and test model may indicate that the Soviets are relatively less certain about the definitions they have assigned them. Their definition of “component,” on the other hand, seems more clearly to reflect Soviet concerns and negotiating objectives. The Soviets acknowledged that the only components defined in the ABM Treaty were those of systems existing at the time the treaty was signed and not those of systems based on other physical principles. They said they had concluded that a clearer definition of space-based ABM components was required because it is not apparent what part of a space-based ABM system would replace an ABM interceptor, radar or launcher, that they wanted to make the definition specific to new technologies, and that the term “component” would refer only to major elements. [*portion marking not declassified*]

In dropping the phrase “including scientific research,” the Soviets made a major tactical shift in pressing their proposed ban on development. This change was a logical accompaniment to their new focus on the ABM Treaty, which uses the word “development” in describing limitations and does not mention research. Soviet officials have sought to portray this shift as a significant concession, asserting they have dropped their proposed ban on research. As in their previous proposal, however, their definition of development would begin with the construction of mockups or models inside or outside laboratories. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviets proposed two other agreements. One would prohibit the development, testing and deployment of space-based weapons capable of hitting targets in the atmosphere or on the ground, and the other would ban ASAT systems and ensure the immunity of satellites. Taken together, the three proposals reflect the same goals that Moscow has been consistently pursuing since the opening of NST:

- They cover all of the weapons included in the Soviet proposal to ban space-strike arms.

- The constraints on the development process remain fundamentally the same as they sought in their original proposal. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviets also tabled a new initiative on offensive strategic arms reductions and linked it to US agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years. Although they made it clear that agreement on non-withdrawal would imply full compliance with all treaty provisions, it was unclear whether they would also insist on agreement on definitions of the sort they have proposed in urging the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. Two Soviet negotiators have said in informal conversations that agreement on definitions of terms that are aimed at

limiting SDI activities is not required for this option. General Secretary Gorbachev's 16 June statement at a Central Committee meeting on the new Soviet approach, however, suggests a linkage between the two. He linked reductions in offensive nuclear arms to agreement on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 15 years and to limiting work in the field of SDI to the level of laboratory research—a level which he said the United States has already actually approached. Although this proposal does not call for specific limits on space or ASAT weapons, the Soviets could claim that US research and development activities in these areas were aimed at circumventing ABM Treaty restrictions. *[portion marking not declassified]*

The Soviets have not proposed changes that would affect the ABM Treaty provision that allows research, development and testing of ground-based ABM weapons or components based on new physical principles. Therefore, implementation of the Soviet proposals to strengthen the ABM Treaty or to agree not to withdraw from it for 15 to 20 years would:

- Permit both sides to continue work up to deployment in an area of relative Soviet strength, pursuing advanced ground-based ABM technologies, including those based on exotic technologies, and conducting activities such as the construction of the laser facility at Saryshagan, which potentially could have ASAT applications.

- Stop US SDI activities at the point when mockups or models of space-based ABM systems or components are constructed and tested either inside or outside a laboratory. *[portion marking not declassified]*

131. Memorandum From the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

I-24902/86

Washington, August 29, 1986

SUBJECT

Early Benefits from SDI—DECISION MEMORANDUM (U)

(C) We need to reexamine whether the SDI program could not yield some early benefits, consistent with the long term goals of SDI. Under the current SDI policy, such benefits would not be pursued unless and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, Arms Control (President Gorbachev)—1986–1988. Confidential. A stamped notation indicates Weinberger saw the memorandum on September 2.

until they were subsumed under a formal decision to deploy a full SDI system. Thus, with the present program, the country might have to wait some 12 years—or more if slowed down by Congressional cuts—until the money invested in SDI began to show any return.

(C) Through all these years without any benefits, it could become increasingly harder to obtain Congressional support for a continually growing SDI budget. Even if future Presidents supported SDI as strongly as does President Reagan, the SDI budget would become an easy target, to be raided in behalf of DoD projects with more immediate benefits or which enjoy stronger institutional support among the services.

(C) The hurdle imposed by the ABM Treaty compounds the difficulty of promoting an increasingly expensive program with very distant benefits. Thus, we have become defensive about SDI by stressing that it is “purely a research program” in compliance with the ABM Treaty. This stance concedes to our critics the offense; they can point out—correctly—that the ultimate objectives of the research are contrary to the objectives of the Treaty. Instead, the argument should have remained focussed on the failure of the Treaty to advance its stated objectives, that is, to facilitate reductions in offensive arms.

(C) In addition, we have accepted unjustifiably difficult criteria for deciding whether or not the eventual results of this “research” program warrant a decision in favor of deployment:

— The defenses must be guaranteed in advance to be “cost-effective at the margin” against countermeasures and attacks we have only imagined the Soviets *might* develop. We require of no other weapons system that it be so resilient as to render all conceivable future Soviet countermeasures ineffective.

— The key test of defenses is not that they be effective against likely Soviet attacks, but against an irrational mass attack aimed at our cities. Never mind that the current US strategy also does not protect against such irrational attack. In essence, the test of SDI has been shifted from the President’s sensible and potentially attainable goal of making missiles “impotent and obsolete” to the unattainable goal of precluding, under all circumstances, any missile attack on a US city.

— We allow the opponents of SDI to postulate that the Soviets would bend every effort to defeat SDI, at any cost they could remotely afford. Yet, we allow the same people to argue the Soviets would benignly settle down on some refurbished SALT regime without trying to defeat our “retaliatory” deterrent forces. Thus, against our assured destruction forces the Soviets are supposed to remain placid (contrary to our experience over the last 15 years); however against our defensive shield they are supposed to embark on a new arms race.

(C) In considering early benefits of SDI we must guard against erring in the opposite direction: we must not settle for a deployment option that would deflect the thrust of the President’s program and lock

us into a defense that merely protected our strategic forces. This would serve to buttress MAD instead of leading to the desired transformation of the strategic order. However, this risk in the opposite direction should not drive us to reject any and all early benefits. In fact, by failing to identify *any* early benefits, we make it easier for the opponents of SDI to fill the void and claim that the protection of strategic forces is the *only* early benefit, indeed the *only foreseeable* benefit of SDI.

(C) Several options for early benefits merit further consideration:

(1) The *initial* stages of a layered *area* ballistic missile defense (see Annex A). This deployment should not be seen as a final deployment configuration or as a point defense system.

— Such a defense would significantly enhance Soviet attack uncertainty against U.S. military assets and provide population protection against light attack or accidental launches. By demonstrating to the Soviets in the near term our commitment to see SDI through to its logical conclusion, such an *initial* deployment also could have an early and beneficial influence on future Soviet development and deployment decisions and approaches to arms control. Unlike other potential near term benefits, this would not be ABM Treaty compliant.

— Sensor elements of this initial deployment will augment and enhance current ballistic missile attack warning and assessment capabilities.

— Some features of this initial deployment can pose not only a deterrent threat to Soviet strikes against U.S. and allied satellites, but offer an elementary capability to defend satellites against current and some near term Soviet ASATs.

(2) Defense of NATO allies in Europe; components/technology derived from this initial deployment could have utility for enhancing air defenses and an ATBM system.

— The utility of such components would clearly be greater for European NATO than for North America. In fact, air defense deployment for North America would likely be made only in conjunction with a decision to deploy ballistic missile defenses; even then, fiscal realities and priorities for ballistic missile defense may dictate a pause before significant air defense deployments in North America are made.

(3) Other near term benefits could be identified that do not provide defense against missiles but other useful functions. The Boost Surveillance and Tracking System, if characterized as a follow-on to DSP for ballistic missile early warning, may be an example.

(C) Whatever near term benefits are identified and pursued, the elements of the initial deployment sequence should comply with some overarching general principles:

— They should be able to be incorporated effectively into an evolutionary ballistic missile defense architecture that ultimately achieves the President's SDI goals;

— They should not delay benefits achieved by fulfilling the ultimate goal of SDI;

— They should be militarily useful (even if it were later decided not to proceed with deployment of a full SDI system). When not involving the deployment of ballistic missile defenses, they would satisfy other important military requirement.

— As more advanced elements are deployed, initial elements should be capable of performing important, but alternate roles and missions.

— Aside from their role in ballistic missile defense, they should satisfy or complement other important strategic military requirements.

(U) Jim Abrahamson, who has been out of town as we completed this memo, agrees with the general thrust here expressed. He and I propose that SDIO, in cooperation with ISP, prepare a briefing for you, for the second half of September, to flesh out the specific technical and cost aspects.

Briefing after Mid-September:²

Fred C. Ikle³

Annex A

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, undated

INITIAL OPTION (U)

I. System Functions:

— Enhance ballistic missile attack warning and assessment to increase US confidence in attack characterization and response selection by substantially increasing the number and capability of ballistic missile surveillance assets.

² Weinberger indicated his approval of this recommendation on September 2.

³ Ikle signed the memorandum "Fred" above this typed signature.

⁴ Secret.

— Establish an initial satellite defense capability to protect critical US assets against co-orbital and some direct ascent ASATs and create a global, real-time anti-satellite capability to deter attacks on US satellites with ERIS and the initial deployment of space-based kinetic kill vehicles.

— Deny Soviet confidence, disrupt attack timing, and restrict allocation flexibility for attacks on critical US military assets with the deployment of terminal, late mid-course and boost-phase interceptors.

— Protect critical military targets from upper tier leakage with high altitude endo-atmospheric interceptors.

— Defend NATO allies and US forces in Europe through the provision of late mid-course and terminal defense SDI technology and by the boost-phase interceptor deployment.

II. *Estimated Date of Initial Deployed Capability:*

FY92/FY93

III. *Estimated Costs: (R & D and Investment)*

Boost	\$24B
Late Mid-Course (Area)	11B
Terminal (Point)	16B
BM/C ³	<u>5B</u>
	\$56B + O&S

IV. *Description of System Elements in 1996:*

— Upgraded ground-based early warning and ABM radars

BMEWS

PARCS

PAVE PAWS

Cobra Dane

— Upgraded ground-based spacetrack radars and electro-optical sensors

— Upgraded DSP to provide stereo track data

— [1½ lines not declassified]

— 1000 ground-based exo-atmospheric interceptors

— 500 ground-based endo-atmospheric interceptors

— [1½ lines not declassified]

132. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, September 12, 1986

SUBJECT

Paper on Restraints Associated with the President's Proposal on Strategic Defense

Attached at *Tab I*² is a memorandum for the President which forwards the final version of the SAGE 30 paper (*Tab A*)³ that we have been working for the last two weeks. We have provided this so that you can work this via memorandum if you so choose. We would recommend that you take the time to talk to the President about this—especially since SecDef may wish to do so.

The only issue remaining is the Secretary of Defense's concern that the correct interpretation of the President's letter⁴ is a treaty, negotiated now, that covers *all* aspects of the proposal vice an agreement that has embedded in it a Treaty which would be negotiated now but triggered under certain conditions later. We have provided you the OSD rationale for this position in our series of debriefs on this. We have summarized this rationale in the memorandum for the President. We should also expect the SecDef to wish to discuss this further.

Attached at *Tab B*⁵ is an annotated rewrite of the SAGE 30 paper produced by OSD staff showing where material would be deleted (as indicated by []) and where specific material would be added (as indicated by underlining) to conform the paper to the SecDef's point of view on the issue involving the scope of the Treaty proposed by the President.

We would recommend that you take the following steps:

1. Discuss this with the President.
2. Then use the memorandum at *Tab I* to obtain the President's decision for the record.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, September 1986 Chron File. Secret. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. An unknown hand wrote "SEPT 17" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Printed as Document 133.

³ See *Tab A*, Document 133.

⁴ Reagan's July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 254.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 133.

3. Assuming the President does not alter his view based on the SecDef's concern, use the memorandum to agencies at *Tab II*⁶ to implement the President's decision.

Recommendation

That you follow the course of action laid out in the paragraph immediately above to resolve this issue.⁷

Concurrence: Kraemer, Manley, Brooks, Steiner

⁶ Attached but not printed is a distribution memorandum from Poindexter to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Crowe, and Adelman dated September 17: "The President has approved the attached paper as supplemental policy guidance on the above subject. A similar paper will be developed providing additional elaboration on the elimination of ballistic missiles in the context of the President's proposal. Both topics will then be incorporated into a new National Security Decision Directive on this general subject. Until superseded by the new NSDD, agencies should be guided by the attached paper." (Ibid.)

⁷ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

133. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Paper on Restraints Associated with Your Proposal on Strategic Defense

ISSUE

Should you authorize me to issue amplified guidance on the proposal made in your July 25th letter to General Secretary Gorbachev?

DISCUSSION

In preparing the instructions² for the next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks which begins on September 18, some confusion has arisen on how to present the restraints that would operate if your recent proposal to Gorbachev on Defense and Space were accepted. To correct

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, September 1986 Chron File. Secret. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. Prepared by Linhard.

² For the instructions for NST Round VI, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Documents 154 and 55.

this, we have developed the paper attached at *Tab A* and worked it with the various agencies.

State would prefer no further guidance be issued at this time. This is largely because Paul Nitze believes that we should simply stay under the terms of the ABM Treaty all the way through the two years of negotiations called for by your new treaty. All others feel we need to be able to do some additional developmental work (currently not permitted by the terms of the ABM Treaty) during that two year negotiating period which would likely occur beginning in 1992. Because of this, I think that the paper makes a needed contribution and should be issued.

Within the paper, the only issue remaining is that the Secretary of Defense continues to feel that the correct interpretation of your letter is that we propose one treaty, negotiated now, that covers *all* aspects of the proposal—vice an agreement that has embedded in it a treaty which would be negotiated now, but not triggered until certain conditions are met after 1991. Cap argues that his interpretation is simpler both to explain and to implement. He has made this argument with you before. He is correct that it may simplify the explanation a bit. In theory, it also would make the mechanics of implementation more direct since we would seek to negotiate one treaty covering all aspects of the proposal applying to defenses and then work to ratify it as a treaty. The main problem with his approach is that it increases the likelihood of the headline “President proposes scrapping the ABM Treaty immediately” while decreasing our ability to deal with such an interpretation.

Cap would also like more elaboration of what you mean by a plan for eliminating ballistic missiles. This is a good idea. However, I think we need to issue *now* this guidance on restraints. Therefore, I would offer to Cap to have his staff (Richard Perle) work with ours (Bob Linhard) to develop a companion elaboration on what we have in mind in proposing the elimination of ballistic missiles, which we would issue as soon as it’s ready.

Tab A is the paper that I would recommend you authorize as guidance on restraints. If you agree, I would propose that I forward this paper under a cover memorandum from me in your name that informs agencies to treat this as guidance.

Attached at *Tab B*³ is an annotated rewrite of the SAGE 30 paper produced by OSD staff showing where material would be deleted (as indicated by []) and where specific material would be added (as indicated by underlining) to conform the paper to Cap’s point of view on the issue of whether we want an agreement *and* a treaty (our current understanding of your proposal) or just one larger treaty (Cap’s

³ Attached but not printed.

understanding of your proposal). It is provided so you can fully understand what Cap has in mind.

RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

— That you authorize me to issue the paper at *Tab A* as guidance on this subject in your name.⁴

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, September 17, 1986

RESTRAINTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE (U)

Purpose. This paper provides an elaboration of the restraint provisions implicit in the President's proposal made in his July 25th letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. (U)

What the President's Letter Proposed. The President's letter proposes an agreement which would have the following elements:

(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves for five years, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures.

(b) Following this five year period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty *now* which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of *both* sides. *Once a plan is offered to this end*, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination

⁴ Poindexter approved the recommendation on Reagan's behalf, and wrote below the recommendation line: "Discussed verbally."

⁵ Secret.

of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years.

(c) If, following the initial five year period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months' notice is given to the other side. (S)

Additionally, while there already are agreements in force that address this subject, to meet continued Soviet concerns and in the context of the approach outlined above, the U.S. would also be prepared to discuss additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space of advanced weapons *capable of* inflicting mass destruction on the surface of the earth. (S)

Finally, significant commitments of this type with respect to strategic defenses would make sense only if made in conjunction with the implementation of immediate actions on both sides to begin moving toward our common goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. (S)

Elaboration. The following is supplemental guidance on the letter. (S)

Restraint During Negotiations. What the President proposes is to negotiate as soon as possible (in 1986 if possible) the treaty referenced in item (b) above which would have to include agreement on: (1) the *mechanism* that triggers the treaty's provisions; (2) the specific *negotiating activities* that would occur during the two year period; (3) the *alternative outcomes* that could result from such negotiations; and (4) the *restraint* that both sides would exercise during the negotiating period with respect to ballistic missile defenses. In each of these areas, the USG has a proposal. (S)

— The *mechanism* that would trigger the treaty's provisions is the occurrence of the following conditions: (1) after 1991; (2) either side decides to move to the deployment of defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty; and, having made such a decision, (3) offers to the other side a plan that addresses, as a minimum, the elements outlined in the President's letter. (S)

— The *negotiating activities* that would then occur for a period of no more than two years would be focused upon the elements of the proposed plan. (S)

— The *outcome* that the U.S. hopes will occur would be a successful negotiation in which such a plan is adopted. This plan would guide a jointly managed transition to increased reliance on defenses. Should, after two years, the negotiations not yield a successful outcome, either side would be free to begin deployments of ballistic missile defenses

currently not permitted by the ABM Treaty, after providing six months notice of its intent to do so. (S)

— The *restraint* regime which we would propose be implemented during this two years would entail altering the conditions of the ABM Treaty so as to permit, during the negotiations, research, development and testing (but not deployment except as permitted by the ABM Treaty) of ballistic missile defense to include both those based on new physical principles and those based on more traditional approaches. (S)

Restraint Prior to Triggering the Treaty. Until the provisions of this new treaty are triggered in 1992 or later, there would be no change from the restraint regime proposed for the 1986–1991 period described in item (a) on page 1 of this paper. (S)

Relation to Transition. The President's proposal provides a concrete framework for agreement on the terms for a jointly managed transition. For the next negotiating round, the U.S. delegation should focus on the President's proposal in this context, illustrating its consistency and continuity with past U.S. proposals. (S)

Relation to the ABM Treaty. The President has said that the U.S. will observe the limitations of the ABM Treaty. The President's proposal does not alter that commitment. When the new treaty, negotiated as soon as possible and hopefully in 1986, is triggered as specified above, it would not automatically replace the existing ABM Treaty, which would continue to be operative except for those provisions altered (by novation) by the new treaty. With respect to such provisions, the new treaty would take precedence. (S)

The President proposes that the new treaty specifically address conditions under which ABM deployments currently not permitted by the ABM Treaty could occur. Once agreed, deployments under such conditions would be made under the provisions of the new treaty and, therefore, would not require further modification or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. (S)

Summary. Under the President's proposal, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would confine themselves to activities permitted by the terms of the ABM Treaty through 1991, and possibly beyond, until such time as the program of research, development and testing demonstrates effective defenses to be feasible and until a plan is submitted for "sharing the benefits" and "eliminating offensive ballistic missiles." At that point, a new treaty regime, to be negotiated as soon as possible, and hopefully in 1986, will be triggered. Under the new treaty regime, the sides will negotiate on the plan for "sharing the benefits" and "eliminating offensive ballistic missiles." If agreement is reached, then deployment will proceed according to that agreement. If agreement is not reached after two years of such negotiation, either side will be free to deploy after providing six months' notice of its intention to do so. (S)

This proposal is consistent with past assurances that the U.S. will conduct its activities consistent with the ABM Treaty regime until such time as effective defenses are shown to be feasible. Moreover, it demonstrates our continuing commitment to stability in indicating our willingness to refrain from deployment for two additional years beyond the time when defenses are judged to be feasible while negotiating with the Soviet Union on how the benefits of such defenses could be shared and ballistic missiles eliminated. (S)

Impact on Current Policy. The President's proposal does not change U.S. policy with respect to the correct legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty (as stated in NSDD 192, 11 October 1985). Pursuant to NSDD 192, although not restructuring the U.S. SDI program now, the U.S. may choose to restructure the SDI program, in accordance with the correct legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty, if needed at some time in the future. The President's proposal also does not alter the criteria for effective defenses. (S)

134. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 27, 1986

SUBJECT

Visit of Dr. Edward Teller, and Senators Boschwitz and Quayle with Secretary Shultz

Boschwitz said he had been impressed by the briefing he had received from Teller and thanked the Secretary for agreeing to meet with them. He thought it was important that the Secretary have the benefit of Teller's ideas.

Teller said he had two points to make:

The first one related to the fact that the ABM Treaty permitted the United States to deploy 100 launchers and a number of radars in the Grand Forks area. He thought it was important to utilize this right; it could not only provide limited protection for a significant area of the United States but, more importantly, it would allow us to find out how effective various defenses can be. He would like to deploy at Grand Forks a number of different systems—perhaps as many as 8 to 14—of various types. Our program should not limit us more than does the Treaty.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, September 1986. Secret.

Secretary Shultz made the point that what Teller suggests would be quite feasible if we were talking about a private corporation. The Government, however, has to operate within political and fiscal constraints. He agreed, however, with Teller's point that one learns by doing. Shultz made the further point that if this were funded by adding the funds required to SDI, there was the real danger of killing SDI. He noted that there are those in favor of aborting the ABM Treaty, but it was the firm opinion of our military that the Treaty did more for us than it did for the Soviet Union.

Teller then got to his second point. He said the Soviet SA-12 was the focal point of his concern. He said it was excellent against airplanes and could make the airplane leg of our deterrent almost obsolete. The Pentagon thought the Stealth technology could avoid this; he knew something of that technology, and doubted that the Pentagon was correct. Teller went on to say that if our re-entry vehicles achieve 3 to 4 miles per second and if they are MARVed, then there is a question whether the SA-12 can still follow them. Teller said that is why Cap says the SA-12 will not provide them with an effective ABM defense. However, if the Soviets equip the SA-12 with a small warhead with *[less than 1 line not declassified]*—then the situation would be different. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* has no damaging effect upon people on the ground. At Los Alamos we are developing *[less than 1 line not declassified]* which is based upon *[2 lines not declassified]*. Los Alamos is about to ruin the project by making excessive demands on it; they wish to have it make *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. Teller thinks this is impossible. To make it accurate within a range *[less than 1 line not declassified]* is another matter. If the SA-12 were given such a capability it could catch up to a MARV *[less than 1 line not declassified]* and attack it effectively. The Soviets may have developed such a capability without our being able to detect it. They began building a facility at *[less than 1 line not declassified]* which we called *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. They put a *[less than 1 line not declassified]* or more into it. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. It has been *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. The Soviets can probably now make a *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

Our SLBMs are our most reliable offensive weapons, and, at the time when they were themselves intending to launch and could expect retaliation, if the Soviets could localize an SLBM submarine within a hundred miles, a sea-based SA-12 would be effective in boost phase intercept.

Teller went on to say that whatever we do re a short range ABM will be effective on the high seas. If we could in the next five years deploy such weapons, the Israelis and Germans could make use of that technology. He said he did not mind taking one or two billion out of the MX program; at least one billion in the first year. Secretary Shultz asked

him what the total cost of the program might be. He said it could be anything up to 50 billion. He said he could not make a precise estimate. If he tried to do so, he would be wrong. He mentioned that [2½ lines not declassified].

Secretary Shultz said he thought the basic problem was that we were not appropriating enough for defense or for the general support of our foreign policy; the Congress did not understand the seriousness of the Soviet problem.

Teller said that he thought the President's decision to concentrate on non-nuclear defenses had made our development program chaotic and uncertain. Soviet efforts in this field may make U.S. attempts at retaliation in the '90s obsolete.

After Secretary Shultz left the meeting, I had a further discussion with Teller. He continued to emphasize how wrong he thought it was for the President to talk about the abolition of nuclear weapons. I emphasized that the President was serious about this as a long-term goal. I suggested that maybe the best way to get at what he, Teller, wanted to do was to get much more specific about the program. That would get it away from generalities. Teller said he did not want to do that. He thought that research and development should not exclude any possibilities. I said I had understood him to be recommending a deployment program. I saw no possibility of his getting the authorization and appropriations for such a program unless the SDIO were specific about the systems that he and they thought should be deployed and were persuaded as to their probable effectiveness. I asked Teller which system he thought had the best chance of being effective and therefore should be the first to be deployed. He said he would wish to deploy at least two types; one would be a [less than 1 line not declassified]; the other would be [less than 1 line not declassified]. Senator Quayle spoke highly of [less than 1 line not declassified]. I said I had had heard people in the SDIO also speak well of it. Teller continued to support [less than 1 line not declassified]. (I was told later by Linhard that [less than 1 line not declassified] is a system in which more modern technology has been applied to [less than 1 line not declassified] to reduce its size and cost and to increase its effectiveness.)

Paul H. Nitze²

² Nitze initialed "PHN" above his typed signature.

135. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Timing the Point at Which We Pass Out of Technical Observance of SALT (C)

Issue

When is the most appropriate time for us to pass out of technical observance of the provisions of SALT II.

Facts

In making your May 27th decision² that we would base future strategic force decisions on our national security interests and the threat we face, rather than on provisions of the SALT agreements, you noted that we would remain in technical observance of SALT until late this year. To ensure proper control of the timing of any breach of the SALT limits, you directed in NSDD 232³ that you be informed in advance of any action whereby we would no longer be in such technical observance.

We will pass out of technical observance of SALT when the 131st B-52 bomber converted to carry Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) rolls out of the assembly plant. Previously we had assumed this would not take place until late December. Secretary Weinberger will shortly inform you that it will occur in late October or early November. This timing may soon become public knowledge; Senators Byrd and Leahy have requested an Air Force briefing on the ALCM conversion schedule.

Discussion

For several reasons, I believe our passing out of technical observance of SALT should be delayed until near the end of the year:

— In announcing your May 27 decision, you noted that the delay in our passing out of technical observance gave the Soviets an opportunity to, among other things, respond constructively in the Geneva negotiations. The next round of negotiations, which begins September 18, may well last into November; we should give the Soviets the entire round to see how they respond.

— While we have no agreement on the date, we anticipate a summit will be held in early December. Breaking through SALT limits in

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, END of SALT, 131st Bomber, November 1, 1986. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Brooks. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See footnote 8, Document 109.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 149.

the weeks shortly before the summit will generate significant publicity. Such a step could give the Soviets an excuse to walk away from their commitment to a summit this year and, if the Soviets come, decrease the chance of a favorable summit outcome.

— We are uncertain when Congress will complete final action on the Fiscal Year 1987 budget. We should not unnecessarily take a step which will cause a negative reaction on the Hill while the budget can still be impacted by such a reaction. On the other hand, depending on the final Defense appropriations level, we may wish to consider unplanned retirements of older strategic systems for fiscal reasons, thus potentially eliminating or deferring the need to bear the propaganda costs of breaching SALT limits.

— Passing out of technical observance of SALT immediately before the November election will inevitably convert what should be a technical national security issue into a partisan political issue.

No significant military penalties would accrue from delaying rollout of the 131st ALCM bomber until late this year, although there would probably be some cost in production efficiency.

While it is premature for you to make any decision in advance of formal notification by Secretary Weinberger, I have provided the foregoing for your review in the event a decision is required on short notice due to the Congressional request for information.

Recommendation

None at this time.

136. Memorandum From Sven Kraemer and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, October 2, 1986

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint Policy Options Paper

In response to tasking under NSDD–236,² a specially compartmented (MUSE) paper has been prepared under Arms Control Support Group auspices on options for US interim restraint policy. The basic

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–093, NSDD 236. Secret; Muse. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Cockell, Mahley, and Brooks. A stamped notation at the top of memorandum reads: “Signed.”

² See Document 129.

study, and a verification annex (Annex B) prepared by the DCI, were completed over the last weekend, but we were not able to achieve closure until last night on a technical annex (Annex A) tasked to JCS and OSD on military sufficiency. A memo from Secretary Weinberger (included with Annex A at OSD's request) takes strong issue with the JCS analysis.

In the memorandum to agencies attached for your signature at Tab I, it is requested that agencies provide their comments no later than Wednesday, October 8, 1986. However, keeping in mind the NSPG meeting now scheduled for Monday, October 6,³ your memo encourages the addressees to familiarize themselves with the paper at their earliest opportunity and seeks their comments as early as possible. Since agencies have had copies of the basic paper and, at least the verification annex, in their possession for several days, they should be able to provide their views to you very rapidly.

Prior to Monday's⁴ NSPG, we will provide a brief assessment of the attached options paper, as well as any preliminary views we have received from agencies by that time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I seeking their early comments on the specially compartmented paper on Interim Restraint options attached at Tab A.⁵

³ An unknown hand crossed out "Tuesday, October 7," drew a line to the right-hand margin, and wrote "Monday Oct 6."

⁴ An unknown hand crossed out "Tuesday's" and wrote "Monday's" above it.

⁵ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

Tab I

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe), and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Adelman)⁶

Washington, October 4, 1986

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint Policy (U)

In response to tasking under NSDD–236, a study has been prepared on options to be considered with regard to future U.S. Interim Restraint Policy. To complete the planned review of this subject, it is requested that you provide comments on the options, as described in the attached study, no later than Wednesday, October 8, 1986. However, given the rapidly approaching meeting in Iceland and the likely Soviet interest in this subject, I would encourage you to familiarize yourself with this paper at your earliest opportunity and to provide your comments as rapidly as possible so that they can be most useful to the President in his preparations. (S)

In view of the sensitive nature of this specially compartmented study, it is requested that you restrict access to those in your agency who are currently cleared for the *MUSE* compartment. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

John M. Poindexter

⁶Secret; Muse.

Attachment

Study Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁷

Washington, September 26, 1986

[Omitted here are the title page and the table of contents.]

MUTUAL INTERIM RESTRAINT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In his May 27 decision, President Reagan stated our current restraint policy, *inter alia*, that (1) in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces; (2) the United States will exercise utmost restraint, seeking to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative; (3) as we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in US strategic offensive forces and assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program; and, (4) the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

This study is prepared in response to NSDD-236. In that Directive, the President noted that the US and the USSR need to build a sound new foundation of truly mutual restraint and real arms reductions. The Directive requested that a study examine:

- Numerical limitations, in addition to, or as substitutes for, the May 27 statement;
- Supporting definitions and rules;
- Other qualitative limits, pending completion of START; and,
- What legal form such elements could take.

This study examines a variety of possible elements for a new US restraint policy, including those of the President's May 27 statement, the SALT limits, and other possible limits. All elements were analyzed in terms of a number of criteria for determining their desirability and utility for possible inclusion in a new interim restraint regime: impact on US forces; impact on Soviet forces; consistency with US policy and our START position; monitorability and verifiability; whether or not

⁷ Secret; Noform; Wnintel; Muse.

the Soviets have violated limits; complexity of getting Soviet agreement to mutual restraint; and, finally an overall assessment of desirability or utility for possible inclusion in a new interim restraint regime.

Form of Undertaking

The study examines whether or not a regime should be based on unilateral statements or bilateral agreements, and concludes that a unilateral statement approach would be strongly preferred. It would reduce the likelihood of diverting the focus from the START negotiations. A unilateral statement approach would also allow the US more flexibility in changing policy and reduce the likelihood that the resulting restraint regime would be argued to require Congressional consent.

Duration

The NSDD does not specify a duration for possible mutual restraint regimes. The analysis of military sufficiency of the options presented looks at a number of timeframes (i.e., through 1988, 1991 and 1996).

The President's Restraint Limits

The study concludes that the President's restraint limits from his May 27 statement—that the United States will not exceed the Soviet levels of SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile RVs—are appropriate for our restraint policy. It is particularly appropriate in the case of SNDV restraint to use the actual Soviet level rather than a fixed limit, as the Soviets have violated the SALT fixed limit on SNDVs.

Central SALT Limits

The study concludes that the central SALT limits (aggregate SNDV limits (other than the President's proposal), MIRV subceilings, limits on new types of ICBMs, and the restrictions on telemetry encryption), are not appropriate for a regime of interim restraint. This is concluded in light of their obsolescence, their permissiveness in allowing a continued and highly threatening Soviet strategic force buildup, their inconsistency with current START policy and the fact that Soviet violations have made the limits largely irrelevant.

Non-Central SALT Limits

The SALT II Treaty's variety of lesser provisions were examined. It is concluded that several of these non-central limits could be appropriate for inclusion in a restraint policy. Incorporation of these limits into a restraint regime would be straightforward in all cases if we were to use the SALT II provisions without change. If negotiated, discussions could become complex as changes were made—changes that might be better left to START. In many cases, our START position rejects a direct carry-over of SALT II limits. Hence, this study has narrowed those provisions to a small number, as summarized in the decision matrix.

Definitions and Counting Rules

The study also examined the SALT II definitions and counting rules and concluded that these are inadequate and, therefore, inappropriate for a new restraint regime pending a START agreement. While we have not as yet addressed definitions and counting rules in the START negotiations, any eventual START agreement will have new and different definitions and counting rules as well as improved formulations of past definitions and counting rules; and we would not want to give credence to past formulations that we have found to be inadequate. There is consensus, therefore, that we should say nothing publicly about definitions or counting rules or seek to negotiate these with the Soviets outside of START. *Some believe*, however, that we will need appropriate definitions and counting rules for internal use, both in assessing Soviet compliance and in assessing implications for US forces with regard to a new interim restraint regime. *Others believe* that counting rules and definitions are needed only for bilateral agreements. In the case of unilateral statements, intelligence assessment can and should be made on the basis of evidence, analysis and inference to judge Soviet compliance and implications for US force structure, not predetermined rules and definitions.

In any event, depending on the complexity of the regime, it may require some discussion with the Soviet side to establish the ground rules the US intends to employ with regard to assessing Soviet behavior under a new interim restraint regime.

Other Suggested Constraints Not Based on SALT

The study examined supplementing the President's proposed restraint policy with new restraints. These fall into four general categories: limitations on US forces (generally in areas where we are currently ahead); limitations on Soviet forces (generally in areas where they are ahead); limitations on US forces that are explicitly conditional on reciprocal Soviet restraint (generally in areas where the sides have similar capabilities); and, confidence-building measures (CBMs), derived from those proposed by the US in 1982 and 1983 in the context of the START negotiations.

These restraints could be complemented by the SALT limits (or modifications of those limits), which were assessed as being positive in the matrix.

Options

A number of options have been constructed.

A. *Current approach* with its two limits on SNDV and strategic ballistic missile RVs at the Soviet level. This option would be the simplest approach and would leave all possible future options open, including

the adoption of additional constraints pursuant to agreement on a START framework.

B. *Additional constraints.* This option, based on previous analysis, suggests possible candidates to supplement our existing regime. These include both SALT and non-SALT restraints which are either conditional on Soviet restraint, or unilateral on the part of the Soviet Union, in light of US restraint. These include:

- A US unilateral undertaking to limit its heavy bombers to 450 and not appreciably increase its planned ALCM deployments, given no significant change in the threat we face.

- A US *offer*:

- Not to test or deploy more than 10 RVs per ICBM or more than 14 RVs per SLBM.

- Not to test or deploy more than 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber, if the Soviets do the same.

- Not to encrypt telemetry on strategic ballistic missile flight tests or interfere with national technical means of verification if the Soviets do the same.

- A statement of US *expectation* that the Soviet Union would not:

- Significantly increase strategic ballistic missile warheads, SNDVs and throw weight.

- Expand their heavy ICBM force and not test new or modernize heavy ICBMs.

- Test or deploy more than 10 RVs per ICBM or more than 14 RVs per SLBM.

- Test or deploy more than 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber.

- Encrypt strategic ballistic missile telemetry or interfere with national technical means of verification.

- TWO CBMs:

- A data exchange derived from that proposed by the US in 1982 and 1983 on deployed strategic systems by type.

- Notification of all strategic ballistic missile launches.

C. *Reductions approaches.* Two reduction approaches have been suggested as possible candidates to supplement our existing regime:

- (a) One variant which expands on the two constraints in the May 27 policy, would be for the US to announce that not only is the US committed not to deploy more SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile RVs than the Soviet Union, but it is prepared to restrict the number of its SNDVs and ballistic missile RVs to limits five percent below the current Soviet levels [*less than 1 line not declassified*], provided that the Soviet Union will reduce its SNDVs and ballistic missile RVs to the same limits. In this context, the United States is also prepared to restrict its deployed ALCMs to a limit five percent below the US planned deployment level

[*less than 1 line not declassified*], provided that the Soviet Union will restrict their deployed ALCMs to the same limit.

(b) Another alternative would be for the US to announce that, as a clear demonstration of restraint (particularly in the context of a Summit), the US would be willing to dismantle strategic ballistic missile launchers containing 500 warheads on strategic ballistic missiles, on a one-time basis, if the Soviets do the same. The strategic ballistic missiles and their warheads would be removed and the launchers dismantled over a one-year period beginning on or about December 1, 1986. This would not necessarily involve any net reductions in strategic ballistic missile warheads or SNDVs. Nor would it involve any US commitment to a new strategic ballistic missile warhead or SNDV ceiling beyond the existing US commitment not to deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads or SNDVs than the Soviet Union.

Pros and Cons for these options are presented in Section VIII.

Monitoring Considerations

Overall, *the DCI representative* judges that, given current Soviet practices, the three basic policy options can be monitored now by US intelligence [*less than 1 line not declassified*], depending upon the policy element in question. [*3 lines not declassified*] Whatever the situation, these confidences could be improved by what appear to be relatively easy and modest steps in the areas of definitions, counting rules, procedures, et al. Particularly for Option A, these steps could be entirely within the US Government. If these steps were undertaken, in combination with others to maintain a robust potential to react to Soviet actions, they collectively should lead fairly quickly to as strong a verification regime as it is possible to create in practical terms.

With regard to the specific options, it is clear that as these options progress in complexity, the monitoring difficulty increases as well. And the more complex Options B and C appear to require some sort of an understanding between the sides as to how weapons are to be counted and in the case of Option C, their launchers (or carriers) are to be removed from the inventory. Further, Options B and C increasingly imply the need for some discussion with the Soviets so that they understand the ground rules and standards of behavior the US intends to employ.

While not quarreling with many of the basic monitoring assessments presented by the DCI's representative, *others believe* definitions, counting rules, and procedures to enhance verification would be difficult to develop and negotiate in the context of interim restraint—and could set negative precedents for START.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

Annex A (1)

**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Poindexter)⁸**

Washington, October 1, 1986

SUBJECT

Military Sufficiency Assessment of Interim Restraint Options (U)

(S) NSDD 236 directed that there be “An assessment, led by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the answers [of the interim restraint study]⁹ in terms of their impact on U.S. and Allied security and military sufficiency.”

(S/MUSE) The attached paper by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concludes that all four interim restraint options under consideration are militarily sufficient under a number of assumptions which, among others, include:

- The United States strategic modernization program will be carried out to the degree permitted by each option.
- Adequate C3I will be available.
- No strategic defenses are deployed beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty.

The Joint Chiefs note that, “These assumptions are not made to prejudice policy, but are necessary if analysis is to be accomplished in a timely fashion . . .”

(S/MUSE) The JCS analysis is reasonable as far as it goes and in light of the assumptions made. However, there are a number of considerations which affect the desirability of the options under consideration. First, as the President stated on 23 September, the House of Representatives is not funding defense at an adequate level. While it is clearly impossible to predict precisely what will be funded over the next several years, it would be highly imprudent to assume complete funding of the strategic modernization program.

(S/MUSE) Second, the assumption that the Soviets will not deploy widespread missile defense capability may also be optimistic. The Soviets are in clear violation of the ABM Treaty and, as the President concluded in his December 1985 compliance report, the pattern of

⁸ Secret; Muse. Weinberger wrote “John” above the recipient line.

⁹ Brackets are in the original.

Soviet activity, "suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory." Recent discovery of [1 line not declassified] by the U.S.S.R. and evidence concerning the [less than 1 line not declassified] reinforce this concern.

(S/MUSE) Third, when we consider the larger issue of U.S. and Allied security, we face the issue of proposing "cosmetic" or token reductions. The United States Government has consistently refused to do so since 1981. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that, "The enclosed assessment does not prejudice the advisability of any of those options as appropriate arms control constraints for the United States." As the President noted in his 27 May statement, ". . . no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received my highest priority."

(S/MUSE) The dangers inherent in the Option C approach of a mutual 500 RV reduction proposal should be obvious. In short, it does not conform to our stated arms control principles: *deep* reductions to *equal levels* under *verifiable agreements*. If one factors in the underlying premise, i.e., that both we and the Soviets would be free to *build back up* to levels at or above those we had before the retirements, the cosmetic nature of this proposal would make even the "fatally-flawed" SALT II Treaty appear responsible by contrast. Furthermore, if one anticipates—as we must—that the Soviets will attempt to turn this proposal to their advantage (e.g., a freeze by both sides at the new, slightly lower but unequal levels), it should be self-evident that we must eschew this approach for military as well as arms control policy reasons.

(S/MUSE) Thus, we believe that Option A is the most militarily advantageous. Our existing policy is most consistent with our modernization program and meeting our military requirements. It gives us the most flexibility in responding to changes in the threat. It maximizes our leverage in the START negotiations. (The other options would tend to reduce Soviet incentives to agree to significant reductions.) It is consistent with the policy this Administration has pursued for almost six years—a policy which for the first time has forced the Soviets to agree at least to the principle of substantial reductions. We believe this policy must be continued.

Cap

Annex A (2)

Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Welch) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹⁰

Washington, September 24, 1986

SUBJECT

Military Sufficiency Assessment of Interim Restraint Options (C)

1. (S/MUSE) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the four options developed in the NSDD–236 study. Attached is an annex to that study, certifying the military sufficiency of those options.

2. (S/MUSE) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached their conclusion based upon the specific assumptions and constraints described in the annex. Insofar as they are providing their military judgments of sufficiency prior to completion of the study, they are prepared to review and comment upon the study in its finished form in the near future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

LARRY D. WELCH
*Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Annex A (3)

Paper Prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹¹

Washington, undated

Annex: Military Sufficiency

NSDD 236 directs a study of mutual interim restraint, to include an assessment of the military sufficiency of candidate mutual interim restraint regimes. This annex addresses the military sufficiency of four options developed and described in detail within the body of the companion study: Option A (Current Approach), Option B (Additional

¹⁰ Secret; NoFORN; MUSE.

¹¹ Secret; NoFORN; MUSE.

Constraints), Option C1 (Percentage Reductions Approach), and Option C2 (Numerical Reductions Approach).

In anticipation of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which commenced in 1985, the President reaffirmed earlier guidance that any approach or alternative approaches to those talks recommended for his approval should, as a minimum, permit the United States to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed the Soviet Union, to permit execution of U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The President specifically directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify the military sufficiency of any approach submitted to him in this regard.

For purposes of this study, the same general procedures used in arriving at military sufficiency judgments for NST options have been used in assessing candidate mutual interim restraint regimes. It is important to note that the military sufficiency judgments apply to regimes as a whole, not to elements of a regime or to regimes with elements other than those explicitly described in this annex. In addition, the following assumptions were made in arriving at the military sufficiency judgments:

- The United States strategic modernization program will be carried out to the degree permitted by each option.
- There will be no change to national security policy and strategy.
- Adequate C3I will be available.
- No strategic defenses are deployed beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty.
- Soviet compliance, consistent with the nature of each option.

These assumptions are not made to prejudice policy, but are necessary if analysis is to be accomplished in a timely fashion and with sufficient detail to support the requirements of NSDD 236. The assumptions apply to the three time periods under review: through 1988, through 1991, and through 1996.

Option A (Current Approach) is the existing interim restraint regime which was established by the President's 27 May 1986 announcement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined this option in terms of illustrative Soviet forces provided by CIA for purposes of this study. U.S. forces under this option would be constrained by the factors announced by the President:

- The United States will continue to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, continuing to retire older forces as national security requirements permit.
- Assuming no significant change in the threat, the United States does not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in its strategic offensive forces.

◦ The United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Option B (Current Approach with Additional Constraints) involves an expanded restraint regime. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also examined this option in terms of illustrative Soviet forces provided by CIA for purposes of this study. Soviet and U.S. forces in this option were constrained by a number of proposed limits. The major numerical limits were:

◦ No increase in the current level of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; the United States may deploy up to that level.

◦ No expansion of the Soviet heavy ICBM force or testing of new heavy or modernized ICBMs, and no increase in Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight.

◦ No increase in the current level of Soviet ballistic missile warheads; the United States may deploy up to that level.

◦ No testing or deployment of more than 10 RVs per ICBM and 14 RVs per SLBM (a conditional restraint—the analysis assumed compliance by both the United States and the Soviet Union).

◦ No deployment of U.S. heavy bombers beyond an operational limit of 450 (the analysis assumed staying within current plans).

◦ No appreciable increase in planned U.S. ALCM deployment (the analysis assumed staying within current plans).

◦ No testing or deployment of more than 20 ALCMs on a heavy bomber (a conditional restraint—the analysis assumed compliance by the United States and the Soviet Union).

The same general assumptions that applied to Option A also apply to Option B.

Option C1 (Percentage Reductions Approach) is a variation on expanding the two numerical limits expressed in the President's 27 May statement. As with Options A and B, the Joint Chiefs of Staff examined this option in terms of illustrative forces provided by CIA. These forces were constrained by a five percent reduction below current Soviet levels of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and strategic ballistic missile warheads. Thus, the limits for U.S. forces become:

◦ The United States will not deploy strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or ballistic missile warheads to a level beyond ninety-five percent of *current* Soviet levels in these two categories, assuming the Soviets reduce and remain at that level.

◦ The United States also will not deploy ALCMs to a level beyond ninety-five percent of its planned deployment level, in the context of the above limit and assuming the Soviets are prepared to show equal restraint.

Although this option allows for incorporating additional constraints of Option B, bounds had to be placed on the option for the purpose of supporting analyses. Thus the only numerical limits

examined in reaching a military sufficiency judgment are those explicitly described above.

Option C2 (Numerical Reductions Approach) also is a variation on expanding the two numerical limits in the Presidents 27 May statement. The Joint Chiefs examined this option in terms of illustrative forces provided by CIA and constrained by a one-time reduction of 500 warheads on strategic ballistic missiles, with the reduction taking place from 1 December 1986 through 1 December 1987. It was assumed that the reduction would take place only if the Soviets agreed to do the same. Thus the limit on United States forces essentially is the same as in Option A, with an additional one-time reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads. This option also allows for incorporating additional constraints of Option B; however, for the same reasons discussed earlier, such additional constraints were not considered in this assessment.

Conclusion: Given the assumptions and the numerical limits in the options laid out in this annex, the Joint Chiefs of Staff find that all four options permit the United States to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed the Soviet Union, to permit execution of U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. Therefore the Joint Chiefs certify with those understandings that the proposed mutual interim restraint options are militarily sufficient. This certification does not prejudice the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment of the advisability of any of these options as appropriate arms control initiatives for the United States.

Annex B

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹²

Washington, September 26, 1986

Annex B: Assessment of Monitorability and Verifiability

Overview

Overall, the DCI Representatives judges that, given current Soviet practices, the three basic policy options can be monitored [*less than 1 line not declassified*] depending upon the policy element in question. [*2½ lines not declassified*]. Whatever the situation, these confidences could be improved by what appear to be relatively easy and modest steps in

¹² Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original.

the areas of definitions, counting rules, procedures, et al. Particularly for Option A, these steps could be entirely within the US Government. The associated verification judgments ought to track directly with such steps. If these steps were undertaken, in combination with others to maintain a robust potential to react to Soviet actions, they collectively should lead fairly quickly to as strong a verification regime as it is possible to create in practical terms. [*portion marking not declassified*]

As the three basic policy Options progress in complexity, the monitoring difficulties increase as well. At least one element of each Option implies creation of a verification regime. And the more complex Options B and C seem to require some sort of understanding as to how weapons are to be counted and/or their launchers (or carriers) are to be removed from the accountable inventory. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Further, Options B and C seem to increasingly imply the need for discussion with the Soviets so that they understand US standards of behavior and so that the US does not employ a standard of behavior which the Soviets have rejected already or would reject if it were exposed to them. And finally, some elements of Options B and C—without an explicit verification package of some type, directly connected to these constraints—seem to imply political and military risk beyond what the US has judged itself willing to accept in the recent past, although comparable risks from pre-existing accords have been judged tolerable for short periods of a few years. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Supporting definitions and other features, such as counting rules, are judged necessary to ensure as strong a verification regime as possible for these options. The regime needed varies somewhat from option to option and from element to element in each option. A few, such as the limit on SNDVs, are relatively easy to express, based on our experience in monitoring Soviet forces and tacit “rules of the road” that have developed over the years and seem to be understood by both the US and USSR. For these, the US could unilaterally express the standard of behavior for the Soviets which—should they choose to participate—they could readily accept and understand. [*portion marking not declassified*]

However, most of these specific elements—for example, RV counting, throw weight, and maximum ALCM loadings—involve difficult technical, and controversial political, issues resulting in some monitoring uncertainty and associated military risk. [*8½ lines not declassified*]

Introduction

1. *Policy Options:* This annex examines the monitorability and verifiability of the variety of possible elements for a new US interim restraint policy, including those of the President’s May 27 statement, selected SALT limits, and other possible limits. These elements are currently embodied in three policy options. [*portion marking not declassified*]

To support whichever option is chosen, US intelligence will have to perform the monitoring tasks outlined below:

- Option A: Assess whether there has been any increase (or decrease) in deployed Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and strategic ballistic missile warheads;

- Option B: Determine whether the Soviets were:

- Significantly increasing (or decreasing) strategic ballistic missile warheads, SNDVs, and throw weight.

- Expanding their heavy ICBM force and not testing new or modernized heavy ICBMs.

- Testing [or deploying] more than 10 RVs per ICBM or more than 14 RVs per SLBM.

- Testing [or deploying] more than 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber.

- [Encrypting strategic ballistic missile telemetry or interfering with national technical means of verification.]

- There are two confidence building measures included in this option:

- [A data exchange derived from that proposed by the US in 1982 and 1983 on deployed strategic systems by type.]

- [Notification of all strategic ballistic missile launches.]

- Option C: In addition to portions of Options 1 and 2, or by itself, determine whether the Soviet Union was:

- Reducing its deployed SNDVs and ballistic missile RVs by 5 percent, and restricting its deployed ALCMs to a limit 5 percent below the US planned deployment level (about [*number not classified*]); or

- Dismantling strategic ballistic missile launchers containing 500 warheads on missiles over a one-year period. [*portion marking not declassified*]

- 2. [*1 line not declassified*]

- [*4 lines not declassified*]

- [*2 lines not declassified*]

- [*2 lines not declassified*]

- [*2 lines not declassified*]

- [*1 line not declassified*]

These stages make it possible to offer verification assessments. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. *Value of Monitoring/Verification Assessments*: The above factors are the necessary inputs for a considered verification assessment of the interim restraint options. It is clear that as the options progress to include more complex restraints involving greater monitoring uncertainties, it becomes more necessary to provide detailed verification measures, tailored to those restraints, to maximize the capability of the US to know whether or not the Soviets may have engaged in activities

(including non-compliance) in enough time to allow the US to exercise the safeguards put in place to cope with Soviet behavior. Depending on the monitoring uncertainties, cooperative measures to reduce uncertainties, appropriate safeguards, and a JCS assessment of military sufficiency of each policy option, it ought to be possible to make an assessment of the acceptability of any particular verification regime. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Assessment of Option A

[7 lines not declassified]

5. *[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]*

6. *[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]*

7. *[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]*

8. *Cooperative Measures:* Although there are no specific cooperative measures attached to this option, it is clear that there needs to be some type of an understanding concerning terms, definitions, counting rules, and procedures. This could be entirely within the US Government or between the US and USSR. Without this understanding, not only would the Soviet Union not be able to know how it should act to satisfy the restraints, but US intelligence would have unnecessary difficulty in accurately assessing Soviet activities. Further, without such elements of a verification regime, a disparity could arise between the operational force and the force defined under the policy option. SNDVs taken “off line” for whatever reasons might still be judged accountable. *[portion marking not declassified]*

9. In the case of SNDVs, it is clear that both sides have a good understanding of what constitutes a SNDV in today’s world. A unilateral statement by the US to this effect could suffice. For RVs, however, it would not be possible to improve the prospects for verification without some sort of communications with the Soviets, either through diplomatic channels or in the SCC. Because of the different ways a side could determine the maximum number of deployed RVs on each type of fractionated missile, it is judged essential for assessments that it be made clear to (or with) the Soviets what criteria it is using to determine the maximum RV loadings. For example, it is possible to use the maximum number of RVs flight tested with (or without) the maximum number of simulated releases on a missile type during flight tests. These particular illustrative criteria, however, would not necessarily capture the maximum number. Monitoring confidences would not be likely to improve a lot—and for all types of missiles—simply because of this one counting rule, however, as long as Soviet telemetry encryption continues at its current levels. *[portion marking not declassified]*

10. *[1 paragraph (20 lines) not declassified]*

11. *[1 paragraph (14 lines) not declassified]*

12. *Possible Safeguards*: In order for the US to be in the strongest possible verification situation for this Option, the US needs to decide on (and create and declare as necessary), as well as put in place, the following steps:

- A vigorous effort on options for US strategic forces; this would include RDT&E, as well as deployment, of all elements of the Strategic Modernization Program.

- A strong national intelligence program, which incorporates the capability to monitor SNDVs and to estimate the RV loadup on deployed operational ballistic missiles. Some additional funding, now undetermined in cost and duration, in addition to restoring cuts directed so far, might be prudent.

- A policy statement that the US will react politically and/or militarily to significant changes in either level.

To the degree that these steps already exist, sufficient (and perhaps strong) safeguards are in place for Option A. These safeguards could be strengthened by extending these steps into an Executive-Legislative understanding. One conceivable way to do this is by means of a binding joint resolution of Congress. [*portion marking not declassified*]

13. *Verification Assessment*: [2 lines not declassified]. Moreover, a number of steps could be created which, if undertaken, in combination with actions to maintain at least a plausible potential to react to Soviet actions, ought to lead to as strong a verification regime for this option as it is possible to create in practical terms. Depending on the JCS assessment of military sufficiency, which is not available at present, this verification regime might be at least acceptable. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Assessment of Option B

14. *Relation to Option A*: Option B contains all the restraints in Option A but adds other restraints, as well as confidence building measures. [*portion marking not declassified*]

15. *Monitorability*: With regard to SNDVs, the assessment for Option A above is unchanged, except to note that a data exchange on deployed strategic systems by type would marginally assist US intelligence in its accounting of SNDVs, particularly land-based mobile ICBMs. To be most practical and useful, a data base should be established at the beginning of the interim restraint regime with data exchanges of updates repeated every 6 months. Also helpful would be notification of SNDV launchers that enter and exit the inventory and new types of systems coming on line. Notification of a few days or weeks would suffice for the first; several months or a year's notice would be helpful for the second. Any such data exchanges and notifications could take

place via diplomatic channels or through the SCC. [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. *Ballistic Missile RVs*: The assessments concerning the monitoring of ballistic missile RVs would differ in this option from Option A. This option includes an implicit end to telemetry encryption, [*7 lines not declassified*]

17. [*1 paragraph (14 lines) not declassified*]

18. [*1 paragraph (20 lines) not declassified*]

19. [*1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified*]

20. [*1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified*]

21. [*1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified*]

22. *Cooperative Measures*: Among the measures that would be needed for this wide-ranging option to be monitored [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would be: an agreement or understanding as to what constitutes throw weight (an issue of past contention), as well as what constitutes a new heavy or modernized ICBM (also an issue of contention). Moreover, an end to encryption, a data exchange periodically updated on all the types of deployed strategic systems, and notification of ballistic missile launches would assist US monitoring of this overall option. An end to encryption would have a particular impact in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the estimates of the numbers of RVs and the amount of throw weight flight tested. Further, on-site inspection/monitoring [*less than 1 line not declassified*] could confirm that an ICBM (or SLBM) had been deployed with no more than 10 (or 14) RVs. And the data from the on-site inspection/monitoring would be valid only during the time of the inspection/monitoring. It is clear, however, that the list of restraints noted above and these cooperative measures would require at least a discussion with the Soviets. The measures would also be most beneficial to monitoring efforts if they were kept together as a package. [*portion marking not declassified*]

23. *Significance of Violations*: The same risks and projections that apply in Option A also apply to Option B. In addition, although there would be a significant risk to US security were there a major Soviet expansion of its heavy ballistic missile force, and new heavy or modernized ICBMs (assuming no US response), [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Any resulting increases ought to lead to only slightly more military risk for the US in this option than they would in any other option. [*6 lines not declassified*]

24. *Possible Safeguards*: Approximately the same as in Option A; the details ought to follow from the policy elements selected. [*portion marking not declassified*]

25. *Verification Assessment*: The DCI Representative believes that the verifiability of this wide-ranging option (as stated) ought to be [*less*

than 1 line not declassified] depending on which element(s) are selected and how they are combined. Moreover, a number of steps could be created which, if undertaken in combination with actions to maintain at least a plausible potential to react to Soviet actions, ought to lead to as strong a verification regime as it is possible to create in practical terms. Depending on the JCS assessment of military sufficiency, which is not available at this time, this verification regime might be at least acceptable. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Assessment of Option C

26. *Monitorability*: *[3 lines not declassified]*. However, procedures can be devised that would allow *[less than 1 line not declassified]* confidence in monitoring the number of launchers and missiles removed from the USSR's operational inventory. But this would require, among other things, specific procedures governing removal from deployment (e.g., dismantling and destruction) of the weapon systems and launchers in question. *[2 lines not declassified]* it is assumed that the dismantling and destruction of missiles and launchers would also involve at least the removal of the warheads from their operational launcher. *[portion marking not declassified]*

27. Monitoring the removal from deployment depends on the steps the Soviets use. For example, monitoring the destruction of fixed silo launchers, SSBNs, and large aircraft, is relatively easy and can be done *[less than 1 line not declassified]* if the USSR cooperates. Such monitoring for mobile missile launchers is somewhat harder *[less than 1 line not declassified]* unless the USSR cooperates. *[2½ lines not declassified]*. In contrast, even with past types of cooperation, the destruction of missile airframes requires determination of the types of missiles destroyed. This is particularly important for "newer" missiles—such as the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-25, and SS-X-24, *[5 lines not declassified]*.

28. *[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]*

29. Programmed changes or additions to US intelligence capabilities will help the monitoring of this option somewhat. Monitoring here is much more dependent upon appropriate cooperative measures, properly designed and implemented. *[portion marking not declassified]*

30. *Cooperative Measures*: In the absence of active cooperative measures, agreement on detailed passive cooperative measures is necessary for successful monitoring of this option. Specifically, agreement ought to be reached on at least:

- Prenotification of reductions, dismantlements, and destruction (including locations, if possible).
- Procedures for destroying launchers or cutting up airframes.
- Length of time for such activities and for display to NTM.
- If necessary, positive identification of the airframe.
- Disposition of remaining (including destroyed) parts.

These types of procedures have been a source of contention on occasion between the Soviets and the US and ought to require more detailed discussion. [4 lines not declassified]

31. *Significance of Violations*: With a SNDV total of about [number not declassified] (depending on the definition of SNDV), and a total deployed ballistic missile warhead count in the range of about [less than 1 line not declassified] (depending on counting rules), there ought to be minimal (if any) military significance to a Soviet failure to reduce either 5 percent in SNDVs (i.e., [number not declassified]); or 500 warheads. [portion marking not declassified]

32. *Possible Safeguards*: Approximately the same as in Option A; the details ought to follow from the policy elements selected. [portion marking not declassified]

33. *Verification Assessment*: The DCI Representative believes, [2½ lines not declassified]. These steps and others could be created which, if undertaken in combination with actions to maintain at least a plausible potential to react to Soviet actions, ought to lead to as strong a verification regime for this option as it is possible to create in practical terms. Depending on the JCS assessment of military significance, which is not available at present, this verification regime might be at least acceptable. [portion marking not declassified]

137. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 3, 1986

SUBJECT

Status of ICBM Modernization Process

On September 25, I attended a briefing on the status of ICBM modernization which was given by Donald Hicks, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Hicks previewed a briefing to be given at an upcoming meeting of the NSC.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat S/S Records, 1986 Nodis and Exdis Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D093, 1986 Nodis Memorandums, October 1–31, 1986 #1. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stogdale in PM; Cleared by Davis in PM. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.

DOD has now narrowed to four the basing options for an additional 50 MX. By November, Weinberger is to recommend a final MX basing mode as well as the configuration and basing mode for the small ICBM. It is my sense that DOD may recommend a delay in the decision-making on both systems based on insufficient data, even though the White House is unreceptive to such a delay.

Hicks reviewed the four MX options remaining under consideration:

- Superhardened silos [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
- [2 lines not declassified]
- [2 lines not declassified]
- [3 lines not declassified]

Hicks expressed his personal support of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] emphasizing that it would provide “enough” survivability. He also seems to support a mixed force of small ICBMs and MX. We understand that at least some of the Air Force leadership has been brought along to a view that if the MX is sellable only as a mobile, then perhaps [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is the best option available.

The consideration of these options so far seems to be centered on questions of technology, survivability and cost. It is not clear, for example, that DOD has thought about how they might be verified under a START agreement or how unattractive we would find similar modes of Soviet deployment. If arms control is going to reduce the size of US and Soviet strategic arsenals in verifiable ways, these considerations will need to be addressed before basing decisions are made. My staff is working on this issue, and I will get further thoughts to you as these basing concepts are further developed this fall.²

²No minutes were found.

138. Editorial Note

On October 9, 1986, President Ronald Reagan traveled from Washington to Reykjavik, Iceland, to meet with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Air Force One departed from Andrews Air Force Base at around 9:45 a.m. and landed at Keflavik airport at 7:05 p.m. The President then proceeded to the United States Ambassadorial Residence, where he stayed that evening. Throughout the following day, Reagan met privately with senior advisors, including Secretary of State George Shultz, reviewed preparatory material, and called on

Icelandic President Vigdis Finnbogadóttir and other senior Icelandic officials from 4:30 to 5:10 p.m., before returning to the Ambassadorial Residence to dine with Shultz, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs John Poindexter. A chronology is in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 1.

On October 11, Reagan received briefings from his senior staff and a team of experts, before departing for Hofdi House at 10:15 a.m. and arriving shortly before Gorbachev and the Soviet delegation. From 10:40 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., Reagan and Gorbachev met with an interpreter and a notetaker, with Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze joining them at 11:30 a.m. Gorbachev proposed a draft agreement to reduce by fifty percent the strategic offensive arms of both sides; a draft agreement eliminating U.S. and Soviet long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF) in Europe; to initiate negotiations on shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) in Europe; to limit Soviet LRINF in Asia; and to agree that the United States and Soviet Union would adhere to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for ten years and, during this period, confine to laboratories any space-based elements of potential missile defense systems. The President described the General Secretary's proposals as "very encouraging," while noting outstanding differences—most notably the restriction on testing of defensive systems should further development of promising systems necessitate testing beyond the ABM Treaty. After several exchanges, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to break for lunch and consultations with their respective teams, and then continue discussions of nuclear arms later that afternoon. The memorandum of this first conversation between Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 301.

Reagan and Gorbachev met again in Hofdi House from 3:30 until 5:40 p.m. The President offered detailed responses to the General Secretary's morning proposals, laid out his case for the Strategic Defense Initiative, and called for two meetings of experts' groups to commence at 8 p.m. that evening and report back to the two leaders by the following morning. One group would discuss nuclear arms, while the other would discuss regional and bilateral affairs and human rights. Gorbachev accepted this negotiating framework. At the conclusion of this meeting, Reagan returned to the U.S. Embassy, where he met with Shultz, Regan, Poindexter, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Ambassador Max Kampelman, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council staff, to review the afternoon conversations with Gorbachev and provide instructions for

the evening's nuclear arms negotiations. Reagan then had a private dinner with Shultz, Regan, and Poindexter, after which he retired for the evening. The memoranda of conversation of Reagan and Gorbachev's second meeting at Reykjavik and that of the experts' group meeting on regional and bilateral affairs are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 302 and 303. The memorandum of conversation of the overnight arms control experts' conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume XI, START I, Document 159.

The following morning, Reagan met with Gorbachev from 10 a.m. until 1:35 p.m., 3:25 until 4:30 p.m., and 5:30 until 6:50 p.m., in between which Shultz and Shevardnadze met from 2:05 until 3 p.m. Memoranda of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 306, 308, and 307. Reagan departed Keflavik Airport on Air Force One at approximately 8:49 p.m. local time, and arrived at the White House Residence at 10:43 p.m.

Subsequently, the National Security Council staff prepared a detailed chronology of all exchanges between U.S. and Soviet counterparts at Reykjavik, which is in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 1. On October 14, William Tobey and Steven Steiner of the National Security Council staff sent Poindexter a set of talking points, titled "The Importance of SDI," which included: "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative offers our best hope of a safer world where our and our Allies' security would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of mass annihilation"; "SDI is a research and technology development program to demonstrate by the early 1990s the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for targeting missiles in all phases of their flight—boost, mid-course, and terminal"; and "SDI is critical to progress towards arms reduction agreements. It brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table and now acts as the necessary lever that for the first time has them talking seriously about deep reductions of the most dangerous weapons—offensive ballistic missiles." (Reagan Library, Steven Steiner Files, Arms Control File, 51—AC/SDI (10/1/1986–10/31/1986))

139. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 16, 1986

SUBJECT

Why We Can't Commit to Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons Within 10 Years

Purpose. Mr. President, my purpose in this note is to strongly recommend that you step back from any discussion of eliminating *all nuclear weapons* in 10 years, and focus attention on the proposals that you handed over to General Secretary Gorbachev in writing in Iceland which were focused on the elimination of *all offensive ballistic missiles* in 10 years.² Further, I would recommend that you make no further public comment endorsing the idea of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in 10 years as something discussed and agreed with the General Secretary. If asked, I would recommend that you stand firm by your long-term commitment to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, but always cast this in terms of a long-term goal which will require the correction of existing conventional force imbalances and other conditions that require us to have the nuclear weapons in the first place.

Eliminating Ballistic Missiles. The idea of calling for the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles is not a new one. And although we had not previously considered suggesting that this be accomplished by 1996 (in 10 short years), it is a concept that we have studied carefully.

As you will remember, the idea of calling for the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles grew out of a proposal initially made by Cap Weinberger.³ He made it to you as we were working your last arms control letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.⁴ Cap suggested that it be coupled with the idea of sharing the benefits of advanced defenses.

The logic of this idea is simple and direct. Cap argued that it would make no sense to commit to share the benefits of advanced defenses with the Soviets if they insisted on continuing to possess large numbers of offensive ballistic missiles which would attempt to defeat our

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Poindexter Files, Chron File, Chron October 1986. Top Secret; Sensitive. Poindexter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "0930 10/16/86 President read and agreed. JP."

² See Document 138.

³ See Document 114.

⁴ Reagan's July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 254.

defenses. In short, why share the benefits of our research unless the Soviets showed a willingness to join us in making the transition to a more defense reliant world by reducing and ultimately eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.

The call for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles was also consistent with what we were trying to do *both* in START and in INF, and also with the fundamental goal that you specifically set for the SDI program.

With respect to START, the call for the total elimination of all ballistic missiles is a logical extension of the position we have taken in the START negotiations that we must reduce and eliminate the unique threat posed by ballistic missiles. Our position has long been that while each side may need nuclear forces for some time to deter conflict and underwrite its security, neither side needs fast-flying, non-recallable offensive ballistic missiles for this purpose. From the very first, in START, we have been trying to draw a clear distinction between fast-flying ballistic systems, which are uniquely suited for an attempted first-strike by an aggressor, and slow-flying systems which are better suited for retaliation (less so for aggression). As a result, we have been attempting to focus on reductions in ballistic missile warheads as the heart of the issue to be resolved—and have treated slow-flying bombers largely to meet Soviet concerns.

In INF, we have taken a similar position. We have kept the focus on missiles, and avoided discussion of dual-capable, tactical aircraft. We proposed the zero-zero solution for the LRINF missile problem. We have called for the similar reduction and elimination of shorter-range ballistic missiles, missiles that pose as direct a threat to our Allies as Soviet ICBMs do to the United States.

With respect to SDI, your specific, stated goal was to make ballistic missiles obsolete, not to make all nuclear weapons obsolete. Here, again, your focus was on promptly eliminating the threat posed by these fast-flying missiles. You did discuss the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, but you made it very clear that this step could only be taken if either the conventional balance of forces were corrected, or if the conditions of the world changed sufficiently so that the conventional force imbalance was not as a direct a threat as it is today and our requirements for nuclear weapons were removed.

After study and discussion, you incorporated the idea of proposing the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles into your letter to the General Secretary. We then consulted our Allies about this idea, and gained their support for it.

In Iceland, at the critical point of finding a response to Soviet concerns which neither compromised our principles or our security, we recommended that you draw upon this previous consensus and adapt

this element (a call for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles) into your response to the Soviet call for a 10 year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. By doing so, we undercut any Soviet objection to our having the right to deploy defenses as insurance, since we would have committed to wait until all offensive ballistic missiles of the two superpowers should have been eliminated anyway. By calling for the elimination of missiles of all ranges, we also, in one step, solved the problem of getting rid of both the last 100 Soviet SS-20 warheads in Asia (a concern of our Asian allies) and the remaining shorter-range INF missiles that still would threaten our European allies (a particular concern of Kohl).

It was for these reasons that we recommended to you, and you agreed and passed to the Soviets, the proposal calling for the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles in 10 years attached at *Tab A*.⁵ It was also for these reasons that we recommended to you, and you agreed and passed to the Soviets, a rejection of their attempt to alter this to a proposal for the elimination of all strategic forces (*Tab B*)⁶—and instead went back to them with a second proposal that was altered in certain language but firm on the call for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles (*Tab C*).⁷

Under the recommended proposals, at the end of 10 years, when no offensive ballistic missiles exist, the US and the Soviet Union would still have up to 50% of today's strategic nuclear offensive force levels, although they would now be concentrated in slow-flying systems (bombers and cruise missiles). This would provide a modest strategic retaliatory force to deter attack on the US and conventional aggression against our allies throughout the world until our conventional forces could be upgraded and our air defenses put in place. It would keep a US nuclear umbrella, although a quite smaller one, over NATO. We would also still have some nuclear weapons in battlefield systems like artillery and in our dual-capable fighter aircraft that could hold Soviet tank concentrations at risk. Thus, keeping some nuclear forces would offset the great Soviet advantage in conventional forces that exists threatening NATO. These were the very significant reasons behind our recommendations to you that you reject any Soviet attempts to shift the proposal from the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles to either the elimination of all strategic forces or the total elimination of nuclear weapons in 10 years.

⁵ Not found attached.

⁶ Not found attached.

⁷ Not found attached.

Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons. In your speech announcing the SDI program in March, 1983, you called for a future nuclear free world.⁸ Prior to finalizing that speech, as you will recall, we had a series of discussions about the fact that until regional conventional force imbalances could be corrected, such a step was simply not possible—and, therefore, the main thrust of the SDI program announced in your speech, and the specific objective given to that program by you was not to make nuclear weapons obsolete, but to make ballistic missiles obsolete.

In January, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed a plan for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.⁹ You will remember that we very carefully studied the plan, and reached the conclusion that while we agreed with the ultimate goal, that such a step could only be taken if we were confident that we had other means to offset Soviet conventional force advantages. You responded to the General Secretary's proposal along these lines. Nothing has changed since that time.

The Conventional Imbalance. Given the differences in the size of conventional forces that exist today, and the military requirements we face, it is very unlikely that we could take the actions to improve our conventional force capabilities needed to permit us to do without some nuclear weapons within the next ten years. Our allies face the same problem, and many have made it clear that they do not support any move in this direction for this very practical reason. Thus, both US and Allied security require at least some nuclear weapons be retained for the foreseeable future.

Mrs. Thatcher's Views. Mrs. Thatcher, in her recent phone conversation with you, made the very same points. She strongly feels that the premature elimination of all nuclear weapons would strike at the heart of our deterrence strategy. She also feels that the Soviets clearly have conventional superiority, and that doing away with all nuclear weapons would give them the upper hand. She said to you that she remained concerned that if we were to give up all our nuclear weapons, the Soviets, with their conventional superiority, could just sweep across Europe. She noted that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is what her political opposition (Neil Kinnock) is advocating, but that she feels that this would be tantamount to surrender. Finally, she reminded you that Winston Churchill had long ago declared that an independent

⁸ Reagan's March 23, 1983, speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 145.

⁹ Gorbachev's January 14, 1986, letter proposing the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 177.

nuclear deterrent was the only way for smaller countries, like Great Britain, to equalize the strength and power of bigger countries—and that she fully agreed with this.

The Impact on US/Allied Military Strategy. If we could put aside for the moment the nuclear forces of the UK, France and China—and others who could become nuclear powers like India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, etc.—we should also consider the situation we would face if the types of proposals discussed above were implemented.

Eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles would push us back to a condition similar to that which we faced in the 1950s. A limited number of nuclear weapons would exist, largely deliverable by aircraft.

In terms of military tactics, the existence of these remaining nuclear weapons would mean that an aggressor could not mass his forces in any one place in the hope of breaking through conventional defenses because he could not be sure that nuclear weapons would not be used to destroy these forces when they are massed. The fact that the threat of nuclear attack prevents an aggressor from massing his conventional forces without risk makes modern conventional weapons more effective, giving them the chance to handle the threat they face since the existence of nuclear weapons means that the aggressor can't simply mass forces and overwhelm positions with force of numbers.

In terms of strategy, the existence of these weapons (too slow to be used to surprise and defeat retaliatory forces, but still well suited for a retaliatory mission) would still raise the price of aggression to a level high enough that it could help deter aggression.

Eliminating all nuclear weapons (once again ignoring the forces of the UK, France, China and others for simplicity) would push us back to a situation that existed on the eve of WW II—with the peace dependent upon the assessment of an aggressor of the relative strength of his conventional forces alone. However, instead of the Panzer divisions that Hitler had at his disposal, we would face the challenge posed by the combined arms capability of the Soviet army. It simply is not clear that we can take the steps necessary to upgrade our own and NATO's conventional defenses sufficiently to have our security rest on conventional forces alone within 10 years. If we cannot, then the Soviet ability to coerce our allies—to Finlandize other nations—will increase, and our security decrease, as a result of the premature elimination of all nuclear weapons.

While our allies certainly are not happy having their security tied to the use of nuclear weapons to offset conventional forces, and the prospect of nuclear war in Europe is unacceptable to them, so is the alternative if they are faced with added expense for conventional forces and all they get as a result of that added expense is the replacement of

the potential for nuclear war in Europe with the potential of an equally devastating high-tech replay of WW II.

Verification. Finally, we can't ignore that others have nuclear weapons. The elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles will be difficult to verify, but it is likely to be child's play compared to verifying the elimination of all nuclear weapons. In addition, the need for verification will be enormous since if we believe we are living in a nuclear free world and suddenly someone demonstrates that they have a covert nuclear stockpile, their ability to coerce this great nation would be immense. This, alone, is a fundamental reason for moving much more slowly on the path towards an agreement *now* on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Bottom Line. All this being so, the main point of this memorandum is simply that neither our military experts or our allies would support the idea of moving to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within 10 years.

They can likely support a goal of the elimination of all ballistic missiles in that period. The elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would remove not only the nuclear threat posed by such weapons, but the chemical threat as well. It would also enhance our conventional capability by removing the direct threat of rocket attack against our conventional forces, our airfields, the sites where we store the tanks and vehicles that our troops coming from the US in a crisis which would reinforce NATO reinforcements coming from the US would need in a crisis. It would make the planning of a quick disarming first strike by a conventional aggressor much more difficult.

Recommendations. Based on all of the above, Mr. President, I would strongly recommend that:

(1) you step back from any discussion of eliminating *all nuclear weapons* in 10 years, and focus attention on the proposals that you handed over to General Secretary Gorbachev in writing in Iceland which were focused on the elimination of *all offensive ballistic missiles* in 10 years;

(2) you make no further public comment endorsing the idea of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in 10 years as something discussed and agreed with the General Secretary; and

(3) if asked about such discussions or your position on this, I would recommend that you stand firm by your long-term commitment to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, but always cast this in terms of a long-term goal which will require the correction of existing conventional force imbalances and other conditions that require us to have the nuclear weapons in the first place.

We have a good, consistent position in our proposal to reduce by 50% the existing strategic nuclear arsenals and then to totally eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles. We can be reasonably assured that our

military can support this, that our allies can support this, and that our security requirements can support this. We have adjusted your recent report to the nation to reflect this approach, and it was well received.¹⁰ We have explained this position to the Congress, our allies, and the American people—and it was well received.

I recognize that I am asking you to step back from an idea that did come up in Iceland. I also recognize that you may feel that you have committed to supporting this idea. However, I strongly feel that you should step back—and do so now.

Once you have read this memorandum, I am prepared to discuss this with you in whatever detail that you desire. I would ask that if you disagree with the recommendations I have made, that you give me the opportunity to explain them in person to you before you address this subject publicly.

¹⁰ See Reagan, “Address to the Nation on the Meetings With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland,” *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pp. 1367–1374.

140. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

I-23878/86

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Post-Reykjavik Instructions to the NST Negotiators (U)—ACTION
MEMORANDUM—URGENT

(S) Below action memorandum at Tab A² you will find the current draft instructions for the US negotiators to the Nuclear and Space Talks, intended to take into account developments at Reykjavik. The President’s decision is expected to be made over the weekend. While there may be issues raised to the President on START and INF, by far the most important controversies are associated with the Defense and Space talks. In the draft memo conveying your views to the President

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Subject File, 1986 Arms Control Reykjavik Summit #2–11 (2). Secret.

² Attached but not printed are undated draft guidance telegrams for the Nuclear and Space Talks, sent under cover of an October 16 memorandum from ACDA Assistant Director for Strategic Programs Michael Mobbs to the Arms Control Support Group.

(Tab B), we have therefore focused exclusively on the dangerous proposals being advanced in the D & S area.

(S) The principal issue at stake here is Paul Nitze's proposal that we offer the Soviets the opportunity to negotiate agreed understandings of what is permitted and what is not under the ABM Treaty—without requiring them to accept the President's Reykjavik framework (i.e., for delayed deployment of SDI provided all ballistic missiles were eliminated). As you can readily appreciate, such a proposal would give the Soviets precisely the leverage they seek—and the President rejected—over SDI. It would in all likelihood result a year or so hence in a new agreement restricting our current (legally correct) interpretation of the ABM Treaty, *divorced from all the other elements of the President's position*. This new "Nitze agreement" might then turn out to be the only signed strategic arms agreement in this Administration.

(S) A related point is reflected in brackets we have inserted in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 asserting the requirement for a new treaty. As we discussed in connection with the NSC-produced "clarification" of the President's July proposal, it should be self-evident that any future addressal of the ABM Treaty (e.g., non-withdrawal, what is permitted/not permitted, novation) must be undertaken in the context of a new agreement—not as an amendment to the existing accord. One would think such a new treaty would have to have its own "supreme national interest" for withdrawal clause to be ratifiable.

(S) *START*. The outstanding issues in *START* are reasonably straightforward:

- We believe that we should not move away from the *sublimits* (para. 3, fourth tick) associated with our previous 50% without some movement on the Soviets' part. State believes we should give the negotiator the flexibility to move to the higher sublimits envisioned in our 30% reduction proposal tabled in July.

- The JCS have reserved on the proposed elimination of all ballistic missiles by 1996 (para. 5) pending completion of an analysis now underway. We will have a hand in shaping this study and its conclusions. (I'll have a separate memo following on this general point.)

- We have reserved pending your guidance on paragraph 6, which State has advanced, offering a separate, interim deal on 50% reductions. The obvious danger here (in addition to your general disdain for so-called "interim" agreements) is that the deployment of defenses could be strung out pending completion of the second phase of negotiations.

(S) *INF*. The only real issue in *INF* is the same bullet above, namely our reservation on your behalf about paragraph 7's reference to the zero-in-Europe/100-global level as an interim step to be followed by negotiations to zero globally. We understand that, subsequent to the President's decision about retaining our right to Alaska basing, no agency will support the third tick under paragraph 5—this is progress.

(The bracket is being retained pending comments from Ambassador Glitman.)

(S) *Recommendation:*

We recommend that you focus your message to the President on the “ABM treaty-clarifying negotiations” proposal to nip this poisonous plant in the bud. See draft memo at Tab B.

Fred C. Ikle³

Tab B

**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to
President Reagan⁴**

Washington, October 19, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

Post-Reykjavik Instructions for the Geneva Negotiators (U)

(S) New draft instructions have been prepared for the Geneva arms negotiations, based on the Reykjavik meeting. I want to draw your attention to some critical choices that these proposed instructions raise.

(S) The instructions for the Space and Defense area are of particular importance, since they involve options that would have the effect of undoing the position on SDI that you so effectively defended in Reykjavik. You *refused to accept additional limitations on research, development, and testing of SDI*, and this *decision of yours must not be undone through the back door*.

(S) One of the options would authorize negotiations in Geneva on “exactly what activities are prohibited under the ABM Treaty” (paragraph 5 of the draft Defense and Space instructions). In my judgment, this will lead to crippling limitations on SDI.

(S) In the absence of an overall agreement, the only foreseeable outcome of negotiations on the activities allowed by the ABM Treaty would be new restrictions on SDI. No other outcome is possible since now, by our interpretation, the only limitation on SDI research is that we cannot deploy a completed system. The inevitable result of the compromise

³ Ikle signed the memorandum “Fred” above this typed signature.

⁴ Secret.

proposed in the new instructions would be new constraints. Why is it that there are always proposed to you new concessions for *us* to make? You have gained the respect of the world by standing firm. Let's let the *Soviets* make a few new offers and compromises.

(S) We must not permit the essence of your Reykjavik proposal to be eviscerated by offering the Soviets the chance to negotiate additional limitations on SDI. I strongly urge your rejection of any option having the effect of tightening the ABM Treaty restrictions, or defining what it is we can and cannot do as part of our SDI research. We can only injure, probably fatally, SDI if we try to define now what we cannot do as a part of our future research. And, of course, we could never verify Soviet compliance with any such restrictions.

Cap

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0311Z

330272. Subject: (S) Additional Guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291909;² (B) State 293566.³

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VI, based on U.S. proposals made to the Soviet Union in Iceland meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev on October 11–12. This guidance is in addition to, and does not replace guidance for, D&S Negotiating Group of reftels (A) and (B) and previous rounds, except as specifically noted below.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy, Electronic Telegrams, D860801–0090. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Timbie, Vigdor Teplitz (ACDA/SP), Linhard, Pearson, and in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Adelman.

² In telegram 291909 to NST Geneva, September 17, the Department transmitted the Defense and Space instructions for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860705–0290)

³ In telegram 293566 to NST Geneva, September 18, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Round VI Defense and Space negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860708–0824)

3. The existing U.S. proposal as contained in previous guidance and in the President's July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the table.

4. Paragraph (4A) contains the initial Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik on the first day of the discussions. Paragraph (4B) provides the text of the first U.S. alternative proposal made by the President to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik on the afternoon of the second day of discussions. Paragraph (4C) provides the text of the Soviet counterproposal made that same afternoon. Paragraph (4D) provides the text of the second and last U.S. alternative proposal made in writing by the President. These are provided for the information of the Negotiating Group.

A. Soviet proposal, a.m. October 11. For the purpose of strengthening the regime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which is of unlimited duration, an understanding shall be reached that the USSR and the USA undertake not to exercise their right to withdraw from that treaty for a period of ten years, and to strictly comply with all its provisions throughout that period. Testing in space of all missile-defense space elements shall be prohibited except for research and testing carried out in laboratories. This would not entail a ban on the testing of such fixed land-based systems and their components as are allowed under the ABM Treaty. Subsequently, within several years, the parties shall negotiate further mutually acceptable solutions in this area. The parties deem it appropriate to undertake additional efforts with a view to achieve mutually acceptable agreements banning anti-satellite systems.

B. First U.S.-proposal, p.m. October 12. Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides would continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of ten year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses.

C. Soviet proposal, p.m. October 12. The USSR and the United States would undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic

offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides' strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated.

D. Second U.S. proposal, p.m. October 12. The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise.

5. Guidance on the U.S. proposals made at Reykjavik is under consideration in Washington, including additional analytical work. In the interim, the Negotiating Group should avoid discussion of the specifics of either of the U.S. proposals.

6. If questioned about the U.S. proposals made in Reykjavik, the U.S. Negotiating Group should respond that the U.S. intends to build upon the positive accomplishments of the Reykjavik meeting, and that the U.S. will be making a proposal in Geneva based on these accomplishments shortly. If asked whether the additional commitments suggested in the U.S. proposals discussed in Reykjavik depend upon other conditions, the Negotiating Group should note that in Reykjavik it was clear by the terms of the proposals made that the additional commitments included in the proposals tabled by the U.S. were strictly conditioned on the two sides' reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement now on a schedule of reductions resulting in 50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.

Shultz

142. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 24, 1986

SUBJECT

Luncheon Discussion with Colonel Linhard

In our discussion today of the upcoming meeting with Shevardnadze,² Linhard told me he was concerned about the fact that the conversion of the 131st bomber could occur as early as the 11th of November, unless action were promptly taken to delay it. I said that I was not certain that a specific time in the future would be better but that that is a matter to which we should give prompt consideration.

He asked me what you had in mind with respect to the meeting with Shevardnadze. I said I thought you wanted to be prepared for a meeting which will deal either with procedures, i.e., what further fora and channels are appropriate, or with making progress at Vienna on substance. I said that you had thought it wise to have Mike Glitman and Ron Lehman at Vienna if the Soviets indicate they wish to negotiate substance there. I said Roz had been asked to find out from them what their ideas were. We both agreed that prior to leaving for Vienna we should have clarified our thoughts on procedure, i.e., when should the next Geneva round begin; should there be additional experts' meetings, if so, would it not be better to have Marshal Akhromyev head their team rather than Karpov; should there be a further Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting, and should there be a review of the other scheduled meetings such as that of the experts' meeting on nuclear testing.

I said I thought it important that the issue of the approach to a forum for a conventional arms reduction negotiations should be clarified prior to your departure for Vienna. Linhard asked me what solution I preferred. I said I thought the circumstances were such that we should support the position of the Germans, French, British, Italians, and Belgians; this was informally supported by all the NATO countries other than the US. Linhard asked whether it was necessary to decide

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum. Pascoe's stamped initials are at the top of the memorandum.

² For the memoranda of conversation of Shultz and Shevardnadze's November 5–6 meetings in Vienna, see *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 6 and 7.

this issue now or whether it could be postponed. I said I thought postponement would be risky.

Linhard concluded this portion of the discussion by saying that he proposed that the issue of instructions to our Geneva negotiators be settled by next Tuesday³ and that the remainder of the week be devoted to issues connected with Vienna.

On the draft additional instructions to Kampelman and Company,⁴ I said that I believed we could get into deep trouble on the evident appearance of contradiction between the statement in the President's Reykjavik proposal that the USSR and the US would undertake for 10 years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and paragraph 7 of the instructions which said that the US cannot waive its rights to withdrawal for reasons of supreme national interests or in the face of a mutual breach or for other reasons reached under international law. I thought the contrast between "undertake not to exercise" and "cannot waive" is too stark and that there must be another way of going at the same point. He asked that we suggest alternative language by the end of the day; this we have done. He also asked that I look closely at the language concerning the second five years in the draft instructions and indicate any improvement that could be made, particularly with respect to the linkage between the immediate INF and START negotiations and the ten-year elimination proposal; this we have also done.

I asked Linhard how the Joint Staff was progressing on their analysis of the pros and cons of total elimination of ballistic missiles or of strategic nuclear arms. He said he had low confidence in their ability to do a useful analysis, particularly in the absence of Admiral Crowe who had gone to Gleneagles with Secretary Weinberger. I said I thought one could analyze the issues involved without the assistance of computer analyses; the uncertainties involved in the inputs to the computers make such analyses no more useful than an objective common sense review of the facts inherent in problems. Linhard agreed but stressed the political importance of having concurrence or non-objection from the Joint Chiefs.

³ October 28.

⁴ Not found.

143. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe)¹

Washington, October 25, 1986

SUBJECT

NSPG on Follow-up to Reykjavik.

(U) The Secretary met yesterday with Richard Perle and me,² regarding the NSPG now scheduled for Monday³ at 11:00 a.m. Since the time Monday morning will be short for your preparatory discussion with the Secretary, I thought you might find it helpful to have this memo on some of the policy aspects, for your perusal on the flight back to Washington.

(S) The *INF position* that emerged from Reykjavik, if seen as an agreement that stands by itself (i.e. without the elimination of strategic missiles), apparently will pass muster in terms of the JCS military assessments. We should keep in mind, however, that negotiating the detailed INF verification provisions will lead to a highly refractory impasse, which in turn will cause some political indigestion in the Alliance and in Washington, and the belching up of proposals to “overcome” the impasse by accepting an unverifiable INF agreement. But that’s for later.

(TS) The partial agreement on *START* issues reached in Reykjavik results in a more favorable basis for follow-on negotiations than we had agreed to before Reykjavik. However, it would represent a challenge to the leisurely pace of nuclear planning we all have become accustomed to, should we actually have to compress between now and the end of 1991 the completion of such a *START* agreement, the mandated destruction of systems, and the required adjustments in our remaining forces, SIOP, and SACEUR plans. Yet, in the implausible event that this compressed schedule became reality, I feel the Defense Department could rise to this challenge. Our predecessors had less time to plan for World War II, build all our forces, fight the war, and win it. We don’t want our detractors to allege that today’s Pentagon would need more than half a decade for a reduction in strategic arms down to warhead levels that would still be well above those of 1972.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikke Files, Arms Control (President Gorbachev)—1986–1988. Top Secret. Sent to Weinberger for information.

² No minutes were found.

³ The minutes of the October 27 NSPG meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 3.

(S) You also need to consider the manner in which the President's Reykjavik proposal for *the elimination of all ballistic offensive missiles by the end of 1996* ought to be translated into instructions for our Geneva negotiators and what, if any, further military and policy analyses should now be started. Without the 1996 cut-off date, this proposal was, of course, presented in the President's letter to Gorbachev last summer.⁴ Regardless of whether this transformation of the US-Soviet strategic relationship is envisaged to take place within ten years, or a longer period, the military and political assessment of it confronts daunting uncertainties.

(S) The question to focus on is how such a strategic relationship would compare with alternative arms control arrangements, or no arms control. Clearly, for the foreseeable future, we prefer the missile-free relationship to the abolition of all "strategic" arms that Gorbachev proposes. (As Thursday's⁵ White House Release reminds us, the President favors "The Goal of Complete Elimination" of all nuclear weapons, but holds this could only come about when international conditions "have changed significantly.") Hence, the military assessment ought to compare:

(A) The elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996 plus the START limits on other nuclear forces that would be reached by 1991 (i.e., the President's Reykjavik proposal); with

(B) The proposed 1991 START limits only, extended to 1996, with no further missile elimination; or with

(C) Presently projected forces, without arms control.

(TS) For a first cut at this comparison, we need not distinguish between situation (B) and (C). The following broad criteria ought to affect the evaluation of situation (A):

(1) *Vulnerability of our forces to surprise attack.*

While a Soviet SLCM attack still would present a "decapitation" risk (as it does in situation B and C); the major part of our strategic forces could be more *survivable* by using interior basing and airborne alerts upon warning of Soviet bomber take-off.

(2) *Attacking Soviet relocatable targets and damage limiting.*

We anticipate now that by 1996 we would find only a fraction of Soviet mobile ICBMs, and would rely on B-1 or ATB to attack them. By contrast, in the missile free situation (A), the relocated Soviet bombers would be easier to find. This would help our prospects for damage limiting. And while we could not use fast flying ICBMs to interrupt

⁴ Reagan's July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985-October 1986, Document 254.

⁵ October 23.

an ongoing Soviet attack, the Soviet attack itself would be slower and subject to interference with our limited air defenses, SLCM and ALCM attacks on Soviet bomber bases, etc.

(3) *Reserve forces.*

About a third of our TLAM-C are now allocated to reserve, though not on station. This role of TLAM-C for long-term (not immediately useable) reserve could be expanded. The Soviets, by contrast, would probably have greater difficulty in keeping Naval vessels survivable in a protracted war.

(4) *Attrition during a conventional war.*

In a conventional war, US and Soviet strategic forces are subject to attrition (loss of SLBMs, loss of tankers, etc.). Without missiles, a greater fraction of Soviet forces would be subject to attrition; in particular, we would have an advantage in sea-based SLCMs and aircraft. (And our carrier-based aircraft would surely be considered as a “strategic” threat by the Soviets, regardless of whether we call them “tactical.”)

(5) *NATO first-use.*

The key test for our nuclear forces is whether they represent a credible back-up deterrent for our conventional NATO forces. To this end, limited tactical nuclear options have long been considered as critical. If both sides had no missiles, NATO’s threat of nuclear escalation might be more credible.

(6) *Violations.*

The most serious drawback of the agreed elimination of missiles (situation A) is that it might be highly unstable prior to the deployment of some strategic defenses. The Soviets could conceal hundreds of missiles in the final years of the ten year elimination period. Of course, this problem would also exist with only the START reductions (situation B). The analysis of “military sufficiency” must address the violation problem.

(S) *Summary.*

Except for the important violation problem, several of the important policy criteria suggest that we would be better off with the elimination of missiles (situation A) than with situation B or C. Surely, Gorbachev now thinks so and was emphatic in his speech last Wednesday, arguing that the Reykjavik talks dealt with the elimination of all “strategic” arms, not the elimination of ballistic missiles only.

(S) We, of course, see ballistic missiles with their hair-triggered alert postures and unrecallability as particularly destabilizing, hence a world without large missile forces as safer. This is why we are for SDI and this is why the President proposed last summer to Gorbachev an agreed elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. It would be unfortunate if our military assessment lost sight of this larger picture, and if the vagaries of a host of necessarily arbitrary assumptions fed into a

computer analysis led to the conclusion that the President should be advised to back away from his proposal. To be sure, careful quantitative analyses are needed to flesh out the proposal and to delineate its pitfalls (especially the violation problem!). But these analyses should be fit into a larger context that allows the President and his most senior advisors to weigh the plausibility of the wartime contingencies and to track the political objectives that were assumed for the calculations.

(U) I hope these points will be helpful for your preparation for the NSPG meeting.

144. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 27, 1986

SUBJECT

Alternative to Elimination of Ballistic Missiles

The Soviets did not agree in Reykjavik to the elimination of all ballistic missiles. They are not likely to agree to this proposal in the future, as they consider such an approach would lead to advantages for the U.S. in bombers and cruise missiles. Rather than go beyond elimination of ballistic missiles to discuss elimination of all strategic offensive forces or all nuclear weapons, we should consider the alternative of reducing by 1996 to a small strategic nuclear force. This paper explores this alternative.

Baseline Proposal

- Reduce from [*number not declassified*] strategic warheads to [*number not declassified*] by 1996.
- Reduce the sublimits proportionally (e.g., [*number not declassified*] ballistic missile warheads).
- Ban MIRVed ballistic missiles.
- Less drastic reductions in SNDVs (e.g. from [*number not declassified*] to [*number not declassified*]). This would permit several launchers for each ICBM.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Shultz saw it. Pascoe initialed the memorandum and wrote "10/30."

- Eliminate all other nuclear weapons (INF, tactical, naval, etc.).
- Continue the SDI research program; ban all ballistic missile defense deployments, including the Moscow system.
- Permit [*number not declassified*] warheads each for the British, French, and Chinese.
- Ban chemical weapons.
- Balance conventional forces at reduced levels.

Analysis

There is nothing magic about the [*number not declassified*] figure. It simply illustrates a small residual strategic force with the same balance of ballistic missile warheads and bomber/ALCM forces as permitted under the [*number not declassified*] limit. The number could be higher or lower.

The ban on MIRVed ballistic missiles would have many of the benefits of the President's proposal to ban all ballistic missiles, and would enhance stability. There would be a strong incentive in any event to reduce fractionation at such low warhead levels, and this ban would help to make the small forces survivable.

Keeping the SNDV number relatively high would permit us to keep several silos for each ICBM. Together with a ban on MIRVs, this would permit one option for an inexpensive, survivable ICBM force. Other options such as mobile ICBMs would also be permitted. The result could be stability at a low level of forces.

If the objective is a small nuclear force, it makes sense to make each one highly survivable, highly effective and long range. This leads to the conclusion that nuclear weapons other than the [*number not declassified*] strategic warheads should be prohibited. For example, rather than permit [*number not declassified*] battlefield weapons, it would make more sense to raise the [*number not declassified*] ceiling by [*number not declassified*]. In addition, most battlefield weapons are vulnerable to preemption. Verification would be difficult, but the [*number not declassified*] permitted warheads would serve as a hedge against cheating.

It would not make sense to permit deployment of SDI at these low levels. Advanced defense could probably call into question the effectiveness of a force of a few hundred ballistic missile warheads. In addition to a ban on all ballistic missile defense deployments, the ballistic missiles we deploy would probably employ penetration aids, including maneuvering RVs, to enhance confidence in their effectiveness (e.g. against advanced air defenses). Continued research would be important to preserve the option for deployment, and Soviet incentives to agree to and implement the reductions.

The British and French will probably accept a level much lower than the U.S. and USSR; the Chinese may not. The Soviets would want to count the British and French warheads against the U.S., and the right

to offset the Chinese. Near-nuclear nations will need to be discouraged from joining, as the reductions lower the price of admission to the major league. Resolving this third country problem is likely to be a very difficult negotiating problem.

Such reductions would need to be accompanied by moves to improve the conventional balance, including both Soviet reductions and NATO improvements.

Such an agreement would be consistent with the goal of eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. It would be a major step in that direction, both in terms of reducing weapons and creating conditions in which we can reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. [1½ lines not declassified]. They would give future leaders the option to retain a small deterrent force, or continue reductions to zero, or move to greater reliance on defenses.

Representative U.S. Force

[3 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

The agreement would permit deployment of ALCMs, but the counting rules would discourage ALCMs in favor of bombers carrying bombs and short-range missiles.

145. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, October 29, 1986

SUBJECT

ICBM Modernization (U)

In August I proposed that we use two briefings to prepare the President for this fall's decisions on Peacekeeper and the Small ICBM. (C)

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 857, Subject File, 1986 ICBM modernization #14-36 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Poindexter crossed out "Caspar" in the recipient line and wrote "Cap" above it. A stamped notation indicates Weinberger saw the memorandum on October 29. Weinberger initialed the bottom of the memorandum.

We had hoped to have you brief the President by 10 October on the top four basing modes for Peacekeeper and the top three configurations for the Small ICBM. Don Hicks gave the staff an excellent briefing on both these programs in early October, but we have not had time to have you brief the President in similar detail. (S)

In looking at the President's November schedule, it now appears that we might best meet our objectives by your and my meeting jointly with the President sometime in early November to informally discuss the alternatives and to set the stage for your final recommendations. (U)

If you concur, I will find an appropriate time on the President's schedule in early November for a short, informal discussion of our ICBM alternatives.² (U)

As we both plan for our final decisions in December, I feel it is important that we have a more formal meeting with the President that would include Admiral Crowe and General Welch.³ Such a meeting would help to ensure that we all agree on the facts before we ask for the President's decision. This could of course be followed by a private meeting in which you present your final recommendations.⁴ (C)

I look forward to discussing this sequence of events at your convenience. (U)

John M. Poindexter⁵

² Weinberger wrote "OK" in the left-hand margin beside this paragraph.

³ Weinberger underlined "a more formal meeting" and "Admiral Crowe and General," wrote "OK" in the left-hand margin beside this sentence, drew a line down to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote: "We might do this as part of a regular meeting of the JCS with the President—I'd like to [illegible] the President over for lunch again. Please remind me to call John. [illegible]."

⁴ Weinberger underlined "course be followed by a private meeting in which you present your final recommendations."

⁵ Poindexter signed the memorandum "John" above this typed signature. Weinberger responded to Poindexter in a memorandum of October 31: "Thank you for your October 29th memo on ICBM Modernization. I will of course be glad to brief the President on basing modes for MX and the Small ICBM anytime you wish. We could also have the somewhat more formal meeting you mentioned, to include Admiral Crowe and General Welch. As I mentioned to you on the telephone this morning, it might be possible to schedule this during the next meeting with the President and the Joint Chiefs—a meeting which has not yet been scheduled, but what I would very much like to have in the form of a luncheon here in the Pentagon, if the President's schedule could accommodate that. Following that, I would of course be glad to have the private meeting you described to present the President with our formal recommendations. I would be glad to discuss this with you anytime that is convenient. Cap." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 857, Subject File, 1986 ICBM modernization #14–36 (2))

146. Electronic Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, October 29, 1986, 12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSDD on Reykjavik Follow-up.

I read the first draft on the way out here to Evansville.² I think it is a very good start on documenting the President's thinking. It almost sounds like he wrote it. The following areas need some more work.

We need a way of addressing a constant "risk level" over the time period being considered. If we don't hold that constant we will be comparing apples and oranges. On the other hand we believe that the elimination of ballistic missiles will be an inherently more stable deterrence because of the longer flight times. That may very well mean some arms control restrictions on sub launched SLCM's. Now we may want to reduce the risk level lower but that should be calculated as a delta for reduced risk.

On SDI we need to point out the new environment that we are talking about results in reduced capabilities for system to be deployed. But since we cannot be certain that we will get an agreement and because we need the leverage produced by the possibility of being able to develop a fully capable system, we need a research and development program that has the potential of producing a fully capable system. In terms of the analysis of what the world would be like in 1996, the chiefs should be able to assume we could deploy ERIS type systems. I believe we know how to do that today. The uncertainties of the more difficult fully capable system should not produce uncertainties as to whether we could defend against third countries or concealed weapons. The uncertainties of the fully blown system should only enter into the leverage that SDI produces and the parallel path of unilateral deployment.

The conclusion needs to be beefed up to make the strong point that the President wants to know how to do it rather than whether he can do it.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 250. Secret. Copies were sent to Linhard, McDaniel, Cockell, and Thompson.

² Not found. Poindexter accompanied Reagan to Evansville, Indiana, where the President was campaigning ahead of the November 4 midterm elections. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pp. 1468-1472)

Lastly, a paragraph that gives them lead on what constitutes deterrence would be helpful.

Thanks.

147. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to Robert Pearson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, October 29, 1986, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

S-W-P Breakfast 29 Oct: Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting

Cap asked whether Shultz had an agenda for the upcoming Vienna meeting. Shultz replied “more or less;” yesterday agreement was reached on a two meeting approach—Wednesday² afternoon and early morning on Thursday³ (Shevardnadze has to leave late in the morning). They could work between meetings, of course, as in Reykjavik. The Soviets will want to discuss “laboratories,” he believes. Shultz is willing to hear them on that; but his principal objective, he said, will be to nail down the areas on which there was agreement at Reykjavik, get confirmation in areas where there is specific language, and get language in areas where there is none. Cap replied it was important that in the process of setting out positions we did not slop over into substantive negotiations without proper preparation. “We should establish what both tabled and let that be the case, and then we can go on from there.” In addition, we need to get things separated out. “The Soviets will not be willing to do that,” he believed, “except in the INF area, where there is no question they will—they want the missiles out of Europe.” Shultz observed that we want to end the debate over what was or was not agreed at Reykjavik—“get the positions out there.” Cap asked whether we had anything in our proposal about “laboratories.”

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 44122. Secret. Also sent to McDaniel, Rodman, Matlock, Brooks, Kraemer, Keel, and Poindexter. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found. A repeat of an electronic message from Cockell to Linhard, October 29 at 12:47 p.m.

² November 5. For the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 6.

³ November 6. For the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 7.

JMP replied that we used the language contained in the President's July 25 letter—R&D which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Cap mentioned that he had just received a letter from Abe⁴ which describes the testing he has to do, and notes that, in some cases, it won't be clear what he has to do until portions of the program are farther along, and the results of initial testing are in hand. He will send a copy over for JMP. Shultz continued that there are a few items which are implicit in our positions which we need to bring out explicitly. The first relates to the "reservations" which were talked about at Monday's NSPG⁵ (i.e., supreme national interest clause, and the contingency of an ABM Treaty violation). The second is the point that we can't go forward if the British, French and Chinese are not in the agreement. The third is the necessity to deal with CW and BW. And the fourth is the importance of focussing on conventional deterrence as we reduce strategic forces. In addition, we need to go through the Reykjavik record and pick out those areas where Gorbachev talked strongly about the importance of verification, lift them out, and develop a separate statement on the importance of the kind of verification that would go with massive force reductions. The Soviets, of course, won't buy that, but we need to start them getting used to it. In short, he concluded, our efforts at Vienna should be concentrated on consolidating the ground travelled at Reykjavik. Weinberger asked if this, in effect, meant a full-blown resumption of negotiations. Shultz reiterated that he would characterize it simply as a consolidation. "We want to grab Soviet agreement with our position on START, for example, and solidify it." Cap returned to the issue of British, French and Chinese systems and observed that we can't raise allies' systems—"that's up to them." Shultz replied that the Soviets won't completely eliminate their ballistic missile force "while the British and French stand there with a thousand warheads." We need to fill out the record, he continued, so the President won't be open to attack on the grounds that he hasn't thought through all the implications of what was talked about at Reykjavik. Cap responded that he thought there had been agreement with the Soviets that they would not raise the British and French issue. Shultz replied that was in the context of INF, "but it's inconceivable they wouldn't raise it" in connection with the proposal to go to zero ballistic missiles. Cap noted that, in any event, we should not be the party to raise the issue. He then went on to reiterate that he was concerned about Shultz's "opening the negotiations in full form." That could easily slip over into a statement of new positions. JMP noted that one of the first things we need to get

⁴ Not found.

⁵ October 27. For the minutes of the NSPG meeting, at which participants discussed the negotiating instructions for the Defense and Space talks in Geneva, see *Foreign Relations, 1981-1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989, Document 3.

consolidated is the work program outside of the arms control issues—human rights, regional issues, etc. The substance was agreed upon in the working group chaired by Roz Ridgway, but the meeting ended before the heads of state could get to it.

Shultz commented that there is lots we need to get on the public record and nailed down. JMP observed that if we can get separation on INF, START, and nuclear testing—and leave ABM/SDI to be treated independently—that would be the desirable outcome. Cap commented that with all that Gorbachev has said since Reykjavik about linkage—and the recalling of Karpov to “reeducate” him re linkage, “I don’t think we’re going to get anything.” JMP commented that it would be good if Shultz brought up Cap’s invitation to the Soviet Defense Minister. Shultz observed that it would be better to invite Akhromeyev—“he’s pretty good.” JMP noted that was his ultimate motive—to get Akhromeyev over here.

Shultz concluded by observing that there are three other things pertinent to the agenda for Vienna. The first is Gorbachev’s proposal to allow Russian language broadcasts by us if we reciprocate by permitting English language broadcasts by the Soviets. JMP asked if Shultz had seen the intelligence report⁶ which said because of Chernobyl, and the shutting down of similar reactors in the USSR, the Russians have an electrical shortage. Their motive in avoiding jamming of VOA might be to save electricity. Shultz went on to note the final issue related to visits of labor leaders. An arrangement had been worked out with Lane Kirkland to support an exchange of visits. Finally, there were some economic issues the Soviets wanted to discuss. Shultz noted that what he had outlined was “more of an agenda that we can cover,” and that the arms control issues should head the list. Cap observed that if we reach agreement with the Soviets on the issue of broadcasts, we should insist that Arbatov be the Soviet broadcaster—“he’s so repulsive.”

⁶ Not further identified.

148. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV M 86-201006X

Washington, October 31, 1986

SUBJECT

Soviet Statements on SDI Since Reykjavik

Numerous public [*less than 1 line not declassified*] comments by Soviet officials since the 11-12 October Reykjavik summit have alleged that Moscow's position with regard to research and testing of space-based antiballistic missile systems was not properly understood by the US side in Reykjavik. These comments seem to imply some flexibility on Moscow's part on the question of permissible testing within the limits of the ABM Treaty and may foreshadow Soviet probing on this issue. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Since Reykjavik, Soviet spokesmen have sought to counter allegations in the West that Moscow's insistence on banning deployment of space-based antiballistic missile defenses led to the negotiating impasse and prevented agreement on strategic arms reductions. Both Gorbachev and chief Soviet arms negotiator Karpov have claimed publicly that the Soviets did not ask the United States in Reykjavik to renounce the program. They have argued that the Soviet proposal was aimed at ensuring that SDI remained a "research" effort within the framework of limitations contained in the ABM Treaty for a period of ten years.

— In public statements on 12 and 14 October reporting the Reykjavik meeting, Gorbachev acknowledged the President's commitment to SDI and claimed that he had not requested cessation of the program. He said that he had proposed that all provisions of the ABM Treaty be fully observed and that his proposal to continue laboratory tests would allow the President "to see through his idea and to clarify what SDI actually is."

— [*1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified*]

— In a 14 October press conference in London, Karpov said that Gorbachev's SDI proposal had been misunderstood and that the Soviets were not insisting on renunciation of the SDI program.

— In a 17 October press conference in Moscow, Karpov added that the Soviets had asked that the SDI program not transcend the framework of the ABM Treaty. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet spokesmen have emphasized an interpretation of Article V of the ABM Treaty that prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems regardless of the technology

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files, 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, CIA. Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*].

involved (see attachment for exact treaty provisions).² An 18 October *Pravda* article by K. Georgiyev (an apparent pseudonym suggesting authoritative authorship) discussed the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union on what activities are permitted by the ABM Treaty for space-based ABM systems. The article disputed what it claims is the US interpretation of the treaty—that Agreed Statement D allows development and testing of space-based ABM systems based on exotic technologies up to the start of deployment—and claimed that Article V prohibits all space-based ABMs. It cited a January 1983 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report to Congress to support the contention that the United States agreed with the Soviet position on Article V. It claimed the United States changed its position only after the March 1983 decision to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative. This emphasis on the putative restrictions of the ABM Treaty appears in part to be an effort by Moscow to bring pressure on the US Administration from both Allied and domestic constituencies to renounce the “broad” US interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which they understand would allow testing in space of ABM weapons or components. [portion marking not declassified]

While vigorously denouncing the “broad” interpretation of the treaty, several Soviet statements before and since Reykjavik have seemed to point toward a Soviet willingness to accept SDI-related research within the context of the restrictive US interpretation of the treaty, which would prohibit testing in space of prototypes of ABM weapons or components. They have implied that the issue of testing limitations related to space-based defenses can be the subject of further US-Soviet discussions.

— [1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified]

— In public [less than 1 line not declassified] remarks following the Reykjavik meeting, Karpov claimed that the Soviets were suggesting that if there were disagreements on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, they could be dealt with and agreed upon. He said that Moscow would not agree to the broad US interpretation of the ABM Treaty but would be prepared to accept the restrictive US interpretation if Washington would abide by it.

— An American journalist on 16 October quoted an unnamed Soviet bloc source as saying that a potential compromise on SDI might include agreement on the “number and kinds” of tests that could be conducted outside of laboratories for a period of up to 12 years with provisions for negotiations on deployments at the conclusion of the period.

— [3½ lines not declassified] According to press accounts, Roal’d Sagdeyev, Director of the Soviet Space Research Institute, also said in a 29 October press conference at the United Nations that some tests could be carried out in space because scientists consider manned space stations to be orbital laboratories.

— [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

² Attached but not printed.

— Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, said in a 29 October interview on Hungarian television that the question of what is meant by laboratory testing could be further clarified and agreement reached. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Two Soviet officials have singled out directed-energy weapons as a problem in defining limits for SDI weapons, and they have suggested a possible way to limit and verify these weapons. One official declared that kinetic-energy weapons are banned by any interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

— [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

— Roal'd Sagdeyev has also been cited in the press as suggesting that the power of a laser could determine if it was within the limits considered permissible. [*portion marking not declassified*]

149. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 31, 1986

Mr. Secretary:

You asked for additional materials to counter arguments that the US should move now to deploy terminal ABM defenses using currently available technologies.

Proposals in this area are multiplying. PM is collecting materials on the serious studies in the field. We will keep you informed as we proceed.

Some of the current early deployment proposals would require the US to abrogate the ABM Treaty; their obvious result would be to block further arms control progress. Other proposals are more cautious, merely suggesting a shift in the emphasis of our ballistic missile defense research/development toward activities that would give the US the option of nearer-term deployments as a response in case the Soviets should break out from the ABM Treaty.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, The Executive Secretariat's Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, 1986—October. Secret; Not for the System. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Shultz wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Allen, Pls discuss with Paul N & then let's talk thru this. G." A typed transcription of Shultz's note is dated November 4.

The central problem with these proposals is that they would make it impossible to realize the President's vision of a world in which nuclear weapons are rendered impotent and obsolete, and thus can be eliminated. Any defenses we could deploy now or in the near-term could eventually be overwhelmed by proliferation of Soviet offensive forces—and thus would directly undercut the President's effort to supplant MAD with a cooperative transition to increased reliance by both sides on strategic defense.

In the past the President has made some mild public statements against early deployments. The President gave repeated assurances to Gorbachev in Geneva and at Reykjavik that the US would *not* deploy defenses for the purpose of supporting our offensive capability. Deployment of partially effective defenses now would be in direct contradiction to those assurances and would undercut the President's credibility.

Attached are expanded talking points for your use in countering early deployment proposals. I've also attached a summary of the early deployment proposals we have identified thus far.

Sincerely,

H. Allen Holmes²

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

Talking Points

Question: Why isn't early SDI deployment for point defense in the national interest?

— A unilateral deployment decision would undermine the President's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it would go in the opposite direction, helping to preserve the doctrine of deterrence by mutual assured destruction. In so doing, it would seriously damage—perhaps fatally—the possibility of a stabilizing cooperative transition by the U.S. and the USSR to increased reliance on defenses.

² Holmes signed the letter "Allen" above his typed signature.

³ Secret.

— Deployment of partially effective defenses in support of our offensive capability would be in direct contradiction to the President's repeated assertions to Gorbachev that SDI is not intended to enhance our counterforce capability. Early deployment of such limited point defenses would undercut the President's credibility in the most blatant manner.

— Though some components for early deployment of ground-based defenses are available, we are years away from integrating them into a survivable weapon system that would be effective against the Soviet responsive threat.

— Any system we could deploy in the immediate future (before the mid-1990's) would be only marginally better than the Safeguard system we abandoned as inadequate in the early 1970s.

— Such a deployment could easily be defeated by a proliferation of Soviet warheads, given their hot production lines, and could lead the Soviets to add extensively to their offensive forces; this would force us to give up our goal of SDI coupled with offensive nuclear arms reductions, and plunge us into a new arms race.

— The Administration would be blamed at home and abroad for destroying its professed hopes for progress in arms control. Domestic support for defense programs would be eroded; neutralist movement in NATO countries would be strengthened.

— Some proponents claim that early deployments would lay the groundwork for a more complete territorial defense later on. This could only contribute to security and stability if it was done in the context of mutual offensive force reductions and mutual agreement to deploy defenses. Without that context, such deployments would only stimulate Soviet countermeasures that would lead us further from our goal.

— Early deployment is most often advocated by supporters of the President who want to help him achieve his goals. They believe that this initial budgetary and political commitment to defense hardware would build support for fuller defenses later on. They do not realize that their proposals would accomplish the exact opposite of what the President is trying to achieve.

— It is true that as long as we still rely on our offensive deterrent forces, we should protect them; however, for the near term we have opted for cheaper and more stabilizing means of protection, e.g. underwater basing on strategic submarines. The near-term defensive deployment options currently available would be destabilizing, costly, vulnerable, only partially effective, and counter to our efforts to reduce the offensive threat. For the longer term, we have opted for developing effective layered defenses.

— Early U.S. deployments could free the Soviets from ABM Treaty constraints and permit them to expand their deployed defenses, an area where they could exploit over the near-term their advantages in production facilities and operational experience. This would create a prompt strategic disadvantage for the U.S.

— Although the Soviets now have the capability to move toward rapid deployment of a ground-based territorial ABM defense, we have no evidence that they have engaged in the testing and construction activities that would indicate intent to break out of the ABM Treaty in the near term (i.e., within ten years). A U.S. move toward early deployment could push the Soviets in this direction.

— Deployment of defenses based on currently available technologies would tend to freeze designs and inhibit conceptual development. We would risk locking ourselves into obsolescent technology.

— Early deployment of a limited and vulnerable, yet extremely costly (several billions of dollars), ground-based ABM system would siphon away needed funds from SDI efforts to develop effective and survivable strategic defenses utilizing advanced weapons, sensors, and battle management software.

— Deployment in Europe of ATBMs based on previously developed ABM-capable systems (with a view to adapting them subsequently for U.S. continental defense in case of Soviet break-out from the ABM Treaty), as some have suggested, would expose us to charges of ABM Treaty violations, since the Treaty prohibits transfer to other states or deployment outside the national territory of ABM systems or components limited by the Treaty.

— Although some of the early deployment proposals claim to use non-nuclear components, most experts admit that any realistic system in the near term would be dependent on nuclear interceptors for the terminal defense portion and would be effective only for hardened point targets.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated

Early Deployment Proposals

1. William A. Davis, 1986: Deployment within NATO of ATBM defenses based on improved LoADS (Low Altitude Defense System) and Sentry systems, to bring to maturity systems that could later be adapted on short notice for terminal US continental defense if the Soviets broke out of the ABM Treaty. At a later stage the Davis proposal would use Homing Overlay-related technology for late-midcourse US continental defenses. Davis claims early operating capability within two to four years given optimum funding. He believes nuclear warheads would perform better, especially against a responsive threat, but recognizes the political problem they would cause and therefore calls for a nonnuclear system in Europe, backed up by nuclear warheads for possible US continental use later on if necessary.

2. Kemp/Courter October 1986: Not yet reviewed but reportedly calls for ATBM deployments in Europe plus reactivation of the ABM system at Grand Forks.

3. AT&T study, October 1985: Study recommends we hold off deployments to allow new technologies to mature. However, the nearest-term deployment option available would use 1500 nuclear warheads to defend 500 silos. National command authority (NCA) would be defended by 100–200 interceptors. Sentry radar technology would be used. Operations capability for NCA defense FY93, for silo defense FY 95.

4. Recent SDIO study: Not yet reviewed but reportedly recommends against nearest-term options using ERIS (Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor System). Instead, calls for mid-90s deployments of ground-based and space-based kinetic kill vehicles as first phase of a full SDI architecture. Reportedly SDIO believes that in order to lay the groundwork for this option we would have to apply the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

5. High Frontier, 1982 (we are trying to obtain October 1986 update): Recommended use of nuclear-armed LoADS (Low Altitude Defense System) or nonnuclear SWARMJET interceptors in ground-based point defense of US silos. DOD spokesmen, including General Abrahamson, have criticized the proposed deployments as costly, ineffective, and vulnerable.

⁴ Secret.

150. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 1, 1986

SUBJECT

NSDD on Post-Reykjavik Follow-up Activities

Attached for your final review and forwarding to the President is the NSDD² providing top-down guidance to the JCS for their study of the transition to a world without ballistic missiles. Comments from all the senior staff have been incorporated.

We have also received and, where appropriate, incorporated comments from Secretary Weinberger, Admiral Crowe, and Directors Casey and Adelman. Their inputs, annotated to give you an idea of what was taken and what was not, are attached at *Tab III*³ for your information. It would be worth your time to scan this material.

— We believe that we have met and satisfied the main concerns of Secretary Shultz, and Directors Casey and Adelman.

— We have taken all the suggestions made by Admiral Crowe except those which would change the tone to suggest that the issue was *whether* the objective of eliminating ballistic missiles in ten years was an appropriate objective rather than *how* best to achieve that objective. Admiral Crowe is also concerned that the fiscal guidance is simply too tight. We believe that if we relax the guidance now, we will simply invite request for a very large budget increase. We recommend sticking with the guidance as contained in the draft which constrains the baseline but allows the JCS to suggest additions as excursions.

— We also took SecDef's comments where possible, but much of his memorandum addresses issues already resolved and attempts to walk-back central elements of the President's decision. This we cannot do.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Cockell and Rodman. Attached but not printed is Poindexter's NSDD distribution memorandum; see footnote 1, Document 152. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "signed."

² Printed as Document 152.

³ Attached but not printed are an October 31 memorandum from Weinberger to Poindexter; an undated letter from Crowe to Keel; an October 31 letter from Casey to Keel; and an October 31 note from Adelman to Keel.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum provided *Tab I*⁴ forwarding the NSDD to the President for signature.⁵

⁴ Printed as Document 151.

⁵ Poindexter did not indicate his preference with respect to the recommendation.

151. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Guidance for Post-Reykjavik Follow-up Activities

Issue

To task detailed planning on how best to make the transition to a world without offensive ballistic missiles.

Facts

Such tasking is an appropriate follow-up to the proposals you made at Reykjavik. During the October 27 NSPG,² Admiral Crowe requested your guidance on the conduct of such a study.

Discussion

The draft NSDD at *Tab A*³ provides the necessary guidance. It reviews the events at Reykjavik, explains in general terms the value of a world without offensive ballistic missiles, describes the nature of

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Prepared by Linhard. Poindexter sent the memorandum to Reagan, who was at Rancho del Cielo, California, under cover of a November 1 note: "Mr. President: Sorry to intrude on your Sunday with this, but we need to get this out early Monday morning since there is a great deal of work that must be done by December 1. If you could read it Sunday evening, then I can discuss with you on Monday morning any questions you have. I believe this is a landmark document which will help bring us to a safer, more stable world. John" (Ibid.) References are to Sunday, November 2, and Monday, November 3.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989, Document 3.

³ Printed as Document 152.

deterrence in such a world, lists assumptions, and provides specific taskings to the JCS and others. The NSDD requests an initial input recommending the basic approach to use in meeting your tasking by December 1, 1986. At that time, based on those recommendations, a final completion date will be established. This two step process will ensure the study is responsive to your needs.

This draft has been provided to Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Admiral Crowe, Bill Casey and Ken Adelman for their personal review. The majority of the comments received have been incorporated. I am satisfied that we have addressed those concerns that we can, and I am prepared to give you a short briefing on a few specific suggestions which we cannot.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you permit me to give you a short update on the views of your key advisors and then that you sign the NSDD (*Tab A*) tasking detailed planning on how best to make the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles.⁴

⁴ Reagan approved the recommendation. According to the President's Daily Diary, he spoke with Poindexter twice on November 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No memoranda of conversations for the discussions were found.

152. National Security Decision Directive 250¹

Washington, November 3, 1986

POST-REYKJAVIK FOLLOW-UP (U)

At my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11–12, 1986, we were able to reach a series of

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Poindexter distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Casey, Crowe, and Adelman under a covering memorandum of November 3: "The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing guidance for the development of a detailed plan for the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles. Access to this NSDD and the related products called for by this document should be limited only to those who need to know or assist in the development of these specific products." (Ibid.)

understandings that will serve as the foundation for future progress in a number of areas. With respect to nuclear arms control matters, the common ground that exists between positions of the two sides was substantially expanded in both the START and INF areas. A path toward progress was also uncovered in the area of nuclear testing. However, as we neared the end of the time allotted for our second day of discussions, the General Secretary placed great emphasis on the Soviet need for the United States to agree not to exercise its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of time in excess of 10 years. At the same time, he asked me to accept additional restrictions on some aspects of our SDI program that go well beyond the existing treaty restrictions. He ultimately tried making further progress at that meeting, even on those areas of understanding which we had already reached, to US willingness to make such a commitment with respect to a "strengthened" ABM Treaty. (U)

I did not intend to leave Reykjavik with any potential path to progress left unexplored. Therefore, I told the General Secretary that, for the US part, we would be willing to consider any approach as long as it did not demand of us that we compromise our fundamental principles, our security and that of our allies, or our hopes for a more stable future through a transition to an increased reliance on defenses that threaten no one. (U)

Further, I made it clear that I believed that we should make progress in each substantive arms control area based on the individual merits of the understandings reached in that area. We should not hold the potential increased mutual benefits to security and stability achievable by such progress hostage to either side's desires in other areas of discussion. (U)

With respect to the specific Soviet demand for a US commitment not to exercise our existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, I explained that a blanket commitment to waive all rights of withdrawal would not be acceptable, and that any US attempt to meet Soviet concerns in this regard should not be interpreted by the Soviet Union as US readiness to forfeit its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty due to supreme national interest or in the face of material breach of the treaty by a party. (U)

Therefore, as an attempt to see if I could find a way to respond to the General Secretary's concern in a manner that met the criteria outlined above, I reviewed the various elements of the previous US proposals to see if they could be reformulated in a novel way so as to meet both US and Soviet concerns. As a result of this effort, I offered the following initial proposal which laid out the conditions under which I was prepared to consider meeting the basic thrust of the Soviet request. (U)

Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of

5 years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses. (U)

The General Secretary responded to this with the following Soviet proposal. (U)

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. (U)

This Soviet proposal was clearly unacceptable in a number of respects. It sought to have the US accept restrictions on research on advanced defenses well beyond those specified in the existing ABM Treaty. It redefined the conditions for the subsequent five-year period to involve the elimination of *all* strategic forces of the US and the Soviet Union. And, it did not include a positive commitment that, following the ten-year period, either side could then begin the transition to increased reliance on advanced defenses. (U)

Having evaluated the Soviet offer, I again attempted to find an appropriate bridge between the US and Soviet positions. In this effort, I tried to use as much as possible of the Soviet proposal. The result was the following second US offer which was designed to correct the key problems associated with the Soviet proposal while making it clear that in this context the US was prepared to meet what was perceived to be the central Soviet concern by an appropriately limited US commitment not to exercise its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1996 for the purpose of deploying advanced defenses. It was this US offer which was the US offer of record when the discussions ended without further agreement. (U)

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the

two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise. (U)

Eliminating All Offensive Ballistic Missiles. At the heart of the last US proposal made at Reykjavik is the expressed US commitment to join a bilateral agreement to delay any deployment of US and Soviet advanced defenses against ballistic missiles until after the elimination of all US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles, with this US commitment made in return for a corresponding Soviet commitment to join a parallel bilateral agreement to complete this elimination within a specific period of time. The ten-year period of the US proposal was associated with the period through 1996 because I will not permit the possibility of the US moving to a more stable deterrent, unilaterally if need be, to slip further into the future. This specific ten-year period was chosen to balance the Soviet desire to have the US commitment not to deploy defenses for as long as possible against the US desire to find an appropriate means of eliminating the threat currently posed by offensive ballistic missiles as quickly as possible. (U)

The elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles is not a new objective for the US. In 1983, when I announced the establishment of the SDI program I did so with the specific objective of making offensive ballistic missiles obsolete. It was examined as a part of our review and response to the proposals made by General Secretary Gorbachev in January, 1986, which went beyond this to call for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within the next 14 years. In short, it is an objective that we have studied and discussed both within the US government and with our allies, most recently in the deliberations that led to my July 25, 1986, letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.² (U)

In the preparations for that letter, I initially focused on my desire to make a concrete proposal which would formalize my offer to share the benefits of advanced defenses with the Soviet Union, should our research into such defenses meet the objectives that we have set. However, when considering this idea, the Secretary of Defense correctly pointed out that it made little sense to commit to share the benefits of advanced defenses with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union insisted on continuing to retain large numbers of offensive ballistic missiles which would, in turn, attempt to defeat our defenses. After discussion and study by my principal advisors, it was agreed that the new US proposal should

² Reagan's July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 254.

contain a specific call for a plan for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles. Therefore, my July 25 letter to the General Secretary was framed to incorporate this objective as a key element of the new US proposal presented in that letter. After full consultation with our allies on this and the other elements of the proposal to be contained in this correspondence, I finalized and sent the letter. (U)

Additionally, the objective of the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles is consistent with what we have been trying to do for some time *both* in START and in INF, and also with the fundamental goal that I specifically set for the SDI program. (U)

With respect to the START negotiations, our position has long been that while each side may need nuclear forces for some time to deter conflict and underwrite its security, neither side needs fast-flying, non-recallable offensive ballistic missiles for this purpose. From the very first, in START, we have been trying to draw a clear distinction between fast-flying ballistic systems, which are uniquely suited for an attempted first-strike by an aggressor, and slow-flying systems which are better suited for deterrence through the prospect of retaliation. As a result, we have been attempting to focus on reductions in ballistic missile warheads (which also are an area of Soviet advantage) as the heart of the issue to be resolved—and have addressed restrictions on slow-flying systems largely as means to meet Soviet concerns. (U)

In the INF negotiations, we have taken a similar position. We have kept the focus on missiles, and avoided discussion of dual-capable, tactical aircraft. We proposed the zero-zero solution for the LRINF missile problem. We have called for the similar reduction and elimination of shorter-range ballistic missiles, missiles that pose as direct a threat to our Allies and our forces deployed in support of those allies, as Soviet ICBMs do to the United States. (U)

With respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative, my specific, stated goal has always been to make ballistic missiles obsolete. Here, again, our focus has been on promptly eliminating the threat posed by these fast-flying missiles. (U)

In Iceland, at the critical point of attempting to find a response to Soviet concerns which would not compromise our principles, our security, or our future, I drew upon previously completed work with respect to the objective of eliminating the threat posed by offensive ballistic missiles, and I incorporated this objective into my response to the Soviet call for a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. By doing so, we undercut any Soviet objection to our having the right to deploy defenses as insurance, since we would have committed to delay until all offensive ballistic missiles of the two superpowers should have been eliminated. By calling for the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges, we also, in one step, addressed

the problem of eliminating both the last 100 Soviet SS-20 warheads in Asia (a concern of our Asian allies) and the remaining shorter-range INF missiles that still would threaten our European allies (a particular concern of our German allies). (C)

An Alternative Future. Should the Soviets accept the proposal I offered in Reykjavik, we would face a substantially different future than that we anticipate today. At the end of the ten-year period specified in the offer, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would possess any offensive ballistic missiles. When adequate advanced defenses are deployed, they should provide insurance against the return or covert retention of such missiles and guard against third country ballistic missiles. Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, although smaller than today and of a different composition, would remain and would retain their essential role in ensuring US and allied security. (U)

With respect to *strategic forces*, by the end of 1996 the United States and Soviet Union could retain no more than 50 percent of today's strategic nuclear offensive forces. These forces would consist exclusively of bombers and cruise missiles. Since the major portions of forces of the United States and Soviet Union would be covered by agreements that would reduce these forces to equal levels (unlike the situation today), these forces should provide a sufficient strategic retaliatory capability to deter attack on the United States or its allies while eliminating the crisis stability problems inherent in the short time of flight ballistic missiles. At the same time, elimination of ballistic missiles on both sides would drastically reduce the Soviet first strike potential and, to the extent Soviet fears of a US first strike are genuinely felt, would alleviate such concerns. (U)

With respect to our *commitment to NATO*, the remaining strategic nuclear systems would also provide the US nuclear umbrella over NATO which has been one of the pillars of NATO's strategy for decades. Not only would the US commitment to NATO's agreed strategy, as embodied in MC 14/3, remain, but the elimination of the ballistic missile threat to the United States and to NATO should increase the credibility of both NATO's ability to execute its strategy and the US commitment to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, in accordance with that strategy in support of the alliance. (U)

The United States presently contributes to all legs of the "NATO triad": conventional forces, non-strategic nuclear forces, and strategic forces. That contribution would continue. Nuclear artillery and nuclear weapons on dual capable aircraft would continue to fill the twin deterrent roles of helping offset Soviet conventional superiority and serving as a link to strategic forces. Thus, while it will be essential to continue (or accelerate) current NATO initiatives to improve conventional capability, it will be equally essential for the foreseeable future to keep some

nuclear forces (both strategic and non-strategic) to permit the United States and its allies to maintain the deterrence which is the heart of the NATO strategy set forth in MC 14/3. (U)

With respect to the *Strategic Defense Initiative* (SDI) program, it is clear that in the alternative future that such an agreement would provide, the requirements that SDI would have to meet would be altered substantially. Deployments of advanced defenses against ballistic missiles could be sized to provide the insurance that we need against both any existing or potential third country threats and against the covert retention of ballistic systems by the Soviet Union. Even if ballistic missiles were covertly retained, only certain elements of such systems could be covertly tested (e.g. boosters under the guise of space launch systems). It would be extremely difficult covertly to test offensive ballistic missiles as integrated combat systems in a surface-to-surface mode in such an environment. Therefore, confidence in the overall reliability of such systems would degrade over time. Also, without the ability to conduct developmental testing of new offensive ballistic missile systems, the problem of the defenses having to constantly stay ahead of a technologically evolving ballistic missile threat may also be greatly reduced. In short, the size, complexity, and technological difficulty of fielding a militarily meaningful defensive system against any residual ballistic missile threat will be substantially different. If the US proposal were accepted and implemented, these factors may be reduced to the point that, even based on the progress made in SDI to date, there would be little question that a scaled-down defense will be adequate and feasible under those future conditions. (U)

We can consider the possibility of more limited requirements for defense if ballistic missiles are actually eliminated. On the other hand, even if the Soviets were to accept the proposal that I made in Reykjavik, we will continue to need the leverage and protection produced by the possibility of being able to develop a system capable of handling a much more extensive and evolving offensive ballistic threat. (U)

Deterrence in such a future. The basic concept of deterrence in such an alternative future need not be altered. (U)

Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessments of war outcomes so uncertain as to remove any incentive for initiating attack. This would require that we possess a mix of military forces, including those nuclear and conventional forces providing defensive and retaliatory capabilities, that the Soviets will view as giving us the ability to deny them their political and military objectives. (U)

In short, deterrence of aggression is also achieved by maximizing an aggressor's *uncertainty* that he can achieve political objectives by force, and the *certainty* that he will face grave risk to things that he

values most should he try. Certainly, the tools for maintaining deterrence will change. The challenge and opportunity that we face is to determine how best to channel that change. (U)

The potential impact of eliminating ballistic missiles on deterrence. The elimination of offensive ballistic missiles offers the possibility of enhancing deterrence because the slower pace associated with the employment of bomber and cruise missile forces makes their effective use by an aggressor in a first strike much more difficult. The effects of such an attempt are also much more uncertain. At the same time, it should be recognized that the certainty of the ability of the US to respond to a first strike with strategic forces which are not degraded by that attempted attack is considerably higher when both sides have only slow flying systems. These considerations should be factored into evaluations of the military sufficiency of alternative forces to deter and to respond to a first strike. (U)

In today's world, or in a future that builds on today's trends, ballistic missiles are uniquely suited to be employed by an aggressor with relatively certain results. The time between the detection of a ballistic missile attack and its arrival is so short that it freezes the situation, reducing the options of the party attacked so that they can be largely anticipated by an aggressor. Facing no defenses, there can be little doubt that, if ballistic missiles function reliably, they will arrive on target. Finally, predicting the specific levels of damage they can inflict on a target is largely a matter of physics. Their effectiveness does not depend on the skill, courage or training of men in the loop. It depends on the technological reliability of the system which can be tested and measured in peacetime. (U)

If such systems were eliminated, the uncertainty in the mind of an aggressor must increase because of the loss of their unique characteristics. Provided that we take steps to ensure that other forms of attack are not permitted to rebuild that certainty over time, the result can be a significant net gain in terms of the quality of deterrence and, in turn, in our security and that of our allies. In considering the requirements for maintaining deterrence in such a future world, a high premium should be placed on identifying, determining the feasibility of, and taking such steps. (U)

Measuring the Impact on Deterrence. In measuring our ability to deter in an alternative future, we must take into account the elimination of the contribution of our own ballistic missiles and the corresponding relative increase in the degree of our uncertainty in predicting the effectiveness of our retaliatory strike, should deterrence fail. But at the same time, we must also properly reflect in our measurements the contribution that this same inherent uncertainty makes in deterring an aggressor. We should also consider the even more fundamental contribution that is

made to our security should we face an aggressor who is not rational or finds himself placed in an irrational situation by events that have gotten beyond his control, but who is armed only with systems against which we can build a reasonable defense should we choose to do so. We must also weigh the real and immediate benefits of removing an immense, existing threat to the United States that is literally only thirty minutes away. Nor can we forget that, unlike Soviet stated policy, US strategic and nuclear forces are intended to make an explicitly identified contribution to the deterrence of conventional attack on our Allies and our forces deployed in support of our Allies. (U)

In accomplishing this measurement, to the extent practical, we should attempt to approach the problem from the point of view of a net assessment of all considerations involved. Our present analytic tools will fall short of resolving all the questions such an alternative future presents. Therefore, until new methods adapted to the challenges and opportunities of this alternative future are fully developed, we will have to depend heavily on the experience, expertise, resourcefulness, creativity, and judgment of our professional military and defense community. I believe that this, too, plays into a significant aspect of our strength. (U)

The Immediate Task Ahead. At this time, it is not clear whether the Soviet Union will have the wisdom to accept the US proposal which I made in Reykjavik. The main thrust of our national security planning and military programming should not be altered now in anticipation of such an uncertain possibility. In fact, if we were prematurely to adjust our current military plans and programs for either the modernization of our own ballistic missile forces or to limit the scope of our SDI program, the Soviet Union would certainly attempt to pocket these actions without a reciprocal response on their part. Unilateral action of this sort would be counterproductive and dangerous. It would not only reduce the likelihood of our convincing the Soviet Union to join us in the approach to a future elimination of offensive ballistic missiles contained in my Reykjavik proposals, but it would also reduce our security and that of our allies. (U)

However, I want to ensure that we are prepared to exploit, fully and safely, our proposal should the Soviet Union be willing to join us in its pursuit. In order to do so, the necessary foundation of detailed, careful planning must be laid now. Therefore, I request the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under direction of the Secretary of Defense and drawing upon other agencies as necessary, to provide a plan which would permit the US to safely transition to the alternative future I have proposed. (C)

The nature of the plan. This plan should catalogue the necessary national security requirements to support the implementation of the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996

as proposed in the last US offer made at Reykjavik. It should fully take into account the discussion of deterrence that I have provided above. Having done so, it should propose programmatic and non-programmatic approaches—including changes in military strategy and tactics, force structure and posture, and additional supportive arms control/reduction initiatives—which could be used to meet and fulfill those requirements. The identification of multiple and competing approaches to meeting requirements is encouraged. If alternative paths or methods exist, they should be presented. Finally, the resource implications of all alternatives should be estimated and provided with the alternatives. (C)

Assumptions. In developing this plan, the following assumptions should be used: (U)

— With respect to the 50 percent reductions in strategic forces to be taken in the first five years:

1. there will be no sublimit on heavy bombers within the 1,600 ceiling on the number of SNDVs; and

2. within the 6,000 ceiling associated with ballistic missile warheads, air-launched cruise missiles, and (indirectly) other bomber weapons:

(a) there will be no sublimit on ALCMs;

(b) each ALCM on a heavy bomber counts as one warhead;

(c) all the gravity bombs and SRAM on a single heavy bomber counts as one warhead; and

(d) SLCMs will not be included in this number. (C)

— The US and Soviet Union will eliminate *all* offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. As a departure point for planning, the term offensive ballistic missiles should be applied to ballistic missiles of all ranges and carrying *any* type of weapon designed for use in a surface-to-surface mode. Air-to-surface missiles that employ a ballistic trajectory should not be included. Artillery, rocket assisted artillery rounds, and rocket assisted ASW systems should also not be included. Recommendations with respect to alternative or additional limitations on the term “offensive ballistic missile” are encouraged. (S)

— While eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, the United States will not abandon the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence. (U)

— The strategic policy and targeting priorities of NSDD-13 should be considered as an initial baseline.³ They should be critically reviewed in the context of the purposes of the development of this plan. Recommendations concerning alternative formulations which may be more appropriate for a ballistic missile free world are encouraged. These alternatives should be

³ NSDD-13, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

provided as soon as possible so that they can be reviewed and, if considered appropriate, approved for use for this planning activity. However, it remains US policy not to attack civilian population *per se*. (TS)

— It will continue to be an objective of US policy to retain a nuclear reserve force, including a secure reserve component, of appropriate size and composition. (TS)

— The Strategic Defense Initiative will be given adequate resources to ensure the deployment of effective advanced strategic defenses can be made if and when required, and to hedge against Soviet cheating. The US may choose to deploy a treaty-compliant defense (e.g., perhaps using ERIS-type technology as an initial limited ABM system and for its related ASAT capability, and/or an ATBM capability) at any time that such a defense is useful prior to 1996. The US will deploy appropriate defenses which can go beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty after 1996 if it is in the US interest to do so. The Soviet Union will deploy comparable defenses. (TS)

— The NATO strategy embodied in MC 14/3 will remain in effect and be fully supported by the United States. The current NATO efforts to raise the nuclear threshold through conventional improvements will continue. (U)

— For the purpose of this plan, the total resources available to the Department of Defense will not exceed current planning levels, with a rate of growth thereafter not to exceed three percent in real terms. However, the reorientation of priorities may be considered within those totals. Should the JCS consider additional resources essential, they should so indicate as an excursion to their baseline plan. (S)

— The military capabilities associated with this plan will be acquired under peacetime, non-mobilization conditions. Where this guideline, constraints on our industrial capacity, or constraints on non-fiscal resources (ranging from availability of trained manpower to the availability of special nuclear materials) impact upon achieving desired force levels, this fact should be explicitly indicated, with a clear identification of the governing constraint. (C)

— In Soviet acceptance of the proposals made in Reykjavik which would open the possibility of the projected alternative future in question, the Soviet Union would also agree to monitoring as necessary to permit effective verification of their compliance. (U)

— This being said, the US plan for implementing the ten-year path to the negotiated elimination of ballistic missiles should be such that, should the Soviet Union not act in accord with the agreements reached, the United States could stop the reductions and elimination process, and take additional responses as necessary, at any step along the way without unacceptable risk. (U)

Initial progress report. In developing this plan, an initial progress report should be submitted not later than December 1, 1986, which addresses the following:

- initial recommendations, if any, with respect to national policy guidance and strategy for the employment of nuclear and non-nuclear forces that should be considered in the development of such a plan;

- an explanation of the analytic methodology planned for evaluating risk and force effectiveness in support of the development of the plan, recognizing, as mentioned earlier, that military expertise and judgment will play a critically important role accomplishing the overall task;

- a description of the initial basic planning assumptions that will be made concerning friendly forces available during the period in question, corresponding hostile forces, critical missions to be accomplished; and, the general number and characteristics of the targets associated with these missions;

- a method for appropriately folding into this planning process the contribution of highly compartmented programs while maintaining their security; and

- an estimate, submitted for my approval, of the date upon which this plan will be available for my final review. (TS)

Issues to be addressed in the full plan. The final completed plan should address at a minimum:

- recommendations on the appropriate phasing of the elimination of US ballistic missiles by 1996 in the context of the US proposal, and those steps which we could take to ensure that the phasing of the elimination of Soviet ballistic missiles is accomplished in an appropriate manner (and preferably in a manner advantageous to US and Allied security);

- recommendations on specific changes in strategic nuclear force employment strategy and related force structure made necessary by the elimination of both US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles;

- recommendations on the role and scope of deployments of advanced strategic defenses against ballistic missiles (both treaty compliant before 1996 and those not currently permitted by the ABM Treaty after 1996) that may be required, and the potential timing and implications of these deployments;

- recommendations on the role and scope of deployments of advanced strategic defenses against bomber and cruise missile attack that may be required, and the potential timing and implications of such deployments (considering both the use of traditional technologies and the potential contribution that could be made to a more cost-effective

solution by advanced, compartmented systems and spin-offs from the SDI program);

- recommendations on the role of advanced technologies (e.g., low observables) in countering existing and improved Soviet defenses against bomber and cruise missile attack both to ensure the effectiveness of US retaliatory forces and to offset the potential Soviet advantage in existing investments in air defense;

- recommendations on other additional strategic capabilities that may be needed (e.g., increased C3I, ASAT capability, etc.);

- recommendations on similar changes in the associated strategy for the employment, deployment and structural development of non-strategic nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces;

- recommendations on additional general purpose capabilities that may be needed (e.g., increased ASW capability);

- recommendations on additional improvements in any area needed to ensure that the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent relative to NATO and our overall military capability to meet NATO and other alliance commitments are maintained;

- recommendations on how we can best use technological advantage to implement competitive strategies in support of this plan;

- recommendations on how other existing arms control proposals, including in the conventional area, could be made more supportive of national security as a consequence of the elimination of ballistic missiles;

- recommendations concerning how we can best address the US commitment to pursue in START limitations on SLCMs with the Soviet Union in the context of this plan; and

- recommendations on additional arms control proposals, including: measures which could help minimize the potential danger of other forms of militarily significant, short-notice attack (to include cruise missiles) after the elimination of ballistic missiles is achieved; proposals for scheduling the drawdown of forces restricted by negotiated agreement in manners which further enhance security and stability; and additional approaches in the conventional area. (TS)

Treatment of Risk. In formulating the alternatives and making the assessments associated with this plan, the objective of the baseline plan should be to hold overall levels of risk generally constant. It is unlikely that the risk could be kept genuinely constant in the projected environment which will be continually changing over the ten-year period. On the other hand, every effort should be made to avoid even short periods of greatly increased risk and to remain within a band of acceptable risk using today's levels as the departure point. (U)

An appropriate methodology for measuring risk over the period being considered will be required to ensure this objective is met. Sources of greatest risk and uncertainty should be documented as they are identified and addressed in the development of the plan. (U)

Alternatives that reduce risk at no significant cost can and should be included within the baseline plan. Alternatives that reduce overall levels of military risk from current or anticipated levels (as measured assuming currently planned or programmed forces), and that significantly increase the cost or difficulty of achieving an executable baseline plan can also be considered and presented. However, these should be presented as excursions to the baseline plan. (U)

Associated Taskings. It goes without saying that the assurance of effective verification is essential to our entering into the arms control agreements that are assumed as the backdrop for the above tasking. Therefore, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the participation and drawing upon the assistance of other appropriate agencies, should prepare a supporting plan which recommends a preferred path, and alternative paths where appropriate, for achieving the effective verification of the assumed arms control agreements. (U)

Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence should provide:

- an assessment of the Soviet Union's intentions and capability, both military and economic, to satisfy its own national strategy and strategic force objectives;

- an assessment of the intentions and potential capabilities of other countries which currently have, or could obtain, ballistic missiles; and

- an assessment of the intelligence resources needed both to monitor Soviet compliance in such an alternative future and to support the evolving projected US military requirements associated with that future. (S)

Implementation. The objective is the optimal executable plan, with alternative paths where appropriate, which would permit me to move quickly to exploit any Soviet willingness to join us in the proposal involving the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles within ten years which I made in Reykjavik. This should be completed on a priority basis. (U)

Access to this NSDD and to the resulting products should be limited only to those with a clear need to know about and assist in the development of each individual product. (U)

Ronald Reagan

153. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 5, 1986

SUBJECT

Presidential Meeting on ICBM Modernization

In the memo at Tab III,² you proposed that the SecDef and yourself brief the President in early November on our options for basing Peacekeeper missiles and our options for the various configurations of the small ICBM. You further proposed that this meeting be followed by a more formal briefing in early December. The SecDef replied on 31 October (Tab IV)³ concurring with your recommendations and proposing that the December meeting take place in a luncheon meeting with the Chiefs at the Pentagon.

The first meeting with the President has now been scheduled for 11:00 a.m. this Friday,⁴ on NSC time. An appropriate meeting memo is at Tab I. Your talking points for the meeting are at Tab II and have been structured to place the President's ICBM decisions in the context of the recent events in Iceland.

I have not yet developed the Schedule request for the more formal meeting in December. I believe that the meeting should be held here, not at the Pentagon, to ensure that all the appropriate senior members of the White House staff can attend. The Air Force expressed extreme sensitivity to the idea of the M-X and small ICBM decisions being the subject of a JCS meeting with the President. They have no problem with the Chairman, but did not feel that this decision is appropriate for a full meeting of the Chiefs. I spoke to Mike Donley about this, and he concurs.

We have scheduled an hour of your time tomorrow to discuss the details of our strategy for ICBM modernization and the sequence of events for Friday's meeting with the President.

Also attached, at Tab V,⁵ for your information are the briefing charts used by the Air Force to brief the SecDef on these issues on 4 November 1986.

Bob Linhard, Bill Cockell, Mike Donley and Ron Sable concur.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, ICBM Modernization. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² Attached but not printed; see Document 145.

³ Attached but not printed; see footnote 5, Document 145.

⁴ November 7.

⁵ Not found attached.

Recommendations

1. That you sign the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I.⁶
2. That you approve of the concept of having the more formal meeting on NSC time in December, here at the White House.⁷

Tab I**Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan⁸**

Washington, undated

*MEETING ON ICBM MODERNIZATION**I. PURPOSE*

To meet with Secretary Weinberger to discuss the options for basing additional Peacekeeper missiles and the options for developing the small ICBM.

II. BACKGROUND

In 1984 your Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission) recommended that we place 100 Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos and initiate development of a new small ICBM. Congress ultimately approved 50 of the 100 Peacekeepers, but refused further funding until we develop a more survivable basing mode. The results of our research on new basing modes is now complete. Secretary Weinberger will outline for you the top four candidate basing modes.

Our initial research on the small ICBM is also now complete. Secretary Weinberger will outline our options for developing this missile with one, two, or three warheads.

After these preliminary discussions on the 7th of November, the Secretary will return in early December with a more formal briefing and his recommendations.

⁶ Printed from a version on which Poindexter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

⁷ Printed from a version on which Poindexter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

⁸ Secret. Prepared by Douglass. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for November 7 from 11 until noon in the Oval Office.

III. *PARTICIPANTS*

The President, Vice President Donald T. Regan, Secretary Weinberger, Admiral Crowe, John Poindexter, Al Keel, Bill Cockell, Bob Linhard, and John Douglass.

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

None.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS*

John Poindexter will open the meeting by outlining the issue and will call upon Secretary Weinberger to explain the options that will be presented to you more formally in December. After Secretary Weinberger's remarks, you would respond with the remarks at Tab A. A general discussion would follow.

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, undated

— Cap, I'm very pleased with the technical progress that you've made on both the Peacekeeper and the small ICBM.

— Our problems in ICBM modernization, however, have always been more political than technical.

— I believe that we must keep our Research and Development on all our ICBM and SLBM programs healthy until we see how far the Soviets will go towards the elimination of all ballistic missiles.

— Anyone else have any comments?

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁰

Washington, undated

Talking Points for Adm. Poindexter
on
Peacekeeper/Small ICBM Options

— Mr. President, Cap and I thought it would be helpful if we spent a few moments outlining the decision process that will lead up to your

⁹No classification marking.

¹⁰No classification marking.

decisions on Peacekeeper basing and the configuration of the small ICBM.

— Before Cap runs through the alternatives, however, I felt it might be helpful to quickly discuss how our ICBM programs will be affected by the Arms Control situation we see after Iceland.

— Some opponents may try to use Iceland against us to assert that since we are proposing zero ballistic missiles by 1997, we should stop our ballistic missile research programs, i.e., the Peacekeeper, the small ICBM, and the D-5.

— We, of course, need to continue these programs to give incentive to the Soviets to reach agreement, and we may want to deploy limited numbers of these new systems prior to 1996 even if we reach an agreement with the Soviets to eliminate all ballistic missiles by 1996.

— Cap and Admiral Crowe are analyzing our options in this regard now and will have a position prepared on this later this year.

— Cap, why don't you run through the options on both the Peacekeeper and the small ICBM for the President.

154. Talking Points Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense¹

Washington, undated

Meeting with the President on ICBM Modernization

Talking Points:

◦ We were on the right track with the President's 1981 Strategic Modernization Decision.

— Develop and deploy 100 MX missiles.

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 857, Subject File, 1986 ICBM modernization #14-36 (2). Secret. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, November 7, from 11 a.m. until noon in the Oval Office. Ikle sent the talking points to Weinberger under cover of a November 6 memorandum: "Attached are OSD suggested talking points for your meeting with the President on ICBM Modernization tomorrow. Dick Godwin reviewed the attached, and he will join the meeting scheduled tomorrow at 0830. Dick Godwin's feeling is that you may not want to get into the last tick on page 3 of the talking points or the discussion of the 'Congressional climate' in the penultimate tick. Since it is a restricted meeting at the Oval Office, I feel these political aspects could well have a place. Fred" (Ibid.)

— Initially deploy 40 in Minuteman silos and work on a *more survivable* basing mode for *all* 100 missiles.

- But since 1982, Congress has acted to slow and divert this plan.

- The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission in 1983, in retrospect, initially were of limited usefulness and are now overtaken by events. Congress at first seemed to agree with Scowcroft Commission, but later limited MX to 50 missiles, and pushed hard for the Small ICBM.

- For 1987 Congress has funded:

- Funded production of 12 Peacekeeper (we requested 21).

- Peacekeeper basing at \$120M (we requested \$389M).

- Development of the Small ICBM at \$1.2B (we requested \$1.4B).

- President asked SecDef (NSDD-227)² to recommend the best options:

- Find a survivable basing mode for Peacekeeper;

- Examine the effectiveness of Peacekeeper/Small ICBM mixes (including a MIRVed Small ICBM).

- Make determination by 30 Nov and brief the NSC by 10 Dec.

- Our decision criteria for selecting the most cost-effective basing options are:

- System chosen must contribute efficiently to our overall deterrence objectives, in a cost-effective fashion, and on a timely basis, without diverting funds from other key elements of our deterrence posture.³

- It should be resilient to changing Soviet threats.

- It should help maintain a diversity of US deterrent forces—a balanced Triad—so that no potential new vulnerability could affect all our forces (“not to put all our eggs in one basket”).

- Possible arms control effects.

- Of the many peacekeeper mobile options we analyzed, four⁴ look best:

- Garrisoned rail mobile—\$10–15B for over 20 years. (*Chart I*)⁵

- Requires hours of warning for survival like non alert bombers and submarines in port.

² See Document 108.

³ Weinberger drew two vertical lines and a leftward facing arrow in the right-hand margin beside this point.

⁴ Weinberger drew two lines under “four.”

⁵ Chart I is attached but not printed. Weinberger wrote “1)” in the left-hand margin beside this point.

— Carry hard—shelter or tunnel—\$20–25B for over 20 years. (Charts IIA and B)⁶

— Superhard looks good today (\$8–10B), but vulnerable to improving accuracy. (Chart III)⁷

◦ All Small ICBM options are inferior from cost-effectiveness point of view to *equally survivable* Peacekeeper options, although they are technically feasible.

— For example, even the least expensive option, a *two* warhead Small ICBM based at Minuteman sites would cost \$33–39B for 500 warheads, while *500 equally survivable MX* warheads would cost between \$20B and \$25B.⁸

◦ Arms control implications:

— The arms control assumptions of the Scowcroft Commission that were adduced in favor of the *single* warhead Small ICBM are overtaken by events. The assumption was that both the US and the USSR might move toward mobile *single* warhead Small ICBMs, with the Soviets giving up the multiple warhead large ICBMs. This is an old SALT idea, predating SDI. Now, the Soviets are moving toward multiple warhead mobiles, and in any event, it is SDI and not our Small ICBM that provides the spur for the Soviets to talk seriously about arms reductions. It is in the Soviet interest to have us put our defense dollars in the costly Small ICBM, instead of into programs (such as SDI, stealth, etc.) that are of higher concern to them.

◦ Conclusions:

— The Peacekeeper basing modes under consideration appear to have high potential. They offer significant improvements in survivability, at an affordable price, and can respond to a changing threat.

— Of particular interest is the possibility of applying the survivable MX basing mode eventually not just to the next 50 missiles, but to all 100 missiles. (Charts IVA and IVB)⁹

— Small missile is feasible and ready for development, but is much more costly than any of the Peacekeeper alternatives, with no extra benefits for arms control or survivability that would justify the extra \$10

⁶ Charts IIA and B are attached but not printed. Weinberger wrote “2)” in the left-hand margin beside this point.

⁷ Chart III is attached but not printed. Weinberger wrote “3)” in the left-hand margin beside this point.

⁸ Weinberger underlined “500 equally survivable MX” and wrote “(50 Mis)” in the right-hand margin beside it. He also drew an arrow in the left-hand margin pointing to “\$33–39B.” He also drew a bracket in the right-hand margin beside the entire bullet point.

⁹ Charts IVA and IVB are attached but not printed. Weinberger drew two short vertical lines and a rightward facing arrow in the left-hand margin of this section. He drew an upward facing diagonal line from the end of the section to the top of the page and wrote: “Retrofit [illegible] First 50.”

or \$15B. In current Congressional climate, given pre-eminence of SDI as well as fiscal constraints, we should come out with a clear rationale why the small ICBM has been overtaken by events.

— There are a number of useful measures we could undertake to strengthen our deterrent with a fraction of the SICBM funding. For example, we could include the option of converting 50 Minuteman II to Minuteman III. (*Chart V*)¹⁰

¹⁰ Chart V is attached but not printed. Weinberger drew a rightward facing arrow in the left-hand margin pointing to “SICBM.”

155. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, November 7, 1986

Special Advisors mtg w/ Pres

JMP intro/bkgrd

CAP Intro/ rvw histy

— Asked 100 in silos, Cong said no

— appt Scowcroft; said in silos

Options: (1) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

— predetermined launch pts

— least expensive²

— [*1 line not declassified*]

— widely dispersed

— on line starting 1990

(2) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

— [*less than 1 line not declassified*] (deception)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, Ballistic Missile Defense. No classification marking. Drafted by Keel, who hand wrote the notes. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix A. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Bush, Weinberger, Crowe, Regan, Poindexter, and Keel in the Oval Office from 11 until 11:58 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No formal memorandum of conversation was found.

² Keel wrote “ordinary looking trains” in the left-hand margin beside this point.

- 360 mi²
- grave doubts about
- a lot of similarities to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] (reflects services attachment to)
- very high cost, some higher survivability (no [illegible] I will not be rec)
- (3) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
 - similar, enormous amt of land
 - EIS 999 acres
 - some more uncertainty
- (4) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
 - now [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
 - can get [*less than 1 line not declassified*] give the treatment, special kind of geology)
 - cost high for [*number not declassified*], not much higher for [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
 - don't get certain srv if hit close (crater even if don't violate)
 - perhaps, at this pt second best (very likely not finally rec)

On basis of what I've seen so far, likely see Garrison rail

- no new land
- on public land
- not likely a public outcry

SMALL ICBM

- Rec at this pt go to mobile, hardened carrier
 - diff is that 1RV, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
 - is favorite of 2, 3 people in Congress
 - \$33B if go w/ original weight
 - then said would go to 2 w/h, increase w/h
 - not till 1994
- I have to tell you that I've never felt msl was very eff, or very useful
 - *Cost Comparisons*
 - another option #5, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] not considered very much
 - at moment, most probably going to rec
 - [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
 - not go w/ SM ICBM

Pres:

- I can see people asking why doing, if are going to destroy
- Yet must have appearance to go ahead if get Soviets to be serious
- Regard Small, perhaps get each Congressman to take one in each district

Pres: —Don't see how anyone (Pres) could sit at that desk and *not* retaliate (send out msles) [illegible] hit empty sites.

Crowe: Hell of dilemma for Soviets, if send only 100, is suicide for them; if send 1000, we'll know in seconds

CAP: —If we don't proceed w/ small ICBM, then have \$1.2B in five years

- *have to start production 1989, 1990*

JMP: —What do we need to get into next budget 1988, 1989 to convince Soviets

Cap: —If we don't go w/small ICBM, then we have \$1.2B avail FY87

Pres: —Perhaps thing is to look like we're going ahead

Crowe: —In looking ahead to what do beyond Reyk—could use [less than 1 line not declassified] not Small ICBM

Regan: (1) Cost of [less than 1 line not declassified]

CAP: (1) Approx \$800M

Regan: Any way to proceed w/both for nego purpose

Crowe: —From stnpt nego w/ Soviets, believe they [illegible] capability, so they look at [number not declassified] w/h's

- believe for military reasons/ nego reasons, don't need to do
- political is another problem, however

[less than 1 line not declassified]

- bias toward: get out on CONUS
- are less accurate, although close
- comm real time is problem but need to work on
- larger w/h

— could conceivably launch from bottom

Pres: But could keep (again) R&D going for small ICBM at lower level to keep for nego purpose.

JMP: (1) Work w/Cap/Bill to consider

- Arms Control strategy
- Strategy w/Cong
- looks like its obvious on rail mobile re: MX.

Pres: Two pts in mind

(1) Soviets have to believe in arms [illegible]??

(2) Probs w/ Public re: build and destroy

CAP: Maggie [illegible] if she knows we're proceeding w/MX—³

³ In a personal diary entry of November 7, Reagan wrote: "We had a meeting with Cap W. & Admiral Crowe (Chmn. joint Chiefs of staff). This was on forming a plan for continuing the modernization of nuc. weapons at same time we are talking eliminating of such weapons. Our own people are going to challenge our doing this—while Russians will stiffen their backs if we show signs of not doing it. I've charged the chiefs to come up with a plan that meets this double problem." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 655)

156. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to Steven Steiner of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, November 12, 1986, 11:04 a.m.

SUBJECT

S-W-P Breakfast 12 Nov: Arms Control

Cap asked Shultz for his impressions of the Vienna meeting. Shultz replied it was sort of a standoff. Shevardnadze wanted to re-write the Reykjavik record his way; we wanted it as it happened. The Soviets weren't ready to discuss the paper we tabled. They proposed an inter-round meeting which would focus entirely on what is permitted under the ABM Treaty. We declined and proposed a meeting that would discuss all subjects. Shultz said that he understands from Max Kampelman that the Soviets are now agreeable to discussing all major proposals—across the board—at a four day interim session that would be limited to the principals and their deputies. Cap asked what the point of such session would be. It would be the same people that meet regularly. We would just rake over the same coals and the Soviets would use it for propaganda advantage. Why should we do this in December rather than at the regular meeting in January? Shultz replied that because the

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 47323. Secret. Copies were sent to Rodman, Kraemer, McDaniel, Thompson, Pearson, Poindexter, Keel, and Brooks. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found. A repeat of an electronic message from Cockell to Linhard, November 12 at 10:50 a.m.

whole process is so painstaking we need to try to move forward. “You plough the ground, then get some kind of a break. It’s important to keep inching forward.” He did not think that the Soviets got any kind of a propaganda advantage out of Geneva. JMP observed that the paper the Soviets tabled Friday² contained some new ideas that went beyond the details presented at Reykjavik. It’s an easier package for us to defend against, he said. We’re in a very good position. The Soviets have gone so far there is no likelihood that Congress will view our position as wrong. There will be no pressure for us to go further; on the contrary, the pressures will be in the other direction.

² November 7. The Delegation analyzed the Soviets’ November 7 START proposals in telegram 10396 from NST Geneva, November 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860863–0801)

157. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 19, 1986, 10:27 a.m.

SUBJECT

S-W-P Breakfast 11–19: Arms Control

Cap opened the discussion by saying he was going to return to an “old wound.” Specifically, he wondered what we thought we would accomplish in the December 3–5 arms control discussions with the Soviets which Max had arranged. Do we need a whole new set of instructions? George Shultz said he thought none were required. What, then, is the point of the discussions, Cap asked. George replied that “in the battle of imagery” we want to be seen as the people who are willing to engage in discussions. “In the battle of substance,” following a long gestation period, at Reykjavik the Soviets essentially agreed to our positions on INF and START . . . there will still be some arguing—details remain to be worked out, but in essence the Soviets accepted our positions, and we made progress in things like counting rules. Then at

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 49822. Secret. Copies were sent to Rodman, McDaniel, Thompson, Pearson, Brooks, Mahley, Matlock, Sommer, and Keel. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found.

Vienna, Shevardnadze “kind of stiff armed us”; but that (Soviet) posture is already breaking up by virtue of the planned December meeting, “so we should scratch around” and see what’s possible.

Cap asked who had requested the December meeting. George indicated that at Vienna Shevardnadze wanted a special group to meet in order to discuss what is permitted under the ABM Treaty. We had said no to that proposal, but indicated that we would be amenable to inter-round discussions, “sort of like last summer,”² and this is the result. George said he had complete confidence in the capability of our negotiators to manage the discussions sensibly.

Cap replied that he had a somewhat different view of the situation. At Reykjavik, he said, the Soviets pursued two paths. They tried to tempt us with some attractive agreements, “then slammed the door on SDI.” If we had agreed with the Soviets they would have achieved their goal of killing SDI. If we did not agree, then the Soviets could portray SDI as the obstacle, and try to mobilize public opinion against it. This is reminiscent of the approach the Soviets used in the ‘70s—to portray us as the source of the problem; then, in our eagerness to get agreement, we would “eliminate the problem”, as the Soviets had defined it. But, in this case, their attempts to mobilize US opinion against SDI failed; the polls showed increased support after Reykjavik, though in England, Germany and Italy (but not France) they may have made some headway, supported by a general increase in anti-American feeling. “So that’s why I worry about continued meetings in which the Soviets could advance their (propaganda) aim further . . . I don’t think the Soviets were serious about their offer on the first day at Reykjavik.” George replied that, of course, we can never be sure how serious the Soviets were in their positions at Reykjavik; though it’s obvious they would like to cripple SDI. Their positions are always a mixture of propaganda and serious intent. But if we refuse to talk to them, that just adds fuel to their propaganda campaign. At Reykjavik the President did well. He pocketed the Soviet concessions. We wanted zero-zero INF. It’s there now, and the Soviets won’t be able to get it off the table. In his Eureka College speech,³ the President talked about 5000 RVs. “The Reykjavik number is below that, probably.” We made headway on counting rules—that’s on the table. The Soviets want Pershing out of Europe, he continued, “so I think they’ll de-link INF. That’s an important objective for them.” START is more questionable. There is a stronger

² Reference is to August 11–12 meetings in Moscow; memoranda of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Documents 142, 143 and 144.

³ Reference is to Reagan’s commencement address at Eureka College on May 9, 1982, in which he outlined U.S. objectives in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks set to begin the following month. The speech is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 99.

defensive connection there. Cap again said he felt it was important for us to be cautious about “any backdoor measures” the Soviets use to try to kill SDI. Cap then went on to observe that “Mrs. Thatcher’s press statement” was a good one. George corrected him, noting that it was not “her” statement, but the product of negotiations. Her great worry, Cap said, was that we would give up our strategic modernization program “and wipe out everything at the ten year point.” Cap had told her that there was no intention to give up an effective deterrent. What she wanted most was a statement regarding TRIDENT D-5 and support for the British program.

George commented that we need a heavily coordinated approach to the Europeans as we go into the December series of NATO meetings. He noted that he had given a speech in Chicago Monday⁴ on arms control “which was heavily cleared,” so he assumes it represents a coordinated USG position. Al Keel observed that there are two incorrect interpretations of the President’s position which are receiving play in the media currently, including an erroneous twist on the speech the President gave last night.⁵ “The President just reiterated our existing priorities” for the Thatcher statement, he said; there was no change. And the Shultz reference to the possible retention of some ballistic missiles after 10 years is not a change in Administration position either. He was speaking hypothetically. (Shultz noted that he had discussed that part of the speech personally with the President). Al went on, noting that the press is trying to create the impression that the President is backing away from Reykjavik. That is not the case.

The media are engaged in a frenzied effort to conjure up an image of disarray in the administration. We must be particularly careful today to ensure that the three press spokesmen emphasize that the President has no intent of backing away from the proposals tabled at Reykjavik. Fred Ikle commented that he had talked to Paul Nitze about the concept of retaining a few ballistic missiles. Fred is not convinced that such missiles would be useful in the context of a hedge against Soviet violations (i.e., the fact that both sides were allowed to retain some missiles could actually make it easier for the Soviets to cheat.) George suggested that we should work up some fairly extensive talking points for all to use to be sure we’re presenting a coordinated and correct position publicly.

⁴ November 17. Reference is to Shultz’s speech on “Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Future of Deterrence,” before the International House of Chicago and the *Chicago Sun-Times* Forum at the University of Chicago. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1987, pp. 31–35)

⁵ Reference is to Reagan’s remarks at the Ethics and Public Policy Center Anniversary dinner at the Washington Hilton on November 18. For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pp. 1563–1567.

Cap noted that “we should do more in the way of joint preparations” for the upcoming NATO meetings than we typically do. He expects the meetings to be “extremely unpleasant.” George said he didn’t think so. He’s been to two meetings with the Allies since Reykjavik, and they weren’t so bad. It’s rather interesting, he noted, that some of the Allied governments now love SDI—because they see it getting in the way of arms control! Cap agreed it’s remarkable to see how many Europeans love nukes now.

158. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, November 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT

Your meeting in the Oval Office, Friday, 21 November²

(S) *Topic: Our Strategy for the Missile Threat.*

I believe it’s important at this time that the President be made to feel comfortable and confident again of his policy on SDI and the Soviet missile threat. The loss of the Senate, the Thatcher criticism, the Soviet refusal to follow-up on Reykjavik, and the atmospheric spill-over from the Iran issue could create openings for those who wish to talk the President into revising his SDI position. You should take this opportunity to remind the President that his long-term policy “to make missiles impotent and obsolete” must not be abandoned and that in the next two years we can build on the progress made since 1983, firmly to establish the President’s missile policy in the defense community, in Congress and in the country.

(S) *Some Talking Points.*

◦ The more we in the Pentagon look at the 1990s and beyond, the more important the goal to overcome the Soviet missile threat.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, Arms Control (President Gorbachev)—1986–1988. Secret.

² According to the President’s Daily Diary, Weinberger met with Reagan and Poindexter in the Oval Office from 1:01 until 1:35 p.m. on November 21. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found.

◦ In the long term, our democracies cannot build a defense effort on a strategy that relies on suicidal threats. MAD is not a viable way to maintain our Alliances.

◦ The SDI research program has been going well, has had many unexpected successes in technology developments, and the Allies now very much want to be part of it.

◦ We can't tell whether the Soviet concessions in Reykjavik on INF and START were genuine. But it's clear from private and public Soviet statements that none of our strategic programs—not the MX, not stealth—provides as much an incentive for them to move on arms control as does SDI.

◦ The Allied anxieties about getting pushed into sudden missile reductions are passing. NATO never likes change at first. They didn't want to deploy INF, now they don't want to trade INF for a 90% reduction in Soviet SS-20s. But they realize now that the Soviets are stalling and that we will maintain adequate nuclear deterrence, with or without missile reductions. And they begin to realize the danger of being confronted by Soviet missile forces. In fact, there is good support now in NATO for working on defenses against the shorter range Soviet missiles (Anti Tactical Ballistic Missile systems).

◦ We must stay on track with SDI and our arms control position. The underlying trends are in favor of success if we remain steady.

The Issue of Phased Deployment and The Correct Treaty Interpretation.

(1) I believe there is a good case for an evolutionary deployment of strategic defenses. The more the Soviets see us move toward a *deployed* SDI, the greater will be their interest in actually completing and implementing a reduction agreement (instead of just pretending they would agree to reduce). We have studied ways to move to a phased deployment of SDI. I would like to have you hear a briefing on this as soon as convenient.

(2) The decisions necessary to support a deployed system in the mid-1990's, especially with regard to the ABM Treaty interpretation, must be taken in 1987 to protect the strategic defense options of a future President. This need for earlier decision results from the success of our research effort.

Our research has advanced technology much faster than political roadblocks have been cleared away. Our SDI research is increasingly constrained by the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It is imperative that we can soon follow the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Fred C. Ikle³

³ Ikle signed the memorandum "Fred" above his typed signature.

159. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 21, 1986

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting on Interim Restraint, Tuesday November 25, 1986

Attached at *Tab I*² is the Meeting Memorandum for the National Security Planning Group Meeting scheduled for Tuesday, November 25, 1986. The Agenda is at *Tab A*.³

The Meeting Memorandum states that no decision is necessary *at the meeting*. We believe, however, that, in view of the short time until the overhaul of USS ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a decision will need to be made later the same day. The presentation of that decision, both in terms of timing and of rationale, is probably at least as important as the decision itself. We will provide you, well in advance of the meeting, some suggestions on presenting a possible approach, which we understand you have discussed with Al Keel, to decommission, but not to dismantle HAMILTON and USS WOODROW WILSON, rather than to overhaul them.

Recommendations

That you approve and forward the NSPG Meeting Memorandum provided at *Tab I*.⁴

That you use the talking points at *Tab II* in conducting the meeting.⁵
Bob Linhard concurs.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Sent for action.

² Printed as Document 162.

³ See footnote 1, Document 162.

⁴ Poindexter initialed his approval.

⁵ Poindexter initialed his approval.

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

National Security Planning Group Meeting

DRAFT TALKING POINTS

I. Introduction (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, on May 27 you decided that, in the future, the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the flawed, unratified and expired SALT II Treaty that has been continually violated by the Soviet Union.

— At that time you noted that, as we continue to press for agreement on deep reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and assuming no significant change in the Soviet strategic threat, the United States would continue to exercise utmost restraint by not deploying more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than did the Soviet Union.

— Finally you stated that, in late 1986, the United States would equip its 131st heavy bomber (a B-52) for cruise missile carriage, without undertaking compensating dismantlements under SALT II. At that time we would no longer be technically in observance of the SALT II sublimits.

— The 131st ALCM carrying bomber is currently scheduled to depart the conversion facility in mid-December, at which time, absent other action, we will pass out of technical observance of SALT II.

— In addition, two Poseidon submarines, identical to the two you elected (for cost effectiveness reasons) to dismantle in May, are due for overhaul this fiscal year. The overhauls begin on November 30 and next June.

— These facts make it appropriate for you to review the situation with your senior advisors.

— In view of the cost of the overhauls, the substantially reduced Defense Department funding levels finally approved by Congress for fiscal year 1987, the comparatively limited military utility of this older

⁶Secret. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, November 25, from 3 p.m. until 4 p.m.

system, and the politically sensitive concern among our European Allies that we not discard SALT II sublimits even as we put SALT II behind us, it may be prudent to consider whether these submarines should be retired instead of overhauled.

— Retirement could be accompanied by dismantling the submarines, thus continuing technical observance of SALT II, but appearing to alter your decision of May 27 not to undertake compensatory dismantlements.

— Alternatively, it could simply entail decommissioning *without* dismantlement, thus making clear you were not complying in any way with the obsolete SALT II Treaty, while making it equally clear you were exercising fiscal prudence and utmost restraint with regard to our strategic forces.

— Obviously, whatever course you elect will have implications with our allies, the Congress and the public.

— Before we turn to discussion of the specific courses open to us, I think it would be useful to have a review of the current status of the 131st bomber and of the Poseidon submarines involved. Secretary Weinberger?

II. Review of Status of 131st Bomber And of Submarine Overhauls (10 minutes)

NOTE: FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR IN THE COURSE OF SECDEF'S PRESENTATION. IF NOT, YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE THEM.

— Submarines involved are USS ALEXANDER HAMILTON (SSBN-617) (overhaul begins 30 November in Puget Sound, Washington) and USS WOODROW WILSON (SSBN-624) (overhaul begins mid-June 1987; shipyard not selected).

— Each overhaul will cost around 170 million dollars and will result in each submarine being out of service for over two years.

— Decommissioning (with or without dismantlement) costs about 20 million dollars per submarine (not dismantling saves about 2 million dollars).

III. Discussion (25 minutes)

— Thank you. I think it would be useful to hear from Secretary Shultz on the foreign policy implications of any action you might take and then from Admiral Crowe on the military implications. Secretary Shultz?

NOTE: Discussion should bring out:

(1) that our allies would oppose breaching the SALT II sub-limits (even though Soviets have continually breached SNDV numerical limit and other SALT II provisions),

(2) that we cannot accept selective Soviet adherence or unilateral US adherence,

(3) that the submarines involved carry the Poseidon missile, an older, relatively less accurate, low yield (ten 40 kt warheads per missile) system, not well suited to engaging the Soviet targets of greatest military interest, such as hardened silos.

IV. Timing Considerations (2 minutes)

— In the time we have remaining, I'd like to turn to timing and presentation considerations.

— Major NATO ministerial meetings will be held in December. Defense ministers meet as the NATO Defense Planning Committee on 4–5 December; foreign ministers hold a session of the North Atlantic Council on 11–12 December.

— Dave Abshire, our Ambassador to NATO, urges that deployment of the 131st ALCM carrying bomber not occur close to these major meetings.

— Since the overhaul of the first submarine we have been discussing begins in a week, we would need to act promptly to minimize the disruption should you elect not to continue with the planned overhaul.

— Finally, whatever your decision, we will require careful explanation of it to the public, Congress and allies.

— Perhaps we could now have thoughts on when and how this subject should be presented.

V. Discussion (15 minutes)

VI. Summary (3 minutes)

— Mr. President, we are obviously in agreement that, whatever course we take, we must make it clear we have put SALT II behind us.

— We are also in agreement that careful management of our allies, Congress and the public will be necessary whatever your decision.

— Ultimately the decision we face is twofold: how to use scarce resources most efficiently, and how to maximize the benefit of whatever decision you make.

— We are confident that, no matter what your decision, it will not eclipse the major strides we have been making toward moving beyond the era of SALT toward genuine arms reductions.

— Thank you all for coming.

160. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Watson) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, November 21, 1986

SUBJECT

Arms Control: Jim Hoagland article

Hoagland's article plays on the now popular theme that "we don't have our act together."² He has pulled together pieces of evidence to show our "disorganization." Hoagland's thesis is that no one has been willing or has had the courage to tell the President, since his March 1983 SDI speech, that eliminating all nuclear weapons is not a very practical idea. Whether one agrees or not with that thesis or that nuclear weapons should be eliminated, there is a confusion factor out there that resonates well given the current climate.

To be more precise, consistently since March 1983 the President has spoken of complete elimination. Briefing paper after briefing paper, NSDDs, and talking points for the President and Secretary Shultz have included points on complete elimination as a goal. The President has been beat up over the years on this from all sides—critics can't have it both ways. They can't criticize him for not being interested in arms control and disarmament, and then criticize him for making sweeping and revolutionary proposals.³ At the same time, we are faced with an internal dilemma: we are in a good rhetorical position, on the moral high ground with proposals to eliminate all nuclear weapons. People want it. It is appealing. As a matter of national strategy, and of military planning, a world without nuclear weapons would be very hard for the west to cope with. We made a fundamental decision in the late-1940's to keep conventional force levels low, and compensate with nuclear weapons. This decision carries through to today. It is most recently

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Sam Watson Files, Country File, OA/ID 19865-017, Arms Control—Other. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Gregg wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "MR VICE PRESIDENT A very good, & tough-minded paper from Sam. DG." Bush wrote below Gregg's note: "Good. somehow we must challenge all to think anew. Because it's gone one way since '40 does not mean we have to keep on with MAD for the next 40. GB"

² Attached but not printed is a copy of Jim Hoagland, "Bailing Out the President," *Washington Post*, November 21, 1986, p. A2.

³ Bush drew two short vertical lines in the right-hand margin beside this sentence and wrote: "good point."

enunciated in the NATO triad strategy (deter/fight with conventional battlefield forces, deliberate escalation to battlefield and theater nuclear weapons, if that doesn't stop a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack then escalation to strategic and intercontinental nuclear forces).

Now, back to the Hoagland article. Hoagland says the White House is blaming the press for misunderstanding the President's vision. No one misunderstands his vision. Few, though, understood how seriously he believed it. Our proposal for elimination of all nuclear weapons eventually, or even of all strategic offensive ballistic missiles in ten years will be tough for the Joint Chiefs to live with,⁴ and to adjust their strategy to. That it took people outside our government to tell him of the practical problems is troublesome.⁵ True, the Joint Chiefs (Admiral Bill Crowe) have recently gone public on this issue. But serious doubts over that goal have not been surfaced inside. Rather, all agencies have agreed with the talking papers, etc.⁶

I doubt a "czar" or a backchannel is needed. We have a NSC structure and a Chief of Staff. The problem is not here. The problem is that the agencies and departments don't trust each other. The stakes are too high. They insist on sending agency representatives with the President or George Shultz. The NSC staff, John Poindexter, and Bud have done a darn good job of pulling together the vastly disparate views in Washington. Reasonable and principled decisions made after discussion with the President are often taken as staff decisions, not as Presidential. Discipline by the agencies would help move the negotiations along.

What can be done to repair our image? Here at home many will fasten on the President. They'll push him hard to make a definitive speech on his arms control goals. Not a bad idea. But the President should not carry the entire burden. The departments and agencies need to pull together behind the President.⁷ A little head bashing might help.

Asia does not seem to be a problem, though Rowny can discuss his Asian consultations Monday afternoon. Europe needs some high level stroking. As you know, we've previously discussed a trip by you to give them the final word on the issue. We should give serious thought to a trip—the NSC staff had asked in September if you would after the November Washington summit.

⁴ Bush underlined "Our proposal for elimination of all nuclear weapons eventually, or even of all strategic offensive ballistic missiles in ten years will be tough for the Joint Chiefs to live with."

⁵ Bush underlined this sentence.

⁶ Bush underlined "serious doubts over that goal have not been surfaced inside. Rather, all agencies have agreed with the talking papers, etc."

⁷ Bush drew a short vertical line in the left-hand margin beside the last three sentences of this paragraph.

161. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 24, 1986

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting on Interim Restraint, Tuesday, November 25, 1986—Talking Points on Presentation

Attached at *Tab I* are some suggestions on presenting a possible approach, which we understand you have discussed with Al Keel, to decommission, but not to dismantle HAMILTON and USS WOODROW WILSON, rather than to overhaul them. Talking Points for explaining this approach are at *Tab II*.

Recommendations

That you approve the approach provided at *Tab I*.²

That you use the talking points at *Tab II* in explaining the approach during the NSPG.³

Will Tobey concurs. Steve Steiner and Sven Kraemer are on travel.

Tab I

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

Announcement and Presentation Strategy

Basic message to convey:

— We made a military/fiscal decision not to overhaul two older submarines in order to free funds for other uses.

— We did *not* make a SALT compliance decision; there is no SALT Treaty to comply with.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Cockell.

² Poindexter approved the recommendation.

³ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

⁴ Secret.

Sequence of Events:

- Tuesday 25 November—NSPG Meeting, Presidential decision
- Late Wednesday 26 November—Calls by Keel/Poindexter to key Congressional leaders
- Friday 28 November—Speakes make (or post) following announcement:

“After consulting with his senior advisors on Defense funding needs for the remainder of this fiscal year, the President has decided to retire rather than overhaul two Poseidon ballistic missile submarines, USS ALEXANDER HAMILTON (SSBN–617), previously planned for overhaul this month, and USS WOODROW WILSON (SSBN–624), previously scheduled for overhaul in June 1987. This decision reflects the President’s May 27, 1986 decision that current and future decisions reflecting our strategic forces must be based on overall U.S. military requirements and the threat we face. The retirements will free approximately one-quarter of a billion dollars to be applied to high priority personnel and readiness needs. Retirement of these 23-year old submarines is consistent with the long-standing U.S. policy to exercise utmost restraint in strategic forces. Since the submarines will not be dismantled incident to their retirement, this decision does not alter U.S. plans to pass out of technical observance of SALT II when the 131st ALCM-equipped B-52 deploys later this year.”

Additional details would be provided by DOD.

— Friday 12 December (NAC)—Secretary Shultz mention to his counterparts that 131st bomber will deploy in next few days, stressing that (1) we cannot technically observe a treaty the Soviets have violated, but (2) the President’s November decision to retire Poseidon submarines demonstrates our restraint and (3) the President remains committed to his May 27th pledge not to deploy more SNDVs or ballistic missile RVs than does the Soviet Union.

— Monday 15 December—DOD include in their routine press handout (the one that announces contracts, etc) that the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 has rejoined the operational forces.

Additional Considerations

Both in response to questions and in background discussions we will need to be consistent in dealing with two questions:

Since dismantlement costs so little more, why not dismantle these submarines?

We should *not* imply there is an operational reason or that we are preserving these ships as a hedge against recommissioning; we are not. Rather we should face the issue squarely and say that the President was unwilling to spend money to establish a dangerous precedent for the future by appearing to reverse the May 27 decision *not* to remain in

technical observance of SALT II. We should then rehearse all the reasons why selective compliance with parts of a treaty is bad.

Why did we dismantle the submarines in May, since the same logic applies?

We should state that dismantlement was part of those planned retirements and we elected not to disrupt the process by changing established plans. We are changing the process now to avoid the dangerous precedent noted above.

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

Announcement and Presentation Talking Points

— I would like to turn to how we might present an approach such as we have been discussing. I think we would need to convey two basic messages:

— We made a military/fiscal decision not to overhaul two older submarines in order to free funds for other uses.

— We did *not* make a SALT compliance decision; there is no SALT Treaty to comply with.

— I would foresee the following sequence of events:

— Late tomorrow Al Keel or I would make calls to key Congressional leaders explaining the decision and ensuring it was seen in context of the messages we want to convey.

— Friday Larry Speakes would make (or post) a brief announcement, relating this to the Defense Department need for supplemental funding for personnel and readiness. He would note that, since the submarines will not be dismantled incident to their retirement, this decision does not alter U.S. plans to pass out of technical observance of SALT II when the 131st ALCM-equipped B-52 deploys later this year. Additional questions would be referred to DOD.

— At the NAC on 12 December Secretary Shultz would mention to his counterparts that the 131st bomber will deploy in next few days, stressing that (1) we cannot technically observe a treaty the Soviets have violated, but (2) the President's November decision to retire Poseidon submarines demonstrates our restraint and (3) the President remains committed to his May 27th pledge not to deploy more SNDVs or ballistic missile RVs than does the Soviet Union.

⁵ Secret.

— On 15 December—or whatever the appropriate time is *after* the NAC—DOD would include in their routine daily press handout a statement that the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 has rejoined the operational forces.

— I think we will also need to ensure we are all consistent in dealing with two questions:

— Since dismantlement costs so little more than decommissioning, some will ask why do we not dismantle these submarines.

— We should *not* imply there is an operational reason or that we are preserving these ships as a hedge against recommissioning; we are not. Rather we should face the issue squarely and say that the President was unwilling to spend money to establish a dangerous precedent for the future by appearing to reverse the May 27 decision *not* to remain in technical observance of SALT II. We should then rehearse all the reasons why selective compliance with parts of a treaty is bad.

— We might then be asked, why we *did* dismantle the submarines in May, since the same logic applies?

— I think we should state that dismantlement was part of those planned retirements and we elected not to disrupt the process by changing established plans. We are changing the process now to avoid the dangerous precedent noted above.

162. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 24, 1986

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

I. PURPOSE

To review possible steps in a setting of major fiscal constraints and in furtherance of your policy of interim restraint on strategic offensive arms. Specifically, to consider whether two Poseidon ballistic missile submarines currently scheduled and funded for overhaul should instead be retired through decommissioning.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Prepared by Brooks and Kraemer. Copies were sent to Reagan and Bush. Attached at Tab A but not printed is the meeting agenda. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on November 25.

II. BACKGROUND

On May 27 you decided that, in the future, the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union. At that time you noted that, as we continue to press for agreement on deep reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and assuming no significant change in the Soviet strategic threat, the United States would continue to exercise utmost restraint by not deploying more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than did the Soviet Union. Finally you stated that, in late 1986, the United States would equip its 131st heavy bomber (a B-52) for cruise missile carriage, without undertaking compensating dismantlements under SALT II. At that time we would no longer be technically in observance of the SALT II sublimits.

The 131st ALCM carrying bomber is currently scheduled to depart the conversion facility in mid-December, at which time, absent other action, we will pass out of technical observance of SALT II. At this point we need to review the situation.

Two Poseidon submarines, identical to the two you elected for cost effectiveness reasons, to dismantle in May, are due for overhaul this fiscal year. The overhauls begin on November 30 and next June. (Overhaul of a third Poseidon submarine has already begun.) Each overhaul will cost around 170 million dollars and will result in each submarine being out of service for over two years. [4½ lines not declassified]

In view of the cost of the overhauls, the substantially reduced Defense Department funding levels finally approved by Congress for fiscal year 1987, the comparatively limited military utility of this older system, and the politically sensitive concern among our European Allies that we not discard SALT II sublimits even as we put SALT II behind us, it is prudent to consider whether these submarines should be retired instead of overhauled and which of two retirement approaches should be undertaken.

Retirement could either be accomplished by dismantling the submarines (thereby continuing technical observance of SALT II) or it could simply entail decommissioning without dismantlement. Either course would save approximately 150 million dollars per submarine or 300 million dollars for both. An advantage we see in decommissioning without dismantlement is that this would make it clear you were not complying in any way with the obsolete SALT II Treaty, while making it equally clear you were exercising fiscal prudence and utmost restraint with regard to our strategic forces.

The NSPG will provide you an opportunity to hear the views of your senior advisors on this subject. I do not expect unanimity. Secretary Shultz will doubtless stress the importance the Europeans place on continued observance of the SALT II sublimits and the value of remaining in technical observance of SALT II by both decommissioning a submarine *and* dismantling it according to SALT II procedures. In contrast, Secretary Weinberger will argue that retention of these submarines through their scheduled overhaul is necessary to avoid a walk back from your May 27 decision not to undertake compensating dismantlement, as a hedge against Soviet ABM programs, and to provide coverage of the overall target base. Others may consider that decommissioning without dismantlement might be the worst of both worlds, not the best. That is, they will suggest, such a step will not placate our European allies but will enrage the pro-defense members of Congress, who believed SALT II was finally behind us and who, like Senator McClure and Goldwater, have urged you to implement your May 27 decision as soon as possible.

No decisions are required at the meeting. Since, however, the first of the two submarines involved is scheduled to begin overhaul on November 30, we will be soliciting your decision immediately after the NSPG on whether to overhaul the two submarines in question.

III. *PARTICIPANTS*

List of participants is at *Tab B*.²

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

None

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS*

After a brief introduction by me, I will ask Secretary Weinberger to report the status of the 131st bomber, the impending submarine overhauls, and the overall fiscal 1987 strategic funding. I will then open the floor to general discussion. Before concluding the meeting I will also discuss the timing and content of any possible announcement of your decision on overhauling or decommissioning the submarines and on the deployment of the 131st bomber.

² Attached but not printed.

163. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 25, 1986, 10:51 a.m.

SUBJECT

NSPG on 131st Bomber

Re Bob's note,² on the SSBN issue we are potentially subject to criticism on several points:

— That it is unilateral, uncompensated force reduction. (Answer is that, without dismantlement, the boats remain accountable forces for which we would get credit in any subsequent negotiated reduction. We should not make this prominent part of rationale; but it answers the conservative argument.)

— That there is valid, continuing and significant military requirement for the boats. JCS are the key here. The argument is a weak one unless you accept all the premises which underlie our current targeting concepts. JSTPS will find a use for every warhead and still complain there aren't enough. Whether the two SSBNs fill a "real world" requirement is another question, however.

— That the warheads concerned are "cheap." They are "cheap" only to the extent that they fill a valid military requirement; so the outcome of this argument hinges on the outcome to the prior one.

— That we shouldn't give up SLBM warheads so long as SSBNs remain the most survivable TRIAD leg and we have problems with B-1 penetrability and ICBM survivability. However you put it, the issue is still one of military requirement for the particular type of capability which the warheads in question offer. This is the sort of issue that NSDD-250³ response should shed some light on. Meantime, it is a valid observation, but doesn't help much with the decision on these two boats.

In addition to Nitze, Perle feels strongly that the boats should be retained, and he claims that with the replacement of Watkins by Trost, the Navy now supports retention.

Bottom line is that Bob's advice is sound. I would not go for a decision today but use the NSPG to get exposure of all positions, then review the bidding and make a decision. If the President is going to go

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. No classification marking. Copies were sent to McDaniel, Linhard, and Keel.

² Not further identified.

³ See Document 152.

against military advice on this issue (assuming the Chiefs do, in fact, oppose decommissioning) it should be done with thoughtful consideration of how to present the decision so it does not contribute to the perception of White House/JCS dissension, or waffling on the interim restraint decision.

164. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, November 25, 1986, 3–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Interim Restraint (Deployment of the 131st ALCM-equipped B-52) (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

State:
Secretary George Shultz
Mr. Allen Holmes

Treasury:
Secretary James Baker

Defense:
Secretary Caspar Weinberger
Mr. Richard Perle

Justice:
Attorney General Edwin Meese

OMB:
Mr. James Miller

ACDA
Mr. Kenneth Adelman

CIA:
Mr. William Casey
Mr. Douglas George

JCS:
Admiral William J. Crowe
LTG John Moellering

White House:
Chief of Staff Regan
Dr. Alton J. Keel
Mr. Larry Speakes
Mr. Craig Fuller
Mr. William Cockell
Colonel Robert Linhard
Special Advisors
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Edward Rowny

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Prepared by Brooks. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets, except those indicating added material, are in the original text.

Minutes

The meeting opened at 3:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. The agenda was as shown at *Tab A*² except that Dr. Alton Keel substituted for VADM John Poindexter and conducted the meeting as Acting National Security Advisor.³ (U)

Dr. Keel opened the meeting using his prepared talking points.⁴ He then asked Secretary Weinberger to comment on the status of the 131st ALCM bomber. (U)

Weinberger: The 131st B-52 is finished and outside the hanger. It's ready to be deployed. We are on a regular schedule and the next bombers will be on schedule. If we delay beyond December 15 we will disrupt the program. With regard to dismantling SSBNs, planning for dismantling has not been done. We have already taken three of these submarines down, the Rayburn, Greene and Hale. We need time for dismantling the rest of them. We could not dismantle them before November or December 1987. We would have to move \$400 million to eliminate B-52 ALCM carriage, and \$5½ million to cut the capability. (S)

Crowe: Those are not the same numbers I have. The numbers are too high. (U)

Weinberger: It costs \$44 thousand per aircraft for a total of \$396 million. For 66 aircraft it would cost 5½ million. We can't dismantle Poseidons for about one year. So we need to get on and press forward. It's not a good idea to keep pushing on with SALT. The submarines are needed; they are not old enough to destroy. We don't want to stop ALCM outfitting of B-52 and B-1. Dave Abshire [U.S. Ambassador to NATO] argues that we should roll the 131st bomber before the 11th of December to avoid problems with the Allies. You will be told Congress wants you to stay in limits. Congress was about to order you to comply. But the people who are telling you to do this are like Wright and Pell who will never help us in any case. If we change our minds now and do not break out it will cost us \$5 million in backing out of the B-52 conversions. We can't do the submarines for a year. The submarines we did before are older; we are now dealing with a different type of submarine. [Note: Secretary Weinberger was in error.] There will always be something, an election or something else that will be used to tell you must stay within SALT. The Allies know about your decision; a greater time lag will make it worse not better. ALCMs make older B-52s better. We

² Attached but not printed.

³ At 12:05 p.m. that day, Reagan spoke to reporters in the Briefing Room, where he discussed preliminary findings of Meese's review of the National Security Council's role in Iran Contra, and announced the resignation of Poindexter and North. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pp. 1587)

⁴ Attached but not printed. See Tab II, Document 159.

don't have that many submarines and we need to hold on to the capability of the C-3 and C-4 missiles. There is no reason to hold the SALT yard stick up to ourselves. The Soviets have violated the Treaty and the Treaty has expired. We can't use this useless yard stick. We should deploy the systems that seem best to us. The Soviets did not raise the question of 131st bomber at the SCC. In conclusion, Mr. President, we should press forward. (S)

The President: I made the decision to dismantle the submarines last spring because of the age of the submarines. (C)

Weinberger: Yes. They were older submarines. We have submarines now that are different. We will have 194 B-52s with ALCM, even though they too are old. (S)

The President: If we fly B-52s that are that old we may have our dismantling by accident. (C)

Weinberger: The B-52Gs and B-52Hs are OK for some years. The balance between us and the Soviets is such that we can't give up useful capability. (S)

Keel: No one is advocating giving up B-52s. (C)

Weinberger: The point is that we can't go ahead and dismantle submarines. We need a year. Thus if we stay within SALT limits, we will have to give up B-52s. (S)

Keel: These are the same type of submarines we talked about this spring. We can save \$150 million by not overhauling them. Hamilton was one that at one time we were going to retire. We would not be in technical observance of SALT because of timing, but we would save money. Could we gain anything that way in Congress or the Alliance? (S)

Weinberger: We have not done any dismantlement planning. We cannot dismantle the submarines for a year. There is no gain to this approach. (S)

Shultz: I basically agree with Cap. SALT is behind us. Anything we do should be based on technical considerations. We need a plan to deal with the reactions, however. The sooner we deploy the 131st bomber, the better. I would rather have NATO shoot at us and have us defend our actions than have them go after a decision that you have not made. We are in an excellent position. The Allies are in no position to raise the issue. But they will anyhow. We need to be able to answer the issues they do raise. We need to have the plane come out as soon as possible. Submarines should be handled as the Navy sees fit. We need to be prepared to explain why the boat you didn't break up differs from the one that you did. We don't want to be in a position of *deliberately* going over a limit, but we want to do what's right militarily. We have Congressional and Allied problems and will get roughed up by the Soviet Union and by the Canadians [Note: refers to Canadian concern with the domestic

political problems of testing ALCM over Canada if the US moves beyond SALT II sublimits]. But we are in a good position to handle it. (S)

Weinberger: We are ginning up two to three pages of arguments. (U)

Shultz: You supply the arguments and we will put them out. (U)

The President: What about our friends over there facing elections? Are we in conformity with what the Soviets are doing on SALT II? I know we are not up to them on numbers. (S)

Weinberger: The Soviets have 70 SS-25s deployed. Each is a violation of the Treaty. That's much more than what we are doing. (S)

Crowe: In the past decisions were made based on a mix of politics, arms control and strategy. Now the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Naval Operations agree we should go ahead with overhauling submarines. We are below our DE [damage expectancy] requirements on soft targets. We will get at least six years from the submarines after overhaul. The B-52s are also needed. The submarines involved will be in overhaul for 30 months. Their military contribution will be a modest one once they come out, but it is important. Yes, we want to go forward. (S)

The President: We will have to make a statement. We should talk about restraint. SALT II was never ratified. We and the Soviets made certain agreements but the Soviets went beyond the limits they had agreed to. Yes this will put us above SALT II, but we are beyond the overages of SALT just as the Soviets are. We will match what they do. (S)

Weinberger: Our actions must be compared to what they have done with the SS-25s. We can provide analysis on this. (S)

Crowe: What we are doing is proportionate and appropriate. We clearly can do this. (C)

Miller: Are they really appropriate responses? (U)

Shultz: We made the SALT decision. Our modernization and our military plans have to press forward. We should avoid comparisons with SALT. (S)

The President: I never liked SALT. (C)

Crowe: Both the Navy and the Air Force want to go forward irrespective of SALT. Both looked at the issue with no SALT in mind. (C)

The President: We can say it's hypocritical to continue to talk about SALT when the Soviets abandoned it long ago. (C)

Crowe: The Soviets have increased well above the 2504 level of SALT II. (C)

Shultz: We will draft a statement. We will [have] problems with the Congress and the Allies and will need to work with Congress. (C)⁵

⁵ Brackets added by the editor.

The President: This will be an interesting fight with Congress. It was a Democratic Senate that refused to ratify the SALT II Treaty. (U)

Shultz: The best way is to argue that the United States has a strong modernization program and a new arms control proposal. Our strategy is working. Reykjavik got placed on the table stuff that we had never been able to put on the table before. (S)

Keel: We can put together the arguments. We need to inform the Allies and Congress. Senators Nunn and Warner and Congressmen Wright and Aspin have all asked for material on this subject. We need to go to them first. (C)

Shultz: It is important that we be able to explain how we differentiate the submarines of last May from the submarines of this November. (S)

Crowe: That isn't easy to explain. (U)

Weinberger: We can do so on a broad basis however. (U)

Crowe: We are not modernizing the Poseidon (C-3) missile; we are just keeping it in existence. It has less range, accuracy, etc. than we need. (C)

Weinberger: The argument is a platform with 16 tubes of deterrence. We have got all the material we need; we have got lots of material. [Note: Comment appears to be a *non sequitur* and may have been improperly recorded.] (S)

Adelman: We should not speak in terms of violating SALT II. We made a political commitment the Soviets were not willing to match. Now we are moving past that commitment. Arms control should look forward not backward. The Soviets assume that SALT II is over. A good line for us to take is that we "hope this is the last treaty they ever violate". (S)

Miller: Our concern must be national security. What does this do to Cap's [Weinberger] budget next year? What will happen to the DOD budget? (C)

Weinberger: We are not going to get any more by following the wishes of those who don't support us. There are no increased dollars to be gained by reversing the President's May decision. (U)

The President: If the submarines are not going to be able to come back on line for 30 months, do we have to deal with this issue now? (U)

Crowe: Yes we must make a decision now. (U)

Regan: We should get a decision paper now. It should include Congressional strategy. (C)

The President: Yes, meetings with Congress are needed. (U)

Keel: We will have a decision paper for you tomorrow. (U)

Weinberger: I will get our arguments over tonight. (U)

The President: Gorbachev opened a wide door to make public opinion aware of the actual facts on this subject. (U)

Dr. Keel then drew the meeting to a close.

165. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 26, 1986

SUBJECT

131st Bomber Game Plan

Attached at *Tab I*² is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval, based on yesterday's NSPG,³ to proceed with the deployment of the 131st bomber and providing a game plan for Congressional and Allied notification. The package includes talking points we will use with Congress and a suggested announcement DOD might make on Friday.⁴

To support Dave Abshire's desire to get the 131st bomber behind us as soon as possible, Congressional notification needs to be made today. Ron Sable is poised to begin that process as soon as we have Presidential approval. You should note, however, that the bomber will not actually return to its operations base until after several days of testing. We believe we should declare it operational now to avoid the conflict with the scheduled NATO meetings.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at *Tab I*.⁵

Ron Sable, Don Mahley, Steve Steiner and Will Tobey concur.⁶ Sven Kraemer is on travel.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Cockell.

² Printed as Document 166.

³ See Document 164.

⁴ November 28. Tabs A and B are printed as the attachments to Document 166.

⁵ Keel approved the recommendation.

⁶ Brooks concurred on behalf of Sable, Mahley, Steiner, and Tobey.

166. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

131st Bomber Game Plan

Issue

To approve the details of deploying the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber, thus passing out of technical observance of SALT II.

Facts

On May 27 you decided that, in the future, the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union. At that time you noted that, in late 1986, the United States would equip its 131st heavy bomber (a B-52) for cruise missile carriage, without undertaking compensating dismantlements under SALT II. At that time we would no longer be technically in observance of the SALT II sublimits.

Ambassador Abshire, United States ambassador to NATO, has urged the 131st bomber be deployed as soon as possible, well before scheduled NATO meetings of Defense Ministers (4–5 December) and Foreign Ministers (11–12 December).

Discussion

Two Poseidon submarines, identical to the two you elected for cost effectiveness reasons, to dismantle in May, are due for overhaul this fiscal year. At yesterday's NSPG it was the unanimous opinion of your national security advisors that these overhauls should proceed as scheduled and that the 131st bomber should be deployed without further delay and without any compensatory retirements.

When we treat the bomber as becoming operational is somewhat arbitrary. It will make its first flight on Friday, 27 November but will still have several days of testing before it returns to its operational base. To avoid conflict with impending NATO meetings, we believe Friday 27

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Prepared by Brooks. Keel crossed out "John M. Poindexter" in the sender line and wrote "Al Keel."

November is the appropriate date to consider the bomber's conversion complete. Prior to that date we believe it is essential to notify the Congressional leadership and our allies and to have pre-positioned press guidance. We recommend this *not* be portrayed as a major new decision. Instead we should suggest that: (1) you made a decision in May, (2) the logical consequences of that decision have now occurred, and (3) you and your top advisors conducted one final review and were unanimous in seeing no reason to alter your previous decision.

Once you have given your approval, we will take the following steps:

— NSC and White House Legislative Affairs will notify key Congressional leaders on Wednesday 26 November, using the talking points at *Tab A*.

— A message to our allies will be sent as soon as possible but no later than Thursday 27 November.

— The Department of Defense will make an announcement similar to that at *Tab B* on Friday 28 November.

Making the announcement from Defense rather than the White House reinforces the position that this is not a new decision but simply the implementation of the decision you made in May.

Recommendation

OK NO

— — That you approve the above approach to the deployment of the 131st bomber.²

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

Talking Points With Congressional Leaders

— The 131st B-52 bomber to be equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles will complete its conversion on Friday. By this action the United States will pass out of technical observance of SALT II.

² Reagan approved the recommendation. Keel wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Mr. President, Cap has suggested extensive (four page) announcement by White House in your name (see attached). We recommend a shorter, matter-of-fact statement by DOD (Tab B), with DOD backgrounding detail in Cap's statement. Al."

³Unclassified.

— On May 27, 1986 the President decided that current and future decisions reflecting our strategic forces must be based on overall U.S. military requirements and the threat we face, rather than on the flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

— He also noted at that time that, in late 1986, the United States would equip its 131st heavy bomber (a B–52) for cruise missile carriage, without undertaking compensating dismantlements under SALT II.

— The bomber has now completed conversion.

— The President and his senior national security advisors reviewed the situation on Tuesday.

— It was the unanimous view of the participants in that review that nothing has occurred since May to warrant reversing the President's decision.

— Thus the bomber will complete modifications on schedule this Friday. A brief DOD announcement will be made at that time.

— After a few days of additional testing, the bomber involved will return to its operational base at Carswell Air Force Base, in Texas.

Tab B

Draft Press Statement Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

Draft Press Statement

"The 131st B–52 bomber to be equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles completed its conversion today. By this action the United States passed out of technical observance of SALT II. This step reflects the President's May 27, 1986 decision that current and future decisions reflecting our strategic forces must be based on overall U.S. military requirements and the threat we face.

"After a few days of additional testing, the bomber involved will return to its operational base at Carswell Air Force Base, Texas."

⁴Unclassified.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁵

Washington, undated

On June 17, 1982, I addressed the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.⁶ I told this gathering a fundamental truth:

Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace when they are kept. Otherwise, we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war.

I have formally reported to the Congress several times on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. In my most recent report to Congress of December 23, 1985, I noted the scope of Soviet noncompliance with existing agreements:

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet non-compliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union had violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

I have made abundantly clear the seriousness of Soviet noncompliance:

It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future.

The United States has attempted to resolve our compliance concerns with the Soviet Union for many years through both the Standing Consultative Commission and senior diplomatic channels—but to no avail.

⁵Unclassified. Attached but not printed is a November 26 covering memorandum from Weinberger to Reagan: "To follow up on our meeting yesterday, I have enclosed a paper for your use in making a public statement associated with the deployment of the 131st ALCM bomber. On page 3 of the statement (1st paragraph) reference is made to a deployment date. I have given instructions for the aircraft to deploy to its operational base, effective November 28. There are also contingency questions and answers provided." The questions and answers were not attached. At the bottom of Weinberger's memorandum, Keel wrote: "Mr. President, Longer announcement statement recommended by Cap for White House release in your name. AI."

⁶Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 106.

I have even expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him last year in Geneva and again in October of this year in Reykjavik.

Despite these intensive efforts, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its non-compliance and has not provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues.

Thus, on May 27th, 1986, I announced that the United States would no longer unilaterally observe the SALT structure. This decision should not have taken anyone by surprise. In June 1985 I announced that we could not accept a double standard in which we observe arms control agreements and the Soviets do not. At that time I decided to go the extra mile by dismantling a Poseidon submarine in an effort to give the Soviets more time to correct their non-compliance and resolve our other compliance concerns and reverse their military buildup. Unfortunately, their violations and military buildup continued.

Of particular concern to me was the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with SALT and the ABM Treaty. These violations have involved some of the most important provisions of SALT II which were cited by proponents of SALT II as the principal reasons for supporting the agreement.

- the development and deployment of the SS-25 missile, a prohibited second new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM);
- extensive encryption of telemetry during test flights of strategic ballistic missiles;
- concealment of the association between missiles and their launchers during testing;
- exceeding the permitted number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs); and
- an issue related to the throw-weight of a certain SLBM.

It is important to note that prior to my May 27th decision, the Soviets tested what was probably a new follow-on heavy ICBM. Such a new heavy ICBM would be prohibited by SALT II.

Soviet SALT violations have been compounded by the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar in violation of the ABM Treaty and other ABM-related activities suggesting that the Soviet Union might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory, which is prohibited by the Treaty. Such an action, if left without a U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

On May 27th, I announced a new policy for the United States concerning interim restraint:

Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has

been undermined by Soviet noncompliance and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

I went on to note that, since the United States would retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines last summer, the United States would remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the United States deployed its 131st heavy bomber equipped for cruise missile carriage late in the year. I noted my intent to deploy that and future ALCM-carrying heavy bombers as an appropriate response to Soviet violations without dismantling additional systems as compensation to remain within SALT II limits. My decision is effective November 28 in that regard. I have given instructions for the aircraft to deploy to its operational base.

Since May 27th—during the period of U.S. technical observance of SALT II—the Soviet Union has failed to take any constructive steps. The activities which constituted violations of SALT have continued. The Soviets have also continued to violate the ABM Treaty and to increase their capability to deploy a prohibited nationwide ABM defense. Recent developments include the construction of additional radars which are capable of supporting an ABM system and the deployment of a surface-to-air missile which has tactical ABM capability and may have significant ABM capability. The continuation of the massive Soviet offensive and defensive programs, some of which clearly violate existing arms control treaties, create a significant threat which we must meet. In view of the foregoing, I have determined that our cruise missile deployment programs must continue and that we cannot dismantle additional missile submarines at this time.

The integration of the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) into the B-52 weapon system is one key element of our full modernization program. The program began for 99 B-52G models in 1981 and will conclude when the last B-52H model is modified in 1990.

You may recall that last May I chose to dismantle two of our older Poseidon submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted rather than overhaul and refuel them. This decision had long been planned and was based on military and economic circumstances at that time. Had I been convinced that refueling and retaining these two Poseidon submarines would have contributed significantly and to the national security, I would have directed that these two Poseidon submarines not be dismantled but overhauled and retained.

During the fiscal year ahead, we will be overhauling three Poseidon submarines. Funds for these overhauls were appropriated by Congress in the Contingency Resolution for Fiscal Year 1987. The U.S. can no longer afford to reduce its future nuclear deterrent force structure. Our SLBM submarines at sea have the least day-to-day vulnerability of our TRIAD forces. The weapons they carry are critical to our

national security as the Soviet target base continues to grow and ABM potential continues to grow. These prompt arriving weapons—which pose a threat against a wide variety of less hardened targets—are a key element of our deterrent force. For example, they are highly effective against the Soviet ABM threat. In addition, they represent a sizeable portion of the U.S. reserve force. For these militarily sound reasons, I have directed that these Poseidon submarines be overhauled, refueled and retained. Once overhauled, they will remain in the operational deterrent force until the mid to late 1990s.

The Future

As I noted in my May 27th statement, “The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continued Soviet offensive force growth.” We intend to continue the measured, yet absolutely vital, strategic modernization program we adopted in 1981. Full funding for this and for the SDI is essential if we are to protect our national security and to make progress in arms control agreements. I also announced in my May 27th statement—and affirm once again—that:

Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Noting this unilateral U.S. action, I called upon the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join the United States in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. Yet, no policy of interim restraint can be a substitute for the negotiation of meaningful, new agreements involving substantial reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces. At Reykjavik I put forward the most far-reaching, realistic arms control proposal in history. I proposed the 50% reduction of strategic nuclear forces and the total eliminating ballistic missiles of all ranges.

Those who argued that the Soviets could never be brought even to consider the concept of deep reductions have been proven wrong. Those who argued that we had to accept or rationalize Soviet SALT violations to improve the climate for arms control have also been proven wrong.

The United States intends to press for the realization of the agreements in principle achieved at Reykjavik. We cannot promise that this will be a speedy or easy process. Things of real value are not easily obtained. We will not accept a bad agreement or Soviet noncompliance. We will continue our SDI program and will not agree to limits proposed by the Soviet Union which are designed to cripple and kill our effort to find a more stable way to maintain deterrence. Our intent, quite simply, is to build a safer, more secure—and most fundamentally a free—world.

167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

CM-483-86

Washington, December 11, 1986

SUBJECT

ICBM Modernization (U)

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed the Air Force proposed response to NSDD-227² and offer the following comments for your consideration as you prepare your recommendations for the President.

2. (S) The Peacekeeper missile is a key element of the President's Strategic Modernization program, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently supported deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles. Deployed in the rail-garrison configuration, the second 50 Peacekeepers provide 500 survivable, prompt, and highly accurate weapons at a relatively low cost. In addition to being the least expensive Peacekeeper deployment option, the rail-garrison basing mode has several other advantages: it can meet an early IOC (1990); it does not suffer public interface problems because the missiles would be garrisoned on existing bases; it has potentially the highest survivability of any ICBM basing option considered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend ending study of the basing alternatives for the second 50 Peacekeepers and going to full scale³ development of the rail-garrison basing mode as soon as possible.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are clearly aware, however, that Congress has previously favored the Small ICBM over the Peacekeeper and that not to submit the Small ICBM as part of the ICBM modernization package would probably jeopardize authorization and funding of the second 50 Peacekeepers and perhaps the full scale development funding for the basing mode. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it is extremely important that the analytical data comparing Peacekeeper and Small ICBM cost-effectiveness be included in the final submission to Congress. Congressional decision-makers need the benefit of the comparative analysis contained in the Air Force proposal. For example, with life cycle costs of approximately 40 billion dollars for 500 missiles, the Small ICBM is extremely expensive. The same number of warheads deployed on rail-garrisoned Peacekeepers would be highly

¹Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 857, Subject File, 1986, ICBM modernization #37-45 (3). Secret. A stamped notation indicates Weinberger saw the memorandum on December 12.

²Not found. See Document 108.

³Weinberger underlined "scale development of the rail-garrison basing mode as."

survivable, but have a life cycle cost of only ten billion dollars. It should be noted that this cost differential of 30 billion dollars would require a diversion of funds from other critical strategic and conventional military programs unless Congress would be willing to provide funding through overguidance. Assuming Congress does decide to procure the Small ICBM, the JCS support this funding approach.

4. (S) It is the JCS position that Congress expects a Presidential decision no later than January, and the impact of delaying the decision would be to significantly degrade the chances of deploying the first full increment of Peacekeepers and further reduce chances of funding and deploying the second 50 missiles. These weapon systems have been sufficiently studied and delaying decisions now would only place ICBM modernization in jeopardy.

William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

168. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 15, 1986

SUBJECT

My meeting with the President on December 15, 1986 in the Oval Office

I met with the President in the Oval Office, with Al Keel present.

[Omitted here is material not related to National Security Policy.]

II. I urged that we view with great caution the latest Soviet “back channel” approach,² and particularly anything that limited our activity on strategic defense, such as adopting the restrictive interpretation of ICBM for five years. I pointed out that under a State Department

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appt. and Daily File, Box 10, Notes Set B, 1986, 3, #34–48. Secret. Drafted on December 19. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that Reagan met with Weinberger and Keel in the Oval Office on December 15 from 1:59 until 2:35 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In a personal diary entry for that day, Reagan wrote: “Met with Cap W. on plan for having 50 MX missiles on railroad cars. He & I agree we’d like to cancel the ‘Midget’ missile Cong. forced on us as a requirement for getting the MX.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 668)

² See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 9.

suggestion we would not even get any promise from the Soviets that they would agree to SDI deployment in ten years.

III. I gave him a brief preview of the MX-Small Missile briefing we would do for him the next day, and reported to him the JCS view that the Small Missile made no sense militarily, or economically.

IV. The President asked if I would give him a list of things we could do with the six billion dollars presently allocated to the Small Missile if we abandoned the Small Missile program.

V. I spoke to him about the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, and urged that we include five or six million dollars in that Supplemental to make up for cuts Congress had made in the SDI program. He agreed.

VI. I urged that we oppose Senator Dole's idea to bring the SALT II Treaty to a vote in the Senate, on the ground that the President's decision on SALT II should be considered final and that no good could come from a Senate debate (and, in fact, we might lose).

[Omitted here is material not related to National Security Policy.]

169. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Steven Steiner of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, December 15, 1986

SUBJECT

Secretary Weinberger's Briefing on SDI

At Tab I for your approval is a meeting memo to the President for Secretary Weinberger's briefing on early SDI deployments.

We are still trying to pin down a full hour on Wednesday² for this presentation and the needed discussion. We feel strongly that a full hour is needed, as the new DOD plan for beginning phased SDI deployments as early as 1993 raises a number of very difficult questions: military, budgetary, political and legal.

We aired some of these problems this afternoon at the prebrief with General Abrahamson, who was unable to come up with all of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December 1986 Chron File. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² December 17.

the answers. General Abrahamson undertook to flesh out some of these issues further with his staff, to talk them through with Secretary Weinberger in the morning and to discuss them further with us. Based on this additional airing of the issues, we will submit to you by Noon tomorrow a supplementary memo for the President designed to walk him through some of the thornier issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward to the President the meeting memo at Tab I.³

Tab I

**Memorandum From the President's Acting Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan⁴**

Washington, December 16, 1986

SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S BRIEFING ON SDI

I. PURPOSE

Secretary Weinberger wishes to present to you a relatively near term phased deployment plan on strategic defenses.

II. BACKGROUND

Secretary Weinberger now believes that in order to protect the SDI deployment options of future presidents, it is essential that you take certain key policy steps in that direction during your remaining two years in office. He will recommend that we begin to lay the groundwork now for phased deployments of increasingly effective strategic defenses, beginning with a deployment in 1993 of two layers: space-based kinetic kill vehicles designed to intercept Soviet ballistic missiles in their boost phase and a ground-based system which would intercept Soviet warheads in their late mid-course. The plan raises a number of difficult issues which need to be aired at the meeting, including: a) the military utility of these systems and the survivability of the space-based elements; b) the need for additional SDI funding, including an FY 87 supplemental; c) the necessity for an urgent enhancement of our space boost capability; and d) the need to move to the broader, legally correct,

³ Keel approved the recommendation.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. The note indicates that the briefing was to take place on December 17 at 11 a.m. in the White House Situation Room.

interpretation of the ABM Treaty within a year or two and to break out of the Treaty altogether when we begin deployments.

III. *PARTICIPANTS*

List at Tab A.⁵

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

No press plan.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS*

Secretary Weinberger will open with a policy presentation, SDIO Director Lt. Gen. Abrahamson will brief on the program changes which would be involved, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle will brief on the ABM Treaty implications and the plan's relationship to your arms control objectives. Discussion will follow.

⁵ Not attached.

170. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, December 15, 1986

SUBJECT

Your Talking Points for the December 16, 1986 NSC Meeting on ICBM Modernization

Enclosed at Tab I is a talking paper² for your use at Tuesday's NSC meeting on ICBM Modernization. The meeting memo is a Tab II³ and the agenda is at Tab III.⁴

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 252. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates Keel saw the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed are talking points prepared in the National Security Council.

³ Printed as Document 171.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a meeting agenda prepared in the National Security Council.

Your remarks should introduce the subject for the President, inform everyone that the meeting is a *decision* meeting, and briefly outline the context of the decisions. At the bottom of the talking paper are the issues of whether or not we ask for the second 50 Peacekeepers in FY 88 or FY 89 and the Iceland context issue. I did not put these into your opening remarks because I felt you might want to make these points at an appropriate time in the briefing.

You should also be aware that General Welch believes strongly that we should have as low-key an announcement as possible. He came by this view based on his meetings with Nunn and Aspin. There are no talking points on this issue because I'm confident that your judgment is better than mine on this. I agree with the low-key approach, but would disagree if there was a move to try and sit on the announcement for any length of time. That would ensure a leak and generate the appearance we are hiding our decision for some reason. Legally we must announce by 30 December 1986 or wait 90 days. Based on that I believe the 19th is the best date for an appropriate low-key announcement.

At the end of the meeting you have five minutes to sum up the results. The only point I would recommend that you make in your summary which may not arise naturally from the discussion is the need for discipline after the President has made his decision. We cannot afford to have elements of OSD up on the Hill lobbying against the SICBM or mobile missiles in general. Our consensus on this will be very fragile.

Bob Linhard, Bill Cockell and Ron Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab I for Tuesday's meeting.⁵

⁵ Keel approved the recommendation.

171. Memorandum From the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 15, 1986

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

I. PURPOSE

To review final recommendations from the Air Force and the Department of Defense on ICBM Modernization.

II. BACKGROUND

Our plan is to announce your decision on a new basing mode for the Peacekeeper missile and a proper development program for the small ICBM on 19 December 1986. This meeting will provide you with DOD's final recommendations and a briefing from the Air Force.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab C.²

IV. PRESS PLAN

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject, Secretary Weinberger will present a short briefing and discuss his recommendations. Your remarks (Tab A)³ would then follow. A short discussion will follow your remarks. Your final decision will be included in a National Security Decision Directive that will be prepared for your signature on December 17th.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 252. Secret. Prepared by Douglass. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Pearson initialed the memorandum on Keel's behalf. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for December 16 from 9:45 a.m. until 10:45 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. Attached at Tab B but not printed is the meeting agenda. A stamped notation indicates Regan saw the memorandum on December 16. Regan wrote his initials in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed are talking points prepared in the National Security Council.

172. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, December 16, 1986, 9:45–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

ICBM Modernization

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:

Sam Watson

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Allen Holmes

Treasury:

Secretary James Baker

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Edward C. Aldridge

Richard Godwin

General Larry D. Welch

General Charles A. May, Jr.

LtCol Michael Elliott

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese

Transportation:

Secretary Elizabeth Dole

OMB:

Director James Miller

Wayne Army

CIA:

Robert Gates

Lawrence Gershwin

JCS:

General P.X. Kelley

Lt. General John Moellering

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

Michael Mobbs

OSTP:

William R. Graham

White House:

Donald Regan

Alton Keel

William Ball

Dan Howard

David Chew

NSC:

William Cockell

Rod McDaniel

John Douglass

Ron Sable

Minutes

Dr. Keel introduced the subject and set the context of the meeting. He noted the long history of several Administrations' attempts to find an acceptable basing mode for the Peacekeeper missile and summarized the events leading to the Scowcroft Commission. He reminded the participants of the Scowcroft recommendations, to place 100 Peacekeepers in Minuteman silos, to start development of a small ICBM, to pursue arms control, and to seek a new survivable basing mode for the

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 252. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes.

Peacekeeper missile. Dr. Keel noted that the Scowcroft recommendations attracted bipartisan support at first, but that the support faded and the Congress limited deployment of the Peacekeeper to 50 missiles in Minuteman silos.

He further noted that the Secretary of Defense would be reporting during the meeting on the results of the basing work to date.

Changing the tone slightly, Dr. Keel noted the great importance of the Peacekeeper and the small ICBM to our arms control negotiations. He spoke of the need to maintain and demonstrate our resolve to protect our national security absent the arms control process and the need to develop leverage as we negotiate.

Dr. Keel concluded his introduction by speaking of the need to resolve the apparent contradictions between our arms control proposals to ban mobile missiles and our plans to develop mobile missiles for our deterrent force, and cautioned that we must not stop our development programs in anticipation of an arms control agreement.

Secretary Weinberger followed with a short introduction of the Garrison Rail Mobile basing concept and a discussion of the high cost of the small ICBM in relation to the Peacekeeper garrison rail mobile system.

General Welch then presented the briefing at Tab A.²

Secretary Shultz asked General Welch if garrison rail mobile basing required warning of a Soviet attack.

General Welch replied that it required about four hours of warning to be highly survivable.

Secretary Baker asked if garrison rail mobile basing was the same as the old racetrack system in the Carter Administration.

General Welch replied that it was not the same. He noted that the shallow trench system is more similar to the old racetrack system.

The President asked if there were problems in finding locations for the basing sites.

General Welch explained the Air Force's initial thinking about basing the small ICBM and noted that there had been few objections to the locations of the small ICBM bases. He also explained the garrison rail concept and further noted that these sites had not been discussed in detail or their planned locations announced.

The President noted that the small ICBM was strongly supported by members of Congress and that its continued development was essential to national security and to winning further support from the Democrats for the Peacekeeper garrison rail basing concept. He further

² Attached but not printed is a slide deck prepared in the Department of Defense.

remarked that he felt a low-key announcement of his decisions on ICBM Modernization was the best approach for now. He concluded his remarks by asking General Welch if the small ICBM would be deployed on the highways.

General Welch explained to the President that the small ICBM may use some local roads, but does not depend on them for survivability. General Welch also noted that we have been transporting Minuteman missiles to and from their silos over these same roads for years and have had few if any problems.

General Kelley joined the conversation by noting that the Peacekeeper basing is a political hostage to the small ICBM program on the Hill. He further noted, however, that the small ICBM has strong military value to the country and is fully supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He recommended to the President that we move forward with both the small ICBM and Peacekeeper garrison rail basing as soon as possible.

The President explained that he had approved a low-key announcement on Friday, the 19th of December.

Secretary Shultz responded to the President by noting his strong support for the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations and expressing his view that the recommended development of the small ICBM and Peacekeeper garrison rail basing was in full agreement with the Commission's recommendations. The Secretary noted that the two programs are linked and should be considered as a package. He expressed the view that some critics may try to exploit the idea that garrison basing depends on warning and noted the need to deal with that issue carefully and with tact. He explained to the President that having both programs in development would help with our objectives of getting an equitable arms control treaty. The Secretary further noted that in the past the Peacekeeper program had been plagued by less than full support from within the Department of Defense. He noted that the Chiefs did not support the plan for Closely Spaced Basing for Peacekeeper and asked for everyone to express their views on the present program so that the President would know where everyone stood. He closed by noting that we will need everyone's support this time or the program will not be approved by the Congress.

General Kelley replied that the Chiefs fully support the recommendation to proceed with development of both the small ICBM and the Peacekeeper garrison rail basing.

Secretary Weinberger noted that there were concerns within the Department of Defense over the cost of the small ICBM, but explained that the Department would fully support the President's decisions.

Attorney General Meese joined in by noting that Congressional support is the real issue. The Attorney General then recommended that the President invite the Congressional leadership down to the White

House to be briefed and to discuss the issue with the President. He noted that this would give them the feeling they are participating in this important decision and generate considerable goodwill.

Secretary Weinberger agreed that such a meeting was a good idea.

Dr. Keel explained to the President that General Welch and Dick Godwin had been prebriefing Congressional leaders and that their reaction had been favorable so far.

Director Adelman noted the need to support the small ICBM in such meetings.

Secretary Dole expressed the strong support of the Department of Transportation for garrison rail basing for the Peacekeeper missile.

Secretary Weinberger again raised the issue of whether or not we should try to have a leadership meeting before the Friday³ announcement.

The President asked if there was time to organize such a meeting.

Secretary Weinberger said that the DOD is ready to announce on Friday, but expressed concern that there was not enough time to organize a leadership meeting, especially since the Congress was not in session.

Dr. Keel noted the need to go ahead with the announcement on Friday and told the President that we would see what was possible with the Congress.

The President concluded the meeting with a humorous story and thanked everyone for their recommendations.⁴

³ December 19.

⁴ Reagan wrote in his personal diary for December 16: "An N.S.C. meeting on the Midget Missile. I'm afraid we're stuck with a \$40 Bil. program the military doesn't want & I don't want. Congress tied the small missile (mobile) to the 2nd 50 MX missiles. We couldn't have the MX's unless we agreed to go forward with the Midget." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 668)

173. Memorandum From Robert Einhorn of the Policy Planning Staff to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)¹

Washington, December 16, 1986

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Al Mense, SDIO Chief Scientist

During your meeting a few weeks ago with Dick Solomon,² we recognized that State didn't have enough information at its disposal to evaluate alternative solutions to the permitted ABM activities issue, and we agreed that it would be worthwhile to have direct contacts with SDIO on this matter. I have therefore set up a meeting with Al Mense, SDIO's Chief Scientist, which will take place in your office on Wednesday³ at 10:30 a.m. Jim Timbie and I plan to attend.

Before becoming Chief Scientist, Mense was an engineer at one of the aerospace companies. When I met him in mid-October (at an SDI conference in Talloires), he was brand new in his job and quite open with me. He struck me as gung-ho about SDI's technological prospects, but concerned about its political future. (SDI, he told me, has few friends in the USG, especially in the White House and JCS.)

When I asked about SDI's current schedule, he remarked that the "early 1990's" target date for a decision on whether to proceed with full-scale engineering development was politically driven and essentially arbitrary. Meeting that schedule with reduced funding required the SDIO to reduce the number of technological paths explored. From a strictly scientific point of view, he said, the program might benefit from a more relaxed pace. At the same time, he argued that, as long as funding was limited and the research schedule was compressed, SDIO would want the maximum flexibility (i.e., broad interpretation) to structure the program as cost-effectively as possible.

When setting up the appointment, I told Mense we were interested in an informal discussion about where we stood in the negotiations. I'm sure he'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on NST's current status.

It would be good to try to draw Mense into a discussion of how the SDI program might be served by an arms control regime. Institutionally, SDIO is no doubt very skeptical about such a proposition. But I think the case is strong that, given the political landscape and budgetary

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, November–December 1986. Secret.

² No minutes were found.

³ December 17.

realities, SDI would be healthier in 10 years with an agreement than without one.

— Much (but by no means all) of the Congressional opposition to SDI is based on the perception that it is incompatible with arms control (i.e., destroys the ABM Treaty, blocks offensive reductions). Agreement would remove this source of opposition and could even have the effect of “legitimizing” the program, insulating it to some extent from political pressures.

— Agreement on precisely what activities would be permitted for 10 years would allow program managers to plan more confidently. Without agreement, the political/legal environment those managers would have to operate in could be quite volatile.

— A clear boundary between permitted and prohibited activities could be beneficial to us. It would enable us, with confidence, to design experiments right up to that boundary. Without agreement, we might be barred by Congress from exploiting gray areas. Also, today we are not very worried about the Soviets taking advantage of ambiguities. In 10 years, we might want the Soviets to be constrained by clearer limits.

I don’t have a feel for whether Mense would see merit in these arguments. You may or may not want to lead the conversation in this direction. One way of doing so would be to solicit his views on prospects for SDI funding on the Hill—and to ask him whether he believes an agreement could help.

Whether or not you decide to cover this ground with Mense, you probably should seek his informal personal reactions to various ideas for drawing the boundary for ABM activities. In particular, you might mention the approach Sagdeev discussed with Rand recently (allowing the testing of sensors in space, but banning the testing of kill mechanisms that exceed agreed performance thresholds). Is the approach practical? Is the distinction between sensors and kill mechanisms workable? Could quantitative thresholds be devised that would be credible constraints without undercutting our research objectives? Could they be verified?

In helping to understand what numerical thresholds might make sense, it would be interesting to know whether there are internal quantitative guidelines that SDIO follows in determining that certain experiments (e.g., Delta 180) are treaty compliant.

In addition, you might want to ask him to provide his assessment of where the program currently stands.

Finally, it might be useful to suggest some sort of ongoing, informal contacts with SDIO, perhaps at the working level.

If you have some time before the meeting with Mense, perhaps it would be useful for some of us to discuss what we’d like to accomplish with him.

174. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, December 16, 1986

SUBJECT

Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missiles

We have reviewed the initial JCS report on eliminating ballistic missiles (*Tab B*).² The report primarily covers the assumptions and methodology JCS will use and establishes a January 31 date for submission for the final product. We believe January 31 to be realistic and acceptable.

After our meeting with you, we have revised the package to include five issues:

— Whether our arms control position requires modification to take into account [*1½ lines not declassified*].

— The JCS narrow interpretation of the guidance in NSDD–250³ not to increase risks to the United States, leading to the use of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] damage rather than considered military judgment.

— The need to reevaluate the guidance provided in NSDD–13 on the priority used to allocate weapons to the target base.

— The use of the FYDP as fiscal guidance.

— The contrast between [*2½ lines not declassified*] and our commitment with the Soviets to seek a solution to the problem of such missiles.

In view of both the intrinsic importance of the subject and the political importance of the President being seen as interested in the JCS recommendations, we believe a short synopsis of the initial report should be provided to the President. *Tab I*⁴ has been drafted for this purpose. Sending this to the President will also help prepare him for his December 19 meeting with the JCS, where we understand this report will be discussed. After that meeting we believe it would be appropriate for you to send a memorandum to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense making the points on SLCM and military judgment noted above. A suggested memorandum for this purpose is at *Tab II*;⁵ the memorandum to the President at *Tab I* seeks his approval for this course of action.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Michael Donley Files, Subject File, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS Meeting with the President 12/19/86. Top Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

² See footnote 3, Document 182.

³ See Document 152.

⁴ Printed as Document 182.

⁵ Not found attached.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at *Tab I* forwarding the initial JCS input and a synopsis thereof to the President for his review.⁶

That after Presidential review, and unless the December 19 meeting reveals any reason to reconsider, you sign the memorandum at *Tab II* approving the JCS approach but noting the specific concerns discussed above.⁷

Bill Cockell, John Douglass and Mike Donley concur.

⁶ Keel approved the recommendation.

⁷ Keel approved the recommendation.

**175. Memorandum From the President's Acting Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, December 16, 1986

SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S BRIEFING ON SDI

I. PURPOSE

Secretary Weinberger wishes to present to you a relatively near term phased deployment plan on strategic defenses.

II. BACKGROUND

Secretary Weinberger now believes that in order to protect the SDI deployment options of future presidents, it is essential that you take certain key policy steps in that direction during your remaining two years in office. He will recommend that we begin to lay the groundwork now for phased deployments of increasingly effective strategic defenses, beginning with a deployment in 1993 of two layers: space-based kinetic kill vehicles designed to intercept Soviet ballistic missiles in their boost phase and a ground-based system which would intercept Soviet warheads in their late mid-course. The plan raises a number of difficult issues which need to be aired at the meeting, including: a) the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December 1986 Chron File. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. A stamped notation at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it on December 17. Reagan wrote his initials in the top right-corner of the memorandum. The document notes that the briefing was scheduled for December 17 at 11 a.m. in the Situation Room.

military utility of these systems and the survivability of the space-based elements; b) the need for additional SDI funding, including an FY 87 supplemental; c) the necessity for an urgent enhancement of our space boost capability; and d) the need to move to the broader, legally correct, interpretation of the ABM Treaty within a year or two and to break out of the Treaty altogether when we begin deployments.

III. *PARTICIPANTS*

List at Tab A²

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

No press plan.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS*

Secretary Weinberger will open with a policy presentation, SDIO Director Lt. Gen. Abrahamson will brief on the program changes which would be involved, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle will brief on the ABM Treaty implications and the plan's relationship to your arms control objectives. Discussion will follow.

² Attached but not printed is a list of participants, which included: Reagan, Bush, Weinberger, Keel, Cockell, Perle, Abrahamson, and Linhard.

176. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Steven Steiner of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

December 17 SDI Briefing: Analysis of DOD Early Deployment Options

At Tab I² for your approval is an information memo to the President providing him with further detail, and some questions he might raise, concerning the DOD SDI briefing on December 17.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December 1986 Chron File. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. An unknown hand wrote "Dec 16?" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Steiner initialed for Cockell's concurrence.

² Printed as Document 177.

At Tab II³ are proposed talking points for your use in introducing the Secretary's briefing and in seeking clarification of some aspects of the DOD-proposed deployment plan which (to now) still remain unclear.

Admiral Cockell concurs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) That you send the memo at Tab I to the President.⁴
- 2) That you draw upon the points in Tab II at the briefing.⁵

³ Printed as Document 178.

⁴ Keel approved the recommendation.

⁵ Keel approved the recommendation.

177. Memorandum From the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

December 17 SDI Briefing: Analysis of DOD Early Deployment Options

At tomorrow's briefing, Secretary Weinberger will present an assessment that, if proper steps are taken now, the US could *begin deployment* of a two-layer defensive system in 1993. The Secretary will note that this system would not be capable of handling *all* threatening Soviet ballistic missiles. Rather, it would be a start towards that capability, and (in DOD's opinion) would be able to disrupt an attack by ballistic missiles sufficiently to add to deterrence. Later in the 1990's, the US could continue to add layers to the defense. In short, the system that we could start to deploy in 1993 would be the first step in a phased, incremental deployment of advanced defenses that would move us progressively closer to the ultimate level of effectiveness called for by your vision.

The Secretary's briefing does not describe in any detail the system that he would begin deploying in 1993. We understand that it would have two layers and take three to four years to fully deploy.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December 1986 Chron File. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

In order to protect this option, the Secretary will likely recommend the following actions:

1. *Endorse the idea of planning for a phased, incremental deployment of advanced defenses—with the first deployed system providing less than the capability needed for achievement of your full vision, but still providing a significant contribution to enhanced deterrence.* This concept is clearly the only way that we will be able to actually deploy advanced defenses, and its endorsement in general should pose no problem.

2. *Endorse and protect the option of beginning deployment of an initial advanced defensive system as described above by 1993.* This is a more difficult issue. It hinges on our degree of confidence of being able to implement this option, and the costs and benefits associated with it.

— The most immediate issue may be funding. Although the estimates are preliminary, the overall cost of this initial two-layer system could be \$40–50 billion through 1995. In addition, to protect the 1993 date, it may be required to add \$300 million as a supplemental to the FY87 budget, and some additional \$500 million to \$1 billion to the SDI related elements in the FY88 budget.

— A new, cost effective heavy-lift space launch booster will also be needed. The costs of this booster are included in the figures cited above, but to have the booster available to support this system, you would have to commit to such a project in the very near future.

— To permit the research to move quickly enough, you would also have to permit the SDI program to be restructured to make full use of the legally correct (broad) interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The exact timing of when this would have to be done is not clear, but it would likely have to be within the next 2–3 years.

3. *Endorse the immediate pursuit of a new, heavy-lift space booster.*

4. *Permit the SDI program to be restructured to make full use of the legally correct (broad) interpretation of the ABM Treaty.*

Finally, you may wish to discuss the opportunity costs of seeking sharp increases in SDI funding for near term deployment. We will need to make such a move at some point, preferably during your term. But for the survival of the program, we need to be certain of *winning* the next major SDI debate. You may wish to emphasize that you would not wish a move now toward development and deployment to have a detrimental effect on the prospects for continuing the research and testing which are essential to your central SDI objective of establishing comprehensive defenses. In other words, we need to make the right move at the right time.

178. Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

SDI BRIEFING: SUGGESTED TALKERS

— Mr. President, Secretary Weinberger and his staff have been working hard on various options for beginning a process of step by step SDI deployments, building toward the comprehensive defenses which you seek.

— They have come up with a suggested plan which merits your attention. Secretary Weinberger, along with Lt. Gen. Abrahamson and Assistant Secretary Perle, will present this to you today.

— Since any such plan will raise important questions concerning budget, political timing and ABM Treaty implications, we have set this up to allow ample time for discussion at the end of the briefing. (Give floor to Secretary Weinberger).

— (*At conclusion of briefing*) As I indicated, any such plan involves issues which we need to consider together. Mr. President, are there any areas which you would like to have spelled out in greater detail?

— Can you describe in more detail the system that you would begin deploying in 1993?

— How would you ensure the survivability of the space-based elements?

— Given my OMB experience, would you mind if I ask what are the fiscal requirements needed to protect this option. Do we need a supplemental in FY87? Can it fit within the \$500 M supplemental you have already requested? Do we need to increase our FY88 request for \$5.2 B? What are the total costs of this plan through 1995?

— With respect to the space lift requirement, what type of boost vehicle are you planning to use for this? Cost? Are you confident you can have this available when needed?

— If we were to press ahead, when would the President have to authorize a restructuring of the SDI program to make use of the legally correct interpretation—and what program activity would be the forcing mechanism?

— (*At conclusion of meeting*) Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for the briefing. (As appropriate) We look forward to working further with you and your staff on the questions which remain.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December 1986 Chron File. Secret; Sensitive.

**179. Memorandum From the President's Acting Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

ICBM Modernization Decisions

Issue

Modernizing the ICBM Forces

Facts

At yesterday's NSC meeting² your advisors were unanimous in recommending that future Peacekeeper deployments take place using the garrison rail mobile concept. All urged that we start development of this concept as soon as possible. There were a wide spectrum of opinions regarding the advisability of moving into full-scale development of the small ICBM, but all present seem to share the view that the Congress would not approve further Peacekeeper funding without the small ICBM. Secretary Weinberger expressed strong concerns regarding the cost of the small ICBM. Several advisors recommended that you meet with the key members of both parties to explain the high cost of the SICBM in relation to the austere budgets we now face. Your advisors all agreed that legal and strategic considerations require an announcement of your decision by 30 December 1986.

Discussion

As your Advisors stated in the meeting, there are both pros and cons associated with proceeding further with the small ICBM. The drawbacks are that it is expensive, and this is troublesome because it comes at a time of relative austerity. The small missile does, however, have military utility, as Generals Welch and Kelley pointed out, and as Secretary Shultz noted, it is seen by many to be a stabilizing factor in the international arena. The most compelling argument for the continuation of the SICBM, however, lies in the fact that it has become the symbol of bipartisan support for your entire Strategic Modernization Program. Killing it, or delaying it, or even adapting an administration

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 252. Top Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Douglass. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² See Document 172.

position of open hostility towards it, will almost certainly destroy the bipartisan support for Peacekeeper and the other important, but costly programs that support our policy of deterrence. Because of this political reality, most of your Advisors support moving the SICBM into full scale development.

In regards to where we go from here, Will Ball and I recommend that we invite key members of Congress that are available to come to the White House on Friday morning³ to hear the same briefing you heard today. Will and I will represent you at the meeting. Our announcement of your decision would come late Friday and would be appropriately low key. We would then have a formal bipartisan leadership briefing in January where you can explain your decisions in the context of the overall budget as Ed Meese and George Shultz recommend.

Finally, with your approval I will send the NSDD at Tab I⁴ to the appropriate agencies today for coordination. Our plan would be to have the NSDD ready for your signature by Thursday afternoon.

Recommendations

OK No

- | | | |
|---|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| — | — | That we place both the Peacekeeper garrison rail basing and the SICBM into full-scale development as soon as possible. ⁵ |
| — | — | That Cap and General Welch brief congressional members on your decision on Friday here at the White House and we make a low key announcement on Friday afternoon. ⁶ |
| — | — | That I distribute the draft NSDD at Tab I today for comment. ⁷ |

Will Ball concurs.

³ December 19.

⁴ Attached but not printed. For the final version, see Document 186.

⁵ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁶ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁷ Reagan initialed his approval.

180. Minutes of a Presidential Briefing¹

Washington, December 17, 1986, 11 a.m.–noon

SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S BRIEFING ON SDI

SUBJECT

DOD Briefing on SDI

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

DOD:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Under Secretary Richard Godwin
Assistant Secretary Richard N. Perle
SDIO Director Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson
Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

OMB:
Mr. L. Wayne Army

JCS:
Admiral William J. Crowe

OSTP:
Dr. William Graham

White House:
Mr. Donald T. Regan
Dr. Alton G. Keel, Jr.

NSC:
Adm. William A. Cockell
Col. Robert E. Linhard
Mr. Steven E. Steiner

MINUTES

Dr. Keel opened the meeting by informing the President that Secretary Weinberger and his staff had been working very hard in studying various SDI deployment options and wished to brief him on their conclusions thus far.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Cockell Files, Subject File, SDI (5). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Steiner. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. In a personal diary entry for December 17, Reagan wrote: "Cap W. came by for a meeting in the situation room. It was an update on S.D.I. and a proposal that we deploy partially about 1993—not the finished system but 2 stages that will give us a partial defense but more important valuable information for completing the system. There are some problems but I'm inclined to go forward with it." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 669)

Secretary Weinberger stated that the program has been proceeding very well and that we are far ahead of our expectations of a year or two ago. He said that we are at the point where it is essential to move to the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He said he wished to present to the President a proposal for phased SDI deployments which would work toward the President's objective of full population protection.

The Secretary said he remains negative toward deployment of traditional systems designed exclusively to protect military sites and communications centers. He recommends instead a first generation defense which will begin to build a structure which will protect whole continents. This first step will require only an extension and increase of what we are already able to do technologically.

The Secretary expressed his concern over the impact of keeping the U.S. within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He expressed the view that if we continue to limit the program in this way, it will slow our progress and discourage Congress from providing the needed funding. He applauded the President's rejection of Gorbachev's efforts in Iceland to kill SDI, and cautioned that this Soviet effort will continue to come back at us in various forms.

General Abrahamson then briefed the President on the proposed deployment plan. He emphasized that it is logical to move toward our final goal of comprehensive defenses incrementally. He said we can deploy a first generation defense as early as 1993 if we are provided with adequate resources. This would not include the most advanced technologies, such as lasers, which will not be ready until the second or third generation of deployments. He said that we should look at phased deployments in terms of how many incoming Soviet warheads they could destroy. The deployment of the maximum one hundred interceptors permitted by the ABM Treaty would not make sense, as this could destroy only tens of incoming warheads. We are looking instead for a starting point which will give us the ability to destroy hundreds and to interfere with the timing and attack plans of Soviet military planners. This would consist of both space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKKVs) and ground-based systems, both of which would constitute area defenses which could protect both population and military targets.

Our second generation deployments would build on this by adding to the thickness and robustness of these systems and providing some advanced technological capabilities. This would be designed to create sufficient uncertainty so that Soviet military planners could not be confident of achieving their objective through aggression.

The General stated that DOD had studied the question of even earlier deployments such as the light area defense over much of the U.S. which could be provided by the ERIS system (Exoatmospheric Reentry

Interceptor System). However, this would cost \$5–6B and would not make a major contribution. What we seek instead is a combination of space-based systems complemented by targeting satellites, along with a ground-based system such as ERIS.

The General said that in order to provide the needed space lift capability, DOD has plans to develop a large booster similar to that which the Soviets already have on the launch pad. He said that approximately 150,000 pounds of lift capability would be needed. *Dr. Graham* added that such a booster would give significant benefit to the civilian space program as well.

General Abrahamson continued by stating that DOD envisions a third generation of deployments occurring near the end of this century which would move us even closer toward the President's objectives. He stressed that the advantage of this phased approach would be that we could watch step-by-step how the Soviets try to counter our actions and in the end may not need to deploy systems as extensive as now envisioned. This may save money in the final analysis.

Assistant Secretary Perle then provided to the President the background of the ABM Treaty negotiations, emphasizing that the negotiations focused on the Soviet effort to limit our freedom to deploy defenses and the U.S. effort to cut offensive levels. As a result, with the Treaty limit of 100 interceptors the U.S. decided that this was too modest a defense to maintain.

Mr. Perle said that the interpretation of the Treaty given by our negotiators at that time remained in place until after the President began the SDI program. A rigorous review of the negotiating record then revealed that there was considerable U.S.-Soviet disagreement on what should be permitted in regard to systems based on "other physical principals" (OPP). The Soviet Union said it would not accept limits on future systems which could not then be defined. The Soviets clearly wanted to protect future technologies and therefore insisted on addressing this issue in an Agreed Statement rather than in the Treaty proper. Further, the language of Agreed Statement D contemplates the creation of future systems and stipulates that any limits on them in regard to research, development and testing would have to be discussed and agreed. He noted to the President that systems based on OPP are a major part of the U.S. program, and he stated that it would be extremely difficult to meet the timetable presented by General Abrahamson if we stayed within the restrictive Treaty interpretation.

Mr. Perle emphasized that staying within the restrictive interpretation would require us to withdraw from the Treaty in order to test. He expressed doubt that Congress would support such a move for testing systems that might not work out, as opposed to doing it for the purpose of *deploying* systems which have been successfully tested. A second

problem, which will grow more serious over time, is that in order to stay within the restrictive interpretation we have been instructing our program managers to degrade the performance of components which are being tested so that they are not capable of serving as components of ABM systems. Mr. Perle said this is placing a technical and a political burden on the program and is likely to incur increasing criticism in Congress as a "sharp practice" designed to evade the Treaty. It also slows the program and makes it more expensive.

Mr. Perle noted that State Department Legal Advisor Sofaer and DOD Counsel are in full agreement on the legally correct interpretation, and he expressed the view that we can withstand any challenge to it. He therefore urged that the President pave the way for his successor by moving to the legal interpretation during his Administration.

Secretary Weinberger said there are numerous additional things we could do short of deployment if we move to this interpretation. He said that abrogation of the ABM Treaty would not concern him as he feels the Treaty was a mistake, but this would admittedly cause political problems. The answer therefore is to move to the legal interpretation.

The Vice President asked if we would have to discuss this with the Soviets and get their agreement prior to making such a move. *Secretary Weinberger* responded that this is not necessary, as only the question of restrictions on OPP short of deployment would have to be discussed and agreed. He added that we need to make this move in 1988 if we are to carry through on the proposed deployment plan, and said the SDI program is already being slowed by the restrictive interpretation.

General Abrahamson said that political problems such as this, along with funding cuts, have slowed the program rather than technological barriers. He said the technologies which we would wish to deploy in the first generation do not involve high risk technically. He emphasized that we are planning tests now which make it urgent to move to the legal interpretation, as Congress would likely be pressing us on Treaty questions in regard to these tests.

Finally, General Abrahamson stressed that although his organization has been doing war-gaming on the value of partial defenses leading to full defenses, this is subject to additional thinking by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He indicated that while the military principles make sense, additional work is necessary. He believes, however, that if we can show Congress that we have come up with bridging steps toward out ultimate goals, this would gain additional support for the program.

Secretary Weinberger stressed that it was the Soviets who favored the weaker restrictions on OPP contained in Agreed Statement D, not the U.S. He said Soviet programs are proceeding apace in secrecy, and he offered the President another briefing in this regard.

The Secretary said DOD is seeking a supplemental in FY87 for some of the funds which have been cut. He stressed the program is now moving more rapidly than expected and that if the President approves the DOD proposal for early deployments, we can focus now on the first generation and on the launch vehicle while continuing our research.

The President asked how this plan would affect the commitments which he made at Reykjavik and earlier concerning the elimination of ballistic missiles and the concept of sharing the benefits of strategic defense, to show that we do not intend to achieve a first strike capability. *The Secretary* responded that the Soviets have rejected this. *The President* said that in regard to sharing the Soviets said that they did not believe that we would do this.

Dr. Keel noted that this plan raises a number of political, technical and arms control questions which could require adjusting our Reykjavik proposal. *Secretary Weinberger* responded that a rejected offer is one that has ended. *Assistant Secretary Perle* said we would not need to change our proposal and could simply move forward in the program as we wish as long as the Soviets have not agreed to that proposal. *Secretary Weinberger* stressed once again how fast the Soviets are working on their own strategic defenses.

The Vice President asked if we knew Soviet intentions concerning their heavy lift capability. *General Abrahamson* said that we have an idea of their capability, but are not sure of their intentions. He noted that the Soviet vehicle could be used for strategic defense systems, but their space-based strategic defense programs probably are not as far along as the Soviets would like, particularly due to their computer dependency. He said our own work on a vehicle would be a helpful signal which would still give us flexibility in arms control.

Mr. Godwin said our vehicle would involve an engineering jump. *General Abrahamson* agreed, but said it is achievable and that the real need is to bring down the cost.

Mr. Regan asked the additional cost of the DOD phased deployment plan and of the launch capability. *General Abrahamson* responded that the first phase deployments would cost an estimated \$40–50B. *Secretary Weinberger* noted this is the approximate cost of the small ICBM. *Mr. Regan* asked if this included the heavy launch vehicle and the General said that it does. *Secretary Weinberger* stressed that these costs would be stretched over a number of years.

Mr. Regan asked when these costs would go into the budget. *Secretary Weinberger* replied that 300 million of the 500 million dollar supplemental already requested by DOD would be applied to work on the heavy launch vehicle. He said we would not seek a further program increase in the two year budget for 1988–89. *General Abrahamson* noted we would change our priorities to stay within this budget. *Secretary Weinberger* said we need the SDI supplemental in any case. *General*

Abrahamson noted that during the last two years we have lost through cuts 26% and 32%, respectively, of our SDI budget, which will require us to restructure the program to get support at the levels required.

Admiral Crowe emphasized that the heavy lift capability will give the U.S. benefits well beyond SDI. *Mr. Regan* asked how long it would take to have the vehicle ready and whether it would be funded entirely by DOD. *General Abrahamson* said it would take seven years, and *Secretary Weinberger* said it would be part of the SDI budget. *Mr. Regan* asked whether we could share the project with NASA and the private sector. *The Secretary* said he would be delighted to try to do this, and noted that *Mr. Godwin* would work with the private sector. *Dr. Graham* added that the technologies involved in the shuttle program would give us this capability in less than seven years.

In closing the meeting, *Dr. Keel* stated that we would work with DOD to explore these issues further and would then be back in touch with the President.

181. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 17, 1986

SUBJECT

Meeting with Dr. Al Mense, Chief Scientist, SDIO

I met with Dr. Mense today to discuss the status of SDI research and the approach we might take to defining permitted and prohibited testing activities.

With respect to the latter, I outlined for him the Sagdeev proposal as reported by the RAND group. I explained that we would not want to amend the ABM Treaty but rather envisage a common understanding similar to the understanding reached in the SCC in 1978 on testing in an ABM mode. This common understanding would establish definitions and criteria regarding components capable of substituting for ABM components and testing of these components in an ABM mode. I said there are two key questions that need to be addressed: (1) What are the components we know might be created that are potentially capable of playing an ABM role? (2) What are the criteria which would define testing of these components in an ABM mode?

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, November-December 1986. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

Mense agreed with my suggestion that one such component would be a mirror in space, and a figure of merit for assessing a mirror could be its diameter. He suggested that we might, as an alternative, use a time-limited constraint, such as restricting mirrors in space within the next seven years to a diameter of less than 10 meters. We would need to avoid a limit on mirrors with a diameter of X meters *or equivalent capability*, because SDI would like to use smaller mirrors in conjunction to attain the capability of larger mirrors. Mense said another possible limit would be a restriction on the number of devices that could be tested simultaneously, such as a ban on testing more than three satellites at once.

For other technologies, Mense suggested the following figures of merit:

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

Regarding the status of research, Mense said we have now reached the technological capability such that we could deploy beginning in 1993 a space-based kinetic kill system capable of intercepting SS-18s in boost phase. Between 1993 and 1998, we could deploy on the order of 100–200 battle stations with 7–8 weapons each. A recent key advance was the finding in the Delta 180 experiment that ultraviolet light is far superior to infrared light in tracking a missile, because it can see the missile within its plume. The SDIO has also shifted its approach toward greater autonomy within individual systems and components, which simplifies interface problems and allows proliferation of satellites to enhance survivability. This increased autonomy is made possible by advances in small computers; Mense said SDI researchers have developed a lap-sized computer that is 5–10 times faster than a CRAY supercomputer, which is currently the fastest computer in the world. They have the weight of a kinetic kill device down to 10–20 pounds for the front end and 80–100 pounds for propulsion.

Mense also said that SDIO has compiled a complete list of their proposed space experiments for the next 10 years, which he would be willing to share with us (we've been unable to acquire such a list to date). He offered a briefing on that subject and on their ideas regarding a possible system architecture.

This was a very productive meeting. Dr. Mense talked freely and expressed a desire to be cooperative, asking only that we keep this and future meetings closely held. This was in distinct contrast to LTG Abrahamson's reluctance to discuss possible testing limits, based on the pressure he is under from OSD, and I'm not sure how long Mense can continue to cooperate. In any event, I plan to follow up with further discussions to the extent possible.

182. Memorandum From the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 18, 1986

SUBJECT

Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missiles

Issue

To respond to the initial input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles.

Facts

In NSDD-250² you tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense, to develop a plan which would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, should the Soviets prove willing to join us in such an agreement. The initial JCS report has been received; a final report will be provided by January 31, 1987. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss the subject at their planned December 19 meeting with you.

Discussion

The initial JCS report (*Tab B*)³ covers the assumptions and methodology to be used in the final report. The initial report makes no recommendations. A synopsis of the key points raised by the JCS is at *Tab A*.

Generally the JCS report is a sound approach to a complex issue. There are, however, several areas of possible concern:

- The JCS assume that the Soviets will retain their hard-target kill ICBMs as long as possible and imply this may present unacceptable risk. If the final analysis confirms such a risk, they should be tasked to provide recommendations on arms control measures which would result in a safer phasing of reductions.

- The JCS are using a narrow interpretation of your guidance in NSDD-250 not to increase risks to the United States. They have chosen to define this guidance as requiring the same quantitative damage be

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Michael Donley Files, Subject File, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS Meeting with the President 12/19/86. Top Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on December 19. Keel wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Mr. President, If time permits, you may want to glance at this before your meeting with Chiefs. AL."

² See Document 152.

³ Not found attached.

inflicted on the Soviet Union by our strategic offensive forces in the future as can be inflicted today. Using this criteria will invariably drive the analysis in the direction of numerical measures of merit, which, while important aides to judgment, must not replace the considered military judgment of the JCS. In particular it will be important to ensure that the analysis does not overlook the great improvements in deterrence which will be achieved by increasing Soviet uncertainty that they can conduct a successful attack.

— The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that, in a world without ballistic missiles, the guidance provided in NSDD–13 on the priority used to allocate weapons to the target base should be reevaluated. Their specific recommendations should be requested.

— The JCS elected to use levels for fiscal guidance which they (and we) believe to be overly optimistic. Alternate, more realistic levels are available; their use should be directed.

— The preliminary JCS report indicates a heavy dependence on sea-launched cruise missiles to replace some of the capability lost through the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. Given this, the final JCS report should consider what arms control restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles are advantageous as part of the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles. We are committed with the Soviets to seeking a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles; we must understand the relationship between such a solution and the military sufficiency of our strategic forces in a world without ballistic missiles.

Once you have reviewed the synopsis at *Tab A* and heard the JCS discussion on December 19, I will, in your name, provide a response to the JCS initial report, making the points above.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you review the synopsis at *Tab A* and skim the report at *Tab B*.⁴

_____ _____ That after you meet with the JCS, you authorize me to respond in your name, approving the initial report subject to the comments noted above.⁵

⁴ Reagan did not indicate a preference.

⁵ Reagan approved the recommendation. An unknown hand underlined “authorize me to respond in your name, approving the initial report subject to the comments noted above,” drew a box around the recommendation and Reagan’s initials, and drew an asterisk in the left-hand margin beside the box.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

SYNOPSIS OF JCS INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT

Basic Planning Assumptions. The basic purpose of the study is to determine those U.S. military forces which will permit a safe transition to a world without U.S. or Soviet ballistic missiles. The study makes the following general assumptions:

- U.S. arms control proposals presently on the table are accepted.
- The currently projected real growth in DOD spending actually occurs. The JCS note that this is overly optimistic and will bias the study toward favorable results.
- Soviet war aims remain unchanged. To meet their strategic nuclear war aims the Soviets will retain ICBMs as long as possible. In addition, by 1996 the Soviets could have 450–500 bombers, up to 1750 sea-launched cruise missiles, and improved air defense.
- Soviet military strategy (which views domination of the Eurasian land mass as central) will not change. Eliminating ballistic missiles will stress Soviet theater air forces; there is no good substitute for Soviet short range ballistic missiles.
- The Soviet target base (i.e. the targets the United States must hold at risk for deterrence) will be roughly comparable to today, with the exception of ICBMs.

United States National Strategy to 1996 and Beyond. The study assumes the U.S. National Security Strategy will remain as set forth in NSDD-238.⁷ The initial report summarizes and restates the importance of deterrence and the need to maintain strong military forces. It makes the following assumptions and observations:

- [less than 1 line not declassified] sea-launched cruise missiles on dedicated submarines will be included in the SIOP and in NATO nuclear strike plans.
- The alert rate of strategic forces will decrease as ICBMs (which have the highest alert rate) are eliminated.

⁶ Top Secret.

⁷ NSDD-238, "Basic National Security Strategy," September 2, 1986, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, pt. 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

— The reduction of the ballistic missile threat from the Soviet Union will largely offset our loss of ballistic missile capability. Some employment policies will need to change, however. [2½ lines not declassified]

— Escalation control options will be more difficult without ballistic missiles; stealthy systems may fill this gap.

— It will be essential to have a multiplicity of strategic/nuclear systems (different bombers, air-and sea-launched cruise missiles on a variety of platforms) to prevent the Soviets from being able to concentrate on a single aspect of our strategic forces.

— Large, pre-planned attack options (like today's SIOP) will still be required, although existing target allocation priorities should be reevaluated.

— The need to employ sea-launched cruise missiles near the USSR could alter naval strategy.

— Effective defensive systems will be essential and must themselves be defended.

— The essential NATO strategy will remain unchanged. Since NATO now relies on nuclear weapons to deter chemical attack, reduction in non-strategic nuclear forces could weaken such deterrence.

— The period of transition to a ballistic missile-free world will require especial care.

Analytical Methodology. The analysis will use military judgement along with mathematical modeling. To comply with instructions in NSDD-250 to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, the capability of forces proposed in the study will be measured against the capability of [less than 1 line not declassified] (today's strategic nuclear war plan). Specific analytical assumptions for strategic systems and non strategic nuclear forces are attached. A separate annex will deal with the contribution from highly compartmented programs such as stealth.

Completion. A baseline analysis will be submitted on 31 January. This will continue the current targeting policy set forth in NSDD-13 and will hold overall risk levels constant.⁸ Excursions and alternatives will be submitted subsequently if required.

⁸ NSDD-13, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," October 19, 1981, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

183. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, December 19, 1986, 11 a.m.–noon

JCS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

Regular JCS Quarterly Meeting with the President.

Topics Discussed: NSDI-250 re elimination of ballistic missiles; JCS Exercise Program

PARTICIPANTS

White House

The President

Alton G. Keel

Defense

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Deputy Secretary William H. Taft, IV

JCS

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman

Admiral Carlisle P. H. Trost

General Larry D. Welch

General Paul X. Kelley

General John A. Wickham

Major James T. Conway, USMC

NSC

Rodney B. McDaniel

Michael Donley

William Cockell

Robert E. Linhard

Other

Sam Watson (Office of the Vice President)

Minutes

The President opened the meeting at 11:10 a.m.

Admiral Crowe began by describing the tasks and schedule laid out in NSDD-250, indicating that a world without ballistic missiles would present genuine challenges. He first described how this might affect the balance of forces in Europe.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Michael Donley Files, Subject File, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS Meeting with President 12/19/86. Top Secret. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original. Prepared by Donley. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

The Chiefs believe the zero-zero INF proposal for Europe “has great promise,” and they are flexible on the manner in which this might be achieved. However, a continuing draw-down into SRINF/NSNF would present problems and would have to be worked very carefully with Europeans. [2½ lines not declassified] Verification would continue to be problematic in such a regime.

Admiral Crowe indicated that a 50 percent reduction of strategic forces in five years would not jeopardize our deterrent and would be strongly supported by our allies; although negotiation of sublimits, and verification, would be thorny.

However, moving to zero ballistic missiles within ten years is a completely different challenge, “requiring us to adjust our thinking in every area”: nuclear weapons policy; fiscal projections; Soviet force structure and strategy; new technology; and the role of NATO in 1996. The intel community has been very cooperative in these areas.

[3 lines not declassified] In response, “to maintain the same level of deterrence we have today,” we would need to do four things: strengthen and modernize the remaining deterrent forces (particularly air-breathing systems); improve conventional forces; examine new defenses; and continue to emphasize alliances.

Crowe turned to *General Welch*, who reviewed bomber penetration issues from both offensive and defensive perspectives. Welch began by noting that we [1½ lines not declassified] Welch indicated that, in a zero ballistic missile regime, to penetrate Soviet defenses would require more USSLCMs, ALCMs, and ATBs, costing “tens of billions” of dollars. Similarly, the JCS would expect the Soviet offense to evolve in a similar fashion, requiring greater US investment in defenses (aircraft, missiles, and tankers)—again on the order of “tens of billions” of dollars.

Admiral Crowe noted the naval picture would also change, and turned to ADM Trost. *Admiral Trost* noted that much of the Soviet SSN force is devoted to protecting bastions for SSBNs. Thus, a zero ballistic missile regime would free-up Soviet SSNs for other missions. Overall the Soviets still lack carrier-based air and at-sea sustaining capabilities; but their open-ocean capabilities and ability to influence crises would increase. Trost also focused on the dramatic changes expected in the ASW picture. The Soviets would operate SSGNs closer to the US, so US land-based air defenses and ASW alert rates “would go way up.” At the same time, Trost noted, the Soviet ASW problem would become easier as the US would have to concentrate SSGN/SLCM assets closer to Soviet coasts.

General Wickham then assessed the additional requirements for ground forces. He noted that the current modernization program for ground forces is only about 30 percent complete and that, to be completed with the ten-year transition period, it would have to be

accelerated at an estimated cost of \$180 billion. To emphasize the scope of the challenge, he noted that a single week of combat sustainability for the Army costs about \$14 billion and that our current sustainability of about 6 weeks in Europe needs to be doubled. In addition, the current Army force structure is short 200,000 billets. Wickham noted that the Allies may or may not have the will to join us in this effort—even though they can afford to do so; and that the Soviets may also choose to significantly strengthen their conventional capabilities.

General Kelley wrapped up the conventional force analysis in a regional context. Kelley noted that up to now, extended deterrence of the “nuclear umbrella” has “really depended on ballistic missiles.” Any premature shift away from ballistic missiles would stress both conventional capabilities and regional balances. He was not sure we could really implement the necessary force improvements outlined by the other Chiefs.

Admiral Crowe concluded by outlining the four things that would have to be done (as listed above) and stressing the downsides of cost and verification. The upsides, however, were that the Reykjavik proposals brought the arms control process into sharper focus, making US citizens and Allies look carefully and realistically at the prospect of real reductions in strategic weapons.

The President responded by assuring the Chiefs he is not “living in a dream world.” He noted the economic potential of the US and its Allies if there is a will to act; and suggested the Soviets have their own economic problems: “The Soviets fear an arms race which they would lose.” The President said he was focusing on ballistic missiles because of their destabilizing characteristics; but recognizes that none of this can come about without realistic verification.

The President noted that “at the end of Reykjavik we were talking ballistics, and they [the Soviets] brought up the idea of all nuclear weapons.” The President said he recently told Prime Minister Thatcher that before ballistic missiles are eliminated, we would have to begin serious negotiations on chemical and conventional reductions to ensure we wouldn’t be placed in an inferior position.

The President said we needed to go through with this so that the Soviets can see we are serious: “They have a choice—join us in arms reduction or lose an arms race. We will not allow Soviet superiority to develop.”

Secretary Weinberger asserted that the first step should be a 50 percent strategic missile reduction in five years; all the rest (zero ballistics, etc.) would pose problems. He noted that while we have the resources to move towards conventional emphasis, we don’t have the will (i.e., “We don’t have the votes”). But while the Soviets don’t have the overall

resources, they can make up for this through their determination to make further sacrifices. The President agreed that the conditions essential to the US proposal for the second five years had been changed due to the Soviet proposal.

There followed general discussion about how best to measure economic sacrifices (GNP, per capita GNP, etc.). *The President* noted that the Soviets have an increasingly cynical and restive population owing to their lower standard of living. *Admiral Crowe* picked up on this theme by noting the importance of high quality and motivated personnel for the armed forces.

Discussion of NSDD-250 concluded at 11:45 a.m.

JCS Exercise Program

Admiral Crowe stressed the importance of the worldwide exercise program as an adjunct to US foreign policy, strengthening war planning, Allied interoperability and politico-military relations. For a cost of \$400 million in FY85, the exercise program involved 45 countries and the joint training of 1.1 million US and 3.3 million Allied servicemen. Crowe summarized the exercise program for Northern and Central Europe, focusing on maritime/amphibious exercises in Norway and Denmark and the REFORGER and AUTUMN FORGE series.

General Wickham discussed the DISPLAY DETERMINATION series on NATO's Southern Flank and the BRIGHT STAR series in Northeast Africa. *General Kelley* followed with a brief outline of minor exercises with Gulf States, and then focused on major Pacific exercises, such as TEAM SPIRIT—which he described as the largest regularly scheduled exercise in the free world. *Admiral Trost* discussed the importance of the Central America exercise program to US foreign policy objectives of deterring Nicaragua, reassuring Honduras, and upgrading Honduran facilities and joint US-Honduran force readiness.

All the Chiefs noted the continuity and political importance attached to these exercises by friendly governments. (For example, the UNITAS, Latin American naval exercise series is 27 years old.) All stressed the important role played by Guard and Reserve forces in these exercises.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:01 p.m. No decisions were requested. No follow-up action is required.

184. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Watson) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, December 22, 1986

SUBJECT

Joint Chiefs Meeting with the President

All the Chiefs (Wickham, Kelley, Welch, Trost) and Chairman Bill Crowe met with the President Friday for an hour—their quarterly meeting.² They briefed him on their views of the Reykjavik proposals and their world wide exercise and training program. They ran out of time and couldn't cover the military's role in drug interdiction.

On *Reykjavik*: They agree with the INF zero/zero, 100/100 proposal but stressed the need to continue to reaffirm and argue our linkage to European and Atlantic defenses—the proposal does not erode it or its conceptual basis, MC 14/3. On *START* they readily agreed to 50%/5 years. They stressed their problems, intellectual and operational, with the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles in ten years. They never came out and directly told him they disagreed, but the message was there.³ They stressed the serious problems in restructuring forces and buying new types of weaponry if zero ballistic missiles were to result. *Air Force Chief Welch said the Soviets would focus all their air defenses against bombers; that it would be harder then to penetrate the Soviet Union for lack of defense suppression SLBMs, thus he would not recommend a monad of just bombers. CNO Trost emphasized the radically different nature of sea power, force projection and war at sea: more Sov subs freed up to attack the North Atlantic sea lanes, more Sov bombers to attack carrier battle groups, more SLCMs closer to CONUS. Army Chief Wickham emphasized the need to go to 6–8 weeks of ammo and war reserve stocks in Europe, 200,000 more men, \$180 billion in new equipment, and more European government effort. PX Kelley said countries are friendly to us now because we are the world's preeminent power because of our nuclear umbrella—we shouldn't lose it. The President responded that the Soviets couldn't keep*

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Don Gregg Files, Subject File, OA/ID 19852–018, Arms Control. Secret; Sensitive. Bush wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum on December 22.

² December 19. See Document 183.

³ Bush underlined "They never came out and directly told him they disagreed, but the message was there," and drew two vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this sentence and the preceding two sentences.

up if they tried; that *ballistic missiles are an uncivilized weapon that have changed the rules of war putting innocent civilians at risk*. He said that at the end of Reykjavik Gorbachev proposed the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and we had no time to respond before the meetings were over. He concluded saying it could be either an arms race or arms reductions with verification and no cheating. *Cap Weinberger said he agreed but added that 50%/5 years was good but that zero ballistic missiles/10 years caused him very major problems. Neither Cap nor the President mentioned SDI.*⁴

World-wide military training exercises: Everyone agreed they were very useful for us and for countries that participated. Many participants are now *reservists* practicing their war contingency plans. The Chiefs said that training exercises could continue as Congress had passed a law permitting Federal use of National Guard *without a governor's permission*.

⁴ Bush drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin beside the last three sentences of this paragraph.

185. Memorandum From Steven Steiner of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, December 23, 1986

SUBJECT

Follow-up on SDI Deployment Plan

Purpose. This memorandum provides our recommendations on how to follow-up on the SDI briefing provided to the President on December 17th by the Secretary of Defense.² Specifically:

- it summarizes the problems and issues that we feel must be resolved *before* the President can act on the recommendations made in that briefing;

- it lays out the gameplan we would recommend for resolving those issues;

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Steven Steiner Files, Arms Control File, 51—AC/SDI (12/1/1986–12/31/1986). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² See Document 180.

— and asks your approval to press ahead along the course suggested in this memorandum.

Background. As you indicated in closing the SDI briefing on December 17, the plan which was presented raises some important questions—military, political and legal—which will require further staff work prior to moving toward any Presidential decision. We recommend, therefore, that we follow up with the DOD staff along the lines below. We also see need, once we have consulted further with DOD, to surface the DOD briefing and its recommendations (including protecting the option of beginning deployment of SDI systems in 1993) in some form in the correct interagency forum. This is particularly important since other agencies are now aware that such a briefing was presented and since a more extensive version of such a deployment plan has been surfaced publicly in the Marshall Institute report (Jastrow, Seitz and company).³

The specific deployment plan recommended by DOD raises so many important military questions that we feel the risks of taking on the associated budget, political and legal issues at this time would clearly outweigh the potential benefits. Nonetheless, the presentation made by DOD is based on some key concepts which we would like to endorse. Our plan would be to work these concepts further with DOD while we continue to address the military questions raised by the proposed deployment plan. Building on these concepts, we would hope to produce a draft NSDD by mid-January which would lay out a strategy and philosophy for future deployments *without* committing at this time to specific systems to be deployed or the exact timing of deployments. We could use the draft NSDD as our vehicle for surfacing these ideas interagency, on a very senior level and close-hold basis.

Substantive Issues to be Resolved. If you approve, we would like to begin immediately to address the following key concepts and issues with DOD staff.

Phased Deployments. We are in basic agreement with DOD that we should seek to reach the President's ultimate goal of truly comprehensive defenses through incremental deployments which build upon each other and gradually expand our defensive capability. We would seek USG endorsement of this general concept, without committing in detail to what is to be deployed or when. We would seek, however, to protect the DOD-proposed beginning point of 1993, provided that:

(a) a deployment plan can be created which clearly moves us toward meeting the President's SDI criteria;

³ Reference is to George C. Marshall Institute, *Report of the Technical Panel on Missile Defense in the 1990s* (Washington: Marshall Institute, February 1987).

(b) the needed resources can be obtained; and

(c) the Soviets have not accepted existing US arms control offers which would require reshaping such a plan.

We would develop this concept in a manner designed to serve the President's objective of moving gradually toward deterrence based increasingly on the contribution of advanced defenses.

Heavy Lift-launch Vehicle. We likewise would seek endorsement of DOD's concept of beginning now to develop a national HLV capability. While we believe it substantively sound and politically prudent for *initial* work on this concept to be carried out within the SDI program, we are not convinced that it should remain exclusively within SDI since:

(a) as both Admiral Crowe and Dr. Graham indicated at the meeting, such a vehicle would have benefits for the nation far beyond SDI; and

(b) placing such a major project exclusively within SDI could undermine our ability to obtain the needed funding for the continued research essential to achieving the President's central SDI goal of global population protection.

We would endorse, however, General Abrahamson's suggestion that DOD/SDIO, working with NASA and the other members of the space community, begin now to develop a philosophy on roles and missions for an HLV. (See below for discussion of budget strategy.)

Survivability. This is clearly the weakest element of the specific plan put forward by DOD, and a potentially serious obstacle—politically and militarily—for any initial deployment proposal. It has long been one of the President's key SDI criteria and has been invaluable to us politically in putting behind us for now the debate over "whether" we should be pursuing SDI. To avoid reopening this debate, we need to ask DOD to present us with a full description of how they have been pursuing the survivability problem and what further work needs to be done to ensure that when the time comes we will be able to deal effectively with Congress on this issue.

Funding Strategy. Here, too, we have serious concerns and believe DOD needs to sort out its planning in further detail. Working in terms of specific budgets, we would seek to develop a USG strategy along these lines:

FY87 Supplemental. Secretary Weinberger stated at the December 17 meeting that \$300m of the \$500m already requested by DOD would be used for early work on the HLV. The NSC Staff supports this concept, but believes it has not been sufficiently developed to justify taking the serious political risk of seeking an SDI supplemental primarily for the HLV. We have proposed, therefore, that we support the full supplemental request but ask DOD to go back to their original justification, while protecting the HLV option.

FY88–89 Budgets. If DOD can modify its proposed deployment plan to meet the major military problems which have been raised (above all, survivability), we may need to ask reconsideration of their decision to move in this direction within our existing SDI projection for this two-year budget (\$5.2B and \$6.4B, respectively). This is based on our concern over the effect which the increased funding for FSED and eventual deployment could have on our ability to continue the key research designed to meet the President's central objectives. Further thought will also need to be given to our budget strategy for an HLV. In our view, until this concept has been worked out further, General Abrahamson should continue to pursue it quietly within existing SDI funding; we would endorse, for example, his concept of moving now to start a "horserace" competition for developing with private industry an architecture and roles/mission philosophy for such a vehicle.

FY90 and Beyond. Our planning here would depend in considerable detail on how well we have thrashed out in the meantime the various issues raised in early deployment studies. However, as indicated above, we should seek to protect the option of beginning to deploy as early as 1993 and should try to determine how to protect this in our budgetary planning and how it relates to possible arms reduction outcomes.

ABM Treaty. We need to press DOD now for the needed detail on how planned and putative SDI testing may bump against the restrictive interpretation, as this has not yet been established. Much more information is needed as well on the kind and pace of testing which would be required for various early deployment options, including the one proposed by DOD. Further technical and legal analysis is needed, for example, on the kind of integrated testing which would be needed to develop and ultimately deploy various space-based systems, including the SBKKVs which are crucial to the DOD plan.

Also, to use the legally correct interpretation (LCI, or broad interpretation) of the ABM Treaty to accomplish all that was suggested in the briefing to the President, one would have to rely (once again) on what may be viewed by some as a "sharp practice." DOD may be counting on taking the view that any integrated test that involved both traditional elements and elements that were based on other physical principles (OPP) would be considered totally a test of systems based on OPP and therefore only governed by Agreed Statement D of the Treaty. This approach may stretch the legally correct interpretation more than it can stand. This needs more staffing to ensure that it is fully understood by all concerned before the President considers any decision on the recommendations made in the DOD briefing.

Arms Reductions. Finally, as our thinking is developed further in the areas outlined above, we need to ensure that our present arms

reduction proposals and any future steps which we contemplate continue to be mutually reinforcing with our forward movement in SDI.

Next Steps. As we see it, our immediate objective should be an NSDD which provides the President's guidance in response to the recommendations made in the DOD briefing while addressing the issues identified above. To get there, the specific steps we would recommend are as follows.

a. Put the supplemental behind us while maintaining all of the President's options. (late-December)

b. Lay the necessary foundation with DOD so that our immediate questions are answered and they are prepared to present DOD's views in the appropriate interagency forum. (early January)

c. Draft the NSDD, vet it as appropriate in the interagency, and provide it for the President's review and approval. (mid-January)

Recommendation

That you approve our working promptly with DOD staff to develop further the concepts presented above and to develop a more detailed action plan by the end of December which would permit us to provide a draft NSDD to the President for his approval by mid-January.⁴

Concurrence: Cockell, Linhard, Donley, Tobey

⁴ Keel neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

186. National Security Decision Directive 252¹

Washington, December 24, 1986

ICBM MODERNIZATION (U)

NSDD–178, dated July 10, 1985, outlined the overall U.S. Strategic Modernization Program.² The ICBM portion of NSDD–178 directed the Department of Defense to be prepared to place a new basing mode for the Peacekeeper missile, and the small ICBM, into full-scale

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–094, NSDD 252. Top Secret. Keel distributed the Decision Directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Dole, Miller, Casey, Crowe, and Adelman under cover of a December 24 memorandum: "The President has signed the attached National Security Decision Directive on ICBM Modernization." (Ibid.)

² See Document 51.

development in FY 1987. NSDD-227 directed the DOD to consider certain configurations of the small ICBM as options for development.³ The following guidance supersedes the direction in NSDD-178 and NSDD-227 pertaining to ICBM modernization. (S)

The modernization program outlined in this directive will guide the continued high priority modernization of our land-based ICBM forces. (S)

1. *Peacekeeper*

The Department of Defense will immediately place the concept of garrison rail mobile basing into full-scale development. The rail garrison system will be designed to respond to changing threats and will have the capability to operate out of garrison or on extended deployments to satellite bases or in continuous movement. Research on all other basing modes except as prescribed by law will cease immediately. (TS)

The development of garrison rail mobile basing will be implemented at an appropriate pace in order to be able to support a production decision on future Peacekeeper deployments in FY 1989 in support of a 1991 IOC. This development program will include the construction and test deployment of a prototype train in FY 1987. The program will also include a special study on command, control, and communications requirements for garrison basing and for covert deployment of the trains in times of crisis. Based on this study, the Secretary of Defense shall make appropriate recommendations to me on procedures for deployment of the missile trains from garrison in times of crisis and will be submitted to me by 1 October 1987. (TS)

The operational concept of garrison rail mobile will involve the deployment of at least 50 Peacekeeper missiles on rail cars garrisoned on military reservations in times of peace. The cars will be designed to look like standard rail cars to the maximum extent possible. The design and appearance of these cars will be classified Top Secret. As design of the cars progresses, consideration will be given to ways the cars could be constructed to be functionally and observably different for other rail cars if a future arms control agreement so required. The DOD will develop an appropriate number of Secret satellite bases that can be used to support deployment in times of crisis. Further covert basing locations for crisis use will also be developed as appropriate and will be controlled on a strict need-to-know-Codeword basis. While the Soviets would be able to determine the size and peacetime configuration of the rail-mobile missile force, the ability to deploy the force quickly to covert sites in time of crisis would provide a high degree of survivability. (TS)

³ See Document 108.

The primary staffing of the locomotives will be through the use of appropriately cleared commercial railroad engineers and other crew members as required. Missile control and security will be maintained by Air Force crews. Backup staffing of locomotives will be by Air Force crews if required. (S)

The single point of contact with the rail industry is the Federal Railroad Administration. The Air Force, as executive agent for the DOD, working with the office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget, will execute an appropriate memorandum of agreement (MOA) to ensure that coordination of rail safety issues and contacts with the rail industry are coordinated in the overall best interests of the country. This MOA will be submitted to me for approval no later than 15 April 1987. (S)

The main operating base for Peacekeeper garrison rail mobile is to be at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming where we already have a sizeable investment in Peacekeeper support facilities, with garrisons based both there and at other Defense installations. After considering the alternatives for satisfying the military-related requirements, I have decided that the candidate installations for locating garrisons should include:

Barksdale AFB, LA	Little Rock AFB, AK
Blytheville AFB, AK	Malmstrom AFB, MT
Dyess AFB, TX	Minot AFB, ND
Fairchild AFB, WA	Whiteman AFB, MO
Grand Forks AFB, ND	Wurtsmith AFB, MI (S)

These candidates are to be evaluated over the coming months on a high priority basis in order to determine their suitability for this program. Accordingly, preparation of an environmental impact statement is to be immediately undertaken to aid in final selections and the development of appropriate mitigations. Comments from the affected governors, members of Congress and the public are to be sought.

2. *Small ICBM*

The DOD will immediately place the SICBM into full-scale development. The SICBM baseline configuration will be a small single warhead missile which will weigh approximately 37,000 pounds. The development of the SICBM will be implemented at a pace that will support an FY 1989 production decision and an initial operational capability (IOC) in 1992. (TS)

The SICBM will be designed to operate from a hard mobile launcher that will be deployed in two basing modes. The initial basing mode will be on Minuteman bases starting with Malmstrom AFB, Montana. After activation of the missiles in Montana, follow-on

systems will be deployed at Minuteman facilities at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming (with locations extending into Nebraska and Colorado) and Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. Later missiles should be deployed in random movement on large tracts of government land located in the Southwestern portion of the country. This could involve deployments at the Texas/New Mexico complex, consisting of Ft. Bliss, White Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Force Base, and at the Arizona complex, consisting of the Luke Air Force Range and Yuma Proving Ground. Holloman AFB and the Yuma Proving Ground would serve as the main operating base for the respective complexes. To aid in the making of site-specific decisions, a final environmental impact statement covering deployment and peacetime operations at each of the selected areas, and possible mitigation actions, is to be prepared with the benefit of public comment. (TS)

The DOD, working with the Air Force, will recommend to me an appropriate name for the SICBM by 1 April 1987. (S)

3. Future Requirements

In NSDD-178 I directed the DOD to recommend to me an appropriate program to attack relocatable targets in the Soviet Union using U.S. strategic forces. The DOD report that ensued noted the high survivability of mobile systems and recommended that it was premature to develop U.S. strategic systems capable of attacking relocatable targets in the Soviet Union. The DOD report recommended further study of the issue. (TS)

The results of that additional study should be reported to me by 1 December 1987. In that report the DOD should be prepared to recommend both changes to the U.S. offensive force structure where required, to deal with Soviet mobile targets and an appropriate mix of mobile forces for the U.S. ICBM force. This study should be based on the concept that the size of the deployment of future Peacekeeper missiles in garrison rail mobile basing and the size of the deployment of the SICBM will be decided at an appropriate time in FY 1989. There will also be a continuing need to review the relationship between these systems and our arms control objectives as the specific basing concepts are developed. The Department of State and the Department of Defense, working with other appropriate agencies, should assess this relationship, especially the implications of SICBM and garrison rail basing systems for verification of our START proposals. A preliminary report on this subject should be submitted to me by October 1, 1987. (TS)

Ronald Reagan

187. Memorandum From the President's Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe)¹

Washington, December 29, 1986

SUBJECT

Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missiles (U)

The President has reviewed the JCS initial progress report responding to NSDD–250 in which the President tasked the JCS, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan that would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.² The assumptions and methodology set forth in the initial report are approved. (S)

The President appreciates both the thorough report and the valuable discussion of the subject during his most recent meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³ Based on that report and discussion he wishes to emphasize the following points:

— The President notes the assumption in the initial report that the Soviets will retain their hard-target kill ICBMs as long as possible. If the year-by-year approach of the analysis indicates that unacceptable risk would therefore result in one or more of the transition years, recommendations should be provided on arms control measures which would result in a safer phasing of reductions. (S)

— The initial report notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in seeking to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, intend to measure the capability of forces proposed in the plan against those of SIOP Revision 6C. The adequacy of deterrence in a world without ballistic missiles may be far more a matter of subjective military judgment than of quantitative measures, especially since the most critical factors may not be analytically quantifiable using today's tools. For example, significant, but difficult to quantify, improvements in deterrence will be achieved by increasing Soviet uncertainty that they can conduct a successful attack. Thus the President reemphasizes the great value he will place on the personal military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in preparing such a plan for ballistic missile free world. (TS)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Michael Donley Files, Subject File, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS Meeting with the President 12/19/86. Top Secret.

² See Document 182.

³ See Document 183.

— The President notes the views of the Joints Chiefs of Staff that, in a world without ballistic missiles, the guidance provided in NSDD-13 on the priority used to allocate weapons to the target base should be reevaluated. The analysis the Joints Chiefs of Staff are conducting should provide an excellent basis for such a reevaluation. The President looks forward to receiving any recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject. (TS)

— The President took note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the fiscal guidance derived from the Fiscal Year 1988 FYDP is overly optimistic. He agrees and suggests the fiscal constraints approved for the Fiscal Year 1988–1989 Budget be used in lieu of the levels in the interim report. (C)

— The President notes that sea-launched cruise missiles figure heavily in the JCS approach to devising future strategic forces. The President agrees with the need for diversity in our strategic forces and, if sea-launched cruise missiles are to be retained, with their employment in a strategic role as part of a transition to a world without ballistic missiles. The President notes, however, that we have agreed with the Soviets to seek an arms control solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles. Additionally we should fully evaluate the contribution to our security that could be made by limiting Soviet capabilities in this same area. Thus, in devising future forces, the JCS should be explicit in noting what arms control constraints on sea-launched cruise missiles will or will not be advantageous from a military standpoint. (S)

The January 31, 1987 date for submission of the baseline plan is approved. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Alton G. Keel Jr.⁴

⁴ McDaniel signed the memorandum on Keel's behalf.

188. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)¹

Washington, January 2, 1987

SUBJECT

SDI

Bob Einhorn and I met with Dr. Allan Mense, the new SDI Chief Scientist. The following items are of interest.

— His thinking closely paralleled our own on how best to distinguish OPP devices that have BMD potential from those that do not. For directed energy systems, he would use power (a few megawatts) and optics diameter (about 5 meters). He confirmed that for continuous wave systems power is the figure of merit; for pulsed systems it is energy per pulse.

— [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

— Fast-burn boosters represent a major headache for SDI, and a ban on new types of missiles would be looked on with great favor. (Perhaps there is something we can do here, picking up on the Soviet proposed ban on new types, e.g. ban on new types first tested after 1990 (to protect M-X, D-S, and SICBM). The definition of new types might include specific impulse to distinguish fast burn from ordinary missiles).

— Survivability of space-based assets is also a major headache. They don't have a single solution, so they are pursuing a lot of possibilities like stealth, decoys, defense, proliferation, etc. No one of these will work, but the hope is that a combination will make attack on the system expensive.

— Their approach to mid-course dissemination is similar: any single sensor can be decoyed, but with enough sensors decoys become heavy and expensive. So they are pursuing radar, IR, and various active systems.

— The new heavy-lift systems research money in the DOD supplemental came about when Abrahamson told the President he needed this capability and the President said OK. Abrahamson and Weinberger

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1987. Secret. A stamped notation indicates Nitze saw the memorandum.

then put it in the supplemental request with no consultation with the Air Force, NASA, Commerce, etc. A scary procedure.

— He has some people working quantitatively on what the precise thresholds should be to distinguish BMD capable devices from devices not so capable. He welcomed further discussions in a few weeks when this work is further along.

189. Memorandum From Michael Donley of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, January 2, 1987

SUBJECT

Minutes of JCS meeting with the President

The JCS met with the President on December 19th to discuss progress in implementing NSDD-250, and the worldwide exercise program.

Further background material on NSDD-250 has been provided for your reference. NSDD-250 (at Tab E)² directed the JCS to evaluate the military implications of proposals to eliminate ballistic missiles by 1996. The final report is not expected until the end of January, but an Initial Progress Report (Tab D)³ was sent to the President December 5th. A summary of the Progress Report is at Tab C.⁴

In their meeting with the President the JCS went beyond the Progress Report and discussed their preliminary conclusions. Dr. Keel approved the memo to SecDef and CJCS (at Tab B)⁵ in response to the meeting and our analysis of the Progress Report.

The meeting Minutes were compiled and cross-checked against three sources: Donley notes; Linhard notes; and Admiral Crowe's script for the 12/19 briefing. While we recognize the awkwardness of your approving the Minutes of a meeting you did not attend, the National

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Michael Donley Files, Subject File, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS Meeting with President 12/19/86. Top Secret. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed. See Document 152.

³ Attached but not printed. See Document 182.

⁴ Attached but not printed. See Document 174.

⁵ Attached but not printed. See Document 187.

Security Advisor usually approves such Minutes prior to their transmittal to the Diarist.

Recommendation

That you approve the meeting Minutes at Tab A for signature by the Executive Secretary.⁶

Bill Cockell and Lint Brooks concur.

⁶ Carlucci approved the recommendation. The minutes are attached but not printed; see Document 183.

190. Memorandum From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, January 5, 1987

SUBJECT

JCS Meeting with the President

The minutes of the recent JCS meeting with the President which you requested this morning have been forwarded to you.² I would like to add several comments, from my perspective.

— The basic question the Chiefs were asked to answer by NSDD–250 was whether it is possible to maintain deterrence with strategic forces which (1) have been significantly reduced, i.e., the 5 year, 50% reduction plan; or (2) have had ballistic missiles eliminated from them, i.e., the 10 year Zero Ballistic Missiles (ZBM) plan.

— The Chiefs are reasonably comfortable with the 5 year plan. With regard to the 10 year plan, their objective at the meeting obviously was to sensitize the President to the likelihood that there will be a big price tag attached to the ZBM plan in terms of the costs to expand and improve our air-breathing strategic forces, to deploy extensive air defenses, and to build up conventional forces. The latter requirement is essentially an assertion at this point, with little analysis to back it up;

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 94, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum.

² See Document 189.

and it is potentially the weakest part of the Chiefs' argument. If they conclude that it is possible to maintain an adequate deterrent with a strategic force that lacks ballistic missiles, then that undercuts the argument that a ZBM world must also entail massive increases in conventional force expenditures. For this reason we want to keep the Chiefs focussed, in the first instance, on the issues of whether a reliable and sufficient strategic deterrent can be maintained without ballistic missiles; and the type of force structure which would be needed to accomplish this. Only if the answer is that an adequate deterrent *cannot* be maintained under those circumstances does it become pertinent to look at other, non-strategic measures necessary to provide a substitute for the strategic deterrent.

— All this begs the question of whether ZBM is within the realm of negotiability; or whether, given the major cost of building up the non-ballistic missile portion of our strategic forces, it is a goal which nets out to our advantage. The Chiefs' study will help shed light on these very complex issues and, in the process, provide an analytical framework within which we will be able to evaluate a number of other plausible arms control measures as well; hence its contribution will be a continuing one. At the same time, in our honest broker role, we want to influence the study in the direction of maximum balance, objectivity and realism; and that is what our comments on the Chiefs' interim report try to do.

191. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, January 12, 1987

SUBJECT

Some Post-Iceland Thoughts on Technology and Strategic Doctrine

Several months ago when the President came home from Iceland there was a certain feeling of euphoria that stemmed from the notion that it might really be possible to reach an agreement to eliminate all ballistic missiles over a 10 year period. At that time, I started this memo

¹ Source: Reagan Library, W Files, Box WI-18, Special Programs 1987. Top Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum. Carlucci wrote in the upper right-hand margin of the memorandum: "John—Interesting. Thanks. FC."

for John Poindexter to make sure John was aware of how long it takes technology to mature in certain areas.

John is gone now, and I was sidetracked by all the effort I had to put into the Peacekeeper/SICBM issue. Reading it again in retrospect, however, it still strikes me as a useful paper on what is or is not achievable in 10 years. I submit it to you as background for the more detailed work done by the JCS.

First, it is important to remember how incredibly short 10 years is in terms of our ability to develop new systems and new doctrines. It took us eight years to develop and deploy SENIOR TREND and that was an extraordinary achievement. The ATB will take us 15 years if we're lucky (they already want to extend it a year). The ATF will end up taking that long or more, the Tomahawk and the ALCM about 12 years. It's important that this lead-time not be underestimated—especially if we have the idea in mind of balancing existing Soviet defenses against future U.S. achievements in the technologies of air power. Thus, it may be important that we move now to initiate certain thrusts of technology or turn up the heat where work has already been started. Air defense is an example of an area where we are very short of resources.

Looking first at the offense, one of the aspects of a world without ballistic missiles that strikes me as most pervasive is that we will need to move away from the spasm type analysis that we have become used to and move towards a concept that is more like the analysis of tactical warfare than the present way we look at strategic capabilities. We will have to judge the capabilities of both sides in manner more like we did in the 40's and 50's than like we do today. Bombers will have to be measured realistically in terms of their contribution to air power than in terms of the loads they can carry in a single strike.

Since bombers can be reused, and the technologies of speed, Stealth and deception can reasonably be expected to keep pace with opposing technologies of defense, the concept of the strategic air battle will once more become more pertinent. We will need to develop systems that allow the air commanders to interact in such a way that the offense can be controlled to counter the moves of the defense. Old notions of mass and saturation will again become important and the days of preplanned missions carried out like some rigid computer game will end. Clearly, this will generate the need for systems like airborne command posts, long range fighters that might be manned or unmanned to engage the enemy on his own turf, hypersonic systems, massive use of mechanical, optic, and electronic Stealth, and a new generation of C³ and intelligence systems that operate at speeds and logic densities comparable with those required for SDI.

Armament will also have to be updated. Changes here will range from simple projects already under way like SRAM II to newer cruise

missiles that have longer range and better accuracies. Longer range brings forth the concept of stand-off systems like cruise missile carriers and, of course, intercontinental cruise missiles or indeed whole bombers loaded with cruise missiles and SRAMs that have no humans on board (such a notion is well within the present state of the art).

On the defense side of the equation, changes will be equally dramatic, perhaps more so for us than the Soviets. We will have to rapidly adjust our priorities. In FY 1986 we spent over \$3B on SDI and only \$50M on air defense. This will have to change and change quickly.

We will have to immediately start a program to produce a modern interceptor aircraft and a much more robust development for systems that can get to the Soviet bombers fast—like hypervelocity unmanned interceptors. Our sensor technology programs will have to be expanded and improved, and new radars or other types of sensors deployed as soon as possible, to offset the inevitable Soviet transition towards Stealth. Many of these changes are evolutionary and some are underway already, but they will not be reflected in hardware by 1996.

Because of the time required to deploy these new technologies, the world we would most probably see in 1996 if we went to zero ballistic missiles would not be a revolutionary change from what we know today.

We could have a significantly bigger force of B-1B Bombers and we could have a large number of stealthy cruise missiles and SRAM II's, but we would not have many more ATBs than we now have planned without significantly increasing the risk in the ATB program. Further, given the problems with the B-1B, it's not at all clear that the extra B-1Bs we could buy would be a good investment.

On the defense side, our defenses would be primarily based on an early deployment of SDI options and existing systems like the F-15E and the AWACS. A new interceptor would not be available by 1996 nor will the ATF be available in numbers. If we decided to develop a new ground-to-air missile, it would probably be in its operational test phase by the mid-1990's.

The bottom line of all of this is that technology can lead us toward stability in a world without ballistic missiles, but not within 10 years. We would probably need more like 15 to 20 years to make our strong suit felt in a way that would approach the stability that now emanates from the triad that exists on both sides of the strategic balance.

Bill Cockell concurs.²

² Cockell wrote below this sentence: "The Chiefs' reply to NSDD-250 should shed light on many of these, & other important areas."

192. Memorandum From William Tobey and Steven Steiner of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, January 14, 1987

SUBJECT

SDI Briefing

Tomorrow you will receive a briefing on OSD's concept for near-term deployment of strategic defenses. In brief, the architecture would consist of: a geosynchronous orbit surveillance and tracking system; 210 lower orbit kinetic kill vehicle satellites (each carrying 10 interceptors); up to 1000 ground-based exoatmospheric interceptors (ERIS); and 40 ground-based space probes for tracking and guidance. The system would provide a thin global defense, countering the attack from boost through terminal phases. Deployments could begin as early as 1993.

The OSD estimate of cost, provided as a "rough order of magnitude only," is \$32 to \$60 billion for FY 1988–2001.

OSD maintains that in order to protect the U.S. option to pursue these deployments, decisions on two key policy questions must be made now: (1) the concept of phased deployments must be endorsed; and (2) SDIO must be authorized to restructure its programs to take advantage of the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty (LCI). Both recommendations are contained in a draft NSDD forwarded to you at Tab II. Both recommendations raise thorny policy problems.

Phased Deployments. In abstract, the concept of a phased deployment of strategic defenses makes perfect sense. No strategic defense system could be deployed in full, at once. However, the draft NSDD attempts to displace our current criteria for judging the effectiveness of a potential strategic defense system (military effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and survivability) with the new criterion of "whether the deployment in question is an integral part of the whole system, onto which other phases of deployment could be added to secure the whole system we want, namely a system that protects people and continents not just silos or other targets."

The President's criteria have shielded us from criticism that SDI is destabilizing and have thus largely put to rest the question of whether the program should be pursued at all. To abandon the criteria directed

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Tobey Files, Subject File, Early Deployment (4 of 8). Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum. Carlucci initialed the top of the memorandum.

in NSDD 172² could reopen fundamental questions about the wisdom of the program itself. However, Secretary Weinberger has never been particularly enthusiastic about the criteria, especially cost-effectiveness, and he has a limited but legitimate point.

NSDD 172 states that "Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while other systems can discourage such a counter effort."

SecDef is worried that this criterion will be used to defeat any deployment plan because initial deployments have fixed costs which do not fit easily into a comparison of the cost of a particular interceptor vs. the cost of an additional warhead. This concern is legitimate. At the same time, abandoning this criterion would leave us open to the criticism that we will encourage the Soviets to proliferate their offensive forces.

We have brokered an uneasy compromise on this issue by stressing that this is much more than an economic concept and deleting references to specific cost comparisons in policy guidance. At some point this may need to be elaborated in a new NSDD, but we believe it would severely damage the SDI program politically to drop the criterion completely. We will need to avoid a simple comparison of U.S. interceptor vs. Soviet warhead costs.

SecDef has been less critical of the survivability criterion, but we have serious questions about whether or not it can be met by the concept proposed by OSD. After the briefing to the President,³ OSD was tasked to do several papers, including one on how the system would be made survivable. Their response (on half a page) was disappointing.⁴ Essentially, it argues that the 32 Soviet GALOSH ABM interceptors and 20 Soviet ASAT interceptors pose only a limited threat to the 220 satellite defense constellation which DOD proposes. Unfortunately, the paper leaves unanalyzed the threat posed by ballistic missiles (which can be reprogrammed to attack targets in orbit), GALOSH reloads (a concern raised in our compliance report),⁵ and even the large laser at

² See Document 40.

³ See Document 180.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Not further identified.

Sary Shagan (which has been judged to have possible ASAT capability). These systems could be used to punch a hole in our defense as it orbits the earth. More work will have to be done by OSD on this question.

Legally Correct Interpretation (LCI). The LCI would permit development and testing of ABM systems and components that are not fixed, ground-based, if they are based on “other physical principles,” e.g. lasers. The SDI program was originally structured to permit it to achieve its objectives while remaining consistent with a more narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This being the case, in October 1985, while reserving the right to move to the LCI, the President directed that the program not be restructured toward the boundaries of the ABM Treaty which the U.S. could legally observe.

The President also directed that OSD provide quarterly reports, beginning in December 1985, of financial and program costs associated with adhering to the more narrow interpretation of the Treaty. To date, we have received no reports.

OSD is now arguing that to preserve the option of a near-term deployment, we must move immediately to the LCI. They state that this is necessary to begin planning for proof of principle experiments for the following systems: Space-based Kinetic Kill Vehicles (FY 88 experiment); Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (FY 92 experiment); Airborne Optical System (FY 89 experiment); and Long Wave Infra-red Probe (FY 92 experiment).

We must balance the threat of incurring Congressional intervention against the cost of delaying these experiments. Senator Levin and others intend to attempt to legislate compliance with the narrow interpretation. We are now in a position to rebut such an attempt by arguing that: we are currently in compliance with the narrow interpretation; there is no practical problem to be addressed; and intervention by Congress will damage our leverage in Geneva.

Moreover, even if we successfully resist attempts to legislate the narrow interpretation, restructuring would create obvious targets for opponents to cut out of the budget. We would highlight for opponents of SDI those cuts that would hurt us most.

This is not to say that we should not move to the LCI, but rather means that there will be real costs and risks which must be weighed against the costs of continuing to adhere to the more restrictive interpretation.

Conclusion. We believe the OSD concept is constructive, but much work remains to be done. A premature decision on SecDef’s specific deployment proposals could dangerously undermine support for SDI. Nonetheless, endorsement of the general concept of phased deployments may add impetus and focus to the program. At Tab I is a list of

questions you may wish to bear in mind during the briefing.⁶ Clearly, the issue first must be discussed further in the interagency community. We stand by our plan submitted to you on January 12, recommending interagency follow-up and eventually a new NSDD.⁷

Bob Linhard and Bill Cockell concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you bear in mind the questions at Tab I during the briefing.⁸

Tab I

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, January 15, 1987

Questions for SDI Briefing

— *General*: We clearly want to move as fast as possible in SDI, but we need to make sure we put together our proposed first moves in a way that will get us what we need. Above all, are we sure that the plan you present gives the needed attention to the criteria which the President established for judging our research: military effectiveness, cost effectiveness and survivability?

— *Survivability*: I am worried about survivability. From your briefing and from the short paper you gave us, it does not appear that this has been adequately addressed. We are certain to get hard questions from Congress on the survivability of our proposed space-based platforms. Do we have good answers yet?

— *Cost Effectiveness*: Also, we will need to show, at least in military terms, how this meets the President's criterion of cost effectiveness. At a minimum, we will need to make the best case to Congress that we are not providing clear incentives to the Soviets to proliferate their offense.

— *Legally Correct Interpretation* (LCI): Another potentially major problem is the treaty question. We haven't received the quarterly reports which the President requested in 1985, when he made his decision on the legally correct interpretation. Since some of the experiments

⁶ Not found.

⁷ Tobey initialed for Linhard and Cockell.

⁸ Carlucci neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

⁹ Secret.

required for this system would not occur until FY 1992, why is it necessary to move to LCI now?

— *Budget*: I have some questions on the budgetary aspects too. How much would it cost if the President wants to move on this proposal? Over how many years? When would we need increases over the amounts we had planned to request for SDI, and how much? What would the effect be on the need to continue other basic research to reach the President's objective of fully comprehensive defenses?

— *Heavy Lift-launch Vehicle (HLV)*: While I agree on the need for an HLV and that it should be within SDI initially, it is not clear to me how long it should stay within the SDI program. At what point would we have funding requirements that could affect adversely other parts of the SDI program? Should we perhaps be working toward eventually pursuing it as a separate program, led by DOD but in cooperation with NASA and the private sector?

— *Political Management*: As you know, this is a very delicate issue, and one which requires further work with other agencies before the President has what he needs to make a decision. We therefore need to cut off the press play on this issue and work it quietly within the Administration so that all of the President's options are fully protected.

Tab II

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹⁰

Washington, January 13, 1987

SUBJECT

The ABM Treaty and the Phased Deployment of Strategic Defenses (U)

(S) On 17 December, I briefed the President on the phased deployment of strategic defenses. During that briefing I emphasized that our research has advanced technology much faster than political roadblocks have been cleared away. Consequently, I recommended that we adopt the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty and that we take steps to preserve the ability to deploy the first phase of advanced strategic defenses, including beginning work on a heavy lift launch vehicle.

¹⁰ Secret.

(S) My view is that the decisions necessary to support a deployed system in the mid-1990's, especially with regard to the ABM Treaty, must be taken in early 1987. In the immediate future, we are facing several deadlines concerning reports to Congress that can only be properly prepared if the decisions I am recommending have been taken. Of particular importance in this regard are our annual report on compliance of SDI with the ABM Treaty which is due by 1 February; a report on the effect of ABM Treaty interpretation also due by 1 February; and a report on near-term strategic defense deployment options due by 15 March. I believe it is imperative that we have the necessary Presidential guidance correcting our programmatic approach under the ABM Treaty and clarifying our commitment to a phased deployment of strategic defenses prior to submitting these reports.

(S) I understand that a briefing to you of the information presented to the President has been scheduled for 15 January. In the interest of streamlining the consideration of these vital issues and the translation of decisions arising therefrom into an NSDD, I am enclosing a draft of such a document for your review. Following your receipt of this briefing I suggest that you and I get together with Secretary Shultz immediately upon his return to expedite addressal of these issues by the President. I believe all this is particularly timely now, in view of all the testimony we have to give, and our conversations on this subject the past few days.

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹¹

Washington, undated

DRAFT NSDD ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

I. Introduction

The basic objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) since the program was initiated are still appropriate. SDI is a research, development and testing program examining means to provide an effective defense of the United States and its allies from attack by nuclear ballistic

¹¹ Secret.

missiles. The defenses we seek in the long term would be sufficiently effective to make such missiles impotent and obsolete.

The SDI program continues to be carried out consistent with all U.S. arms control obligations. The program has made major progress in examining the technical approaches to strategic defense. In fact, the program has reached the point where we must now begin to identify specific means to achieve our long term goal for strategic defense. Such means must also support our approach to strategic arms control with the Soviet Union.

II. SDI and the ABM Treaty

In October 1985 I directed that, as a matter of policy, SDI be carried out consistent with an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that is more restrictive than is our legal right under the Treaty. It was clear at that time that the United States retained the right to alter that policy in order to restructure the SDI program towards the boundaries of the Treaty which the United States could observe.

I am now concerned about the effect of that unilateral restraint on the fruits of SDI. The schedule of the program, its cost, and the breadth of technical approaches being examined in it are all becoming increasingly affected by that restraint. We must have an affordable SDI program to examine all of the technologies relevant to effective defense, and the program must be able to support a decision concerning possible deployment of defenses in a timely manner. In particular, this nation's security demands that we not be in a position where the Soviet Union could consider unilateral deployment of large scale, very effective strategic defenses before the United States reached that point.

In order to avoid such a situation, we cannot continue to abide by a more restrictive standard under the ABM Treaty than is our legal obligation. Accordingly, I am directing that the Secretary of Defense may restructure the SDI program. This restructured program is to remain consistent with our legal obligations under the ABM Treaty, but, as the Secretary deems appropriate, it may take advantage of all our legal rights under that Treaty.

III. Phased Deployment of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

Defenses that would render nuclear ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete cannot be put into service quickly. It is important to begin now to identify a specific, practical approach to deployment of defenses, an approach that would maintain—and seek to enhance—stability during the phasing in of defenses. Our criterion for judging whether a particular defense would be appropriate for deployment is whether the deployment is part of the entire system, that is whether the deployment

in question is an integral part of the whole system, onto which other phases of deployment could be added to secure the whole system we want, namely a system that protects people and continents not just silos or other targets.

Phased deployment is an integral part of the whole system would provide some benefits of defense before the remaining phases would become available. In addition, phased deployment can support the United States arms control objectives. If we were to demonstrate a resolve to proceed with a phased deployment of defenses, we would create additional incentive for the Soviet Union to join us in a cooperative transition to defenses. In particular, the Soviets would be more likely to reduce strategic offensive arms substantially, given such a U.S. decision. Phased deployment would also provide an active defense deployment program, which would give the United States a viable response to possible Soviet arms control breakout. Such a U.S. posture would significantly enhance deterrence against such Soviet breakout.

The Secretary of Defense should consider such a phased deployment of defenses against nuclear ballistic missiles to be the baseline for planning a possible future deployment. The Secretary should define a specific phased deployment program and should provide that program for my consideration by March 31, 1987.

IV. Other Policy Considerations

The redirection of the SDI program to take advantage of all our rights under legally correct construction of the ABM Treaty, and to use phased deployment as a planning baseline for possible future defense deployment does not alter our arms control objectives of seeking to facilitate deployment of the full strategic defense system and of seeking Soviet agreement to a cooperative transition to defenses. Similarly, it also does not change our commitment to consult with our allies as we proceed with deployment.

193. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Gates to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, January 15, 1987

SUBJECT

NSDD 250 Response [*portion markings not declassified*]

1. Attached is the DCI response to a key portion of the tasking that was posed to the Director in NSDD 250; that portion of the tasking that dealt with verification matters and was assigned to Ken Adelman and the DCI jointly as well as the response to the question on the collection resources necessary for monitoring, will follow at a later date. [*portion markings not declassified*]

2. The attached paper has been reviewed by senior CIA and DIA officials. It has also been provided on a "close-hold" basis to senior officers on the Joint Staff in an effort to assist them in their efforts to prepare the detailed responses that are required of the JCS by NSDD 250. [*portion markings not declassified*]

3. The paper covers a lot of important issues. I want to emphasize that, although I think it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would go along with a move to eliminate ballistic missiles while retaining bombers and cruise missiles, they, in fact, would be in a much better position to take advantage of such a new regime than most people realize. These points are well documented in the paper. Larry Gershwin, my National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, is available to discuss the package further should you desire. Fritz Ermarth participated in writing this paper and is thoroughly familiar with its contents. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Robert M. Gates²

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Tobey Files, Subject File, Sov ABM Breakout (3 of 4). Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. Eyes Only. Gates wrote "Frank—" below the subject line. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper-right hand corner of the memorandum. Carlucci sent the memorandum and attachment to Reagan under cover of a January 20 note: "Mr. President: In NSDD 250 you tasked the DCI to give an assessment in Soviet and other Foreign Reactions to a Zero Ballistic Missile World. The DCI's response is attached. It is a thorough job, worthy of your personal attention. I suggest you read the overview, the first paragraph on page 16 on the possibility of cheating and paragraphs 66 through 96. (Starting on page 29.)" (Ibid.)

² Gates signed the memorandum "Bob" above his typed signature.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Intelligence Council³

Washington, January 1987

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents]

OVERVIEW

There are strong and compelling reasons—doctrinal, institutional, bureaucratic, personal, economic, and strategic—for the USSR to reject proposals that promise to eradicate the USSR's ballistic missile arsenal. Doctrinally, ballistic missiles occupy essential roles in supporting Soviet global ambitions and are important weapons for securing Soviet military objectives on the battlefield. From a force structure perspective, they carry well over 90 percent of the Soviet intercontinental range nuclear weapons and ambitious modernization efforts for both ICBMs and SLBMs are already underway. Moreover, the future of key military and industrial bureaucracies remains inextricably linked to ensuring the primacy of the role that ballistic missiles play in the USSR's broader game plan for extending its influence. Also, the apparent savings associated with an agreement to remove all ballistic missiles could be more than offset by the increased expenditures necessary to augment and further modernize the remaining Soviet strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, and general purpose forces. For these and other reasons, it is highly unlikely that the USSR contemplates an arms control regime with the U.S. that would result in the removal of all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles. [*portion markings not declassified*]

At the same time, however, there have been forces at play in the Soviet defense arena which would facilitate the USSR's transition to a zero ballistic missile world and that would serve them well should such an arrangement ever come about. Soviet defense decisionmakers tasked with assessing how the USSR could meet its strategic objectives in a zero-zero ballistic missile world by 1996 would undertake their work mindful that the USSR is already replacing its heavy bomber force with Blackjack and Bear H, is flight testing a variety of cruise missiles including a supersonic missile, and possesses substantial and improving air defenses, an operational ARM system, a large civil defense apparatus, and a huge deep underground shelter network designed to protect the USSR's leadership in the event of nuclear war. Moreover, they would be relatively pleased by the current conventional balance, even as they

³ Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*].

address existing and serious deficiencies in their air forces. In short, a zero-zero ballistic missile agreement would not catch the USSR fully flatfooted. *And, perhaps most importantly the absence of fast-flying ballistic missiles would go a long way to resolving the principal concern of Soviet war planners: How to anticipate, avoid or handle the potentially "sudden" transition to general nuclear war from a conventional conflict in Europe that they expect to win? The elimination of all U.S. "fast-flying" ballistic missiles would mitigate this central problem for the USSR.* [portion markings not declassified]

While it is unclear whether in a zero ballistic missile world the risk of escalation from conventional to nuclear war would decrease, the likelihood of crises and even conventional conflict, however, could increase. (Nonetheless, war itself—even a conventional war—remains unlikely.) Overall, the elimination of ballistic missiles could reduce somewhat political stability, by increasing Soviet propensity for risk-taking, since the Soviets might judge that the probability and potency of any U.S. response would likely be decreased in a world without ballistic missiles. [portion markings not declassified]

Whatever the Soviets think about the military implications of specific arms control concepts or proposals, they are clearly and, for the moment, primarily playing a political game about which they are very serious. Achievement of Gorbachev's two principal arms control objectives—stopping SDI and deflecting the Reagan Administration from its entire national security agenda of arms buildup and counter-Soviet actions—would make the 1990s much easier for the USSR than they would otherwise be. They would facilitate the reconciliation of Soviet internal economic and social modernization with continued and possibly expanded Soviet roles as an international superpower. [portion markings not declassified]

In the eyes of the Soviet military planner the actual likelihood of arms control eliminating nuclear weapons, all strategic forces, or whole classes of weapons is probably so small as to be practically zero. But the Gorbachev campaign surrounding radical arms control could well promote effects such as those above—with or without agreements—and Soviet military power would gain therefrom. [portion markings not declassified]

Key NATO allies, especially the nuclear powers, will continue to oppose the elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles on the grounds that it will undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and weaken the perceived U.S. commitment to Western Europe's defense.

— The French have strongly opposed the concept of a "denuclearized", Europe and would refuse to participate in any multilateral negotiations that Washington might hope to follow initial U.S.-Soviet agreements for 50 percent cuts in strategic forces. [8 lines not declassified]

— A Conservative-led British government would join the French in publicly criticizing unilateral U.S. actions that it perceives as

undermining their independent nuclear forces and London's special relationship with the U.S. If the U.S. cancels its ballistic missile programs, the British might hope that Washington would make good on its commitment to sell them Trident or some alternative—like cruise missiles. However, London would also [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on future ballistic missile systems and joint cruise missile projects.

— Other allies, especially West Germany, also would perceive the elimination of all ballistic missiles as possibly the first step in a unilateral U.S. decision to withdraw from Western Europe. Bonn and other allies remain unconvinced that NATO's extended nuclear deterrent can be preserved by bombers and cruise missiles. [*portion markings not declassified*]

In our view, Bonn would see two alternatives to accepting a lessened U.S. defense commitment—either seek greater defense guarantees from the French or consider pursuing a new Ostpolitik that resembles the “security partnership” with the East put forward by the Social Democratic opposition. Bonn will prefer to retain close ties to Washington and only reluctantly seek defense guarantees from the French, but West Germans probably would be compelled to consider new forms of detente with the East as a hedge against faltering Western security guarantees to the Federal Republic. [*portion markings not declassified*]

A zero-zero ballistic missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be cause for concern in Beijing—despite its longstanding call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. China would expect to come under great international pressure to accede to any U.S.-Soviet treaty, and they would not want to be perceived internationally as dragging their feet on an historic opportunity for sharp cuts in nuclear arms. At the same time, compliance with an agreement that eliminated ballistic missiles while allowing strategic defenses and nonballistic offensive systems would nullify China's deterrent, which relies exclusively on ballistic missiles that can threaten the Soviet Union. As a result, we believe Beijing would at a minimum attempt to retain its present nuclear capability and pursue a political strategy designed to deflect international pressures to sign on. [*portion markings not declassified*]

THE SOVIETS IN A ZERO-BALLISTIC-MISSILE WORLD

1. Soviet foreign policy is driven by forces stemming from historical and ideological roots. Soviet national security policy seeks to promote the USSR's global objective of extending its influence either directly as in Afghanistan or through proxies such as the Sandinistas in Central America and the Cubans in Africa. Neither the arms control policies of the sixties and seventies, nor the U.S. arms reduction agenda of the eighties, has in any appreciable way altered the Soviet world

view and its Marxist Leninist agenda. Nor is any prospective arms reduction agreement likely to alter Soviet strategic objectives, although it could change the Soviet gameplan for securing those strategic objectives; that is because the Soviets see arms control as a means for managing their program for achieving global objectives and not as a substitute for those national objectives. *[portion markings not declassified]*

The Soviet Strategic Outlook

2. The USSR's national security decisionmakers underwrite the research, development, testing and deployment of its strategic nuclear arsenal for two principal reasons. First, as Marxist-Leninists they see a deep and abiding antagonism with the West that could well result in nuclear war—even if such a war is no longer deemed fatalistically inevitable. Anything short of serious war-waging capabilities would, in their view, be inadequate preparation for this contingency. Second, such forces also give the USSR superpower status with attendant foreign policy influences. Strategic nuclear weapons—principally ballistic missiles—are the most visible confirmation of Soviet superpower status; they are their primary capital when it comes to affirming the USSR's status as a co-equal with the U.S.—a perception that is critical to their global objective of extending their influence and control. Strategic nuclear forces underpin an assertive Soviet foreign policy by projecting an image of military strength. Soviet leaders appreciate the political utility of world perceptions of military power and have long stressed the contribution of strategic forces to the USSR's superpower status. They recognize that military power is their principal foreign policy asset and that continued high levels of defense efforts, both in acquisition of forces and in research and development programs, are necessary to sustain and expand Moscow's global role. *[portion markings not declassified]*

3. Although the Soviets share the West's goal of avoiding nuclear war, the avenue they chose, early in the strategic nuclear era, for securing that goal was different than the one followed by the West. As a continental power that had long understood warfare as the art of advancing, conquering and occupying an opponent's homeland, they rejected Western concepts of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as a sound basis for strategic nuclear force planning. Instead they derisively described MAD as little more than a mutual suicide pact that they had no intention of joining. Their refusal to sign on to MAD was enduring even while their appreciation of the consequences of nuclear war matured. Throughout the seventies, while exercises featuring nuclear play became more realistic, reflecting higher and higher casualty rates, and statements by Soviet leaders increasingly touted the horrendous consequences of nuclear war, the USSR has continued its emphasis on the procurement of strategic weapons with warfighting attributes, and its commitment to passive and active strategic defenses designed to facilitate the survival of the leadership that

would be necessary for centralized war direction and reconstitution. *[portion markings not declassified]*

4. The Soviets apparently believe that in the present U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders have stated that nuclear war with the United States would be a catastrophe that must be avoided if possible and that they do not foresee such a conflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, they regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility. They seek superior capabilities to fight and win a nuclear war with the United States, and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing in such a conflict. A tenet of their strategic thinking holds that the better prepared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be dissuaded from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions. To this end the Soviets are developing and deploying forces that will enable them to deal flexibly with conflict contingencies in various geographic settings that differ in scope and intensity—from border skirmishes to protracted intercontinental nuclear war. *[portion markings not declassified]*

Sources of, and Limits to, Doctrinal Change

5. Soviet military discourse on intercontinental nuclear war—both classified and unclassified—for virtually all of the post World War II nuclear era has focused on what Soviet military theorists have described as the initial nuclear phase—the opening nuclear salvos—which they have routinely described as potentially decisive. While it is true that Soviet understanding and characterization of that initial nuclear phase has evolved over the last three decades, such evolution has come about only as the result of long and divisive doctrinal debate and has always affirmed the conclusion that the outcome of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war could be determined by the initial nuclear strike. This emphasis has occurred, despite their realization that even general nuclear war could become protracted, and extend over a period of weeks or months, a possibility that requires survivable nuclear assets and command and control capabilities. In essence, Soviet doctrinal discussions ultimately evolved from a belief that general nuclear war would begin with spasmodic launches of each side's entire arsenal, to allow for an initial, conventional opening war phase which over the years they have come to perceive as being of greater and greater duration and complexity. This evolution has been slow and painful. *[portion markings not declassified]*

6. Doctrinal evolution in the USSR begins with debates among military theorists, which are then followed by war games and simulations, then by testing and evaluation in field exercises—and ultimately by codification by the political military leadership of the USSR. This process can take a decade or more to run its course. And there are no short

cuts on cosmic issues that affect Soviet military doctrine. This is one reason, but not the only one, that the Soviets have rejected, for a number of years now, what they describe as one-sided U.S. proposals that seek to restructure the Soviet strategic arsenal. As such any new U.S. proposal that would require radical changes in the makeup of Soviet nuclear forces will be perceived as running counter to an orthodoxy and doctrinal decision making process that the Soviets describe as “scientific.” The process that creates Soviet military doctrine and the resulting Soviet force structure are slow to change. The Soviets are suspicious of proposals that require radical shifts in the way their “scientific” process dictates [the way] they think; these proposals are almost sure to be rejected. [*portion markings not declassified*]

7. Soviet military doctrine’s preoccupation with the initial phase of a nuclear war with the U.S., derived in the first instance from the tremendous destructive capability of nuclear weapons and secondly from the creation of “fast-flyers”—ballistic missiles that can strike the U.S. or the USSR in thirty minutes or less. On the one hand the potential presented by nuclear weapons for delivering a knock-out punch argued for reliance on fast-flyers and once ballistic missiles become the leading edge of the two sides’ arsenals it made the initial nuclear phase even more important in Soviet orthodoxy. The further enshrinement of the tenet which holds that the initial nuclear phase can be decisive in turn had a synergistically derived impact on the role and status of ballistic missiles. [*portion markings not declassified*]

8. In addition, ballistic missiles quickly became a symbol of Soviet prowess particularly on the international scene where it has become the one area in which the USSR has gained a status co-equal with the U.S. as a superpower. Domestically, the top Soviet political leaders, until recently, were directly involved in the creation of the Soviet ballistic missile force and saw their careers prosper in direct proportion to the growth of the USSR’s status as a ballistic missile power. Brezhnev, for example, began his meteoric rise to the post of General Secretary as the principal Party Secretary charged by Khrushchev with overseeing the ballistic missile industry in the early 1960s. Although such direct and personal linkage between the political leadership and the fate of the strategic ballistic missile is changing there is likely still to be a strong residue of this. Moreover, within the military structure itself the people that controlled and operated large ballistic missiles became an independent service, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and soon thereafter, the officially acknowledged senior service in all of the USSR’s Armed Forces. And unlike its U.S. counterpart, the SRF is a one- system service—it possesses only fast-flying ballistic missiles. To ban ballistic missiles means the end of what the USSR officially describes as its senior military service. The bureaucratic pressures marshalled by the SRF within the military against such a proposal would be intense. (Although

there might be some in the USSR's Ground Forces from whose ranks the real leaders of the USSR's professional military establishment still come, who would see such a development as a "just reward" given the symbolic slighting this service has gotten since the 1960s). The story they would carry would resonate well with the lobbying of a defense industrial sector whose leaders—the missile designers—have been national heroes. The ballistic missile defense industry is not one that is readily convertible to other endeavors and so a ban on ballistic missiles would almost certainly incur hard times for important, one can say elite, segments of the Soviet polity. *[portion markings not declassified]*

9. Thus there are strong and compelling reasons—doctrinal, institutional, bureaucratic, personal, economic, and strategic—for the USSR to reject proposals that promise to eradicate the USSR's ballistic missile arsenal. In fact, Soviet proposals for the elimination of all strategic offensive arms (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) was probably an attempt to keep the West "off-balance" through a series of confusing indications of tough and conciliatory changes in Soviet policy. Moscow probably sees such an approach as favorable to the creation of a political atmosphere hostile to those in the West who want continuing strategic force modernization. That said, Soviet military doctrine does evolve, the USSR's strategic arsenal is on the path of diversification, there is a changing of the guard in the USSR's national security arena and it is the USSR's global objectives which are paramount rather than the means they have adopted for reaching those ends. *[portion markings not declassified]*

The Soviet Calculus

10. Soviet defense decisionmakers tasked with assessing how the USSR could meet its strategic objectives in a zero-zero ballistic missile world by 1996 would undertake their work mindful that the USSR is already modernizing its heavy bomber force, is flight testing cruise missiles including a supersonic variant, possesses substantial air defenses, as well as an operational ABM system, a large civil defense apparatus and a huge deep underground shelter network designed to protect the USSR's leadership in the event of nuclear war. Moreover, they would be relatively pleased by the current conventional balance even as they address existing and serious deficiencies in their air forces. In short a zero-zero ballistic missile world would not catch the USSR fully flat-footed. In particular, their conventional force dominance would hold them in good stead in such a scenario. *Perhaps most importantly the absence of fast-flying ballistic missiles would go a long way to resolving the principal concern of Soviet war planners: How to anticipate, avoid or handle the transition to general nuclear war from a conventional conflict in Europe that they expect to win? The elimination of all U.S. ballistic missiles would*

mitigate this central problem for the USSR. At the same time, however, Soviet planners would also have to consider:

- The extent to which an expanded Soviet bomber, tactical aircraft, and cruise missile force could assume the remaining key strategic missions in a zero-zero ballistic missile world, heretofore assigned primarily to ballistic missiles—especially ICBMs.

- Their assessment of the U.S. ability to create a strategic defense that could significantly attrit remaining Soviet strategic assets.

- Their confidence that the United States would not acquire a strategic advantage during or after the period of transition from a force reliant mainly on ballistic missiles to a force comprised solely of bombers and cruise missiles.

- Their perception of how difficult it would be to manage the transition to a zero ballistic missile world.

- Their ability over the next decade to produce and deploy additional heavy bombers and cruise missiles with existing production facilities and without major disruptions in industry and the economy.

- Their preference that such a proposal provide some cost savings or, at a minimum, not increase spending for defense above that programmed in the absence of an arms control agreement.

- Their ability to retain or create a covert force of ballistic missiles, especially ICBMs.

- Their assessment of the degree to which their passive and active strategic defenses in a zero-zero ballistic missile world would be enhanced.

- Their expectations concerning third country nuclear weapons development programs starting with the Chinese, British and French but also to a lesser degree, other nuclear-weapon-possessing countries. [*portion markings not declassified*]

11. A key element of the Soviet strategic force posture is the capability to preempt the enemy's use of nuclear weapons. The means for accomplishing this initially would be greatly affected by a zero ballistic missile force. The time required to employ bombers will seriously hinder Soviet capability to achieve a preemption of a U.S. strategic strike. Force reposturing (such as placing SLCMs off the U.S. shores) may solve part of the problem, but may not achieve their damage limitation requirements or provide timely enough response or reliable C3 connectivity with the high level of certainty specified in their war plans. Thus, at least initially, a zero ballistic missile world would leave the Soviets without the means to achieve a basic tenet of their current strategic war plans. Soviet military planners also place high priority on capabilities to destroy enemy targets under a variety of wartime conditions, including retaliation. The Soviets probably believe that elimination of ballistic missiles has the potential to jeopardize their capability to cover these

targets, particularly under circumstances of retaliation; they would probably be somewhat less confident that their improved bomber force could cover these targets as well. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Soviet Offensive Forces Under the U.S. Proposal

12. We doubt that the Soviets would alter the basic missions of their remaining strategic nuclear offensive forces—and certainly not in the near term—even under an agreement eliminating ballistic missiles. Soviet military writers routinely emphasize the importance of rapidly destroying an opponent's warmaking capability in a strategic war. In evaluating the U.S. proposal, Soviet military planners would consider the capabilities of their bomber and cruise missile forces to meet their projected targeting requirements, particularly those requirements for the initial nuclear strike, while allowing for operational obstacles such as reliability problems, readiness factors and attrition from enemy air defenses. Soviet planning for conventional conflict in Europe would almost certainly evolve, however, since much of what constitutes Soviet tactics for conventional war in Europe is tailored to meet the possibility that the West could resort in very short order to the use of nuclear armed ballistic missiles with very short flight times. Soviet planning and forces would continue to be based on fighting and winning a conventional or nuclear war against NATO. Although the Soviets are placing more emphasis on fashioning their theater forces and operational planning to fight a protracted conventional war against NATO, their military doctrine and tactics would still be based on the realization that NATO could resort to nuclear weapons during combat. The threat of escalation to nuclear combat on the battlefield would remain present even without ballistic missiles. [*portion markings not declassified*]

13. Even in a zero-zero ballistic missile world the Soviets would still perceive the need to grapple with a complex set of time urgent targets which would still command the attention of Soviet force planners and would still magnify the importance of the initial Soviet nuclear strike; bombers on the ground, submarines in port and GLCMs in their garages are inviting targets that would be much less vulnerable to attack once deployed from home bases. For this reason the Soviets would still perceive the need for fast flyers—either supersonic, and ultimately hypersonic, cruise missiles, deployed for example in converted SSBNs off the U.S. and European coasts, or a covert ballistic missile force. Moreover, because they would probably assume that the U.S. would see the zero ballistic missile world from similar perspectives, they would assume a U.S. requirement for fast-flyers; hence the specter of a surprise first strike would likely remain a prominent concern for military planners, although it would still be our judgment that the most likely scenario for nuclear conflict is one in which the nuclear conflict grows out of a major international crisis or a conventional conflict in one or more theaters. [*portion markings not declassified*]

14. The Intelligence Community believes the Soviets expect war to begin following a period of increased tension and crisis, during which time the Soviets generate their armed forces. Also the Soviets apparently believe that a major nuclear conflict, if it occurs, would be most likely to arise out of a conventional conflict. Further, the Soviets see little likelihood that the U.S. or NATO would launch a surprise or sudden attack from a normal peacetime posture without providing warning. [*portion markings not declassified*]

15. As a result, we do not believe the Soviets would adopt a large-scale strip alert posture for their intercontinental bomber force. However, the Soviets may opt to place a small portion of their bomber force (a few aircraft per main operating base) on strip alert as the ballistic missiles are phased out. With the advent of the AS-15-equipped BEAR H, the Soviets have instituted a limited peacetime patrol program. Over time, as the size of the bomber force increased, so might this program. [*portion markings not declassified*]

16. *Targeting Requirements.* The elimination of ballistic missiles would result in a net reduction of fixed strategic targets by [*number not declassified*] from the current total of [*number not declassified*] worldwide. The greatest change would be the elimination of [*1 line not declassified*]. This would be partially offset by additions to Soviet strategic nuclear targeting requirements.

— There would be more U.S. bases for cruise missiles—although many of these missiles probably would be based near existing ports, air bases, and ground forces installations already targeted by Soviet nuclear forces; and,

— The Soviets would anticipate an expansion of U.S. and allied air defense installations, which would pose a greater threat to attacking Soviet offensive strategic forces. [*portion markings not declassified*]

17. The Soviets also would anticipate an increase in U.S. GLCMs, unless these were prohibited or limited by an INF agreement, and would see a corresponding requirement to attack any GLCMs that could be located in field operating areas by Soviet reconnaissance. Barring a marked increase in the deployment of U.S. or allied GLCMs or a major breakthrough in Soviet reconnaissance capabilities, Soviet weapons requirements for attacking field-deployed missiles probably would not dramatically increase. In any case, the Soviets probably would expect that the United States would continue to deploy more ALCMs and SLCMs than GLCMs. [*portion markings not declassified*]

18. *Other Considerations for Force Sizing.* In assessing their requirements for strategic forces, the Soviets would consider, in addition to the number of targets, the wartime operational obstacles to the successful delivery of weapons to targets.

— The Soviets may anticipate *reliability* problems with long-range land-attack cruise missiles, which incorporate new technologies.

— The Soviets probably believe that their cruise missile forces will not achieve the day-to-day *readiness* of their silo-based ICBM forces. Thus, many of these cruise missiles may not be available for nuclear strike operations when nuclear war begins. The Soviets would plan to generate their cruise missile forces during a period of conventional war with the United States, but they could not count on this.

— Soviet cruise missile carriers—especially submarines—would be at least as vulnerable to attacks during a conventional phase preceding nuclear warfare as were their ballistic missile predecessors. Expected force *attrition* might offset planned force generation.

— The Soviets might anticipate formidable U.S. and allied air defenses that would reduce the *penetrativity* of Soviet cruise missiles and cruise missile carriers. Because they probably would see U.S. and NATO naval forces as major threats to Soviet submarines carrying SLCMs, the Soviets might allocate most of their SLCMs to targets in Eurasia, and use mostly ALCMs in attacks against North American targets. They still would be concerned, however, that U.S. and allied air defenses would intercept many Soviet cruise missiles and bombers. [portion markings not declassified]

19. Considering the new environment and specifically the targeting changes resulting from the elimination of ballistic missiles, we judge that the Soviets might plan to attack [number not declassified] targets worldwide with their strategic nuclear forces. This total would include over [number not declassified] targets in North America, over [number not declassified] targets in the NATO countries, and [number not declassified] targets in Asia, and the Pacific areas of the globe. WE JUDGE THAT BY 1996 THE SOVIETS COULD REALISTICALLY MEET THESE TARGETTING REQUIREMENTS USING NONBALLISTIC STRATEGIC ARMS—BUT ONLY IF THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES DID NOT DEPLOY EFFECTIVE STRAGETIC AIR DEFENSES AND DID NOT EMBARK ON OTHER MAJOR PASSIVE DEFENSE PROGRAMS. [portion markings not declassified]

20. Soviet military planners would factor in all of the above considerations in determining reserve requirements for their strategic forces. Although we cannot replicate Soviet calculations of bomber and cruise missile requirements for the end of 1996—when all ballistic missiles would be eliminated—our analysis indicates that the Soviets may require about 5,000 to 8,000 cruise missiles—assuming no upgrading of U.S. air defenses—and up to 10,000 to 17,000 cruise missiles if the United States deploys an extensive air defense system. [portion markings not declassified]

Cheating or Rapid Buildup Following a Ban

21. Under an arms control agreement that would eliminate ballistic missiles during the next ten years but retain heavy bombers indefinitely thereafter, cheating must be examined separately for the two distinct periods of the agreement:

— 1986–1996, during which time ICBMs, SLBKs, and heavy bombers would be allowed.

— 1996 and beyond, during which time heavy bombers would be permitted, but ICBMs and SLBMs would be banned.

During the first period, cheating could take the form of Soviet deployment of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers in excess of the numbers permitted. During the second period, however, cheating could be in one of two forms—the Soviets could deploy excess heavy bombers and bomber weapons; or they could deploy ICBMs and SLBMs in violation of the ban on those types of systems. [*portion markings not declassified*]

22. In the period through 1996, during which time aggregate limits would be in effect on delivery vehicles and their weapons as ballistic missiles were being reduced to zero, Soviet attempts to cheat could take any of several forms. Below are some illustrative examples, listed in order from those we can monitor with lower confidences to those we can monitor with higher confidences:

— Stockpile excess numbers of mobile ICBM launchers and missiles.

— Deploy excess numbers of mobile ICBMs.

— Convert other aircraft to perform missions of heavy bombers.

— Fail to dismantle heavy bombers.

— Stockpile excess numbers of heavy bombers.

— Deploy excess numbers of heavy bombers.

— Fail to convert SSBNs to SSNs.

— Produce new or improved systems.

— Test new or improved systems. [*portion markings not declassified*]

23. In the period after 1996, by which time all ballistic missiles would have been reduced to zero, Soviet attempts to cheat could take any of several forms. Below are some illustrative examples, listed in order from those we can monitor with lower confidences to those we can monitor with higher confidences:

— Deploy existing bombers and their weapons in excess of the numbers permitted.

— Deploy new bombers and their weapons in excess of the numbers permitted.

— Store ICBMs under the guise of space-launch vehicles.

- Retain road-mobile ICBMs.
- Retain rail-mobile ICBMs.
- Retain SLBMs in SSBNs.
- Retain ICBMs in silos.
- Test, produce, or deploy any ballistic missile systems that had existed prior to elimination.
- Create new ballistic missile systems. [*portion markings not declassified*]

24. We judge that after ballistic missiles were eliminated, the prospects of Soviet cheating are clearly large in the area of mobile missiles, both road-mobile and rail-mobile. We assume that any Soviet cheating would be done for a military reason and would be sufficient to meet specific military requirements. In a zero ballistic missile world, the Soviets would consider U.S. C3 assets, U.S. bomber airfields and ports, and nations possessing nuclear weapons (other than the U.S.) as primary targets that a covert ballistic missile force could be applied against. We assume that cheating could be done using either the 10-RV SS-X-24 rail-mobile system and/or the 1-RV or 3-RV SS-25-class road-mobile system, although for a given number of total RVs the higher deployment level and attendant infrastructure necessary in an SS-25-class force would be more susceptible to detection. (In the discussion below we use the example of the SS-X-24 rail-mobile system with 10 RVs.) Soviet cheating with convert ballistic missiles could be of two basic variants. One option would be to maintain a covert force in cold storage and generate it at the appropriate time. [*portion markings not declassified*]

25. How well U.S. intelligence could detect the deployment of a convert mobile ballistic missile force would be a function of the size of the convert force, the convert deployment or storage scheme selected by the Soviets, [*3½ lines not declassified*]. It would also depend on whether the covert force was a residual force from the previously deployed force, remaining in existence as a result of our uncertainty in estimating the force size prior to the dismantlement or, less likely, was a newly deployed force. [*portion markings not declassified*]

26. It is difficult to provide a judgment on the capability of U.S. intelligence to detect and correctly characterize deployment of a covert Soviet mobile missile force. The fact that the missiles are banned would help; it is probably more difficult to detect deployments in excess of an allowed number. Any judgment on the detectability of a force of a given size, and the time it would take to gain a reasonable level of certainty, is thus subject to a high degree of uncertainty. The analysis of these issues has been insufficient to date to provide any confidence. Two examples serve to illustrate this difficulty.

— We have a large uncertainty in the number of nondeployed SS–20 missiles, ranging from as few as about 175 to as many as some 525. The higher figures would require storage in locations we have not identified, but there is a real possibility that such is the case. Agencies have differing views on the issue.

— For a number of years we had the problem of attempting to determine if any SS–16 missiles were at Plesetsk, and, if so, the status of the force. A force of about 50 missiles was at issue. Even though the matter concerned a possible covert force at a major test range, a location subject to considerable normal intelligence collection, no satisfactory resolution of the problem was ever achieved. [*portion markings not declassified*]

27. U.S. intelligence estimates that while at least some of the activities for a force of about 100 to 200 ICBMs deployed on road mobile launchers might be detected, it would be difficult to provide any confidence in a characterization of the activity as an illegal deployment of ballistic missiles. Such a concealed deployment scheme that involved large, complex equipment and nuclear warheads would have a number of elements susceptible to detection, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. However, if the force were maintained in a reduced readiness state and was partially dispersed, as would seem likely, the observables might be quite subtle and nonunique. Thus a prudent planning force of some 100 to 200 road-mobile launchers, possibly with a 3–RV missile, would seem reasonable. [*portion markings not declassified*]

28. A force of covert rail-mobile ICBMs would also require a significant amount of large, complex equipment and infrastructure, but we are less certain at this time about its normal operational mode or the necessary equipment for a force to operate once deployed. Hence we are even less able to estimate a reasonable covert force level that would present a challenge to our detection capabilities. A very rough estimate is that while a force of ten covert rail-mobile launchers would be difficult to detect, a force of 100 or so would seem susceptible to detection and at least partial characterization. Thus a rough estimate of about 50 rail-mobile launchers as a Soviet covert force would seem to be a prudent force level to assume for planning purposes at this time. [*portion markings not declassified*]

29. U.S. intelligence judges that it would have low or very low confidence in its ability to detect the storage of offensive ballistic missiles at undeclared locations—even with fairly comprehensive on-site inspection/monitoring provisions. The Soviets, then, could stockpile a sizable number of offensive ballistic missiles (up to several hundred) without significant risk of U.S. detection. But over time, as long as there was an effective ban on the production of new ballistic missiles, the reliability of the stockpile would be increasingly questionable. In addition, a ban on ballistic missile flight testing and the difficulty of covert

training would diminish over time the military utility of any covertly deployed or nondeployed mobile missile force. It is conceivable that under the guise of testing allowed missiles, such as defensive or space launch missiles, there could be at least a partial redressal of the problem. [*portion markings not declassified*]

30. We have evaluated several levels of military significance from the perspective of a potential Soviet target base (red on blue) and the level of weapons necessary to cover that target base. Although there is an insufficient analytical basis for establishing our monitoring confidence levels, we have made judgments of our ability to detect and accurately characterize covert ballistic missile deployments.

— If Soviet cheating were intended to provide them the means necessary to attack U.S. C3 in order to disrupt a U.S. response and thereby help ensure damage limitation to the USSR, an attack against critical U.S. C3 nodes could be undertaken. [*11 lines not declassified*]

— [*7½ lines not declassified*] However, additional systems could be required for reliability. We judge that over time we would have some chance of being able to detect such deployments.

— [*3 lines not declassified*]. We judge that over time we would have a reasonable chance to detect and correctly characterize such deployment levels. It is important to note that inclusion of Chinese nuclear assets in the equation would drive the Soviet weapon requirements up because of the hardness of the Chinese storage facilities. [*portion markings not declassified*]

31. While it is difficult to assess U.S. ability to monitor Soviet activities under conditions assumed to exist under a future agreement eliminating ballistic missiles by 1996, this scaling of the potential Soviet approaches provides the basic rationale for our judgments regarding U.S. ability to detect such cheating. We judge that the Soviets could maintain small numbers of mobile missiles in both road- and rail-mobile deployment modes for a considerable period of time with little chance of detection by U.S. intelligence. As the size of the force and the period of deployment increase, the chances of detection increase, but we are uncertain how to assess the actual likelihood of detection. [*portion markings not declassified*]

32. Another issue is the Soviet capability to rebuild a significant ballistic missile force following the arrival of the two sides at a complete ban by 1996. If the Soviets were able to maintain some key production facilities and test capabilities—for instance, under the guise of supporting their space program—in addition to their design bureau teams, then the potential would exist for reintroduction of a force of at least several hundred ballistic missiles in a matter of several years. The Soviets would probably be able to introduce such forces considerably quicker than the United States; it is uncertain whether they could

outpace U.S. defensive deployments designed to keep up with such a possibility. [*portion markings not declassified*]

33. The Soviets also would pursue new technologies to field such systems as hypersonic cruise missiles and low-flying terrain avoidance vehicles with stealth technology. Over the long run, they might believe that these systems—which would be allowed under the U.S. START proposal—would provide a better basis for delivering prompt or surprise attacks against U.S. offensive strategic forces. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Soviet Assessment of Effectiveness of U.S. Air Defenses

34. Perhaps the key element in Soviet calculations of their requirements for strategic weapons under an agreement eliminating ballistic missiles would be their assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. and allied air defenses. We have little information on Soviet estimates of potential U.S. continental air defenses. Soviet writings have reflected little concern over U.S. air defenses, largely because since the early 1960s the United States has placed little emphasis on defending North America from attacks by what for many years was a declining Soviet strategic bomber threat. The Soviets are well aware, however, of the considerable emphasis assigned by the U.S. military to air defense of tactical military targets such as aircraft carrier battle groups and army troop formations. Soviet military writings and exercises demonstrate considerable respect for the ability of U.S. air defense systems to defend such targets. [*portion markings not declassified*]

35. The Soviets probably expect that the United States could design and begin to deploy an impressive air defense network for North America by adapting technology, and many of the systems involved in:

— the Aegis and Patriot phased-array, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems;

— the AWACS aircraft;

— the Phoenix long-range air-to-air missile;

— the F-14 and F-15 interceptor aircraft.

These systems, in Soviet eyes, are technically superior to similar systems in the USSR such as the SA-10 SAM and the Foxhound and Flanker interceptors. In addition, the Soviets probably judge that the U.S. would be able to use forward basing for AWACS and interceptor aircraft in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Iceland and Norway. The use of bases in these areas would give the United States some capability to intercept Soviet bombers before they could launch their cruise missiles. The Soviets, therefore, probably would believe that their ability to launch an effective bomber/ALCM strike against North America would depend largely on their ability to destroy a significant portion of any forward-based defensive systems prior to escalation to intercontinental war. Although the Soviets could not be sure that such defenses

would ever be fielded, a worst-case Soviet scenario in which U.S. forward-based air defenses remained largely intact, probably would envisage significant attrition—perhaps as high as 50 percent—to the initial Soviet attacking force. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Soviet Defensive Systems

36. *Air Defense.* The Soviets would also be concerned that U.S. planning to develop and deploy the Strategic Defense Initiative would mask plans for a system that could counter not only ballistic missiles but the full range of the Soviet aerodynamic threat. Indeed they would probably be even more concerned about the military effectiveness of an SDI system in a world without Soviet and U.S. ballistic missiles than they would in a world unconstrained by arms control. Thus they would have to factor in substantial attrition factors in building their aerodynamic force for the late 1990s. [*portion markings not declassified*]

37. *Soviet Defensive Systems.* Soviet military planners almost certainly would argue for increased investment in strategic air defense to protect their homeland assets from the enhanced airborne nuclear attack capabilities they would project for the U.S. The Soviets have traditionally pursued three methods to defend their homeland:

- Preemptive attacks on U.S. and allied nuclear forces;
- Active defenses to intercept and destroy U.S. and allied missiles and aircraft in flight;
- Passive defenses (hardening and dispersal) to negate the effects of arriving U.S. and allied nuclear weapons.

In an environment without ballistic missiles, the Soviets probably would judge that the relative effectiveness of these three methods would change. The slow speed and uncertain penetration ability of cruise missiles make these systems poor replacements for ICBMs assigned the mission of destroying and disrupting a U.S. and allied nuclear attack. Thus, they would have to assume they would have to face a large, coordinated bomber and cruise missile attack. The Soviets might believe that passive defenses, combined concentrated air defenses and denial of U.S. and allied wartime reconnaissance, could provide survivability for selected homeland assets. At the very least, the Soviets would expect more assets would survive longer into the nuclear war (unless the United States fielded hypersonic cruise missiles) than they would if targeted by ballistic missiles. As far as air defense effectiveness is concerned, the absence of U.S. ballistic missile attacks to accomplish defense suppression would leave the Soviet air defenses relatively undegraded prior to their engagement of the aerodynamic attack. [*portion markings not declassified*]

38. On the other hand, Soviet planners would see any prospective U.S. strategic aerodynamic force as placing great technological and numerical demands on their air defenses. Soviet open sources and

classified writings in the 1980s consistently state that U.S. ALCMs and SLCMs will be exceedingly difficult to destroy. The Soviets probably believe that the deployment of U.S. ALCMs with stealth technology will make it even more difficult for them to detect cruise missiles once they have been launched. Overall, Soviet planners probably would not be sanguine about their ability to prevent large numbers of U.S. cruise missiles from reaching their targets. [*portion markings not declassified*]

39. The Soviets will continue to make substantial investments in strategic air defenses. The lowest force projections for strategic defenses in the latest National Intelligence Estimate—which would include the addition of 200 strategic SAM battalions and 1,400 new interceptor aircraft (to replace larger numbers of older systems)—would require roughly 40 billion rubles for procurement over the next decade. The Soviets almost certainly would invest substantially larger sums on air defenses, particularly in the face of an enhanced U.S. aerodynamic threat but such increases would ultimately depend on their assessment of the extent to which these increases in investment would improve the effectiveness against U.S. bomber and cruise missile forces. [*portion markings not declassified*]

40. A Soviet move toward a zero-zero ballistic missile environment probably would result over the next decade in at least a halt in the projected modest decline of the size of the air defense forces, if not some overall growth. The U.S. Intelligence Community, in observing the historical long-term gradual decline in interceptors, has projected that Soviet SAM and interceptor totals would decline by five to 15 percent over this period. (The overall capability would significantly increase, as the new systems are much more capable than those being replaced.) The Soviets, however, could halt this numerical decline by decreasing their retirement of old systems and increasing production of new systems such as the Foxhound, Flanker, and Fulcrum interceptors and the SA-10 SAM. Slowing retirements of old systems would be the easiest course for the Soviets, but such a move probably would require them to develop more modification programs for existing systems. They have done so for the Flogger interceptor, and the large number of mid-1960s-vintage Flakons currently operational could make this venerable interceptor a candidate for updating. The Soviets also apparently are improving their ability to deploy more SA-10s than we currently project by adding new calibration lines at their SA-10 checkout facility. Similar increases in new interceptor deliveries would be more difficult and probably could be accomplished only by reducing other aircraft production, by reducing fighter exports, or by adopting some combination of the two. Using a combination of measures, the Soviets most likely could increase the size of their interceptor and SAM forces by some 20 to 25 percent by 1996. [*portion markings not declassified*]

41. Such a force build-up probably would be accompanied by increases in support forces; AWACS aircraft and tankers would be especially in high demand. We currently project that the Soviets would need approximately 30–50 Mainstay AWACS aircraft to support a mid-1990s force. An increased air defense force could easily double this requirement. Although such an effort probably would exacerbate current production problems with the Mainstay, increased deployments would release the Soviets from having to find the large numbers of additional ground-based radars that, because of line-of-sight considerations and performance limitations, would be required to eliminate significant gaps in tracking low-observable targets at low altitude. Moreover, the Soviets will undoubtedly provide air-to-air refueling for some of their new fighters. They might see the need to dedicate some 100 to 150 tankers—in addition to the tankers required by their enhanced bomber force—to support the fighters and air-refuelable AWACS aircraft during operations out away from Soviet territory. These long-range intercepts would be a desirable improvement in Soviet air defense operations as the Soviets attempted to intercept U.S. aircraft prior to their launching of cruise missiles. Another means to extend their air defense coverage forward during a conflict would be the establishment of forward air defense bases in occupied territory, such as in Scandinavia or key northern islands, such as Spitzbergen. [*portion markings not declassified*]

42. Longer term efforts that could result in significant new systems deployments in the late 1990s and beyond include:

- The development of new interceptors capable of unrefueled operations in excess of 2,000 km from Soviet territory to engage cruise missile carriers;

- The development of a long-range SAM, as a replacement for the SA-5, with the capability to engage bomber-sized targets at a range of 400 to 800 km.

- The development of ground-based and airborne high-energy laser weapons;

- The real-time integration of early warning radars with high-speed computers to allow processing of intermittent tracking data from several radars. (Such a capability could prove useful in tracking low-observable targets).

- Bistatic over-the-horizon radars designed to detect low-observable penetrators;

- Space-based electro-optical and radar detection systems eventually, to track bombers and cruise missiles throughout their flight.

- Space-based kill weapons to use the early warning data from long-range detection systems for kills against aerodynamic targets far from Soviet territory.

We know that the Soviets are working on some of these developments, such as laser weapons. Many of these developments would require Soviet advances in technologies that are likely to be most challenging for the Soviets. These would include computers and microelectronics and a variety of sensor technologies. In many regards, the U.S. SDI program is intended to advance the “state-of-the-art” in the same areas. The Soviets probably would look at a competition [of] advanced air defense technologies in the same light as they see the SDI challenge. *[portion markings not declassified]*

43. *Other Defenses.* Overall, we judge that the Soviets would feel that their longstanding commitment to conventional strategic air defenses would give them a net advantage in this area, as compared to the U.S., in coping with the transition to a zero ballistic missile world. Despite their healthy respect for U.S. technological prowess, the existing Soviet nationwide air defense system would mean fewer institutional and budgetary headaches in the transition phase than they would expect the U.S. to have to deal with. Their biggest problem would be the nature and pace of air defense modernization, and the ability to make the operational and organizational changes necessary in order to get the full advantage the improvements offer. *[portion markings not declassified]*

44. We judge that the Soviets would attempt to preserve the ABM Treaty and forego investments in an expanded ABM defense in favor of investment in other military forces or in the economy. The Soviets, in preparing for the possibility of a U.S. breakout from a zero-zero ballistic missile environment, would continue to develop ground-based ABMs and directed energy weapons. Such developments could include interceptors with sufficient accuracy to use nonnuclear warheads, and radars with improved capabilities to discriminate real targets from decoys and chaff, and improved battle management capabilities. These developments could be incorporated into the Moscow ABM defense, a deployment that the Soviets would continue to maintain, especially should other countries—particularly the People’s Republic of China—maintain ballistic missiles, and would also provide the basis for an ABM system suitable for more widespread ABM defenses. The Soviets probably would conduct these development efforts in a manner that they would present as fully consistent with a strict interpretation of the 1972 Treaty, and any visible research in space-based ABMs probably would be restricted to basic laboratory work or would be ambiguous and thus interpretable as for ASAT. *[portion markings not declassified]*

45. We would not expect to see any significant changes in Soviet passive defense development since air-delivered nuclear weapons would not seem to affect passive defense any differently than those from ballistic missiles *[2 lines not declassified]*. The Soviets are likely to continue their civil defense shelter effort at a level that would keep pace

with population growth. This program currently is capable of sheltering approximately 11 percent of the Soviet urban population and this portion should grow by a percent or two over the next decade. Other civil defense programs such as the evacuation effort are not expected to change appreciably. [*portion markings not declassified*]

46. *Soviet Perceptions of the U.S. Aerodynamic Threat.* The Soviets have a healthy respect for U.S. technological prowess, one that creates substantial concern about the current force of bomber and cruise missiles now in the U.S. inventory and one which is likely to cause Soviet planners to project substantial technological advantages for follow-on systems in the next ten years. In contrast, the designers of Soviet strategic aerodynamic systems appeared for many years to have fallen into relatively low repute, although in the last five years we have seen a major effort to modernize the intercontinental bomber fleet and develop long-range cruise missiles. Soviet national security planners are unlikely to believe that, left to their own devices, these designers could compete with their Western counterparts. The substantial Soviet ability through espionage to even up this disparity notwithstanding, Soviet planners would be wary of a U.S.-Soviet competition dominated by aerodynamic threats. The technological disparity would dictate resort to the time-honored Soviet approach of balancing reliance on technologically inferior forces by deploying a quantitatively superior arsenal in areas not constrained by any existing arms control sublimits, and making extensive use of active and passive defenses. Moreover, the lesser technological capability of the Soviet aerodynamic force is of much less significance so long as the United States does not deploy a major homeland air defense. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Projected Future Soviet Forces

47. *Strategic Offensive Systems.* The Soviets would evaluate the U.S. proposal in light of the leeway it would provide them to shift their offensive forces towards bombers at a measured pace that minimized dislocations in the economy and disruptions in their defense industrial base. In moving to an all-bomber and cruise missile force the Soviets also would have to factor in other considerations such as:

- Their possible objective of maintaining the maximum number of ballistic missile warheads allowed during the transition period. This objective however, could limit their ability to deploy bombers and ALCMs especially if all Bear H and Blackjack are counted as ALCM-equipped aircraft. For example, if they retained 4,800 ballistic missile warheads in 1991—the maximum allowed—to stay within the 6,000-warhead limit, they could deploy only 1,200 accountable ALCMs and bomber weapons. However, if the Soviets slowed deployments of Bear H and Blackjack ALCM-carriers before 1991 to keep their

accountable ALCMs from exceeding 1,200 in 1991 they probably could not produce enough bombers after 1991 to approach the 6,000 ALCM limit in 1996—unless they chose to bring new bomber production facilities on line after 1991.

— The Soviets also would be sensitive to the pace at which the United States was shifting its forces toward bombers, in order to ensure that the United States did not gain an advantage in ballistic missiles during the transition period. [*portion markings not declassified*]

48. Table 1 illustrates potential Soviet forces that could result from an agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles by 1996. Some of the key assumptions of this force are:

— The Soviets retain all 1,650 accountable SS–18 warheads allowed in 1991.

— The Soviets retain slightly fewer than the 3,300 ICBM warheads and 4,000 ballistic missile warheads allowed in 1991 in order to proceed more reasonably with their bomber and ALCM programs.

— Most of the ballistic missiles retained are on newer MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs—this would result in a force with far fewer SNDVs than the 1,600 allowed.

— All Bear H and Blackjack bombers are capable of carrying ALCMs and are counted as such. All Blackjacks are counted as carrying 12 ALCMs, although some may be configured with payloads of bombs and SRAMs rather than ALCMs. Bear H aircraft are deployed with only 6 ALCMs (carried internally) until the mid-1990s in order to minimize the number of accountable ALCMs and allow the Soviets to retain more ballistic missile warheads. During the mid-1990s these aircraft are deployed with an additional six ALCMs (carried externally), for a total of 12.

— The Soviets do not deploy a new strategic heavy bomber until after 1996. Beginning in the early 1990s, they deploy cruise missiles with some use of stealth technology. During the mid-1990s they deploy improved versions of the Blackjack incorporating some stealth technology, air-to-air missiles and improved electronic countermeasures equipment. This new aircraft might not be tested with ALCMs, in order to count as having only one bomber weapon. [*portion markings not declassified*]

49. The forces in Table 1 are consistent with our estimate of production capacity for Soviet weapons systems. We estimate that the Soviets could produce some 450 to 500 Bear H and Blackjack aircraft by 1996, at the expense of other aircraft programs, using production capacity that is either readily available or convertible in one to two years.

— We estimate that if the Soviets forego production of Backfire medium bombers and Classic transport aircraft and devote all of the resources at the Kazan airframe plant to the Blackjack program they could produce about 30 Blackjack per year by the early-to-mid-1990s.

— Similarly, we judge that if the Soviets were willing to forego the production of Bear F aircraft for the Navy they could convert the Taganrog airframe plant to produce the Bear H. Combined with production of Bear H aircraft at the Kuybyshev facility, this would enable the Soviets to produce about 36 of these aircraft per year by the early 1990s. [*portion markings not declassified*]

50. The Soviets might consider converting other large airframe plants—such as the one at Ul’yanovsk that currently is producing the AN-24 Condor transport aircraft—to produce heavy bombers. Such conversions, however, would take years to accomplish and would reduce the Soviets’ ability to produce transport aircraft. [*portion markings not declassified*]

51. The Soviets probably would not be constrained by a shortage of capacity to produce cruise missile airframes. Two production plants currently are in operation and the Soviets could bring on-line additional plants—they might convert plants that formerly produced ballistic missiles. They might face a bottleneck, however, in the production of guidance components—for example the terrain mapping radar. [*portion markings not declassified*]

52. Deploying a force of 450 bombers—a force about two and one-half times the size of the current force—would require a significant investment in infrastructure. The Soviets would have to construct a number of new airfields, or enlarge existing airfields to support bombers, and procure additional communications, maintenance and ground support equipment. Such a force probably also would require a large number of Midas tanker aircraft—perhaps as many as 450, compared to our current estimate for the mid-1990s of 100–180 to support both bomber and air defense needs. In order to produce this number of tankers—which use the IL-76 airframe—the Soviets would have to stop producing transport and AWACS aircraft using this airframe. (But we judge they would, if anything, produce *more* AWACS.) In addition, the Soviets would have to train hundreds of additional aircrews, as well as additional mechanics and technicians. [*portion markings not declassified*]

53. In the absence of any limits on long-range SLCMs, we judge that the Soviets also would place a major emphasis on the deployment of these systems. It is difficult to predict the classes of submarines (and the loadings of these submarines) that would be deployed with SLCMs. Candidates for the SS-NX-21-class would be Victor-class, 402AA, Akula, and Sierra submarines. Yankee and Delta ballistic missile submarines that would have their SLBM launchers dismantled under such an agreement could also be converted as cruise missile carriers. (The 402AA is a converted Yankee.) We estimate that larger, supersonic SS-NX-24-class SLCMs would be deployed on a new class of submarine, and thus the number of these SLCMs is constrained by the submarine production rate. In sum, we judge that under the U.S. proposal, the

Soviets might deploy some 1,700 to 2,000 long-range SLCMs by the end of 1996, compared to the 400 to 800 we normally project for the mid-1990s. About half of these would be SS–NX–21-class SLCMs deployed on converted Yankee and Delta SSBNs. (We judge that the Soviets could convert about four of these submarines per year). We estimate the Soviets could maintain a continual deployment of some 200 SLCMs off the U.S. coasts by the early 1990s. However, the Soviets would regard such a forward deployed force as vulnerable during a conventional phase of conflict and the Soviets could not rely on having these units available as a first-strike force. [*portion markings not declassified*]

54. The force in Table 1 assumes that an INF agreement limits the Soviets to 100 warheads on INF missiles in Asia—with no ballistic missiles (only GLCMs) in 1996. In the absence of an INF agreement limiting GLCMs, the Soviets probably would deploy a force of some 500 to 1,000 GLCMs. These systems would replace SS–20 IRBMs aimed at targets in Europe and Asia. [*portion markings not declassified*]

55. This force in Table 1 assumes that the Soviets do not deploy new ballistic missile systems during the period of reductions.⁴ The force in Table 1 also assumes that the Soviets choose not to deploy the new Delta-type SSBN with SS–N–23 follow-on SLBMs, which would have to be dismantled by 1996 and thus would have very short lifetimes. [*portion markings not declassified*]

56. The procurement of the bomber and cruise missile-oriented force depicted in Table 1 would require about 45 billion rubles (in 1982 prices) over the next ten years—a figure substantially less than the roughly 70 billion rubles we estimate they would allocate to their triad of ICBM, SLBM and bomber forces in the absence of such an arms control agreement. Seventy billion rubles is also what we estimate the Soviets allocated to the procurement of these forces over the past decade. This apparent savings would be offset by the increased expenditures necessary to augment and further modernize Soviet strategic defenses; most importantly, however, would be the impact of any increased expenditures on general purpose forces. Moreover, much of the apparent savings is illusory, since significant inefficiencies and downtime would occur in a conversion of ballistic missile facilities to other military or civilian functions. [*portion markings not declassified*]

⁴ Silo-based SS–X–24 class missiles would be the only new Soviet ICBMs now under allowed by the U.S. proposal—and these would compete with the heavy ICBMs under the proposal's subceiling on warheads on heavy ICBMs and ICBMs with more than six warheads. The ban on mobile systems and new or modernized heavy ICBMs would eliminate the rail-mobile version of the SS–X–24, mobile SS–25-class missiles and the SS–18 follow-on. [Footnote is in the original.] [*portion marking not declassified*]

57. *Tactical Forces.* In a ballistic missile-free environment, the Soviets would put more emphasis on their air forces—and probably short-range cruise missiles—to perform the operational role now assigned to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). In recent years, SRBMs have assumed an increased role in Soviet military planning against NATO, especially in conventional fire support missions. The advent of new, accurate systems—such as the SS-21 and SS-23—equipped with improved conventional munition warheads, has enabled the Soviets for the first time to plan conventional SRBM strikes against a range of NATO targets with a high degree of confidence. In nuclear or conventional operations, SRBMs are an integral part of Soviet operational planning, and planned missions include striking heavily defended targets, opening corridors through NATO air defenses, and engaging time sensitive targets. [*portion markings not declassified*]

58. *Ground Forces.* There are two different views of how ZBM would affect Soviet ground forces:

— *CIA view:* CIA does not see the elimination of ballistic missiles causing a radical departure in Soviet ground force equipment modernization or force structure trends. The Soviets' strategy for employing these forces and the traditionally large role played by ground forces in combined-arms operations is expected to remain largely unchanged. The Soviets may establish a few additional low-strength motorized rifle and tank divisions in the western USSR, but we do not foresee a significant increase in the peacetime readiness posture of the ground forces, or any increase in the number of divisions stationed in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Soviets probably would not attempt to expedite significantly the relatively lengthy RDT&E process associated with the development and introduction of major items of ground force equipment, a cycle which now is typically measured between five to ten years. It is likely, however, that to the extent the USSR believes NATO will react to a ballistic missile-free situation by increasing tactical air forces, the Soviets will undertake a program to increase the number and technical capabilities of their already well-developed air defense assets. [*portion markings not declassified*]

— *DIA View:* In a nonnuclear ballistic missile-free environment, DIA would expect to continue to see the ground forces as the dominant force in the theatre war, and thus would expect to see significant changes to the methods in which these forces are employed and to the rate at which modernization will occur. Beyond our current forecasts, however, DIA would not expect any extraordinarily high increases in combat arms equipment deployments or force structure expansions (although more emphasis would probably be given to air defense modernization—above and beyond the already high priority it now receives). Operationally, the Soviets can be expected to take steps to

optimize the employment of their advantage in mass and firepower as a result of NATO's loss of strike assets such as Lance and Pershing II, and their follow-on systems. [*portion markings not declassified*]

— Although DIA does not foresee a change in doctrine, DIA anticipates a significant enhancement in the role of the ground force in a combined arms operation. Specifically, the ground forces will be exposed to a diminished threat which will allow more effective employment. However, DIA does not expect the Soviets to increase their combat arms force structure above what is currently projected. The absence of ballistic missiles reduces the threat to vital facilities supporting the movement of forces behind the FEBA and from the USSR to ACE and possibly in the future the forces themselves. As a result, marked operational advantages accrue to the Soviets to maximize their already considerable lead in mass. They will continue to devote assets to countering NATO conventional deep-strike systems which they also believe pose a severe threat to their forward deployment capability. Another area this could be reflected in would be the initiation of hostilities. The Soviets have had to consider the impact of NATO ballistic missiles on the forward movement of Western MD forces. Presently, they plan the movement of these forces prior to the opening of war. Among the reasons for doing so is to minimize superiority in the long range attack. The reduction of this threat may allow the Soviets to consider movement after initiation of hostilities which reduces NATO warning creating a more unstable environment. [*portion markings not declassified*]

— The Soviets are likely to believe that NATO will react to a ballistic free situation by increasing fixed wing assets to replace SRBMs in its war plans. The Soviets likely would counter this enlarged threat by increasing their already highly capable and well-developed air defense assets. In addition, the Soviets will be able to devote increased assets to an already high-priority effort to defend against cruise missiles. [*portion markings not declassified*]

59. The role currently played by SRBMs in Soviet operational planning cannot be readily fulfilled by any other existing ground forces weapon system. Large-caliber multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and cannons might be able to assume certain close-in nuclear fire support missions, but their restricted range of less than 40 kilometers would limit such a substitution scheme. One obvious candidate to compensate for the loss of ballistic missiles would be a short-range ground-launched cruise missile, and we believe that the Soviets would place more emphasis on cruise missile development under these circumstances. Another possibility is a long range multiple rocket launcher. [*portion markings not declassified*]

60. *Air Forces.* Elimination of SRBMs would increase considerably the operational responsibility of the already strained Soviet air forces.

— A larger portion of the air forces would probably be withheld in readiness for nuclear operations.

— The air forces would assume the entire burden of conventional strikes beyond the range of cannons, MRLs, and attack helicopters.

Although the elimination of U.S. and NATO ballistic missiles would relieve the air forces of many high priority targets, this probably would be offset by the requirement to attack heavily-defended targets currently assigned to SRBMs. [*portion markings not declassified*]

61. In response to expanded operational requirements, the Soviets would likely increase the overall size of the air force by keeping older aircraft in the inventory longer, and by increasing the production of newer aircraft. The Soviets also see themselves at a technological disadvantage in the development and production of advanced combat aircraft, however, and to increase the development or production of such aircraft would require large new investments. The most likely response at least in the short-term would, therefore, be a modest increase in the size of the existing force using older and contemporary aircraft. [*portion markings not declassified*]

62. *Naval Forces.* Because of the impact of long lead time procurement of major subsystems for warships, force changes will probably take longer to be realized in naval forces than in other forces. As a result of ceasing SSBN production, the Soviets could increase their SSN production rate from the current 3–4 per year to upwards of six per year in addition to the SSBN conversion program discussed earlier. In other submarine-related developments, we would expect the USSR to vigorously pursue development of a long-range (500–600 km) torpedo tube-fired anti-ship weapon to allow the broadest range of their SSN force (such as VICTORs) to participate in the increasingly important anti-ship warfare tasks, particularly as more U.S. ships are equipped with land attack cruise missiles. Furthermore, the Soviet SSN force would be able to be more fully applied to open ocean tasks because it would no longer be encumbered by the requirement to protect SSBNs in the bastion areas. [*portion markings not declassified*]

63. Although the elimination of SLBMs would reduce the USSR's need for strategic submarine bastions, the Soviet requirement for echeloned defense in depth at sea would increase to counter heightened enemy SLCM/ALCM threats. Thus, many Soviet general purpose naval forces, released from pro-SSBN defense, would shift to anti-SLCM/ALCM roles in expanded sea control and sea denial areas. Since SLCM submarines must approach their targets more closely than SSBNs to be within effective weapons release range, the Soviet strategic ASW problem would contract from forward areas to primarily the Norwegian Sea and Northwest Pacific. This would also cause the Soviets to concentrate naval air defense forces in these areas. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Soviet Assessment of Third Country Nuclear Systems

64. Lastly, the Soviets would add to their calculus their assessment of third country nuclear developments especially for British, French, Chinese and other ballistic missile possessing nations. The Soviets assess the adequacy of their strategic nuclear force against the combined nuclear forces of all their potential enemies—an approach consistent with the way military planning has been carried out in Russia, even in Czarist times. The Soviets have a keen appreciation of British and French strategic nuclear force planning and at least a sound appreciation of Chinese nuclear capabilities. We are less certain of Soviet understanding of Indian, Pakistani, and other third country nuclear programs but they are highly unlikely to project any substantial short, or especially long-range ballistic threat from these countries before the year 2000. [*portion markings not declassified*]

65. The substantial growth planned for British and French strategic nuclear forces—particularly in SLBMs and IRBMs—is of real concern to the USSR. The Soviets are unlikely to ever contemplate going to zero ballistic missiles while the British, French and Chinese remain outside such an agreement. Force planners assessing a U.S.-Soviet zero ballistic missile regime would add these and other third country nuclear capabilities to the missions that remaining Soviet forces would have to offset. [*portion markings not declassified*]

The Gorbachev Arms Control Agenda

66. The latest Soviet START proposal calls for mutual reductions to 6,000 weapons by 1991 and the complete elimination of offensive strategic weapons by 1996. While the proposed elimination of all offensive strategic weapons was undoubtedly intended in large part to help them seize the high ground politically, the Soviets probably regard the proposal for an interim reduction to 6,000 weapons as a possible basis for a future arms control agreement. The proposal they tabled in October 1985 also called for reductions to 6,000 weapons. [*portion markings not declassified*]

67. The Soviets perceive that U.S. weapon programs threaten to erode the USSR's hard-won strategic position. They probably judge that their proposed reductions to 6,000 weapons—which they have made contingent on the U.S. not going ahead with SDI—would constrain U.S. offensive modernization programs severely. Our analysis of Soviet targeting requirements indicates that such reductions would make sound military sense. Under deep reductions for both sides, the Soviets would be able to meet critical strategic missions in either a preemptive or retaliatory strike as well as they can today. Also, the U.S. threat would be more manageable for Moscow if there were a substantially smaller U.S. force. [*portion markings not declassified*]

68. Nevertheless, the Soviet decision to counter the U.S. zero ballistic missile proposal with a call for the abolition of all nuclear weapons—such a sweeping arms control proposal by the Soviet side represents no historic breakthrough but rather is consistent with their general disarmament proposals that date back to Lenin's time—raises several questions about Gorbachev's arms control agenda: Are the Soviets serious about all this in the sense that they would be willing to negotiate in detail, agree on, and implement the propositions they have advanced if their own terms are accepted? What motives and calculations underly the advancement of so radical an agenda? Are there shades or degrees of seriousness depending on the issues or future contingencies? [*portion markings not declassified*]

69. The evidence and broad logic of the situation allow for three alternative answers.

— The Gorbachev regime may be largely serious about this radical agenda because it believes that achieving it would a) bring about a sharp diminution of the overall East-West military competition and permit concentration of Soviet resources on economic modernization, but at the same time b) allow keeping some of the military bases of Soviet superpower status intact (modernized conventional forces) and permit other forms of Soviet power projection in the world.

— The Soviets are not serious at all about their radical arms control agenda except as a means to attain short- and medium-term political goals. Actually implementing it would be too wrenching with regard to their own military doctrines and structures, and implausible with regard to verification, detailed negotiations, third countries, future technology, etc.

— They are very serious about their political goals in advancing this agenda. But the present political state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship makes it unnecessary and undesirable to decide one way or other about the seriousness of specific propositions being advanced. Rather they expect that the present interaction over radical arms control and the surrounding politics will create a new political situation—possibly before, possibly after the next U.S. elections—in which they will decide what they want to pursue in practical arms negotiations probably on a less radical agenda. In the meantime, they will play a largely political and propaganda game. [*portion markings not declassified*]

70. For the present, the third is the best answer. In any case, the evidence does not allow us to take Soviet seriousness about Moscow's own proposals at face value. There is a clearly manipulative dimension to Soviet arms control policy and to Soviet foreign policy as a whole in the present period.

— Across the board, Gorbachev has been seeking to revitalize the effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy through activism and bold tactics

after a period of near paralysis. This has involved outright deception on occasion (as in the sham withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan). In no area, however, has a fundamental change of Soviet objectives yet been observed.

— Soviet management of the Reykjavik meeting indicates that it was artfully, if hurriedly, contrived to put maximum psychological and public pressure on the President, either to accept Soviet terms for a breakthrough or to suffer a costly “failure.” [*portion markings not declassified*]

71. What is Gorbachev trying to do? He has two urgent objectives:

— First and most specifically, he is trying to stop the SDI program through a combination of formal agreement and the political side-effects which may be expected from the manner in which SDI is debated. Because the Soviets respect American technological prowess once mobilized, SDI presents a costly and frightening strategic uncertainty for Soviet military and economic planning likely to dominate the next two decades if it is not stopped. The longer it goes on the more likely it is to become “institutionalized” in terms of budgets, technology momentum, and constituencies. It is still politically vulnerable, however, because of great cost, technological uncertainty, and conflict with “conventional” arms control thinking. Gorbachev is trying to maximize and exploit those vulnerabilities by seeking to depict SDI as the major obstacle to millennial arms control breakthroughs. He almost certainly calculates that, should the U.S. accept this depiction and, even in principle, declare SDI forfeit for major arms control progress, political support for the program will erode or can be kept limited in the years ahead. Moreover, this political effect will set in as soon as SDI is put on the block of negotiations, while the fine print of other issues could be negotiated for years without or before agreement.

— Second and more generally, Gorbachev is seeking to use the prospect of far-reaching arms control breakthroughs to deflect the Reagan Administration from its entire national security agenda of arms buildup and counter-Soviet actions, or, failing this, to create a political climate in which the Administration cannot act effectively on that agenda and cannot perpetuate it into a successor Administration because this agenda led to “mismanagement” of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. [*portion markings not declassified*]

72. Whatever they think about the military implications of specific arms control concepts or proposals, the Soviets are clearly and, for the moment, primarily playing a political game about which they are very serious. Achievement of the two objectives stated above would make the 1990s much easier for the USSR than they would otherwise be. They would facilitate the reconciliation of Soviet internal economic and social

modernization with continued and possibly expanded Soviet roles as an international superpower. [*portion markings not declassified*]

73. While he plays his political game, Gorbachev has a strong political interest in assuring that he has the confidence of his own military leadership. Present evidence suggests that he has it, despite insinuations for external effect by Soviet spokesmen that there is military opposition to such gambits as the unilateral test moratorium. Gorbachev took Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev to Reykjavik to both play the game for credibility with U.S. participants and to assure the Soviet military establishment that the game was in competent professional hands, whatever it might lead to. For those in the Soviet system not fully read into leadership political calculations, the agenda of radical arms control may well produce a certain queasiness and apprehension. But it is extremely unlikely that Gorbachev could or would venture his radical initiatives without support for their tactical logic in the Politburo and in the top military leadership. His references to the Soviet leadership and the presence of Akhromeyev at Reykjavik indicate that this is an important requirement and that it is being met. [*portion markings not declassified*]

74. At the same time, there is an underlying logic of evolving Soviet strategic doctrine which supports Gorbachev in his radical arms control agenda for political and, eventually, some military purposes. [*portion markings not declassified*]

75. First, Soviet military and political leaders concerned about the future of Soviet military power—which means the entire Soviet leadership—well appreciate that Soviet strategic interests will be served if Gorbachev succeeds in his main objectives, stopping SDI and muting the overall competitiveness of the U.S. adversary. They all have an interest in recreating an East-West environment of detente in which the Soviets can pursue established or new strategic objectives at their own pace, retain the initiative if not a monopoly on strategic defense developments, and reconcile more easily the objectives of economic and military modernization which could clash sharply in the next several five year plans. [*portion markings not declassified*]

76. Second, as revealed by the writings of Marshal Ogarkov and other military authorities, Soviet military planners are grappling—as yet inconclusively we believe—with a proposed evolution of Soviet military doctrine in which there is some shift of emphasis away from nuclear forces toward more proficient nonnuclear forces exploiting new technologies and operational concepts. This evolution is inspired in part by a recognition that extensive use of nuclear weapons in war would very likely lead to such destruction of military forces, particularly land combat forces, that coherent operations for tangible military objectives might not be possible. This might occur even if mutual

deterrence, counterforce operations, or strategic defense measures somehow protected the Soviet homeland from destruction. Soviet planners are also mindful that new nonnuclear technologies—for precise attack, battle management, and area effects—offer the possibility that nonnuclear maneuver and strike forces can be employed to strategic effect where hitherto only nuclear weapons seemed suitable. Not only are such nonnuclear approaches attractive to Soviet planners for strategic (usable warfighting power) and institutional (the power of the ground forces) reasons, they believe that they are working their way into Western military practice anyway; the USSR must strive to get ahead of an inexorable, but costly and technologically demanding, objective process. [*portion markings not declassified*]

77. It is unclear whether this doctrinal evolution, to the extent it is being implemented as opposed to merely being discussed, has led top Soviet military leaders to accede to arms control approaches that facilitate some reduction of the weight of nuclear weapons and forces in the overall strategic environment. The Gorbachev agenda of radical arms control is not a program for achieving such a reduction directly and mechanically. Neither the Soviet military nor political leaderships believe in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They may not take any of the lesser goals on Gorbachev's agenda seriously as concrete goals, at least for the present. The whole campaign, however, does tend to create an international political environment in which it may be easier to use arms control to facilitate the attainment of Soviet military, as well as political, objectives.

— The erosion of the peacetime legitimacy and credibility of NATO nuclear doctrines, commitments, and programs.

— The slowing down of all the military programs of NATO countries.

— A reduced likelihood that, in the event of an East-West conflict, the U.S. and NATO would have the political consensus or the requisite nuclear fire power to threaten or execute a credible, i.e., militarily effective, tolerable, and repeatable, escalation to nuclear use. [*portion markings not declassified*]

78. In the eyes of the Soviet military planner the actual likelihood of arms control eliminating nuclear weapons, all strategic forces, or whole classes of weapons is probably so small as to be practically zero. But the Gorbachev campaign surrounding radical arms control could well promote effects such as those above—with or without agreements—and Soviet military power would gain therefrom. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Soviet Risk-Taking Propensities

79. The Soviets most likely assess that the Warsaw Pact has sufficient conventional ground forces to meet their planning requirements for the ground operation of their overall theater operation plan. And even without ballistic missiles, the Soviets would maintain an advantage in theater nuclear assets. However, the Soviets also probably assess that the Warsaw Pact has insufficient air assets to meet their planning requirements for either the initial Air Operation—whose success they consider critical to the overall theater operation—or to adequately support Pact ground force operations. *[portion markings not declassified]*

80. There will probably be no change in Soviet objectives toward areas contiguous to the Warsaw Pact or elsewhere. However, as the defense of Western Europe has traditionally been coupled with U.S. strategic forces comprised primarily of ballistic missiles and their associated warheads—the Soviets may pursue more vigorously the coercive power flowing from their conventional force superiority. Soviet actions elsewhere will continue to be based on achieving specific aims and influenced by regional political/military factors, as well as the strategic East-West relationship. *[portion markings not declassified]*

81. Currently, U.S. ballistic missiles are the principal component of extended deterrence, and their elimination would substantially reduce NATO's nuclear deterrent. However, not all nuclear weapons would be eliminated under the proposal and the threat of a nuclear attack in response to a conventional attack against NATO would continue to have some deterrent value in crisis situations. *While it is unclear whether in a zero ballistic missile world the risk of escalation from conventional to nuclear war would decrease, the likelihood of crises and even conventional conflict, however, could increase.* (Nonetheless, war itself—even a conventional war—remains unlikely.) Overall, the elimination of ballistic missiles could reduce somewhat political stability, by increasing Soviet propensity for risk-taking, since the Soviets might judge that the probability and potency of any U.S. response would likely be decreased in a world without ballistic missiles. *[portion markings not declassified]*

*THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES**The NATO Allies*

82. Key NATO allies, especially the nuclear powers, will spare no effort in opposing the elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles on the grounds that it will undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and NATO's Flexible Response doctrine, lead inexorably toward a weakened U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe and require additional military efforts on their part to redress the conventional imbalance. *[portion markings not declassified]*

83. *France*. Paris is unlikely to revise its present defense doctrine or nuclear modernization efforts in the wake of a zero ballistic missile (ZBM) agreement. The French have made clear their view that nuclear deterrence cannot be replaced, and their current modernization program reflects a belief that ballistic missiles remain the most credible, survivable and potent element of Western defenses. As presently planned the French modernization of its SSBN force would be largely complete by 1996—[2½ lines not declassified].

— To accomplish this strategic modernization effort, Paris has earmarked approximately [less than 1 line not declassified] of its military procurement budget and [less than 1 line not declassified] of total defense spending. [portion markings not declassified]

84. French military planners are probably reviewing existing military plans—particularly those dealing with possible new ballistic missiles—in light of their concern for the possible deployment of U.S. and Soviet strategic defenses. Paris is committed to maintaining its ballistic missile force's credibility, even if Moscow chooses to deploy a nationwide defense. The French defense ministry has already conducted studies of prospective Soviet defenses and concluded that the advantage is still likely to remain with the attacker rather than the defender. Moreover, they probably would judge the effectiveness of any Soviet defenses to be considerably less than those contemplated by the U.S. Thus, the French probably would try to counter any Soviet defenses by improving the penetrability of their ballistic missile warheads—perhaps adding more warheads and penetration aids or examining methods to reduce warning time such as depressed trajectories for ballistic missiles. We would expect, however, that during the transition period to ZBM the French might actively develop alternatives to ballistic missiles, probably a more advanced cruise missile—such as a longer range version of the ASMP—that could be produced in large numbers and deployed on tactical aircraft. [portion markings not declassified]

85. The cost of maintaining this nuclear force, however, is likely to grow—a factor that is already forcing France to make some difficult tradeoffs between the strategic modernization effort and conventional defense improvements. Paris would be more likely to continue emphasizing strategic modernization at the expense of conventional forces, particularly if it believed that U.S. nuclear guarantees were no longer assured. Moreover, many French officials might argue that unilateral U.S. decisions to eliminate ballistic missiles would so undermine the NATO Alliance that collective defense efforts—particularly those based on conventional defense—would be largely meaningless and require France to take steps to secure its own national defense. [portion markings not declassified]

86. *UK.* For all intents and purposes, Britain has made its own nuclear deterrent dependent on the U.S. SLBM program. London decided in the 1970s that it could not afford to maintain the capability to build ballistic missiles and chose to purchase the U.S. Trident II missile, which would carry a UK-designed warhead. [*portion markings not declassified*]

87. Thus, British plans call for introducing the new Trident system when the U.S. and the Soviets would be phasing out their ballistic missiles.

— The first Trident-carrying boat will enter service in the early 1990s. By the late 1990s, the British nuclear force would consist of [*3 lines not declassified*].

— The cost of the Trident program is presently estimated at \$12–13 billion and London has already committed \$3.6 billion to the program.

— Moreover, the Thatcher government has now signed contracts for the first two boats and will have signed contracts on the remaining two by 1993. London is legally bound to pay major penalties should those contracts be cancelled. To many observers, the cancellation of the Trident program would be nearly as costly as completing it. [*portion markings not declassified*]

88. If the U.S. were to cancel its own ballistic missile programs, including Trident, London would doubt Washington's ability to make good on its earlier commitments to sell Trident II missiles. The British would hope that Washington would provide an alternative system such as cruise missiles. Otherwise, the Thatcher government would face another Skybolt affair—in which it mortgaged its nuclear future to an American program only to have it unilaterally cancelled by the United States. This would be a major embarrassment to the Tory government which has stressed its close ties and influence with Washington. Moreover, all of this could be used by the unilateralist Labour party to argue that Trident would not be supportable without U.S. assistance. [*portion markings not declassified*]

89. Given the controversy over the future viability of an independent British nuclear deterrent, British military planners have probably not developed detailed plans for the post-Trident generation of strategic systems. As a possible near-term response, however, London already is studying [*1 line not declassified*] to modernize its tactical missile forces. Although the UK has not seriously studied cruise missile options, we believe they would probably investigate such options in the event the U.S. and Soviet Union appeared intent on deploying strategic defenses. In all likelihood, however, London would probably see a cruise missile option as an expensive one that might require continuing technical cooperation with the United States. However, a new U.S.-UK nuclear agreement would be more politically suspect in the aftermath

of unilateral U.S. actions to eliminate ballistic missiles. [*portion markings not declassified*]

90. In the absence of U.S. assistance in developing cruise missiles, [*1½ lines not declassified*] Over the short-term, London probably would hope to maintain whatever Polaris and Trident force it had in being when a U.S.-Soviet ZBM accord was reached. And, British military planners probably would have some confidence that with improved penails enough of the force could penetrate Soviet defenses, available at the end of the century, to maintain the UK's minimum deterrence posture. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

91. *West Germany.* In all likelihood, the West German public would perceive a U.S.-Soviet agreement as evidence of a reduced threat to Europe. However, conservative political elites would be concerned that such steps would undermine the nuclear guarantee on which West Germany's security has been based since it joined the Alliance. Within the CDU, there probably would be hard-line supporters of nuclear deterrence who would argue that nuclear-armed aircraft could not fulfill present NATO military missions without major improvements. [*3 lines not declassified*]. However, such steps might be difficult to implement at a time when the public perceived the U.S. and Soviet Union reducing drastically their nuclear arsenals. [*portion markings not declassified*]

92. At best, the government would hope to preserve those nuclear-capable systems that are presently stationed in the FRG. Some defense officials might also seek closer collaboration with the U.S. on developing European defenses against the nonballistic missile threat. Even so, conservatives would be deeply suspicious that Washington was beginning to create "unequal zones of security" within the Alliance that would inevitably mean a less credible U.S. defense guarantee. [*portion markings not declassified*]

93. We believe Bonn would be unlikely to respond to a ZBM accord by pushing for large increases in conventional defense improvements. Limited military manpower in the 1990s, the practical problems of increasing the number of foreign troops in West Germany and tight budgets will be major constraints. Bonn might press for closer conventional defense cooperation with the French, in terms of more joint operational planning to maximize European resources. But, West German officials can be expected to oppose any U.S. initiative such as ZBM, which they perceive as making a conventional war fought largely on West Germany soil more thinkable. [*portion markings not declassified*]

94. [*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

95. One important strain in the West German debate would be the psychological insecurity generated by the perceived weakening of U.S. defense guarantees. [*2½ lines not declassified*]. We believe such trends

would ultimately force the West German government to launch a more active Ostpolitik that focuses on possible arms control initiatives as a way to reassure the public that Moscow's military preponderance would not be used against the Federal Republic. In the face of greater uncertainty about U.S. responses to potential Soviet actions vis-a-vis the West Europeans, West Germans might also become more reluctant to take steps that would antagonize Moscow, leading to what could eventually amount to "Finlandization." [*portion markings not declassified*]

China

96. A zero-zero ballistic missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be cause for concern in Beijing—despite its longstanding call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. China would expect to come under great international pressure to accede to any U.S.-Soviet treaty, and they would not want to be perceived internationally as dragging their feet on an historic opportunity for sharp cuts in nuclear arms. At the same time, compliance with an agreement that eliminated ballistic missiles while allowing strategic defenses and nonballistic offensive systems would nullify China's deterrent, which relies exclusively on ballistic missiles that can threaten the Soviet Union. As a result, we believe Beijing would at a minimum attempt to retain its present nuclear capability and pursue a political strategy designed to deflect international pressures to sign on. [*portion markings not declassified*]

97. China, moreover, would be particularly concerned about the failure of such an agreement to abolish all types of nuclear weapons and to restrict strategic defenses. With a limited bomber force, cruise missile capability, and early warning system, and with the elimination of its own ballistic missile force, the Chinese would be unable to respond in kind to a Soviet cruise missile or bomber strike. China would also lose its even more limited ability to target the United States. [*portion markings not declassified*]

98. Another concern would be verification, although Beijing has not made an issue of this in the past and is in a particularly good position—given its experience with camouflage—to hide ballistic missile deployments. Nonetheless, China has very little verification capability, and would have to trust the United States and the Soviet Union to monitor compliance. [*portion markings not declassified*]

99. Compounding all this is China's distrust of India, which is nuclear capable and probably would be unaffected by the agreement. Tensions along their disputed border are high at present and subject to periodic flare-ups. [*portion markings not declassified*]

100. China's present plans apparently call for an expansion of its ballistic missile forces during the 1990s. CSS-4 deployments are

projected to go from two deployed silos (and perhaps two others we have not located) to 18–26 by 1996. By the mid-1990s some or all CSS-4s will probably have four reentry vehicles each—the RV for the SLBM and the CSS-X-5 could be adapted for this purpose. The mobile CSS-X-5 medium-range ballistic missile will probably begin deployments in the next two years and reach about 40 launchers by 1996. Over the same period, Beijing will probably begin deploying tactical short-range ballistic missiles (600 km range) of the type displayed at the recent Asian Defense Exposition. The intermediate-range follow-on to the CSS-X-5 is probably ten years from deployment; a new solid-propellant ICBM will probably be developed, for deployment in the mid-to-late 1990s. *[portion markings not declassified]*

101. In our view, in addition to pursuing its current plans Beijing has three broad military strategies from which to choose in responding to a U.S.-Soviet agreement. None are satisfactory from China's point of view, in our opinion, and all would be combined with a vigorous diplomatic campaign designed to deflect pressures to accede to the agreement. Each of the strategies has the drawback of requiring Beijing to reallocate funds to nuclear development at a time when—ironically—reliable intelligence indicates China has been cutting back on nuclear weapons programs and wants to contain military spending to devote more resources to economic development. *[portion markings not declassified]*

102. China's first military option would be to redirect research funds into strategic bombers and cruise missile development. In addition to being expensive, China would find itself attempting to overcome a 25-year gap in these military technologies. We believe China is at least ten years away from developing nuclear artillery, and while short-range (90 km) cruise missiles developed from China's Styx-type anti-ship missile are a possibility in the next few years, neither it nor the artillery provide the second strike deterrent China believes is essential for its security. *[portion markings not declassified]*

103. In our judgment, China might combine the above activity with dismantlement of existing silos and bases and a secret attempt to speed up deployment of a mobile IRBM with a range of about 5000 km. If deployed at secret bases in western China, it would be able to reach Moscow. We believe Beijing could probably cut deployment time for such a system to five or six years, but probably realizes it would be difficult to keep secret. Discovery, moreover, would set back key foreign policy goals. *[portion markings not declassified]*

104. Less likely would be Beijing's second broad option—rejecting an agreement outright and attempt to overcome an unrestrained Soviet ballistic missile defense by sheer numbers of warheads. With an all-out effort, China probably could double the size of the force we project

as likely by the mid-1990s, but only by sacrificing economic development and modernization of its conventional forces. Even then, the cost of building a strategic missile force large enough to overwhelm an expanded Soviet ballistic missile defense—protecting Moscow and other major Soviet population centers—not constrained by the ABM treaty—would be prohibitive. *[portion markings not declassified]*

105. We judge China's least likely option is full compliance with the agreement. China would have great difficulty constructing an effective nuclear deterrent before 1996 that did not rely on ballistic missiles. Penetrating bombers with sophisticated electronic countermeasures or stealth technology, long-range cruise missiles with terrain-following radar, or alternative weapons will be beyond Beijing's technological capability for at least the next ten years. Similarly, Beijing would have scant prospects for building an effective strategic defense system. *[portion markings not declassified]*

106. Whatever China decides to do with its nuclear forces, we believe it will launch a diplomatic offensive designed to deflect international pressure to sign on and play to third-world audiences. We believe Beijing would likely call for additional steps by the superpowers before other nations can sign on because of the continued overwhelming U.S. and Soviet nuclear superiority. Although we believe it less likely because it would cast China in a negative light, Beijing could even choose to portray a U.S.-Soviet agreement as a superpower hoax designed to prevent other nations from achieving equality and guaranteeing their security, much as it treats the nuclear test ban treaty. *[portion markings not declassified]*

Nth Countries

107. It is difficult to gauge how other nations, who either may possess, have under development, or might develop, nuclear weapons would react to a U.S.-Soviet zero ballistic missile world. It is unlikely, nevertheless, that a U.S.-Soviet agreement would in any way curtail or otherwise slow such programs down. Nor would such an agreement act as a stimulus to a buildup in nuclear capabilities. These countries are developing nuclear capabilities primarily for regional purposes, not to threaten the two superpowers. Moreover, by 1996 none would be capable of deploying more than a few long-range ballistic missiles. *[portion markings not declassified]*

108. There are 15 countries of concern in this area: Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Libya, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, and North Korea. They can be put into four groups depending on their stage of missile development or deployment. *[3½ lines not declassified]*. A second category—Libya, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, Syria, Iraq, and

Iran—have operational, potentially nuclear-capable, ballistic missiles in the form of the Soviet-origin SCUD missile. All five of these countries are attempting the development of “indigenous” missile systems with aid from more technically advanced countries. Libya [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have the most active programs; however, it will be at least five years before an indigenously produced Libyan [*less than 1 line not declassified*] missile could be operational. It will be at least 10 years before Syrian, Iraqi, or Iranian missiles would be operational if the current pace of development continues. The next category—Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, India, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and North Korea—have ballistic missiles under development. India and Brazil have relatively advanced space launch vehicle (SLV) programs. Most of the SLV technology, equipment, and experience is directly applicable to ballistic missiles development. Argentina and Pakistan have declared intentions to develop SLVs; however, these declarations are being used to conceal rocket motor developments intended for ballistic missiles. In the last category, South Africa [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have the potential to develop indigenous missile systems but none have been identified. [*portion markings not declassified*]

109. Direct threats to the continental U.S. by ballistic missile attack from Nth world countries in the next 10 years would be minimal at best. Any long range threat that could be developed would likely come from countries such as India or Brazil who, if successful in their attempts to develop large SLVs, could certainly develop intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead, threats to U.S. forces and interests by ballistic missile attack are more likely on a regional basis during the next 10 years; e.g., U.S. forces deployed in South Korea or to British forces deployed to the Falkland Islands. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Table 1

Table Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁵

Washington, undated

⁵ Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*].

TABLE 1

Potential Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces
(November 1986 U.S. START Proposal)

System	Nov 1986 SNDVs/ Weapons	Dec 1991 SNDVs/ Weapons	Dec 1996 SNDVs/ Weapons
SS-18 (10-14 RVs) ⁶	308/3080	165/1650	— —
SS-25 class (mob) (1 RV)	72/72	— —	— —
SS-11 (1 RV)	448/448	90/90	— —
SS-13 (1 RV)	60/60	— —	— —
SS-17 (4 RVs)	150/600	— —	— —
SS-19 (6 RVs)	360/2160	210/1260	— —
ICBMs	1398/6420 ⁷	465/3000 ⁸	— —
SS-N-6/Y-I (1 RV)	272/272	— —	— —
SS-N-17/Y-II (1 RV)	12/12	— —	— —
SS-N-8/D-I, D-II, G/ H-III (1 RV)	292/292	112/112	— —
SS-N-18/D-III (7 RVs)	224/1568	— —	— —
SS-N-23/D-IV, D-III (4-10 RVs) ⁹	48/192	96/384	— —
SS-N-20 class Typhoon (10 RVs)	80/800	100/1000	— —
SLBMs	928/3136 ¹⁰	308/1496 ¹¹	— —
Bear H (6-12 ALCMs) (6-12 ALCMs) ¹²	59/354	80/480	220/2640

⁶ ICBM weapons totals are for accountable RVs. It is assumed that the SS-18 is tested with no more than 10 RVs and is counted as having 10 RVs, although we judge that this missile is capable of carrying as many as 14 RVs. If all SS-18 ICBMs were deployed with 14 RVs, the totals for ICBM and ballistic missile RVs shown here would increase by about 1200 RVs in 1986 and 600 RVs in 1991. [Footnote is in the original.] [*portion marking not declassified*]

⁷ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 6, above.

⁸ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 6, above.

⁹ The SS-N-23 is assumed to be counted with 4 RVs—the number a Soviet official at Geneva has claimed has been tested with this system. We believe that the SS-N-23 is deployed with 10 RVs. If this system is counted as having 10 RVs, the totals for SLBM and ballistic missile RVs shown here would increase by 288 RVs in 1986 and 576 RVs in 1991. [Footnote is in the original.] [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹⁰ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 9, above.

¹¹ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 9, above.

¹² It is assumed here that the Soviets would continue to deploy the Bear H only with six AS-15-class ALCMs (mounted internally) through 1991 in order to minimize their accountable ALCMs and leave room for the maximum number of ballistic missile RVs. We believe that the Bear H is capable of carrying an additional six of these ALCMs

System	Nov 1986 SNDVs/ Weapons	Dec 1991 SNDVs/ Weapons	Dec 1996 SNDVs/ Weapons
Blackjack (12 ALCMs) ¹³	6/72	85/1020	230/2760
Bear A/B/C/G ¹⁴ (bombs & ASMs)	100/100	— —	— —
Bison bombers ¹⁵	20/20	— —	— —
Bombers	185/546 ¹⁶	165/1500	450/5400
SNDVs	2511	938	450
Ballistic Missile RVs (Accountable) ^{17,18}	9556	4496	—
ALCMs & bomber weapons ¹⁹	546	1500	5400
SLCMs (not accountable under this agreement) ²⁰	—	1000	1750
INF missiles: ²¹	441/1323	33/99	— —
SS–20–class	— —	— —	100/100
GLCMs			

mounted externally. It is assumed that after 1991 the Soviets equip the Bear Hs with 12 AS–15 ALCMs and that all of these aircraft are then counted as carrying 12 ALCMs. [Footnote is in the original.] *[portion marking not declassified]*

¹³ The totals shown here assume that each Blackjack carries 12 ALCMs, although we estimate that some of these aircraft probably will carry a mix of bombs and SRAMS rather than ALCMs. [Footnote is in the original.] *[portion marking not declassified]*

¹⁴ Under the proposed counting rules, aircraft equipped only with bombs would be counted as deployed with one weapon each. We estimate that a total of about 350 bombs and ASMs currently are carried on older Bear and Bison bombers. [Footnote is in the original.] *[portion marking not declassified]*

¹⁵ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 14, above.

¹⁶ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 14, above.

¹⁷ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 6, above.

¹⁸ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 9, above.

¹⁹ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 14, above.

²⁰ Under an agreement calling for the elimination of all ballistic missiles, the Soviets probably would place a major emphasis on the deployment of long-range SLCMs. The figures shown here assume that they deploy SS–NX–21 class SLCMs on Victor, 402AA, Akula, and Sierra submarines, and on converted Yankee and Delta SSBNs that would have their SLBM launchers dismantled under such an agreement. [Footnote is in the original.] *[portion marking not declassified]*

²¹ The forces depicted here assume that a separate INF agreement limits the Soviets to 100 warheads on INF missiles in Asia and that ballistic missiles are eliminated in 1996. [Footnote is in the original.] *[portion marking not declassified]*

194. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 15, 1987

SUBJECT

Secretary Weinberger Proposes Adoption of the Broad Interpretation of the ABM Treaty to Support SDI Development

SUMMARY: The press has reported that Secretary Weinberger has told the President that agreeing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years would hurt SDI, that the U.S. could deploy an effective strategic defense by 1994. We have learned Weinberger recommended the U.S. immediately adopt the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty to facilitate development and testing of a space-based system required for the proposed defensive system. Making such a development decision now could have extremely negative effects, both politically and technologically. *END SUMMARY*

In a January 14 column (attached),² Evans and Novak contend that Secretary Weinberger warned the President last month that agreeing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years would result in real penalties for SDI. Evans and Novak claim that Weinberger, Adm. Crowe, and Gen. Abrahamson told the President the U.S. could deploy the first stage of a land- and space-based territorial missile shield by 1993 or 1994, using space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKKVs). This report has been picked up by the European press.

Sources inside SDIO inform us that Weinberger recommended the U.S. shift immediately to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty for the conduct of the SDI program and begin development of a multi-layered ABM system, containing space-based elements, that could be deployed in the 1994 timeframe. The deployment outlined by Weinberger consists of three layers, SBKKVs for boost-phase intercept and two types of ground-based interceptors for exo- and endo-atmospheric intercept.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 NODIS and EXDIS MEMORANDUMS, Lot 94D432, 1987 Nodis Memorandums: January 1–31, 1987. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on January 14 by Jeffrey Garrison (PM/SNP) and Thomas Farr (EUR/RPM); cleared by Timbie and in PM/SNP, PM, EUR/SOY (draft), and S/ARN (draft). A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Pascoe also initialed the memorandum and wrote "1/15."

² Attached but not printed is Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Weinberger's SDI Move," *Washington Post*, January 14, 1987, p. A23.

In classified briefings during the past year, SDIO has consistently described this sort of hybrid system as the most promising near-term deployment option. It is essentially the same as the option proposed in a study by Robert Jastrow and others at the George C. Marshall Institute at the request of Sens. Wilson, Wallop, Quayle, and Reps. Courter and Kemp.

Under any interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we would be free to develop, test, and deploy up to 100 of the proposed ground-based interceptors, providing they are deployed in fixed launchers at either Grand Forks, North Dakota, or the national capital area as permitted by the Treaty. Further, under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we could develop and test, but not deploy, space-based systems and components as long as they are based on "other physical principles (OPP)." Space-based rockets of the type envisioned for SBKKVs, however, have generally been considered as based on traditional technologies; thus, developing and testing them appears prohibited even under the broad interpretation of the Treaty.

OSD is now arguing that the sensors employed by the space-based rockets—some of which will be attached to the rockets—are based on other physical principles. Therefore, they contend SBKKVs should be considered OPP systems. Adopting this controversial assumption would permit us to develop and test, but not deploy, SBKKVs. We understand SDIO claims it could begin tests of these rockets as full components within one year of restructuring the program toward the broad interpretation.

As I pointed out in my December 19 memo,³ there are many questions, both political and technological, that will have to be answered before we adopt a course of action such as Secretary Weinberger has proposed. Politically, such a decision could have very negative effects on congressional, public, and allied support for SDI and on the prospects for reaching agreements with the Soviets on offensive arms reductions. Technologically, we need to solve several difficult problems, including mid-course discrimination necessary to support an exo-atmospheric interceptor, and we still require sophisticated battle management systems to operate the SBKKVs.

Aside from deciding whether we wish to freeze ourselves into this possibly limited set of technologies, we must also determine whether this system can meet our criteria for deployment. We are requesting that the briefing given last month to the President be promptly presented to

³Not found.

you and other appropriate State officials. We hope we can then offer a considered judgment on the proposed system's effectiveness, survivability, and cost effectiveness at the margin. Such judgments will be sensitive, however, to assumptions concerning how the Soviets will respond.

195. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 15, 1987

Mr. Secretary:

As we have discussed previously, in order to achieve a START deal, I believe we must deal concurrently with the Soviets on space/defense. As to the latter, we must come to an understanding with the Soviets on what is—and what, with respect to systems based on “other physical principles,” is to be—permitted and not permitted under the ABM Treaty. In pursuing the permitted/non-permitted activities issue with the Soviets, we will wish to preserve our SDI research program.

Accordingly, I have developed a “think piece” which might deal with permitted/prohibited activities. I have circulated to a number of people in the Administration in an effort to refine the paper; most have been helpful and the attached paper represents this refinement.

It will not be surprising to you that the comments fall into two basic categories: (1) from those who wished to work constructively on the problem, and (2) those in OSD who wished to block any solution to the problem.

This is one of the issues which we need to discuss when you return.²

Paul H. Nitze³

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1987. Secret; Sensitive.

² Shultz departed the United States on January 6 to visit Bermuda (January 6–7), Dakar (January 8–9), Douala (January 9), Nairobi (January 9–12), Lagos (January 12), Abidjan (January 12–14), and Monrovia (January 14), before returning to Washington.

³ Nitze wrote “PHN” above his typed signature.

Attachment

Draft Paper Prepared by the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz⁴

Washington, January 7, 1987

Draft #II
(As modified)

A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO WHAT TESTING THE ABM TREATY PERMITS AND DOES NOT PERMIT

Should the Soviets indicate an interest in working out an NST deal of interest to the U.S., what kind of an NST package would be of interest to us and be potentially negotiable?

Our interest would be in stabilizing START and INF reductions. The Soviet interest appears to be focused on a time period involving non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and strict adherence to an agreed interpretation of its terms.

We know pretty well what we want with respect to START and INF. The most difficult and controversial Space/Defense issue within the Executive Branch is the question of what we could live with in the way of an agreed interpretation of what testing of components of systems based upon “other physical principles” (OPP) is permitted and not permitted by the ABM Treaty. The currently agreed interpretation of the Treaty in the U.S. Executive Branch includes the view that Article V does not apply to testing of components based on OPP as addressed in Agreed Statement D.

As a possible approach, the concept in Agreed Statement D of consultation under Article XIII, combined with the concept in Article VI, could logically be applied to “components” based on OPP capable of substituting for ABM missiles, launchers, or radars. Article VI explicitly applies to missiles, launchers, and radars that are not Article II “components”; specifically, Article VI(a) prohibits giving “missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars” ABM capabilities or testing them in an ABM mode. It would be consistent with the concept of Agreed Statement D and of Article VI, after consultation under Article XIII, to extend the coverage of Article VI to devices based on OPP and potentially capable of substituting for ABM missiles, launchers, or radars.

⁴ Secret.

A procedure which could lead to a mutually agreeable solution to the permitted/non-permitted testing of components based upon OPP issue might be found along the following lines:

The sides would confirm that it would be consistent with the concept of Agreed Statement D and of Article VI of the ABM Treaty to interpret Article VI to provide that neither side will give systems or components other than those defined in Articles I and II an ABM capability or test them in an ABM mode.

— The sides would specifically agree that “components” based upon OPP *and* potentially capable of substituting for ABM components as defined in Article II are subject to the limitation in Article VI.

— It would then be necessary for the sides to arrive at a mutual understanding as to what are such components based upon OPP that have the potential to substitute for ABM components as defined in Article II if tested in an ABM mode and what the term “testing in an ABM mode” means with respect to such potential components based upon OPP.

The U.S. Government, before offering to negotiate such a mutual understanding, would have had to arrive at a judgment as to the answers to two questions implied by the above.

a) What could we now agree would constitute components based upon OPP potentially capable of substituting for ABM components as defined in Article II?

b) What could we now agree would be verifiable criteria with respect to determining whether such potential ABM components are tested in an ABM mode?

With respect to question a) above, a number of possible examples come to mind:

i. Space-based continuous lasers with power greater than 10^n watts or space-based pulsed lasers with energy greater than 10^p joules per pulse.

ii. Ground-based continuous lasers with power greater than 10^{n+y} watts or ground-based pulsed lasers with energy greater than 10^{p+z} joules per pulse.

iii. Space-based mirrors associated with directed energy systems with an effective diameter greater than “D” or ground-based mirrors with a diameter greater than “D”+X.

iv. Other space-based and ground-based directed energy weapons with comparable potential effectiveness.

v. Space-based kinetic energy devices capable of accelerating to a relative velocity greater than 3 kms per second.

With respect to question b) above, the sides would use an appropriate modification of the definition of “tested in an ABM mode” as

it was defined in the 1978 Agreed Statement to the Treaty (attached).⁵ In addition, we would seek reaffirmation: (1) that “subcomponents” or devices that do not have the potential for component-level capabilities as defined above may be tested without limitation; (2) that testing against an object in orbit in space is not a test in an ABM mode; and (3) that tests in space from fixed, land-based test ranges not “in an ABM mode” are permitted, but if these tasks are “in an ABM mode” they would cause the components capable of substituting for ABM components involved in the test to become “ABM components” subject to all of the treaty’s limitations on such components.

⁵ Not attached.

196. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 22, 1987, 12:15–1 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Velikhov
Mr. Sergey Rogov
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
Norman G. Clyne
Dr. James Timbie

Velikhov opened the conversation by referring to the possibility of an agreement on offensive and defensive arms. He said the principal obstacle at Reykjavik had been the laboratory question, the confinement of testing of defensive systems to laboratories. Nitze recounted his recollection of Shevardnadze’s presentation in Reykjavik, which implied all activity outside the walls of laboratories would be prohibited.

Now Velikhov was thinking of another possible solution, to which he would like Nitze’s reaction. The idea is to establish a quantitative boundary. Below this boundary there would be room for research. For lasers, the boundary would be a certain level of brightness. For

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret. Nitze initialed the memorandum beside his name on the list of participants.

particle beams, there would be perhaps a different level of brightness, and energy would need to be taken into account as well. Under this approach, a powerful laser (over the threshold) could be tested outside the lab on the ground, but not in space. This would permit research but prevent testing as a component of a space-based system. He asked Nitze what he thought of this idea.

Nitze responded that the problem with trying to apply the ABM Treaty to systems based on other physical principles was that the Treaty provides no definition of "component" for such systems. He summarized the steps in Velikhov's concept to see if he understood it:

- identify a list of systems based on OPP
- these would include lasers, particle beams, and kinetic energy devices
- distinctions could be made between continuous and pulsed lasers
- for each major component of such system, establish a quantitative boundary below which testing would be permitted and above which such devices would be subject to the Treaty's constraints on testing in an ABM mode
- agree on what would constitute testing in an ABM mode with respect to OPP components which exceeded the threshold
- sensors could be treated differently from kill mechanisms

Velikhov said Nitze had understood precisely and asked for his opinion. Nitze replied that he could not respond for his Government, and in any event the proper place to agree where such discussion should take place was between Kampelman and Vorontsov. Velikhov agreed.

Rogov asked what to make of the publicity over early deployment. Nitze replied that the SDI program was making progress. Velikhov said that all potential systems were far from the criteria on survivability and cost-effectiveness Nitze had advanced. The High Frontier systems do not meet the criteria, and neither do lasers. Nitze said some of them may have the promise of doing so.

Nitze raised the Krasnoyarsk radar as another obstacle to progress. Velikhov said the radar was not operating. Nitze said the radar limits were designed to provide early warning of breakout, and that warning was slipping away. Waiting for operation defeats the entire purpose of the constraint. In addition, the "space-track" explanation is not consistent with the characteristics of the radar. Velikhov said this issue could also be discussed. He suggested Krasnoyarsk, Thule and Fylingdales all be grandfathered. Nitze explained why Thule and Fylingdales are consistent with the Treaty, and Krasnoyarsk is not.

Velikhov thanked Nitze for the opportunity to present his ideas.

197. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 23, 1987

SUBJECT

Briefing by General Abrahamson, January 22, 1987

I was briefed by General Abrahamson on SDI on above date. Abe said the briefing was to have had two parts. Perle was to address the narrow vs. the broad interpretation while he was to address a program for “phased deployment of SDI.” Perle was not available, so Abe proceeded with his part.

He described four possible phases. The earliest he called early deployment. That would use existing technology and be in place by 1992. He was not recommending it. The three phases he was recommending were:

Phase I. Abrahamson said this phase would not be very effective, it would not be cost-effective, and it would not be survivable. But it should have a meaningful capability, i.e., an impact on Soviet strategy and tactics. Deployment could begin in 1993, but this would be neither a full operational capability (FOC) nor an initial operational capability (IOC). What kind of a capability would need to be defined by the Chiefs. It should be able to kill hundreds of Soviet warheads (not thousands), some in boost phase, some in close in mid-course.

Phase II would be a second generation system with an add-on of features to make it survivable against the countermeasures the Soviets would have deployed against the Phase I system. It should be able to intercept some 70% of Soviet warheads, i.e., some 5000 to 6000. If the survivability measures were effective it should come close to meeting the three criteria. This phase might be deployable in 1995.

Phase III would be deployable in 1997 or thereafter, would not be leak-proof, but its effectiveness should be in the upper 90’s. The three criteria should be fully met in this phase.

Abrahamson also discussed his heavy-lift program. He doubted it could become operational at the level of cost-reduction he desires (\$200 per pound lifted) until after 1997.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.

Abrahamson recognized that none of these deployments could take place without abrogating or amending the Treaty. He also acknowledged that the testing required would exceed what is permitted by the Treaty well before the first deployments.

I subsequently talked to Bob Linhard on this subject. He saw five issues to be discussed:

a). Should the President endorse a phased incremental approach to SDI deployment?

He thought the answer should be yes, some time in the future, if each step is on the main line that leads to where we want to be in the future and if it will meet our criteria.

b). Should we go forward with a heavy lift program? Yes; but it won't be ready earlier than 1997.

c). Can we endorse, as an illustrative first approach to SDI architecture, the approach proposed? This approach includes, as a principal element, 210 satellite garages in earth orbit and 5 sensor packages in synchronous orbit.

Linhard believes we must first get an answer as to its survivability against a direct attack. If this cannot be done the Congress will kill it. If we assert that it is survivable, they will demonstrate we are wrong and will kill it. If we admit it is not survivable they will also kill it.

Perhaps if we set forth a reasonable survivability program to be worked on concurrently, we could defend it.

d). To what extent should we demand adherence to the three criteria? Linhard says Cap is against them but that they are sound and will survive. If the garages cannot be directly attacked, the cost to the Soviets to defeat our defenses are hard to measure, we may be able then to defend the cost-effectiveness of the system.

e). Should we go now for what we think is the legally correct interpretation of the Treaty? He thought this to be the principal issue to be discussed.

I said I thought there was a sixth and over-riding issue. That is, does the President now want to endorse a program which unambiguously contemplates withdrawal from the ABM Treaty?

198. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 23, 1987

Mr. Secretary:

The attached document provides the thrust of the OSD argument that will underly the SDIO briefing to you tomorrow:²

— they recommend the SDI program be restructured immediately to adopt a “phased deployment concept,” specifically to permit a decision by this Administration on development and early deployment.

— They recognize that this is a major shift in our standard line on SDI, which has foreseen a decision in the early 1990s, and argue that an early decision is the best chance to assure the program.

— They would adopt immediately the “broad” interpretation of the ABM treaty, so as to permit development and testing of mobile and space-based components within the limits of the treaty.

— OSD will deny having any specific system or *development* decisions in mind but desire the restructure to permit initial *deployment* by the early to mid-1990’s and presumably will present technical evidence to support such a move.

OSD needs to address for us the budgetary impact (on other Defense programs, and the overall deficit), the probability that the ABM treaty would not survive under such strain, and the arms control impact of a decision along these lines. Their proposal is also clearly designed to polarize the Congressional debate, with potentially dangerous consequences for many other Administration interests.

H. Allen Holmes³

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1987. Secret; Super Sensitive.

² No minutes for a January 24 briefing were found.

³ Holmes signed the letter “Allen” above his typed signature.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, undated

Issues Regarding OSD Briefing on SDI

Background

On 17 December 1986, the Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle and General Abrahamson briefed the President and a number of his senior staff on the implications of continuing to conduct the SDI program with a view to making development decisions in the 1990's and subject to the limitations of the "restrictive" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. They recommended, in the briefing to be presented to the Secretary of State on Thursday, that the SDI program be restructured immediately so as to adopt a "phased deployment concept" (permitting developmental decisions to be made in the next two years) and allowing the development and testing to be performed in accordance with the "legally-correct" interpretation.

Key Issues

- It is now clear that certain technologies are sufficiently mature to permit decisions on their development to be made during this Administration. While OSD is not, at this time, recommending any specific systems or development decisions, it is apparent that, if we are to take advantage of the opportunity for this President to leave behind an SDI program with a reasonable chance of being realized, we need to make some immediate decisions.

- To varying degrees, these decisions will entail some adjustments in the "catechism" we have developed over the past three years to describe our policies regarding the SDI program. As this catechism is about to spelled out yet again in a series of reports⁵ due shortly on Capitol Hill, a driving consideration in the OSD effort promptly to focus senior-level attention on these decisions stems from the need for authoritative and coherent characterizations of our policy for these impending reports.

- *Phased Deployment:* The first major decision involves a departure from our description of the program as leading to development decisions "by a future President, sometime in the early-to-mid 1990's." OSD believes it is possible, indeed necessary, to adopt a programmatic—and, therefore, policy—approach which gives this President the option of making some development decisions on the nearest-term, global

⁴ Secret. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Super Sensitive/Internal OSD Memo (PROTECT)."

⁵ These reports include: the annual SDI report to Congress (due 1 Feb), a report on the restrictive interpretation's impact (due 1 Feb), a report on nearterm deployment options (due 1 March) and the annual ACIS (overdue). [Footnote is in the original.]

defense system, leading to a deployment capability in the early-to-mid 1990's. OSD will be prepared to give a description of what such a notional system would involve; it will not, however, be recommending that a development decision be taken at this time on this or any other specific system.

◦ *Legally-Correct Interpretation*: The second decision sought by the OSD briefing is the adoption of the “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty which is identified in this briefing as the “Legally-Correct Interpretation (LCI).” OSD (including SDIO) believes that the adoption of the LCI will be critical to our future ability to demonstrate a workable, reliable and survivable strategic defense capability. Development and testing allowed under the LCI but prohibited by the “restrictive” interpretation will allow the SDI program to prove its viability more quickly, more confidently and at lower cost—without having to abrogate the ABM Treaty. Indeed, OSD believes it is the only way SDI will be able to achieve its goals.

◦ It is obvious that the issues being raised in this briefing are contentious and of considerable significance for the Reagan Administration and for the President's SDI program. OSD believes that decisions need promptly to be made not only to ensure that the program is managed and executed as efficiently as possible (all the more important in light of the reduced funding approved to date by the Congress) but also to minimize our exposure to self-inflicted wounds (e.g. flailing over the reports now in preparation) or Congressionally-imposed restraints (e.g. legislation which would *oblige* us to conduct the SDI program within the “restrictive” interpretation. The latter will be a particularly difficult measure to defeat as long as our policy remains one of observing such an interpretation).

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 27, 1987

PARTICIPANTS

Paul H. Nitze
John B. Rhinelander
James P. Timbie

Nitze opened the discussion with a reference to the great amount of interest in what they had negotiated 15 years ago, but contrary to popular opinion, the central issue is not the broad versus narrow

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1987. Confidential. Drafted on February 2. Nitze initialed the memorandum beside his name on the list of participants. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

interpretation. Rhinelander agreed and said the real issue is, what is a component.

Nitze reviewed his conversation with Velikhov.² They had identified a list of technologies that represented other physical principles (OPP), including lasers, particle beams, and kinetic energy. Rhinelander said kinetic energy could properly be considered OPP. Nitze went on to say that Velikhov's approach would treat continuous and pulsed lasers separately. Within each category, thresholds would be identified to define component levels capability. The process is analogous to the use of 3×10^6 watt meters squared to distinguish radars constrained by the ABM Treaty from smaller radars not so constrained. Below the thresholds, testing would be unconstrained; above them, there would be agreement on what constitutes testing in an ABM mode. Finally, there would be a distinction between sensors and kill mechanisms, with no limit on testing sensors except in conjunction with kill mechanisms.

Rhineland said he agrees with the approach, and believes the Soviets are indeed thinking along those lines as well.

Nitze said that absent such an agreement, testing of devices not yet agreed to be components is not limited. Rhinelander said that a rule of reason should apply. He gave as an example the Airborne Optical Adjunct. In his view, this system comes closest to the capability of a component, as it is close to being capable of substituting for a radar. He believes this and the Krasnoyarsk radar are the two key current questions concerning the ABM Treaty.

Rhineland said he had not reviewed any documents for 15 years and was relying on his memory, but he recalled that the Graybeal/Karpov group had worked out Article V, and agreed that its scope covered both current and new technologies.³ Nitze disagreed, saying that what Karpov said was that Article V covered future systems; this was ambiguous as to whether future developments of systems based on old technology or also included systems based on OPP. Garthoff subsequently had a long discussion of OPP, but no examples were discussed. Only later was Garthoff authorized to mention lasers.

Rhineland said the word "currently" in Article II makes clear that Article II applies to future systems. This was done in late 1970. Article III was completed later, in the spring of 1972. In about April 1972 he drafted an interpretive memo suggesting certain issues be looked at, including multiple warhead ABM interceptors and test

² See Document 196.

³ Reference is to Sidney Graybeal, the U. S. Chair of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission of ACDA.

ranges. It was decided not to go back to the question of Article V and future components. All agreed on what has come to be known as the historic interpretation.

Nitze responded that the question is, what did the Russians agree to. He had reviewed the record carefully, and had not seen anything that makes clear that the Soviets agreed that OPP systems are limited to fixed basing. Rhineland said his recollection after 15 years was that lasers could only be at Sary Shagan or White Sands. Most of the discussion concerned adjuncts. Nitze said we had come a long way since 1972. No one thought of mirrors in space then. The ABM Treaty just doesn't deal with such questions.

200. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 28, 1987, 3–5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Malcolm Wallop
Senator Pete Wilson
Congressman Jack Kemp
Congressman Jim Courter
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
Mr. Norman G. Clyne

The Congressmen were accompanied by some 8–10 members of their staffs. Senator Wallop began by saying that they wished to find out what I thought about early SDI deployment, and that they also wished to present to me their ideas on the subject.

I emphasized that I had been briefed on this subject on Thursday, January 22nd, and the Secretary and I had been briefed on Saturday, January 24th.² Both the Secretary and I felt it was necessary that we do considerably more work to fully understand what the Pentagon had in mind before we could come up with a definitive view. I followed the attached talking points. I, told them what I understand to be the Pentagon-approved procedure for making major acquisition decisions and that the Pentagon has decided to follow that procedure with respect

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. No classification marking. Nitze initialed the memorandum beside his name on the list of participants. The meeting took place in Wallop's office.

² See Document 197.

to acquisitions related to the deployment of SDI. I said that from the briefings I had received I was not certain as to what stage in the process they consider the program to be.

Senator Wallop said that his group had spent some 7 to 10 days going from laboratory to laboratory being briefed on individual weapon systems and it was their opinion that the entire program was ready for a decision on prompt deployment. I said that was not the impression I had received. Senator Wallop then questioned whether the procurement procedure which I outlined was necessary with respect to SDI. They thought only a political decision was required. I asked whether they thought that Congress would permit money to be spent on prompt deployment. They argued that if the Pentagon and the State Department were strongly behind the program, and if the President used his full powers of persuasion, the Congress would not stand in the way.

I said I thought an ability persuasively to answer the full range of questions applicable to such a decision would be necessary to win such a debate.

Attachment

Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

TALKING POINTS
FOR MEETING WITH
CONGRESSMAN COURTER
JANUARY 28, 1987

1. Have been briefed twice by General Abrahamson and have talked to others in Executive Branch about the Pentagon concept. Secretary Shultz briefed last Saturday.

2. Pentagon has not yet developed a program or project one can get one's teeth into and fully understand. Therefore, it is premature to have a final opinion on the issue.

3. The Pentagon has, some time ago, developed a procedure for making major acquisition decisions. As I understand it, it involves a number of prescribed milestones.

³No classification marking.

— The first is milestone 0, a decision that the idea underlying the project seems to be good enough to warrant exploration.

— Milestone (1) is validation of the technology involved.

— Milestone (2) is a decision that full scale development is justified and should be approved.

— Milestone (3) is a decision that production of the system and its components for actual deployment should be and is approved.

4. As I understand it, the Pentagon has decided that Abrahamson's SDI early deployment concept is to be subjected to these procurement decision procedures.

I am not informed as to what portions of the concept have yet to pass Milestone 1 and which are ready for Milestone 2, and if any are ready for a Milestone 3 decision.

5. No serious interdepartmental staff work has yet been done on a program to embody the concept of early-phased deployment.

QUESTION: What are your present views on the concepts of phased early deployment.

ANSWER: (a) I believe the Soviets are obtaining certain potential advantages from their work on their Moscow-based ABM system, on their relatively dense phased-array early warning system, and on the elements of what could become an ATBM system. Whether those potential advantages are worth the substantial costs involved is not demonstrable one way or the other. The more important question is whether a roughly comparable effort on our part would produce capabilities and give us experience worth more than the alternate uses to which comparable resources could be applied.

(b) There is a separate problem with respect to tests and deployments requiring us to deviate from the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, or from the so-called narrow interpretation.

(c) The broad versus narrow interpretation may not go to the heart of the problem. At the time the Treaty was being negotiated we had little idea as to what systems based on OPP might be. We certainly did not then know how to define "components" of such systems with the same precision with which we defined in Article II of the Treaty "ABM components" based on the then understood technologies. This is a problem we need to think through.

(d) Work needs to be done before a definitive view on a program to implement the phased-early deployment concept is possible.

201. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 30, 1987

MEETING WITH SENIOR ADVISORS

I. PURPOSE

To prepare the President for a series of decisions associated with the SDI program which will be discussed in more detail in an NSPG on Tuesday, February 3.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 17, 1986, the Secretary of Defense provided the President with a briefing on the status of the SDI program and made several recommendations to the President about that program. Since that time, these recommendations have been staffed with other agencies. The NSPG, scheduled for February 3, will discuss the results of this staffing. A memorandum which was previously prepared for the President's reading, and which summarizes the issues and decisions the President will face, is provided at *Tab A*. Monday's session with the President would review the subjects covered in this memorandum to ensure the President is prepared for Tuesday's critical NSPG meeting.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President, Vice President, Mr. Regan, Mr. Carlucci, General Powell, Colonel Linhard, and Mr. Ermarth.

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press plan.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Mr. Carlucci will frame the purpose of Tuesday's meeting and ask Colonel Linhard to walk through the current status of each of the issues. This will be followed by general discussion. No decisions are required at this meeting.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0143 [SDI-ABM]. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Powell initialed the memorandum on behalf of Carlucci. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper righthand corner of the memorandum. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for February 2 from 2 p.m. until 3 p.m. in the Oval Office.

Tab A

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan²

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

SDI—Upcoming Decisions

I. BACKGROUND

This paper is an overview of the status of a number of SDI issues we will face in the next two weeks. It is for your information. No immediate decisions are needed.

As follow-up to the briefing you received last month on incremental deployment of strategic defenses, Cap Weinberger has sent over a draft National Security Decision Directive and a set of working papers on the concept he presented.³

These papers raise two types of issues that will need to be resolved over the next two weeks. The first type is a collection of generally non-controversial, but important programmatic decisions. The second is a single, difficult, and crucial decision—whether or not to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of our full legal rights under the ABM Treaty. *Your decision on this issue could be the most important one you will make on the SDI program over the next two years.*

DOD is presenting the briefing you received to George Shultz and his advisors and other key arms control officials. You will be meeting next week with both Cap and George to clarify points of consensus, although I believe they will differ sharply on the need to move to the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty. These issues must be resolved. Following the February 3rd meeting, I will provide the necessary option papers for your consideration.

II. PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES

There are four programmatic issues associated with incremental deployments of strategic defenses:

- the concept of incremental deployments itself;
- the need for a Heavy-lift Launch Vehicle (HLV);
- commitment to a specific system or deployment date; and
- criteria for a deployment decision.

²Secret. Sent for information. Powell initialed the memorandum on behalf of Carlucci.

³Not found.

Incremental Deployments

The concept of incremental deployment of strategic defenses makes a great deal of military and technological sense. Such deployments would achieve interim improvements in strategic stability (by complicating Soviet attack planning and confounding their confidence in success of a possible attack), while working toward your primary goal of comprehensive defenses. Formal recognition of the advantages of incremental deployments is probably appropriate.

Heavy-lift Launch Vehicle

A new cargo-carrying rocket is imperative for a strategic defense system with space-based elements. A larger rocket with more reusable parts will dramatically lower launch costs, a key factor in the cost-effectiveness of strategic defenses. Such a system would also be of great use for other military and civil space programs, for example the space station. Therefore, there seems to be consensus that we should proceed with such a system, although questions may arise on funding and management of the program.

Specific Systems or Deployment Dates

Cap has stressed that the system he described to you was simply illustrative of what might be done. No specific system or deployment date has been fully analyzed or submitted to you, and much work remains to be done before a meaningful deployment decision could be made. However, there is already confusion in the press and on the Hill that you are considering a decision on deployment of a specific system. Therefore, should you decide to endorse the concept of incremental deployments (and I recommend that you do), you may also wish to make clear that such an endorsement does not constitute either approval of a particular system architecture or commitment to deploy by a certain date.

Criteria for Deployment

You have directed, and Congress has subsequently written into law, that any decision to deploy strategic defenses be made on the basis of three criteria: military effectiveness; survivability; and cost-effectiveness at the margin. The draft NSDD Cap submitted, implicitly replaces these criteria with one that would simply require initial deployments to be on a path toward comprehensive defenses. Such a substitution would leave SDI vulnerable to criticism from those opponents who believe strategic defenses would be destabilizing. So far, we have defeated opponents' arguments by demonstrating how our standards for the program will guarantee strategic stability. If we abandoned our criteria, we would lose this protection and end up in renewed debate about whether we should pursue SDI at all.

III. ABM TREATY ISSUE

Cap recommends that it is now time to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of our full legal rights under the ABM Treaty, allowing testing of space-based strategic defenses.

Background. You will recall that after careful review of the ABM Treaty and its negotiating record in the Fall of 1985, the State Department's legal advisor, Judge Sofaer, and others concluded that the ABM Treaty was substantially more flexible than we had previously believed. In fact, it permits development and testing of space-based strategic defenses, if they are based on so-called "other physical principles" (OPP), e.g. lasers or infra-red sensors.

Therefore, on October 11, 1985, you issued NSDD 192 affirming our right to conduct ABM development and testing under this legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the Treaty. However, because the SDI program had originally been structured to meet its goals under a restrictive treaty interpretation, and because restructuring the program would have political and diplomatic costs, you also directed that, as a matter of policy, the SDI program would not be restructured to take advantage of the "broader" or legally correct interpretation, so long its progress was not jeopardized. Secretary Weinberger believes we are now at a point where SDI's progress is being slowed by this policy.

Issues. In deciding whether to take advantage of the LCI, you may wish to balance five factors:

- The program costs of adhering to a more restrictive interpretation;
- The best timing for taking advantage of the LCI;
- Tactics for dealing with Congress;
- Allied opinions; and,
- Effects on the Geneva arms reduction talks.

Program Costs. There is no clear-cut answer from DOD on what are the specific dollar or delay costs incurred by not continuing our current policy of not restructuring the SDI program to take advantage of the LCI. Clear cut answers simply may not be possible.

In demonstrating the feasibility of ABM technologies, SDI scientists have designed creative experiments to work *within* more restrictive Treaty restraints. They take a piecemeal approach, testing different devices separately, and they also consciously scale back the capabilities of the devices they test (e.g. the successful Delta 180 experiment last fall had scaled-back sensors). So far, this approach has not prevented the SDI program from making progress toward its goals. Nonetheless, OSD tells us that certain proposed experiments have been delayed or denied by the Defense Department's treaty compliance review board which would have been approved under the LCI (e.g. the planned Delta 181 sensor experiment). Based on what Cap has provided to date,

it is not clear that from a programmatic view we need now to restructure the program—but Cap may not agree.

In sum, the current piecemeal approach to testing increases costs, contributes to delay, and actually diminishes our confidence in the results because an integrated test of various strategic defense devices is the best way to demonstrate the feasibility of technology. Indeed, to have sufficient information for an informed decision on incremental deployment, it will almost certainly be necessary to restructure the SDI program toward the LCI at some point. When we do this, there will be both political risks and costs. This raises the question of optimal timing.

Optimal Timing. Because the outcome of a decision to move toward the LCI is so important, the timing of such a move is critical. There are really three choices, this year, next year, or during a future President's term. It is difficult to know what pressure will face the next President, but in all candor, there is a strong possibility that his commitment to SDI will not match yours; therefore, you may not wish to leave this decision to a successor. A second consideration is that next year it may be more difficult to take new policy initiatives. Moreover, certain options may become impossible if we achieve significant progress toward an arms reduction agreement. Even this year, sustaining a decision on taking advantage of the LCI will not be easy. Much depends on action in the Congress.

Strategy for Dealing with Congress. Senator Levin and several of his colleagues are moving to legislate our adherence to a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. There are two alternative strategies for countering this move. We could wait for Levin et al. to strike first, and argue that without provocation he is attempting to breach separation of powers by tampering with our right to interpret treaties and by undermining our position in Geneva.

Alternatively, we could take the initiative and lay out our legal and programmatic case, including, as a first step discreet discussions with key Senators. However, this might incur a risk that even Congressmen not inclined to support Levin would attempt to "punish" us by cutting SDI funding. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the issue, we cannot get a firm head count on how Congress might vote in either case. However, we are now making discreet inquiries.

Allied Opinions. Allied opinion on implementing the LCI will be unfavorable. We can almost certainly expect strong reactions from both Britain and West Germany. Moreover, after your decision in October, 1985, we pledged to consult with the Allies over any decision to take advantage of the LCI. On the other hand, some of our Allies showed new (and ironic) appreciation for SDI when they perceived that it prevented the Soviets from accepting the comprehensive proposals you made at Reykjavik and that it would provide insurance as ballistic missiles were drawn down. The bottom line is that the Allies simply do not like change when it comes to strategic issues.

Effect on the Geneva Negotiations

The impact on the Geneva negotiations depends largely upon whether or not we succeed in implementing the LCI. If the U.S. successfully implements the LCI, it would vividly demonstrate to the Soviets our resolve to pursue SDI. This would increase our leverage in Geneva and could be a decisive factor in persuading them to shift their emphasis, from trying to kill SDI to trying to get the best deal they can on how and when defenses are deployed.

On the other hand, if the Congress were to legislate prohibition of U.S. implementation of the LCI—either on their own, or in response to your direction that the SDI program be restructured to take advantage of the LCI—not only would the program be severely damaged, but our negotiating leverage in Geneva would be sharply diminished.

Other's Views. It is now clear that *Cap* will press strongly for immediate permission to restructure the SDI program to take full advantage of the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It is equally clear that *George* will strongly oppose such a move. He will argue that while this may be necessary later, to do so now would cause major problems with our Allies and needlessly foreclose negotiating options. In a recent memo to you, George suggested an NST proposal that assumes we continue under current policy—with the SDI program following a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty—for at least a few more years as part of a negotiated agreement on permitted and prohibited SDI activity. *Cap* believes this is the very type of agreement that we should avoid, pursuing instead a simpler approach, negotiating the timing of deployments. The *JCS* supported *Cap's* briefing, but their formal views have not been submitted. *ACDA* and *CIA* have not offered opinions.

Bottom Line. All agree that if we could move now to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty, while managing Allied reactions, and more importantly, maintaining Congressional support, it would be in the U.S. interest. It would accelerate progress, cut costs, increase confidence, *and* add pressure on the Soviets. However, the issue is whether we can manage the risks and, if we are uncertain about this, whether we should take the chance now. The discussions over the next two weeks should focus on this issue.⁴

⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan participated in a briefing with Bush, Carlucci, Powell, Linhard, Ermarth, and Regan on February 2 from 2:02 until 3:05 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found. Reagan noted in his personal diary for that day: "Then a pre-meeting to be briefed for tomorrow's N.S.P.G. meeting on S.D.I. & whether to go for the liberal interpretation of A.B.M. treaty which is really legal & correct one. Doing this would help research on S.D.I. but the Soviets & possibly some of our allies might scream." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 684)

202. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, February 2, 1987, 1736Z

1001. For the Secretary From Ambassador Kampelman. Subject: Treaty Interpretation.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Dear Mr. Secretary:

3. Here is a copy of a private message I have just sent to Frank Carlucci.

4. Begin text.

5. This message relates to the agenda of the Tuesday² meeting. I believe the underlying issue to be the most important to be faced by the President in the remaining period of the Reagan Presidency. Since it deals with an area where the President has given me a major responsibility, I offer my views.

6. It would, I believe, be a serious blunder were the President now to abandon his policy of limiting SDI Research to the traditional “narrow” ABM Treaty interpretation, or were he to make a decision now for early deployment. And I speak as a strong supporter of SDI. The subject of when and how to broaden the scope of SDI research should be periodically under review, but it should not be made now in the midst of active arms reduction talks in Geneva that are entering a serious stage. Such a decision now would give the Soviets a wide opening to claim that it was made to destroy the current Geneva talks, just as they were showing greater negotiating forthrightness. This position would, I fear, be shared by a majority in Congress of both parties and would be strongly echoed by most of the press and by our European allies. I would hate to see this inevitable polarization be the dominant theme of the next year. Congressional hearings would involve us all. It is not in the national interest or the President’s. Nor will it produce the SDI funding and support we want.

7. How can we best support SDI? There is no doubt that its development will require going beyond the narrow into the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Its eventual deployment, once it proves itself to the President and the Congress, will require withdrawing from or amending the ABM Treaty. The President has asserted that the broad

¹ Source: Department of State, S Records, Records of Counselor Max Kampelman, Lot 89D056, Mink Cables. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Mink. Drafted and approved by Kampelman.

² February 3.

interpretation is the legally correct one. There is a strong basis for that conclusion. I support it, but it is contrary to the view presented by the Nixon administration to the Senate during the treaty ratification proceedings and by other administrations, including the Reagan administration. Many outstanding international lawyers have persuaded many members of congress of both parties that the contrary legal interpretation is more valid. Why not find a way to avoid a constitutional crisis and achieve our goals without this controversy? A confrontation now, which I believe to be unnecessary, would lead the Congress to respond with firm legislative restrictions that will curb SDIO and its funding. I work closely with the Congress and I have no doubt of the Congressional effort and it will cross party lines.

8. My objective in Geneva is to reach a negotiating result with the Soviets which will produce for us 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms and reduce medium range missiles by at least 80%—without paying an SDI price. I believe we can bypass a fruitless and intense debate as to what the ABM Treaty means and permit us to pursue SDI without any restrictions at all on our research effort and with either no or very few restrictions on our testing in space requirements. We should know within six months at the latest whether these objectives are attainable. The President can then decide whether he wishes to accept the results and he will then have my recommendation. Our inability to reach a satisfactory negotiating result, if that should be the case, would then justify a presidential decision to proceed. It is prudent to wait.

9. The SDI program is a good one. The President's vision is a clear and correct one. The results will prove themselves. There is no need to be precipitous and preemptive. Our task is not to polarize or be divisive. It is to expand the SDI consensus that began with the President's 1983 speech and not endanger it. That is the best formula for success. End text.

Kampelman

203. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Sofaer) to Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, February 2, 1987

SUBJECT

Whether a Proper Basis now Exists for Implementing the "Broad" View of the ABM Treaty

You asked me whether the President could now properly implement the "broad" view of the ABM Treaty, and if not what steps should be taken before that issue could definitively be addressed.

The President will be able to implement the broad view when he is satisfied on the basis of all relevant criteria that it is the legally correct interpretation ("LCI"), and when he determines that no other legal obstacle exists to its immediate implementation.

In my judgment, the work necessary for a final decision on the LCI of the ABM Treaty is substantially advanced, but still incomplete. In particular, (1) we should afford the Senate a full opportunity to consider our position on the negotiating record; and (2) we should complete our study of subsequent conduct and permit the Senate to respond to our conclusions. In addition, issues remain which constitute potential legal obstacles to the immediate implementation of the broad view. In particular, (1) we should deal with the claim that Executive branch representations made during ratification of the Treaty are legally binding; and (2) we must avoid actions inconsistent with governing SDI legislation. (These issues are discussed in Tab A.)²

A proposed agenda for completing the work necessary to enable the President to make a final judgment on the LCI is attached (Tab B).³ It contemplates a program of legal research and analysis, as well as a full dialogue with Congress. (A draft letter to Senators Nunn and Warner

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Top Secret. In a February 2 memorandum to Shultz, Sofaer wrote: "Issue for Decision: Whether to send the attached Platt/Carlucci with the memorandum that Col. Linhard requested I prepare. (I have shown the memorandum to the Attorney General, who seems likely to agree to its recommendations.) I recommend that you approve sending the memorandum." Shultz approved Sofaer's recommendation. (Ibid.) Platt sent Sofaer's memorandum to Linhard under cover of a February 2 memorandum to Carlucci. (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed is a paper prepared in the Department of State laying out steps required before a decision on LCI, and possible legal obstacles to immediate implementation.

³ Attached but not printed is a proposed work agenda prepared in the Department of State.

announcing the President's willingness to engage in this dialogue is attached at Tab C.)⁴ The entire process could be completed within about six months.

Permitting this process of analysis and consultation to proceed on a reasonable but expedited schedule would:

- * avoid a reaction from Congress (especially the Senate) based on a bipartisan defense of institutional prerogatives;

- * lend credibility to Administration claims on the merits of the broad interpretation;

- * preserve legislative good will necessary for future funding of SDI activities;

- * place added pressure on the Soviets for a negotiated agreement that moots the legislative controversy;

- * fulfill our commitment to notify our alliance partners of an intention to switch to the broad view.

Finally, a careful legal analysis is also necessary, before the President acts, to determine what advantages the United States would obtain by switching to the broad view. The broad view is helpful only with respect to certain tests of certain devices based on other physical principles (OPP). Deployment of any system is governed by Article I, and the development, testing or deployment of a non-OPP system or component is subject to all the constraints in the Treaty, including all the limitations of Articles V and VI. Many of the tests contemplated under the phased deployment scheme, particularly of kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs), will be lawful under the broad view only if we establish that KKV's are not "missiles" and therefore are governed solely by Agreed Statement D. More important, the Treaty contains no definition of what constitutes a "component" based upon OPP comparable to the definitions in Article II.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a draft letter from President Reagan to Senators Nunn and Warner.

204. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 2, 1987

SUBJECT

Likely Reactions of NATO Allies to Official U.S. Adoption of the Broad Interpretation of the ABM Treaty

In light of recent comments at one of your Saturday SDI meetings about possible NATO reactions to a broad US interpretation of the ABM treaty, we have examined allied views. We find:

— Adoption of a policy conforming to the broad interpretation of the ABM treaty would be viewed by our allies as tantamount to a decision to deploy SDI and would be opposed by them at this time.

— Allied support and participation has been predicated on our assurance that they will be consulted before the US makes decisions on development. They do not believe we have met that obligation at this time.

— A decision to implement the broad interpretation will bring to the fore longstanding concerns about SDI's political and military implications for alliance strategy, for the efficacy of UK and French deterrents, and for strategic stability.

— The allies would believe the NST will be hopelessly stalemated by such a decision and an opportunity lost for significant arms control achievement.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no P number]. Secret; Noform; Nodis. Drafted by Robert Hansen (INR/WEA). A stamped notation in the upper-right corner of the memorandum indicates Shultz saw it.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State²

Washington, February 2, 1987

LIKELY REACTIONS OF NATO ALLIES TO OFFICIAL US ADOPTION OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY

The reactions of our NATO allies to a US move in the coming months to adopt officially the broad interpretation of the ABM treaty would be uniformly negative and some, including our principal allies, would strongly oppose it. Given the recent public debate over acceleration of SDI deployment, our allies would view a decision to move to the broad interpretation of the treaty as tantamount to an early deployment decision. They would regard such a move as a radical switch in policy and premature in light of the commitments we have made to them to date. It would, moreover, feed their accumulating fears about the administration's grip on foreign policy.

Conditions for Present Allied Support for SDI

Most of our allies have endorsed the SDI research program as an appropriate response to Soviet strategic defense activities. Prime Ministers Thatcher and Chirac and Chancellor Kohl have all been supportive of the legitimacy of SDI research. Kohl and others credited SDI research with providing a strong inducement to the Soviets to return to the negotiating table and bargain seriously. London, Bonn, and Rome have lent moral support to the program by signing formal agreements to participate in SDI research, although their primary motive has been the desire not to be left behind in the SDI technology revolution.

While endorsing SDI research the allies have reserved on the merits of deployment. Their support has been given on conditions implicit in Prime Minister Thatcher's Camp David statement (see annex).³

² Secret; NoFORN; NODIS. Drafted by Hansen.

³ Attached but not printed is Thatcher's Camp David Statement: "First, the US and Western aim was not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments; Second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations; Third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and, Fourth, the East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides." For the memorandum of conversation of Reagan and Thatcher's meeting at Camp David, see Document 9.

One of these conditions has been that research will be conducted in conformity with the ABM treaty. When the question of treaty interpretation arose last fall, our allies made clear their unhappiness with our initiative to adopt a more permissive reading which would permit full-scale development and testing of space-based defense components. London and Bonn were relieved by the President's decision to confine SDI activities to the restrictive interpretation as a matter of policy.

Kohl has publicly endorsed the restrictive interpretation of the treaty. Although Thatcher has reportedly said she does not wish to be drawn into interpreting the treaty, Geoffrey Howe, presumably speaking last week with her blessing, urged adherence to the restrictive interpretation.

The allies have taken us at our word that we will consult with them before taking any decision to develop and deploy strategic defenses. Because they will see an official move to the broad interpretation of the treaty as presaging deployment, they will insist that consultations are in order. On a number of occasions, they have sought to engage us in discussion of the pros and cons of strategic defenses but have found US answers to their questions unsatisfying. They have acquiesced in postponing such a dialogue, believing there would be an opportunity for it later. We have repeatedly said decisions on development and deployment would be made by a future president, at the earliest in the early 1990s.

Foreign Minister Genscher last week complained to Ambassador Burt that the Germans had been told nothing of US consideration of SDI deployment and that they would want to express their views on so important a matter. Lord Carrington reportedly is considering calling for US-NATO consultations on SDI deployment options. Belgian and Canadian permreps at NATO have called for a NATO study of the implications of SDI for alliance strategy. In consultations, our allies will expect a detailed, rigorous analysis of the political and military implications of SDI and a thorough exchange of views.

The allies have been temporarily reassured in the past by our enunciation of objective criteria for judging the efficacy of SDI—cost effectiveness, survivability, and stability. Before we take a decision to develop a specific system, they will expect us to show how these criteria are met.

Strategic Concerns

Although debate on the strategic implications of SDI has been overshadowed in the past year by attention to other aspects of the SDI issue, such as participation in the research and the Reykjavik negotiations, there is no indication that the concerns voiced earlier have eased.

These would be brought to the fore by decisions on the ABM treaty interpretation. These concerns include:

— *Alliance strategy.* Protection of the US and the USSR by defensive systems would diminish or end the extended deterrent of US strategic forces, leaving Europe exposed to a relatively greater threat from superior Soviet conventional forces.

— *UK-French deterrents.* A Soviet strategic defense in the long run could easily neutralize the much smaller deterrents of Britain and France. Both France and the UK fear difficulties in sustaining political support for their nuclear programs, a challenge which would be accelerated by an early deployment decision.

— *Instability.* Our allies fear destabilizing effects of SDI on the strategic relationship. They will have special doubts about the survivability and cost-effectiveness of a first-generation strategic defense against an unconstrained Soviet threat.

Arms Control Implications

The allies probably believe that US adoption of the broader interpretation of the ABM treaty would seal the doom of the Nuclear and Space Talks because of either a Soviet walkout or a hopeless stalemate. Soviet assertions that the US had killed the talks would find a receptive audience among those Europeans who are already suspicious of or hostile to SDI.

Our allies believe that a departure in practice from the restrictive interpretation should be a matter for negotiation with the Soviets. Geoffrey Howe has recently suggested to you that we offer to stick with the broad interpretation in exchange for 50-percent reductions. The disruption of the Geneva talks would come at time when London and Bonn believe Gorbachev is interested in reaching a deal and that the Soviet internal situation may offer unique opportunities for reducing tensions.

Allied Domestic Concerns

With an election on the horizon, Thatcher would find US decisions on the treaty unwelcome at this time. Although the Kohl government has just won reelection, US decisions that led to a rupture of the Geneva talks would likely bring mass protests from Germany's peace movement. Moreover, Foreign Minister Genscher, who is personally most suspicious of SDI, has been strengthened in the coalition by the strong showing of the FDP.

Chirac's enthusiasm for SDI has been motivated in part by a desire to distinguish his policy from Mitterrand's. Differences between the two over SDI are likely to be muted in the face of a US decision leading to accelerated development, since Gaullists and Socialists alike must deal with the strategic implications of SDI for the French deterrent.

Impact on the Alliance

Events of the last year—including the bombing of Libya, our decision on SALT II, and the proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles—have already conveyed the impression that we will act alone when it suits us, with insufficient regard for allied views and interests. Official adoption of the broad interpretation, particularly without adequate consultations, would likely be viewed as a last-ditch act to assure implementation of a policy now because we doubted that political support could be mobilized later.

These perceptions would likely diminish US ability to lead the alliance on other tough issues such as coordinating a common approach in the CSCE and improving NATO's conventional posture. The tendencies of our European partners to use the EC and WEU to prepare a common front for dealing with the US on security issues would doubtlessly be given momentum. One cannot rule out the possibility that, as a group or individually, our allies might embark on unilateralist paths of their own in dealing with Moscow.

205. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, February 3, 1987, 10:29 a.m.

SUBJECT

Consultations and Today's NSPG.

Good Morning, Boss.

Both me and my normal back-up, Don Mahley, got trapped on the Shirley Highway this morning, causing us to miss the 7:30 meeting. I understand that consultation on SDI did come up as an issue (Fritz came down and gave me a detailed debrief after the meeting).

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 61930. Secret. Copies were sent to Ermarth, Alison Fortier, Kraemer, Brooks, Sestanovich, Tobey, Mahley, Sommer, and Linhard. Sent through Green and Pearson.

I would offer the following thoughts on the consultation process (both allied and congressional).

1. Before we initiate a consultative process, we need to get the President to the point where he has fully thought through the issue, the arguments, and the consequences of the views he will hear (when asked) from both Congress and allies. This helps the President by preparing him with a context within which he can quickly understand what he hears, evaluate it, and respond as needed. In my view, we are not quite there yet. I would argue for one more NSPG, after today's, which focuses on the arms control options in the defense and space area. We could be ready for this meeting as early as this Friday²—but the likely best time would be next Tuesday, 10 February. Following that meeting, the President should have about as much information as we will be able to provide. He could use the remainder of that week to come to some tentative decisions and then (by Friday, February 13th) issue instructions on how his views should be presented to allies and the Congress. In the past, we have issued an NSDD on "consultations" which provides these instructions and thus structures the substance of the consultation process.

2. The "how" to consult issue can only be resolved after the President has made up his mind about his tentative decision. Let's consider the allied problem first. Should the President decide that he is not going to restructure the SDI program now, then, since we know this will not be a problem for allies and we don't want to make this an event so that they can lay markers down in an attempt to lock us in for all time, we would want a very low key process. In this case, we may be able to handle this via message thru normal diplomatic channels. We really don't need senior representatives "explaining" this decision, since this will give our valiant allies the chance to lay down marker after marker. In short, we want to avoid the allied higher political levels in the consultation since they are the level that can lay down markers, and deal with this as a routine matter. On the other hand, should the President decide to authorize restructuring, then we will want to do just the opposite and avoid the normal diplomatic channels and contacts below the political level who will likely oppose the action (i.e., in the UK, the Foreign Office—Geoffrey Howe) and take our case directly to the top (i.e., to Mrs. Thatcher). To do this, we would likely have to send Nitze to Europe with either Fritz or I as thought police and co-briefers to consult at the highest available levels in the SDI participating countries (UK, FRG, Italy) and in France—and with a stop at the NAC

² February 6.

(NATO) to officially touch base with all the rest. We would also need to send someone (maybe with Fritz going to Europe, I could handle Asia), to Japan and Korea, possibly Australia, and returning via Israel (another SDI participant). Ed Rowny would likely expect to be asked to "lead" an Asian trip. The two teams would be preceded by a closely held head-of-state letter so that allies could prepare for discussions when the team arrives. The official line would be that the President has completed his assessment, has tentative views on how to proceed that he wishes these teams to share with his allies so that he can solicit their views before he makes any final decisions. Congress is more difficult to handle. No matter what the decision, we will have a problem with one part of Congress or another. Contact with Congress on the President's tentative views must start at the same time as the initiation of allied consultations. Both your congressional advisors and your advisors on alliance management will argue that their clients need to be notified first or we risk that the other group will leak and their clients will read about the issue in the paper before we get to them. In the past, the best solution is to run both processes at the same time. We will have to sit down with Alison and Will Ball/Ron Sable and lay out a game plan for Congress. We should start this planning as soon as today's NSPG is behind us. Tentative plan:

- At today's NSPG, simply note if necessary that NSC staff Linhard/Ermarth will be in with contact State and others to discuss the planning for allied consultation, but that process should not begin until the President has indicated that he is prepared and made up his mind on how to present the US view in such consultation.

- Also today you authorize us to plan for a second, final NSPG which focuses on the related arms control aspects of this and the situation in Geneva.

- Tomorrow we will work up a 1st cut at a congressional plan for internal NSC review and begin contacts with State on an allied plan.

- By Friday, we will complete the "Grip 02" paper in the Arms Control Support Group which focuses on the arms control options.

- Tuesday, 10 Feb (at the latest), we hold the second NSPG on arms control related issues.

- By Thursday, 12 Feb, the President indicates the general direction of his decision and (if he is inclined to authorize the SDI restructuring) we inform allies a team will be coming to talk arriving at their first stop on Monday, 16 Feb, with consultations ended by Friday/Saturday 20/21 Feb, and congressional consultations proceed at the same time in parallel.

- The President makes his final decision during the week of 23 Feb. If, at any time in this process, the President should reach the

clear decision not to restructure the SDI program, then we should move quickly to telescope the consultations, focus on handling the “right” on the Hill, and put the decision behind us so that we limit the exposure for markers to be placed and minimize the significance for the future of the decision not to move now. I would note that we should expect allies to attempt to “give us their views” on the issue now. We can’t stop that—but we should try to minimize it to the extent possible since: (1) the President isn’t yet ready to process this input; (2) at most, allies can comment in general and without the benefit of an explanation of the US rationale—we should be trying to keep their minds open until we can give them our thoughts; and (3) in most instances, we will be getting the view of the allied bureaucracies—not the leaders. Also, this dialogue with allied “bureaucracies” may limit the flexibility of allied leaders later. When approached, we should simply listen at this point—but not attempt to present US views.

In sum, I would not make this a major issue at tomorrow’s NSPG. If needed, I would simply note that:

1. We are not ready to begin consultations—but we will consult when the appropriate time comes.

2. We should expect to get unsolicited advice from allies/Congress. We should simply take the advice but not speculate on the way the President sees the issues or the current US thinking. We should simply tell those who ask that the issue is under study, the President will consult before making up his mind, but he needs a bit more time to frame the issue in his own mind.

3. NSC staff Linhard/Ermarth will start this week to discuss with appropriate staffs in agencies how best to consult with Congress and allies when the time comes. I have discussed the broad outlines of the above note with Fritz and Peter Sommer—but not all the details. They will, I am sure, help improve both the planning and handling of allies. I have yet to discuss the above with Alison Fortier or (thru her) Ron Sable. I will do this shortly.

P.S. Sorry for the length of this one. Tuff subject, and first time we came up on this.

206. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, February 3, 1987, 1:50–3 p.m.

MEETING OF THE
SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS

February 3, 1987

SUBJECT

The SDI Program

MINUTES

ATTENDEES

The President
 The Vice President
 Mr. Craig Fuller
 Secretary Shultz
 Ambassador Nitze
 Ambassador Rowny
 Secretary Weinberger

Mr. Edwin Meese
 Admiral Crowe
 Mr. Kenneth Adelman
 Mr. Donald T. Regan
 Mr. James Miller
 Mr. Frank C. Carlucci
 Gen Colin Powell
 Col Robert Linhard

The meeting opened at 1:50 pm in the Situation Room. Mr. CARLUCCI announced that Mr. Gates, unable to attend, had sent a short statement. Mr. CARLUCCI then read the statement that highlighted, once again, that the Soviet Union:

- was continuing work on its own ABM systems;
- was working on a new generation of both offensive and defensive systems; and
- was pressing forward towards significant heavy lift capability.

Mr. CARLUCCI then began the agenda (*Tab B*)² and framed the first issue for discussion using the talking points attached at *Tab C*.³

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued. (N.B. These notes reflect the thrust of the remarks made. And while the note-taker did try to capture the speakers' words as closely as possible, these should not be considered verbatim notes.)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0143 [SDI-ABM]. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The President's Daily Diary for February 3 lists this meeting as that of a National Security Planning Group. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is the meeting attendance list. The meeting agenda and meeting memorandum at Tab B is printed as Document 201. Tab E, a "Post-meeting Package on Leaks," was not attached.

³ Not found.

WEINBERGER: If we want to deploy SDI, especially in light of continued Soviet activity, we need to consider the most effective way to proceed.

We have nothing to deploy now, nor do we anticipate anything upon which to base a deployment decision in the next year. There is nothing we should take “off-the-shelf” and consider for deployment. Rather, we need to focus on deploying something that is both effective in its own right and a part of a later, integrated system.

We have been looking at options, various paths and degrees of concurrency. The progress that we have made is astonishing.

Space-based Kinetic Kill Vehicle (SBKKV) technology is most promising, and the most likely to yield earliest results. We are in a position to recommend further testing of SBKKV, looking at the possibility of an initial deployment in the 1993/4 timeframe.

We don’t need to decide more about this now than to decide that we should focus on deploying a phase of SDI capability as an initial deployment. We will be unable to achieve our overall objectives at once.

We should see if, with proper testing and development, we can recommend an initial deployment of 60 garages carrying SBKKVs capable of killing some 2,000 weapons in boost phase. So we will need to be in a position to give the OK to the necessary testing and development.

We will need to be able to conduct realistic tests. The Delta 180 test proved that we could distinguish metal [i.e., the booster] within the plume [generated by the engine’s firing]. Delta 181, having found the missile in the plume, should test if we can hit the missile. We can’t conduct such an intercept under the restrictive interpretation (RI). However, under the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty, we can do the Delta 181 test and see if we can hit the missile. If the answer is yes, then we are well on the road to a useable technology.

We should think of the concept of phased SDI deployments like building a house. The 1st phase deployment is like laying the foundation of the house. The 2nd phase can be like putting up the walls; the 3rd, the ceiling.

We need to be able to move to planning for such activity now. Specifically, we need you, Mr. President, to decide the following:

1. that the concept of phased deployments is OK;
2. that you would like to deploy the 1st phase as soon as we can; and
3. that we can immediately restructure the SDI program to follow the LCI.

[At this point, Secretary Weinberger read large sections of NSDD 192, which was the October, 1985, decision document covering the President’s initial judgment on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty.]⁴

⁴ See Document 76.

WEINBERGER: In October, 1985, you set certain criteria for moving to the LCI. It is now February, 1987, Mr. President, and the costs of maintaining the RI are now very high because of the astonishing success of the SDI program.

We could move to the LCI immediately. There may be no need for an announcement. You could simply allow us to do the planning under the LCI to prepare you to decide if you feel we can really support the 1993 option that I have suggested. Other options may also arise and be OK.

We don't need you to announce a deployment decision or a date. All we need is the OK to press on under the LCI and the associated funding.

There is no rush to field something before the end of your Administration.

However, without an OK to move to the LCI, I fear that we will have to conduct ineffective testing and, as a result, we may lose funding for the SDI program.

CARLUCCI: Cap (Weinberger), the first issue under discussion is simply the concept of phased deployment.

WEINBERGER: Well, on that, phased deployment is the only way to go. We simply will never be able to do it all at once. Programmatically, it is the only way. The Soviets may get there first.

I am not interested in a point defense. The 1st phase deployment must be an area defense.

CARLUCCI: What do you say to the arguments on the hill that phased deployments could lead to instability?

WEINBERGER: The logic of the argument is faulty, and that is key. The same players argued that we should not deploy MX without a defense.

SDI may be the only thing that keeps the Soviets at the negotiating table. They agreed to the ABM Treaty only after ABM passed the Senate by 1 vote.

The Soviets may not sign any agreement if we don't press forward. We should press forward. It will provide much better leverage.

As long as the 1st phase involves a boost-phase capability, it is not destabilizing.

CARLUCCI: Do others see any problems with the concept of phased SDI deployments?

CROWE: The Chiefs support SDI and the concept of phased deployments. They do feel that SBKKV technology is very promising. However, they feel that they simply do not have enough information now to decide to deploy anything in 1993.

WEINBERGER: I agree. We don't know enough now to decide.

CROWE: I agree. We do have problems yet to resolve, especially in C3. The software issue is very tough. At this point, the single biggest challenge may be battle management.

WEINBERGER: However, we are making great strides in computational capabilities to: discriminate decoys from warheads, and to compute the trajectories needed to kill vehicles in flight. We are experiencing a real expansion of knowledge.

CROWE: But it still remains a challenge. In addition, a heavy lift vehicle is needed, both for general national needs and to meet the challenging requirements of a 1993 deployment option. We need more information on whether we can build a suitable heavy lift vehicle by 1993.

WEINBERGER: The Soviets are already building heavy lift capability.

THE PRESIDENT: Didn't we already approve pressing forward towards heavy lift capability in NASA's management plan?

CROWE: That was based on a different timetable.

VICE PRESIDENT: But, was that for SDI?

WEINBERGER: It supports both civil and defense needs.

SHULTZ: I didn't know that the Secretary of Defense had made specific recommendations [as outlined in CARLUCCI'S introductory talking points] in December; or, for that matter, that the President was briefed on this subject. However, I have informed myself on the issues involved. General Abrahamson has briefed me several times lately on the status of the SDI program.

In my view, we have done well on the issue of survivability. I also share the sense that we have accomplished many important things.

I am equally impressed by the unanimity of the view of the Chiefs, expressed on several occasions, that it is not to the US benefit if the Soviet Union departs from the ABM Treaty.

Phased deployments will require that we depart from the ABM Treaty. It is my view that we should not start on phase one unless you know what will follow in the entire integrated system. This must be considered prior to any deployment decision. However, once you satisfy our conditions, the only way to proceed is in a phased manner. This is very sensible to me.

But we are not in a position to decide on a phased deployment now. I agree with the Chiefs that there are problems to be resolved, like C3, and we need more information on phases two and three.

So, Mr. President, in summary, I agree both with Cap and with Bill Crowe.

CARLUCCI: Do you mean that you agree conceptually with the idea of a 1st phase, on which phases two and three could build?

SHULTZ: We need to know the next steps [phases two and three] before we cross the ABM Treaty [by deploying phase one]. If phase one is simply countered by the Soviet Union breaking out, that is not good.

WEINBERGER: Mr. President, there is not a lot of daylight between our positions [Shultz-Weinberger]. By the time we need to consider a real deployment of phase two or three, we can determine if we need more SBKKVs or something based on other technologies. By 1993, we will be in a position to make such a decision.

We need to keep our options for 1993 open. There is no need to decide today. There is no need to decide today even if the initial deployment should be SBKKVs.

The Soviets could counter SBKKVs only with great effort, and in the process, our defenses would introduce great doubt into their military planning.

It is not our idea just to deploy a phase one system and stop; but to go on make ballistic missiles obsolete. The first phase system should make a start and contribute to this overall goal. We should only deploy something if it will be an integral part of the whole system.

We are making great strides. . . .

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] With respect to the 1993 option, it is my sense that, when questioned, General Abrahamson smiles as he says 1993. Others, who have managed other similar programs, say we should add a few more years to that estimate. 1993 is, at best, the earliest possible date; the most likely date is later. This must be kept in mind because it plays with what we do in Geneva.

WEINBERGER: Only a few years ago, the earliest projections were 1998/9. It is now realistic to talk about 1993.

I base my estimates not only on General Abrahamson's view but also on the view of my oversight group. It has recognized Abe's optimism, and feels that it is realistic.

ADELMAN: It would be imprudent to go forward with phase one if we needed phases two through four to maintain stability. We must judge that phase one is good for us on its own merits.

WEINBERGER: I agree; and I believe that we can meet that challenge.

SHULTZ: If we are to protect the 1993 option at all, we will need heavy lift capability; so we should press on with the pursuit of that heavy lift capability now.

CROWE: We could get along for a while [in 1993] without a new heavy lifter.

WEINBERGER: We could use available Titan IVs.

MILLER: Do we need a different heavy lifter than NASA wants?

WEINBERGER: No.

REGAN: But are we talking about two vehicles: one for OSD and another for NASA?

WEINBERGER: No, just one vehicle.

[At this point, CARLUCCI used his prepared points to move the discussion to the issue of the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty. He turned to Secretary Weinberger to begin this discussion.]

WEINBERGER: The issues of the LCI and the program are interlocked. To move to phased deployment, we need the most economical and effective way to test. For example, under the restrictive interpretation (RI) we have to use Delta 181 to test, trying for a near miss. This is a silly way to test, especially if the LCI is legally correct.

The ABM Treaty forbids the deployment of ABM components based on other physical principles (OPP) without prior agreement. But even in the absence of such an agreement about deployment, it places no restrictions on the development or testing of such devices. This position has been sustained by our legal experts. We should be able to do anything we wish short of deployment.

It would be a monstrosity of logic to follow the RI for some number of years and then attempt to shift to the LCI. We should opt now to go for the most effective path.

CARLUCCI: Do we need integrated testing now?

WEINBERGER: Yes. We don't need a test this year; but we need to begin planning for such a test this year. The first such test could come in 1988/9.

CARLUCCI: You don't mean 1988. The budget is already submitted.

WEINBERGER: It could be 1988. We could reallocate funds.

CARLUCCI: So you hold the possibility of such a test in calendar year 1988?

WEINBERGER: I don't know the exact date; but I do know we need to begin planning for it now.

MEESE: It seems that we have general agreement from all Administration lawyers that the LCI is acceptable.

ADELMAN: Yes. We had. But there is new evidence. We need to look at the new evidence to be prudent. It may not have a bearing on the issue, but we must be sure.

WEINBERGER: There were discussions by Ellis; loose conversation at the SCC some 13 years after the treaty was signed. Ellis should be retired.

SHULTZ: We need to adopt a strategy to support the LCI because we need the LCI to achieve the full potential of SDI.

We need a strategy because we need to garner support effectively, in a manner that can be supported by Congress. Nothing will be gained by an announcement or reprogramming if Congress cuts SDI funds.

I believe that there is a way to accomplish this via a process of discussion with the Senate and the House, and with our allies also. Judge Sofaer sent me a copy of a memorandum⁵ tasked by the NSC staff which provides such a plan.

Three main issues must be handled; and this can only be done in collaborative way with Congress if we are to avoid having our water cut off:

1. Sofaer has already focused on the negotiating record and we have made this available to some in Congress. Attacks from these quarters have diminished. We need to make this record available to others in Congress so they can see for themselves.

2. We need to consider the common law of treaties. We must examine more fully the practice and understand what both parties have been doing under the treaty over the years.

— The ACDA General Counsel recently put out a paper on this and Sofaer began receiving calls about it before he even had a chance to read it himself.

ADELMAN: That was just a compilation of the various statements collected.

SHULTZ: It was released on the record and made immediately available to the press. So this needs to be dealt with. Sofaer has completed a draft memorandum on this subject, and he is confident that we have a case, but he requires more time to work on it and prove that it is correct.

3. Representations were made at the time of ratification that also must be dealt with. Secretary of Defense Laird did say that the US understood the treaty as presented under the narrow interpretation when he was asked. Some in the Senate are now claiming that that is the interpretation that the Senate ratified. We need to work this through carefully before engaging on this point so that we put ourselves in a position so that we can successfully assert our position in light of what we and the Soviets have been doing.

In short, I agree with Cap. Cap is right. We need to move to the LCI. However, we need to do it effectively. We need to convince and win support before we move.

⁵ See Document 203.

At the same time, it is conceivable that the negotiations could result in an agreement on prohibited activity that would help us, especially on moving to the SDI testing we desire, and would build support for SDI.

Max is now authorized to listen and probe; but to adhere to our position that the LCI is legally correct and that's that. He will continue to do this. This is a satisfactory tactic for now; but we may find a moment in the near future where movement is a good idea.

Right now we are not ready or able to examine options internally.

We also need some sort of process to allow the implementation of the LCI.

Sofaer suggests a 5–6 month program. I don't see why 5–6 months is a problem. There is nothing we need to do to the FY88 budget for now, and current Congressional appropriation language limits us to the narrow interpretation.

I fully agree with your hope, Mr. President, of moving to a world with fewer nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The proposal made at Reykjavik was a good one. The immediate agreement to reduce offensive arsenals by 50% would be even better.

If we are able to deploy a perfect SDI shield, great. It would mean that we have achieved the "0 ballistic" situation called for at Reykjavik. That is where the SDI program is going, and we should recognize it.

This possibility also means that we will need enhanced defenses against cruise missiles, bombers and conventional forces. All of this will cost more money, in addition to the costs of SDI deployments.

The level of real spending for the Defense budget is orders of magnitude too low. We need to get this reality in play. We need, and will need more than 3% growth. There is no reason why higher levels can't be supported by our economy. We need to make the public realize that if they want a safer world, they have to pay for it—and it will be more expensive. We need to get this into play while we have some time to go.

In summary, I support the LCI. We need a process so that we can implement it effectively, so that it will be supported. We also need to show our public where SDI is taking us and what our future needs will be.

WEINBERGER: I like the part about your supporting Cap. We do have a major disagreement on the subject of negotiating what is prohibited. To engage in such a negotiation, we will eventually have to prohibit something; and I don't know what that could be.

SHULTZ: We need to see if there is anything. We can't discuss this now within the Administration, so we can't prepare to negotiate. If the Soviets realize our situation they will see they are in clover. They will be able to press us knowing we will never agree. [The notes of the last

two sentences of the Secretary's remarks are very brief and the resulting reconstruction may not be accurate even in its basic thrust.]

WEINBERGER: The Soviets want to strengthen the ABM Treaty. If we sit down to negotiate, they can only conclude that there is something that we are prepared to prohibit. But we have a position under which nothing which is based on OPP (save deployment) is prohibited.

Further, I believe that 5–6 months of study will impact on our program and is unnecessary. The common law of treaties is not applicable here. It has only been since 1983/4 that we have had the possibility of using other physical principles. Laird's remarks should not bind us. He was talking about traditional technologies. We really don't need to spend 6 months working up good arguments.

We need to stay away from negotiations on what is permitted and prohibited.

George (Shultz) is correct that we can never leave ourselves with our deterrent down. We will need air defense and improved conventional capability. It is vital that we don't take down our strategic offensive nuclear capability before enhanced conventional capability is in place. Therefore, we need to watch the reductions schedules.

In any case, all agree that any additional prohibitions are almost certainly going to be unverifiable. There should be no additional agreements on prohibitions. We should prepare a strong case for the LCI and press on.

ADELMAN: All agree to the need to move the program to the LCI. To make a deployment decision, we will need integrated testing. You would not buy a car based on the assurance that all the individual pieces were fully tested, but the car was never assembled and driven.

We need to do three things:

1. We need to look at all the legal evidence to ensure that we are correct.

2. We need to have clear idea of the specific tests under the LCI vice the RI, and why each is needed.

3. It is fine to talk about activities in the ABM under the ABM Treaty, as long as we are trying to get the Soviets to buy the LCI.

We should go nowhere beyond the LCI. Anywhere beyond LCI is a wilderness, a swamp, especially since we don't really know what the Soviets are doing [in advanced defenses] and what they are driving for.

MEESE: The 5/6 month study that Sofaer suggests can be done in 3 months. We should consider concurrently going forward with the planning needed to restructure the program.

The idea we should pursue is not to see if we can sell the LCI, but to sell it. We will need a massive, big deal sales job—and it should be seen as a big deal.

Go up and do it. Make the effort massive if needed. I will help with assets. If it really looks like it will take 4 months, let's find out by pressing for 3 months.

[Secretary Shultz left the room to go to the Hill for a Congressional hearing.]

THE PRESIDENT: Why couldn't we just go ahead [and restructure the SDI program] without making any announcement? We could let others bring up any problems, and we could respond to them.

We could, and should point out that we are not going as far as the Soviets have gone "under" the ABM Treaty. We may have only 5 years to prepare, since the Soviets are already installing battle management radars.

If the Soviets press on with both their offensive and defensive improvements, we will be hurting.

Why should we go to Congress, just do it?

CARLUCCI: You already issued an NSDD [192] which made commitments.

THE PRESIDENT: But how does that NSDD read?

[Secretary Weinberger gave the President a copy of NSDD 192 to review. The President read portions of the NSDD aloud. He noted that it was a good position, well stated, and had stood the test of time. He also noted that it permitted him to move as he had suggested.]

WEINBERGER: You will note, Mr. President, it sets as one of the conditions "adequate funding."

CARLUCCI: The problem with your approach, Mr. President, is that if we surprise the Congress, they could simply cut SDI funding.

ADELMAN: I agree. We should not attempt to bushwack the Congress. It will simply result in funding cuts.

[The President returned to reading NSDD 192 aloud.]

ROWNY: Mr. President, the SDI program is now approaching critical mass, so it would be good to announce your intention to restructure the program.

NITZE: To build the support that we will need, Mr. President, you must inform them of your restructuring.

WEINBERGER: You don't need to ask them; but in order to support your action, you do need to tell them.

[The President continued reading NSDD 192. He completed reading the section involving Soviet violations.]

THE PRESIDENT: The whole story is in this NSDD. It covers the Soviet violations. It explains that I evaluated the price involved in my decision. It sets the criteria that "as long as the program receives adequate support." It's all laid out.

The NSDD makes it clear that my decision not to restructure the program in 1985 was temporary, but that I clearly retained the right to move to the broader interpretation when needed.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, we are agreed on a number of points.

1. We are agreed on the concept of phased deployments.
2. We are agreed on the need for more priority on the heavy lift vehicle.
3. We are agreed on moving to the LCI when the correct foundation is laid.

We now need to discuss the arms control aspects, including the issues of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities, and the process of implementing the points made above. We will carry on this discussion at next week's meeting to focus on these areas.

We need to be able to implement our decisions effectively; and the only way we can do this is if our deliberations on this sensitive issue stay within this room.

MEESE: I want my lawyers to get with Sofaer to see how we can help.

THE PRESIDENT: We do need to effectively work this issue with the Congress.

WEINBERGER: Don't forget you, Mr. President, and not the Congress, interpret treaties. The Congress can't impose an interpretation of the treaty on you because of Constitutional grounds.

CARLUCCI: Our next meeting will be next Tuesday.⁶

[The meeting was completed at 3 pm.]

Tab C

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

I. Introduction (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, the purpose of this meeting is to consider Cap's recommendations made initially on 17 December concerning phased or

⁶ February 10.

⁷ Secret.

incremental SDI deployments. The concept, which has been briefed to George and others, raises several important issues for decision.

— Some of these decisions, including the very concept of incremental deployments, are basically programmatic.

— But a related and more difficult issue for decision is whether or not to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of our full legal rights under the ABM Treaty. This question raises important considerations of program needs, political timing, and Congressional and Allied reaction.

— We will try to get through the programmatic issues as expeditiously as we can to allot about half of our time to the treaty issue.

— The basic programmatic issue is the concept of incremental deployments. This concept raises subsidiary questions about illustrative architectures, possible deployment dates, and the need for a Heavy-lift Launch Vehicle.

II. *Concept of Incremental Deployments and Early Options* (10 minutes)

— From the preliminary discussions most of us have had, the concept of incremental deployment of strategic defenses seems to make sense both militarily and technologically. It provides a path toward our ultimate objective of comprehensive strategic defenses protecting U.S. and Allied populations.

— We would want to ensure that each step moves us toward this goal and that each step improves strategic stability by complicating Soviet attack planning and confounding their confidence that an attack would succeed.

— Would anyone like to comment on the concept of incremental deployments itself?

(After discussion)

— Cap, if I correctly understood the briefing I received, you are not proposing a definite system or deployment schedule, but instead you have provided an example of the type of deployment option that may be available. Is that correct?

(If the question of criteria for deployment is raised)

— When we make initial deployments, we must be able to make the case that we are achieving an interim improvement in strategic stability. The President's criteria of military effectiveness, survivability and cost effectiveness answer potential criticism that strategic defenses are destabilizing. If we cannot answer this criticism, we may put at risk the whole SDI program.

— Furthermore, I think it is quite encouraging how far we have come toward meeting the criteria for deployment. While more work may need to be done before a specific system can be analyzed, I for one,

am confident that the SDI program can meet the tough standards we have set for it.

(If there is discussion of the cost-effectiveness criterion)

— We have made it clear repeatedly that this is far more than an economic consideration. It seems to me that the bottom line is that the system we choose should not allow the Soviets to easily defeat the system simply by proliferating their offense.

(If there is consensus on the concept of incremental deployment)

— Mr. President, it seems that there is consensus that the best course for ultimately deploying strategic defenses is through incremental deployments, building toward a comprehensive system.

III. *Need for Heavy-Lift Capability* (10 minutes)

— Like the concept of incremental deployments, we may also have a consensus on the need for a Heavy-lift Launch Vehicle. A new cargo-carrying rocket would be imperative for strategic defenses with space-based elements, and would boost other military and civil space programs as well.

— Does anyone have any comments on the need for an HLV?

(After discussion)

— Mr. President, there may remain some questions about program management and specific design for the HLV, but there seems to be consensus that the U.S. needs such a system.

IV. *Restructuring the SDI Program* (30 minutes)

— Cap believes we should move now to take advantage of our full legal rights under the ABM Treaty, allowing, for example, integrated testing of space-based kinetic interceptors. This is perhaps the most important decision on SDI that you will make over the next two years. In weighing your decision, you may wish to take account of six factors:

— the program costs of sticking with a more restrictive interpretation;

— the best timing for taking advantage of the legally correct interpretation (LCI);

— dealing with Congress, including likely action by Levin and others to try to legislate the restrictive interpretation (RI);

— Allied views;

— the effects on the Geneva arms reduction talks; and

— any other Soviet reactions.

— Cap, can I turn to you first to summarize your rationale and the program needs, and to give your thoughts on the factors I mentioned?

— George, would you like to comment?

— Does anyone else have thoughts on this issue?

(After discussion)

— I understand there is a newly discovered problem involving U.S. statements to the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission prior to the President's October 1985 decision on the LCI. I know that the General Counsels of the relevant agencies are studying the situation and that the earliest we can expect an opinion is in about two weeks.

— Ken (Adelman), I understand you have taken a personal interest in this, how serious a problem is this?

— Mr. President, you may also wish to study this issue from another angle. There are now several options on the table with respect to possible new U.S. arms control proposals. Some of these options would have an effect on our ability to exercise the LCI. Those proposals will be a topic for discussion by the near future, perhaps as early as next week.

V. Summary (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, this has been a good discussion. It has shown some important areas of consensus, such as the concept of incremental deployments and the need for an HLV. It has also revealed some important differences of opinion.

— We will continue to work on tying up the loose ends identified by this session. Thank you all for coming.

Tab D

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁸

Washington, February 2, 1987

ISSUES FOR NSPG DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

Mr. President, this paper is designed to prepare you for potentially very significant NSPG on the future conduct of the SDI program which will be held tomorrow afternoon. The agenda for the NSPG is based on the major recommendations made to you about the SDI program by the Secretary of Defense in a briefing given to you on December 17, 1986. There are three main agenda items; and this paper deals first with the third item on the agenda since it is clearly the most difficult.

⁸ Secret.

AGENDA ITEM 3: RESTRUCTURING THE SDI PROGRAM

Introduction

In 1983, when you directed the establishment of the SDI program, the US believed that the ABM Treaty should be interpreted with respect to future “exotic” advanced defensive systems in a fairly “narrow” way. At the time, we believed that we would likely have to use a series of more limited experiments to “establish the feasibility” of such defenses sufficiently to permit a future President to make a decision to press on (beyond the ABM Treaty’s bounds) to move toward the deployment of advanced defenses because full scale, integrated testing of such systems was not permitted under the Treaty. We were not certain that the Soviet Union agreed with this view; and in fact, the Soviets had resisted it to some degree in negotiation. However, it was the US view. As a result, the SDI program was initially structured to achieve its objectives while operating under this “narrow” interpretation of the treaty.

In the fall of 1985, you reviewed the ABM Treaty and decided that a “broader” interpretation of the treaty was “fully justified.” At the same time, you determined that as long as the SDI program was capable of reaching its objectives, as a policy matter, we would not restructure the SDI program to exercise the added flexibility provided by the “broader” interpretation of the treaty. However, at that time, you clearly reserved the right to restructure the SDI program in accordance with the “broader” interpretation if needed later. Further, you directed that the Secretary of Defense provide to you a report at the end of every quarter, beginning in December, 1985, which outlined the costs in terms of program opportunities lost by maintaining this policy. (You have never received any such reports.)

You took the position you did in 1985, based upon the recommendation of the staff, because it was judged to be too risky to move the program to the “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty at that time.

The Immediate Issue

On December 17th, the Secretary of Defense recommended that you take that step now and that you authorize him to immediately restructure the SDI program to take full benefit of the “broad” interpretation of the ABM treaty, an interpretation that we have begun to refer to as the “Legally Correct Interpretation” or “LCI” for short. The issue of restructuring the SDI program is likely the most significant and difficult strategic issue that you will face as President over the next two years. It is certainly the toughest strategic issue that your staff has faced in meeting its responsibilities to recommend a course of action to you; and it is so not because the issue is both significant and complex (although it is), but because it is so heavily based on a series of key political judgments that, in the end, only you are best qualified to make.

All of your advisors agree that if we could restructure the SDI program along the lines of the “broader” or “legally correct interpretation” now, the program would be cheaper, quicker and more certain (e.g., technical uncertainties reduced before decisions need be made on any specific deployment). It would permit us to conduct “integrated” testing of prototype advanced ABM systems, and do so without hobbling the individual components: testing which, as we will shortly explain, is not permitted under the more narrow interpretation. This would result in fewer tests since in a single test we could evaluate new sensors and kill mechanisms together, at full capability, under realistic conditions, and thus allow us to move forward faster, save both time and money, and significantly reduce technical risk in the process.

Finally, and most importantly, if we could institute this interpretation, it would mean that a future President could decide to move to deployment of specific advanced defensive systems, a step that would clearly require him to move beyond the ABM Treaty, based on a full-up test of the prototype of such a system, a test which could be conducted while staying under the ABM Treaty only under this interpretation of the treaty. Without this, a future President would have to base a decision to either, (1) move beyond the ABM Treaty to conduct full prototype integrated testing prior to making a decision to pursue deployment, or (2) move beyond the treaty and (in effect) make a deployment decision, based on a series of tests involving less than an integrated system operating under realistic conditions.

Whether a future President could make such a decision without full, integrated prototype testing is questionable at best; and the risk of putting a future President in that position is the “future risk” we would like to avoid by restructuring the SDI program now.

However, some feel that such an action runs very significant “near-term” risks, including the risk of:

- Congressional legislation locking us into the “narrower” or the “restrictive interpretation” of the treaty;

- retaliatory SDI program funding cuts and the renewal of debate about whether to pursue SDI at all;

- adverse Allied reactions and problems, including increased pressure on our friends like Thatcher and Kohl and perhaps with an adverse impact on Allied participation in SDI;

- a retaliatory Soviet slow-down in any negotiating activity in the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva;

- other negative Soviet propaganda initiatives or programmatic reactions like an acceleration of their offensive modernization and/or more traditional ABM programs; and

— a more difficult time in handling an emerging technical legal challenge to the US view of the “legally correct interpretation” of the treaty which we will explain later.

The issue, therefore, is whether we can restructure the SDI program at this time without significant damage to the program as we know it.

You will likely find the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense at odds over this issue. Once it becomes public that you are considering such an action, you will also hear from Congress with strong views expressed by both key members on the right and left. You will also certainly hear from Mrs. Thatcher; and you will also likely hear from other allied leaders, especially those whose nations now are a part of the SDI program: UK, Italy, FRG, Israel, and Japan (which now is almost a participant).

The reason, then, that this is such a critical issue is that the momentum of SDI is at stake; and with it, quality of national security for near-term. Unless we can institutionalize the SDI program, the next Congress or President could kill the current program; so we must put a premium on actions which can protect SDI even if those actions involve risks. On the other hand, the program itself is still in its relative infancy, and we have to worry about asking it to move too quickly lest we stunt its growth, or worse still, contribute to the “crib death” of the current program.

So, in many respects, we are trading the extent to which we are exposed to near-term political risks (associated with the health and survival of the current research program for a potential reduction in future political risks (associated with our ability to move from SDI to the deployment of advanced defenses).

And, we are talking about dangers to the current program and the risk of a loss of momentum, rather than dangers to the future US ability to deploy advanced defenses, because even if the current SDI program were killed, it would have to be reinvented and reborn, after a very damaging delay, because under such conditions the Soviet Union is going to continue to press ahead in both offense and defense and the United States will have no acceptable alternative national security response except the reestablishment of the SDI program. This basic reality is the reason that you have long recognized how central to future US and Western security the SDI program is, and why, as long as the Soviet Union remains the type of government it is and no matter what concessions the Soviet Union may offer, the promise that SDI offers can never be bargained away at the negotiating table.

We will return to this critical issue, whether to permit the SDI program to be restructured to use the full flexibility provided by the “legally correct interpretation” (LCI or “broad interpretation”) of the ABM Treaty, after a short review of ABM Treaty’s provisions in this area.

Differences Between the “Legally Correct Interpretation” (LCI) and the “Restrictive Interpretation” (RI)

As we think about the terms of the ABM Treaty, we should keep in mind one basic fact that we can't escape: while the basic purpose of the ABM Treaty was to improve security and stability (goals shared by the SDI program), the method chosen and the explicit thrust of the ABM Treaty is to block the deployment of nation-wide or large area “active” defenses, exactly the types of defenses that we seek in the SDI program. No matter what we do, we will always have to deal with that basic incompatibility.

You have committed the US to conduct the SDI program in accordance with the ABM Treaty: therefore, short of the deployment of such defenses, the Soviet Union will try to force us into the most restrictive interpretation of how much development and testing of such defenses can be conducted without forcing the US to renege on the commitment that you have made. The more restrictions on the development and testing of advanced defenses, and especially those which can provide wide-area or nation-wide defense at reasonable cost (like boost-phase, space-borne systems), that the Soviet Union can force us to accept, the more difficult it will be for the US to use SDI to reverse the current trends, shift the “correlation of forces” (as the Soviets like to say), and achieve your vision of the future.

Before we talk about the specific restrictions, we should note that the situation does provide a “loophole” that the Soviets can (and have been using). The ABM Treaty restricts a large-area or nation-wide “active” defense. It does not restrict “passive” defenses like hardening or dispersing things you want to protect. The Soviets, if left unchecked, can use this “loophole” because you can protect certain types of things with hardening and dispersal; things like a leadership cadre, the forces needed to maintain that leadership's coercive power to control, or a selected portion of a much larger population. This ability gets even better when you can then use terminal defenses to protect the bunkers and hardened shelters. We can't follow this path because you can't harden our cities, and you really can't defend any city (vice something buried under a city) with traditional ABM terminal defenses even if you believed that our society would permit us to deploy such systems in very large numbers.

So this brings us back to the simple fact that the Soviets need to keep us trapped under a very restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty so that they can continue to work on their 18 year program to defend what they value while we cannot. They will try to “strengthen” those existing provisions of the ABM Treaty that block our ability to use active defenses to protect what we value, especially advanced, mobile (and especially space-based) defenses, while leaving the way open for

them to gradually continue to improve active, fixed land-based defenses which, when used with their extensive program of passive defenses, can protect what they value. If they succeed, at some point, the combination of their improvements in offense forces and both active and passive defenses, which are already eroding deterrence, will let them clearly undercut the basis of deterrence as we now know it, and do so to their advantage.

This returns us to the argument about how to interpret the specific provisions of the ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty places restrictions on ABM components, devices which are capable of substituting for ABM components, and systems which are made up of components. In its basic provisions, it identifies ABM components in terms of the technologies available in 1972 when the treaty was signed. It says an ABM component is an ABM interceptor, ABM launcher, and an ABM radar or any device which is capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor, ABM launcher, or an ABM radar. The ABM Treaty places no restrictions at all on the research, development, testing or deployment of any device that is not an ABM component. For ABM components based on the technologies known in 1972, and specifically for ABM interceptors, launchers and radars based on such technologies, there is no doubt that such components can only be:

- developed if they are fixed, land-based;
- tested at agreed ABM test ranges in a fixed, land-based mode; and
- deployed under restrictions identified in the treaty.

However, Agreed Statement D of the treaty recognizes that, in the future, devices could be invented based on “other physical principles” (OPP) not considered feasible at the signing of the treaty. The heart of the argument is what restrictions the ABM Treaty places on devices which are based on “other physical principles” in terms of their development, testing and deployment.

Both interpretations of the treaty agree that such systems, if they have the capability to substitute for ABM interceptors, launchers or radars, cannot be deployed without further agreement.

Under the “legally correct interpretation” (the “broader interpretation”), other than not being able to be deployed without further agreement, none of the other restrictions of the ABM Treaty apply to such systems. Therefore, whether fixed/land-based or not, you can develop such systems, test them anywhere you wish, even if the test device could be interpreted as having a capability to substitute for a traditional ABM component, as long as you did not deploy such devices without agreement. So, under this interpretation, the US could test fully capable space-borne sensors or kill mechanisms based on other physical principles, and it could even conduct a integrated test of sensors and kill

mechanisms together to see if a system composed of such components would work.

Under the “restrictive” (or the “narrow” interpretation), devices based on other physical principles with the capability to substitute for more traditional ABM interceptors, launchers or radars, could be:

- developed only if they were fixed/land-based;
- be tested only as fixed/land-based devices at agreed ABM test ranges; and
- be deployed, after further agreement, only as fixed land-based components under the restrictions for traditional systems under the ABM Treaty.

So, for as long as the SDI program remains structured as currently, all the advanced devices that we develop or test, except for those which are fixed/land-based, must have their capability restricted so that it is clear that they cannot substitute for traditional ABM interceptors, launchers or radars. This means that we must cobble any device we may want to make mobile so that it can survive (like airborne optical sensors) or any device which we test in space. This also means that the Soviets remain free to develop full capability prototypes and conduct integrated tests of the fixed/land-based systems that they prefer and that their extensive network of passive defenses make useful, while we are blocked under this interpretation from doing the same for the types of advanced defenses, especially space-based systems, which we wish to pursue.

When the ABM Treaty was negotiated, and as late as just prior to your 1985 decision, the US argued vigorously for the “restrictive” interpretation of the treaty and most believe that the Soviet Union resisted this and supported a position that we would now call the “legally correct interpretation” of the treaty. With the advent of the SDI program, and a detailed review of the ABM Treaty and the associated negotiating record, the public positions of the US and the Soviet Union flip-flopped. This is the main argument that we are now having with the Soviet Union, and the main reason why this argument is so critical to the future of the SDI program and our long-term national security.

There is one other issue with respect to the interpretation of the ABM Treaty which is just starting to emerge within the Administration. Article VI of the treaty states that sides will not give missiles that are not ABM interceptor missiles the capability to counter a ballistic missile in flight. The issue here is whether the Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicles (SBKKVs) that the Secretary of Defense described in his briefing on December 17th, and which are the primary space-based kill mechanisms in the concept he presented, are “missiles” and therefore covered by this restriction. This issue is not central to the problem of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and the staffing is not yet mature,

but it is something that affects the concept offered by the Secretary of Defense and something that bears monitoring.

The Risk Trade-Off

As you can see, if the SDI program is successful, we will bump-up against the ABM Treaty at some point. Until 1985, we didn't have the "legally correct interpretation" and the possibility to conduct full prototype, integrated testing which should certainly provide sufficient information, in an unambiguous form, to support a decision to deploy an advanced defense, and do so at the expense of the ABM Treaty if the Soviets do not agree. Before that time, we pursued the SDI program on the belief and hope that we could evaluate the feasibility of advanced technologies sufficiently to permit us to make any needed decision to move beyond the treaty based on the results of more limited testing which could be conducted under the "restrictive interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. In pursuing the SDI program under those rules, our knowledge has grown quickly, but we anticipate that learning curve will flatten out as [we] ask our scientists to extrapolate more and more from limited testing.

Most advisors still hold the view that this course can lead to a sufficient level of information that a future President could make a decision, but the time and cost needed to get to that point, and the level of technical and political risk associated with making a decision then to press on could be reduced if we moved to the "legally correct interpretation" now. In short, we may never have to go to the "legally correct interpretation"; but the question facing us is whether we should choose to do so now, trading increased risk to the survival of the program now for decreased risk that a future President will be unable to act later.

Some advisors may argue that this characterization of the problem is no longer valid, and that given current circumstances, we will never get sufficient information for a future political decision if we stay under the "restrictive interpretation" of the treaty. In short, those who hold this view would argue that we will have to face the risks of restructuring the SDI program at some point before we are in a position to make a deployment decision, therefore, the issue is whether we are better positioned to take those risks now or later.

If we accept this second assessment, we should consider the logical consequences of Congressional legislation that locks us into the "restrictive interpretation." The question to ask of those who hold this assessment is that should a situation like that come to pass, and therefore the game is lost, would they support trading the program at that point for as much as possible? If the answer is no, then as a minimum, the strength of the argument to move now in restructuring the SDI program based on this assessment is weaker than it may initially appear.

Other Risks

In addition to the risks associated with being able to move from the SDI program to a deployment decision at some time, we must also consider the risks entailed as an immediate consequence of restructuring the program now. Assuming authority is given to restructure the program as requested, you should consider the likely immediate outcomes.

With respect to the program itself, it is still unclear how quickly such a decision would result in an action, a test, which is both needed to keep the pace of the program and which is now inhibited by the “restrictive interpretation” of the treaty. We have asked this question in a number of ways, and gotten fairly general answers from the Department of Defense. We have not asked the converse question: if authority is given, what specific changes would be made in the program and when? This is a question that we may still wish to ask.

The Congress could respond in a number of ways to such a decision. It could simply accept it and we would face the normal budget battle for funds. However, as the impact of the decision is felt in subsequent years, we may be in a better long-term position on funding and support. On the other hand, we have been told that some members intend to introduce legislation which would limit the US to the “restrictive interpretation” of the treaty regardless of our policy on restructuring the SDI program. Some advisors feel that a decision now to restructure the program would give this group the opportunity to do so and claim it was a response to an Administration action, rather than unsolicited Congressional meddling in national security, and thus make the situation more difficult. Other advisors feel that we will face this action by Congress no matter what we do, and we would be in a better position if we were to take the initiative because our supporters in Congress will not battle hard on our behalf if they believe that we are not going to restructure the SDI program and that as a matter of policy we intend to continue to restrict the SDI program even if the legislative restrictions are defeated. Finally, if we restructure the program now, some advisors worry that those in Congress who wish to restrict us could simply watch the programmatic actions attempted and selectively cut the funding in any “restructured” area of the program.

Our allies, also, will react to this decision if taken. Again, the best outcome we could expect is acceptance and support. Even in this case, we should recognize that supportive Allied leaders, like Mrs. Thatcher, will come under strong criticism within their own countries if they support the US on this score. On the other hand, we could face a rift with key allies over this issue, and the participation of some allies in the SDI program itself could suffer.

The Soviets will also react, certainly at the negotiating table and perhaps with propaganda or programmatic initiatives as well. For example, they could use the decision to slow activity in Geneva or even condition further progress on a reversal of the decision. At the extreme, they could use such a decision as an excuse to accelerate their own more traditional programs, increasing the risk of a near-term ABM breakout based on those systems.

While it is clear that a decision to restructure the SDI program may have the risks suggested, we should also remember that the very fact that you are considering such a decision means we run many of the same risks even if you decide not to restructure the program. For example, we will still face the risk of Congressional legislation. We may have allies tell us that if we ever make such a restructuring, they will take negative actions. We may have the Soviets make the maintenance of the "restrictive interpretation" a condition for the future. In fact, the Soviets may interpret a failure to move now as an assessment that we judge we can't move, and take even harder positions.

In short, because this decision will be public, if we do not choose to restructure the program, we should expect to see some drawn lines in the sand to attempt to lock us in further for the future.

Related Arms Control Issue

We need also consider the relationship between this issue and recommendations that have been made on how best to proceed in the Defense and Space area of the Nuclear and Space Talks. The Arms Control Support Group is currently working on a paper evaluating the views of your principal advisors.

The Secretary of Defense is arguing for a position in which the only restriction that we would offer to the Soviets in this area is a commitment not to deploy advanced defenses for some period of years. During this period, the US would be free to follow the "legally correct interpretation" of the treaty.

The Secretary of State has asked you to consider an option which would:

- identify those devices based on "other physical principles";
- negotiate criteria for judging whether such devices could substitute for more traditional ABM components;
- exclude sensors from further restriction; but
- negotiate agreed restrictions on kill mechanisms that meet the identified criteria.

This approach implies that negotiation of restrictions which would, in certain areas (i.e., sensors), be much more permissive than the "restrictive interpretation" but which could focus or space-based

kill mechanisms and which likely would be more restrictive than the “legally correct interpretation” in these critical areas. Options for integrated testing of space-based sensors and kill mechanisms would certainly be affected.

The Arms Control Support Group paper will be completed shortly, and it could support a follow-up NSPG discussion of this related area in about one week.

The Legal Problem

In addition to all of the above, there is also a related legal issue to be considered. When the decision on the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty was made in 1985, it was based upon the discovery of ambiguity in the treaty with respect to devices based on other physical principles described earlier. To support the US position, our chief legal advisors used the negotiating record to resolve the areas of ambiguity in the treaty text. While the statements made by US officials during Senate ratification were studied and fully considered, and some review of the records of the SALT negotiations and the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was completed, a full review of the entire SCC record as not completed at that time.

The continuing review of the SCC has recently uncovered the fact that the US SCC Commissioner, in May of 1985 and before the change in the US position with respect to the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, made at least one statement that laid out the US understanding of the application of the treaty to devices based on other physical principles in a way that could be very damaging to the current US position. This is even more of a problem because such statements are usually considered under international treaty law as evidence of “subsequent practice” by the parties of a treaty. In turn, international treaty law recognizes “subsequent practice” as a precedent for interpreting ambiguities in treaty text on a par with examination of the text itself. On the other hand, recourse to examination of the “negotiating record” is viewed as a much less authoritative source.

Our best legal experts are still assessing the seriousness of the problem we face. Judge Sofaer, the State Department legal counsel, currently thinks that the “legally correct interpretation” remains valid and the situation is manageable, but that time will be needed to address this in a professional manner. His assessment is that about three weeks to a month are needed.

We do know that the press is aware of this potential legal problem, so any action related to the interpretation of the treaty is likely to immediately cause the story to break before we are fully prepared (although we run the risk of this story breaking at any time).

In sum, there is an additional risk to be considered in approving a restructuring of the SDI program with the extent of this fundamental problem not fully known.

Issues of Timing

All of the above introduces an issue of near-term timing into any decisions about the issue of restructuring the SDI program. The Secretary of Defense argues for an immediate decision in favor of restructuring both because, in his view, it inhibits the progress of the program, and because he would like to reflect such a decision in legislatively mandated reports, the first being the annual report on the program which was due to the Congress on February 1st.

On the other hand, we have identified a relationship between this decision and decisions on arms control options for the Defense and Space area which we should be able to discuss next week. We also need time to get a better handle on the legal problem recently raised by the discovery of the SCC statements made in May 1985. Finally, we could use additional time to do a better job at trying to reduce some of the uncertainties in critical areas identified above.

All this argues that tomorrow's NSPG serve as a discussion in which you can listen to the arguments and judge their strength, but not a decision meeting on this issue.

AGENDA ITEM 1: PHASED SDI DEPLOYMENTS

Approving the Concept

Turning to the remaining NSPG agenda items, the first involves the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that you endorse and approve the concept of "phased" or "incremental" SDI deployments. We see little difficulty in your endorsing this concept, and much merit in doing so.

The Secretary of Defense's approach helps the SDI program in giving us an explanation why we should not ask the first system of advanced defenses based on SDI to do entire mission of rendering ballistic missiles obsolete. He correctly notes that if we burden the program with such a challenge, it would certainly mean we would never make an initial deployment decision.

The Illustrative System

In proposing the concept of phased SDI deployments, the Secretary of Defense described an illustrative system which he feels should provide the focus for the SDI program over the near-term. He told you that we could be in a position to begin deploying this system by the 1992/3 timeframe. The initial deployment would be completed by about 1995 and be composed of the following elements:

— 300 Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle (SBKKV) Carriers.

These would be platforms armed with 8–10 small rockets (called Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicles {SBKKV}) that could guide in and kill missiles by hitting them (like “smart rocket”) as the missiles were in their boost-phase of flight or shortly thereafter. This network of 300 SBKKV carriers would be organized into 12 orbital “belts” around the globe, with 25 SBKKV carriers in each belt spaced some 250 seconds apart. As they pass over the Soviet Union, half the belts would flow north to south; the other half, south to north. At any one time, some 30 SBKKV Carriers (10 in each of three belts, with a total of about 240 “smart rocks”) would be passing over the Soviet Union in range of ICBM fields. In turn, about half of the SBKKVs in range could engage missiles in boost-phase; the other half would be able to engage the missiles shortly after boost-phase. If every one of the 240 SBKKVs in range hit an SS–18 missile before it began dispensing its warheads, this system could kill 2400 hard target warheads enroute to the US. This would certainly be the best case, and even then it [would] not cover the entire threat that could be launched, but it would certainly break-up any secret ability to plan a coherent first strike.

— 5 Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) Satellites.

These are sensors placed to geosynchronous altitudes which detect an enemy launch and pass needed information to the SBKKVs platforms which are at a much lower, near-earth orbit.

— 500–1000 ERIS Interceptors

These are land-based rockets that could engage another 500–1000 targets that escaped the SBKKVs as they enter the late midcourse phase of their ballistic flight. These could be well used to add additional uncertainty into Soviet planning to preferentially defending critical US installations.

— 40 Long Wave Infrared (LWIF) Probes

These would be rocket mounted sensors which could be launched to give additional targeting data to the ERIS kill vehicles, helping them to distinguish between real targets and decoys.

The Secretary of Defense estimates that such a system could be developed and deployed for under \$60 billion. He has not asked for a “deployment decision” on this system. Rather, just your endorsement of the concept of phased deployments.

A number of your advisors are skeptical of our ability to begin deployment of such a system in the 1992/3 timeframe. One problem is the availability of space lift capability to put the system up at the price quoted. To do this, the Secretary assumes that he will have available a new heavy-lift launch vehicle (which is the subject of the remaining agenda item to be discussed). Most advisors would add about 2–3

years to the estimate of when the earliest such a system could begin deployment.

Criteria For Initial Deployments

One issue which may arise has to do with the “criteria” use to judge whether a deployment decision is made. The Secretary of Defense feels that we should have criteria for initial deployment, and that the primary criteria should be that the deployment contributes in a militarily effective and meaningful way and that it be the type of system that could be built upon to move towards a later phase of deployment more capable to reaching our long-term goals. In this way, we would be increasing our capability incrementally, as additional phases of SDI are deployed.

We have long had identified criteria for judging options for initial SDI deployments. NSDD 172 identified three main criteria: military effectiveness, survivability, and cost effectiveness on the margin. The latter two (survivability and cost effectiveness on the margin) have been incorporated into authorizing legislation associated with the SDI program by Congress. Also, since these last two criteria were first publicly discussed by Paul Nitze, and have subsequently been associated with him, Nitze has taken attacks on the wisdom of these criteria (especially cost effectiveness on the margin) as attacks on his professional reputation and judgment. This is unfortunate, because the Secretary of Defense has led a personal crusade against the use of the phrase “cost effectiveness on the margin” to the point that winning his position on this issue has become almost a point of honor for each of the two players.

The criterion of “cost effectiveness on the margin” was initially articulated by Nitze. He was drawing on his experience using this same criterion during the ABM debate in the late 1960s. It had a very heavy economic dimension in that debate in that the costs of ABM interceptors were compared to attacking missiles. This degree of economic flavor made some sense then because ICBMs only carried one weapon and trading the costs of small interceptors against additional ICBMs on one-for-one basis could have some merit. But the criterion failed even before the advent of the MIRVed ICBM, when strategic attack planners realized that they could attack the “eyes” of the ABM defense, the ABM radars, in ways that undercut the trade-off.

When the initial SDI debate began, staff recommended adopting the criterion, though, in a much less economic sense, to deflect the argument that all SDI will do is to provide incentives to the Soviets to retain additional forces to overwhelm or saturate the defenses. As stated in NSDD 172, we stressed that this idea was much more than an economic criterion, although counted in economic terms. Rather,

cost effectiveness meant to convey that criterion that any deployment should not provide incentives for the retention of offensive forces.

For example, if the Soviets were to rapidly produce and deploy a number of the ABM interceptors that they have around Moscow, the most logical US reaction would be to retain additional offensive warheads to directly attack the interceptors. We would have little choice, and we have a number of older POSEIDON C-3, 40kt warheads that we had planned to retire that could be retained at reasonable cost for this purpose. Certainly, such a deployment would not meet our cost effectiveness criterion; not because of the economics, but because it clearly provides incentives for the retention of additional offensive forces to counter the defense. On the other hand, if we were to deploy the SBKKV system suggested by the Secretary of Defense, and as long as the SBKKV carriers are reasonably survivable (not easy to attack directly), the problem the defense poses for the attacker is one of uncertainty of a type that retaining additional weapons will not easily solve. This means it provides disincentives to retaining excess warheads to attempt to defeat the defenses, and therefore, could be considered "cost effective."

When properly interpreted, this criterion has served us well. It should be retained. Staff can square this problem away provided that we can keep both the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Nitze from making this more of an issue than needed.

In summary, then, for this agenda item, you should have no difficulty indicating that you can endorse the concept of phased deployments and the use of the illustrative system as a means of focusing the SDI program. You should avoid any attempt to gain your commitment to the illustrative system in any more substantive way at this time. Finally, should the issue of "criteria" come up, we can accept the addition of the criteria that the Secretary of Defense has suggested (i.e., any initial phased deployment should be militarily meaningful and contribute to a more capable later system), but we cannot abandon the other basic criteria of military effectiveness, survivability and cost effectiveness. We would recommend that you avoid being drawn into the issue of the retention of the criterion of "cost effectiveness on the margin."

AGENDA ITEM 2: HEAVY LIFT SPACE VEHICLE

In his December 17th briefing, the Secretary of Defense highlighted the need for an immediate priority on the development of a heavy lift space booster. A US heavy lift vehicle is needed both to protect the option of deploying an initial phase of an SDI along the lines the Secretary of Defense argues may be possible in timeframe he suggests, and to so within the costs estimated (i.e., under \$60 billion). It could

also help other US space programs and match a growing Soviet heavy lift capability.

When this was last discussed, it was supported by all of your advisors.

There are issues associated with the heavy lift vehicle program. For example, there are two candidate vehicle types: one a shuttle derivative (favored by NASA); and the second, a booster based on all new technology (favored by OSD and SDIO). The management of the development and acquisition of this capability is also an issue. The options are that the program could be managed by NASA, by OSD, or jointly by OSD-NASA. The proper role of the military services (e.g., the Air Force) and the SDIO also need to be determined. Whose budget carries the funds for this also is an issue. However, all of these issues should be well below the Presidential level of concern.

Recommendation

On this issue, while you may listen to some discussion, as long as no objection to placing priority on this program is made, all you need to do is direct that this be made a priority program and that staff/agencies work out the most efficient way to provide the US the capability needed.

207. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 4, 1987, 12:15–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
Colonel Robert Linhard

I had lunch today with Bob Linhard. Linhard asked me my impression of yesterday's NSPG meeting.² I said I was disappointed at the way in which the issues were drawn. Carlucci and Weinberger had framed the first issue in terms of a decision on "phased incremental deployment." The billboard effect of that phrase is the word "deployment."

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Nitze initialed the memorandum beside his name on the list of participants. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.

² See Document 206.

This is bound to suggest abrogation of the ABM Treaty because, in the absence of amendment, deployment would require withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I thought it would be nigh to impossible to get congressional concurrence with a program that was labeled “deployment.” I said that with respect to the LCI issue, Cap had been right when he had said that only the President has the right, under the constitution, to interpret treaties, but it is equally true that only the House can initiate legislation having to do with appropriations. The SDI program will not fly unless it can obtain the concurrence of Congress.

Linhard said that he was disappointed that we had not made a stronger fight against Cap’s presentation. I said I thought Secretary Shultz had made a clear and cogent attempt but had not received much support.

We then got into a discussion about preparation for next Tuesday’s NSPG meeting.³ He urged that we give close attention to a paper labeled GRIP 02⁴ which deals with the alternative approaches to the prohibited testing issue. I said I had read the paper and thought that, in general, it fairly presented the OSD and State positions; we in State would address it in greater detail. He suggested we also look at GRIP 03⁵ which deals with the process issue. He said it had a negative tone because a foreign ministers’ meeting followed by a summit meeting might be attractive to some. They wanted to be sure we are adequately protected before agreeing to that process. He said that as he saw it, the Soviets are now concerned because they see the clock ticking toward SDI deployment. They want that clock turned off; they intend to use the negotiating process to reverse its impact on the clock and thus dampen progress on SDI. In the meantime, they wish no progress on offensive reductions.

He said that on Tuesday he anticipated there would be a discussion on GRIP 02 and the timing of the consultation process. I said I had urged Abe Sofaer to call Meese to begin coordinating their work. Linhard said we also may need to be prepared for allied consultation. He had in mind that after the Tuesday NSPG meeting, Wednesday and Thursday should be used to settle on instructions, and that then I should be prepared to fly to Europe to consult during the week beginning February 16th and take either Fritz Ermarth or him with me. He rather thought it should be Ermarth so he would be free to go to Asia with Rowny. The focus of consultations should be on the participating countries plus Paris, plus the NAC. In addition, someone might go to Israel and someone to Canada. If the Tuesday meeting decided on no change in our position, then we should send no one but should communicate with the

³ February 10. See Document 211.

⁴ See Tab E, Document 211.

⁵ Not found.

foreign offices that there had been no deployment decision. The technology had made progress, we had talked again about policy and about incremental deployment, but we had not changed our position, except to add two more criteria to the criteria about survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margin. These are that each phase of deployment would have to be consistent with the main line of our program, and that the specific military objective would be to introduce uncertainty into Soviet military decisions and thus increase stability.

I pointed out the inconsistency between various briefings I had received from General Abrahamson. During the first briefing on January 29, Abrahamson had told me that the first phase deployment would not include measures for survivability. He had also told me that they had not decided whether the 1992/93 target would be IOC or FOC. He also told me that he anticipated the first phase deployments would enable them to effect 6000 to 7000 intercepts from having deployed from 220–300 satellite missile launchers.⁶ When Abrahamson briefed me on Monday, February 2, it was largely on the progress that had been made in developing the technology pertinent to survivability. But when I asked him whether that technology would be incorporated in the Phase I deployment, he answered in the negative. The number of satellite missile launches to be deployed had gone down to 60; the anticipated number of intercepts to 2000. I said I had difficulty in understanding such fluidity in Abrahamson's program.

Linhard explained that the changes had been due to his (Linhard's) intervention. He had been briefed by Abrahamson and therefore had told Abrahamson he must concentrate on survivability in his briefing to the Secretary. He also proposed to Abrahamson that he concentrate on the IOC of the system and not on some point between IOC and FOC. It was for those reasons that Abrahamson briefings had shifted so rapidly. I said I had talked to some of Abrahamson's people who had a much more cautious view about the program. I said I understood the Pentagon had agreed that SDI deployment decisions should be subjected to the same review process with designated milestones specified for other acquisition decisions. Once they had gone through that process, the answers to the pertinent questions should be available for use in testimony before the Congress.

Linhard outlined for me the way in which the first phase system was intended to work and what the timelines were. As he explained it, a Soviet capability to eliminate 15 objects in space would put a hole in the boost phase intercept system sufficiently large for a full Soviet offensive launch to escape damage in boost phase.

⁶ No minutes were found.

208. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 4, 1987

SUBJECT

SDI

The development of our SDI program will at some point require going beyond the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We must proceed, however, in a manner that the Congress will support, since substantial growth in funding for the program is essential to its success. If we proceed correctly, we have an opportunity to lock in the solid base of support the program needs to reach its goal; if we don't, all that has been achieved will be in jeopardy.

Given the record of the last fifteen years, it will not be easy to obtain Congressional support for the broad interpretation. At the time the ABM Treaty was ratified in 1972, the Nixon Administration made statements to the Senate supporting the restrictive interpretation. As recently as 1985, this Administration made statements in the SDI report to Congress and to the Soviets in the SCC consistent with the restrictive interpretation, which was then the agreed position of the Executive Branch. A majority of the Congress still believes the restrictive interpretation is the more valid. If we summarily begin to act in a way that many believe contrary to our treaty obligations, we will strengthen the opponents of the SDI program rather than win them over.

We have a well thought out strategy for obtaining the necessary support and we must follow it. Judge Sofaer has drawn up a plan for completing our analysis and consulting with the Congress. It includes (1) giving the Senate an opportunity to review our position on the negotiating record, (2) completing our analysis of subsequent conduct by the Parties and permitting the Senate to respond to our conclusions, and (3) a careful legal analysis of the practical implications of shifting to a program based upon the broad interpretation. We have also told our Allies we would consult with them before moving to the broad interpretation. Something along the lines of Sofaer's plan is the best way to establish the broad interpretation as the legally correct interpretation.

This means that for the near term our program will continue to be carried out within the same constraints the program has respected from the beginning. Given the current status of the research, this should

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Shultz initialed the original on February 4. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Hand-carried to President by Secretary 2/4."

not be a major problem for us. The important point is that if we do this job right, the result will be to lock the SDI into our defense and arms control program. Congress cannot interpret the ABM Treaty, but if we jump to a decision without having gone through a deliberative process, funding for SDI could be lost.

As we proceed to work with the Congress according to Judge Sofaer's plan—and on the timetable he and Ed Meese will work out—we should also prepare to negotiate an understanding with the Soviets on what activity with respect to advanced defenses is prohibited. It would be in our interest to work out an understanding on prohibited activity that would allow necessary SDI testing to go forward, and supersede the question of broad versus restrictive interpretation. Max Kampelman can continue to draw concessions out of the Soviets, but at some point we need to be prepared to offer ideas of our own. If such a settlement could be achieved, it would secure Congressional support for SDI and help us advance on the path to the more than fifty percent reduction in strategic forces and eighty percent reduction in INF outlined in Reykjavik.

While it will not be easy to negotiate an understanding with the Soviets that permits SDI testing to go forward, we should give Max the time and the flexibility to try. Persuading the Congress the broad interpretation is the correct one will also be difficult, and by pursuing both paths we minimize the risk to the program.

As for a commitment to early deployment, we are not yet to the point of proposing a system that meets the statutory criteria for survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margin. While the program is beginning to identify what can be done early, we do not yet understand the subsequent phases necessary for a full system that meets these objectives. We should not commit ourselves to deployment of the first phase before we understand the subsequent phases and are certain the first step leads in the direction we want to go.

Deployment will require withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and we should not underestimate the consequences of a commitment to this step. The JCS have expressed to me their views that it would not be in the interest of the United States to break away from the Treaty at this time, as the Soviets are in a better position than we are to expand their defenses beyond the very limited system they now have around Moscow.

Our approach should be to start moving toward wide support for the broad interpretation, and at the same time prepare to try to reach an understanding with the Soviets on prohibited activity. Another step we can take to advance the SDI program is to give strong support to the heavy lift launch vehicle, which will be needed for SDI deployments and will give us more reliable access to space for other important missions as well.

209. Letter From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 6, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

I was deeply concerned by the trend of the discussion at this Tuesday's NSPG meeting.²

The first item on the agenda was "early phased deployment." From the beginning of SDI it has been obvious that an advanced defense system could not be deployed all at once, that the lift requirements alone would necessitate its being deployed incrementally. Therefore, there can be no doubt that, if such a deployment is to take place, it must be in increments. The real issue is whether or not you should at this time decide that the U.S. will deploy an advanced defense. The billboard effect of the stories in the press that there was a consensus for "early phased deployment" will be read as a consensus not only to deploy but to abrogate the ABM Treaty. It is possible to deploy such an ABM defense only if there has been an agreed amendment to the ABM Treaty (which is hardly likely) or U.S. withdrawal therefrom.

I do not believe the SDI program is ready for a determination by you approving deployment, nor are we at a point where we could persuasively justify such a determination to the Congress, which must fund the deployments, or to our allies. We have been saying for two years that we would decide to deploy only if our research indicated the technologies had met certain criteria. SDI research to date has not provided sufficient evidence to indicate those criteria can be met. Moreover, assertions by us to the contrary will look especially weak, until SDI has been through the Pentagon's acquisition review procedures. I am told that it is the unanimous opinion of the Chiefs that the program is not ready for a deployment decision.

My regular consultations with Senate and House Observer Groups on the Hill indicate that a deployment decision now would elicit an extremely negative reaction from the Congress; we would probably receive no funding for deployment, and the Congress would reduce research funding below the levels they would otherwise accept. Similarly, the consultations I have held with our NATO allies at your behest indicate that they would vigorously oppose a deployment decision. Finally, such a decision now could end the possibility during your

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 206.

Administration for negotiated reductions in offensive arms, just as our efforts over the last six years are finally showing signs of bearing fruit.

We have a similar problem with respect to deciding now to restructure the SDI testing program to conform to the less restrictive interpretation. There is considerable opposition to that interpretation on the Hill and, although you alone can interpret treaties, the Congress can legislate restrictions on testing independent of our treaty obligations. I believe Congress would respond to a declaration now that we are moving to the broad interpretation by restricting us via legislation to testing that conforms to the narrow interpretation. Furthermore, I believe many of our allies, who have conditioned their participation in SDI on our conformance with the narrow interpretation, would cease their participation.

In order to determine whether a beneficial arms reduction agreement is possible, I think it important that we promptly clear the way for a substantive discussion with the Soviets on the issue of what testing of components based on what the ABM Treaty calls "other physical principles" is, or is not, prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today. If our negotiators remain uninstructed for such a discussion, Mr. Gorbachev and his propagandists will have a relatively easy time putting the onus for lack of progress in the negotiations on the United States.

Finally, we don't need to make a deployment decision now. The Congress will not be seriously addressing the FY88-89 defense budget for several months. In the interim, we can continue research, begin the DOD acquisition review process, determine if the current process in Geneva is likely to produce an acceptable agreement, and begin laying the groundwork for future decisions with the Congress and our allies.

Sincerely yours,

Paul H. Nitze

210. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 7, 1987

*MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL
SECURITY PLANNING GROUP*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss arms control policy options for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group of the Nuclear and Space Talks, as they relate to recently discussed SDI proposals.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting will complete a discussion begun at the NSPG meeting on February 3, 1987.² Detailed analyses of the issues at hand have been forwarded to you under separate cover.³ At our last meeting, we looked at programmatic and policy aspects of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations on SDI. This session will look at some of the same issues from an arms control perspective. We also will try to tie up some loose ends from the last session.

III. PARTICIPANTS

At Tab B.⁴

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the various options available, framing the discussion to follow. After general discussion, I will summarize and close the meeting.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0143 [SDI-ABM]. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for February 10 from 11 a.m. until noon in the Oval Office. Attached but not printed at Tab A is an agenda for the February 10 meeting. Powell initialed the memorandum on behalf of Carlucci. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 206.

³ See Tabs C, D, and E, Document 211.

⁴ Attached but not printed is the list of participants.

211. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 10, 1987, 11 a.m.–12:04 p.m.

MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT

Arms Control & SDI

MINUTES

ATTENDEES

The President	Mr. Robert Gates
The Vice President	Mr. James Miller
Mr. Craig Fuller	Mr. Kenneth Adelman
Secretary Shultz	Mr. Donald T. Regan
Ambassador Nitze	Mr. Will Ball
Ambassador Rowny	Mr. Frank C. Carlucci
Secretary Weinberger	Gen Colin Powell
Admiral Crowe	Col Robert Linhard

The meeting opened at 11:00 am in the Situation Room. Mr. CARLUCCI stressed the importance of security following these meetings. He noted that notes were taken by the NSC staff, in this case by Bob Linhard, and that meeting participants could come and review the notes as needed after the meeting. However, he asked that all notes taken by others at the meeting be left in the Situation Room.

Mr. CARLUCCI then began the agenda (*Tab B*)² and framed the first issue for discussion using the talking points attached at *Tab C*.

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued. (N.B. These notes reflect the thrust of the remarks made. And while the note-taker did try to capture the speakers' words as closely as possible, these should not be considered verbatim notes.)

CARLUCCI: George (Shultz), I understand that you support Option C (see *Tab D/E*). Would you like to say something in its favour?

SHULTZ: I think that we should not decide on Option C now. I would prefer we not discuss it in such an open meeting. It will leak,

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0143 [SDI-ABM]. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Linhard.

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is the Meeting Attendance List. The meeting memorandum at Tab B is printed as Document 210. The agenda also at Tab B is attached but not printed.

and we will lose it. I suggest that we use this option in some other mode, and that we not pursue it further in such a leaky meeting.

We are in a good position. Max is authorized to listen and probe. If pressed, he can simply repeat our position. I think that we should simply stay in this mode for now.

WEINBERGER: I think that Option C is a bad approach. The paper prepared (*Tab E*) suggests good criteria.

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] Don't make me respond about Option C. We may need to be creative at some point soon, but not now.

WEINBERGER: It is important that we don't negotiate what is permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty. And, we certainly should not suggest we are willing to conduct such negotiations in advance of having an end game in sight.

SHULTZ: I am not sure that we should discuss Option C now in this forum. Should we do so?

WEINBERGER: Whether now or later, it will have to be discussed.

The Soviets want to kill the SDI program. Option B offers the only option protecting what we want.

CARLUCCI: [Mildly interrupting] George, if you don't want to talk about Option C now, when would it be appropriate?

ADELMAN: [Joining in the interruption] I agree. We should talk about it now.

WEINBERGER: [Continuing on his points] We agreed to reduce forces by 50%. Option B has this as an end by 1991. We would then be free to deploy, not negotiate.

We need to discuss the concept behind Option C because it will be discussed in Geneva.

The current structure of the SDI program is hurting us already. Delta 181 was designed originally to be an intercept. It is now redesigned to miss.

We need to decide on what we are going to do about the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty.

I agree that we have to consult with Congress and our Allies. But we don't need to get into haggling with the Soviets over how many watts will be permitted for a laser and the like.

If we can keep them convinced that we will hold on to SDI, we will get them to agree to offensive force reductions.

THE PRESIDENT: To ensure that the Soviets understood that we were not interested in a 1st strike capability, I put on the table at Reykjavik the idea of making an agreement in advance that we would share the benefits of SDI. I made the point that it had to be an agreement in advance, so that it was clear to all that they agreed we could go forward with our efforts.

Since then, I've had another thought. Now, the Soviets want an agreement, but are determined to force us to give up SDI. How about looking at going forward with deployment, but of an international SDI, and international defense against *any* ballistic missile.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, we are already staffing that general idea in the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG). [FYI: Actually, the work is being done under a special, compartmented study entitled THRESHER RAIN.]

THE PRESIDENT: This approach would take SDI out of the bargain. This done, I can see no reason why we could not move forward with reductions.

ADELMAN: We should not have this associated with the UN. If placed there, it would be a real loser.

We can't forget that nuclear weapons are needed to deter war in Central Europe. We will not be able to roll that back [change the conditions so this is not the case] in our lifetime. We should not associate this idea with the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

THE PRESIDENT: [Delivered a series of remarks on why MAD was an unacceptable basis for the future.]

A major part of the way we deter requires rethinking and the associated arms control environments, renegotiation. The Soviets don't want an all out arms race with *both* the US and NATO.

ADELMAN: However, Europeans still need nuclear weapons.

CARLUCCI: George (Shultz), what do you think about the idea of a broad international defense?

SHULTZ: The idea needs to be made more concrete before it can be fully evaluated. It must have sufficient detail to be as realistic as cuts in START and INF. This will need some definition.

I do think that the "non-deployment" period is the key; but delinked from the "0 ballistic missile" idea.

I don't think that this is the moment to spring a new concept on the Soviets, but we need to be ready to deal.

WEINBERGER: If we did need to trade some defense for offensive reductions, we should remember that we offered them 10 years of non-deployment, plus sharing, and were scorned.

We don't have to make such a trade! We should show them that it is in their interest, too, to seek offensive force reductions. If we bargain about how much SDI we will give up, we simply set ourselves up for a fall.

Once we signal that our approach involves such a trade, we have a real problem.

SHULTZ: You already offered 7 years of non-deployment [referring to the 25 July 1986 letter to Mr. Gorbachev].

WEINBERGER: That offer entailed no real cost to the SDI program.

THE PRESIDENT: I want to return to the idea that I just suggested.

From the very first, we made it clear that we were prepared for and argued that we should share the benefits of the SDI program for the benefit of all. Our public diplomacy themes have stressed that:

— we want to deploy SDI and render ballistic missiles obsolete, effectively eliminating them;

— we don't intend to simply deploy more defense over our offensive capability; and

— we have offered to share the benefits.

The idea I have fits perfectly with these themes. We can make it clear that we intend to go forward, with no restraints, based upon an agreement in advance that we will seek a system that is designed to hit *any* missile. An international group can be established to monitor what we are doing.

With such an agreement on defense, then we can press forward with offensive reductions.

WEINBERGER: This would certainly put us in a high moral position. And, if the USSR does not agree, we could still go ahead. We would not wait to obtain Soviet agreement, would we?

THE PRESIDENT: Hell no! We would press forward.

WEINBERGER: I agree with Ken (Adelman). I think that the Europeans would not be happy about this.

NITZE: The Soviets would clearly try to gain control of the international group by loading it with those whom they can influence.

THE PRESIDENT: But it would take the SDI program out of the picture [i.e., remove it from controversy and delink it from offensive force reductions].

ADELMAN: We would still have the threat of suitcase bombs.

CARLUCCI: We will have this staffed thoroughly. As we do, we will add options as appropriate.

WEINBERGER: If someone still feels we need an option now, Option B is available. Don't offer anything beyond 1991. In fact, I'd rather not offer anything so we can avoid giving any false impression that we are ready to trade.

CARLUCCI: We also need to consider some other actions. We need to:

1. start consultations immediately with Congress and Allies;
2. continue our legal research, which could take an additional 3 months;

VICE PRESIDENT: [Interrupting] On SDI?

CARLUCCI: Yes, on the legal aspects of ratification [whether the testimony to Congress in 1972 gave Congress the impression that they were ratifying the more restrictive interpretation of the treaty and whether this binds current action] and on case law [the issue of subsequent practice].

SHULTZ: [Interrupting] Yes, we need to do the consultations and the work; but you [Mr. President] need to be in a position of saying that you haven't made any decision. If you are not in that mode, that it really isn't consultation.

We need time to go through the appropriate records. It's hard to determine how much time we will need to do this right. We can go through the legal homework in 3 months, but I have no idea how long it will take to lay the necessary foundation with Congress.

Nunn is already personally going through the negotiating record.

WEINBERGER: Nunn is already acting like a Presidential candidate.

If we delay for 3, 6 or 12 months, we will be blocking experiments that we need and increasing the hopes of those who want to block us permanently.

We need to be in the posture of taking steps to support the LCI, not arguing about its validity. Let's not take actions that aid others to tie our own hands.

CARLUCCI: Cap (Weinberger), could DoD submit to the President a report on how, specifically, the SDI program would be restructured if authorized; including what changes to testing and why?

WEINBERGER: We would be glad to.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, once again, we have a number of actions that we should agree to pursue. These include:

1. completing the legal research;
2. completing the DoD report on restructuring the SDI program;
3. beginning consultations with Congress and Allies; and
4. continuing our work on modifying our arms control positions.

Can we all agree on these are tasks to be accomplished.

[There appeared to be no objection.]

SHULTZ: Cap (Weinberger), you need to be sure that any money you plan to use in a restructured SDI program which goes beyond the restrictive interpretation is permitted by law. [FYI: Secretary Shultz is referring to concerns that the language of the Defense Appropriations Acts for existing funds do place such restrictions.]

CROWE: We need to be sure that we understand the terms of any consultation. We can do some additional staffing involved with

programmatic details to buy some additional time. At the same time, the quicker we are free to move the program freely the better.

WEINBERGER: We can treat the restructuring the SDI as the basic proposal for consultation. The idea of sharing has always scared the pants off some.

SHULTZ: We need to remember to stress that we are offering to share the benefits of SDI, not the technology. The whole idea of going to “0 ballistic missiles” was that this was a clear way for all the world to share the benefits achieved by the SDI program.

ADELMAN: Frank (Carlucci), on your 4th point, the present situation is the best for now.

Option C would have been a good option in 1981. Now it is a swamp. It is unverifiable. On top of all else, it is not clear the Soviets themselves would be interested in this.

SHULTZ: Mr. President, I would strongly advise you not to go into Option C in a public meeting.

ADELMAN: The President asked my views on the options, and I am providing them.

Option B sets the date for the end of the non-deployment commitment period at 1991. This walks us back from Reykjavik.

I am not opposed in principle to negotiating what is permitted and prohibited during some non-deployment period, as long as there is a clear green light to deploy at the end of the period.

WEINBERGER: With respect to Option B, I see no inconsistency or problem with the Reykjavik proposal. The Soviets didn’t accept it when offered, so we can withdraw it. The situation has changed. We have had much more technical progress since then.

With respect to Option C, I think that we need to discuss this *now*!

SHULTZ: We can’t discuss Option C now. The technical work needed to do so is not done. I don’t think that we should task this work to be done either since the work will leak. Therefore, I don’t want to talk about this now.

ROWNY: The most important aspect of the consultations is the way they are done. We need not give the impression that our options and thinking is open-ended. We need to assert that the LCI is correct.

BALL: We can’t let Nunn manage us. We have maintained support for SDI, but we are working on some very thin margins. Reykjavik let us resolve 5 major issues associated with last year’s budget in a favorable way. We will not have that type of device available this year.

We will need allies on the bill. SDI funding will be a fight no matter what we do, but we also must consider that we will also need help on other key issues. We must consider the overall impact of the SDI funding fight.

THE PRESIDENT: If we were to approach the SDI program along the lines that I have suggested in this meeting [FYI: his view of an advance agreement on international sharing], then I would love to see Congress try to cut the funds for SDI.

SHULTZ: Yes, we need to build support to SDI into the very core of an arms control agreement that people want. It must become the insurance policy we need, and in turn, the agreement itself will insure SDI.

THE PRESIDENT: [The President then discussed some recent reading about Chernobyl].

CROWE: Mr. President, your idea about international sharing would require a new order of negotiation and a whole new set of specifics.

ROWNY: Mr. President, you must take steps to ensure that such a proposal is not viewed as being too far afield from the current negotiations, a diversion.

CARLUCCI: Mr. President, our time is up. I believe that we have reached agreement on the following points:

1. We should complete the legal research as quickly as possible.
2. DoD will provide a detailed report on the specific steps we would take if the President were to authorize the restructuring of the SDI program.
3. We will begin consultations with Congress and Allies as soon as possible, and as soon as terms of those consultations can be developed and approved by the President.
4. We will staff out the President's new concept for a "compartmented" or closely-held priority study.
5. All will provide the President their views on the Options discussed today.

George (Shultz), you need to find an appropriate way to discuss your views on Option C so that the President can reach a view or decision on that option as well as the others.

[The meeting ended at 12:04 pm.]

Tab C

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

*NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING
TALKING POINTS*

I. INTRODUCTION

— Mr. President, today we will continue last week's discussion of the SDI proposals recommended by Cap by examining arms control aspects of the problem.

[Leaks]

— Before we discuss the specific arms control options, I believe it is worth reminding everyone of the need to keep these discussions confidential.

— The President and his programs are ill-served by the leaks that occurred from last week's meeting. Those leaks are especially disturbing given the President's request that last week's discussion be kept strictly among ourselves and not be discussed with our staffs.

— We have asked for an investigation.

[Decision Context.]

[NOTE: The talking points do not lay out the explicit plan for proceeding that we have discussed, i.e., calling for the following:

- consultations from 16–20 February;
- a final decision by 27 February;
- an announcement on 2 March (tabling a new arms control initiative in Geneva at that time if appropriate);
- Sofaer completing the legal review by 26 March;
- completing consultation on legal issues with Congress by 15 April;
- completing a programmatic restructuring plan for the SDI program by 15 April;
- finalizing the decision to restructure and notifying both Congress and allies shortly before 2 May; and
- targeting final action to initiate restructuring by 2 May (prior to HASC/SACS authorization mark-up. They are designed to be consistent with such an approach, but not lay out the approach for discussion at this time. They are designed, however, to allow the participants to realize why we should consider an arms control initiative as a part of the above plan; and why, if this is a possibility the President wants to seriously consider, the discussion at this NSPG of the arms control

³Secret. All brackets are in the original.

options must be sufficient to permit him to select from among the options if he so desires.]

— One direct result of last week's leak is that it has made it virtually impossible for the President simply to restructure the SDI program.

— We will certainly have to take additional time to ensure that the proper foundation is laid both with the Congress and our Allies *before* we take such a step.

— Later in today's meeting, I would like to return to the questions of how to lay such a foundation and how much time should we spend in attempting to do so.

— As we take such actions, we should consider whether a complementary arms control initiative would also be helpful.

— Such a step, if carefully crafted, could serve to reinforce the President's decision with respect to the SDI program.

— As a minimum, it could help take some of the bite out of the criticism that we may face from the Congress and some Allies as we position ourselves to move to the legally correct interpretation.

— It also may be able to help us forestall unwanted Congressional action.

— Finally, we should anticipate that Gorbachev will attempt to spring something on us, perhaps during his announced speech on February 16. We may wish to have an initiative prepared to counter this.

— So the question before us is whether we wish to consider making an arms control initiative in the Defense and Space area in the near future, perhaps before the end of the current round (March 8).

II. OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

— The Arms Control Support Group has developed a series of papers in a new compartment called GRIP.

— I believe that we have all seen the first of these papers, GRIP 01, which laid out likely Soviet initiatives that we might face.

— Today's discussion is based on the second of these papers, GRIP 02, which takes the possible Soviet initiatives and develops a range of options that the US could consider to preempt or to respond to Soviet actions.

— This paper offers us four options for our consideration.

[Criteria]

— But before turning to the options, the paper also recommends criteria by which we should evaluate the options available to the President.

— I believe that it would be worth spending a few moments reviewing. They are:

1. It would not be in the US interest to simply trade restrictions on the US SDI program (leaving the bulk of existing Soviet defenses and a

vigorous Soviet R&D program intact) for the right to reduce US offensive forces in return for matching Soviet offensive force reductions.

2. The US should not take any step that would damage or significantly place at risk the ability of the US SDI program to achieve the President's goals for that program.

3. We should be able to identify how any step considered facilitates the ultimate achievement of the goals set for the SDI program.

4. If possible, we should seek steps that:

(a) Further institutionalize support for the SDI program within the US (i.e., appropriate continuing levels of Congressional support via funding);

(b) Move the Soviet Union to formally recognize SDI as a legitimate activity and a cooperative transition to an increased reliance on defense as a mutually beneficial goal; and,

(c) Minimize the impediments to the US moving to exploit the fruits of the SDI program through development and deployment at some date certain in the future.

5. Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty must be rectified prior to the US making additional commitments concerning the ABM Treaty.

[Options]

— The Support Group has generated four options for further US Defense & Space arms control policy. Each of the options is predicated on a different view of the relative strength of the pressures we will be facing.

— *Option A* is to maintain the current US position, continue to focus on reductions in the START and INF areas, while using the positions currently on the table (and nothing more) in the Defense & Space area to respond to Soviet demands or new initiatives.

— This option is predicated on the assumption that it is the Soviets who are the demandeurs in this negotiation, that time is on our side, and that there has been no Soviet move or other event that should cause us to alter our position.

— A suggested variant of this option (*Option A+*) [FYI: supported by ACDA] is to express a willingness to pay an unspecified price in the Defense and Space area if acceptable START and INF terms are worked out. However no further substantive or procedural moves would be made.

— *Option B* [FYI: supported by OSD] would commit not to deploy advanced defenses before 1991, provided that 50% reductions are accomplished in START by 1991, and subject to the following conditions:

1. after 1991, either side will be able to deploy advanced defenses; and,

2. between now and 1991, there will be no restraints upon devices based upon other physical principles (OPP) above and beyond those imposed by the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— This option is predicated on the assumption that the simpler the agreement, the better because: non-deployment is relatively easy to verify; and, discussing or negotiating the details of permitted and prohibited research, development and testing activities will inevitably lead to greater restrictions on SDI.

— *Option C* [FYI: supported by State] would continue the US offer of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996 and the right to deploy thereafter unless otherwise agreed.

— Under it, the U.S. would propose an agreement on the treatment of advanced defenses during this period along the following lines:

1. establish thresholds for devices which are based on other physical principles (OPP) beyond which such devices would be considered "components;"

2. base these thresholds on physical phenomena (e.g., for directed energy devices consider power and the size of optics—for kinetic kill vehicles consider velocity);

3. agree that below the thresholds identified, there would be no constraints on testing, but above the thresholds testing would be subject to constraints to be agreed on testing in an ABM mode; and,

4. agree that sensors that would be able to support ballistic missile defense (other than radars) would be free from any constraints on testing, except testing in conjunction with a kill mechanism.

— This option is predicated on the assumption that we need to enhance support for SDI in Congress and with the Allies by working out a set of rules for identifying and testing components based on OPP which could permit SDI planning to proceed without increasing controversy and that we need to supersede likely unilateral action in Congress to force compliance with the restrictive interpretation or the ABM Treaty.

— *Option D* [FYI: initially suggested by Max Kampelman] would propose that in return for Soviet agreement that either side could deploy advanced defenses as it sees fit without further impediment (unless mutually agreed) after some date certain (e.g., 1995), the U.S. would commit:

1. not to restructure the SDI program to make use of the full flexibility of the legally correct interpretation, before some specific date (e.g. 1990), if the Soviets will observe similar restraint;

2. to continue to observe the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty before some later specific date (e.g. 1993), provided the Soviet Union makes a similar commitment; and,

3. not to deploy advanced defenses before 1995.

— I believe that Max Kampelman had proposed this option for reasons similar to those motivating *Option C*, but I understand that he now favors, at least for the present, a simple non-deployment option.

III. GENERAL DISCUSSION

— We have the opportunity *now* to consider the use of an arms control initiative for the purposes identified earlier.

— We should consider the options above primarily in light of our national security interests; but we should also consider if any could help us in the near-term with the Congress or Allies, or could help fire-proof us against likely Soviet maneuvers which we may shortly face.

— George, I understand you prefer *Option C*. Would you like to comment on that option or on any of the options on the table? Do you think we could verify *Option C*?

— Cap? It is my understanding that if an option were to be selected, you would prefer *Option B*. Isn't committing not to deploy before 1991 a bit short? And do you really want to force the 50% reductions to be completed by that date?

— Ken? I understand you like *Option A+*. That doesn't seem to move us very far beyond our current position. How do you see this helping us?

— Does anyone support *Option D*? It strikes me that if that option were placed on the table, it would be more difficult for Congress to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the treaty since it would directly undercut the US negotiating position. Does anyone see such merit in this option?

— Does anyone else have any further comments on these options?

IV. OTHER ISSUES

— There remain a few loose ends from our previous discussion that we should use the remaining time to address.

— The first is the status of the continuing legal review regarding interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— At our last meeting, Abe Sofaer suggested that six month process to lay the necessary legal foundation for the restructuring of the SDI program.

— At the time, Ed (Meese), you suggested that we may be able to cut that time in half.

— George, do you have anything more to report from Judge Sofaer on when they might complete their analysis? Can we get it done within 2–3 months?

[after any reaction]

— [If necessary] It would be helpful for the President to have a range of options to consider, in addition to the 6 month plan. Perhaps 2 or 3 month intermediate options?

[Allied and Hill Consultation]

— We have also been receiving a heavy dose of correspondence from both the hill and our allies about the current state of our deliberations.

— Once the President has reached tentative decisions on today's discussion and the issues aired last week, it is in our interest to get to our allies and the hill and explain his thinking.

— In the past, we have sent teams to key capitals in Europe and Asia *and* to the hill. Unless someone has a problem with this approach, this is the way that I think we should proceed.

V. CONCLUSION

— Mr. President, unless you have any questions, that exhausts both our time and agenda.

— I would, again, encourage all to keep our discussion within this room.

Tab D

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁴

Washington, undated

Criteria. As we consider Soviet demands that the US make progress in the D&S area before the Soviet Union permits mutually beneficial offensive force reductions to begin, we must clearly identify what specific and appropriate benefits the US will obtain for any flexibility shown. In judging US options, in addition to our more general, long-standing requirements that any arms control proposal be equitable, verifiable, and provide for needed military sufficiency, certain other criteria, uniquely related to the Defense and Space and SDI areas, should also be applied:

1. It would not be in the US interest to simply trade restrictions on the US SDI program (leaving the bulk of existing Soviet defenses and a vigorous Soviet R&D program intact) for the right to reduce US offensive forces in return for matching Soviet offensive force reductions.

2. The US should not take any step that would damage or significantly place at risk the ability of the US SDI program to achieve the President's goals for that program.

3. As a minimum, we should be able to identify how any step considered facilitates the ultimate achievement of the goals set for the SDI program.

4. If possible, we should seek steps that:

- a. further institutionalize support for the SDI program within the US (i.e., appropriate continuing levels of Congressional support via funding);

⁴ Secret; Grip. All brackets are in the original.

b. move the Soviet Union to formally recognize SDI as a legitimate activity and a cooperative transition to an increased reliance on defense as mutually beneficial goal; and,

c. minimize the impediments to the US moving to exploit the fruits of the SDI program through development and deployment at some date certain in the future.

5. Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk Radar) must be rectified prior to the US making additional commitments concerning the ABM treaty. (S/G)

Option A—Current US Position. Continue to focus on reductions in the START and INF areas, while using the positions currently on the table (and nothing more) in the Defense and Space area to respond to Soviet demands or new initiatives. Avoid negotiation about the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty or about activities that would be “permitted and prohibited” under the ABM Treaty as it was applied to currently tabled US positions. (S/G)

Option A+. Express a willingness to pay a price (unspecified) in Defense and Space and SDI if acceptable START and INF terms are worked out and tell the Soviets that the US would not object to a package approach at that time. However, make no further procedural or substantive moves in the Defense and Space area beyond those made in the round subsequent to Reykjavik (e.g., we would *not* establish additional groups to work on specific aspects, and where working groups already exist, *not* engage in bargaining on what would be permitted/prohibited under this approach). Substantive moves to bridge differences would be concentrated in START and INF. (S/G)

Option B. Commit not to deploy advanced defenses before 1991 provided that 50% reductions are accomplished in START by 1991, and subject to the following conditions:

1. after 1991, either side will be able to deploy advanced defenses; and

2. between now and 1991, there will be no restraints upon devices based upon other physical principles (OPP) above and beyond those imposed by the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty (i.e., research, deployment and testing will be unconstrained). (S/G)

Option C. Continue US offer of a non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996 and the right to deploy thereafter unless otherwise agreed. Propose an agreement on the treatment of advanced defenses during this period along the following lines:

1. establish thresholds for devices which are based on other physical principles (OPP) beyond which such devices would be considered “components”;

2. base these thresholds on physical phenomena (i.e., for directed energy devices consider power [watts of output] and the size of the optics [diameter in meters]; for kinetic kill vehicles consider velocity);

3. agree that below the thresholds identified, there would be no constraints on testing, but above the thresholds testing would be subject to constraints to be agreed on testing in an ABM mode; and

4. agree that sensors that would be able to support ballistic missile defense (other than radars) would be free from any constraints on testing except testing in conjunction with a kill mechanism. (S/G)

Option D. In return for a Soviet agreement that either side could deploy advanced defenses as it sees fit without further impediment (unless mutually agreed) after some date certain (e.g., 1995 [7+ years]), commit:

1. not to restructure the SDI program to make use of the full flexibility of the legally correct interpretation before some specific date (e.g. 1990) if the Soviets will observe similar restraint;

2. to continue to observe the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty before some later specific date (e.g. 1993) provided the Soviet Union makes a similar commitment; and

3. not to deploy advanced defenses before 1995. (S/G)

Tab E

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁵

Washington, February 5, 1987

GRIP 02E (U)

Introduction. The Arms Control Support Group (ACSG) SAGE 50 paper (which resulted in NSDD 251),⁶ the work that led to the instructions for round VII of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), and the recent decisions on INF treaty issues lay out in sufficient detail the options and agency views on handling anticipated Soviet probes in the START and INF areas. However, some feel there are new options in the Defense & Space (D&S) area. (S)

⁵ Secret; Grip. All brackets are in the original.

⁶ NSDD 251 was quickly superseded by NSDD 256, which provided guidance for the seventh round of the Nuclear Space Talks, and is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 182.

Criteria. As we consider Soviet demands that the US make progress in the D&S area before the Soviet Union permits mutually beneficial offensive force reductions to begin, we must clearly identify what specific and appropriate benefits the US will obtain for any flexibility shown. In judging US options, in addition to our more general, long-standing requirements that any arms control proposal be equitable, verifiable, and provide for needed military sufficiency, certain other criteria, uniquely related to the Defense and Space and SDI areas, should also be applied:

a. It would not be in the US interest to simply trade restrictions on the US SDI program (leaving the bulk of existing Soviet defenses and a vigorous Soviet R&D program intact) for the right to reduce US offensive forces in return for matching Soviet offensive force reductions.

b. The US should not take any step that would damage or significantly place at risk the ability of the US SDI program to achieve the President's goals for that program.

c. As a minimum, we should be able to identify how any step considered facilitates the ultimate achievement of the goals set for the SDI program.

d. If possible, we should seek steps that:

1. further institutionalize support for the SDI program within the US (i.e., appropriate continuing levels of Congressional support via funding);

2. move the Soviet Union to formally recognize SDI as a legitimate activity and a cooperative transition to an increased reliance on defense as mutually beneficial goal; and,

3. minimize the impediments to the US moving to exploit the fruits of the SDI program through development and deployment at some date certain in the future.

e. Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk Radar) must be rectified prior to the US making additional commitments concerning the ABM treaty. (S/G)

Impact of Options on the ABM Treaty Interpretation Issue. The President has identified what was once referred to as the "broad" interpretation as the "legally correct interpretation" (LCI) of the ABM Treaty. At the same time, we have not restructured the SDI program to go beyond the limits of the "narrow" or "restrictive interpretation" (RI) of the treaty. Further, we have taken the position with the Soviets that the LCI is fully justified, that both sides knew what they signed in 1972, and, therefore, no further "negotiation" of an agreed interpretation of the treaty is needed. This position was intended to ensure that we maintain as much flexibility for the conduct of the SDI program as is legally available and reflects a view that "negotiation" of the interpretation of the ABM

Treaty could only lead to additional narrowing of that flexibility. As the following options are considered, we should recognize the impact each of the options has on this issue of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Attached (Tab A)⁷ is a chart intended to present a summary of relevant data on the ABM Treaty's restrictions. (S/G)

Additional Considerations/Observations.

a. We have identified the SDI program as a research and technology development program which will be conducted under the ABM Treaty. Clearly, any resulting advanced defensive components or systems could be deployed *under the Treaty* only after discussion and with the agreement of the Soviet Union. Absent such agreement, the US would have to withdraw from the Treaty to make such deployments. Of more importance, we should not forget that the ultimate purpose of the SDI program is to provide the tools for the broadest level of protection against all types of ballistic missile attack, and this purpose is incompatible with the stated purpose of the ABM Treaty. Therefore, as options are considered, we should take into account whether the near-term impact of an option on the ABM Treaty regime will make it more difficult to get full benefit from the fruits of the SDI program at a later time. (S/G)

b. During the current session of Congress, and irrespective of what we do, some will likely attempt to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Some feel that the Administration's position in resisting such legislation will be untenable if, at the same time, we are continuing as a matter of policy to adhere to the restrictive interpretation and/or if we are pursuing negotiations with the Soviets which suggest that the restrictive interpretation is acceptable. Others believe that a premature restructuring of the SDI program to take full advantage of the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty would only add fuel to the Congressional opposition to the LCI. This affects each side's view of the options presented below. As indicated in the discussion of the options, others disagree with this assessment. (S/G)

Options. The following are the main options currently supported. (U)

Option A—Current US Position (U)

Position. Continue to focus on reductions in the START and INF areas, while using the positions currently on the table (and nothing more) in the Defense and Space area to respond to Soviet demands or new initiatives. Avoid negotiation about the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty or about activities that would be "permitted and

⁷ Not attached.

prohibited” under the ABM Treaty as it was applied to currently tabled US positions. (S/G)

Option A+ (U)

Position. Express a willingness to pay a price (unspecified) in Defense and Space and SDI if acceptable START and INF terms are worked out and tell the Soviets that the US would not object to a package approach at that time. However, make no further procedural or substantive moves in the Defense and Space area beyond those made in the round subsequent to Reykjavik (e.g., we would *not* establish additional groups to work on specific aspects, and where working groups already exist, *not* engage in bargaining on what would be permitted/prohibited under this approach). Substantive moves to bridge differences would be concentrated in START and INF. (S/G)

Advantages.

a. This would place even more attention, public and in the negotiations, on our main agenda (deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces) and less on the Soviets’ main agenda (undercutting support for SDI).

b. While showing some willingness to compromise if the Soviets prove serious about START and INF, some believe that it could postpone a decision on what specific price we might be willing to pay in SDI until: (1) we see what we will get in START and INF; and (2) we have the opportunity to review the impact various types of restrictions would have on the SDI program.

c. Some believe that it could put off our paying any price in SDI until an “end game.”

d. Some believe that it could ease pressures for moves in SDI now which could have significant adverse impacts on the SDI program and Congressional/public support for the program—particularly given the absence of a comprehensive, technical review of the impact various options might have on the program.

e. It would be the most consistent with current guidance to focus on reductions in offensive nuclear forces. (S/G)

Disadvantages.

a. By making the explicit basis of trade implied restrictions on SDI in return for reductions in START and INF, it may violate criterion “a” identified earlier in this paper.

b. Without knowing how we might be prepared to make good the general commitment to further restrictions on SDI, we may find it difficult to explain and sustain such a position. In fact, some believe that we may increase the danger of the US being boxed into restrictions under pressure that we would prefer to avoid.

c. This option runs the risk of being perceived here and abroad as greater intransigence on SDI despite the expressed willingness to compromise there if the START and INF areas can be solved.

d. It may well be perceived by the Soviets as an unacceptable way to proceed, arguing that progress should be made simultaneously in all three areas.

e. We would have to face up to some further moves or concessions in the Defense and Space area if the START and INF areas were worked out. (S/G)

Option B. (U)

Position. Commit not to deploy advanced defenses before 1991 provided that 50% reductions are accomplished in START by 1991, and subject to the following conditions:

a. after 1991, either side will be able to deploy advanced defenses; and

b. between now and 1991, there will be no restraints upon devices based upon other physical principles (OPP) above and beyond those imposed by the legally correct interpretation (LCI) of the ABM Treaty (i.e., research, development and testing will be unconstrained). (S/G)

Advantages:

a. Some believe that this option would maximize the chances for the US to achieve strategic defenses in accordance with the President's goal by offering the most programmatic freedom for the US if successfully implemented.

b. It represents a simple, clear program for utilizing the arms control process to facilitate the introduction of strategic defenses.

c. Some believe that it strengthens the US negotiating position appropriately in light of the failure of the Soviet effort at Reykjavik (and subsequently) to force the President to give up SDI.

d. It is consistent with a phased deployment approach to SDI. (S/G)

Disadvantages:

a. This runs a greater risk of being perceived both here and abroad as increased US intransigence on SDI, particularly as it changes the offer and conditions the President made at Reykjavik. In this light, some believe that it could weaken, rather than maximize, the promise of SDI because, in taking this position, we could:

1. give the Soviets a propaganda tool in trying to garner international support for their position;

2. lead to increased pressure on the US; and

3. strengthen the hand of the critics of SDI in Congress. (S/G)

Option C (U)

Position. Continue US offer of a non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996 and the right to deploy thereafter unless otherwise agreed. Propose an agreement on the treatment of advanced defenses during this period along with following lines:

a. establish thresholds for devices which are based on other physical principles (OPP) beyond which such devices would be considered “components”;

b. base these thresholds on physical phenomena (i.e., for directed energy devices consider power [watts of output] and the size of the optics [diameter in meters]; for kinetic kill vehicles consider velocity);

c. agree that below the thresholds identified, there would be no constraints on testing, but above the thresholds testing would be subject to constraints to be agreed on testing in an ABM mode; and

d. agree that sensors that would be able to support ballistic missile defense (other than radars) would be free from any constraints on testing except testing in conjunction with a kill mechanism. (S/G)

Advantages:

a. Some believe that this option could enhance support for the SDI program by working out a set of rules for identifying and testing components based on OPP which could permit SDI planning to proceed without continued further controversy—helping to institutionalize the SDI program.

b. If successfully implemented, some believe that this would supersede the “legally correct interpretation” vs. the “restricted interpretation” question, and thus, help avoid unilateral Congressional action on this subject.

c. If mutually agreed, it would provide more assured flexibility for space-based testing and permit currently planned tests to proceed without further controversy.

d. It would resolve a major, outstanding difference in the NST negotiations.

e. It takes advantage of indications of Soviet interest in such an approach, some believe turning it to the US advantage.

f. Some believe that it would shift the issue of what is permitted/prohibited, both under the ABM Treaty and in the preferred US approach to the future, into a channel which, in their opinion, can be controlled to the US advantage. (S/G)

Disadvantages:

a. The idea of establishing performance thresholds for devices based on other physical principles (OPP) is relatively new to the

Administration and has received only minimal technical review on an interagency basis, and the related significant issue of the US ability to monitor and verify Soviet compliance requires study. Detailed analysis of the specific thresholds and the levels for each has yet to be accomplished on an interagency basis.

b. Effect on the US program depends upon the levels set for the thresholds and this would likely be very difficult to negotiate. This approach could entail complex and drawn-out negotiations and would likely result in some additional limitations on SDI (especially the testing in space of weapons based on OPP), and it would also violate criteria set forth earlier.

c. Some believe that this approach will not prevent Congressional action; to the contrary, they feel that the Administration's critics would be justified in interpreting this approach, if it were chosen, as a vindication of their view that the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty is invalid.

d. Some believe that US willingness to pursue thresholds on OPP systems, even in the absence of any agreement with the Soviet Union, will encourage Congress to take steps to ensure that we do nothing in our SDI experiments which would breach our own proposed thresholds.

e. Verification of the proposed thresholds for space-based OPP devices has not been studied rigorously. Preliminary assessments indicate that, with current and programmed intelligence assets, we would have very low confidence in detecting test of many of these devices—let alone measuring the relevant parameters. Verification of “power” more precisely than a factor of two would be difficult, and we have found this level of precision clearly inadequate in the nuclear testing limitation area (i.e., TTBT yield monitoring). Some believe that the difficulties we would have in determining that the Soviets had breached thresholds as we have seen with the TTBT, to say nothing of the problem of succeeding in obtaining corrective action once such a determination is made as we have seen with the Krasnoyarsk radar issue, would pale by comparison. (S/G)

Option D (U)

Position. In return for a Soviet agreement that either side could deploy advanced defenses as it sees fit without further impediment (unless mutually agreed) after some date certain (e.g., 1995 [7+ years]), commit:

a. not to restructure the SDI program to make use of the full flexibility of the legally correct interpretation before some specific date (e.g. 1990) if the Soviets will observe similar restraint;

b. to continue to observe the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty before some

later specific date (e.g. 1993) provided the Soviet Union makes a similar commitment; and

c. not to deploy advanced defenses before 1995. (S/G)

Advantages:

a. If accepted by the Soviets, some believe that it would:

1. Institutionalize a process which would permit the US to restructure the SDI program at a date certain;

2. this, in turn, would also allow planning to make full use of this relief from the restricted interpretation of the treaty in advance of the change in US programmatic developmental/testing practices.

b. Some believe that it may postpone or put us in a better position to successfully manage a Congressional fight over the restructuring of SDI, while also minimizing the problems we would face with Allies. (S/G)

Disadvantages:

a. In effect, if proposed but not accepted by the Soviets, the first phase would tend to delegitimize the legally correct interpretation (LCI), and this, some feel, could make it virtually certain that no future President will be able fully to take advantage of our rights under the ABM Treaty to conduct development and testing of mobile or space-based devices based on other physical principles (OPP).

b. Like Option C, this option will reinforce the ABM Treaty which is antithetical to the President's goal of realizing the full benefit of effective, deployed nation-wide defenses. This leads some to believe that it will not lay the groundwork for the ABM Treaty's replacement with an arms control regime which permits and facilitates a defense-dominant strategic balance. (S/G)

212. Memorandum From Sven Kraemer, Robert Linhard, and Linton Brooks of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, February 11, 1987

SUBJECT

NSDD on Soviet Noncompliance Report

Proposed NSDD

Following your decisions on the findings for the Administration's annual report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, we have prepared a proposed NSDD incorporating your decisions for the President's signature at Tab A.² A memorandum of transmittal to appropriate agencies is attached for your signature at Tab II³ following Presidential signature of the NSDD.

The proposed NSDD contains, in addition to the findings (pp. 6–9): (1) an introductory policy section (pp. 1–5) taken directly from the interagency-approved introductory materials of this year's compliance report, and (2) a US Policy Response section (pp. 9–10) and an Issues for Further Work section (pp. 10–11). These update similar sections in last year's NSDD and are also interagency-agreed. The Further Work section specifically includes the tasking for a comprehensive study by the Arms Control Verification Committee (ACVC) on TTBT compliance and verification issues. (FYI: The ACVC work program, targeted for an interim report in mid-April, is to be agreed by all agencies at an NSC Staff-chaired meeting this Friday, February 13, for transmittal to the NSC.) To try to fireproof the proposed NSDD, NSC staff (Kraemer) worked the attached text today with the DCI's representative, Doug George, on an informal, very close-hold basis.

Memo to the President

For interagency and historical reasons, it is important to have the President's approval and signature on the contentious issues decided in the annual compliance report NSDD. However, for the Administration's past three reports, the NSDD has been discussed by the National Security Advisor with the President for the President's approval, usually during 9:30 a.m. NSC briefing time, without a cover memo to the

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–094, NSDD 260. Secret. Sent for action.

² Printed as Document 215.

³ Attached but not printed. See footnote 1, Document 215.

President attempting to encapsulate the issues and options. This was done because of the volume and great complexity of the individual issues, the urgency of transmitting past years' overdue reports to the Congress, and past experience on involving the President in the details of such issues.

To assure the ability historically to demonstrate the President's role in the NSDD decisions for the current report, Bob Pearson has requested that a brief cover memo on the NSDD be prepared, for the record, seeking the President's review and decision. Accordingly, such a brief memo has been prepared for your use at Tab I.

We recommend that, at the earliest opportunity, and if possible by Friday morning, you discuss the report with the President as you deem appropriate and obtain his approval and signature. Upon the President's signature, the NSDD would be transmitted to agencies and the text of the report would be completed as a package, along with appropriate transmittal letters to the Congress, for final coordination with Will Ball's office and for transmittal through the office of the White House Clerk.

Further Interagency Work

It would be very helpful to the process to have the proposed NSDD signed by the President by noon Friday, February 13, in order to assure that the required additional interagency work can begin before the weekend. Following the release of the NSDD to agencies, considerable interagency work remains to be completed before the actual report (of some 20 pages) can be transmitted to the Congress. We have a 1:00 p.m., Friday, ACVC meeting on the major TTBT compliance work program tasked in the NSDD. The findings decisions must be retrofitted into the report; the report's detailed analyses must be finalized; an unclassified version must be approved by the intelligence community; and interagency agreement must be reached on final versions of draft cable to allies, press guidance, Congressional briefing schedules, etc. For the past reports, this has usually involved a difficult 7–10 day period of ACVC work under NSC Staff leadership.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the proposed NSDD at Tab A incorporating your decisions; that you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I;⁴ that you discuss the NSDD as appropriate with the President to obtain his approval and signature of the NSDD as soon as possible; and that, following Presidential signature, you sign the transmittal memorandum to agencies at Tab II.⁵

⁴ Printed as Tab A to Document 201.

⁵ Carlucci approved the recommendation.

213. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements—NSDD

Issue

Whether to approve the attached National Security Decision Directive on the Administration's current annual report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.²

Background

At the request of the Congress, the Administration has provided three annual reports to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. The reports, prepared by the interagency Arms Control Verification Committee in both classified and unclassified versions, provide extensive analyses and verification findings on a wide range of compliance issues raised by Soviet activities. Because of competing priorities, including the Reykjavik summit, and because of the complexity and contentiousness of most such compliance issues, the current report (which was due on December 1, 1986) is, like the past annual reports, somewhat overdue.

Discussion

The attached NSDD outlines your established concerns about the extensive pattern of Soviet violations and the adverse military and diplomatic implications of the Soviet failure to correct their noncompliance and to continue their massive military buildup. The NSDD reviews your decisions on putting behind us the expired SALT I and SALT II agreements, which the Soviets continued to violate, even as the United States continues to exercise utmost restraint in its strategic force modernization as we press for equitable and verifiable agreements on deep reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The NSDD reflects our best judgments as to the Administration's findings on individual compliance issues, including clear violations and troublesome Soviet activities with regard to the ABM Treaty, the Biological and Chemical Weapons conventions, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 260. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kraemer.

² Printed as Document 215.

Ban Treaty, and the Helsinki Final Act. Finally, the NSDD addresses major issues for further study by agencies.

Recommendation

OK NO

____ That you review and approve the proposed NSDD attached at Tab A.³

³ Reagan neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

214. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, February 17, 1987

MEETING NOTES

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SEC WEINBERGER

Do not negotiate—permitted and prohibited activities. Sovs committed to stopping SDI.

P. If negotiate perm. & prohibited we in losing game.

P. I feel that way; once on table ackn. Willing to bargain.

CWW. Once negotiate you pull into the middle. Bound to put on constraints.

CWW. We prepared to respond. Leave ourselves with freedom to develop effective system.

No preparation necessary. We not tying you down. Don't you tie us down.

P. How many of these in and out of liberal interpretation.

CWW. 5-year non-deployment is only offer we should make.

When get into permitted activities, we don't know enough. Cites velocity of Kinetic vehicles.

P. Wouldn't agree to anything except study for our own use.

CWW. It is on table at Geneva. NSDD language is OK to prevent this.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (01/21/1987–03/12/1987) [Meetings with the President—notes]. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Weinberger, Carlucci, Powell, and Regan in the Oval Office from 10:05 until 10:27 a.m. on February 17. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found.

215. National Security Decision Directive 260¹

Washington, February 17, 1987

*SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS (C)*

At the request of the Congress, I have, in the past three years, provided four reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. These reports include the Administration's reports of January, 1984, and February and December, 1985, as well as the report on Soviet noncompliance prepared for me by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Each of these reports has enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance, their adverse effects to our national security, and our attempts to resolve the issues. When taken as a whole, this series of reports also provides a clear picture of the continuing pattern of Soviet violations and a basis for our continuing concerns. (U)

In the December 23, 1985, report, I stated:

"The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under, or political commitment to, the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty."²

I further stated:

"At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 260. Secret. Carlucci distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Miller, Casey, Walters, Crowe, Adelman, Nitze, Rowney, Kampelman, Lehman, Glitman, and Ellis under a covering memorandum of February 17: "The attached National Security Decision Directive reflects the President's judgments concerning issues reviewed by the Administration, and which are the subject of a classified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements being submitted to the U.S. Congress in response to Congressional request. The judgments provided herewith will also be incorporated, as appropriate, into the unclassified version of the report submitted to the Congress." (Ibid.)

² Reference is to Reagan's December 23, 1985, "Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Transmitting a Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, p. 1504) For the substance of the classified Congressional report, see Document 94.

(including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels.” (U)

I have also expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again this past October in Reykjavik. (U)

Another year has passed and, despite these intensive efforts, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues. (U)

Compliance is a cornerstone of international law; states are to observe and comply with obligations they have freely undertaken. In fact, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the importance of treaty compliance for future arms control, when, by a vote of 131–0 (with 16 abstentions), it passed a resolution that:

- Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;

- Calls upon those parties to consider the implications of non-compliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and

- Appeals to all UN members to support efforts to resolve non-compliance questions “with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements.”³ (U)

Compliance with past arms control commitments is an essential prerequisite for further arms control agreements. As I have stated before:

“In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.”⁴

I have also said that:

“Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective

³ Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 40/94 L: Compliance With Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements, December 12, 1985. (Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 918–919)

⁴ Reference is to Reagan’s February 1, 1985, “Message to the Congress Transmitting a Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 102–104)

arms control process in the future. . . . The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels."⁵ (U)

Soviet Noncompliance and US Restraint Policy

On June 10, 1985, I expressed concern that continued Soviet non-compliance increasingly affected our national security.⁶ I offered to give the Soviet Union additional time in order to take corrective actions to return to full compliance, and I asked them to join us in a policy of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I stated that future US decisions would be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their noncompliance, reversing their military buildup, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reductions agreements. (U)

The December 23, 1985, report showed that the Soviets had not taken any actions to correct their noncompliance with their arms control commitments.⁷ In May 1986, I concluded that the Soviets had made no real progress toward meeting our concerns with respect to their non-compliance, particularly in those activities related to SALT II and the ABM Treaty. From June 1985 until May 1986, we saw no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup. (U)

The third yardstick I had established for judging Soviet actions, was their seriousness at negotiating deep arms reductions. In May 1986, I concluded that, since the November, 1985, summit, the Soviets had not followed up constructively on the commitment undertaken by General Secretary Gorbachev and me to build upon areas of common ground in the Geneva negotiations, including accelerating work toward an interim agreement on INF. (U)

In Reykjavik, General Secretary Gorbachev and I narrowed substantially the differences between our two countries on nuclear arms control issues. However, the Soviets took a major step backward by insisting that progress in every area of nuclear arms control must be linked together in a single package that has as its focus killing the US Strategic Defense Initiative. Furthermore, it became clear that the Soviets intended to make the ABM Treaty more restrictive than it is on its own terms by limiting our SDI research strictly to the laboratory. (U)

It was, however, the continuing pattern of noncompliant Soviet behavior that I have outlined above that was the primary reason why I decided, on May 27, 1986, to end US observance of the provisions of

⁵ See footnote 4, above.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 47.

⁷ See footnote 2, above.

the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II.⁸ The decision to end the US policy of observing the provisions of the Interim Agreement (which had expired) and the SALT II Treaty (which was never ratified and would have expired on December 31, 1985) was not made lightly. The United States cannot, and will not, allow a double standard of compliance with arms control agreements to be established. (U)

Therefore, on May 27, 1986, I announced:

“In the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.”⁹ (U)

Responding to a Soviet request, the US agreed to hold a special session of the SCC in July 1986 to discuss my decision. During that session, the US made it clear that we would continue to demonstrate the utmost restraint. At this session we stated that, assuming there is no significant change in the threat we face, the United States would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. We also repeated my May 27 invitation to the Soviet Union to join the US in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending conclusion of a verifiable agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. The Soviet response was negative. (U)

In my May 27 announcement, I had said the United States would remain in technical observance of SALT II until later in the year when we would deploy our 131st Heavy Bomber equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles. The deployment of that bomber on November 28, 1986, marked the implementation of that policy. (U)

Now that we have put the Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty behind us, Soviet activities with respect to those agreements, which have been studied and reported to the Congress in detail in the past, are not treated in the body of this report. This is not to suggest that the significance of the Soviet violations has in any way diminished. We are still concerned about the increasing Soviet military threat. For example, we expect that at least three new Soviet ICBMs will be flight tested in the next three years; these include a new, silo-based heavy ICBM to replace the SS-18, a new version of the SS-X-24, and a new version of the SS-25 that could have a MIRVed payload option. (S)

⁸ See footnote 8, Document 109.

⁹ See footnote 8, above.

A number of activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the core of central provisions of the Treaty frequently cited by the proponents of SALT II as the primary reason for supporting the agreement. These violations involve both the substantive provisions and the vital verification provisions of the Treaty. Through violation of the SALT II limit of one "new type" of ICBM, the Soviets are in the process of deploying illegal additions to their force that provide even more strategic capability. (U)

Soviet encryption and concealment activities have, in the past, presented special obstacles to verifying arms control agreements. The Soviets' almost total encryption of ballistic missile telemetry impeded US ability to verify key provisions of the SALT II Treaty. The Soviet encryption and concealment practices continue to present obstacles to monitoring Soviet programs today. Of equal importance, these Soviet activities undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new treaties and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable. (U)

Soviet Noncompliance and New Arms Control Agreements

Soviet noncompliance, as documented in this and previous Administration reports, has made verification and compliance pacing elements of arms control today. From the beginning of my Administration, I have sought deep and equitable reductions in the nuclear offensive arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and have personally proposed ways to achieve the objectives in my meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. If we are to enter agreements of this magnitude and significance, effective verification is indispensable and cheating is simply not acceptable. (U)

I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements. (U)

THE FINDINGS

A. ABM Treaty

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

The US Government reaffirms the conclusion in the December, 1985, report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite US requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (U)

2. Mobility of ABM System Components

The US Government reaffirms the judgment of the December, 1985, report that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the USSR's development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (U)

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

The US Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December, 1985, report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully US concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases, this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (U)

4. ABM Capabilities of Modern SAM Systems

The US Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December, 1985, report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (U)

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

The US Government reaffirms the judgment of the December, 1985, report that, on the basis of the evidence available, the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (U)

6. ABM Territorial Defense

The US Government reaffirms the judgment of the December, 1985, report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade,

ABM rapid reload, and ABM mobility) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Our concern continues. (U)

B. Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

The US Government judges that continued activity during 1986 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January, 1984, and February, 1985, reports that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (U)

There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1986 according to our strict standards of evidence. Although several analytical efforts have been undertaken in the past year to investigate continuing reports of attacks, these studies have so far had no positive results. Therefore, there is no basis for amending the December, 1985, conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (U)

C. Threshold Test Ban Treaty

During the past year, the US Government has been reviewing Soviet nuclear weapons test activity that occurred prior to the self-imposed moratorium of August 6, 1985, and has been reviewing related US Government methodologies for estimating Soviet nuclear test yields. The work is continuing. In December 1985, the US Government found that: "Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." At present, with our existing knowledge of this complex topic, that finding stands. It will be updated when studies now underway are completed. Such studies should provide a somewhat improved basis for assessing past Soviet compliance. Ambiguities in the nature and features of past Soviet testing and significant verification difficulties will continue, and much work remains to be done on this technically difficult issue. Such ambiguities demonstrate the need for effective verification measures to correct the verification inadequacies of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its companion accord, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. (U)

D. Limited Test Ban Treaty

The US Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December, 1985, report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous US demarches and requests for corrective action. (U)

E. Helsinki Final Act

The US Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing all the information required in its notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." Since 1981, the Soviets have observed provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in letter, but rarely in spirit. The Soviet Union has a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, and Soviet implementation of voluntary confidence-building measures has been the exception rather than the rule. The Soviets have notified all exercises requiring notification (i.e., those of 25,000 troops or over), but have failed to make voluntary notifications (i.e., those numbering fewer than 25,000 troops). In their notifications, they have provided only the bare minimum of information. They have also observed only minimally the voluntary provisions providing that observers be invited to exercises, having invited observers to only fifty percent of notified activities. (U)

US POLICY RESPONSES

US policy responses to activities of the Soviet Union in violation of its arms control obligations and commitments will include the following. (U)

Reports to Congress

In response to Congressional requests, an unclassified report incorporating the above findings is being forwarded to the Congress and made available to the public.¹⁰ In view of its unclassified nature, this report does not contain issues that have not previously been raised with the Soviet Union. (U)

¹⁰ See Reagan's "Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Transmitting a Report on Compliance With Arms Control Agreements." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book I, pp. 144-145)

A classified report, also requested by the Congress, is being forwarded to the Congress at the same time.¹¹ This report, consisting of an Introduction and detailed findings, will cover all issues analyzed by the Arms Control Verification Committee and will form the basis for briefings and consultations with the Congress and our Allies. (U)

Improved Security

Existing and potential Soviet noncompliance will continue to be factored into US force modernization plans in strategic and chemical weapons and in planning for the Strategic Defense Initiative research program in terms of proportionate and appropriate responses to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance as required for national and Alliance security. (U)

Diplomatic and Public Affairs Context

In the appropriate diplomatic channels, to include high-level demarches and discussions, the United States will inform the Soviet Union of our conclusions regarding issues included in the unclassified report, and will continue to press for their resolution and for corrective action terminating noncompliance. (U)

This Administration report will be handled in the context of our broader arms control and national security objectives. Compliance will be stressed as essential to the arms control process, and the importance of effective verification and unambiguous provisions in future arms control agreements will be emphasized. In this context, the report shall be made available to the US negotiators in the nuclear arms reduction and space talks in Geneva and in other arms control negotiations. (C)

The focus of public, Congressional, and Alliance briefings on compliance issues will be to: build knowledge and understanding about Soviet noncompliance activities; aid in maintaining pressure on the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance activities; develop support for appropriate responses; and direct attention to the need for more effective verification provisions in future agreements. (C)

ISSUES FOR FURTHER WORK

The Arms Control Verification Committee, working with the interagency Backstopping Committee for the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC), will assist in developing proposals for raising Soviet noncompliance activities in the SCC. (C)

As previously directed, the Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will continue to support the preparation of comprehensive assessments of verification issues

¹¹ Not found.

associated with US negotiating proposals. Such assessments should address the overall effectiveness of verification, US monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios), and the possibility of safeguards. As directed earlier, the Committee's assessments will apply to non-nuclear, as well as nuclear, arms control negotiation proposals. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will oversee analytical studies intended to resolve the outstanding issues relating to estimating the yields of Soviet underground nuclear explosions. These compliance-related studies are to include examination of the value of both seismic and non-seismic methods of yield estimation. A preliminary report of results and a finalized plan for a completion of the studies is due no later than April 17, 1987. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will submit recommendations on additional compliance issues of concern to the Administration and/or raised by the Congress that are to be studied. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will prepare a work program for completing work on the above issues on a timely basis. (C)

Ronald Reagan

216. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 17, 1987

SUBJECT

Sharing the Benefits of Strategic Defense

I. WORK IN PROGRESS

You have described to us your thinking about the concept of international control and sharing of SDI. As a result, Ken Adelman has put some of his experts at work to do a "quick look" at the basic concept you have described. The terms of reference paper for that work is provided at *Tab A*.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI—SHARING THE BENEFITS 02/12/1987. Top Secret; Wincey. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Bush. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on February 18.

This is not the only work in progress on this idea. Last Summer, at your request, we initiated a compartmented, interagency study of options for sharing the benefits of strategic defense. This work was initiated and designed to support the offer made about sharing in your July 25, 1986 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.² The first phase of the study, called Thresher Rain, dealt with broad options and criteria for judging their viability. The second phase, currently underway, involves evaluating the technical details of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with each of the options for sharing the benefits of strategic defense.

Our current plan is to review both the results of the ACDA short study when it is completed next week and the status of phase II of the Thresher Rain study. We will then decide whether to have the two efforts work together or in parallel, with the aim of developing the most practical concept.

II. A NOTIONAL SYSTEM

A. ELEMENTS

In your presentation of the concept, you laid out certain key elements. We understand them to be the following:

1. You are prepared to "share the benefits" of any U.S. advanced defensive system (or some significant part of that system) with the Soviet Union and others.
2. You would hope we could agree on a mechanism whereby others could also contribute capabilities to this "common defense."
3. You would be prepared to agree to international or multinational control of such shared defenses.
4. You would like to be in a position to refine this into a specific proposal, framed as a treaty, which you would be willing to sign immediately.

B. DESCRIPTION

To provide a conceptual starting point, we can hypothesize a system like the one described to you by Cap Weinberger in December, using space-based sensors and kinetic energy interceptors.

In principle, the elements of such a system could be controlled by an international body to ensure that the system would fire against all ballistic missile launches, but ignore peaceful space launches. Moreover, at least hypothetically, through test launches and intercepts, the international commission could verify that the system had not been

²Reagan's July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985-October 1986, Document 254.

rigged. Under this concept, strategic defense capabilities that would be primarily ground-based and designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course and terminal phases would remain under national control. These arrangements, and others necessary for the international control of defenses, could be codified in a treaty.

C. ADVANTAGES

Such a sharing arrangement could be proposed to try to allay Soviet fears that we intend to use SDI to gain strategic superiority. If they were to be convinced that the system would protect them, it could diminish Soviet incentives to attack the system in the event of crisis. If these objectives were accomplished, it would also improve the chances for a stable transition to a defense-reliant strategic regime.

D. DISADVANTAGES

The primary disadvantage stems from the fact that in order for our offer to be credible, i.e. for international control to be genuine, the Soviets must have (at a minimum) some means of assuring themselves that the system is not rigged. This would likely require Soviet access to the computer programming and other command and control functions associated with the defenses. From this information the Soviets could derive data necessary for developing countermeasures to the system. Such data could also be derived from tests for verification purposes. Moreover, as the system would depend on our 1990s early warning satellite system for guiding interceptors, the Soviets could gain important insight into our launch detection capabilities.

III. RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

—— —— That we proceed as outlined above coordinating the ACDA and Thresher Rain studies of “sharing.”³

³ Reagan approved the recommendation.

Tab A**Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency⁴**

Washington, undated

*INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SDI (TS)**Task*

The study will examine the concept of international control over SDI, compare it with the Baruch Plan of 1946, and assess its feasibility in today's world. (TS)

Study Content

1. A concept of international control over SDI would have as its main feature the sharing of SDI (or sharing the benefits of SDI) through an international body that would control and maintain a unified international strategic defense. (TS)

2. Such an approach is analogous to the U.S. Baruch Plan of 1946 for international control of atomic energy for both peaceful and military purposes. The Baruch proposal was not put into practice because of Soviet resistance. The study will review the substance and history of that approach. (TS)

3. The report will then examine the security implications for the U.S. if the Soviets and others were to agree to such a structure, without any change in the Soviet political system or Soviet geopolitical objectives. It will take into account the changes in circumstances since 1946: the proliferation of nuclear technology, the spread of significant military and political threats to the U.S. that come from outside the Soviet Union, and decreasing U.S. control and influence in international organizations. (TS)

4. The report will also discuss likely Soviet, Allied, and Congressional reactions to any such concept—particularly the impact on our current arms control efforts. (TS)

5. The report will conclude by summarizing the key long-term issues and problems associated with pursuing such a concept. (TS)

Schedule

A first draft will be available for review by February 18, 1987. (TS)

⁴Top Secret.

217. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Consultations on the SDI Program

Issue

To provide direction for consultations with our allies and Congress on the SDI program.

Facts

Following last Tuesday's NSPG discussion,² we prepared the draft NSDD at *Tab A*³ to serve as a basis for consulting our allies and Congress prior to your making any decisions on restructuring the SDI program. Both allied and Congressional leaders stress that they expect such consultations to occur.

Discussion

The draft NSDD sets for the approach to be used in consultations in considerable detail. We believe such detail is essential to ensure that a consistent message is communicated. The NSDD also requests the Secretary of Defense to provide information on *how* the program might be restructured, and the State Department Legal Advisor to complete his ongoing legal review.

The draft NSDD has been reviewed by your senior advisors including the Secretaries of State and Defense. Their comments have been included.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you sign the draft NSDD at *Tab A* setting forth guidance for consultations on SDI.⁴

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 261. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Powell initialed the memorandum on behalf of Carlucci.

² See Document 211.

³ Printed as Document 218.

⁴ An unknown hand wrote a checkmark beneath the "OK" option.

218. National Security Decision Directive 261¹

Washington, February 18, 1987

CONSULTATIONS ON THE SDI PROGRAM (U)

Initiation of Consultations. Having recently completed a series of discussions with my principal advisors on the future conduct of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, I would like both the Congress and key Allies to be consulted on the substance of the decisions that I face. The material provided at the attachment to this NSDD shall be used as the basis of this consultation. The initial report on the results of this consultation should be provided to me by March 2, 1987. (C)

Public Diplomacy. As we consult, we should anticipate increased public speculation about the future of the SDI program and its relationship to the ABM Treaty. It is essential that all responses to such speculation be fully coordinated in advance to the maximum extent possible. (C)

Related Activity in the Nuclear and Space Talks. We should also anticipate increased Soviet interest and activity in an attempt to influence my future decisions. Therefore, the U.S. delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks will have to take special care to continue to protect all U.S. options. (C)

With regard to the specific issue of activities permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, it is essential that we avoid giving the Soviet Union the mistaken impression that we are willing to accept additional restrictions on the conduct of the SDI program either through the process of clarifying the terms of a 15 year old treaty or by renegotiating what the ABM Treaty permits or prohibits. However, while maintaining the principal focus of the negotiations on the U.S. proposals and agenda, the Defense and Space negotiating group is authorized to respond to the Soviet pursuit of their proposals by continuing to criticize, question, and probe them (in accordance with their instructions), and by pointing out ways in which U.S. proposals respond to Soviet concerns. (S)

Additionally, the Defense and Space negotiating group is authorized to attempt to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement. In seeking such clarification, the negotiating group has been instructed

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 261. Secret. Carlucci distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Miller, Casey, Crowe, Adelman, Kampelman, Lehman, and Glitman under cover of a February 18 memorandum, in which he noted: "The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive directing consultations on the possible restructuring of the SDI program." (Ibid.)

to keep in mind that it is not in the U.S. interest to accept any changes in the understanding of key terms and definitions associated with the ABM Treaty which alter that which has already been negotiated and agreed. The negotiating group is called upon to counter and reject Soviet attempts indirectly to narrow that which is permitted by the treaty. In responding to Soviet attempts to promote their proposed definitions, the negotiating group will make it clear that the U.S. will not accept additional constraints on research, development and testing beyond those established by the treaty. (S)

Additional Tasking. In addition to the consultations on the above, I direct that the following be undertaken. (C)

a. The Department of Defense will provide to me by April 30, 1987, a plan which includes as a minimum:

1. the specific programmatic steps that the Secretary of Defense recommends be taken if I authorize the restructuring of the SDI program;

2. a description, including dates, of the first planning activities which would require the use of the broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty,

3. a description, including dates, of the first tests which would require the broader interpretation; and

4. an assessment of the impact of not being permitted to take these actions. (S)

b. The Department of Defense, in coordination with NASA and other agencies as appropriate, will provide to me by April 30, 1987, recommendations on [how] to increase U.S. space heavy lift capability. These recommendations should include estimates of cost. Additionally, the Department of Defense should provide its assessment of the impact of the funding requirements associated with recommended improvements to U.S. space heavy lift capability on other Defense needs. (S)

c. The Legal Advisor of the Department of State, working with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, will complete work on the remaining issues associated with the interpretation of the ABM Treaty as soon as possible, but not later than April 30, 1987. He will provide a plan to accomplish this task for my approval not later than February 27, 1987. This plan should include a recommendation concerning how the results of this work would be appropriately shared with Congress and Allies. (S)

c. The National Security Advisor, working with Departments and Agencies as appropriate, will coordinate the consultations authorized by this NSDD with both the Congress and Allies. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

TERMS OF CONSULTATION ON THE SDI PROGRAM (U)

Criteria and Technology (U)

— When we initiated the SDI program, we recognized the importance of ensuring that advances in technology were properly channeled to carry the program into areas in which stability and security would be enhanced, not diminished. (U)

— To accomplish this, we developed a series of criteria by which we could judge technological options as they emerged. These criteria include *military effectiveness*, *survivability* and *cost effectiveness* at the margin. (U)

— And, we set for the SDI program the goal of not merely providing technologically feasible options for advanced defenses, but of finding options that meet our criteria, and doing so as expeditiously as possible while conducting our program under the terms of the ABM Treaty. (U)

— In the almost four years since the SDI program began its work, technology has advanced at an unexpectedly fast pace, and is still accelerating. Therefore, the President asked for a review of both the program and its associated policy guidance to ensure that the policy guidance was able to stay ahead of the technology. (U)

— The results of our review, to date, are encouraging both from the point of view of the status of the technology and the validity of our fundamental policy. (U)

— Based upon the progress made to date, we remain convinced that the basic goal of the SDI program is achievable. In fact, if the rate of technological progress continues as now anticipated, that goal may be reached much sooner than we had expected. (U)

— This progress has enabled us to begin now to examine concrete, working hypotheses about the types of defensive options that may be available in the early-to-mid 1990s, and has given us new insights into the contingencies that we would face were we to move to implement the fruits of our research. (U)

² Secret.

Early Deployment Decision (U)

— However, the SDI program has not yet progressed to the point that it has generated options involving advanced defenses which meet our criteria. Therefore, despite speculation to the contrary, discussion about an imminent “early deployment” decision is not appropriate at this time. (U)

Concept of Incremental Capability (U)

— Further, it is very unlikely that we could ever deploy defenses capable of fully achieving the overall objective that the President set for the SDI program in one single step. (U)

— It is much more likely that we will have to make future decisions on a series of defensive options, each of which provide increments of that capability. (U)

— A fundamental issue, then, is whether we can build the overall defensive capability we seek in “increments” while remaining true to our overall objective, while constantly maintaining the quality of stability and security we seek, and while guarding against inefficient use of limited resources. (U)

Incremental Capability and Criteria (U)

— One of the first questions to be considered is whether our previously identified criteria remain valid under such a concept. (U)

— Since our overall objective remains unchanged, we continue to believe that the defense resulting from the various increments must be expected to meet our basic criteria. (U)

— The criterion of *military effectiveness* aids us by focusing the research efforts on outcomes that support our desired goal, rendering ballistic missiles obsolete. (U)

— We don’t simply seek to complement our offensive retaliatory forces by defending them against a disarming 1st strike. (U)

— On the contrary, we seek a transition to a more stable basis for deterrence which makes use of the increased contribution of defenses which threaten no one, and an improved basis for deterrence which allows us simultaneously to move to lower overall levels of strategic offensive forces while always maintaining our security and that of our allies. (U)

— The criterion of *survivability* ensures that the deployment of defenses does not increase crisis instability. If vulnerable, it could generate an incentive in a crisis for an aggressor to attack the defenses. (U)

— Defenses need not be invulnerable, but must be able to maintain a sufficient degree of effectiveness to fulfill their mission, even in the face of determined attacks against them. (U)

— By the criterion of *cost effectiveness* at the margin, we mean that any defensive system should be designed so as not to provide incentives to a potential adversary either to acquire or to retain additional offensive forces in an effort to defeat or overwhelm the effectiveness of our defense. (U)

— Cost effectiveness at the margin is much more than an economic criterion, although it is couched in economic terms. If met, this criterion offers us the opportunity to pursue both stabilizing defenses *and* offensive force reductions as mutually reinforcing goals. (U)

— The criteria of survivability and cost effectiveness provide needed protection against increasing instability. Therefore, it is our view that these two criteria must be appropriately applied to all options considered. (U)

— On the other hand, while the criteria of military effectiveness should also be applied, it certainly cannot require that an option designed to provide incremental capability be expected to achieve the full objective set for the program. (U)

— At the same time, we must ensure that we consider the very real limitations that exist on the resources available *both* for the deployment of incremental capability and for the continued research into the remaining increments needed to accomplish our overall objective. (U)

— Therefore, in applying the concept of military effectiveness to options designed to provide incremental capability, we are inclined to require that any such option:

a. clearly add an element upon which the larger, integrated system can continue to be built; and, in the process,

b. perform a militarily useful function which contributes an increase in our security commensurate with the commitment of resources involved. (U)

Promising Technologies (U)

— We believe that new technological options will be available that will be able to meet both our general criteria and the additional criteria identified for use in evaluating options designed to provide incremental capability. (U)

— For example, if progress continues to be made as anticipated, we may have the option in the relatively near future to consider a decision to deploy a two-layered system which could destroy enough of an attacking ballistic missile force to introduce sufficient uncertainty to enhance materially our ability to deter such an attack and, thus, increase overall stability. (C)

— Some of the President's advisors estimate that were we to use space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKKVs) as a boost-phase layer in

combination with some ground-based late-mid-course kill mechanisms, such a system could begin deployment by the 1993/4 timeframe at reasonable cost. (S)

— Such a system would not be able to engage all attacking ballistic missiles. Rather, it would be designed to destroy a significant portion [of] any ballistic missile attack, and to [do] so in a manner that would make it impossible for the aggressor to know which ballistic missile warheads would get through our defenses to their targets. (U)

— Deterrence would be enhanced because this major element of uncertainty would make it impossible for the aggressor to be sure he could execute a coherent attack and, thus, conduct a successful 1st strike. (U)

— Also, since the attacker could not predict which of his missiles would be destroyed, the uncertainty could not be overcome by simply adding ballistic missile warheads to the attacking force to make up for the portion of his force he can expect to be destroyed. (U)

— This is just one example of what may be possible. It is an idea still in conceptual development. It is not yet an option which is sufficiently formulated and refined to be appropriately measured by the criteria we have cited. (U)

— However, the idea behind the example is mature enough to be used to provide additional focus for our thinking and for our research. (U)

Heavy Lift Capability (U)

— Our programmatic review to date has also led the President to conclude that the United States should give priority to developing additional capability to lift heavy payloads into space. (U)

— This basic capability would assist us in protecting our ability to implement some future option like the one described above in the early-to-mid 1990s at reasonable cost. (U)

— It would also provide greater access to space for a range of both military and civilian purposes, and it would provide a prudent and needed counter-weight to the significant effort that the Soviet Union is already placing in this area. (U)

— Therefore, the President is considering additional steps necessary to place increased priority on the development of U.S. space heavy-lift capability. (U)

The ABM Treaty (U)

— When we embarked on our SDI research, President Reagan made the commitment that this program would be conducted in full compliance with all our legal treaty obligations. He directed, from its

inception, that this program be planned to meet that commitment, and we have done so. (U)

— In October, 1985, the United States completed an extensive review of the ABM Treaty and the associated negotiating record which led President Reagan to conclude that a broader interpretation of our authority under that treaty was fully justified. (U)

— However, at that same time, the President carefully evaluated the price that the U.S. would be required to pay to keep our SDI program structured as it was then within the bounds of the more restrictive view of the ABM Treaty. He weighed these costs against our overall national security requirements and the requirements generated by our commitments to our Allies. Based upon this he decided that, as long as the program received the support needed to implement the plan, it was not necessary to authorize the restructuring of the U.S. SDI program so as to make full use of the broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty which the U.S. could justifiably observe. (U)

— In taking this action, he noted that, there could be absolutely no doubt of our intentions to fully meet our treaty commitments. In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, especially in such cases as the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar in clear violation of the ABM Treaty, the President noted that our clear and principled restraint with respect to our own SDI program, and the price we have paid to date in exercising that restraint, demonstrates by our deeds, our sincerity towards negotiated commitments. (U)

— Since October, 1985, we have continued to review various other records and data on this subject. Some additional work remains to be completed, and the President has asked that this be accomplished on a priority basis so that we can respond appropriately to any and all questions concerning the U.S. position. (U)

— Based on the work completed, we remain convinced of the correctness of the conclusion that the President reached in October, 1985, that a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty is fully justified. (U)

— At the same time, considering the current status of the SDI program, it is clear that the conditions which the President found in 1985 have changed significantly. (U)

— Our technical understanding of the feasibility of providing advanced defensive options, options which could meet our criteria, is growing rapidly. (U)

— The costs of continuing our more restrictive policy with respect to the conduct of the SDI program, in terms of the expenditure of additional resources and time, and in terms of increased, unnecessary technical uncertainty, are growing correspondingly. (U)

— As a result, the balance is shifting between the price that the U.S. and its allies continue to pay for keeping our SDI program structured within the bounds of the more restrictive view of the ABM Treaty and our overall security requirements. (U)

— Therefore, the President is considering the restructuring of the SDI program to take advantage of our rights under the ABM Treaty. (S)

— However, before he makes his final decision, he would like the full benefit of the views of both the U.S. Congress and our Allies. (U)

— The President has asked the Secretary of Defense to provide additional specific programmatic information and recommendations which will take several weeks for the Department to generate and for him to consider. (C)

— Therefore, the President would like to use this time to complete a full and frank, confidential exchange of views on the issue of restructuring the SDI program. (C)

219. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 26, 1987

SUBJECT

JCS Briefing on Response to NSDD 250

The JCS briefed their response to the tasking in NSDD-250 to Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz and to Mr. Carlucci at 1115 on 25 February. The following summarizes the discussion generated by the briefing.

The briefer pointed out that the JCS analysis showed a requirement to spend roughly \$388B (then year dollars) above the 3% real growth baseline in order to meet the NSDD's stipulation that risk levels should be maintained constant (at the 1986 level). Secretary Shultz pointed out that this meant that at an added cost of approximately \$30B a year in

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 94, NSDD 250. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Cockell. Cockell sent the memorandum to Carlucci under cover of a February 26 memorandum: "Attached at Tab I is my Memorandum for Record on yesterday's meeting with the Chiefs. I did it primarily for Colin Powell's information, since he was unable to attend. With your concurrence, I will let Bob Linhard and Lint Brooks read it as well." Powell approved the recommendation to share the memorandum with Linhard and Brooks, and wrote "Thanks Bill, super." (Ibid.)

constant dollars "we could say to the public that represents the cost of getting out from under this terrible threat."

[2½ lines not declassified] Under these circumstances neither side would have enough strategic force capability remaining to achieve damage goals and would, therefore, have to increase their air-breathing strategic forces substantially. At the same time, we should not reduce our ongoing strategic modernization programs. We would need hot production lines for the MX and D-5 in particular to provide the capability to maintain balance with Soviets should the drawdown to zero ballistic missiles (ZBM) be aborted as a consequence of Soviet actions. Mr. Carlucci asked whether, in estimating the risk, likely Soviet actions had been projected ahead, throughout the 10 year drawdown period. Admiral Crowe replied that they had been, but noted that calculations of risk are tenuous and imprecise at best.

Secretary Shultz commented that he found the briefer's viewgraph² reassuring because it showed that throughout the ten year period we always had more weapons than the target base required and that, post-1990, the situation gets even better. Admiral Crowe replied that result was built into the analysis. The tasking was to determine the force required to maintain risk at a level no greater than that in 1986, so it was a given that we would maintain an adequate number of warheads throughout the ten year period. What this portion of the briefing shows is the increment to the 3% real growth budget necessary to maintain risk at the postulated level. In other words, the analysis is constrained by risk but not by cost. That is why, at the 1996 end-point, the ZBM and non-ZBM warhead-to-target ratios are essentially the same. Secretary Shultz said he understood that, but noted that if you put the U.S. and Soviet charts side-by-side,³ it looks pretty good for us. The differential moves in our favor. "It's a hell of a deal," he said. Admiral Crowe replied that, while the U.S. figures are good, the Soviets' are even better. They wind up with [less than 1 line not declassified] the number of warheads they need relative to the U.S. target base.

The briefer went on to note that a ballistic missile defense capability would be needed even in a ZBM world in order to hedge against the possibility of the Soviets' cheating. Given the reduced scale of the probable threat, however, the scope of the defenses would be significantly limited. Shultz commented that "an insurance force against cheating was very much a part of the President's proposal at Reykjavik. I was at the table." He went on to comment that he thought "you people over here are really not doing your job properly when you just give up on air defense." He felt defenses against the bomber/cruise missile threat

² Not found.

³ Not found.

should be pursued whether we go to a ZBM world or not. Weinberger agreed we should do more, and Carlucci pointed out that it's a resource trade-off issue.

The briefer then went on to point out that since strategic deterrence would be less certain under ZBM, the Chiefs had decided that a stronger conventional defense capability would be a necessary hedge. Shultz asked what the total real growth rate would be to support all the Chiefs' recommendations. General Wickham replied that it was about 8%. Others argued it would be higher—on the order of 10 to 13 percent. Referring to the final viewgraph⁴ which expressed the Chiefs' view that it would [be] unrealistic to assume the necessary funding will be available, Shultz said that was not a military judgment but a political one. Weinberger argued that it was an appropriate military judgment. The fact is that the prospects for even the 3% annual growth postulated in the NDDS are poor, to say nothing of the \$388B increment *beyond* the 3% growth rate which the Chiefs are talking about. Shultz replied that the correct formulation would be to say "X% real growth is required, and that the military judgment of the Chiefs is that, at that level of funding, we could maintain a constant level of risk." The military judgment relates to the force structure required to maintain the prescribed risk level, not to the prospects of funding that force level. Whether we would be successful in obtaining the funding depends, among other things, on how the issue is presented to the American people. If we go to them and say, "here is a way to get out from under this especially destabilizing kind of warfare, and the cost isn't that much," the people might be willing to pay the price. It's not unimaginable that we could get the desired support, Shultz concluded.

Summing up, the briefer noted that the JCS's recommendation is that that the goal of transitioning to a world without offensive ballistic missiles within ten years be deferred. Shultz again noted that he did not consider that an appropriate military judgment. Crowe strongly disagreed. To go to ZBM without the intermediate step of, say, a 50% reduction, "to try it out, to see what effect it has, what the uncertainties are" is an appropriate application of military judgment in his view. Weinberger observed that the analysis's estimates of likely Soviet actions could be conservative. To assume the Soviets won't do more would be dangerous. Shultz returned to his earlier theme, observing that we must factor in public attitudes in reaching judgments about supportable funding levels. The public is concerned about nuclear weapons in general, and those which are the most destabilizing in particular. We are feeding that sentiment with our discussions about the importance of SDI—and justifiably so. Moreover, things like Chernobyl *do* make a difference in

⁴ Not found.

public attitudes—including the Soviets'. It seems to him, he continued, "that we must give some credibility to the possibility that public sentiment will force a reduction in ballistic missiles and nuclear weaponry." Look at the effect of Gorbachev's nuclear test proposals, for example. They have had a heavy political impact. It's a simple argument. We need testing if we are to have nuclear weapons; therefore, if we stop testing, the weapons will go away. We have effectively countered much of the Soviet propaganda—as evidenced, e.g., by deployment of our LRINF systems to Europe; but there remains a strong underlying public sentiment in favor of nuclear weapons elimination.

"Where is SDI taking us?", Shultz asked. Assume that by '96 we know how to protect against ballistic missiles. The evidence is powerful that if we can do it, the Soviets can do it too. If that happens, then we both will have (ballistic) missiles and a defensive system. But we will have effectively neutralized the ballistic missile force, so we then have to go forward and do all these other things (outlined in the JCS analysis.) It's realistic, he continued, to look ahead and say (to the public) that "the orders of magnitude being looked at in projected defense budgets are not right, given the assumptions we have to make about the Soviets' progress and continued aggressiveness." Somebody in the world of politics needs to ask: what is the right amount of resources to defend the country? No presidential candidate today shows the slightest inclination to say: instead of the (FY88) \$312B plus 3% real growth we need considerably more. Recall that in the '70s we had a debate about defense requirements, "and those of us who felt they were not being adequately addressed came out on the losing end of the argument." Then sentiment started to shift. There was the Committee on the Present Danger, with Paul Nitze, and that had an impact. The Carter Administration began to turn around. Then the President came down hard during the campaign on the need for strengthening defense, and it became part of his mandate when he was elected. That has been a very important thing, and it came out of politics. There's another gestation period going on now, perhaps. For the last two years we've been beaten on defense. That may have stabilized now, Shultz felt. We should therefore try to set our political sights higher at this point. If the President's proposals at Reykjavik have done nothing else, they have caused the people to think seriously about a world without ballistic missiles, or at least one with fewer nuclear weapons; and that kind of world is a more expensive world. The question that must be asked—and it is a good political question—is: in a situation where the world can be blown up around us, what is it worth to have the risk held constant but in a safer way? Why are we not willing to pay a little more for that? The American economy is so big and dynamic it's awesome, Shultz continued. "As I've been in Washington, and seen the dimensions (of the economy) it's

dawned on me that we could be discussing defense budgets substantially larger than those which are being discussed.”

Weinberger replied that it is necessary to keep in mind certain essential differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems. Even with a superb campaign to get more resources for defense the results are likely to be short-lived. This is not true in the Soviet Union. There is no body politic there to restrain the Government. Budget decisions require the approval of only three or four people. That puts us at a disadvantage. Realism demands that we recognize how difficult it is to keep the U.S. properly focussed on the need for increased defense. We can never do it more than two years at a time. This year’s hearings, so far, suggest little change. In the absence of war, there’s no political likelihood of getting an increase for more than two or three years in a row. ZBM in ten years is simply not feasible, practical, or safe.

Shultz replied that he is not going to give up trying to get people to think bigger about what needs to be done. “Cap is right in the short run,” in his view, but our task is to make the political case for what *needs* to be done.

Carlucci said he assumed that the Chief’s analysis and recommendations would be formally transmitted to the President, at which time it might be appropriate to have a meeting. Secretary Shultz can articulate his views in writing, or at the meeting. We will welcome other views as well, he indicated.

Wickham noted that Shultz’s position is an attractive one, but the reality of things showed it is often difficult to generate the political support for adequate defense. NATO is a classic example. The MC 14/3 “flexible response” strategy is an excellent strategy, but the NATO nations have never been willing to ante up the money to support it. Shultz replied that his point is different. If you don’t build the case, you obviously won’t get the result you’re looking for. The point is to get to the people who vote and make the case to them. If you don’t do that, “you’re holding an empty bag.” Attitudes can be changed. In this regard Shultz thought it was significant that the SASC had just voted to support 3% real growth, “and that’s because people have banged away at it.”

(In an aside, Admiral Crowe remarked to me after the briefing that he thought it had been an excellent session—particularly good for the interchange with Secretary Shultz. He felt the Chiefs should make an effort to interact [*with*] him more frequently.)

220. Letter From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 4, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to your direction in NSDD 261,² Richard Perle and I began that consultation. We first consulted with Mrs. Thatcher and her Foreign and Defense Ministers. We went on to consult with heads of government and Foreign and Defense Ministers in Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, Paris, and Rome. While in Brussels, we also consulted with the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters. Over the weekend, we were able to visit with your negotiators in Geneva, Max Kampelman, Mike Glitman, and Ron Lehman. Coincidentally, we were also fortunate to have the Senate Observer Group in Geneva at the time we were there; we had constructive discussions with that group.

Below is a summary of the initial consultations; we have reported each discussion in detail from respective capitals we visited.

The consultations with our NATO Allies were made somewhat more difficult by press stories that an early deployment decision had been recommended to you, that you had already decided in favor of authorizing a shift in the guidelines for the SDI test program to the broader interpretation, and that formulation of such a decision could be expected shortly after March 2nd. Some took those press stories seriously and, as a result, presumed that our discussions would be more for appearance than to seek their views.

We therefore stressed the seriousness with which you regard the process of consultation. We said that you desire a full and considered expression of their views before you decide whether or not to change the guidelines for the SDI test program. We assured them that they could expect further consultation before such a decision was made.

There were differences of viewpoint among the NATO countries and also among ministers in the same country. In general, however, they agreed on the following points:

A. They were appreciative of the consultations and most relieved to learn that this visit initiated a consultative process in advance of whatever decisions you make in the future. They were especially pleased to learn that press stories alleging you had already made your decision to restructure the SDI program were not true; they look forward to further

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, March-April 1987. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 218.

consultations. A number of them thought that before your final decision is made, there should be a special ministerial meeting on this subject, or at least that it should be put on the agenda of the regular spring NAC Ministerial. Foreign Minister Andreotti proposed a delay until the fall by which time it should be clear whether or not the Geneva negotiations had a serious prospect of success; if by then it was clear they did not, he thought Italy would back a change.

B. They take the view that the interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the responsibility of the parties to the Treaty. They believe, however, that a decision in the short-term redefining the SDI research program to permit testing under the broad interpretation is a political one which would have grave consequences in the following areas:

1. First, they believe such a decision would adversely affect NST negotiations in Geneva. Namely, it would preclude the 50 percent reductions in strategic forces and seriously erode the ABM Treaty unless we cooperatively arrived at a "joint interpretation" with the Soviets. Related to this point was Mrs. Thatcher's view, the most positive of those with whom we consulted. She believed that it was imperative for the U.S. to test, under whatever interpretation, to the extent necessary to prove the feasibility of SDI defenses. In so doing, however, we must engage in a dialogue with the Soviets in order to establish "predictability" between the sides. She emphasized in this regard that we need to give Gorbachev a "face saving" way to follow through with his agreement on 50% reductions. She suggested that, after the Defense Department had completed its study on testing under the broad interpretation, it should be presented in terms of a proposal to the Soviets at Geneva. It was imperative, she said, that Gorbachev be given a face-saver on the one hand and that we ensure our testing on the other. Otherwise, distrust and lack of mutual confidence could upset on-going negotiations or lead to even worse consequences.

2. Our NATO Allies are concerned that a move soon to the broad interpretation would further erode public confidence within their respective countries, and within NATO Europe generally, in U.S. leadership. Related to this point was the view of FRG Defense Minister Woerner. He asked: "Why now?" Rightly or wrongly, he said that the Soviets are winning over the publics with the perceived view that they are putting forth many innovative ideas while the U.S. is plagued with "passivity."

3. Because of points 1 and 2 above, the Allies are concerned that a decision soon would cause disunity among members of NATO resulting in a serious fracture in Alliance solidarity which the Soviets would attempt to exploit.

4. A number of them argued that they had justified participation in the SDI research program by assuring their legislative bodies that it was

our intention to stay within the narrow interpretation; a change now without persuasive justification could jeopardize that participation.

C. While in Geneva Vorontsov told me of Gorbachev's general acceptance of our INF position. I stressed the importance of concurrently reaching agreement on START and Space Defense.

D. Also, in Geneva we had a long discussion among Max, ourselves and Stevens, Pell and five other U.S. Senators. Progress was made on a possible consensus behind higher than anticipated SDI appropriation to give support to your negotiating position with the Soviets during a delay in your moving to a decision to implement the broader interpretation.

Sincerely yours,

Paul H. Nitze

221. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, March 5, 1987

SUBJECT

Weinberger Memo on D&S Developments

At *Tab A* is a memo to you from Cap Weinberger, expressing his concern about hints from Max Kampelman that the U.S. might be willing to accept a period of additional negotiations on permitted and prohibited ABM activities. There is some basis for Cap's concern. A case can be made that Max has pushed his instructions to the limit—or (some feel) perhaps beyond. These actions include:

- Tabling in December a side-by-side paper comparing U.S. and Soviet views of permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty.

- Proposing working groups in January and accepting the Soviet position that one of two working groups should be on permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Tobey Files, Subject File, Arms Control Proposals. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. A stamped notation indicates Powell saw the memorandum.

◦ Suggesting to Vorontsov in January a seven year period of non-deployment, to be followed by an unspecified period of negotiations. [This is not one of two authorized U.S. proposals.]

◦ To our surprise, briefing the Soviets on the details of the ongoing consultations under NSDD 261.² In this context he told the Soviets on February 24th that “None of this [i.e. the contemplation in Washington of restructuring the SDI program to take advantage of the LCI] should interfere with our negotiations since what the sides negotiate, with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, would become the supreme law of the United States.” This may have led the Soviets to believe that the negotiations in Geneva could somehow supersede the President’s decision on this issue, despite NSDD 261’s caution that, “it is essential that we avoid giving the Soviet Union the mistaken impression that we are willing to accept additional restrictions on the conduct of the SDI program . . .”

◦ With Paul Nitze, proposing to visiting Senate Arms Control Observers a plan whereby the Executive Branch would not move to take advantage of the LCI for a specified period of time, in return for a commitment by those senators to support an SDI funding level of \$4 billion. [The President’s FY 88 budget request for SDI is \$5. 2 billion.]

While Max can explain his rationale and his view of his authority to do each of the above, we need to remember that his standing instructions since September state that, “It is not in the U.S. interest to accept any changes in the understanding of key terms and definitions associated with the ABM Treaty which alter that which has already been negotiated and agreed. The negotiating group should counter and reject Soviet attempts indirectly to amend the ABM Treaty and to narrow that which is permitted by the Treaty.” These instructions were reinforced in NSDD 261.

The issue of negotiations with the Soviets about permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty reaches back to the start of the negotiations, with Max resisting instructions that would limit his flexibility. Thus, instructions, private conversations (including one here), backchannel messages (including ones from Cap and you), and now an NSDD have not really prevented Max from discussing with the Soviets and senators how the President’s authority to implement the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty might be circumscribed.

Only intervention from the highest levels will dampen Max’s activity and help us to keep peace in the interagency community. You may wish to discuss these issues with the President, and if he concurs, take Max aside and stress to him privately the nature and level of concern about these issues. If you wish, we will provide talking points for such a conversation.

² See Document 218.

Recommendation

That you raise these issues with Max at an appropriate moment.³

Tab A**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)⁴**

Washington, February 27, 1987

SUBJECT

DST Joint Working Paper Paragraph on "Right to Deploy" (U)

(S) I am concerned about the direction discussions within the DST Delegation may take regarding the deployment of strategic defenses. The Soviets recently suggested it might be possible to move their proposal for 3–5 years of subsequent negotiations on the entire issue of ABM defenses within the 10-year period of non-withdrawal. As currently drafted, paragraph 5 of the joint working paper contains Soviet language proposing the sides "begin negotiations on subject of advanced strategic defenses," juxtaposed with U.S. language that the sides "shall be free to deploy."

(S) Although the U.S. language contains the phrase "unless the sides agree otherwise," the focus of the U.S. position *must* remain on the right to deploy strategic defenses at the end of whatever delay interval is suggested. As you know, I think a 10-year delay is much too long. I recommend no more than a 5-year period, as I have before. But our Delegation should *not* imply to the Soviets that the U.S. side is willing to accept *additional* restrictions on the SDI program. Indeed, placing restrictions on SDI has been the long term objective of the Soviets in these talks. I believe, therefore, that any further effort by the U.S. side to accept the Soviet notion of negotiations within any interval must not forsake that *right* to deploy and must be carefully coordinated with Washington.

³ Neither Powell nor Carlucci approved or disapproved the recommendation.

⁴ Secret. Weinberger wrote "Frank" above the recipient line.

**222. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President
and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)
to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, March 6, 1987

SUBJECT

White House Meeting on Possible SDI Deal with the Congress

Subject meeting was chaired by Colin Powell today. Others attending were LTG Abrahamson, Richard Perle, Ken Adelman, Ed Rowney, Bob Linhard, William Ball, LTG Moellering, Max Kampelman and I. Linhard distributed a paper outlining the subject of the meeting.² We followed that outline.

The first subject was whether or not the Administration could commit itself to continue the SDI test program as currently structured (i.e., under the narrow interpretation) until a date to be specified. It was agreed that it could do so through CY 1987. Perle reserved his position by saying that Cap wished the commitment to be no longer than the current Fiscal Year, that is to October 1, 1987; Kampelman and I supported a timeframe through the current calendar year. Max wanted the Congress to be committed to a measure of Congressional support for at least that long in order to give the negotiators a chance to consummate a deal with the Soviets. I supported that timeframe additionally because I thought it would help to secure the cooperation of our Allies.

The next subject was: "What commitments should we seek from the Congress?" It was agreed that we should seek a commitment not to vote legislation which would restrict our Executive Branch actions to the narrow interpretation or otherwise inhibit negotiations through constraining resolutions. Also we should seek agreement to avoid speeches on the broad/narrow issue.

Additionally, it was agreed that we should seek support for "respectable" SDI funding as part of any deal. Funding wise, we should ask for early action on the five hundred million dollar, FY 87 supplemental (already submitted) to provide for early work on "heavy

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (ES) and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92D52, March 1–31, 1987 Super Sensitive. Secret; Sensitive. Pascoe initialed the memorandum and wrote "3/9."

² Not found.

lift" and the SDI Institute. We also would seek a commitment to SDI funding of 5.2 billion dollars in FY 88, plus a Department of Energy appropriation of five hundred million dollars. In this regard, there was a consensus that before going below 4.5 billion dollars for FY 88, there should be further consultations in this group.

Kampelman proposed that additional steps should be taken to resolve the TTBT/PNET "dual ratification issue" which was of great concern to Nunn and others. This was agreed to, subject to getting a more "precise definition" of the reservation (*precisely* what should be required was not specified).

Kampelman also recommended that we take positive action on the issue of "treaty interpretation." I strongly supported this. An examination of the question is already quietly underway in the Executive Branch. There was general support, with Perle dissenting, that we should prepare ourselves to move promptly to negotiations with the Soviets on this issue.

Linhard will prepare a paper on the above subjects overnight, circulate it tomorrow with a view to lower level resolution next Monday,³ and review by principals on Wednesday.⁴

³ March 9.

⁴ March 11.

223. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 10, 1987

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the possibility of an agreement with various members of Congress on SDI funding and the structure of the SDI program.

II. BACKGROUND

In a discussion in Geneva between our senior negotiator—Max Kampelman—and several visiting Senators, a suggestion was made for an agreement between you and Congress whereby Congress would agree to provide adequate funding for SDI and not legislate any restrictions on the program. In return, you would agree to adhere to the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty for a fixed period of time. We have been examining this option; I am sending to you under separate cover an interagency paper on this subject.²

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.³

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

After your opening remarks (talking points at Tab C), I will call on the participants for their views on the available options, and then close the discussion.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0148. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush and Howard Baker. Attached at Tab A but not printed is the meeting agenda. Powell initialed the memorandum on behalf of Carlucci. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for March 11 from 1 p.m. until 2 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

² See Tab A, Document 224.

³ Attached but not printed.

Tab C**Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁴**

Washington, undated

Meeting with the National Security Planning Group

— I would appreciate the thoughts each of you might have on ideas Max Kampelman has suggested for getting sufficient funding for the SDI program and avoiding Congressional action that would circumscribe my ability to structure the SDI program as is necessary to meet the program's goals.

— I would like to work with the Congress to build a bipartisan consensus behind SDI, for now and the future.

— But I am not prepared to pay *any* price for that consensus. In particular, I do not believe it is in our interest to renegotiate with the Soviets what is permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, especially given that the Soviets have consistently used this issue in their efforts to kill or severely constrain the SDI program.

— I understand that some feel Gorbachev may have shown some flexibility in this area, by referring only to restrictions on deployment in his recent speech on INF. If true, it is good; but we should wait him out.

— Frank, would you outline for us the available policy options?

⁴ Secret.

224. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 10, 1987

SUBJECT

March 11 NSPG Meeting—Proposed Congressional Deal on SDI

NSPG Objectives. As we have discussed, there is a dialogue in progress between a number of members of the Administration and Congress on the possibility of a “deal” involving SDI funding and the conduct of the SDI program. We have scheduled an NSPG for tomorrow to discuss this. The objectives we should seek from tomorrow’s NSPG are the following:

1. To freeze all “free-lancing” by members of the Administration on an SDI deal.
2. To get firm control over this situation so that if further action is taken, the White House calls the timing and the terms.
3. To do the above while avoiding any stories of “disarray” within the Administration.

Tactics. The tactics we have chosen to accomplish these objectives are the following:

1. Develop a paper to identify and establish where various elements in the Executive Branch agree/disagree, and to highlight that while some elements of a “deal” may sound acceptable in certain quarters of the Administration, they are opposed in others. This paper should make it clear to all concerned that “free-lancing” on this issue involves unacceptable risks.

2. Use tomorrow’s NSPG to make it clear that any action in this area will require your specific approval.

3. Use the NSPG to freeze the situation (pending your further guidance), thus bringing the ball firmly back into the White House court.

NSPG Discussion Paper. At *Tab A* is the interagency paper which forms the basis of discussion for tomorrow’s NSPG meeting.

As the paper reflects (see the footnotes to the paper), there is considerable interagency disagreement over the terms of any such deal with the Hill, as well as concern over whether the Senators with whom Max Kampelman discussed this in Geneva could deliver on their end

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0148. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush. Powell initialed the memorandum on Carlucci’s behalf. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.

of the deal. All agree, therefore, that any agreement would have to be in writing and include the Majority Leaders of both houses. Since the proposed deal is not likely to get any better for us over time and to preempt any leaks, all agree as well on the urgency of this NSPG discussion.

Differences. With regard to the discussion paper, the key inter-agency differences are:

- DOD does not believe we should have a “going-in” position, but only the bottom line indicated in the front of the attached paper.

- DOD, ACDA and Ambassador Rowny believe the proposed bottom line we should accept for the duration of the deal, through March 31, 1988, is too long. They want it to last at most through December 31, 1987.

- For very different reasons, DOD, Rowny and Ambassador Kampelman oppose the idea of an interagency study on whether we should negotiate with the Soviets over what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

On this third issue, Cap feels that any such study can only lead to further restrictions being put on SDI. Rowny agrees, and feels that Max Kampelman has already gone far enough on this subject in Max’s discussions with Vorontsov.

Max Kampelman’s comments on this portion of the paper are a bit more troubling. We have provided them at *Tab B* so you can read them for yourself. At best, Max seems to be arguing that we should never imply to the Congress that he is inhibited from negotiating on this subject and attempting to reach agreement (on our terms). Therefore, Max would rather have any study of this subject be characterized as a study as to whether we should change our current negotiating position. On the other hand, Max’s comments may also indicate his frustration at *not* being authorized in his instructions to engage in a real negotiation on this point. If so, it would be useful to reinforce our position that moving beyond our current position of simply asserting (and defending) our interpretation is viewed as a very significant step which would require your explicit authorization. (This issue is included in the proposed talking points which I sent to you with the Meeting Memo.)²

As you know, based on discussions with George, Cap and yourself, I have asked the Arms Control Support Group to conduct a very close-hold study of this subject. This work is proceeding in a special compartment and should be completed in 3 to 4 weeks.

NSPG Meeting Outcome. The outcome we seek from tomorrow’s NSPG meeting is to freeze the situation and regain control in the White House. To do this, the meeting should end on the note that you will consider your options and, pending further guidance:

² See Tab C, Document 223.

1. Members of the Administration should *not* initiate contacts with the Hill on the subject of such a deal until you have studied the various views heard, thought through the issue, and explicitly authorized any such action.

2. If approached by members of Congress, members of the Administration should *not* engage in speculation about such a deal, especially substantive discussion which could foreclose your options, both:

(a) as to whether you will or will not authorize such a deal at the appropriate time; and

(b) as to the substance of such a deal.

Recommendations

OK NO

_____ _____ That you review the attached materials prior to the NSPG.³

_____ _____ That you listen to the views of your advisors, but *not* make any remarks that could be interpreted as authorization for any agency to pursue this “deal” with the Congress at this time.⁴

Tab A

NSPG Discussion Paper⁵

Washington, March 10, 1987

SDI CONGRESSIONAL COMPROMISE ALTERNATIVES

Introduction. Over the last week, the idea of a “compromise” on SDI with the Congress has received a lot of discussion. Before we can evaluate whether attempting to reach such a compromise is in the US interest, we require a firm grasp of what the Administration would require in such a deal. This paper is designed to see if we can reach consensus on the elements of *both* a potential “going in” position *and* affirm “bottom line” position on a Congressional compromise on SDI.⁶

³ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval.

⁵ Secret; Sensitive.

⁶ *Defense* feels that we should *only* consider our bottom line position. [Footnote is in the original.]

An initial version of this paper was circulated for comment on Saturday, March 7. The footnotes in this version of the paper reflect the comments received.

Issue 1. Elements of the Deal—The Bottom Line Position:

1. An agreement be concluded in writing that involved the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), plus a sufficient portion of the ranking majority and minority members of the Arms Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of *both* the Senate and the House to ensure that the Congressional parties to such an agreement could deliver on the commitments made by them.⁷

2. The Congressional parties to the agreement would commit:

a. To assist blocking for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, but no longer than March 31, 1988, any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.⁸

— However, the Congressional parties to the agreement would reserve the right to take such action after the agreed period.⁹

b. To support the establishment of a special Congressional group or other appropriate mechanism to study the issue of the Treaty's interpretation with the results not to be released until the end of the agreed period.¹⁰

c. To support prompt and favorable action on the \$500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request).¹¹

d. To support a minimum of \$4.5B in DoD funds for SDI in the FY88 budget (and a minimum of \$6B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity).

e. To support the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

⁷ *Rowny* notes that it is essential that key conservatives (e.g., Quayle, Wilson, Wallop, Kemp and Courter) be made full partners in such a deal. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ *Defense*, *ACDA*, and *Rowny* feel that this date should be changed to 31 December 1987. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ *ACDA* notes that there is no reason for the Administration to acknowledge this point to the Congress. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ *ACDA* feels that this point should be changed to read "any study of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be done by a special Congressional group with the results not released until the end of the agreed period." [Footnote is in the original.]

¹¹ *Defense* would add a deadline of May 15, 1987, for positive Congressional action on the SDI FY87 supplemental. [Footnote is in the original.]

3. The Administration would commit:

a. Not to restructure the SDI program for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, but no longer than March 31, 1988.¹²

— During this period, the Administration would be permitted by Congress to take actions necessary to keep options open which would allow the Administration to move promptly to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty after that date. These actions could include committing funds to be used for necessary planning and preliminary fabrication of test devices. However, no tests which would require the broad interpretation would be conducted during this period.

b. To study, within the Executive Branch, the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union, but not to proceed with any such negotiations unless such study clearly shows this to be in the US interest.^{13,14}

c. To drop the requirement for “dual ratification” of the TTBT/PNET treaties provided that additional verification criteria for implementing ratification could be agreed, and added to the existing language proposed by Senator Pell.¹⁵

4. The Administration *would not* agree to any action involving SALT or ASAT as a part of this agreement.

*Issue 2. Elements of the Deal—The Going in Position:*¹⁶

1. An agreement be concluded in writing that involved the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), ranking majority/minority members of the Arms Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of *both* the Senate and the House.¹⁷

¹² *Defense*, *ACDA* and *Rowny* feel the end date should be December 31, 1987. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹³ *Defense*, and *Rowny* recommend deleting this element. *Defense* and *Rowny* feel that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁴ *Kampelman* objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted/prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities”, but not to “proceed with any such reexamination” unless study clearly shows this to be in the US interest. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁵ *ACDA* feels that this additional verification detail cannot go as far as the language previously floated by Senator Dole, which would codify our current negotiating position of seeking CORTEX measurements for *all* tests about 75kt. *ACDA* believes we will ultimately wish to agree to monitor some lesser number and should not accept having our hands legislatively bound. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁶ *Defense* feels that we should *only* consider our bottom line position. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁷ *Rowny* notes that it is essential that key conservatives (e.g., Quayle, Wilson, Wallop, Kemp and Courter) be made full partners in such a deal. [Footnote is in the original.]

2. The Congressional parties to the agreement would commit:

a. To assist blocking any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty for the remainder of calendar year 1987.¹⁸

b. Assuming the Administration meets its associated commitments, to assist in blocking any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty after the agreed period.

c. To support the establishment of a special group or other appropriate mechanism to study the issue of the Treaty's interpretation with the results of that study not to be released until the end of the agreed period.¹⁹

d. To assist in blocking additional hearings on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty until the study is complete.²⁰

e. To refrain from personally engaging in criticism of the broad interpretation of the Treaty until the results of such a study are completed.²¹

f. To support prompt and favorable action on the \$500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request).²²

g. To support the full \$5.2B in DoD funds requested for SDI in the FY88 budget (and \$6.2B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity).

h. To support the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

i. To support the Administration's detailed study of the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union with the results of this study to be completed by the end of the agreed period.^{23,24}

¹⁸ *Rowny* believes that the Administration's going in position should be that we will commit to not restructuring the SDI program through FY 87 (October 1, 1987). Therefore, this date would change to October 1, 1987. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁹ *ACDA* feels that this point should be changed to read "any study of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be done by a special Congressional group with the results not released until the end of the agreed period." [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁰ *Kampelman* believes that such a request of Congress should be dropped since it is unrealistic to ask for such a commitment. [Footnote is in the original.]

²¹ Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 20, above.

²² *Defense* does not support a separate going in position. However, to track its position on the bottom line position, it would add a deadline of May 15, 1987, for positive Congressional action on the SDI FY87 supplemental. [Footnote is in the original.]

²³ *Defense*, and *Rowny* recommend deleting this element. *Defense* does not support a separate going in position. However, to track its position on the bottom line position, *Defense* would delete this element arguing that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI. *Rowny* agrees. [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁴ *Kampelman* objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted/prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted

j. To assist in blocking efforts to try to legislate the negotiation of such permitted/prohibited activities until that study is completed.²⁵

3. The Administration would commit:

a. Not to restructure the SDI program before the end of calendar year 1987.²⁶

— During this period, the Administration would be permitted by Congress to take actions necessary to keep options open which would allow the Administration to move promptly to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty after that date. These actions could include committing funds to be used for necessary planning and preliminary fabrication of test devices. However, no tests which would require the broad interpretation would be conducted during this period.

b. To study, within the Executive Branch, the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union.^{27,28}

c. To drop the requirement for “dual ratification” of the TTBT/PNET treaties provided that an appropriate reservation containing additional verification criteria for implementing ratification could be crafted and agreed to by the Administration.²⁹

4. The Administration *would not* agree to any action involving SALT or ASAT as a part of this agreement.

and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities.” [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁵ *Kampelman* would also object to the wording of this element on the same grounds as footnote 18 [24]. He would prefer an alternative wording along the following lines: “To assist in blocking efforts to try to legislate a change in our negotiating position with respect to permitted/prohibited activities until that study is completed.” [Footnote is in the original. Bracket is in the original footnote.] For the original footnote 18, see footnote 24, above.

²⁶ *Rowny* believes that the Administration’s going in position should be that we will commit to not restructuring the SDI program through FY 87 (October 1, 1987). [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁷ *Defense*, and *Rowny* recommend deleting this element. Defense does not support a separate going in position. However, to track its position on the bottom line position, Defense would delete this element arguing that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI. *Rowny* agrees. [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁸ *Kampelman* objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted/prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities.” [Footnote is in the original.]

²⁹ *ACDA* feels that this additional verification detail cannot go as far as the language previously floated by Senator Dole, which would codify our current negotiating position of seeking CORTEX measures for *all* tests above 75kt. ACDA believes we will ultimately wish to agree to monitor some lesser number and should not accept having our hands legislatively bound. [Footnote is in the original.]

Tab B**Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (Kampelman)
to Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff³⁰**

Washington, March 9, 1987

SUBJECT

Your Paper of March 7

Your paper is a good compilation of the essence of our Friday³¹ discussion but I have one serious problem with an element of it. I refer to paragraph 3b of your Issue 1 discussion found on the top of page 2. The same point is applicable to 3b of Issue 2 found on page 3.

Our critics are taking the position that I have not been permitted to negotiate the issue of what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty. You are aware that is not so. I have, indeed, been participating in such a negotiation since 1985, particularly since October 1985. The dictionary in my home defines "negotiate" as "to confer with another party with the aim of reaching an agreement." I have conferred with the Soviets on all issues dealing with our subject matter and have never said or felt that I could not do so. This has involved extensive probing and discussion. I also believe that my objective and the objective of our government has, indeed, been to reach an agreement. We have advanced the U.S. position with respect to what is permitted and prohibited under the broad definition. We must not, in any way, play into the hands of our critics by now saying that we are prepared to look into the feasibility of whether we should negotiate. That is what we have been doing in Geneva.

I think what we are really talking about and what Senator Gore was addressing in Geneva with his request is "the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities" and whether to "proceed with any such reexamination . . ."

Now for an additional brief comment:

I do not believe it is realistic in paragraphs 2d and 2e to block hearings or to stop the Members of Congress from stating their personal views on the treaty interpretation. This certainly is not attainable without the Executive Branch providing an assurance that no government official will state their position in favor of the broad definition. What we should rather seek is moderation.

³⁰ Secret.

³¹ March 6. No minutes were found.

225. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, March 10, 1987

SUBJECT

Talking Points: NSPG, March 11, 1987

Attached at *Tab A* are your draft talking points for tomorrow's NSPG.

The talking points requested for Senator Baker's use are provided at *Tab B*.

Paul Stevens called to relay that the Attorney General's staff were asking about tomorrow's meeting. We did not include Mr. Meese (or Mr. Baker) on the attendance list for the NSPG. If you want either added at this late time, we will take steps to get them the paper as quickly as possible in the morning.²

*Recommendations*³

That you use the points at *Tab A* to conduct tomorrow's NSPG.

That you approve the points at *Tab B* for Senator Baker's use and provide *Tab B* to him prior to the meeting.

That you provide guidance on whether to invite Mr. Meese (and Mr. Baker).

That you remind the President in the morning of the objectives of the NSPG, the outcomes we seek, and that he should not make any remarks at the meeting which could be interpreted as giving authorization for further "free lancing" on this issue.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0148. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum.

² Linhard wrote in the right-hand margin beside this paragraph: "3/11 Meese and Baker *were* invited. We will send paper. Bob"

³ Carlucci did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendations on the document.

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

*Talking Points for Mr. Carlucci**[Introduction]*

— Today's session is intended to be a discussion of the possibility of a compromise with the Congress on SDI which initially surfaced during a meeting between Max Kampelman, Richard Perle and Paul Nitze and members of the Congressional arms control observer group while that group was on a visit to Geneva.

— We felt this was a timely subject because knowledge of that meeting has spread and the idea has begun to take on a life of its own on the Hill.

— Before we begin, Mr. President, would you like to say a few words?

[After the President's remarks]

— The policy issues that we face today focus on three main questions:

1. Given the discussion that has already taken place with some members of Congress, is there a version of the general "deal" that has been discussed which we could all recommend to the President?

— If so, can we all agree on the details of the "going in" and "bottom line" positions that would comprise such a deal?

2. Assuming that we can agree on the substance of such a deal, would it be in our interest to pursue such a deal now or in the future?

3. If in our interest, what would be the correct way to approach Congress? And when?

— I would recommend, Mr. President, that we turn our attention to the first of these questions, the substance of such a "deal", before we move any further.

— We would put the SDI program in great risk if we started down this path without a clear understanding of what we could accept and what we could not.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for March 11 from 1 p.m. until 2 p.m.

— If you agree, Mr. President, we will try to use roughly the first half of our meeting to hear views on this first question.

— Following that, I think it would be useful to have Will Ball give us his assessment of the situation with respect to the SDI program on the Hill.

— The remaining time can then be spent on the second and third questions, that is:

(1) is it in our interest to pursue such a deal; and

(2) if so, how and when should this be done.

[*The Substance of the Deal*]

— To focus our discussion on the first question, the substance of a potential deal, we have had senior staff, including those who were involved in the initial discussions with the Congress on this, develop a paper which you all should have seen which addresses this question.⁵

— The paper attempts to identify *both* a “bottom line” and “going in” position and to indicate, by way of footnotes, agency views on each of the points as they were reported to my staff on Monday.⁶

[*The “Bottom Line” Position*]

— The paper lays out a bottom line position which has the following elements.

1. An agreement be concluded in writing that involved the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), plus a sufficient portion of the ranking majority and minority members of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of *both* the Senate and the House to ensure that the Congressional parties to such an agreement could deliver on the commitments made by them.

— Ed Rowny notes that it is essential that key conservatives (e.g., Quayle, Wilson, Wallop, Kemp and Courter) be made full partners in such a deal.

2. The Congressional parties to the agreement would commit:

a. To assist blocking for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, *but no longer than March 31, 1988*, any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— However, the Congressional parties to the agreement would reserve the right to take such action after the agreed period.

— Defense, ACDA and Ed Rowny all have expressed the view that this date should be changed from March 31, 1988, to December 31, 1987. This point needs discussion.

⁵ See Tab A, Document 224.

⁶ March 9.

— Ken Adelman also feels that there is no reason for the Administration to acknowledge this point to the Congress. This is also worth some discussion, but we should internally have no confusion about whether we can live with this or not as an outcome before we enter into any negotiations with the Congress.

b. (The Congressional parties would also commit) to support the establishment of a special Congressional group or other appropriate mechanism to study the issue of the Treaty's interpretation with the results not to be released until the end of the agreed period.

— The original idea of this element was to try to use this to control both the timing and the nature of Congressional activity on the interpretation issue.

— Ken (Adelman) suggests that this point should be changed to read "any study of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be done by a special Congressional group with the results not released until the end of the agreed period."

(With respect to SDI funding, the Congressional parties would commit:)

c. To support prompt and favorable action on the \$500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request).

d. To support a minimum of \$4.5B in DoD funds for SDI in the FY88 budget (and a minimum of \$6B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity).

e. To support the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

— Defense would add a deadline of May 15, 1987, for positive Congressional action on the SDI FY87 supplemental.

3. (In return for the above,) the Administration would commit:

a. Not to restructure the SDI program for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, but no longer than March 31, 1988.

— During this period, the Administration would be permitted by Congress to take actions necessary to keep options open which would allow the Administration to move promptly to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty after that date. These actions could include committing funds to be used for necessary planning and preliminary fabrication of test devices. However, no tests which would require the broad interpretation would be conducted during this period.

— Defense, ACDA and Ed Rowny feel the end date should be changed from March 31, 1988, to December 31, 1987.

b. (In addition, the Administration would commit) to study, within the Executive Branch, the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union, but not to proceed with any such negotiations unless such study clearly shows this to be in the US interest.

— Defense, and Ed Rowney recommend deleting this element arguing that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI.

— As I understand it, Max Kampelman objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted and prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities”, but not to “proceed with any such reexamination” unless study clearly shows this to be in the US interest.

c. (The Administration would also commit) to drop the requirement for “dual ratification” of the TTBT/PNET treaties provided that additional verification criteria for implementing ratification could be agreed and added to the existing language proposed by Senator Pell.

4. (Finally) the Administration *would not* agree to any action involving SALT or ASAT as a part of this agreement.

— This completes the paper’s treatment of the “bottom line” position.
[*The “Going in” Position*]

— The paper also addresses the subject of a “going in” position.

— The main differences in the “going in” position is that the Administration’s position would harden by adding the following requirements.

1. It would firm up the list of necessary Congressional parties to such an agreement to insist that the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), ranking majority/minority members of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of *both* the Senate and the House, all be included signatures to the written agreement.

2. It would shorten the agreed period covered by the deal from until March 31, 1988, to through December 31, 1987.

3. It would ask the Congressional parties to commit to assist in blocking any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty after the agreed period.

4. It would also ask Congressional parties to refrain from personally engaging in criticism of the broad interpretation of the Treaty, or supporting hearing on this subject, until the results of such a study are completed.

5. With respect to funding, it would ask the Congressional parties to support full funding for SDI during the period:

— the \$500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request);

— the full \$5.2B in DoD funds requested for SDI in the FY88 budget (and \$6.2B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity); and

— the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

6. Finally, associated with the Administration's commitment to study the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities, it would ask the Congressional parties to such an agreement to assist in blocking efforts to try to legislate the negotiation of such permitted/prohibited activities until that study is completed.

— As you can see, the "going in" position does differ from the "bottom line" in certain significant ways; especially the request that the Congressional parties agree in advance to support any attempt to block the restructuring of the SDI program *after* the end of the agreed period.

— However, it is most essential that we see if we can agree on the "bottom line" position.⁷

— In fact, I understand that Cap feels that this is the *only* position that we should consider.

— Perhaps we could start our discussion on this point and ask Cap for his views.⁸

— Cap, as we agreed earlier, could we confine our remarks for now to the substance of a potential agreement. We will turn shortly to the question of whether *any* agreement along these lines is in our interest.

[*Discussion: Solicit views of the various players on substance. Try to leave at least 20 minutes for the other issues.*]

[*After discussion of paper*]

— Let's break off our discussion of the paper and turn to the remaining two questions.

— Will (Ball), to set the stage for the question of whether any deal is in our interest, could you give us your assessment of the situation with respect to SDI on the Hill?

[*After Will Ball's remarks*]

— Could we turn to a discussion of the two remaining questions, that is

(1) is it in our interest to pursue such a deal; and

(2) if so, how and when should this be done.

— George (Shultz), would you like to lead us off?

[*Discussion. Leave 5 minutes for Howard Baker's remarks on everyone staying on the same sheet of music and your summary.*]

[*After discussion*]

— Well, this discussion has been useful. I think that we have quite a bit to think about.

⁷ Carlucci drew two short vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this point.

⁸ Carlucci drew two short vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this point.

— Howard (Baker), do have anything to add to this.

[*Closing, after Baker's remarks*]

— Mr. President, I think that today's discussion gives us quite a bit to consider.

— If you agree, Mr. President, I think that we should all be guided by the following rules while you considering your options. Pending further guidance:

1. Members of the Administration should *not* initiate contacts with the Hill on the subject of such a deal until the President has studied the various views heard, thought through the issue, and explicitly authorizes any such action.

2. If approached by members of Congress, members of the Administration should *not* engage in speculation about such a deal, especially substantive discussion which could foreclose the President's options: both

(a) as to whether he will or will not authorize such a deal at the appropriate time; and

(b) as to the substance of such a deal.

Tab B

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Talking Points for Senator Baker

— I would like [to] make just one point.

— Since the Tower Commission Report and the beginning of the most recent flurry of activity involving the possibility of an agreement in the INF area, there hasn't been a single story about disarray in the Administration over arms control.

— We have been very successful in all singing from the same sheet of music.

— It is essential, both for the President, and for our ability to achieve our objectives, that this continue—especially in SDI related areas.

— Let's make sure we coordinate *before* we act, and all continue to pull in the same direction as a team.

⁹ No classification marking. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for March 11 from 1 p.m. until 2 p.m.

226. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 11, 1987, 1–2 p.m.

National Security Planning Group Meeting

SUBJECT

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary of State Shultz

Counselor Max Kampelman

Treasury

Secretary of Treasury Baker

Defense

Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Dr. Fred Ikle

General James Abrahamson

Justice

Attorney General Meese

OMB

Mr. James Miller

Mr. Wayne Arney

ACDA

Director Kenneth Adelman

CIA

Deputy Director Robert Gates

JCS

General Herres

General Moellering

White House

Chief of Staff Baker

Craig Fuller

Frank C. Carlucci

Colin L. Powell

Will Ball

NSC

Robert Linhard

OSTP

William Graham

Special Advisors to the President

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

*Minutes**The President:* Opened the meeting by reading his points (Tab A).²*Mr. Carlucci:* Read his opening remarks as annotated (Tab B).³
[Following Carlucci's remarks, the discussion began.]

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-111, NSPG 0148. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes.

² Attached but not printed. See Tab C, Document 223.

³ Attached but not printed. See Tab A, Document 225.

Secretary Weinberger: We have made great progress on SDI and, therefore, I favor the date of December 31, 1987 so that we cut our time commitments to a minimum. At the end of that period, we need to be free to do what we want to do. I think this is part of the package we're discussing.

— We should avoid any discussion of determining what may be permitted and prohibited during the period. The Soviets will offer a range of things that they already know would restrict us. We should do nothing to restrict the SDI program. It's unwise even to commit study of the feasibility of this type of thing. The study itself will lead us into restrictions. We should leave any clause with reference to this out. If not asked for by Congress, we should leave it out.

— Some have suggested that we should consider dropping all limits on sensors. Again, I don't want to have any part of this, mainly because the Soviets will use this to achieve their goal blocking the SDI.

— We should not have any opening position in arguing with Congress. We should give them our bottom line as outlined and as modified by this discussion, and then if Congress agrees, okay.

— Once again, I don't want any part of any discussion of what may be permitted and prohibited. This would just undercut our interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and move us towards restrictions. Mr. President, I have a briefing that I'm prepared to give you on at least one experiment that we *can't* do under the narrow interpretation. I would be glad to give you that briefing at this time; if there's no time now, I'll be prepared to give to you at a later date.

Mr. Carlucci: Cap, we need to *hear* the others first. Let's reschedule your briefing.

Secretary Shultz: Working on a compromise like this is a good thing to do. We really must ask ourselves what the alternatives are to fighting with the Congress. We run the risk of getting our ears pinned back. On the other hand, we really could get a good deal, especially Point D (which deals with funding). With respect to permitted and prohibited, the position in our current instructions to our delegation is satisfactory; no changes needed. Max can state our position in Geneva and probe. There's no need to change this. We need to find a way to know what we're talking about. Perhaps, we should do this in a smaller group once we've gotten our homework done.

Mr. Carlucci: I agree that we need to get our homework done. We are doing so, and we're discussing this in a very small group.

Secretary Shultz: I agree; we should be able to handle this.

Chief of Staff Baker: Part of our problem is we don't have one person that we're dealing with; we have a herd of people. We need to find the

group to deal with. It's very early for something like this. We don't need to be in a hurry; we can take our time on what we want. Let's keep our powder dry, and let them come to us. Al Gore is already wetting his pants to try to get a deal. Once again, take it slow and let them come to us.

— The only way to screw this up is if we speak with multiple voices. We should say nothing at all, or everyone should say the *exact* same thing, both with the Soviets and with the Congress. I think we ought to proceed with this exercise, figure out who should do the negotiations, take it slow, and wait for them to come us. And, finally, we need to sing with one voice.

Will Ball: The Speaker is thinking about taking their trip to Moscow. Your trip in April (Secretary Shultz) allows us to block this activity and block an amendment until *after* your trip. This buys us time.

Chief of Staff Baker: I told Congressman Wright that we would talk to him.

Max Kampelman: We're working on the assumption that all here want to preserve and strengthen the SDI program. All we differ on is tactics.

— How did all this arise? We had our observers visit the delegation in Geneva. At lunch, we heard from members of both parties. Both Republicans and Democrats from the Senate said they have the votes and the intentions to signal reduce SDI funding and to place restrictions on the Appropriations Bill to block the use of these funds for testing beyond the narrow interpretation of the Treaty. The House people were not there. We took seriously what was said, because it could *hurt* us and cause the Soviets to get something that they haven't paid for at the negotiating table. Also, we'll know by the end of the year whether a Defense and Space agreement is in the works or not. We tried to figure out in Geneva a way to avoid debate until we're finished with the negotiations with the Soviets.

— We have to ask ourselves what do we want. First, we need respectable funding. Secondly, we need to stop legislative action that could hurt the negotiations.

— Then we have to ask what they want. What the Senate wants, apparently, is a period of time with no change in the SDI program. Richard Perle was there. There was nothing binding on the Administration that was said. Since then, members of Congress have met with others and have talked further about this. I met with both Dole and Byrd, and with some others. I think the piece of paper that was produced by the Arms Control Support Group summarized the deal well. If we have no deal, SDI funding will slow down, and I don't know how that can be helped.

— With respect to negotiations on prohibited and permitted behavior, the Soviets have tried to have negotiations on this issue both through the internal activities in Geneva and through external public contacts. My instructions have allowed me to say publicly that I am authorized to negotiate. I can't maintain the US position while not being able to say so publicly and to the Congress. Now I have talked about permitted and prohibited behavior with the Soviets, but I haven't given them an inch. And, hell no, I won't. And I certainly won't *unless* I am *explicitly* authorized.

— You have nothing to fear if you trust your negotiators.

Secretary Weinberger: Mr. President, you did not want us to discuss and define what is permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty. I'm all for an agreement if the money is right for the SDI program; but maybe it's too early for us to look at that. I do believe that we may face a cut in the SDI funding if there's no agreement along the lines that's suggested. But on the issue of what's permitted and prohibited, maybe the word that's bothering me is negotiation. We should be clear that we can talk about this issue, but there can be *no* movement on our part. Is that agreed?

Max Kampelman: I agree.

Secretary Weinberger: My problem is negotiations mean that you want to make an agreement on a list of what's permitted and prohibited, but you can't do that if you don't know enough about it to make such a list and, instead, we press forward for agreement sake. I strongly oppose any agreement on permitted and prohibited. I strongly support a try for an agreement with the Congress however. Timing remains an issue. Who we talk to is also an issue. What is not an issue, though, is any discussion about what may be permitted and prohibited.

Mr. Carlucci: We have our instructions, and all agree. Let's stick with them.

Secretary Weinberger: I didn't know we needed any additional interpretation for our instructions.

Mr. Carlucci: If we need so, we'll work it out.

The President: All right, what period of time should we be looking towards? Do we want to have this still extend through March 31, 1988? Or December 31, 1987? Do we accept either of those?

Secretary Weinberger: If we accept either, it will have an impact now. But I'm willing to accept a restriction running through December 31, 1987.

Mr. Carlucci: This would let you execute your plans. But would you be ready to test anything in January of 1988?

Secretary Weinberger: If I were free of the narrow interpretation, we could test this fall, and certainly by December.

Mr. Carlucci: If the Congress says no to December, do we walk away?

Secretary Weinberger: No, I'd say we would shift to January 15.

Secretary Baker: You are working a "going in" position.

Secretary Weinberger: No, I'm not.

General Abrahamson: We're working to develop a restructured program by 30 April. There are two types of tests that we are considering—one on near-term adjustments; the second are far-term (tests in 1990) that could be exercised if we make adjustments now, and in the process save us both time and money. There's a real benefit to be able to plan for our testing now.

Mr. Adelman: Okay, I agree with that. However, I agree on the premise that we can move to the broad interpretation now. It would be a worse situation if we were to plan for the broad interpretation and then the Congress legislate the narrow interpretation. We'd be worse off than even now.

— We need to do a lot better in explaining the legal interpretation of the Treaty. We also need a clear understanding and explanation of why we need to go to the broad interpretation.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, one explanation is still simple. If I'm under the broad interpretation and I run a test of our interceptor, I have to plan to miss. If I can work under the broad interpretation, I can try to hit the target I'm shooting for. Right now, we're not trying to hit anything.

Secretary Shultz: What happens if we plan for a miss and we hit it?

The President: Yeah, what do we say? Do we say we intended to miss but whoops?

Secretary Weinberger: It takes us time to plan for events, and we can use the time to plan to exercise the broad interpretation. We can't have a miss step. For example, think about ASAT. We've got an \$80 million target up there right now, and we can't shoot at it. After the period in question, we need to be able to shoot at things. Then we can develop other capabilities needed.

The President: Haven't the Soviets tested against an anti-satellite weapon?

Secretary Shultz: They've had 20 or so shots with their anti-satellite system, but not in the last five years.

The President: Why the hell are we so restricted?

Mr. Carlucci: This is not an ABM Treaty issue.

The President: Let's move to nine months vice the three additional months. Why don't we take the attitude that after 31 January 1988, we can move to the broad interpretation.

Ambassador Rowny: I think you mean 1 January 1988, Mr. President.

The President: Yes, that's right.

Attorney General Meese: I think a lot of this is implicit in our position. We should not make that a negotiating issue. Our chances of their not passing a restrictive legislation on the SDI program *after* the nine-month period are better. So let's follow what the President had in mind.

Chief of Staff Baker: We've got to be careful; we can't insist on what we want, and we can't bind the Congress. We just need to be silent on what we're going to do. We have the Supplemental coming up, and we're going to need to fight this fight several times. Be silent on any idea of what we're going to do later until we need to.

The President: Okay, let's do it. We can limit ourselves until 31 January 1988 (once again, he was referring to 1 January 1988).

Attorney General Meese: It's going to be very hard to override a veto after this.

The President: I agree, but let's do it anyway. The people are on our side.

Ambassador Rowny: You can't deal with Gore, Pell, Stevens, Wright, etc.

Ambassador Nitze: Our greatest asset is that the country is ready for such a deal. I get the feeling that the Congress want to get behind the position that Max is offering and, more important than the specifics of the deal, is the fact that we would get general support for our program.

Secretary Shultz: It seems like we have an agreement on approach with issues of timing and who would do the work. The Supplemental is almost upon us already. TTBT is also a very prominent issue. Some parts of Congress may drive us sooner looking for concessions on TTBT, if we're going to get funding in our Supplemental. We can't wait too long.

Max Kampelman: We have to work with many groups. Howard Baker is the central figure. We'll get a better feel if Senator Baker is key in this process.

Mr. Carlucci: There is sentiment, therefore, for an agreement, but we have to be careful; this could fly apart at anytime.

The President: I don't want anyone free-lancing on this.

Mr. Carlucci: On substance, we will work it all out with Howard Baker, and I defer to Howard Baker on the appropriate use of tactics.

The President: Okay, we got to have someone deal with the Congress.

Secretary Baker: (Pointing at Chief of Staff Baker) He's the one.

Chief of Staff Baker: Well, I'm not dead yet. This is Frank's game, and I will support him.

The Vice President: Are the Soviets close to deploying SDI? We need a Community study on exactly how far the Soviets are.

Mr. Gates: There is such a study. They're roughly comparable to our own program. There will be no space-based Soviet systems until well into the 1990's.

Secretary Weinberger: However, they have a very good heavy lift capability and a good laser capability. And, we can't forget, with no restrictions, they can go as fast as they wish.

Mr. Gates: That's true; they can plow forward.

Mr. Adelman: They also have a Moscow ABM and are working on ground-based lasers.

Mr. President: Maybe we can cooperate. Instead of shooting ours, maybe we can move theirs to Minnesota. I didn't carry that state anyway.

The meeting ended at 1:53 p.m.

227. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 11, 1987

SUBJECT

Broad Interpretation

*Does the Broader Interpretation Permit
a Ballistic Missile Intercept in a Delta 181 Test?*

I have given further thought and talked to Abe Sofaer and SDIO lawyers about this issue.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (ES) and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92D52, March 1–31, 1987 Super Sensitive. Secret; Sensitive. Pascoe initialed the memorandum and wrote "3/11."

The SDIO plans a second experiment in space early next year following up on last year's successful Delta 180 orbital intercept. The follow-on Delta 181 experiment has been designed within the same ground rules as the Delta 180 experiment, that is within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Under current planning, Delta 181 would involve only sensor experiments. Whenever I ask why DoD is proposing to move to implement the broad interpretation, the answer I get is that one important and representative objective is that the restrictions be relaxed so Delta 181 can be modified to add a test of a space-based kinetic-kill interceptor against a target launched into space from earth.

However, the lawyers have as yet not resolved the issue of whether such a modified Delta 181 experiment can in fact be justified under the broader interpretation. Some of the problems are outlined below.

To get a better grasp of the issues involved, it is instructive to go through the judgments necessary to justify such an experiment under the broad interpretation:

a. The interceptor involved must be judged to be an "ABM interceptor missile". If it were a missile other than an ABM interceptor, Article VI would bar giving it ABM capabilities or testing it in an ABM mode. That the Delta 181 interceptor can be considered an interceptor, in the prime dictionary meaning of the term, can hardly be doubted. As an ABM interceptor missile, one of the components listed in Article II of the ABM Treaty, tests from a space-based launcher would appear to be precluded by Article V. However, OSD argues:

b. The guidance system can be judged to be based upon other physical principles. This is reasonable since it is based on ultraviolet and infrared homing, not on radar. However, Harold Brown's contention that the SBKKV program technology of today was available and evaluated in the early 1960's in the "BAMBI" program, complicates the persuasiveness of the argument. In addition, the U.S. had a program in 1972 when the Treaty was signed for an infrared-guided interceptor, and no one at the time argued that it was exempt from the ABM Treaty restrictions because of its guidance system. Nor does anyone argue that infrared-guided ground-launched interceptors now being developed are exempt from the Treaty. An important point here is that some argue that the word "other" in "other physical principles" means "other" than those understood in 1972. The Executive Branch holds that "other" means "other" than those used in Article II components.

c. It must be judged that the interceptor with such a guidance system is a hybrid component and, hence, based upon other physical principles.

The question of hybrid systems and components arose in the SCC in 1977 but was inconclusive; the U.S. decided not to push it to resolution.

d. But if one can sustain the argument that the interceptor is a hybrid based upon other physical principles and therefore a non-ABM interceptor, it is difficult to see why the limitations of Article VI on non-ABM interceptors do not apply. It is argued that Article VI was designed to prevent the upgrading of anti-aircraft systems to an ABM capability; Article VI, however, is written in broad terms to apply to all non-ABM components.

e. The launcher must also be judged to be a hybrid component. It is argued that this is justified because it carries a sensor based on other physical principles. A long range sensor is necessary to send the missile in the right direction, but placing the sensor on the launcher is merely a convenience. This weakens the claimant logic. There are other obvious problems, including the difficulty of reconciling this concept with the words of Agreed Statement D. The State lawyers have yet to review this argument.

Because of the less than conclusive nature of the above complex chain of argument, some have suggested that the best way to proceed would be to adopt an interpretation broader than the broad interpretation. They argue that if any component of a system is based on other physical principles, then all components of that system are also based upon other physical principles and are therefore exempt from the main articles of the Treaty. A better argument, *perhaps*, is that if one component is based on other physical principles, then the entire system could be so characterized, but whether the individual components of such a system could be so characterized is much more difficult. I asked whether, by analogy, we would consider the Soviets to be within the Treaty, if they changed final guidance in the Galosh system to guidance based upon other physical principles, and then claimed the right to ignore the Treaty limitations, other than Agreed Statement D, on the thus modified Galosh system and all of its components. Common sense would suggest the answer must be no.

By What Legal Standard Should the Treaty be Judged?

Gerard Smith, John Rhinelander, Tom Graham, and most of the Senators approach the problem of the treaty interpretation from the point of view of the American Law Institute and the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties. The U.S. signed the Vienna Convention in April 1969 but has never ratified it.

The Soviets "ratified" the Convention in April 1986 by "acceding" to it. This practice is normally followed when a party has never signed a treaty (which the Soviets never did) but wishes to ratify; such "acceding"

would thus satisfy both signature and ratification. Soviet representatives have consistently stated that they consider themselves to be bound only by those obligations they have formally undertaken; in this case, they would appear to be legally bound. They have, however, a long history of stretching even those obligations they have formally undertaken or of considering them to have been overtaken by time or events.

It has long been argued that we should not be bound by an interpretation of obligations under a treaty with the Soviets to which they do not consider themselves bound.

This chain of argument supports the language on which State has long insisted, that the broader interpretation is “fully justified,” as opposed to the OSD words “the legally correct interpretation.”

Should Option C Be Explored?

Option C has been advanced as a possible way out of the above legal swamp.

A fundamental problem when we negotiated the Treaty, was that the U.S. wished to protect the limitations of the Treaty against possible erosion through systems and components based on technologies other than those incorporated in Article II components. Not understanding what the nature of those technologies might be, we could not define the components or systems based on other physical principles. The United States tried to close this hole by banning devices capable of substituting for Article II components; in that, we failed. Agreed Statement D was a compromise to fill this hole.

It therefore makes sense to revisit Option C in order to work out how one might usefully define components based on other physical principles and how “tested in an ABM mode” should relate to them.

228. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to the White House Chief of Staff (Baker) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, March 13, 1987

SUBJECT

The Congress and SDI Negotiations

The decision that we speak with one voice on this issue and that the voice should be your joint voice is a good one. I will move out of the picture except to the extent that you invite me or where you feel I can be of assistance.

Since returning from Geneva a week ago, I have met with a number of Members of Congress, including a lunch today with Tom Foley, the new head of the House Observer Group. Let me summarize my impressions and recommendations.

We must, of course, talk to, and deal with, the leadership. The Arms Control Observer Groups in both Houses could be a good instrument for these exchanges. It will be more difficult to work out an arrangement with the House than with the Senate. Jim Wright is not an easy person to work with and is increasingly partisan. He is also responsive to the growing "leftist" strength among the House Democrats. He can, however, be reached by arguments outlining the clear national security implications of a given course of action and when he can overcome his suspicions that the White House is seeking partisan advantage. Tom Foley reports that the House leadership, including the whip organization, is currently negative about the "deal" idea, particularly after Sam Nunn's speech. They have ABM and SDI amendments in the works, and believe they have the votes. Many are raring to go. However, Foley believes the current negativism can be overcome with a vigorous effort. The Republican leadership, knowing the realities of the voting balance, would welcome a peaceful resolution of the issue, even if it is only in the form of a temporary truce.

The Senate Democrats are also not enthusiastic about a "deal," but are pragmatic and want very much to support the Geneva negotiating process. Bob Byrd and Sam Nunn are sour because of the TTBT ratification difficulties, which they see as a credibility problem for the

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, March-April 1987. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Shultz. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on behalf of Kampelman.

Administration. On the other hand, Alan Cranston, who has influence with the liberals, would like to support and strengthen the prospects for the Geneva negotiations.

On the Senate Republican side, the leadership would like to know what the White House wants. Malcolm Wallop, Pete Wilson and their associates are hostile and suspicious that SDI may be on the block. They have not had an explanation of the “deal,” nor has the case for the “deal” been presented to them.

It is my opinion that a truce through the end of the year or March 31, 1988 at the outside, is feasible. Those who want to attack the Administration on ABM and SDI might be willing to forego that effort for a short period, but not for too long. Those who want to push for the “broad” interpretation can also wait, if it is not for too long.

The funding levels talked about in the papers prepared for the President are, in my opinion, not realistic. We should be clear on this point, even though it may reduce the attraction of the “deal” for us. It will not be difficult to achieve the same level of appropriation for next year as for the current fiscal year, with a small increase to reflect inflation. The Senate might be willing to stretch that sum to four billion dollars, plus DOE funding, but it will be difficult to get that figure in the House. We must, however, keep pushing to get the number up. We can make the argument that we want an increase in appropriations in order to strengthen our negotiating posture with the Soviets, but that will not carry us as high as the figures mentioned in our White House working papers.

In view of the fact that the appropriations cycle has begun, I do not see any virtue in postponing the beginning of a serious exploration with the leadership. On the other hand, Howard, you are the expert in that field.

I believe, finally, that our first step—even without arriving at a final deal—should be to reach a truce until after the Secretary of State’s visit to Moscow on April 13–16.

The Senate Observers have asked me to meet with them on Monday at 4:00 p.m.²

²March 16. No minutes were found.

229. Editorial Note

On March 13, 1987, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze wrote Secretary of State George Shultz a memorandum describing a meeting earlier that day with physicist Sidney Drell, who described "a conversation he had had with [Roald] Sagdeev who is head of the Soviet space program. Sagdeev had said that the ABM Treaty had been based upon radars, interceptor missiles and launchers. Science had progressed beyond that technology. It is now necessary to agree between us on the analogous components applicable to today's technologies. He suggested that the full array of sensors, including optical, infrared, ultraviolet, and electromagnetic sensors, should be substituted for the concept of radars, that space stations should be included in the concept of launchers, and that directed energy weapons should be included in the concept of interceptors." In the same conversation, "Drell went on to say that in any case, he thought the debate about narrow versus broader interpretation was senseless. It was his considered view that the Treaty under neither interpretation would, during the next decade, stand in the way of the SDI work that needed to be done. He explained that by decade he didn't mean exactly 10 years, but he did mean approximately that time period. I noted that that was not the word my friends in the SDI program and the Pentagon were giving me; they tell me that realistic tests against an object put into space by a Delta rocket were necessary for their research program to move forward. Drell said this is incorrect. He said that under current technology the front end guidance package of the interceptor weighed some 20 pounds, requiring an interceptor package of 250 to 500 pounds. In order to make that type of system useable, one has to get the weight of the guidance package down by an order of magnitude, say to 2 pounds. This requires an enormous amount of laboratory work to reduce the weight of the focal plane and other parts of the guidance package. Drell said this work did not require space tests against an object in intercontinental trajectory until the very end of the development process. He said the testing of interceptors of intermediate weight and capability were for the purpose of impressing people in the Pentagon and in the Congress; they were not necessary for the research program itself." A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw Nitze's memorandum. (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, 1987)

In a March 25 memorandum, Nitze wrote Shultz: "The information from the Pentagon generally, and SDIO in particular, has been unsatisfactory, and in recent days has trickled to zero. This is most pronounced in the aftermath of General Abrahamson's visit with Mrs. Thatcher and the questions that were raised in the reports of that visit—particularly

your questions. We have asked General Abrahamson, his Acting Chief Scientist, Dr. Mense, or his deputy, Gordon Smith, to discuss with us the tests which they would recommend under the broad interpretation, and which would not be permitted under the narrow interpretation. We asked also for an explanation of the rationale under which these tests would be permitted under the broad interpretation. Although General Abrahamson gave me a briefing on 'sampling' of activities under NSDD 261, they have refused to discuss details of this subject with me or with the people on my staff. They have also refused to provide information on which I could base the answers to your questions asking clarification of what General Abrahamson is reported to have told Mrs. Thatcher." (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987) Shultz's questions were not found. In telegram 5670 from London, March 16, the Embassy transmitted a memorandum of conversation of Abrahamson's March 14 meeting with Thatcher at her country home in Chequers. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

In a March 26 memorandum to Shultz, Nitze described a meeting of the Modified Senior Arms Control Group earlier that day: "Hank Cooper described the Soviet approach to a Defense/Space Agreement in the following terms. *Soviet Overall Position on Testing in Space.* The Agreement distinguishes between permitted systems and components, and banned systems and components. Those defined in Article II are permitted but can only be deployed pursuant to Article III and tested in conformity with Article IV. All other systems and components are prohibited. They are defined in Article V. Agreed Statement D prohibits deployment of systems and components based upon other physical principles (OPP); it cannot authorize the creation of prohibited components. As a gracious concession from this doctrine, the Soviets say they are willing to grant permission for laboratory research of components and elements based upon OPP but that all testing of components and elements in space must be banned. It was agreed that Cooper would get us a written statement of the Soviet position on these points. *Important Definitions.* There was an extended discussion of what is meant by 'non-deployment' and what is meant by the lapse of such a non-deployment period. Fred Ikle insisted after the end of the non-deployment period any and all deployments of ABM systems would be permitted; in other words, the ABM Treaty would expire without necessity for the U.S. to file a notice of intent to withdraw. I said that that was not my understanding; I thought a ten-year non-deployment period merely meant a return after ten years to adherence to all the provisions and rights included in the Treaty and which existed prior to the commencement of the period of non-deployment. This issue is to be further considered by all the agencies. It was suggested that we need to clarify what is meant by the words 'in space.' The Soviets have suggested that space

begins at 100 kilometers above the earth's surface; it was suggested we might wish a higher figure. *Tactical Issues*. It was said that the Soviets are likely to propose that you and Shevardnadze deal with the brackets in the joint working papers. If he does so, how should we react? I suggested that we not refuse to so do; we should attempt to get them to agree to our language, even if they then claim to have made many more concessions than we. We are making our Defense and Space position contingent on their concurrent agreement to START reductions. They are trying to break this linkage. All agreed that we should maintain it." A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw Nitze's memorandum. (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987)

On March 31 and April 3, Nitze and Shultz participated in National Security Planning Group principals meetings in the White House Situation Room for discussions of the Strategic Defense Initiative, competing interpretations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and the upcoming Moscow Ministerial. The National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 11 a.m. until 12:08 p.m. on April 7. Minutes of these meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, Documents 185, 186, and 188.

230. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, March 31, 1987

SUBJECT

JCS RESPONSE TO NSDD-250

In November, after the President returned from Reykjavik, we issued NSDD-250. The NSDD was issued against a background of criticism of the President's proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles within ten years, and of charges that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been adequately consulted in preparing that proposal. The NSDD set forth

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 94, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Signed."

the rationale behind the assertion that the United States would be safer were ballistic missiles eliminated, and tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a plan on *how* (*not* whether) to move to a ballistic missile free world by 1996. The NSDD further directed that the plan not increase the risk of the United States during the transition and not require significant increases above the existing DOD fiscal guidance.

We have now received the JCS response. It concludes that we can reach a ballistic missile free world by 1996 without increased risk *or* without increased cost, but cannot do both. The JCS note there is no indication the Soviets are willing to eliminate ballistic missiles. For this reason, and because of the prohibitive cost (\$388 billion above the current program) of such an elimination without increasing risk, the JCS believe the goal of the total elimination of ballistic missiles should be deferred and the United States should pursue more affordable intermediate goals, such as the current U.S. 50 percent strategic arms reductions proposal.

The substance of the JCS recommendations is contained in an eight page Executive Summary (*Tab B*).² Almost certainly this is the only portion of the report the Chiefs themselves have actually read; the extensive supporting analysis (100 plus pages) was probably briefed to them but not reviewed in detail. We do not believe it warrants your personal review and have not forwarded it.

Both the JCS response and an earlier response from the DCI suggest (correctly in our view) that there is little likelihood of the Soviets agreeing to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles. Both, however, then go on to suggest that the Soviets might gain significant advantages from such an elimination without some massive U.S. spending program. For all the reasons set forth in NSDD–250, we continue to find this second conclusion difficult to accept. Since, however, it is clear that the first conclusion—the total lack of Soviet interest in eliminating ballistic missiles—is correct, and since the President has already agreed with Mrs. Thatcher to give first priority to the 50 percent reduction proposal, the JCS recommendations clearly support current policy and no useful purpose will be served by debating the rationale.

Secretary Weinberger's forwarding memorandum (*Tab A*)³ points out a number of the complexities and limitations of the JCS analysis. Although not explicitly stated, this is intended to refute the conclusion (which some in the Department of State may have drawn) that just as the cost to eliminate ballistic missiles through negotiations is too high, so too is the cost to eliminate ballistic missiles through development

² Printed as Tab B, Document 231.

³ Printed as Tab A, Document 231.

and deployment of defenses. With regard to the specific Reykjavik proposal, Secretary Weinberger notes the "enormous and really quite unachievable costs" of responding to "proposals such as came out of the Iceland summit". In addition, he stresses that eliminating ballistic missiles would require deploying improved air defenses, and increasing the number of Stealth bombers. Compressing these adjustments, as well as other force adjustments, into ten years is what leads to the high costs. In addition, the Secretary explicitly notes that Reykjavik is flawed since SDI would be needed *before* the elimination of ballistic missiles, while Reykjavik provided for deployment after such elimination. While no useful purpose will be served by raising this point with the President, it does seem to us that if this were a football game Secretary Weinberger's repudiation of a proposal which grew out of *his* concept of eliminating ballistic missiles, and which was tabled in Iceland with the encouragement and support of *his* senior arms control representative, would lead to a 15-yard penalty for piling on.

We believe the best course of action is to quietly close the door on any further military analysis of the elimination of ballistic missiles, at least until there is some evidence of Soviet willingness to discuss this question seriously. We therefore recommend you send the Executive Summary of the report, along with Secretary Weinberger's comments, to the President, using the memorandum at *Tab I*⁴ for that purpose. We do *not* believe a written response to the JCS would be useful. Such a response has a high possibility of gaining further, uncontrolled, distribution and turning into a "President Backs Off Eliminating Ballistic Missiles at JCS Insistence" headline. Instead, we recommend that, once the President has reviewed *Tab I*, and pending other direction from him, you quietly inform the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense that the President has read the Chiefs' report, and agrees that no further action is necessary for now.

Prior to accepting this recommendation, you should recall that during a February 25 meeting with the JCS, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Shultz, and yourself, the Secretary of State displayed some interest in pursuing the possibility of moving forward with the elimination of ballistic missiles. Shultz expressed the view that the economy could certainly sustain the additional costs involved. You, in turn, suggested that once the JCS analysis was formally transmitted, it might be appropriate to have a meeting or for the Secretary of State to articulate his views in writing. (Bill Cockell's Memorandum for the Record on the subject is at *Tab II*.)⁵ Unless you feel you have made a commitment to Secretary Shultz we would *strongly* discourage a meeting. There is

⁴ Printed as Document 231.

⁵ Printed as Document 219.

no realistic chance that the Soviets are going to accept the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, and, despite the Secretary of State's optimism, no realistic chance that if the Soviets *did* accept such an elimination we could increase the budget by a third of a trillion dollars above the currently programmed levels (which are, probably, optimistic already). Thus there is no useful purpose to be served by keeping this drill going, and we recommend that it be brought to a quick and quiet end.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at *Tab I* forwarding the Executive Summary of the report to the President.⁶

That, once the President has reviewed the report, you inform the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense that the President has reviewed the JCS report and is in agreement that we need take no further action on NSDD 250 for now.⁷

Bill Cockell, Fritz Ermarth and Mike Donley concur.

⁶ Carlucci approved the recommendation.

⁷ Carlucci approved the recommendation.

231. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 7, 1987

SUBJECT

Elimination of Ballistic Missiles

Issue

To respond to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transition to a world without ballistic missiles.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-94, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks. Copies were sent to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

Facts

Shortly after you returned from Reykjavik you signed an NSDD-250,² setting forth the rationale for eliminating ballistic missiles and tasking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to devise a plan to eliminate such missiles by 1996. You specified that the plan should not increase the risk to the United States and should be accomplished within current fiscal controls of the Department of Defense budget.

Discussion

The JCS have now responded. They conclude that a transition to a zero ballistic missile world by 1996 is possible *either* with no increase in risk or with no increase in cost, but not both. They provide two plans, one maintaining risk constant, and one involving no increase in cost. The entire JCS response is over a hundred pages;³ an Executive Summary, which I have highlighted, is at *Tab B*. Secretary Weinberger's forwarding memorandum is at *Tab A*.

The JCS note, correctly, that the Soviets have shown no interest in eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. In light of this, and of the costs the JCS consider necessary for a risk free transition to a zero ballistic world, the JCS recommend stressing such intermediate goals as a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Such a stress is, of course, consistent with your policy of giving priority to 50 percent reductions as a necessary first step.

The JCS response provides us the necessary background to move toward a zero ballistic missile world should the Soviets accept your proposal. Given current Soviet unwillingness to do so, and your previous decision to give priority to the 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, I believe no further analysis of the Reykjavik formula for reaching zero ballistic missiles is necessary or appropriate at this time. Once you have reviewed *Tabs A and B*, I will so inform the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of JCS.

Recommendation

OK NO

—— —— That you review Secretary Weinberger's comments at *Tab A* and the JCS report at *Tab B*, but that, pending some Soviet movement in that direction, we take no further action on analyzing the Reykjavik formula for a transition to a world without offensive ballistic missiles.⁴

² Attached but not printed. See Document 152.

³ The full report is in National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 250.

⁴ Reagan approved the recommendation.

Tab A

**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)⁵**

Washington, March 27, 1987

SUBJECT

JCS NSDD 250 Analysis (U)

(S) I thought it might be useful to add a few comments to the JCS response to NSDD 250, which I sent to you and the President some weeks ago. NSDD 250 tasked the JCS, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to analyze the implications of the US proposal at Reykjavik to eliminate all ballistic missiles by 1996.

(TS) The JCS effort was an extensive and dedicated one. The Chiefs' methodology (in part mandated by NSDD 250) included the following key assumptions:

- The adequacy of the US strategic posture was evaluated for the contingency of an all-out Soviet attack on the United States. More limited nuclear attacks were not assessed.

- [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

- Useable tactical warning is assumed for the situation *without* elimination of missiles as compared with the missile-free situation. It is possible, however, that our warning system might be degraded, for example as a result of limited attacks during a conventional phase of a war. If so, our ICBMs would contribute less to our deterrent, and the elimination of missiles by 1996, hence, would subtract less from our deterrent.

- The study did not compare the difference in levels of damage the US might suffer in the event of a NATO "first use" between:

- (a) a 1996 situation with Soviet missiles reduced by 50% as called for in START and no air defenses added; and

- (b) a 1996 situation with missiles eliminated and with the air defenses as proposed in this study.

With missiles eliminated and with such new air defenses, we would have regained—for the first time since the early 1960s—a significant capability to limit damage to the United States from Soviet nuclear attack. This makes it somewhat more possible that nuclear weapons might be used first, in the event a conventional Warsaw Pact attack

⁵Top Secret. Weinberger wrote "Frank" above the recipient line.

could not be stopped. It would, as a result, improve deterrence of conventional attack.

◦ Given the complexity of the analysis, the study could not fully assess risks of Soviet break-out.

(TS) The overriding conclusion of the report about which there can be no doubt is the enormous and really quite unachievable cost of our required responses to proposals such as came out of the Iceland summit. There are some other useful key conclusions from the JCS overall analysis:

(1) The lack of US air defenses would have to be rectified if we move to a strategic relationship without ballistic missiles. Given the substantial Soviet air defense capability that we project for the 1990s, we would have to build a much stronger air defense than we are now planning, since in a world without ballistic missiles the US-Soviet air defense asymmetry would become far more important.

(2) We would have to increase the numbers of "stealth" systems, in particular the Advanced Technology Bomber, in the event of the elimination of ballistic missiles.

(3) And if this elimination were to be completed by 1996, these adjustments in US air defense and stealth technology, as well as other force adjustments, would have to be compressed into an exceedingly short period of time. It is mainly these considerations that account for the added expenditures in our strategic forces that would be required, according to the Chiefs' study, for such a radical and rapid transition to a missile-free world.

(4) SDI would be needed before 1996 to hedge against possible Soviet cheating. *However, the terms of the Reykjavik proposal do not provide for an adequate SDI deployment prior to 1996.*

(TS) The effect of the elimination of ballistic missiles on *conventional deterrence* is ambiguous. On the one hand, without the US missile forces, the risk of nuclear war might appear somewhat less dangerous to the Soviet leaders—hence, they might be less deterred. On the other hand, if we acquired the defenses the Chiefs suggest we would need, we would have a damage-limiting capability that could make our Flexible Response strategy more credible in Soviet eyes—hence we would have more deterrence. Moreover, as the attached Executive Summary points out, "Moscow may or may not find the resources to increase combat arms equipment or expand force structure beyond the increases they would carry out without the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles." In particular, if Moscow decided to increase their bomber forces to make up for the eliminated missiles, they would have fewer resources for their conventional forces. Perhaps the main point to be made is that *we need to improve NATO conventional forces in any event, with or without the elimination of missiles.*

(TS) The JCS analysis points out some of the adjustments needed for safely transitioning to such a world. However, accomplishing such a radical transformation within less than ten years (i.e., by 1996) would lead to impossibly increased costs and consequent risks. As a much longer-term goal, a world without ballistic missiles remains a valuable objective. For in such a world, the means for near-instantaneous nuclear attack would be reduced, risks of an accidental initiation of nuclear attack would be diminished, and Soviet surprise attack against key NATO facilities would be less effective. But such a world requires a Congress willing to spend vastly larger sums than any Congress we have seen.

(TS) Since continued Soviet rejection of the Reykjavik proposal makes the question of eliminating ballistic missiles somewhat academic, it would perhaps be more useful now to address questions more relevant to our current START and Defense and Space negotiations. In particular, I believe we should focus on:

- The growing impact of the asymmetry in US and Soviet air defense capabilities as the role of ballistic missiles is being reduced through reductions and SDI.

- The need to phase in SDI as missiles are being phased out, as a protection against Soviet cheating.

- Implications of a possible Soviet break-out from a strategic reductions agreement.

(S) We are conducting studies of these issues and will keep you advised.

Cap

Tab B

Executive Summary of a Study Prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁶

Washington, undated

BASELINE PLAN

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 250 directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a plan that could be used to implement the US arms control proposal to reduce US and Soviet offensive nuclear

⁶Top Secret; Noform.

weapons by 50 percent by 1991, and eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. This was to be accomplished within the budget guidelines provided by the NSDD, which specified that available resources would not exceed current planning levels. The plan was also to hold the overall level of risk generally constant with that existing today.

The summary finding of this report is that a feasible plan cannot be developed that can meet these guidelines reliably. To compress this massive strategic change into the time period from the conclusion of the agreement until 1996 would require new defense programs to overcome possible new risks resulting from Soviet responses. The cost of the systems for a strategic defensive program could amount to \$110 billion over the fiscal constraints of NSDD-250, and up to an additional \$139 billion in adjustments for strategic offensive systems. The US responses required for maintaining conventional deterrence at the present level are difficult to anticipate. However, given the hazards of seeing 10 years into the future and of forecasting Soviet perceptions, the JCS believe it is necessary to include some conventional hedges to be implemented depending on Soviet actions. These could run in the neighborhood of \$140 billion. This report, therefore, presents a baseline plan based on consideration of alternative force levels that either meet cost constraints or maintain the current level of risk, but not both.

While the plan would allow the United States to transition safely to zero ballistic missiles by 1996, there are no assurances that the Soviets will ever accept such a reduction. In fact, the likelihood the Soviets would accept such a proposal is extremely low. Therefore, it is important that force structuring priorities and decisions suggested in this plan not be taken out of context and used to justify proposed changes to current programs. Taking any assumptions made in this document out of the context in which they are intended could contribute to the Soviet goal of undermining current US force modernization programs. The programmatic decisions implied in the plan are only pertinent to this baseline plan under the provisions of NSDD-250.

Major findings of this report concerning a world without offensive ballistic missiles are shown below.

TIMING: NSDD-250 is focused on the year 1996 as the date when the elimination of ballistic missiles would be completed. Even if a complete, verifiable agreement had been quickly reached with the Soviets and ratified by both sides, the 10-year period for such a massive transformation of the US strategic posture would have been very compressed. Since the Reykjavik meeting, however, it has become clear the Soviets will continue to reject the proposed elimination of offensive ballistic missiles for the foreseeable future. Therefore, if and when the Soviets show interest in the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, a new date should be established which allows for at least a full 10-year term to complete this massive arms reduction.

PHASING: As offensive ballistic missiles are phased out, it is essential the United States maintain credible deterrent forces throughout the transition period. This can be done both by adjusting US force structure to counter an altered Soviet threat and through additional arms control agreements. By making the potential threat more predictable, arms limiting agreements could reduce force structure imbalances and thereby lessen the risk of eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. However, arms control agreements that could likely be negotiated cannot alone substitute for offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities.

THREAT: If the Soviets accepted elimination of their ballistic missiles, they would probably begin a major buildup of other strategic offensive forces. By 1996, they would be expected to have about 450 bombers carrying 5,400 air-launched cruise missiles and bombs, and up to 2,000 sea-launched cruise missiles on 40–50 submarines. Using a combination of measures, the Soviets most likely could increase the size of their interceptor and SAM forces by some 20 to 25 percent by 1996. It is difficult to assess how this agreement might affect Soviet conventional forces. Such a prediction will depend on the emphasis the Soviets place on strategic force changes and their perception of the balance once ballistic missiles have disappeared. It is in the area of Soviet perceptions, of course, that prognostications are most hazardous. In essence, given the costs for changing their strategic forces, Moscow may or may not find the resources to increase combat arms equipment or expand force structure beyond the increases they would carry out without the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. Given these uncertainties, however, the United States cannot afford not to anticipate possible conventional changes in the Soviet forces and thinking. On the ground, we could very well see accelerated additions of a few low-strength motorized rifle and tank divisions in the western USSR as well as air defense improvements. At sea, the transition from SSBNs to SLCM submarines could result in the Soviets placing increased emphasis on defending against US SLCM submarines, attacking the SLOCs, or protecting Soviet forward-deployed or bastion-deployed SLCM submarines.

DETERRENCE: The basis for US nuclear deterrence would not change because the United States would remain [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. In spite of the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, [*7½ lines not declassified*]. On the other hand, the fundamental structure of US deterrent forces would be altered as the United States shifted to a dyad. Other vital aspects of the deterrence equation, e.g., the strategic defense imbalance, would become more significant and would need to be addressed. Whether or not the likelihood of conventional war with the Soviets would increase is an area of much uncertainty. There are many complex questions about the impact of zero ballistic missiles on the conventional force deterrent burden and they are more difficult to address than the strategic nuclear balance. Perhaps the most

significant consequence of eliminating ballistic missiles would be the diminished US capability for rapid nuclear response. Clearly, the time lines of a nuclear attack would be extended and the threat of 30-minute extermination eliminated. The Soviets fear uncontrolled escalation, and increasing nuclear response time may reduce this fear. It can be speculated that the Soviets may perceive a reduction in the credibility of the US threat of escalation in response to a major conventional attack. Such a perception could arise from the simple fact that execution of a nuclear response takes longer, and more time is available to reduce both the probability and the impact of escalation. On the other hand, it would appear that the United States is much better equipped—by history, training, and culture—to wage bomber and submarine warfare than the Soviets. Moreover, without the threat of Soviet offensive ballistic missiles (nuclear or conventional), Soviet surprise attack against key NATO facilities would be less effective. On the other hand, key installations near the coast in the United States may still be vulnerable to short-warning SLCM attacks. Finally, if the United States acquired the air defenses envisioned in this plan, US damage-limiting capability would be significant compared to what it would be in 1996 without offensive ballistic missile elimination. Coupled with the strategic offensive, defensive, and nonstrategic nuclear force improvements recommended in this plan, this could raise Soviet uncertainty to the point that they are more deterred. The impact on the conventional arms imbalance, therefore, is uncertain and will depend primarily on how the Soviets perceive the willingness of the United States and its allies to escalate in response to a Soviet provocation.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES: Ballistic missiles comprise nearly two-thirds of US nuclear forces. [3 lines not declassified] The cost of these strategic forces alone would exceed the guidelines of NSDD-250, as well as any realistic projection of near-term defense budgets. The Soviets, with only a limited bomber capability today, must also consider similar problems in determining the acceptability of the US arms control proposals and in implementing any such agreement.

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES: The Soviets have an extensive air defense system. In view of the US vulnerability to ballistic missiles and the past lack of a major air-breathing threat, the United States has chosen to maintain little air defense capability. If the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles, the United States cannot be left defenseless against nuclear attack by bombers, cruise missiles, or “hidden” ballistic missiles. To do so would reduce stability and deterrence, and increase risk. Thus, there would be a requirement for a substantial investment in defensive systems that would contribute to deterrence through independent objective-denial and damage-limitation.

NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: With or without elimination of nonstrategic ballistic missiles the United States would require some form of compensation to help counter the remaining unfavorable theater nuclear and conventional arms imbalance and, politically, to assure its European allies that the US-NATO linkage continues to be strongly supported. It would also require continued, and perhaps increased, allied support of nonstrategic nuclear forces.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES: There are complex questions about the impact of zero ballistic missiles on the conventional force deterrent burden. Adjustments to US land-based forces are dependent not only on Soviet actions but also on the share of the burden US allies are willing to assume. US sea-based forces are less dependent on the contribution of US allies and more directly tied to the changing requirements of the Soviet threat. If the goal were a more secure world than provided by currently programmed forces (which include ballistic missiles), conventional force adjustments would be required beyond currently planned modernization programs to both land- and sea-based forces as a hedge against Soviet actions. Likewise, US allies should accept their proportional share of the increased conventional requirements. Based on past precedent, the prospects of the allies doing so are not good. All conventional adjustments, however, would not necessarily have to be completed in 10 years, but some can be paced in anticipation of Soviet actions.

MODERNIZATION: With an agreement to eliminate (or sharply reduce) offensive ballistic missiles, the modernization of other elements of US strategic forces would take on increased importance. In particular, with or without ballistic missile elimination, *[5½ lines not declassified]*

With or without the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, the capability of Soviet land-based and naval conventional forces will continue to improve. The Soviets will continue current equipment modernization programs in order to provide first-rate weapon systems for their ground forces. They will maintain their quantitative superiority in frontal aviation and continue to improve theater air defenses, sea-based forces; short-range nuclear forces, and chemical-biological capability. All of these factors make it essential that currently planned conventional force modernization packages continue to receive full support.

In view of the above, the strategic, nonstrategic nuclear, and conventional forces in Table i-1, with a cost of approximately \$390 billion more than the NSDD-250 guidelines, represent the level of effort required to support the US proposals. These forces fall between those that would meet the cost requirements of NSDD-250, but are totally inadequate in terms of deterrence and level of risk, and more fully developed, more effective, but more expensive forces that, while desirable, are not deemed necessary to maintain deterrence and risk.

Because the fiscal guidance of NSDD-250 cannot be met, this baseline report recommends that:

— The goal of transitioning to a world without offensive ballistic missiles within 10 years should be deferred.

— An intermediate goal of deep reductions (as in the 50 percent proposal) achieved in a reasonable period of time should be pursued as a more immediate alternative. This will allow significant arms reductions at affordable costs as well as time to address how best to associate strategic defenses with the reductions in strategic offensive arms. It will also provide an intermediate phase of strategic offensive-defensive deterrent strategy to provide experience for subsequent moves towards a possible future without offensive ballistic missiles.

TABLE i-1 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES

Except for strategic nuclear offensive systems, shown below are "plus-ups" above current plans.⁷ Showing only additional strategic offensive systems would not reflect delayed retirements and accelerated procurement, which constitute most strategic offensive force changes. Although strategic offensive forces reflect the total number of systems as of 1996, the costs shown for these forces reflect only the "plus-ups" above the current plans.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS Quantity Cost (\$ Billions)

[table not declassified]

Support

Accelerate KC-135R Conversion

Program to Complete by 1996

KC-10B (for strategic offense) 119

Subtotal \$136.7

NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

Quantity Cost (\$ Billions)

[table not declassified]

Subtotal \$ 2.7

TOTAL STRATEGIC/NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR

\$139.4

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

Quantity Cost (\$ Billions)

Air Defense

Weapons

Additional Interceptors 288

Patriot Batteries 27

⁷SLCMs costed in strategic offense, but shown here to reflect dedication to SACEUR.
[Footnote is in the original.]

<i>Surveillance</i>		
AWACS	51	
<i>Support</i>		
FOLs	5	
DOBs	3	
Tankers (for strategic defense)		
KC-10B	55	
Tanker Conversions	55	
	Subtotal	<u>\$36.22</u>
ASW		
<i>Weapons</i>		
SSNs	18	
Destroyers	18	
TAGOS	12	
VP Squadrons (4 Active/1 Reserve)	5	
	Subtotal	<u>\$37.0</u>
<u>Ballistic Missile Defense</u>		
Note: No space-based systems deployed prior to 1996.		
Ground-Based Midcourse		
Interceptor Missiles	100	
Space-Based Interceptor Missiles	420	
Boost and Midcourse		
Surveillance Sensors	18	
Sensor Probes	6	
Ground-Based Terminal		
Interceptor Missiles	60	
Dedicated Radars	2	
Annual Space Launches	7	
Early Deployment Option (Treaty Compliant)		
	Subtotal	<u>\$37.18</u>
<u>TOTAL STRATEGIC DEFENSE</u> <u>\$110.40</u>		
<u>CONVENTIONAL FORCES</u>	<u>Quantity Cost (\$ Billions)</u>	
<i>Intelligence</i>		
Photo/Elint Missions	4	
<i>Mobility</i>		
66 MTM/D Airlift Acceleration		
C-17	8	

Air-Refueling (for GP mobility)	
Tanker Conversions	160
KC-10B	40
Amphib Lift	
LCC	1
LHD	10
LSD-41/CVs	28
LCAC	65
<i>Modernization</i>	
Army MLRS BN	3
Army FAAD BDE (-)/DIV	1
Army Decisive Systems	
Army Deep Attack and Classified	
A-7 Upgrade	
E-8 JSTAR	7
Have Quick Secure Comm	2500
JTIDS	1140
LANTIRN	500
<i>Sustainability</i>	
Army, Navy, Air Force	
<u>TOTAL CONVENTIONAL</u> \$138.3	
<u>TOTAL COST OF RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES</u> \$388.1	

232. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 5, 1987

SUBJECT

DOD Report on the SDI Program

At Tab B is the executive summary of the Defense Department's report on how they would restructure the SDI program, if you were to

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-094, NSDD 261. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Tobey. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on May 7. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

decide to take advantage of the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The most important of DOD's conclusions are that:

- Under the recommended restructuring of the program, four major system experiments would be conducted over the next three years. The first experiments would occur as early as Fiscal Year 1988. Planning would begin immediately.

- Restructuring the program could reduce total costs of research by approximately \$3 billion, while increasing confidence in the results of research.

- Restructuring would permit a full scale development decision in 1992, and preserve the option to deploy an initial defense in about 1996. It would also delay the need for a decision on withdrawing from the ABM Treaty until about 1996.

The legal analyses of the ABM Treaty that you requested of the State Department will not be complete for another month. Thus, no decisions are necessary at this time. In the meantime, I will have my staff prepare a complete analysis of the DOD report to support your ultimate decision on restructuring the SDI program.

You may wish to skim Cap Weinberger's cover memo (at Tab A) and the executive summary of DOD's report (at Tab B).

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan²

Washington, April 30, 1987

SUBJECT

Recommendations for the SDI Program—NSDD 261 (U)

(S) On 17 December,³ I presented to you an approach to the SDI program that would provide the United States with the option to defend itself at the earliest practical opportunity. To preserve this option, we discussed that adequate funding, the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and economical space transportation would be essential. Subsequently, you directed the Department of Defense to provide recommendations for an SDI program under the broad interpretation

²Secret.

³See Document 180.

of the ABM Treaty and increasingly heavy lift space launch capability. These reports are attached to this memorandum.⁴

(S) The report on developing a heavy lift space launch capability makes it clear that the Nation cannot afford the cost of deploying a strategic defense system with existing U.S. space launch assets. The report, which NASA assisted the Department of Defense in drafting, concludes that a new, low cost, space launch capability is needed to satisfy growing NASA and DoD space launch requirements, as well as those of SDI.

(S) The report on the SDI program concludes that restructuring the program under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty will dramatically increase program efficiency and reduce costs by approximately \$3 billion. Most significantly, if adequate funding is provided, this restructuring will preserve the option to deploy an initial defense system in 1994 and, thereby, will enhance the prospects for serious negotiation on arms reductions with the Soviet Union. The realization of these benefits, however, is contingent upon the *immediate* authorization to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of our legal right to conduct research and development under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

(S) While the report on restructuring the SDI program makes a compelling *technical* argument for adopting the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, I believe that *political* considerations will prove to be critical, especially the issue of when we will have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. If the SDI program continues to be restricted by an incorrect reading of the ABM Treaty, it will be necessary to withdraw from the Treaty at the latest by 1992, or possibly as early as 1989, in order to continue useful research and testing that could lead to deployment. These activities are necessary to demonstrate persuasively the feasibility of strategic defenses before the nation commits itself to the full-scale engineering development of such a system and certainly before its actual deployment.

(S) If we had to make a decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to continue the *research* phase of the SDI program, it would be tantamount to asking those with an attachment to the existing strategic and arms control arrangement to abandon the Treaty before the program had demonstrated persuasively its ability to provide an effective defense. Since this probably would be more than the political traffic could bear, it would spell the end of the SDI program. The program would forever be caught up in the catch-22 of a national reluctance to jettison the ABM Treaty without clear assurance that SDI could take its

⁴ Not attached.

place, and SDI's inability to provide that assurance without first jettisoning the ABM Treaty.

(S) However, a program restructured under the broad interpretation of the Treaty would avoid this political catch-22. Such a program would allow us to complete the entire research phase of the SDI program, as well as the full scale engineering development phase of the program, *before* we make the decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and deploy a strategic defense. This approach has the advantage of allowing a future President and Congress to make these important and politically difficult decisions *with proof in hand* that effective defenses are technically feasible.

(S) Finally, while the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the development of a national heavy lift launch capability are essential to a successful SDI program, full funding for the program is of equal importance. The gains which are possible by restructuring the SDI program to be consistent with the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty are predicated on the program receiving adequate funding. The SDI program has shouldered the burden of Congressional funding cuts since 1984, when you sent the first SDI budget request to the Congress. These cuts were particularly severe last year and what we have seen so far indicates that the program will have to weather similarly heavy budget storms this year. This is why it is so important that this Administration make a concerted effort over the next several months to secure sufficient funding to guarantee an effective SDI program. As always, I will assist you in this every way I can.

Cap

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁵

Washington, undated

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U)

INTRODUCTION (U)

(S) On 18 February 1987, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to provide a plan for restructuring the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program in the event the President authorizes the use

⁵ Secret.

of the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Secretary of Defense was directed to include a description of the first planning activities and tests which would require the broad interpretation and an assessment of the impact of not being permitted to restructure the program. In order to develop a recommended program, the Department of Defense assumed that this program would remain within currently projected budgets, would maintain a balance among technologies, and would support a Presidential decision on the deployment of defenses as soon as possible. For the purpose of evaluating experiments in the restructured program, it also was assumed that advanced kinetic energy technologies in the SDI program are based on principles other than those that governed defensive systems in 1972 and that, therefore, they could be fully tested and developed under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In view of the limited time available to conduct this analysis, the programmatic and budgetary details of the restructured program presented in this report are approximate and will have to be refined in more formal reviews.

RECOMMENDED RESTRUCTURED PROGRAM (U)

(S) The current research program has focused on individual technologies and components, in part because the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty prevents the development and testing of devices that have full defense capability and integrated tests using these devices. Due to the significant progress that has been made to date, the SDI program is ideally positioned to integrate the basic elements of a strategic defense system, such as sensors and weapons, in realistic tests which will more fully validate defensive concepts. Under the recommended restructured program, four major system exploration experiments will be conducted over the next three years. These experiments are designed to identify early in the program any unexpected technical issues and to increase confidence in the feasibility of strategic defenses. The first experiments in this restructured program will occur as early as Fiscal Year 1988. Planning activities to support this challenging schedule must begin immediately. In the current program, the SDI effort will remain limited to individual experiments which do not validate technologies fully and which do not establish as high a level of confidence in the feasibility of defenses based on these technologies.

(S) In addition to the major experiments which explore the issues of system integration, the development of individual technologies will also benefit from the broad interpretation. Restructuring to take advantage of the broad interpretation more than pays for itself by eliminating repeated flight tests of individual technologies. Although some reprogramming of funds will be necessary within the SDI budget over the next five years, this amount is a fraction of the reallocation caused annually within the program by Congressional cuts.

IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRUCTURING (U)

(S) The implications of restructuring the SDI program are clear and dramatic. The recommended program will allow for more efficient use of projected budgets and could reduce the total costs of research by approximately \$3 billion dollars. Under this program, confidence in defense feasibility will increase much faster, and the program management uncertainty caused by the inherently ambiguous restrictive interpretation will be reduced substantially. Additionally, restructuring under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty allows the President to defer withdrawal from the ABM Treaty until after full-scale engineering development is completed and just prior to actual deployment. A restructured SDI program will permit a full-scale engineering development decision as early as 1992 and preserve the option to deploy an initial defense in about 1996 that will provide an effective defense when fully deployed. Conversely, if the program were not authorized to use the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the United States would have to withdraw from the Treaty about 1992 in order to permit the pre-FSED phase of the program to be completed (FSED could begin at the time of Treaty withdrawal, but at a lower level of confidence in defense feasibility). In fact, because of possible political inhibitions against allocating long-lead funding to prepare for non-Treaty compliant experiments, this issue may have to be faced as early as FY1989 if the program continues to adhere to the restrictive interpretation. A 1992 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would delay a decision to enter full-scale engineering development until at least 1994 (assuming a requirement for a high level of confidence when entering FSED) and the Nation's initial deployment option would slip two years to approximately 1998, allowing even further evolution in Soviet offensive and defensive threats.

AUTHORITY TO RESTRUCTURE (U)

(S) The restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty has already caused the SDI program to sacrifice program effectiveness and highly significant experimental options. Any delay beyond May 1987 in adopting the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty will have increasingly detrimental consequences for the SDI program including higher costs, further delays, and the loss of deployment options. A delay of one year in receiving authorization to restructure the program according to the broad interpretation would, for example, delay the option to deploy an initial defense system at least a year and a half until FY 1997 and sacrifice substantial cost savings.

233. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, May 6, 1987, 11:04 a.m.

SUBJECT

S-W-C Breakfast 5/6/87: Defense and Space Instructions

Weinberger prefaced his surfacing of this issue by noting that he was now turning to a nasty and highly contentious issue. He was concerned, he said, that we are going ahead with the idea of developing a joint working paper (JWP) in Geneva. "First we discuss it, then we negotiate prohibited and permitted activities," he went on. "It's a slippery slope . . . JWP's are a bad framework to work on anyway . . . We've protested directly to Kampelman before, but it still goes on . . . It brings the 'prohibited activities' approach in through the side door . . ." Frank replied that it appeared Weinberger's briefing paper may have been written before the most recent Defense and Space instructions were promulgated.² In Frank's view, the instructions take care of Cap's problem. They direct Max to negotiate off our treaty text. They don't say he can't have a JWP, but they play the idea down. Weinberger left the room at that point to take a phone call. Discussion continued, with all agreeing the issue had been largely resolved by the new instructions and that it was not worth spending a great deal of time on. When Weinberger returned to the room Shultz commented that he did not understand why "it's impossible for us to find out anything regarding the SDI program . . . We take it that Defense has provided something to the President . . . We find out about it afterward, and have had no opportunity to discuss it . . ."³ Frank assured him that State could have a copy, and will have an opportunity to comment on any paper that goes up to Wallop on the subject. Shultz was not satisfied with this reply. State should have the opportunity, he said, to comment on Defense's paper before it goes to the President. Turning to Weinberger, Frank asked if there were any reason that State could not have a copy. Weinberger began to unfasten a copy from his back-up book. Shultz said he would rather receive it "through channels." Weinberger replied

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 71302. Secret. Copies were sent to Green, Pearson, Thompson, Linhard, Alison Fortier, Matthews, and Rodman. Sent through Green and Pearson. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found.

² The Department of State transmitted Round VIII instructions to the Defense and Space delegation in telegram 134765 to NST Geneva, May 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870618-0407)

³ See Tab B, Document 232.

that “this is the most authoritative channel.” The paper had not been coordinated with State, he continued, because Defense construed the tasking in NSDD 261⁴ as requiring a report directly to the President. Shultz replied that State could have construed the tasking that Sofaer is working on relative to ABM Treaty construction in the same way, but it has chosen to coordinate Sofaer’s papers with other agencies; and, in fact, has received some valuable comments which have improved the papers. Frank asked how Abe’s reports are coming . . . “they keep getting dragged out . . . the people on the Hill are saying they must have them.” Shultz replied that, with regard to the paper on patterns and practices, “there are mounds of paper to go through. Having been stung by a half-baked report earlier, Abe feels an obligation to go through all the material personally.” Frank replied that if the result is to get a report out after both Houses have enacted restrictive legislation into law, the report isn’t much help. Shultz noted that Congress may do that in any event. Weinberger said his sense was that some on the Hill think that Nunn’s analysis of the Treaty was shallow. Our report could have some impact. (Weinberger then summarized the principal points in the Defense report to the President.) He then returned to the issue of JWP, and was told that others had concluded, in his absence, that the new instructions adequately dealt with that issue. Frank asked Cap to look at the instructions, “and if they are not satisfactory, let us know.”

⁴ See Document 218.

234. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 26, 1987

SUBJECT

Projected Effectiveness of SDI

On May 21, I spoke confidentially with Bob Perret, a program leader in the Planning and Evaluation Division at Livermore Lab, about a study he is conducting on the projected effectiveness of SDI. Max was also present at the meeting.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret; Sensitive.

The study examines the projected near-term capability and cost ratios of strategic defenses against current and projected Soviet threats. It concludes that Soviet force reconfiguration, based on current Soviet technical capability, may well outpace near-term U.S. defense deployments, preventing a capable defense from being established. It concludes also that the total cost of defense exceeds the cost of upgrading the offense, modestly by 1994, but by a factor of two by 1996, and by a factor of three by 1998. Marginal cost ratios favor a modernized offense, including countermeasures, by an even greater factor, since the defense is found to be ineffective against the final assumed threat.

The study assumes an SDIO candidate architecture for near-term deployment, including SBKKVs with Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) sensors, and ERIS and HEDI ground-based interceptors. First generation deployments would occur from 1993–96, second generation from 1996–98. The penetration of current Soviet forces, assuming no modernization, against these U.S. defenses would decrease from a 100% leakage rate in 1992 to 40% in 1994 to 5% in 1996.

Based on intelligence estimates, the study postulates five types of near-term technology responses, which are within the current technical capability of the Soviet Union: simultaneous deployment of warheads and decoys from the post-boost vehicle (PBV), as opposed to currently-employed sequential deployment of RVs from the buses during an extended post-boost phase; fast burn boosters; ASAT weapons; proliferation of warheads and ICBMs; and other countermeasures to confuse U.S. space-based sensors.

All of these countermeasures are judged to be “likely” responses during the early 1990s, perhaps the most effective of which would be fast-burn boosters and simultaneous release PBVs. These countermeasures would reduce significantly the time of the boost and post-boost phases of the missile’s trajectory. During these phases, offensive targets are more vulnerable and more valuable, since these missiles and PBVs carry many RVs.

These countermeasures would be particularly effective against KKV. First, a more significant midcourse threat, consisting of proliferated warheads and decoys, would be deployed earlier in the missile’s flight. Enhancing the offensive threat would require a corresponding increase in available defenses. The key question here, therefore, is whether the defense meets our cost-effectiveness criterion. The study concludes that the first two generations of defenses would not. Second, reducing the duration of the boost and post-boost phases reduces the fraction of the defenses that can engage targets in these phases of their flight trajectory. Consequently, the Soviets would be able to attack these fewer defensive systems at less cost and perhaps with greater certainty.

The study concludes that, when anticipated Soviet countermeasures are factored in, the expected penetration of Soviet warheads will

decrease from 100% in 1992 to 80% in 1994, where it will remain about constant through 1996 and finally *increase* again to 90% by 1998.

I believe that this study presents a credible, although perhaps not conclusive, case that there remain significant uncertainties whether the early generations of defensive deployments would achieve U.S. strategic objectives. This uncertainty implies that an “early deployment” decision would be imprudent. First and second generation architectures appear to be unable to meet our deployment criteria if the offense is modernized with advanced countermeasures. This implies that we must maintain a broad technology program in SDI and arrest the current tendency to reallocate funding from longer-term technologies to the near-term technologies.

I have learned that, on June 30, the Defense Acquisition Board is due to make a “DAB Milestone 1” decision, which would establish the case that defenses have military utility and that current technology is sufficiently mature to meet projected military requirements.

Several forces are at work here. Those who are committed to early deployment see this as a first step in the acquisition process. Others are pushing this decision as a vehicle to force the Administration to clarify once and for all how and whether ABM Treaty limits will apply to SDI in the future. Finally, General Abrahamson hopes to win the support of the JCS for a positive DAB Milestone 1 decision, and thus establish a firm JCS commitment to SDI acquisition and deployment.

235. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (Abrahamson)¹

JCSM-93-87

Washington, June 23, 1987

SUBJECT

Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Requirements for Phase I Ballistic Missile Defenses (U)

1. (S) The United States continues to adhere to the concept of deterrence and, should deterrence fail, the concept of denying Soviet war aims as the means for preserving the security of the United States and its

¹Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, Arms Control (President Gorbachev)—1986–88. Secret.

allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated² that ballistic missile defense (BMD) could enable the United States to fundamentally change its strategic assumptions regarding deterrence, permitting a shift of emphasis from strictly offensive to a more balanced offensive and defensive orientation. Effective defenses against ballistic missiles could significantly increase Soviet uncertainties regarding a weapon's ability to penetrate the defenses and destroy US and allied targets. Difficulties in predicting vulnerability and outcome could make Soviet military planners much less likely to contemplate initiating a ballistic missile attack, even in crisis circumstances.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide³ operational requirements for future BMD. The long-term objective is for a thoroughly effective defense that will protect the United States and its allies from the threat of attack from ballistic missiles of all ranges. To achieve this objective, it is clear that a strategic defense system will have to be deployed incrementally over time. This memorandum sets out the operational requirements for Phase I of a multiphase BMD system. Phase I, prior to deployment of following phases, must, in combination with our national strategic offensive capabilities, be capable of creating sufficient uncertainty in the Soviet war-planner's mind to dissuade him from attack. Requirements for subsequent phases will be developed after future analyses of the evolving threat.

3. (S) Phase I BMD will serve as a first step toward protecting the United States and its allies from ballistic missile attack. It will also be a significant complement to today's sole reliance on US strategic nuclear retaliatory forces as a deterrent disincentive to a potential Soviet first strike. However, it is important that Phase I not be considered a complete BMD system. Planning, research, evaluation, and testing for subsequent phases must lead to an evolving multiphase BMD system that incrementally builds upon Phase I to achieve sufficient defense effectiveness and robustness to discourage proliferation of the Soviet threat and introduction of countermeasures—and, ultimately, negate the utility of Soviet offensive ballistic missile forces.

4. (S) The operational requirements are based on the assumption that the primary mission of US strategic BMD is to:

- a. Enhance the future deterrent posture.
- b. Contribute, should deterrence fail, to denial of Soviet war aims and limit damage from strategic ballistic missile attack.

² JCSM-66-87, 15 May 1987, "Justification for Major System New Start for the Strategic Defense Initiative Program for Ballistic Missile Defense Research" (U) [Footnote is in the original.] Not found.

³ DOD Directive 5141.5, 21 February 1986, "Strategic Defense Initiative Organization" (U) [Footnote is in the original.] Not found.

5. (S) For the Phase I BMD system, the operational requirements that follow address the portion of a massive Soviet nuclear attack comprised of the first wave (approximately 4,700 RVs of which at least 2,500 are SS-18 delivered RVs) of the first strike (approximately 8,500 RVs) of the [1½ lines not declassified] as detailed⁴ in the baseline DIA BMD threat assessment for 1996.

6. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe Phase I must be sufficiently effective to measurably stress Soviet war plans and also provide near-perfect protection against small ballistic missile attacks. Accordingly, Phase I must fulfill the following system goals:

a. Limit the damage that can be expected from the leading edge or early phases of wave one of a major Soviet nuclear attack.

b. Ensure high defense effectiveness against attack of limited scope (e.g., accidental/unauthorized launch, third nation attack, limited Soviet attack).

c. Destroy as many attacking RVs as possible during the boost and post-boost phases of their flight.

7. (S) To meet the system goals, Phase I must possess certain system characteristics. Phase I must be able to:

a. *Ensure that sufficiently comprehensive and timely tactical warning and attack verification data will be provided to the responsible CINC so that a thorough assessment can be made before his decision to engage with defensive forces.* Given the potentially severe consequences of an accidental or inappropriate activation of the strategic BMD system, a firm military requirement exists for man-in-the-loop control. As a consequence, the Phase I system design must provide for an appropriate man-in-the-loop decision time for weapon system activation.

b. *Survive under attack long enough to ensure that minimum defense effectiveness objectives can be met.* The BMD system must be sufficiently survivable to operate effectively throughout the boost and post-boost flight phases of the Soviet ballistic missile attack. The ground-based portions of the BMD system must survive until its interceptor assets have been expended in the late-midcourse and terminal flight phases of the attack.

c. [1 paragraph (13½ lines) not declassified]

d. [1 paragraph (10½ lines) not declassified]

8. (S) Phase I must be able to defeat the dynamic structure of the Soviet attack by denying the time-critical goals of the leading-edge component of the attack through the application of multiple defense layers

⁴ DIA Memorandum, S-1037/VP-TAO (SDIO), 23 April 1987, "Threat Development for Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Concepts and Requirements" (U) [Footnote is in the original.] Not found.

(e.g., denying Soviet goals by using the boost/post-boost interceptors to break up the targeting strategy of an attack and then using the mid-course interceptors to enforce flexible and adaptive defense). This will necessitate that the defenses provide their peak performance against the leading edge of the attack by destroying a high number of attacking ballistic missiles during their boost and post-boost flight phases.

Ideally, operational requirements would be stated in terms of a quantitative, time-dependent performance that would set forth initial defense effectiveness and allowable reduction in that effectiveness over the course of the first wave battle, due to weapon expenditure and enemy defense suppression, for each of a series of possible attack scenarios. Given that it will take some time to develop such a rigorous statement, system characteristics given in subparagraphs 7c and d, above, provide quantitative performance thresholds, based upon aggregate measures of effectiveness, to provide a benchmark against which to scope Phase I system effectiveness. It must be recognized that these initial descriptions of BMD primary mission performance must be used with due regard to the time-dependent nature of the BMD performance requirement.

9. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue analytic work to refine BMD operational requirements periodically throughout the SDI acquisition process, with particular emphasis on quantifying the time-dependent requirements for BMD.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

236. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, September 23, 1987

SUBJECT

Relocatable Targets (RTs) (U)

(S) NSDD-178² directed the DoD to “develop a program to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with U.S. strategic forces.” I have recently approved the DoD RT Master Plan (attached)³ that constitutes a first step for the coordinated development of the sensors, C3I, and force structure required to hold relocatable targets at risk.

(S) For the near term, we have taken modest steps to improve our operational capability by committing a limited number of bombers and ballistic missiles against RTs in the Single Integrated Operational Plan. Through the master planning process, we are assessing alternative operational concepts for employing these systems in the mid to late 1990s. We will have a better perspective on potential changes to force structure requirements requested in NSDD-252⁴ upon completion of this study in mid-1988.

(S) The RT mission spans a broad range of functions including intelligence production, battle planning, communications, and weapon systems. Consequently, we must approach the RT problem from a multi-disciplined perspective as we consider alternatives for improved capability. Your continued support will ensure that the RT issues are properly addressed through close cooperation between intelligence and DoD organizations.

(S) Although the RT mission is complex and challenging, we are taking positive steps to improve our capability in a prudent and balanced fashion. I will continue to advise you of our progress as we update our plans and implement additional measures to cope with this target set.

Cap

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-090, NSDD 178. Secret. Weinberger wrote “Frank” above the recipient line.

² See Document 51.

³ Attached but not printed is a September 7 paper prepared in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, entitled “The DoD Relocatable Target (RT) Master Plan.”

⁴ See Document 186.

237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Levitsky)¹

Washington, November 9, 1987

SUBJECT

Conversation in the Secretary's Office with Former Secretaries of Defense, et al, October 28, 1987

Participants included the Secretary, James Schlesinger, Melvin Laird, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, James Woolsey, John Whitehead, Paul Nitze, Max Kampelman, Roz Ridgway and myself.

The Secretary set the stage by describing in general terms the content and tone of his recent meetings with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev.² He briefly described the four part agenda and gave somewhat more detail on the state of play with regard to the Geneva talks, CW and nuclear testing. The ensuing conversation ranged across the arms control front and included comments and advice regarding State's relations with Congress, INF ratification prospects, European anxieties about denuclearization in Europe, U.S. strategic force modernization, ABM Treaty interpretation, and Soviet developments and problems.

Inherent in much of what the visitors said was criticism of the Administration in its management of strategic modernization cum arms control issues, both with Congress (and the informed public) and the Allies. A salient example was Jim Woolsey's highly critical comment on DOD's decision to test the Trident D-5 missile with twelve RVs even though the Navy plans an eight RV deployment, at least in the initial years. Woolsey thought that such a test could be disastrous for the United States because SALT counting rules, carried over to START, would mean that the Navy might be limited to as few as eight Trident submarines under a 50% reduction. All the Soviets would have to do to track such a reduced force would be to station a number of fast attack boats around the exit points for our SSBNs. He emphasized that this kind of decision, if carried out, could put strategic force survivability seriously at risk. Moreover, it raises the question as to whether there is

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (ES) and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, Lot 92D52, Super-Sensitive Nov 1-16 (1987). Secret; Sensitive.

² Reference is to Shultz's October 22-23 meetings in Moscow. Memoranda of conversations are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989, Documents 80-85.

a coherent center in the Administration where arms control, force modernization and testing come together.

Mel Laird, Hal Sonnenfeldt and Jim Woolsey all highlighted the dangerous perception that the United States is moving away from nuclear deterrence. Laird cited both Jerry Ford and Henry Kissinger on this point. They decried the experience of the Reykjavik Summit, adding that subsequent trans-Atlantic debate, Presidential rhetoric and inadequate Administration leadership on post-INF deterrence compounded public unease, here and in Europe.

On a more hopeful note, Schlesinger said that INF ratification will probably be achieved, but warned the Administration not to overstate verification capabilities. Congress will live with the verification regime if it is not oversold. The visitors agreed with Kampelman's point that the use of a scale of numbers in assessing verifiability is misleading, even destructive, and should be eschewed.

There was considerable discussion about U.S. strategic force planning, with Woolsey advocating 50 additional MX rail mobile missiles and 500 SICBMs, with the BM RV balance allowed under a START treaty on SSBN's. Sonnenfeldt asserted that the D-5 is the only new strategic weapon that enjoys bipartisan support on the Hill. Schlesinger said that the Air Force is not supporting the Midgetman because the MX program is not finished. He emphasized the importance of a coherent Administration position on this question.

Schlesinger said we need an informed article on Administration policy regarding nuclear force modernization, U.S. commitment to Europe, etc., to be placed in a German newspaper. He suggested that Paul Nitze should write it. (Comment: Such an article was tasked to EUR.)

Woolsey asserted that Nunn understood the arguments over the narrow/broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Nunn's fight had to do primarily with Senate prerogatives. Woolsey strongly suggested that the Administration set the broad versus the narrow argument aside. Sonnenfeldt said the only way is to negotiate limits with the Soviets outside the treaty; this would be the best way to protect SDI.

On U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Sonnenfeldt said Moscow needs expanded economic relations with the United States and increased access to sources of Western financing, including the IFI's. Sonnenfeldt believes that Gorbachev knows that Soviet forces arrayed against the PRC and NATO are extravagant, that it is possible for them to reduce equipment levels. Sonnenfeldt believes the Administration is in a reasonably strong position, that it has substantial leverage, particularly in view of Soviet regional problems. There is solid bipartisan support for the Administration's position on Pakistan/Afghanistan. The Soviets are having renewed difficulties in Angola.

Schlesinger said he was impressed by Soviet difficulty in controlling internal forces unleashed by glasnost. Despite their almost mystical belief in high technology, they will continue having trouble competing with the West because glasnost will not unleash entrepreneurial forces.

COMMENT: It is noteworthy that the visitors talked to the Secretary as if he were the Secretary of Defense. When he demurred, they pressed their points, arguing that he is the most authoritative figure in the Administration.

238. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, November 23, 1987

SUBJECT

Requirement for a Legal Opinion on the Place of Kinetic Energy Systems in the ABM Treaty (S)

(S) After months of ABM Treaty review there is one central issue that remains to be resolved: Are space-based kinetic energy systems based on "other physical principles" and governed by Agreed Statement D, or are these systems conventional ABM systems governed by the body of the ABM Treaty? This is a critical question, because, if kinetic energy devices are *not* based on "other physical principles," testing and development of these devices in space would be prohibited under both interpretations of the ABM Treaty.

(S) As you are aware, space-based kinetic interceptors are key to the effectiveness of the first and second phases of the strategic defenses currently envisioned. Additional restrictions on our ability to conduct development and testing in these particular technologies would have the most deleterious consequences for the strategic defense program and for our effort to move the Soviet Union towards reductions in offensive forces. Since we may arrive at an understanding with Congress which would permit us to plan for space-based experiments under the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Tobey Files, Subject File, Gorbachev and SDI. Secret. Weinberger wrote "Colin" above the recipient line. On November 5, Reagan announced that Powell would succeed Carlucci as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and that Carlucci would succeed Weinberger as Secretary of Defense on November 23.

broad interpretation, it is imperative that our obligations under the ABM Treaty with respect to kinetic systems be clarified without delay.

(S) While there is no doubt in my mind that these advanced systems are indeed “exotic” and that their development and testing is not restricted by the Treaty which we signed in 1972, I believe the President would be best served by a formal opinion to this effect. The President should know where we stand on this issue by mid-November and certainly before he meets with General Secretary Gorbachev. Thus, I urge that you ask Judge Sofaer to provide such an opinion as soon as possible.

Cap

239. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 23, 1987

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON SDI

I. PURPOSE

To visit an SDI facility (Martin Marietta) and to deliver an address on the SDI program. Your address also devotes particular attention to your efforts for offensive arms reductions.

II. BACKGROUND

Since this is your first visit to an SDI facility, your remarks will be particularly important to the men and women working on the program, at Martin Marietta and elsewhere across the country. Your remarks are intended for a wider audience as well, who will be extremely interested in hearing your reaffirmation of your commitment to SDI.

III. PARTICIPANTS

You will speak to the 2,000 employees of Martin Marietta’s Denver Aeronautics Facility, the contractor for SDI’s Zenith Star laser program. SDIO Director Abrahamson and Martin Marietta Chairman and CEO

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Steven Steiner Files, Arms Control File, 51—AC/SDI (11/1/1987–11/30/1987). No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for November 24 from 11:05 a.m. until 12:35 p.m. in Denver, Colorado.

Tom Pownall will be on the podium with you. Your remarks will be preceded by a classified briefing on Zenith Star and other SDI programs, followed by a panel chaired by White House Science Adviser Bill Graham and including three prominent SDI proponents: Dr. Fred Seitz, President Emeritus of Rockefeller University and former President of the National Academy of Sciences; General (USAF, Ret.) Bernard Schriever, a member of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; and Dr. Solomon Buchsbaum, Executive Vice President of Bell Laboratories.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open coverage, except for the classified briefing.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Classified briefing, 11:05; scientific panel, 11:50; Presidential remarks, 12:15; Gen. Abrahamson introduces Martin Marietta employee of the year, who will make a presentation to you, 12:30.

VI. REMARKS²

Provided by speechwriters.

²The text of Reagan's November 24 address to Martin Marietta Denver Astronautics employees is in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book II, pp. 1379–1382. In it, he described the Strategic Defense Initiative "a scientific advance that will be judged a success based not on how many lives it is capable of taking—which is none—but on how many it is able to protect."

240. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV M87–20112X

Washington, December 1, 1987

The Soviet Negotiating Position on SDI: The Bottom Line

Summary

There is substantial evidence, even after discounting the obvious propaganda aims of Soviet statements on the US Strategic Defense Initiative, that Moscow has little confidence in the USSR's ability—at least over the next decade—to compete directly with the United States

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, Washington Summit Run-Up D&S (Defense & Space) 11/27/1987. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Drafted in the Office of Soviet Analysis.

in space-based defenses. While the Soviets have expended considerable effort on certain weapons technologies that could be employed, they trail in most of the key areas of technology critical to implementation of a reliable operational capability. They are pursuing a number of weapons programs—ASAT systems, improved ballistic missile systems, bombers and cruise missiles—that provide alternative approaches to countering strategic defenses, but there is abundant evidence that they consider large numbers of offensive weapons as a critical hedge against a US surge in strategic defense. So long as that perception persists—and we see no prospect that it will not for the foreseeable future—Moscow’s negotiating strategy will continue, in our view, to link offensive weapons reductions to constraints on strategic defense. *[portion markings not declassified]*

For now, as START negotiations proceed, the Soviets can show flexibility as to how those limits are formulated. Indeed, for tactical purposes pursuant to agreement on a framework or “key provisions” for a future treaty on offensive force reductions, they may well intimate willingness to accept less than a formal commitment to linkage and specific limits on defenses. Before signing a treaty that actually commits them to implementing offensive reductions, however, we believe they will insist upon clearly defined limits on SDI and upon their right to withdraw from a START treaty if the United States exceeds those limits.² An agreement on strategic arms reductions is a major component of Gorbachev’s political strategy for holding down the growth of military spending while he seeks to refurbish the USSR’s antiquated industrial base. But to agree to large cuts in the USSR’s offensive weapons while the US strategic defense efforts remain unconstrained would make Soviet political leaders vulnerable to charges of jeopardizing the security of the Soviet Union—a political risk that Gorbachev, with all of the other political gauntlets he is confronting, would be unwilling, in our view, to incur. *[portion markings not declassified]*

The Soviets have a number of programs underway—ASAT systems and ABM weapons, for example—that could be expanded substantially over the next ten years, but as counters to the kind of strategic defense envisioned in the US SDI, such systems would amount at best to stop-gap measures. The development of the USSR’s high-technology support industries is crucial for the efficient production of the new, more advanced weapons systems that the Soviets would need to undertake a program with capabilities even roughly comparable to the US SDI.

² This memorandum is predictive in nature, and there are alternative views about Soviet strategy over the longer term. One view holds that public and Congressional opposition to elements of the SDI program is so strong that the Soviets would not insist upon clearly defined limits on SDI. [Footnote is in the original.] *[portion marking not declassified]*

The Soviets would need to advance their research base in many high-technology fields such as electro-optics, microelectronics, advanced sensors, and computer hardware and software. They also appear to need at least ten years or more of industrial retooling to advance their manufacturing capability in such fields. As such technologies mature and become producible, the Soviets could initiate development of some types of systems in the 1990s. Given the protracted development times which such systems would entail, the first operational deployment of a Soviet strategic defense system probably could not occur for an extended period of time. *[portion markings not declassified]*

A particular Soviet concern is the possibility of early or unexpected US deployments. Moscow has said that the United States might be able to "leapfrog" the normal development process and deploy a strategic defense system before it had undergone testing. According to the US delegation, in the opening round of the Nuclear and Space Talks in early 1985 the Soviets illustrated this point by citing US development of the atomic bomb during World War II. They claimed that the first test of the US atomic bomb was carried out with a mockup and that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed with prototype weapons that had not completed the development and testing process. This concern, moreover, probably is heightened by Soviet awareness that because of the expense of launching satellites and the difficulty in retrieving them, satellites often are deployed without full-scale testing in space. *[portion markings not declassified]*

There is abundant evidence that the Soviets consider large numbers of offensive weapons as a critical hedge against a US surge in strategic defense. They have consistently argued that if arms control constraints were to limit the size of their offensive forces available to counter SDI deployments, they would be vulnerable to a first strike. This view was expressed most recently in an interview with the *New York Times*³ by Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev, who speaks for the military with Politburo backing on these issues. Akhromeyev specifically linked the Soviet concern over SDI to current START proposals, claiming that reductions of strategic warheads to 6,000 on each side would make it possible in theory for the United States to create an effective nuclear shield. In a December 1986 classified military publication, General M.M. Kozlov, former head of the Soviet General Staff Academy, claimed that the purpose of SDI is to disrupt current (sic: offensive) parity and give the United States an edge. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* a Soviet official said *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Soviet

³Reference is to Bill Keller, "Soviet Marshal Sees 'Star Wars' Giving U.S. Edge," *New York Times*, October 30, 1987, p. A1.

agreement to reductions for offensive weapons without limits on SDI would be unilateral disarmament. [*portion markings not declassified*]

In discussing their need to link strategic offensive weapon reductions to limits on SDI, the Soviets also have expressed concern over the possibility of near term deployment of elements of SDI. [*2 lines not declassified*] linkage was necessary because in two years the United States could have the lift capability that would enable it to quickly deploy a space-based kinetic kill vehicle. This concern about potential near term US defense deployments also was expressed by Major General Boris Surikov, a former advisor to the Soviet SALT delegation and technical expert on ABM systems. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Buying Time

So far, the Soviet response to SDI appears to involve only increased funding to research and has not impeded Gorbachev's industrial modernization program. Over the longer term, however, Gorbachev's ability to pursue his economic revitalization goals will almost certainly require constraints on the growth of military expenditures. He is unlikely to be able to sustain domestic political support for such constraints if the United States is perceived to be pursuing the kind of unconstrained high technology strategic weapons program for which SDI—in the Soviet view—represents the leading edge. [*portion markings not declassified*]

Tactical Flexibility . . .

The Soviets know they cannot get US agreement to ban development of strategic defenses and, therefore, they have sought through various proposals to ensure that any US deployment of strategic defenses would at least be delayed for an extended period. They regard agreement on an extended period of continued observance of the ABM Treaty as the most readily attainable means to this end. [*portion markings not declassified*]

The Soviets' desire to get at least a framework agreement for deep reductions in offensive forces before President Reagan leaves office may lead them to show greater flexibility on the linkage question in the coming months. Their increasing emphasis on the need for agreement on "key provisions" for offensive force reductions suggests they believe that such a framework agreement would guide the transition to the next US administration. We think they would view achievement of such momentum as preferable to an impasse in efforts to achieve a full-fledged treaty, particularly if they could do so in a way that does not explicitly prejudice their long term position on linkage. [*portion markings not declassified*]

The Soviets acknowledge that agreeing upon and defining specific limits for allowable activity during the continued observance period for

the ABM Treaty is a particularly difficult issue, and they do not expect final resolution in the near term. Soviet officials have stated repeatedly that the development of a list of devices and parameters for testing them in space is highly technical and requires the work of experts, and they probably have low expectations of negotiating such a list before the next US election. Moscow's immediate objective, therefore, is to obtain US agreement in principle to limit SDI-related activity during the continued observance period. *[portion markings not declassified]*

General Secretary Gorbachev's approach at the upcoming summit is likely to be a call only for a political commitment to continued observance of the ABM Treaty with some understanding, not necessarily public, about deployments, deferring until later negotiations on interpretative language or specific limits for SDI-related activity. Indeed, according to the US NST delegation, Soviet Chief START negotiator Obukhov said on November 10 that such a solution is the Soviet goal—agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years, with disagreements about interpretation of the ABM Treaty limits to be discussed in the Standing Consultative Commission.⁴ He also said that the Soviets would insist that any “rude” violations of the ABM Treaty by the United States would free the USSR from the START reductions. *[portion markings not declassified]*

Soviet public *[less than 1 line not declassified]* statements indicate that Moscow believes that if the United States agrees to continued observance of the ABM Treaty for an extended period, both the present administration and its successor will be confronted with increasing difficulties in justifying large budget outlays for the SDI program and that the Congress will not allow SDI activities to extend beyond those allowed by a narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Indeed *[less than 1 line not declassified]* a Soviet diplomat said earlier this spring that SDI has proved to be an empty issue and that whatever part of the SDI program potentially subverted the ABM Treaty would likely be curbed by Congress. Moscow calculates that this would be doubly true if violations of the ABM Treaty also would negate a potential START agreement. *[portion markings not declassified]*

... Toward a Strategic Objective

Despite their near term flexibility in approaching the issue of limits, we judge the Soviets are unlikely to agree finally to implement reductions in strategic offensive forces without a clear and public

⁴ In telegram 11928 from NST Geneva, November 12, the Delegation reported that Soviet negotiator Aleksey Obukhov told Lehman on November 10 that the Soviet Union required “some simple, specific language that provides for a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870930–0824)

commitment from the United States as to what SDI-related activity is permitted while those reductions are taking place. They also are likely to insist that there be some agreement on how to oversee observance of any limits on SDI-related activity, either through the Standing Consultative Commission or an analogous body. *[portion markings not declassified]*

There appears to be a strong consensus in the Politburo and military leadership on this issue. The recent ouster of Moscow Party Secretary Boris Yel'tsin, a strong supporter of Gorbachev, has strengthened the influence of the more conservative members of the leadership—particularly Politburo members Yegor Ligachev, Andrey Gromyko, and Chief of the KGB Chebrikov—who appear to be the chief skeptics of Gorbachev's arms control policies. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* there has been some opposition in the Soviet military to Gorbachev's other arms control proposals—the nuclear test moratorium, verification measures, and troop cuts—and that there is concern that his proposals for strategic offensive and defensive weapons would undermine Soviet parity with the United States. *[portion markings not declassified]*

241. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg), the Vice President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Watson), and the Vice President's Military Assistant (Mattke) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, December 1, 1987

SUBJECT

SDI and the ABM Treaty in the 1990's

We feel that the INF arms control agreement now being concluded and the START Treaty to be finalized for signature at the Spring/Summer 1988 Summit are good, make for strategic logic, and are ones you can support.

You should be aware that the Summit arms control planners are involved in a compartmented effort considering a Reagan/Gorbachev Joint Statement that could lock the U.S. (and the Soviets) into

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald Gregg Files, Subject File, OA/ID 19852-001, SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) [1]. Secret.

non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty well into the 1990's—possibly as far as the tenth anniversary of Reykjavik (October 11, 1996).

The next President will still be able to continue SDI R&D even with such a commitment.

One Summit joint statement being considered would commit the United States to negotiations beginning by June 30, 1989 to clarify the ABM Treaty “in light of evolving strategic and technological situations,” (read this to mean negotiations on whether SDI can go forward or not).

The next President could expand on our plan for phased SDI deployment by putting SDI sensor platforms up much sooner—thereby enhancing deterrence by better intelligence, surveillance, and early warning and testing the component most crucial to a successful SDI system.

Recommended Position. Before we agree to either non-withdrawal or even to negotiate parameters, we need to establish a definite quid pro quo—or we are trapped into arguing about how much we lose. One approach to the Soviets is to trade *any agreement to not withdraw* for a clear *commitment to the RIGHT TO DEPLOY upon withdrawal*.² That concession would clear the path for development, depriving our domestic opponents of the argument, “It will never be deployed, so why fund it?”

NSPG Alert: There may be an NSPG this Friday³ on Summit arms control issues.

² Gregg drew an asterisk at the end of this sentence and wrote at the bottom of the page, “Assuming the research has worked out well.”

³ December 4. The National Security Planning Group met in the White House Situation Room on December 4 from 2 until 3 p.m.; minutes are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 239.

242. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President's Military Assistant (Mattke) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, December 2, 1987

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty and Non-Withdrawal

As we advised you yesterday,² the Summit arms control planners are involved in a *compartmented* effort considering what, if any, Joint Statement would be appropriate involving the U.S. and Soviet Union in a “non-withdrawal” from the ABM Treaty. Two very different approaches are being considered. The positions have *profound implications for the next President*. Briefly stated

The first position simply advocates restating our current proposal to pledge non-withdrawal through 1994.

The second proposal, the State position, embodies a much more restrictive regime. It provides for a ten year non-withdrawal period and provides for negotiations during the ten year span to develop a new agreement. HOWEVER, if the two sides do not develop a new agreement (if the Soviets stonewall) parties *revert to the ABM Treaty* and remain bound by the *withdrawal provisions of article XV*.

Under the first proposal, a proposal that accurately reflects what we in fact *could realistically expect to be ready to deploy*, we would retain for the next President the prerogative to complete SDI research and commence deployment of Strategic Defense systems during the mid-90's.

But if bound by the more restrictive State proposal, we may be agreeing to defer the program long enough to *effectively table and kill it*. But the really *interesting proposition* of the State proposal *is buried in the revision clause*. Most people don't recognize that Article XV, the withdrawal article, is very cloudy. We have attached the actual language.³ Some legal

¹Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald Gregg Files, Subject File, OA/ID 19852-016, Arms Control [1]. Secret. Gregg wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Mr. Vice President, this is an important issue. I'll be going to the NSPG mtg Friday where this will be discussed. Don Gregg.” On the December 4 NSPG meeting, see footnote 3, Document 241. Bush wrote two checkmarks in the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum.

²See Document 241.

³Attached but not printed is a copy of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, which states: “1. This treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”

interpreters posit that it *may be virtually impossible to withdraw from the Treaty!* Short of proof that our “supreme interests” are jeopardized (by what?) we are bound not to withdraw for an “unlimited duration.”

That is why we recommended yesterday that you support, as a *quid pro quo* for any non-withdrawal commitment, a clear “commitment to the RIGHT TO DEPLOY strategic defenses upon withdrawal from the Treaty.”

Such a commitment would *clear the path for eventual deployment*, should a future President find it in the national interest—and *retain a clear path for funding* during the period of non-withdrawal.

243. Editorial Note

On December 7, 1987, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev arrived in Washington, where he was greeted at the airport by Secretary of State George Shultz. The following day, Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan met in the Oval Office from 10:45 a.m. until 12:30 p.m., before departing for the East Room, where they addressed U.S. and Soviet members of the press and signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Memoranda of conversation between U.S. and Soviet officials during the 1987 Washington Summit are in printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 104–115.

On December 10, 1987, Reagan hosted Gorbachev in a noon meeting in the Oval Office followed by a working luncheon in the Family Dining Room that lasted until 2:10 p.m. “After initial pleasantries,” President Reagan “opened by saying that he’d had a chance to review the joint statement,” and “understood that working delegations were now focused on the START and Defense and Space portions of the statement, and suggested that we get a report.” Gorbachev replied “that meetings were now in progress between Marshal Akhromeyev and Mr. Nitze,” and that in the meantime “he and the President could have some further discussions of regional issues, and the President agreed.” The memorandum of conversation of the meeting between Akhromeyev and Nitze that led to agreement on a joint statement is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, Document 253.

On December 11, in telegram 384489 to all diplomatic and consular posts, the Department of State transmitted the text of the December 10 Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement, which instructed negotiators at the Nuclear and Space Talks to “build upon the agreements on 50-percent

reductions achieved at Reykjavik subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 Strategic Offensive Delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side." The statement also stated: "Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871015–0592)

244. Letter From Daniel Graham to Secretary of Defense Carlucci¹

Washington, December 28, 1987

Dear Mr. Carlucci:

It is our understanding that your position on SDI is not substantially different from that of Cap Weinberger. We certainly hope so, since this vitally important program will be stifled by political and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers, SECDEF Carlucci's Library Subject—1988: SDI [01/01/1988–01/28/1988]. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the letter on January 11, 1988. Carlucci wrote in the upper-right hand corner of the letter: "Ron Lehman, I wish to look into the Eris deployment option. Pls consult with Will + Fred on mtg I had with Cy Weiss. FC"

bureaucratic opposition if it lacks a strong champion in the person of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Weinberger summed up the SDI issue very well in his last press conference: It is simply a matter of whether we are going to deploy or not. He's absolutely right, of course, and at the Summit, President Reagan made it crystal clear that we *will* deploy, but included a *very* vague caveat: "when ready."

Whatever the term "when ready" means, we can be sure that no system will ever be "ready" to deploy until after a decision to deploy it has been made. Herein lie the crucial decisions on SDI which will have to be made by you in 1988.

There is a fundamental disconnect between "deploy when ready" and a 7–10 year delay in deployment decision which would be imposed by an agreement committing us to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This basic paradox can be expected to become the subject of heated debate during 1988.²

The term "when ready" requires clarification. If "ready" means that technology is well enough in hand so that a deployment decision can be made involving only *reasonable* technical risks, there is quite an impressive array of defensive systems "ready" today.³ In fact, if one wished to finesse the ABM Treaty issue, several of these systems can be combined into "treaty compliant" defenses of enormous strategic value. A 100–200 launcher deployment at Grand Forks of Lockheed's ERIS or Vought-Martin Marietta's VM3 system, simple gun-based point defenses of silos and other hard points, and the McDonnell Douglas HOMS anti-tactical missile system for protection of the Central Region of NATO can be ordered deployed without undo technical risk, committing no more than 8 billion dollars over 5 years. Such defenses would provide near-perfect defenses against accidental or rogue attack and a defensive increment to deterrence more than offsetting loss of offensive deterrent forces inherent in the INF and START treaties.

You may have noticed, as we have, that the ramifications of INF and START are changing some previously negative views about the virtues of deployed defenses. For instance, Brent Scowcroft (and colleagues Deutsch and Woolsey) declared in a *Washington Post* article that a 50 percent cut in our triad was dangerous and would make it imperative for us either to deploy SDI, go to launch-on-warning, or redouble the Midgetman program (their preferred solution.) The ink was scarcely dry when Congress delivered the coup de grace to Midgetman,

² Carlucci drew a downward-facing arrow in the left-hand margin of this paragraph.

³ Carlucci wrote and circled "DV" in the left-hand margin beside the first two sentences of this paragraph.

leaving Scowcroft and company to choose between launch-on-warning and deployed SDI. We have no doubt which they would choose, however reluctantly—SDI.

As a matter of fact, the conviction seems to be spreading in all quarters of strategic thought that INF and START *demand* an offsetting increase in deterrent strength available from SDI. We see this trend auguring well for SDI in 1988.

Your known talent for restructuring organizations may be a critical asset over the next year. As you are almost certainly well aware, the primary obstacles to a deployment decision on SDI are *not* technical; they are bureaucratic and political.

Arguably, the greatest of these obstacles is bureaucratic resistance. Without overt and tacit support from within the bureaucracy, the purely political opposition would be far less effective.

Regrettably, the most damaging bureaucratic resistance comes from inside the Department. Such resistance will remain strong until some truly independent agency of DOD is given the *mission* of actual defense against ballistic missiles. Until that happens, SDI will get lip service from your subordinates, but be abandoned by most when the perpetual issue of resource allocations is raised. In particular, the Services will work hard to ensure that SDI remains “research only,” and that a minimum of authority is granted SDIO.

As you know, Mr. Carlucci, High Frontier has been in the thick of the fight for SDI, and we are supported by a sizable “field army” across the country. If we can be of assistance to you, please let me know. We’ll do almost anything except shut up.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel O. Graham⁴
Lt. Gen. USA (Ret.)

⁴ Graham signed the letter “Dan Graham” above his typed signature.

245. Memorandum From the Legal Advisor of the Department of State (Sofaer) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 6, 1988

SUBJECT

Handling of Issues Related to SBKKVs

On December 4, 1987, an NSC Staff directive ordered the Legal Adviser to issue an opinion on whether under the ABM Treaty KKV systems, both land and space-based, are based on "other physical principles" (Tab A).² The opinion is due on January 15, 1988, and we are attempting to complete it on schedule. It is considered necessary in order to justify development and testing requests that DOD apparently intends to include in the Fiscal 1989 budget.

If the Administration seeks funding for SBKKV development and testing we should expect a major controversy, cast in legal terms, over the SBKKV. To succeed, we will have to establish (1) that the broad interpretation is the valid measure of our lawful authority, (2) that the SBKKV is an OPP system; and (3) that any non-OPP component in the SBKKV may be developed and tested in space despite Article V(l) and Article VI. These are difficult and in some cases very close questions.

We would also have to deal with these potentially embarrassing difficulties:

— Opponents will note that numerous Administration officials have already expressed their views on aspects of this question, and their positions have varied. Among others:

- SDIO officially regards all KKV systems as entirely OPP;
- Gen. Abrahamson has testified that ERIS (ground-based KKV) is non-OPP, but SBI is OPP;

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, The Executive Secretariat's Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, January–April 1988. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Drafted by Sofaer on January 5.

² Attached but not printed is a December 4, 1987, memorandum from Stevens to Levitsky, Matz, William Staples (ACDA), and Jonathan Thompson (Office of Science and Technology Policy): "In order to ensure both maximum flexibility for the SDI program and scrupulous compliance with the ABM Treaty, it is necessary to resolve the question of whether space-based kinetic energy systems and ground-based systems such as ERIS are based on 'other physical principles' within the meaning of Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty. The State Department Legal Adviser is requested to opine on these matters and to provide such opinion to the NSC not later than January 15, 1988. In formulating this opinion, State/L should seek technical advice from the Department of Defense and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and legal and policy advice from relevant departments and agencies." (Ibid.)

- Amb. Cooper has argued with the Soviets that an early ground-based KKV was not OPP;

- Amb. Nitze has widely stated that he believes that the KKV is a missile, so it must either be an ABM missile (governed by Article V) or a non-ABM missile (governed by Article VI);

- The Science Adviser seems likely to find the SBKKV is OPP, but is apparently unsure of whether ERIS is OPP.

— Several legislative leaders, including Senators Nunn, Levin, and Johnson, have stated the view that SBKKVs may not lawfully be tested under the broad interpretation, and this view will prevail because other Democrats will defer to Senator Nunn's judgment, especially since Nitze has concurred.

— My own view is still uncertain. While the SDIO legal position is well reasoned, I am undecided on at least one major issue (whether, if the KKV is an ABM missile, it can be tested in space because it is part of an OPP system). At a minimum, I have decided that the Treaty and a 1978 Agreement require us to discuss these issues with the Soviets in the SCC.

The Administration could proceed, at this time, with funding requests for a package of KKV tests that could contribute materially to the SDI program, but would defer the issue of SBKKV testing. The package could include the full range of ERIS tests, as well as tests in space of the sensor systems planned for the SBKKV. We could even seek funding for tests in space of an SBKKV system that is not ABM capable without raising legal difficulties. Of course, if Nunn confirms that he is in fact ready to revisit the merits of the broad interpretation with an open mind (which I don't believe), we could seek greater flexibility.

If the President insists on going ahead with a funding request for SBKKV development and testing, despite the risks, we should formulate a strategy to ensure that we make a respectable showing. We should, first, rest our plans on a legal position that has as wide a base of support within the Administration as possible. For this purpose, I should be tasked to circulate, not a final opinion, but a paper that describes the arguments on all significant issues, on the basis of which leading Administration figures and attorneys could discuss the options and formulate a position. Second, we should all be much more positive and supportive of the position we take, so that Congress is clearly aware that we mean business. Finally, we must have a legislative strategy which includes prior consultations with leading legislators to ascertain what we can win and what we will lose. We may decide to go ahead and lose on certain requests, but we should do so with a full awareness of this result and with a PR line that makes it clear that we have no illusions and are making a record.

246. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Costello) to Secretary of Defense Carlucci¹

Washington, January 12, 1988

SUBJECT

SDI Review Task Force—ACTION MEMORANDUM

Per your direction I am recalling the SDI DSB task force under Bob Everett. Sol Buchsbaum, Sey Weiss, and Bill Perry have agreed to participate. A complete list of members is attached.²

My proposed tasking is to have the panel review LtGen Abrahamson's planned program to support initial deployment demonstrations and longer term technologies under several realistic budget profiles (20% growth/year, 10% growth/year, constant level of effort). Specifically, we will review:

What experiments must be conducted to resolve fundamental issues of feasibility and cost effectiveness?

When would major benefits accrue from the broad interpretation? When would the broad interpretation be required? What are the cost, schedule, and technical risk implications of adhering to the narrow interpretation?

When could full scale development decisions be supported under the broad and narrow interpretations?

What are the implications of initiating deployment with a treaty limited (100 ground based interceptor) force?

LtGen Abrahamson will need some time to prepare answers to these questions for review. Tentatively the group will meet 1–2 February and could give you a quick look assessment shortly thereafter. We feel that a thorough review will take several weeks longer.

Is the proposed guidance and schedule acceptable to you?³

RB Costello

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci's Library Subject—1988: SDI [01/01/1988–01/28/1988]. No classification marking. Stamped notations indicate that Taft saw the memorandum on January 13 and that Carlucci saw the memorandum on January 14. Carlucci wrote at the top of the memorandum: "Give me for my mtg w/President FC." An unknown hand crossed out Carlucci's note and wrote: "Done."

² Attached but not printed is a list of the planned task force membership.

³ Carlucci approved the proposal on January 14.

247. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to Roger DeKok of the National Security Council Staff and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Stevens)¹

Washington, January 13, 1988, 10:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

S-C-P Breakfast 1/13: SDI

Colin raised this non-agenda item, noting that Abe Sofaer had been tasked² to render legal opinions on issues relating to space-based kinetic systems, and ground based systems such as ERIS, specifically addressing whether they are based on OPP within the meaning of Agreed Statement D. This request had been based on Defense's feeling that they needed a definitive judgment, for planning purposes. Frank replied that, as he understands it, there is a committee within DOD which must review all planned testing for compliance with arms control agreements. Taft said that is correct; it operates under USDA. Sofaer had been asked because he is the most experienced in this area. He has asked the counsels in all relevant agencies, including Defense, to provide him an input on this subject, Taft noted. Shultz observed that the issues are very complex in the case of SBI kinetic systems, "which are part traditional and part OPP . . . we can't say at this point how Sofaer will come out, but we don't want something negative." Colin asked when we really need the judgment. Frank replied that the testing would probably occur in 1990, but we need to budget for long-lead items in 1989. Our agreement with Nunn, he continued, is that we can plan, but that there will be no metal bending (without Congressional approval.) Colin asked whether submission of the issue to OSD's committee shouldn't be the first step. Taft said he thought that Abe had wanted to do the analysis, rather than have someone else do it. Shultz commented that "this is one of the toughest cases." Frank said that rather than looking at the issue of KKV/OPP, we should be examining whether we would violate the treaty if we bought long-lead items for testing. (All agreed that simply buying the long-lead material would not violate the treaty.) Colin asked if OSD

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 76077. Secret. Copies were sent to Linhard, DeKok, Nicholas Rostow, Alison Fortier, Rodman, Stevens, Courtney, Steiner, and Tobey. No minutes of the breakfast meeting among Shultz, Carlucci, and Powell were found.

² See footnote 2, Document 245.

would take the first shot at the issue, through its compliance committee; and in the meantime we would tell Abe to continue to stand by, but not go forward with his legal analysis at this time. Taft said that Abe would prefer not to complete the work unless we really want it. Shultz asked if somebody would send a note to Abe. Colin replied that he would take that for action. Taft said he would energize OSD's compliance group. Frank then turned to another facet of SDI, observing that "we've always said that early deployment would not be feasible . . . that may not be true . . . ERIS could be deployed and give ABM coverage to almost all of CONUS . . . and there is a good chance it would be treaty compliant . . . this would fit into our Phase I deployment plans." Taft commented that, under that approach, we would be able to deploy only 100 missiles, however, if we were to remain treaty compliant. Frank said he had asked his people to look into the possibility. The JCS, he continued, had stipulated a requirement for the capability to deal with a small surprise attack in their review of SDI military requirements. The program does not now provide for such capability. Shultz noted that, unlike the Soviets, we have not made a deployment of the type permitted by the treaty. "In R&D, you learn by doing," he continued. "The Russians have deployed and improved and learned a great deal from that . . . we knocked our program down after spending about a billion on it." Colin noted that our position has been that if we deployed a ground-based system, we could jeopardize funding aimed at eventually deploying the more important boost-phase system. Frank commented that the system he was talking about would only be good for a small surprise attack . . . "but the JCS say that is a requirement." Shultz asked if we could deploy such a system while remaining within the SDI funding profile. (No one knew.) Frank said he did not have a firm figure, but he thought the system's cost would run in the low billions. He has asked his people to look at it. RAND has a related idea, he continued; that is to exempt sensors (from the Treaty). "That would get the Soviets off the Krasnoyarsk hook and let us work with sensors . . ."

248. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to Senator Nunn¹

Washington, January 15, 1988

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I am pleased to provide my assessment of the military consequences of eliminating US and USSR strategic ballistic missiles. As specified in the Department of Defense Authorization Act, both classified and unclassified reports are attached.²

As stated in the reports, an arms control agreement eliminating US and USSR strategic ballistic missiles would have substantial repercussions on the essence of deterrence and the future force structure of the United States. Without spending levels above current projections, the United States could not make such a transition and keep risk relatively constant to that which exists today.

The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with my assessment.

Without Appendix A, this letter is unclassified.

Sincerely,

William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix A

Report Prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff³

Washington, undated

**REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE MILITARY
CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING US AND
USSR STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES (U)**

1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) This classified report presents the views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military consequences of eliminating all US

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, JCS Zero Ballistic Report, 01/06/88. Secret; Noform. Crowe sent an identical letter to Aspin. (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed is the unclassified report.

³ Secret; Noform.

and USSR strategic ballistic missiles. The report has been prepared in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Section 905, which requires "the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report examining the military consequences of any arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that would provide for the elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union." This report and a companion unclassified version include a discussion of the strategic, budgetary, and force structure implications of eliminating US and USSR strategic ballistic missiles.

b. (U) The summary finding of this report is that a safe US force structure transition to a world without strategic ballistic missiles could not be undertaken without spending levels above current projections. Although significant additional funding might allow the United States to transition safely to the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles, there are no assurances that the Soviets would ever accept such a reduction. In fact, the likelihood of the Soviets accepting such a proposal would be relatively low because it would eliminate strategic ballistic missiles which form the core of their national defense strategy, capability, and international prestige.

2. (U) *Background*

a. (S)(NOFORN) *Threat*. If the Soviets agreed to eliminate strategic ballistic missiles, they would make significant adjustments to their other strategic offensive forces. They probably would build many more bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles and bombs, and place additional sea-launched cruise missiles on submarines. In addition, to counter the remaining US air breathing threat, the Soviets would likely increase the size of their interceptor and SAM air defense forces by some 20 to 25 percent. It is difficult to assess how an agreement might affect already powerful Soviet conventional forces. Such a prediction would depend on the significance the Soviets placed on strategic force changes and their perception of the overall balance once ballistic missiles disappeared. The costs of changing their strategic forces make it unknown whether the Soviets would be willing to apply the resources to improve their conventional forces beyond the formidable level already planned. However, we could very well see accelerated additions of low-strength motorized rifle and tank divisions in the western USSR as well as theater air defense improvements. Presuming a Soviet transition from SSBNs to SLCM submarines in the strategic arsenals, they could place increased emphasis on their capability to defend against US SLCM submarines, attack the SLOCs, or protect Soviet forward-deployed or bastion-deployed SLCM submarines.

b. (S)(NOFORN) *Deterrence*. The basis for US nuclear deterrence would not change with the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles. In order to deter belligerent Soviet actions against the United States and its allies, the United States would have to remain capable of denying Soviet war aims by destroying with nuclear weapons what the Soviets hold most dear. In spite of eliminating strategic ballistic missiles, the Soviet target base the United States would have to strike to achieve that objective would remain substantial because Soviet ballistic missiles comprise less than 15 percent of that target base. Although the ratio of nuclear weapons on each side would improve arithmetically for the United States if strategic ballistic missiles were eliminated, the United States would still have fewer weapons per target than we believe the Soviets would have for their target base. Also, the total number of US weapons required to hold the adjusted Soviet target base at risk would not change appreciably. On the other hand, the fundamental structure of US deterrent forces would be altered as the United States shifted to some other form than the classic strategic Triad. In transitioning to an alternative future without strategic ballistic missiles, one could not simply assume that replacing ballistic missile warheads with, for example, bomber- or SLCM-delivered warheads would maintain a deterrent posture equal to that of today. The composition and capabilities of the forces would be too different to justify such an assumption without more information on both nation's residual strategic posture. On the other hand, eliminating strategic ballistic missiles and the attendant restructuring of strategic forces to bombers and SLCM submarines could lead to increased deterrence favoring the United States which is much better equipped—by history, training, and culture—to wage bomber and submarine warfare than the Soviets. Moreover, without the threat of Soviet strategic ballistic missiles (nuclear or conventional), a Soviet surprise attack against key NATO facilities would be less effective—although in the United States key installations near each coast would still be vulnerable to short-warning SLCM attacks. Strategic defenses in such an environment would become more important to the United States because that capability is now skewed in favor of the Soviets—the United States has virtually no strategic air defense and no ABM defense at all. Greatly enhanced, damage-limiting air defenses, coupled with strategic offensive, defensive, and nonstrategic nuclear force improvements, could raise Soviet uncertainty and lead to increased deterrence. The impact of these contrasting views about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence on conventional deterrence is uncertain and would depend primarily on how the Soviets might perceive the willingness of the United States and its allies to escalate in response to a Soviet provocation. Clearly, the United States and its allies would have to demonstrate that willingness by maintaining relevant, undisputable

capabilities for flexible response despite the changed environment of strategic arms.

3. (U) *Implications*

a. (U) *Conventional Defenses.* Adjustments to US land-based forces would be dependent not only on Soviet actions but also on the share of the burden US allies would be willing to assume. US sea-based forces are more directly tied to the changing requirements of the Soviet threat. If the goal were at least as stable a world as provided by currently programmed forces (which include strategic ballistic missiles), substantial conventional force adjustments would be required beyond currently planned modernization programs to both land- and sea-based forces as a hedge against Soviet actions. Likewise, US allies would have to accept their proportional share of the increased conventional requirements. Based on precedent, the prospects of the allies doing so are not good. Not all conventional adjustments would necessarily have to be completed immediately, however, since some could be paced in expectation of Soviet actions.

b. (U) *Theater Nuclear Forces.* Eliminating strategic ballistic missiles would not change the longstanding requirements for force modernization and improvements to counter the unfavorable theater nuclear, chemical, and conventional arms imbalance favoring the Warsaw Pact. Combining such an elimination with the impacts of the INF agreement would demand strong positive action by the United States to assure European allies that the US-NATO linkage would continue to be staunchly supported. It would also require continued, and perhaps increased, allied support of the remaining nonstrategic nuclear forces. The United States and NATO would also have to continue to remain firm in opposing any reductions or constraints in the remaining INF forces and shorter-range nuclear forces. At stake would be the credibility of the deterrence proffered by the resulting US-NATO Triad of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces.

c. (S) *Strategic Offensive Forces.* Ballistic missiles comprise nearly two-thirds of US strategic nuclear forces. To hold the adjusted Soviet target base at risk, most if not all of these weapons would have to be replaced in some fashion and the remaining weapon systems modernized. Disregarding the foregoing additional military requirements, just the additional cost of, for example, the strategic bombers and SLCM submarines required to keep risk essentially equal to today's level of risk would exceed any realistic projection of near-term defense budgets. The Soviets, with only a limited bomber capability today, would have to grapple with similar considerations in determining the acceptability of proposals eliminating strategic ballistic missiles.

d. (U) *Air Defenses*. The Soviets have an extensive air defense system. In view of the US vulnerability to ballistic missiles and the past lack of a major air-breathing threat, the United States has chosen to maintain little CONUS air defense capability. If the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate strategic ballistic missiles, the United States could not afford to remain relatively defenseless against nuclear attack by bombers and cruise missiles. To do so would reduce stability and deterrence thus increasing risk. A CONUS air defense system would require a combination of land- and sea-based early warning and interceptor aircraft, as well as forward-deployed ASW and anti-air warfare forces designed to destroy enemy missile carrying platforms before they close within weapons range. Additionally, a capability to destroy launched ALCMs and SLCMs before they entered CONUS airspace would be critical. Point defenses would also be necessary to protect critical assets from weapons that successfully penetrated into the "terminal region." If the United States acquired greatly enhanced air defenses, US damage-limiting capability would be significant compared to what it would be without strategic ballistic missile elimination.

e. (S) *Strategic Defense Initiative Programs*. At least initially, eliminating strategic ballistic missiles would leave the Soviets without the means to achieve their current strategic war aims. Therefore, the Soviets could be expected to retain as many ICBMs as possible throughout the drawdown period, governed by the counting rules, the interim limits and sublimits, and consistent with the production pace required to position a strong substitute force, e.g., an intercontinental bomber and SLCM submarine capability. If the Soviets were unable to meet their targeting requirements using nonballistic strategic arms, and the viability and integrity of their war plans were directly affected, the Soviets would have a high motivation to cheat. Given the potential for Soviet cheating, even in a United States-Soviet zero strategic ballistic missile world, US ballistic missile defensive forces would be required to protect against any covertly held Soviet ballistic missiles and also to deter the use of third nation ballistic missiles. Additionally, US ballistic missile defense forces would guard against accidental or unauthorized launch of Soviet covert or third world ballistic missiles. Thus, there would be a requirement for a substantial investment in defensive systems that would contribute to deterrence through independent objective-denial and damage-limitation. Coupled with strategic offensive, defensive, and nonstrategic nuclear force improvements, a ballistic missile defense capability could raise Soviet uncertainty to the point that they would be adequately deterred.

f. (S) *New Programs.* Maximum use of US technological superiority will continue to give the United States the capability to offset Soviet quantitative superiority. The Soviets will continue to lag behind the United States in this area, and the leverage that technological superiority provides would have to be exploited. Advanced technologies and appropriate classified programs would require full support and provide the enhanced operational capabilities required to keep risk relatively constant. With an agreement to eliminate strategic ballistic missiles, the modernization and replacement of other elements of US strategic and conventional forces would also take on increased importance. C³I improvements would require continued emphasis because the post-ballistic missile Soviet means of nuclear attack—including covert ones—would still constitute a continuous threat to US continuity of government and C³I systems. The shift to increased emphasis on strategic air-breathing systems would significantly enhance the importance of US advanced bomber and air- and sea-launched cruise missile programs.

4. (U) *Conclusion*

a. (U) Deterrence of aggression is achieved by maximizing both an aggressor's uncertainty that he can achieve political objectives by force and the certainty he will face unacceptable risk to what he values most. In transitioning to an alternative future without strategic ballistic missiles, simply replacing ballistic missile warheads with bomber or SLCM-delivered warheads would not maintain a deterrent posture equal to that of today. The composition of the forces would be too different to justify such an assumption at this juncture. The credibility of the threat of escalation by the United States and its allies, as well as the willingness of the allies to accept their share of any increased conventional requirement, would determine the need for increased US conventional force levels. Presently planned modernization programs, both strategic and conventional, would remain vital.

b. (U) If strategic ballistic missiles are phased out, the United States must maintain credible deterrent forces throughout the transition period. This can be done both by adjusting the US force structure to counter an altered Soviet threat and through additional arms control agreements. By making the potential threat more predictable, arms limiting agreements could reduce force structure imbalances and lessen the risk caused by eliminating strategic ballistic missiles. However, arms control agreements that could likely be negotiated cannot alone substitute for offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities. To ensure those deterrent capabilities were available during the transitional phase would require relief from current budgetary constraints.

c. (U) Assuming that an arms control agreement provided for eliminating all strategic ballistic missiles and the necessary funding could

be found to support such a transition, the agreement should not be implemented without fully considering the following:

(1) (S)(NOFORN) Although the ultimate goal of eliminating strategic ballistic missile systems would be a more stable world, the transition to this environment would have to be made very carefully and with force adjustments that match the changes in the form of deterrence. Eliminating strategic ballistic missiles without complementary nuclear force modifications and conventional force improvements could have the opposite effect.

(2) (U) This transition scheme, if implemented, would set in motion a fundamental change in the nature of deterrence—from deterrence based principally on offensive retaliation to deterrence increasingly dependent on defensive capabilities. A transition to this form of deterrence is potentially destabilizing unless implemented in a phased manner that ensures the Soviets comply with the agreement, that the United States acquires the force structure required to support the agreement, and that unexpected events do not result in unrecoverable mistakes.

(3) (U) The future strategic environment would be characterized by major uncertainties if such a transition were to be implemented. Real world constraints might result in a transition characterized by tightly constrained offensive capabilities and unconstrained defensive opportunities. As defenses matured and improved, each side would increasingly have less confidence in the ability of strategic weapons to penetrate to target. This uncertainty, coupled with a Soviet desire for a prompt attack capability would create substantial motivation for the Soviets to cheat by retaining a covert strategic ballistic missile force. Therefore, any negotiated agreement to eliminate strategic ballistic missiles must unquestionably ensure a US ability to verify Soviet compliance. Without adequate and vigorous methods of compliance verification, the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles should not be contemplated.

(4) (U) The transition to the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles would be highly contingent on estimates of what the Soviets would do if they agree to eliminate such systems. Thus, should an agreement be adopted, a critical requirement during its implementation is that transition plans be flexible enough to compensate for unforeseen Soviet actions or technological breakthroughs.

(5) (U) Eliminating strategic ballistic missiles would have to be negotiated with the Soviets in a manner that ensured a phased drawdown of the missile systems and left no ambiguity as to which strategic systems would be dismantled in which years. Soviet good will would have to be tested early. If the Soviets are found to be in noncompliance, the negotiated ballistic missile drawdown rate should allow the United States to take appropriate action without suffering a disadvantage.

(6) (S)(NOFORN) The United States will continue to rely on its alliances with or without the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles. Implementation of a treaty resulting in the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles should not be allowed to diminish NATO's capability to respond to Soviet aggression. To ensure that NATO's capability is not lessened, NATO allies would have to accept their share of the increased conventional and nuclear requirements that result from eliminating strategic ballistic missiles.

(7) (U) Full support would be crucial for advanced technologies in the required force increases ultimately deemed necessary. These enhanced operational capabilities would provide an essential element of the ability of the United States to keep risk relatively constant.

(8) (U) The imprecise nature of deterrence makes it impossible to determine exactly what forces would be needed to implement such a proposal. Specifically, the philosophy used to select and recommend a future force structure would be requirements-driven, addressing minimum cost alternative solutions that keep as closely as possible within budgetary boundaries. Ultimately, if such a course of action were implemented, risk in the changing environment would have to be continually assessed and necessary force structure adjustments made.

249. Letter From Secretary of Defense Carlucci to Senator Nunn¹

Washington, March 31, 1988

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of February 12, 1988,² concerning the Strategic Defense Initiative. You raised two basic issues with your letter: the need to "begin immediately" to conduct operational testing; and, the internal management of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) within the Department of Defense.

Addressing the management issue first, I can assure you that Dr. Robert Costello answered correctly during his confirmation hearings concerning his relationship to the SDI program. I agree with my predecessor that the SDI organization was created to provide strong, centralized management for research; however, my guidance does not

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci's Library Subject—1988: SDI [03/30/1988–03/31/1988]. No classification marking.

² Not found.

preclude other members of DoD from carrying out their responsibilities, nor does it provide any mechanism to “work around Congressional Authorization or Appropriation Acts.” We will work with the Congress through appropriate procedures to avoid any undue fragmenting of the program. The Department’s position was clarified in a December 31, 1987, memorandum (attached), which reaffirms the OSD staff oversight responsibility concerning planning, programming, and budgeting for its SDI program.

The directive on operational testing has not been superseded. Test and Evaluation (T&E) plays a critical role in the acquisition process. With the creation of the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) by Congress in 1983, operational test and evaluation (OT&E) results have now become a key determinant in program approvals.

That portion of OT&E conducted throughout the acquisition process prior to the decision to proceed to full-rate production is called initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). IOT&E is conducted to forecast operational effectiveness and suitability and to provide insights about the potential operational worth of a system throughout its acquisition life. The “operational testing involving field tests, under realistic combat conditions, of actual components of SDI systems” is clearly not feasible in the traditional sense. Therefore, early involvement to develop adequate operational evaluation criteria and appropriate test procedures is warranted.

While development test and evaluation (DT&E) and IOT&E are separate activities and are conducted by different test communities, they interact frequently and are generally complementary. DT&E, also conducted throughout the acquisition process, provides a view of the potential to reach technical objectives, while IOT&E provides an assessment of the potential to satisfy the user’s operational effectiveness and suitability requirements prior to commitment to full production.

The scope, complexity and national importance of the SDI program, and the requirement for early operational assessments at annual Defense Acquisition Board reviews, require an innovative management and organizational approach to OT&E. In order to provide the assessments required by Congress and DoD, the operational testing community must increasingly employ modeling and simulation when hardware is not yet available or cannot be tested cost effectively under realistic conditions. In recognition of this my predecessor directed, and I fully support, the DOT&E approach to providing independent and objective operational evaluations and assessments of the strategic defense system from a total-system perspective.

In summary, there is a real need to begin the operational test activities for the strategic defense system now even though no full scale

development decision is anticipated for some time. In regard to internal management of the SDI program, I plan to bring to bear all of the resources of my staff to ensure success of the President's highest priority program.

Sincerely,

Frank Carlucci

Attachment

Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Taft) to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Costello), the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (Helm), the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Department of Defense (Chu), and the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (Abrahamson)³

Washington, December 31, 1987

SUBJECT

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program

Earlier this year the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) completed a review of the SDI Program.⁴ Progress was judged sufficient to proceed with demonstration and validation of the Strategic Defense System Phase I, subject to the condition that the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization take action to resolve certain issues raised by the DAB. Further DAB reviews are planned, and activity is now underway to provide the necessary data to resolve the issues identified.

I view this as a very positive indication that the program is moving successfully into the defense acquisition process. As the SDI Program moves from a series of technological concepts to a number of technically feasible systems, the DAB can provide not only the thorough review appropriate for a program of this magnitude, but can also provide constructive and supportive ideas which will work to the long term benefit of the program.

As Secretary of Defense, I want to bring to bear all the resources of my staff to ensure the success of this critically important program.

³ No classification marking.

⁴ Not found.

I look forward to the continued constructive involvement of not only the DAB but the staffs responsible for normal planning, programming and budgeting activities. My intention is that the DAB oversight and review process as prescribed in DoD Directive 5000.1 will build confidence and provide a wider base of support within DoD and the Congress for the SDI program.

William H. Taft, IV
Deputy Secretary of Defense

250. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Popadiuk) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Negroponte)¹

Washington, April 27, 1988, 11:29 a.m.

SUBJECT

S-C-P Breakfast 04/27: Strategic Forces

Will Taft observed that the Defense bill will be on the House floor today. There are hundreds of amendments, including some aimed at SDI and strategic forces. Some contain language restricting what we could do under the ABM Treaty, essentially taking the Soviet position. George Shultz commented that he “couldn’t help feeling that we had an opportunity in the negotiations . . . if we could identify test ranges—whatever these ideas are—it would make us better off in terms of the negotiations. Things are not going to get better on the Hill in ’89–’90. The House will be about the same.” Colin said it is not at all clear the Soviets are going to sign up to our proposal on sensors. Kampelman said they would have to think about it for a while. Shultz asked Taft how funding is coming along for ICBMs. Taft replied that the Administration had asked for \$800m for MX and \$200m for SICBM. The House had changed that to \$500[m] for each. The Senate authorizing subcommittee had changed the figures to \$700m for MX and \$50M for SICBM. Exon is very much opposed to SICBM. The sub-committee mark was adopted

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 77896. Secret. Sent through Stevens and Perito. No minutes of the breakfast meeting among Shultz, Carlucci, and Powell were found.

by the full committee. On the appropriations side, the Senate will probably zero SICBM if it can. Taft went on to point out that the number of missiles we buy in FY-89 is independent of basing mode. We still need the 12 MX we asked for to build up the spares required for testing. That would be true even if we did not go beyond the 50 land-based missiles. The uncertainty about the future of US mobiles doesn't help us in the START negotiations, Taft pointed out. Shultz observed that "given the increase in accuracy and the vulnerability of fixed base missiles, we have to get mobiles if we are going to have any land-based missiles." Taft agreed. But the JCS, he continued, fear that Congress won't give us mobiles, and we will wind up facing the SS-24s and 25s anyway. Colin noted that it is better to constrain the Soviet (mobiles) than to have no constraints on them. Shultz commented that it is unfortunate the country seems to have lost its taste both for arms control and for defense at the same time. Max Kampelman said he had met with the Senate arms control observers group yesterday and Gore had raised the issue of whether we should sign a START agreement before the election. There is some feeling that any conclusion of START before the election would be seen as a partisan act, favoring Bush. This could sour the process (on the Hill). Shultz noted that Dukakis supports a 50% reduction, so any agreement would have a bipartisan flavor to it. Taft said we should go forward with the negotiations, but if we reach agreement, wait to sign it until after the election. Kampelman thought no one would have any problem with that. He went on to say that Pell had asked whether the President shouldn't invite Byrd and Dole to the summit.² Colin said we have received a letter³ to that effect—but it's more than Byrd and Dole. Taft asked whether anyone had told them that's out of line.

² Reference is to the May 29–June 1 U.S.-Soviet Summit. Memoranda of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev's meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 156–163.

³ Not found.

251. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 9, 1988, 2–3 p.m.

National Security Planning Group Meeting

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Arms Control Positions (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State:

Secretary George Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese

Defense:

Secretary Frank Carlucci

Mr. Ron Lehman

Energy:

Mr. William Martin

CIA:

Judge William Webster

Mr. Richard Kerr

JCS:

Admiral William Crowe

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

ACDA:

Mr. George Murphy

Vice President's Office:

Mr. Craig Fuller

OMB:

Mr. Joseph Wright

OSTP:

Dr. William Graham

White House:

Mr. Howard Baker

Mr. Ken Duberstein

Mr. Marlin Fitzwater

General Colin Powell

Mr. John Negroponte

NSC Staff:

Colonel Robert Linhard

Captain Linton Brooks

Minutes

The meeting opened at 2:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. *The President* opened the meeting as follows:

Tomorrow night George and Colin will be leaving for their final Foreign Ministers' meeting before the summit. They'll deal with our whole agenda, just as I will in Moscow. Today, however, I want to focus on arms reduction, especially on START and Defense and Space. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG), NSPG 0188, 05/09/1988. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brackets, except those indicating omission statements, are in the original. The full minutes are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XI, START I, Document 299.

You and your people have done a huge amount of work coming to grips with these very difficult issues. I appreciate it and hope you will pass my appreciation on to your staffs. Because of Soviet stonewalling and the inherent difficulty of the issues, we weren't able to have START and Defense and Space treaties ready for signature. However, as I've been saying lately, I want a good treaty, not a quick treaty. Nothing less than a verifiable agreement which enhances our security will do. (S)

I want us to keep working toward this goal after the summit. We have an obligation to finish development of a complete, coherent position to bring about deep reductions while setting the stage for one day deploying effective defenses. As we move forward, I depend on each of the people in this room to tell me if we're moving too fast, or too slow, or in the wrong direction. (S)

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued (not verbatim): (U)

General Powell: Thank you, sir. While, as the President said, our focus is on arms reductions issues, we need to consider the overall context of the meeting. Secretary Shultz, could you review that context? (U)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

Secretary Shultz: We have a dilemma. Increasingly in Congress and the general public there is a belief that the only ICBM to have is a survivable ICBM. As the weapons get more accurate, fixed silo-based ICBMs are not survivable. Maybe if we don't have mobile ICBMs we won't have any new ICBMs. That is why Admiral Crowe wisely wants no sublimit on SLBMs. We may need all 4,900 ballistic missile warheads on submarines. But there are good reasons to have a Triad. So we should keep ICBMs. But the basing mode is difficult; it is unstable if we have a vulnerable basing mode. We have to work hard to find the answer in our own interest, not just to accommodate the Soviets. The Soviets are miles ahead on mobiles. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Well some of the verification regime will help. (S)

Judge Webster: But that makes problems for the JCS. (U)

Admiral Crowe: We are going to accept some scheme, but we are not going to nail all the mobiles down. (S)

General Powell: In summary, there is progress on the verification scheme, but not everyone agrees that we are ready to lay down a number. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: If we indicate verification comes first, we would be willing to lay down a range of numbers. I would be willing to go with a range 500 to 700. State has another number. (S)

The President: The Midgetman that Congress loves. It is my understanding that the military just doesn't want it. Is that correct? (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes that is correct. It is not cost effective. It would be \$39 billion for Midgetman against \$17 billion for MX. (S)

The President: Then why not holler and fight? (U)

Secretary Carlucci: I have hollered. The Senate has suggested the program to put only 45 million in Midgetman and the rest in MX. But the House is playing politics. Aspin says he has to have a big Midgetman number to deal with the Senate in conference. But MX will be funded. We just can't afford Midgetman. (S)

The President: What's their argument against MX? (C)

Secretary Carlucci: They say it is not survivable in a bolt out of the blue. I think this is all political. The basic motivation comes straight from the Democratic caucus. I told Aspin he was holding up a START agreement and he said he didn't care; START is a problem for the next Administration. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Let me play the Devil's advocate. As I understand it, if cost wasn't an issue the military would rather have a hundred single RV missiles than ten multi-warhead missiles. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That is true in part. People are also a resource and we need more people with a larger number of missiles. (S)

The President: But there is no military problem; you would want them? (S)

Admiral Crowe: Yes. (U)

Secretary Shultz: So there are some arguments on this side. So it is a cost argument. If money and people were available we would want to go to single RV missile. There is also a verification argument. If we miss a MX, we miss ten warheads. Two or three years ago that is why we were interested in banning Soviet MIRVed mobiles. Personally I don't dismiss Midgetman as politics. The problem is cost. That is why I have always said we ought to cut the number of warheads on our MIRVed system. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Then it's the same problem. If you cut warheads you still need to buy more missiles. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Why not down load MX? (S)

Admiral Crowe: We could do that. (U)

Secretary Shultz: We say we worry about Soviet heavys because of the breakout question. They could breakout and have more warheads. If we down load MX we will have the same breakout potential. (S)

The Vice President: Isn't there a survivability issue? MX can't deploy as quickly. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes. Midgetman advocates say that it is more survivable to a bolt out of the blue. The difference is something like six hours. (S)

The Vice President: Isn't that a convincing argument? (U)

Admiral Crowe: Some. It is like the big carrier-little carrier debate. The military would always prefer more but they don't believe they are ever going to get it. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: If you take State's idea of 1,000 warheads, it will really break the bank. It will cost you \$80 billion for Midgetman. (S)

The President: How do we get back to the horse cavalry? (U)

Secretary Carlucci: This whole thing will lead to a stalemate on the Hill and no U.S. mobile. (S)

General Powell: Do we need to say anything more on heavy ICBMs? (C)

Ambassador Rowny: I favor a ban on flight testing of heavy ICBMs. That way we will force Soviet heavy ICBMs to atrophy. Even if we cut those ICBMs in half there will still be a unilateral advantage if we allow flight testing. We must not allow that. We won't build any, so including a U.S. right to build is ephemeral. They can put 20 to 30 warheads on heavys. If we go to Congress we will get—correctly—significant problems on questions of equality. (S)

General Powell: Other comments? [Silence] In Defense and Space, we are close to having a complete U.S. position. We are agreed that in Geneva we should:

- Affirm the basic positions in our draft treaty, including: our right to deploy after the specified period; that we will not accept a rolling non-withdrawal period; and, that we believe START reductions should not be held hostage to D&S.

- Maintain our proposal that neither side object to space-based sensors and elicit a Soviet response.

- And, that we should not now formally table our ideas for stipulating that testing of weapons in space does not constitute deployment. (S)

The question is how far to go in changing our Defense and Space position. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We did get something on Sunday.² It shows the Soviets are anxious to move. There may be opportunity here. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes, the opportunity for a swap may be present. (C)

Secretary Shultz: It is just motion. We don't know if there is a swap there. If we could get something we want in SDI it would be a great help. (S)

² May 1.

Admiral Crowe: Remember it's not just SDI that our "sensors run free" proposal is needed for. We also need it for BSTS, our next generation early warning system. (S)

Secretary Shultz: As I understand it we will have a complete proposal on sensors running free. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, we have to be able to distinguish between sensors and weapons. That is not agreed within the United States Government. We can't allow the Soviets to see Black programs. So there is movement here, but we have to be very, very careful. (S)

General Powell: Let's turn to the ABM Treaty review. We are agreed that we should press the Soviets to correct their ABM Treaty violations and advise them that the U.S. will not sign START or Defense and Space Treaties until they agree to correct their violations in a verifiable manner. (S)

At issue is how to treat the ABM Treaty Review. According to the terms of the ABM Treaty the review must begin by October 3.

— Our first option is to tell the Soviets that we will not settle on timing and forum for the review if their violations persist.

— The second option is to tell them that the review will begin by October, but that major uncorrected violations could raise serious questions as to the future of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Secretary Shultz, would you like to comment? (U)

Secretary Shultz: As I understand the facts about the K-radar, its position and orientation make it a clear violation. The outer shell is built, but there is nothing inside; the guts are not there. And they have stopped construction. Also my understanding from Admiral Crowe is that the military judgment is that ending the ABM Treaty is not in our interest because the Soviets are more ready to breakout than we are. Also, ending the ABM Treaty would be hard to sustain politically, both in this country and abroad. So we don't want to abrogate the treaty or get on any track pointing to abrogation. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I agree. We shouldn't get on a track toward abrogating the treaty. That's why I don't understand the State position. If we have an SCC [Standing Consultative Commission] meeting we will be forced to take some action. We should have no SCC meeting until we have a commitment on what they are going to do. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We have a commitment. An understanding that they will destroy the radar once we complete a treaty. If we agree we are not going to abrogate, we ought to be on a careful track. If we refuse to review the treaty, we violate it. If we review it we have a tactical problem, but it will have been reviewed. We shouldn't abrogate the treaty, we should work things out. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: We agree we don't want to abrogate, although we don't want to keep it forever. But remember they may yet try to go to Thule and Fylingdales. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Mr. President this certainly is esoteric. (U)

General Powell: Meanwhile it gets closer and closer to 3 October. (U)

Secretary Shultz: This is a time bomb. (U)

General Powell: What do we need from the Soviets to schedule a review? What do we accept—blowing up the radar? Or do we schedule the review and explain the failure to destroy the radar will be a material breach. (S)

The President: What about other radars which are violations? (S)

General Powell: The radars at Gomel. (S)

Secretary Shultz: It's a technical violation they can't correct. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Can't both parties agree to delay the review? (S)

General Powell: But they keep pressing for it. (U)

Admiral Crowe: But can't we delay? (U)

Ambassador Rowny: They don't want a delay. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: We are the ones doing the delay. (U)

Secretary Shultz: We won't conclude a Defense and Space or START Treaty unless the K-radar is dealt with satisfactorily. (S)

General Powell: And satisfactory means it has to be destroyed. (S)

Secretary Shultz: They said they would do that, although I don't like to say so in so big a room. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: Even most liberals know the K-radar is a violation and if not corrected there can't be a new treaty. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We have a commitment tied to a new treaty, but not tied to the review. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: We need more discussion. It is premature to do anything on this. Why not try to define the discussions we have had during the last three years as the ABM Treaty review. There has been more discussion on that treaty in the last three years than ever before. I suggest we need more discussion and we need to look at this. (S)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

252. Letter From Secretary of Defense Carlucci to Senator Nunn¹

Washington, May 11, 1988

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Last fall, as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, I was involved in negotiating the so-called budget summit agreement. Under this agreement, the Congress and the Administration adopted an overall framework for budget reduction. According to this plan, the Department of Defense was required to reduce its planned program for FY 1989 by \$33 billion to \$299.5 billion. This was well below the level that the Administration felt was necessary for our security, but in the interest of reducing the overall budget we agreed to accept greater risk in our national security posture.

Since assuming my responsibilities as Secretary of Defense in November, the task of making the very difficult decisions required to meet this agreement fell on my shoulders. I cannot overstate how difficult these decisions were. They involved cancelling a number of programs, delaying others, and making reductions in our overall force structure. The budget I submitted represented the soundest overall defense program under these difficult budgetary constraints. I am gratified that to date, the Congress has not reduced overall defense spending below the level agreed to in the budget summit agreement. However, I am very concerned about Congressional reductions to a central element of our defense program—the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

SDI is the cornerstone of our overall defense program. It holds the promise of a more stable and effective deterrent posture based on a balance of offense and defense. The hopes we had for a more stable and safe deterrent under the ABM Treaty regime have not been realized. The Soviet Union has continued to modernize and expand both its strategic offensive and defensive forces in an effort to blunt the credibility and effectiveness of our deterrent. It is time we recognized this, and took the steps necessary to rectify an increasingly unstable situation. The case for the SDI program is further strengthened by the disturbing proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci's Library Subject—1988: SDI [05/06/1988–05/24/1988]. No classification marking. Carlucci sent an identical letter to Warner the same day. (Ibid.)

The Administration's request for Department of Defense SDI activities in FY 1989 is \$4.5 billion. This figure represents a reduction of \$1.7 billion from what we had previously planned to spend in FY 1989. I recommended this reduction to our request with considerable reluctance, as Congressional reductions in SDI funding to date have already resulted in substantial delays in the program. However, I felt that I had made a commitment to present the minimum overall budget request that—while accepting greater risk—was consistent with our security requirements. The request the President submitted for the SDI program reflects a balance between our legitimate security requirements and existing budgetary constraints, and it is a sound technical program. The action of the House of Representatives—which reduced our request by almost \$1.5 billion—was irresponsible, and it would cause grave damage to this vital program.

I urge you in the strongest possible terms to oppose any amendment on the Senate floor which would reduce SDI funding below that level recommended by the Committee. If the Congress sends the President a defense bill that contains a funding level for SDI that is in my view inadequate, I would have no choice but to recommend a veto of that bill. While I would make such a recommendation with regret, I would not be living up to my responsibilities to the President or the Nation if I failed to do so.

Sincerely,

Frank Carlucci

253. Editorial Note

On May 27, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 307, "Review of United States Arms Reduction Positions in Preparation for the Moscow Summit." The NSDD set the following U.S. goals for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks for the May 29–June 2 summit: "We will continue to advocate a legally binding sublimit of 3300 ICBM RVs and will discuss how to record the current Soviet intentions with regard to their program"; "We will provide the Soviets details of our proposed verification scheme for mobile ICBMs based upon the decisions reflected in guidance issued on my behalf by the National Security Council staff on May 24, 1988.

Based on Soviet receptiveness to this verification approach, I will make the decision in Moscow whether to discuss specific numerical limits on mobile ICBMs and, if so, what limits to propose"; "If warranted by Soviet movement in other areas, I am prepared to agree to allow testing and modernization of silo-based heavy ICBMs subject to appropriate restrictions on the modernization of such missiles (but *not* on other ICBM modernization) and subject to the United States having an equal right to heavy ICBMs." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 250) The guidance of May 24 was not found.

In a section on Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Non-Compliance and the ABM Treaty Review, the NSDD stated that U.S. officials would reaffirm their "long-standing concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty" and "make it clear that we will not sign any strategic arms agreements, either in START or in Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement or destruction of the radar." (Ibid.)

President Reagan arrived in Moscow on May 29 and delivered remarks alongside Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the opening ceremony of the summit. ("Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow," May 29, 1988; *Public Papers: Reagan, 1988*, Book I, pages 672–674) In a one-on-one meeting that afternoon in St. Catherine's Hall of the Kremlin, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed previous meetings, human rights, and religion. (Memorandum of Conversation, May 29; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 156.

254. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 10–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

First Plenary Meeting (U)

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President

Secretary George P. Shultz

Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Senator Howard Baker

General Colin Powell

Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

Ambassador Jack Matlock

Mark Parris, Department of State (Notetaker)

Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC (Notetaker)

USSR

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Chairman Andrei Gromyko

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov

Politburo Member Aleksandr Yakovlev

Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin

Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh

Mr. Chernyayev

Ambassador Yuri Dubinin

Mr. Victor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)

Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)

While photos were being taken, *General Secretary Gorbachev* commented that the President had been warmly received by the Soviet people during his first day in Moscow. The Muscovites' feelings were sincere; nothing had been arranged for the President's benefit. It was all spontaneous. (S)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

The President said he had some points to make on Defense and Space. The objective of SDI, he explained, was to make the US and its

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall at the Kremlin. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 158. Additional documentation of the May 29–June 1, 1988, Moscow Summit is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 155–163.

allies more secure, not to threaten the Soviet Union. The Soviet side knew the merits of defending itself, as it devoted far more resources to strategic defense than did the US. As the two leaders had discussed in Reykjavik,² the US was willing in the context of a START agreement to agree to a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty, after which, unless it were otherwise agreed, each side would be free to choose its own course of action. (S)

The President said he could not agree to a nonwithdrawal provision until the Soviet Union had corrected its violations of the ABM Treaty.³ In Washington, he reminded Gorbachev, the General Secretary had made clear that he opposed the United States investigating advanced strategic defenses. Nonetheless, he had accepted that, at the end of a nonwithdrawal period, unless agreed otherwise, each side would have the right to deploy strategic defenses if it so chose. This needed to be made clear in the agreement. (S)

The US also needed, *the President* continued, the right to take necessary steps if its supreme interests were jeopardized by unexpected extraordinary events. This was standard in treaties. It needed as well to protect the right to research, develop and test advanced strategic defenses during the nonwithdrawal period, and could not accept restrictions beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty. We had thus proposed an agreement not to object to each others' space-based sensors. Both sides used space to collect information for a variety of purposes. It was impossible to distinguish among these purposes. Why not agree not to make this the subject of unnecessary disputes? The two sides' negotiators, the President concluded, had put together a joint draft D&S agreement text. He proposed they be instructed to press ahead. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said that that task could be facilitated if the US could accept a single formula in the treaty—that, if one side violated the ABM Treaty, the other would be free of its obligations under the treaty to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent. Such an approach would make it unnecessary to discuss what was or was not permitted under the ABM Treaty. But Secretaries Shultz and Carlucci argued against this. (S)

Secretary Shultz reminded the General Secretary that the US viewed the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation of the Treaty. The essence of the problem, however, was that the two sides did not agree on what was permitted by the Treaty with respect to research, development and testing. If that were agreed, the US would not have so many hang-ups. We

² See Document 138.

³ See Document 243.

had always felt that the Soviet Union agreed that during the period of strategic arms reductions, it would be a good thing to know what would be happening with respect to nonwithdrawal. But there was no such agreement. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he could give the President some free advice—even though Henry Kissinger would have charged him millions for the favor. The President, he stated amiably, was being deceived. He had initially been deceived by former Defense Secretary Weinberger; perhaps Carlucci was now doing the same thing. Some might think that it was possible to put something in space which could give the US an advantage (even though, Gorbachev pointed out, this would be contrary to one of the principles, which had been agreed to at the Geneva Summit).⁴ But during the proposed nonwithdrawal period—nine or eight and a half years—SDI was not a workable concept. If the President would tell his military people to confine their experiments to earth, nothing would happen. There was no need during this period for research in space. Attempts to conduct such research, on the other hand, would produce suspicion and mistrust. It would lead to a cooling of relations. That was why Gorbachev felt Carlucci, with Shultz's help, was moving the President in the wrong direction. He wanted to state this in their presence so they could defend themselves. (S)

The President said that, before they did that, he had some things to say of his own. He had come into office believing in the instability of a world whose security was based primarily on nuclear missiles. The average person could envision and was psychologically prepared to deal with the threat of conventional weapons. But when cities could be destroyed at the push of a button, it was another thing. Shortly after entering office, therefore, he had called in America's senior military leaders and asked if it would be possible to devise a system to render missiles obsolete. They had come back after consulting with our scientific community and said that, with a lot of time and resources, it could be done. The President had said, "Do it." So SDI from its inception has been a defensive weapon. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said that the systems being developed in connection with SDI could be used for other than defensive purposes. (S)

The President replied that Gorbachev was overlooking the President's frequently stated belief that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. The President believed nuclear weapons must be eliminated. When he had been informed that SDI was possible, the President had announced, if a workable system were devised, the

⁴ See Document 84.

US would make deployment of such a system available to all countries, and would not deploy until nuclear weapons had been eliminated. (S)

But if nuclear weapons were eliminated, there would still be a need to ensure that no madman could obtain the knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapon and blackmail the world. The situation, *the President* explained, was akin to that after World War I. Poison gas had been banned, but people had kept their gas masks. The President said he really meant this. There had been breakthroughs, and US scientists were very optimistic SDI could work. But the purpose of the exercise was to eliminate the arsenals which could bring about such destruction in minutes. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl had shown what damage could be done with a release of radioactivity which was miniscule compared to that of even the smallest nuclear warheads. No one could be a victor in a nuclear war. (S)

The President reiterated that if SDI were proved workable, it could not be put into effect until nuclear weapons were eliminated. It was not an offensive weapon in any way. It was, therefore, non-negotiable, as far as the President was concerned. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev asked why SDI would be necessary if all missiles were destroyed. (S)

The President repeated that it was like a gas mask. It was impossible to unlearn the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons. One had to be sure that a madman like Hitler was not at some point able to build a bomb and name his terms to the world. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said one could not be too careful where nuclear weapons were concerned. He reaffirmed that the Soviet side believed SDI was not just a defensive system, but also would provide a means of attacking targets on Earth. The question also arose as to why, if one party wanted to build such weapons, the other should make it easy for him. It was one thing for SDI to defend against a certain number of missiles; it was another for it to stop that number times X. But if both sides devoted all their national wealth to such a competition, the discussions the two sides were having were meaningless. Stability would also suffer. The capital which had been accrued in negotiations to date would be undermined; mistrust would arise; Moscow would have to consider a response. (S)

The President reminded Gorbachev that he had offered in Geneva to share development of SDI with the Soviet Union. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he had to express doubt as to that offer. He pointed out that the US had refused to work out a system of on-site inspection of SLCMs aboard US warships. How could one believe that America would open its laboratories. This simply was not serious. The two sides were talking about matters of life and death. (S)

Secretary Carlucci noted that there was a difference between verifying an operational system and exchanging data and mutual observation opportunities relating to research and development. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said Carlucci had not convinced him. He reiterated that the two sides should proceed on the basis of the Washington Summit statement language on the ABM Treaty. In that connection, he noted that the US had raised the question of sensors. Perhaps the experts could talk more about that. But Gorbachev urged the President to think about what he had said. The President was listening only to scientists like Teller, not to scientists, including those in Europe and the Soviet Union, who had very different views. So the experts could work, but Gorbachev hoped the President would weigh what he had said. (S)

On the Krasnoyarsk radar, *General Secretary Gorbachev* added, several things needed to be kept in mind. First, construction had been stopped. Second, US "scientists" (sic) had visited the site and found nothing. Finally, the Soviet side had expressed its willingness totally to dismantle the radar if an agreement were reached. Gorbachev reminded the President that there were also US "forward" radars which should not be forgotten. But experts could discuss all of this, "including the US sensor idea," in Geneva. (S)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

255. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, June 6, 1988

SUBJECT

SDI Program

Significant momentum is building in favor of restructuring the SDI program, either in response to budget cuts or to undertake a limited ABM deployment. The Defense Resources Board will consider restructuring SDI; guidance will be issued later in the Summer. In Congress, amendments favoring limited deployments enjoyed widespread

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI Program Review, 06/08/1988. Secret. Sent for action.

support, including near unanimous Republican support in the Senate. Both Bill Schneider, Chairman of the General Advisory Commission on Arms Control, and Bill Graham have urged that a limited ABM deployment be given more serious study.

Those who favor a limited, treaty-compliant ABM deployment do so for a variety of reasons. They argue that it would: provide protection against accidental or renegade missile launches; thwart an intended decapitation strike by the Soviet Union against Washington; provide experience in manufacturing and operating ABM systems; open U.S. ABM production lines as a hedge against Soviet breakout; and amount to a foot in the door for SDI.

These are worthwhile objectives, but they must be balanced against their cost. Estimates of the cost of a limited ABM deployment range from \$8 billion to \$20 billion over about five years; (much depends on the effectiveness of the systems and on how the ABM Treaty is interpreted.) Furthermore, the true cost of limited deployments could be to divert us forever from achieving a more comprehensive defenses. This could occur because scarce SDI funds would be siphoned from researching new technology, to producing ground-based systems similar to those of the late 1960s. Furthermore, a limited deployment could sap public support for further deployments because it would have a small effect on our security relative to its cost. Finally, the ABM Treaty may bar successful completion of the accidental launch protection mission.

Funding cuts and the debate over a limited deployment cast a shadow on the Phase I system architecture. Some on the Defense Acquisition Board now argue that Phase I should be scrapped, and that all SDI technologies, including the space-based interceptor should be returned to Milestone 0. This would, of course, be a serious setback for the program.

The debate over the Phase I architecture and whether to pursue a limited ABM deployment cuts to the heart of the SDI program. Any decision to pursue a limited deployment as a prelude to Phase I should be a Presidential decision. Those who wish to restructure the SDI program should have a chance to put their case to the President. Moreover, the President should be kept informed of the results of various panels studying the limited deployment question.

At Tab I² is a scheduling request for an NSPG meeting to allow for a full airing of these issues. We envision a policy and program briefing to review the status of SDI and options for a limited ABM deployment. The President could then issue guidance on next steps. At Tab II

² Attached but not printed.

are recommended talking points, should you wish to discuss this with Secretary Carlucci.

Recommendation

That you approve the scheduling request at Tab I.³
Steve Steiner concurred in draft.⁴

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

Talking Points on SDI Restructuring

— It's been over a year and a half since the President has had a briefing on SDI plans and progress.

— Since that meeting much has happened: the DAB approved a Phase I architecture; we've been hit with Congressional funding cuts; and, proposals have come from several quarters for a limited deployment.

— We need to make sure the President is comfortable with the course of SDI when he leaves office.

— Therefore, I'd like to schedule an NSPG meeting to brief the President on the program, and give you an opportunity to advise him on next steps.

³ Powell neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

⁴ Tobey initialed for Steiner.

⁵ Secret.

256. Letter From Senators Wilson, Wallop, and Quayle to Secretary of Defense Carlucci¹

Washington, June 10, 1988

Dear Frank:

We wanted to take this opportunity to thank you again for taking the time to meet with us to discuss the future of the President's SDI program.² We share your view that if the program is not only going to survive, but more important, to be successful in providing a strategic defense of the United States, it must be refocused to provide deployment options which make tangible contributions to U.S. security in the near-term. Instead of detracting from the program's more ambitious and important goals, we believe that the deployment of a limited protection system will create insurmountable political pressure for more and more capable defenses.

We are concerned by a report from one of our colleagues which indicated that you felt, based on our meeting, that we were encouraging you to deemphasize Phase 1. This was certainly not the case, and we hope you were not left with this impression. While we recognize that in the short-term funding for development and deployment of a limited protection system might come at the expense of continued development of Phase 1, we also believe that beginning to *deploy* defenses will result in increased public support for the SDI program and therefore more funding from the Congress. Therefore, deployment of a limited protection system would have a very positive effect on the development and eventual deployment of Phase 1. We view the deployment of a limited protection system as a means of moving us toward the goal of more effective defenses, and our support for it is based on this belief. To deploy a limited protection system while deemphasizing Phase 1 would be to sacrifice our ultimate objective in the interest of pursuing it. We hope this letter helps to clarify our views on this matter.

The problem of translating the overwhelming public support for the SDI program into a political constituency for the program in Congress is a complicated one that we have grappled with for many years. We are confident that an emphasis on the deployment now of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci's Library Subject—1988: National Security Council and State Meeting [05/18/1988–06/15/1988]. No classification marking. Carlucci sent copies of the letter to Shultz and Powell, separately, under cover of June 13 memoranda: "You may be interested in reading the attached prior to our discussions on SDI. This is not easy!" (Ibid.)

² No memorandum of conversation was found.

even limited defenses will help move us toward the more effective defenses which are so vital to our nation's security.

Finally, while we understand the Joint Chiefs' emphasis on the military and deterrent value of any defensive deployment, we again wish to express our concern regarding the political hazards of limiting SDI to a defense of the Pentagon.

Again, we very much appreciate your willingness to listen to our views and share your own with us on this vital program. We hope that this is a channel of communication that can be kept open.

Sincerely,

Pete Wilson

United States Senator

Malcolm Wallop³

United States Senator

Dan Quayle

United States Senator

³ Wallop signed the letter "Malcolm" above his typed signature.

257. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to Robert Perito of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, June 15, 1988, 10:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

S-C-P Breakfast 6/15: SDI

Frank Carlucci prefaced discussion of this issue by noting that Exon had told him he thinks he can get 550m for MX and 200m for SICBM, with neither fenced (so the next president would have flexibility to reprogram). DOD can maintain the MX schedule at 550m.

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS System, Reagan Administration, ID 79454. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Stevens, Linhard, Brooks, Tobey, Ledsky, Grant, Snider, Popadiuk, Schillaci, Rodman, and DeKok. No minutes of the breakfast meeting among Shultz, Carlucci, and Powell were found.

Frank then turned to SDI, noting that there are two problems with Phase I. The first is the impact of successive budget cuts. Those cuts notwithstanding, however, we could attain Phase I around the turn of the century if we continue to pursue it as a goal. The second problem is cost. Defense estimates the cost to implement Phase I at \$138B. That figure is a little inflated as it includes some costs that would be necessary for total (SDI) program implementation. SDIO estimates Phase I costs as closer to \$117B. In any event, it is a large bill.

We now have consensus within the Pentagon, Frank continued, on a revised approach to implementation of SDI. Under this new approach, there would be two emphases. The first would be on essential space-based sensors; specifically, the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) and the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS). These are low orbiters, both of which will be useful in its own right, and for purposes not necessarily limited to SDI. BSTS, for example, will be the replacement for the DSP early-warning system. DOD's arms control compliance group has looked at the new approach and thinks it is treaty compliant. The second emphasis would be on a ground-based interceptor system, such as ERIS, operating in conjunction with a Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (GBSTS). The technology is moving along quite nicely. We could deploy a reasonable system by '94–'95. Such system would be of limited but useful capability. It could deal with an accidental launch, a third country attack; it could provide protection for the NCA. The latter, he noted, is the only role for which the JCS feel the system could fill a legitimate military requirement.

NCS protection implies a move from Grand Forks to Washington as the site for the single treaty-allowed system, "with all the political hoopla that would involve, as well as the need to inform the Soviets." The last piece of the puzzle, Frank continued, is the space-based interceptor system. It would come along later. It's not clear at this point whether we would want to continue to support the kinetic-kill vehicle (KKV), with its very high costs, or whether we should concentrate on a directed energy system that might be deployable around the turn of the century. That issue should be left open. In presenting our decision publicly we should acknowledge the cost problems with the KKV and say we are moving ahead with R&D on directed energy options as possible alternatives.

Frank felt this new approach would broaden the constituency for the program. "It offers something for everyone." We may be able to get Nunn on board with the concept, though he would be unlikely to endorse it openly until after the election. The approach would be attractive to those who would prefer more emphasis on R&D and less on space-based interceptors. The DAB has looked at the proposed new approach and endorsed it. The staff is now putting together something

that describes the program in layman's terms. Frank proposed unveiling the concept in a speech he will give in Denver in mid-July.

Herres said the JCS supported a limited protective system of the type described and noted that a terrestrial-based layer, such as the proposed system would provide, would be a necessary part of any later Phase I system in any event. "So it makes sense to start the deployment with a ground-based system." Protecting the National Capital Region makes military sense, from a C3/COG point of view, and considering the fact that the NCR contains a large number of likely Soviet high-priority targets.

Frank reiterated that, in DOD's view, the system he is proposing probably would be treaty-compliant. Herres noted that, to be treaty compliant, the system would be limited to 100 interceptors. In the context of a major Soviet attack that would provide little protection; but it could buy some warning time and allow measures for protection of the NCA and COG to be implemented.

In the context of an accidental launch or a third world threat, the system could be considerably more effective in defeating the incoming missile(s). It would also provide a hedge against a Soviet breakout, which the Soviets could accomplish rapidly with the SA-12, since they are not averse to using nuclear warheads on their ABM missiles. In the context of major US strategic force reductions under a START agreement, the importance of the proposed system would increase. "If we had no system at that point, and the Soviets broke out, we'd be in a very dangerous situation." Frank said he thought that's exactly what the Soviets' game plan was.

George Shultz reviewed the bidding, noting that Frank was proposing to say, in a mid-July speech in Denver, that we are making a major change in SDI, scaling down our aspirations drastically, and proposing to deploy around our capital a system like the Soviets have deployed around Moscow. He asked where the money would come from. Frank replied that the program assumes FYDP funding will be available—but no more.

Colin asked if Frank thought protection of the NCR would be salable politically. Frank thought it would be; "this is a non-nuclear program we're proposing." Herres noted that an NCR system would, in fact, provide much broader geographic coverage than Washington; it would extend from Norfolk to New York. Frank observed that what we would say publicly about the new concept is that we have restructured the program as a result of budget cuts, technological advances, and the conclusion that a ground-based defense would serve a useful military purpose. Such defense would be the first part of a sequential approach. We need the sensors in any event; and the ground-based interceptor system would simply be the initial part of a Phase I system. Colin said

that, under this approach, there would be very few dollars left for the visionary elements of the program. Taft observed that he couldn't imagine Cap getting on this train. Frank replied that ground-based system was always a part of Cap's Phase I system. Colin noted that many people will simply view this new approach as a mirror image of the Soviet system. Shultz said that what Frank was saying was that the President's dream is not feasible. "This is the denouement." Frank replied that he is simply trying to structure something that makes programmatic sense and can survive politically. "For the first time there is consensus in the Pentagon about what should be done."

Herres noted that the Phase I goal of killing 2000 out of 4700 incoming warheads was very ambitious. "We were soaking up all the money for KKV. We know how to shoot down ballistic missiles. The key is how to do it in an affordable way. We haven't yet found an affordable way to do that from space." Frank agreed, but said that, as a longer term goal, we still need the capability to get the missiles in boost phase. Costello said we are not backing off the larger requirement, but recognizing that we have much more investigating to do to get affordable mechanisms. The ultimate answer may be a directed energy system rather than kinetic kill.

George Shultz noted that "if we have any chance to sell (SDI), we shouldn't give it away. In our negotiations with the Soviets we've said we can't accept a deployment limitation that goes beyond X years. Now it turns out that's all baloney and we're talking about throwing SDI overboard without getting anything for it. Why not see what we can do in Geneva before your speech in Denver?" Frank said he agreed, and the Denver speech need not be the driver. He can easily cancel that. He went on to note that he had laid the new approach before the President yesterday.² "He understood, but grimaced when I talked about a NCR system."

Colin asked how the change in approach would impact programatically. Would changes be needed in FY89? 90? Taft said there would be some adjustments in 89. At the 3.7 level, rather than the 5.2 we had requested, "there will be adjustments needed to accommodate the 1.5 reduction, keeping all this in mind."

Frank observed that we shouldn't leap to the conclusion that we can accomplish the revised program within the limits of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. "We're so wrapped around the axle with lawyers . . . some argue that even the BSTS violates the treaty. The objections can probably be solved, however. There may be some tests

² Reagan met with Carlucci, Senator Baker, and Duberstein in the Oval Office from 4:03 until 4:31 p.m. on June 14. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes were found.

though that raise questions about treaty interpretation.” Shultz noted that “rather than pulling the (non-deployment) timeframe down, it is in our interest for it to be longer.” Frank agreed that was a plausible proposition, particularly if we believe that the Soviets are heading for a breakout capability. Extending the limit would restrain them.

Herres felt we could sign up to a ten-year non-deployment provision which would not, of course, impact our ability to deploy a treaty-compliant system. Shultz reiterated his view that, as a matter of priority, we should give some thought to our negotiating position and how we might extract something from the Soviets. Frank said that Jon Howe and Ron Lehman should sit down with State’s people and address that issue. Frank also noted that he had not raised that aspect of the proposal with the President, feeling it would be more proper for Shultz, as the chief negotiator, to do so. Colin said that, after we have had an opportunity to reflect on the implications of the proposal, we should have an NSPG and let the President hear from all of his advisers. Frank said it will leak out in the meantime. Colin noted that there has already been press speculation on the subject.

258. Information Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze), the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes), and the Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 17, 1988

SUBJECT

ICBM Force Modernization

Once again, the U.S. Government is in disarray over the question of what steps we should take to ensure the future survivability of the land-based leg of the triad. The Administration is coming under intense criticism for this state of affairs, which is being used to justify opposition to individual ICBM programs as well as arguments to abandon efforts to

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 NODIS and EXDIS Memorandums, Lot 94D433, 1988 Nodis Memorandums: June 1–30, 1988. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Michael Stafford (S/ARN); cleared in PM, C, EUR/RPM, and for information in EUR/SOV. Stafford initialed for all clearing offices.

conclude a START Treaty during this term. It is imperative that we strive to establish a comprehensive approach to ICBM force modernization that will receive broad support from the Congress and the public.

There are currently three general options for ICBM modernization; our program would presumably derive from one or more of these options:

1. Midgetman, deployed in hardened road-mobile launchers. This program is currently in advanced development, with \$700 million appropriated for FY88.

2. MX, deployed in a rail-garrison mode. This program is also in full-scale development, with \$350 million appropriated for FY88.

3. Minuteman III, deployed in a multiple protective shelter (MPS) scheme referred to as “carry-hard”. This concept was studied and rejected earlier in the Administration, but recently resurfaced by OSD.

In evaluating these options, we should use the following criteria:

1. Survivability, in terms of the number of Soviet RVs required to destroy our force
2. Cost
3. Political viability

On the basis of currently available information, the options can be assessed as follows.

Survivability

1. Midgetman. We have agreed with the Soviets that, under START, road-mobile ICBMs would be confined to restricted areas, with a small portion allowed outside these areas on a day-to-day basis and the entire force allowed outside for a limited number of exercises or for dispersal during crises. We have proposed that these areas be 25 square kilometers in size, while the Soviets prefer 100 square kilometers. We have in mind restricting the number of launchers in each area to 9 (the number of launchers in an SS-25 regiment).

Our own plan, however, as recently briefed by the Air Force to the START IG, is to deploy 2 launchers at selected, existing Minuteman silos. An area of about one acre size around each silo would constitute the restricted area; thus, a 500-Midgetman force would use 250 restricted areas. The launchers would remain within this one-acre area during day-to-day operations, despite being allowed to use a larger area of 25–100 square kilometers. The Air Force is willing to keep the launchers in such a small area, because of their ability to disperse rapidly on receipt of tactical warning.

Should the Soviets initiate an attack, our early warning systems should provide us 20–30 minutes’ warning. The entire Midgetman force, which would be kept on high-alert status, could begin to disperse

almost immediately upon receipt of warning at the Midgetman site. (If our early warning system were to catastrophically fail, each 2-missile unit could be destroyed with 1 SS-18 RV.) Because the Midgetman launcher can reach speeds up to 60 MPH, the number of SS-18 RVs required to destroy the force would increase rapidly as the dispersal proceeded. For example, 15 minutes after scrambling, each 2-missile unit could increase its possible operating area by about 600 square kilometers and hunker down to give itself 30–50 PSI hardness. This would force the Soviets to use about 60 SS-18 RVs to barrage the entire area in which the unit might be located. (It would be necessary to select Minuteman silos that were sufficiently spaced, however, to ensure that Midgetman dispersal areas did not excessively overlap.)

2. MX. The agreed START scheme for rail-mobile ICBMs also would use small deployment areas, with the same provision for day-to-day exits and dispersals. This scheme is consistent with the rail-garrison concept the JCS plans to use should there be no START agreement.

MX in this basing mode would be destroyed with far fewer RVs than would Midgetman if there were insufficient warning. The garrisons would likely be about 1 square kilometer in size, and the launchers [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in hardness. Thus, if the trains were caught in garrison, it would require only 1 SS-18 RV to destroy the 8–12 missiles in each garrison (or about: 1/100 RV per MX RV destroyed).

MX would also require more warning time. Except for one alert train per garrison, or a total of about 14 missiles, which could scramble in minutes, the force would take about 2–3 hours to begin scrambling.

3. Minuteman III. The MPS scheme would use about four [*less than 1 line not declassified*] shelters per RV, spaced about 1500 feet apart so that a single SS-18 RV could not destroy more than one shelter. The Minuteman III missiles would be moved randomly among these shelters. As long as the Soviets remained uncertain which shelters housed missiles, and thus had to attack all of them, they would need to use at least 4 SS-18 RVs per Minuteman III RV destroyed. There, of course, would be no requirement for strategic warning in this basing scheme. Concerns about potential vulnerability would center on the possibility that the Soviets might somehow determine which shelters contained missiles.

Cost

The following costs, expressed in FY 88 dollars, are for acquisition of a 500-RV force.

1. Midgetman. About \$33 billion (this is the current DOD estimate, but contractor bids have indicated the cost might be more like about \$25 billion).

2. MX. About \$10 billion (this figure may also be reduced in light of recent contractor bids).

3. Minuteman III. About \$15 billion.

The cost of operating and maintaining the force would also vary among the options. It would be lowest for MX and highest for Midgetman, which would cost an additional \$3–5 billion compared to MX over 15 years.

Political Viability

1. Midgetman. The Midgetman force would remain on Minuteman bases at all times, except during operational dispersals. This should minimize the public interface problems faced by previous mobile ICBM options. There are several influential supporters of the program in Congress and elsewhere, including the members of the Scowcroft Commission. Those who oppose the program do so principally on the basis of cost.

2. MX. While the majority of the MX force would remain on government land during day-to-day operations, training trains would have to use the public rail system regularly. This is likely to create considerable problems with the public. The program has also run into Congressional opposition, due to this problem and to the requirement for several hours' strategic warning for survivability. It is supported by others as the cheapest way to deploy 500 modern ICBM RVs.

3. Minuteman III. The entire force would remain on government land at all times, and thus should present no public interface problems. As a lower cost alternative to Midgetman that avoids the survivability and public interface problems of MX, this option could receive substantial support in Congress. It would be necessary, however, to address the breakout problems that might arise under a START Treaty, if the Soviets were also to deploy a large number of shelters.

Additional Alternatives

In addition, to the baseline options analyzed above, two other alternatives have been suggested. One is to use a new, more capable, 1- or 2-RV Minuteman IV rather than the Minuteman III in the MPS deployment scheme. This option would be similar to the Minuteman III option in survivability and political viability, but higher in cost.

The other alternative is to deploy Midgetman initially in silos, which would be cheaper than mobile basing, and eventually supplement it with mobile or MPS deployment. The silo-based missiles would exact a price of 1-to-2 SS-18 RVs per RV destroyed, not as good as mobile Midgetman but still a net loss of warheads for the Soviets should they attack. As a cheaper version of Midgetman that avoids the problems of MX, this option could also receive substantial support in Congress.

Next Steps

We should attempt to establish an agreed U.S. Government program as soon as possible, and a concerted effort to develop a bipartisan consensus with the Congressional leadership will be necessary. To obtain such, the Administration must first reach its own consensus on what to recommend to Congress. The essential requirement is to achieve a deployment mode that has a good prospect of surviving without requiring strategic warning. A deployment scheme that relied on strategic warning would constitute a dangerous invitation to surprise attack. It is our recommendation that, in discussions with Carlucci and Powell, you propose that we explore either the Minuteman/MPS deployment scheme or the scheme to place Midgetman in silos while preserving the option to supplement it with mobile or MPS deployment. We will be sending you further thoughts on how to pursue this objective.

259. Memorandum From William Tobey and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, June 27, 1988

SUBJECT

Restructuring the SDI Program

At *Tab I*² is the memorandum for the President you requested analyzing the OSD paper on restructuring the SDI program. We are working toward an NSPG meeting on the issue next week, and will prepare the necessary package. We anticipate the outcome of the meeting will be an NSDD on which options OSD should pursue, with an additional briefing for the President and a final decision in August to guide the Defense Acquisition Board.

With respect to a possible breakthrough at Lawrence Livermore National Lab, General Abrahamson reports that DOD has also been contacted by someone in the Attorney General's office. The system is indeed the "brilliant pebbles" concept. This system would involve

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI NSPG, 07/05/88. Secret. Sent for action.

² Printed as Document 260.

placing thousands of cheap, light, single-shot kinetic interceptors in orbit. They have made impressive progress, but Abe would not call it a breakthrough. Indeed, he says that much work remains to be done; in particular, they are working to ensure that they meet the “man in the loop” requirement. Abe will forward a paper on the concept this afternoon and will be prepared to answer questions on the concept at the NSPG. This should ensure that the President is fully informed on the concept, without giving way to undue optimism.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.³

That you approve our plan for handling the Livermore “breakthrough.”⁴

Bill Cockell, Linton Brooks, and Don Mahley concur.⁵

³ Powell neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

⁴ Powell neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

⁵ Tobey initialed for Brooks and Mahley.

260. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 27, 1988

SUBJECT

Restructuring the SDI Program

At *Tab A* is an OSD paper outlining a plan for restructuring SDI to: (1) commit us now to develop and deploy space-based sensors; (2) hold open the option for deployment of limited strategic defenses in the early- to mid-1990s; and, (3) place less emphasis on the space-based kinetic interceptor.

The OSD paper is written to present publicly changes Frank Carlucci favors because of Congressional budget cuts and higher than anticipated costs for the space-based kinetic interceptor. Because the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI NSPG, 07/05/88. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on July 1. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

paper is written for the public, it does not discuss the full programmatic and policy implications of the proposed restructuring. The issues highlighted below are implicit in the OSD paper, and were raised by earlier drafts of the paper, which were toned down for public presentation.

Sensors. The first element of the proposed restructuring plan, to emphasize sensors, makes sense. We need to improve our ballistic missile early-warning and space surveillance capabilities. Moreover, improved sensors are necessary for any system of effective strategic defenses. Since some of the sensors would be deployed in space, we may also further our objective of moving SDI into space by starting with systems which are clearly benign.

Limited Deployment. The second element of the proposed restructuring, to hold open the option for deployment of limited strategic defenses, is more problematic. Those who favor such a deployment believe it would give us: operational experience; open production lines as a hedge against Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty; and greater public understanding of and support for the feasibility of more extensive defenses.

SDI supporters who oppose a limited deployment argue that land-based, terminal defenses would divert us from our real objective—comprehensive defenses that can intercept ballistic missiles in their boost phase. Moreover, we would be playing to a Soviet strength because they have long worked to protect what they value (their leadership and military forces) through terminal defenses and deep underground bunkers. Such defenses cannot protect what we value, our society.

Under the ABM Treaty, limited defenses could be deployed at either Grand Forks, N.D. or Washington, D.C. The JCS will support a *limited* deployment *only* if it is at Washington. SDIO has suggested, and the OSD paper anticipates but does not explicitly mention, a \$5 billion system with 30 interceptors protecting Washington.

Such a system could be overwhelmed by four large Soviet ICBMs. Moreover, even a \$5 billion system (an estimate that may well be too low) would delay the day we could deploy more comprehensive defenses by about two years. Even holding open the option for such a deployment would mean spending substantial sums starting next year. Finally, there is the political danger that such a costly system with such limited capability would undermine support for *any* further strategic defense efforts. We would gain experience, but not with the systems that are critical for comprehensive defenses—i.e., space-based systems.

Less Emphasis on Space-based Kinetic Interceptors. This would entail diverting money from the relatively mature space-based kinetic interceptor, toward directed energy programs, such as lasers. Two factors motivate this proposal: (1) a space-based kinetic interceptor system

may cost, \$52 billion, for a total cost of \$118 billion for a Phase I strategic defense deployment; and, (2) budget cuts have delayed the deployment decision point, giving lasers and other more advanced technologies a chance to catch up with space-based kinetic interceptors.

In the current Defense Authorization Bill, Congress has sharply cut the space-based kinetic interceptor program. Our only recourse would be to veto the bill. Thus, the question may be moot. However, space-based kinetic interceptors will be a necessary part of any comprehensive strategic defense system we may deploy. It is not now clear how large their role should be. General Abrahamson is working hard to bring down their cost; but, unless he is successful, lasers and other directed energy weapons may be our best alternative as the backbone of a system. Even so, as noted above, there is a real question as to whether money should be diverted from space-based kinetic interceptor research toward deployment of limited, ground-based defenses.

Conclusion. The Pentagon is continuing to review its options. I hope to schedule an NSPG meeting next week to give you an opportunity to discuss Frank Carlucci's proposal with your other senior advisors. We will follow up with a package for your decision.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense²

Washington, undated

A RESTRUCTURED SDI PROGRAM

The SDI program is vital to U.S. and allied security. As the President has directed, we are moving to provide the Nation with options to deploy a highly effective nation-wide defense against ballistic missiles and to provide our allies with options to deploy such defenses against intermediate and shorter range ballistic missiles. In the nearer term we are providing a hedge against possible Soviet breakthroughs in defense research, and possible Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. We are also moving to provide options to enhance deterrence and increase stability through a greater reliance on defenses that could be deployed as we progress toward the President's long term goal.

The technical progress of the SDI program has been excellent. A large majority of the contracts and experiments are on or ahead of

²Secret.

schedule, and the record of testing successes has been outstanding. These accomplishments are a tribute to effective program management and the creative, dedicated efforts of thousands of people involved in the research effort across this Nation and with our Allies. In part because of this progress, poll after poll continues to indicate that the American people are solidly behind the President's vision of acquiring an effective means of countering a ballistic missile attack. Unfortunately, there is also a negative side to the history of SDI. In the past 5 years, SDI has been the subject of unwarranted criticism, a lack of understanding of the program, dramatically reduced budgets, and the continuing debate on the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty. These have served to draw attention away from the objectives and progress of the program. Still, most responsible analysts now endorse the research effort at a minimum. Although Congress has repeatedly not provided the full budget requested by the Administration for SDI, it has increased resources each year. This reflects a significant measure of bipartisan consensus on the research aspects of the program.

The SDI program has been hurt by the funding cuts that have occurred. The development of defenses and the date at which possible deployment of defenses could occur have been delayed. The program would be hurt even more by any further cuts. Because of these reductions and other factors, we are taking steps to restructure SDI. We wish to get more from each dollar we spend; we also intend to fight for increased funding.

Last year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the long-term goal for SDI research. They also developed the performance requirement for the first major strategic defense deployment step that would provide a militarily useful contribution to deterrence. The requirement for this Phase I Strategic Defense System is based on the reality that ballistic missile defenses acting in concert with our offensive forces can significantly enhance deterrence. This does not mean that a Phase I System would only defend military targets; it does mean that the layered defense concept that is fundamental to SDI will provide much greater assurance that we can prevent a nuclear war from ever starting. Our system architecture work, which dates back to the Fletcher Commission study of 1983, has shown consistently that a multi-layered system concept will provide the best chance of achieving the requisite defense effectiveness to meet the President's goal.

A principal Department of Defense challenge is planning security programs in the face of reduced military budgets. SDI has had to absorb its share of these reductions along with other DoD programs. That reduction inevitably forces a difficult series of choices—for example, either slow the entire program or maintain the pace on those technologies that are most mature, while slowing other parts of the program.

The pace of SDI was the subject of a recent review by a panel of the Defense Science Board. The panel recommended a series of incremental steps that would build on the program's progress, with each one providing additional confidence for the next step. These increments would be on the path to the Phase I System which would meet the Joint Chiefs' initial deployment requirement as well as on the path to the President's long-term objective of a thoroughly effective defense.

In the context of the above factors, and especially the reduced SDI budget, candidate programmatic adjustments for SDI are being examined. Information to support possible programmatic decisions should be available in two to three months. It should be noted that the research program will continue in accordance with domestic law and U.S. international obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The following program priorities will be the basis for these adjustments:

(1) Continue to emphasize space-based defenses which can destroy missiles soon after they are launched, anywhere on earth. Space-based defenses that can destroy missiles in the boost phase are essential to achieving a thoroughly effective defense. In addition, such defenses provide a means of responding to the challenge to our security presented by Soviet efforts to control space. The technical progress in developing space-based interceptors has been impressive. As we proceed, care must be taken to maintain a careful balance in the allocation of resources between increasingly mature kinetic energy interceptor technologies and the more advanced directed energy concepts which are also making excellent progress in SDI research. In addition, budget reductions and their effect on the overall SDI program require additional evaluation. Consequently, a study is now underway to evaluate the appropriate pace and mix of these technologies. This study will examine each technology's potential effectiveness, its availability for deployment, and the opportunities it offers to reduce the costs of a deployed system further. This will provide a solid basis for future decisions on the appropriate nature and mix of space-based defense components.

(2) As a first priority in developing specific systems, proceed as quickly as possible to deploy a national sensor system. This system would meet existing requirements for enhanced warning, attack assessment, space surveillance and improved verification of arms control agreements. This system could also provide the basic sensor and communications capability for SDI anti-ballistic missile weapons. The system would be composed of satellites, communications equipment, ground radars and command centers. With sufficient resources, deployment of these sensors could begin in the mid-1990's.

(3) On the way to Phase I, make the option available for a deployment which would provide limited protection against accidental,

irrational or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks. This could also provide a means of dealing with threats from the growing list of countries who are developing or purchasing ballistic missiles that may become nuclear armed. A Limited Protection System (LPS) could serve as an operational laboratory providing important experience and confidence. This system would be part of the terrestrial-based layer of a Phase I architecture. Its deployment could begin in the first half of the 1990's. The SDI program has made excellent progress on interceptors to counter attacking warheads. These technologies present us with choices from which we may select. A commitment to this deployment, where it would occur and how it would fit with the ABM Treaty, as is the case with the other programmatic adjustments, will be the subject of future decisions.

(4) Finally, the SDI program will continue to move toward the goal of providing the Nation with an effective, nationwide defense that will meet the JCS requirements and satisfy the President's long-term goals. This will require that we continue to examine ways to reduce the costs of future defenses and ways to overcome responses that might be taken to counter defense effectiveness. Continued real growth in the funding for SDI is necessary to accomplish these objectives.

261. Editorial Note

On June 28, 1988, Senator Malcolm Wallop [R-Wyoming] sent President Ronald Reagan a letter co-signed by nineteen congressional colleagues urging him to declare that the Krasnoyarsk radar represented a material breach of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The letter is printed as Tab 1, Document 265. That same day, the Senior Arms Control Group held a meeting on the ABM Treaty Review in the Cordell Hull Conference Room 208 of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. No minutes were found. According to handwritten notes of the meeting drafted by National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control Robert Linhard, participants disagreed over whether to declare a material breach. (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SACG (Senior Arms Control Group) Meeting—06/28/1988)

One June 29, Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Donald Gregg and the Vice President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Samuel Watson sent Vice President George H.W. Bush a memorandum: "The President will soon make decisions

to hold the required five-year review of the ABM Treaty. He will also be asked to decide how we will characterize Soviet violations. Most arms control advisors at a Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) meeting agreed to a mid-July meeting. Some thought the ABM Treaty review should be postponed until September. They feel a fight in the Platform Committee and later on the floor of the Republican Convention will develop unless we elevate the seriousness of our charges of violations. We believe a mid-July Treaty review is more appropriate—better to do it sooner rather than in the middle of the campaign. The public will not focus on lawyerly debates of violations versus ‘material breach.’ Instead, they could focus on what some will say is an attempt to void the ABM Treaty and an attempt to proceed on SDI without treaty restraint. The other Presidential decision is whether, because of the Krasnoyarsk radar, to continue to charge the Soviets with a violation or elevate it to a ‘material breach.’ General Powell appears inclined to recommend to the President that we proceed with a mid-July review and continue to press the Soviets to correct the violation, *not* declaring it a material breach.” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Sam Watson File, Country Files, OA/ID 19865–019, Arms Control—ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty)

On July 1, Linhard composed a memorandum for the record: “The NSPG that had been considered for 5 July on SDI was cancelled after two sessions with SECDEF on 30 June. At these meetings (7AM breakfast and 3PM meeting), SECDEF decided to ‘reflect’ on whether to issue SDI program restructuring guidance or wait till studies of options are completed in September. Status of play: awaiting SECDEF’s view. Will have NSPG if SECDEF feels he wishes to go forward with restructuring.” (Ibid.)

On June 29, Linhard and National Security Council Deputy Director for Arms Control William Tobey drafted a memorandum for President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Colin Powell to send to President Reagan in advance of a proposed National Security Planning Group meeting at which Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci might submit recommendations for restructuring the Strategic Defense Initiative. (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI NSPG, 07/05/88)

262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 2, 1988, 0546Z

213218. Subject: ABM Treaty Review.

1. S—Entire Text.

2. Ambassador should propose to the Soviets that the ABM Treaty review be conducted in Geneva on July 14–20, using talking points in para 3 below.

3. —Soviet representatives have from time to time sought U.S. views on the conduct of the five-year review required by the ABM Treaty.

— We propose the review be conducted by delegations of senior officials convened for this purpose. The U.S. delegation would be led by MGen William F. Burns, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. His delegation would include senior representatives of the United States Government.

— The U.S. proposes to begin the review on July 14, 1988, in Geneva, Switzerland, and to conclude the review on July 20. Both the opening and closing dates should be agreed upon in advance. The review would consist of three to five plenary sessions.

— In our view, the review is to focus on compliance concerns, the most important of which are the Krasnoyarsk radar and the ABM radars at Gomel. These issues have been discussed extensively in other fora. The results of the review would depend on whether violations are corrected.

— We expect the Soviet side will come to the review prepared to resolve these violations.

— As the U.S. made clear at the Moscow Summit, the only solution to Krasnoyarsk is to dismantle the radar in a verifiable way.

— Given the subject matter and the timing we suggest for the review, the U.S. proposes that the reconvening of the Defense and Space Negotiations be postponed until shortly after completion of the review.

— The United States further believes that with this meeting of delegations to conduct the ABM Treaty review, there is no need for a meeting

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880564–0444. Secret; Immediate. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Timbie, Roger Harrison (PM), Perito, and in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Ridgway.

of the SCC later this year. The review meeting would obviate the need for the required second session of the SCC this year, and we would be prepared during the meeting to exchange required notifications.

—We look forward to your response.

4. If asked about a joint statement, you should reply that if the violations are not resolved there will be no joint statement, and we would record our concerns in a unilateral statement.

Armacost

263. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, William Heiser, and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, July 2, 1988

SUBJECT

NSPG, Wednesday, July 6
Handling the Krasnoyarsk Radar Issue

Attached at *Tab I*² is a short memorandum for the President which provides him with:

Tab A an NSC-developed issues paper;³

Tab 1 the letter from twenty Senators on this issue;⁴ and,

Tab 2 a paper containing 2 options for handling the situation.⁵

Attached at *Tab II* is a set of talking points drafted for your consideration. They track the paper at *Tab A*. In using these points, we would like to preposition the options paper (*Tab 2*) so that it is available in front of each participant. Unless we hear otherwise, we will discuss these two options with the ACSI on Tuesday (10:00 a.m. – noon) so that the majority of the NSPG principals should be familiar with the options *before* the meeting.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institution Files, Box SR-113, NSPG 0193. Secret. Sent for action.

² Printed as Document 264.

³ Printed as Tab C, Document 264.

⁴ Printed as Tab 1, Document 265.

⁵ Printed as Tab 2, Document 265.

Also, in developing these points, we have suggested an order in which we would recommend that you attempt to take comments at the NSPG. The order is designed to ensure:

1. that all those with strong feelings have a chance to express themselves; and,
2. that the flow most likely supports a proper outcome.

Recommendations

That you approve and forward the memorandum to the President at *Tab I* (with the material at *Tabs 1 and 2*), and that you approve the approach to the NSPG suggested by the talking points drafted for your use at *Tab II*.⁶

Concurrence: None. Neither Rostow nor Fortier were available as this was drafted. We will provide copies to both on Tuesday morning.

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

Talking Points for General Powell

INTRODUCTION

— Thank you, Mr. President.

— Let me say just a few words on the more general subject of the upcoming ABM Treaty review to put the main subject of our discussion in context.⁸

— The ABM Treaty requires us to conduct a five-year review by October 2 of this year; and we had previously told the Soviets that we intended to conduct the review by that date.

— Based on a SACG held last week,⁹ last Friday we proposed to the Soviets that we conduct the five-year review in Geneva from 14 to 20 July.

⁶ Powell approved the recommendation.

⁷ Secret. All brackets are in the original. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for July 6 from 11 a.m. until 11:50 a.m. in the White House Situation Room.

⁸ Powell crossed out this point.

⁹ June 29. See Document 261.

— The U.S. delegation will be headed by Bill Burns, and the preparations for the handling of the likely topics is coming along well.¹⁰

ISSUES

— The issues that we need to focus on today are:¹¹

1. are there sufficient grounds to support declaring the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach,¹² of the ABM Treaty; and,

2. if so, should we declare it a material breach in the context¹³ of the upcoming five-year ABM Treaty review?

ISSUE 1: Are there sufficient grounds for material breach?

— According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [Art 60, para 3], a material breach¹⁴ of a treaty consists in . . . “violation of a provision *essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty*.”

— The International Law Commission (ILC), which provided the official commentary to the Vienna Convention, stated that a material breach should be limited to cases where the violation or breach was of a serious nature;¹⁵ however, that this should not imply that it must involve a violation of a fundamental provision of the treaty.

— Other provisions *considered by a party to be essential to the effective execution of the treaty* may have been very *material* in inducing it to enter into the treaty at all, even though these provisions may be of an ancillary character.

— Finally, the American Law Institute position is that “not every breach of an agreement is material; only . . . a *significant* violation of a provision *essential* to the agreement . . .”

— The legal and policy experts of the various agencies have looked at the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar in light of these definitions.

— All agree that the prohibition on construction of illegal¹⁶ large phased-array radars was considered *essential* to the agreement since the construction of such radars, which takes years, provides warning that one party is moving to deploy a nation-wide defense.

¹⁰ Powell wrote at the end of this point: “Haven’t heard from Sovs.”

¹¹ Powell drew a horizontal line from the end of this clause to the adjacent right-hand margin and wrote: “Serious violation.”

¹² Powell underlined “material breach.”

¹³ Powell underlined “in the context.”

¹⁴ Powell underlined “a material breach.”

¹⁵ Powell underlined “material breach should be limited to cases where the violation or breach was of a serious nature.”

¹⁶ Powell underlined “All agree that the prohibition on construction of illegal.”

— Setting aside, for the moment, the subsequent issue of whether to declare it to be so at this time, a *majority* of your advisors [OSD, DCI, ACDA, OSTP, Rowny, Cooper] feel that the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar *satisfies* the definition of a material breach since the construction already completed erodes that warning time.¹⁷

— However, there are some [JCS, State] who hold the opinion that there are insufficient grounds for upgrading our assessment of the radar to a material breach at this time since:

(1) it has been four years since we discovered the construction of the radar,¹⁸

(2) we have already declared it to be a serious violation of the treaty and demanded the Soviets dismantle it,¹⁹

(3) while not taking the radar down, the Soviet Union has claimed to have stopped all work on the radar and there is some evidence that this is the case, and²⁰

(4) the Soviets have hinted that they would be prepared²¹ to take down the radar in the context of a new strategic forces treaty.

— We have also heard from the Congress on this issue. Some 20 Senators, including Bob Dole and key Republican conservatives, recently sent a letter to you, Mr. President, arguing that Krasnoyarsk is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, likely intended as a battle management radar, and a material breach.²²

— The 20 Senators encourage you to declare Krasnoyarsk to be material breach at the ABM Treaty review conference. This brings us to the second main issue for today.

ISSUE 2: Should we declare material breach?

— Today's second issue is, even if we decide there are sufficient grounds for calling the Krasnoyarsk violation a material breach, should we do so now?

— As I have said, 20 Senators encourage you to do so [Dole, Wallop, Wilson, Quayle, Warner, Hecht, Humphrey, Helms, Karnes, Symms,

¹⁷ Powell underlined "satisfies" and "since the construction already completed erodes that warning time."

¹⁸ Powell underlined "it has been four years since we discovered the construction of the radar."

¹⁹ Powell underlined "a serious violation" and "demanded the Soviets dismantle it."

²⁰ Powell underlined "claimed to have stopped all work on the radar and there is some evidence that this is the case, and."

²¹ Powell underlined "they would be prepared."

²² See Tab 1, Document 265.

Grassley, McClure, Thurmond, Armstrong?, Gramm?, McCain?, Dixon (D–Ill), Heflin (D–Ala), Shelby (D–Ala), Hollings (D–SC)].

— Some of your advisors within the Executive Branch argue that we should declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach because, in their view, it is the only honest, straight forward thing to do.

— They would note that if this Administration can't declare Krasnoyarsk to be a material breach, then what hope do we²³ have for future administrations taking appropriate measures against significant, but likely less clear-cut violations.

— They would further argue that a failure to declare a material breach now would send the wrong signal²⁴ to the Soviets concerning our seriousness about their compliance.

— Others advise against declaring a material breach at this time.

— Some, as we discussed earlier, [JCS, State] simply feel²⁵ that such a step is unwarranted at this time.

— Others take the view that while there are sufficient grounds for calling the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach, we still should not take the step of declaring it as such at this time.

— They point out that the declaration of material breach is normally associated with some parallel declaration of a response to the breach,²⁶ and, under customary international law, the declaration of material breach serves notice that the declaring party feels it has the right, because of the material breach, to suspend some or all of the provisions of the treaty involved.

— We have already declared the Krasnoyarsk radar a significant violation of the²⁷ ABM Treaty.

— Having done so, we already have the right to take any programmatic response to the violation we wish as long as we do not exceed the ABM Treaty's provisions.²⁸ However, to move beyond the treaty by suspending its provisions in whole or in part²⁹ in response to the Krasnoyarsk radar we must take the step of declaring a material breach.

— We currently have no specific programmatic responses to the Krasnoyarsk radar that we wish to take, and no agency has proposed that we suspend any part of the ABM Treaty at this time.

²³ Powell underlined "then what hope do we."

²⁴ Powell underlined "send the wrong signal."

²⁵ Powell underlined "simply feel."

²⁶ Powell underlined "with some parallel declaration of a response to the breach."

²⁷ Powell underlined "significant violation of the."

²⁸ Powell underlined "we wish as long as we do not exceed the ABM Treaty's provisions."

²⁹ Powell underlined "by suspending its provisions in whole or in part."

— This being the case, those against declaring a material breach now point out that, in their view, by doing so:

1. we may give the wrong impression that we are rapidly moving out from under the ABM Treaty (and that this is part of a tactic to do so before the end of the Administration);

2. in turn, we may encourage legislation designed to ensure we stay under the ABM Treaty, potentially hurting both our Defense & Space negotiating position and SDI options;

3. as time passes, although legally we would retain the right, we may politically weaken our ability to take appropriate action against the Krasnoyarsk violation;

4. declaring the material breach and taking no action may signal political weakness in this area to the Soviets; and

5. as a result of all of the above, we may significantly undercut U.S. compliance policy and its ability to affect Soviet non-compliance in the future.

OPTIONS

— At the SACG meeting held last week, we examined six options for handling the Krasnoyarsk radar in the upcoming review.³⁰

— In the folders in front of each of you are two options which represent our efforts to capture elements common to all approaches while maintaining the basic difference concerning whether or not to declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

— Mr. President, with my remarks as background, I would suggest that we now ask each of your advisors to give you their views on the issues and on the suggested options.

— As you do so, please try to address the following questions:

(1) are the grounds sufficient to call Krasnoyarsk a material breach;

(2) if so, should we do so at this time;

(3) can you support either of the options presented; and,

(4) what would be the consequences of implementing *each* of the two options suggested?

DISCUSSION

— [CARLUCCI] Secretary Carlucci, perhaps you would like to start us off?

[After FCC's initial remarks]

³⁰ Powell crossed out this point.

— Mr. Secretary, do you think that with more time we can develop additional options for responding to the Krasnoyarsk radar, and if so, how much time would be needed to do so?

— [BURNS] Bill, you will be leading the U.S. team. How do you see the issue and how would ACDA answer the questions posed?

— [WEBSTER] Judge, your turn to take the quiz. Besides addressing the questions, would you also comment on the status of the Krasnoyarsk radar?

— [ROWNY] Ed, you have strong views on this. How would you answer the questions?

— [NITZE] Paul, what about you?

— [GRAHAM] Mr. President, your Science Advisor was also the chairman of the General Advisory Council on arms control for a good part of the Administration. Bill, how do you answer the questions posed.

— [KAMPELMAN] Max (sitting in for SecState who is traveling), what is the State Department view? How would Secretary Shultz answer the four questions posed?

— [HERRES] General (Crowe will be hosting Akhromeyev), how would the Chiefs answer the questions?

— [KRANOWITZ] Allan, could you give us your view as to how each of the two options would play on the hill?

— [HERRES *Again*] Well, no matter what we do on this, we can expect hearings. The Chiefs will be asked to give their assessment of the military consequences of the choice made. General, what would the Chiefs likely be able to say with respect to the two options before us?

[If Fitzwater is present]

— [FITZWATER] Marlin, how will each of the two options play publicly? If we were to decide to declare a material breach now, how difficult will it be to correct the impression that we are rushing to get out of the treaty?

— [KAMPELMAN *Again*] Max, how will the Allies react to each of the options?

— [OTHERS] Do others have additional comments?

SUMMARY

— Based on today's discussion, it seems we have some consensus on the following points:

[SUMMARIZE CONSENSUS, IF ANY]

— However, differences still remain.

— We will capture the points made today and provide to you, Mr. President, a decision paper on these issues.

— Before we adjourn, I would like to say something about the press.

— We have now had a series of articles on our internal deliberations on this issue; including some leaks out of the SACG which is very rare.

— Please hold today's discussion very closely.

— Mr. President, unless you have something to add, this concludes today's meeting.

264. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 5, 1988

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

I. PURPOSE

To discuss whether the U.S. should declare the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

II. BACKGROUND

The U.S. is required to join the Soviet Union in conducting a five-year review of the ABM Treaty by October 2, 1988. Since the last five-year review, the U.S. has identified the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk as a violation of the ABM Treaty. Some feel that the U.S. should take the opportunity of the upcoming review to declare the illegal Soviet radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty. Others feel that this step is unwarranted at this time. The purpose of this NSPG is to permit you to hear the views of your key advisors prior to deciding this issue. The proposed agenda for this meeting is at *Tab A*.²

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institution Files, Box SR-113, NSPG 0193. Secret. Prepared by Heiser and Tobey. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on July 6. Linhard, Heiser, and Tobey sent the memorandum to Powell for his signature under cover of a July 1 memorandum. (Ibid.) The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for July 6 from 11 a.m. until 11:50 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

² Attached but not printed.

III. *PARTICIPANTS*

List at *Tab B*.³

IV. *PRESS PLAN*

No press plan.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS*

We have provided (at *Tab C*) a few brief points for your consideration for use in starting the meeting. Following your remarks, we will set the stage for a discussion summarizing the current plans for the ABM Treaty Review and outlining the issue of the declaration of material breach. No decisions are required to be announced at this meeting.

Tab C

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

*POINTS TO BE MADE WHEN MEETING WITH
THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING GROUP*

— The ABM Treaty requires us to conduct a five-year review by October 2.

— Thanks to the hard work of your staffs, the preparations for that review are coming along quite well.

— However, one critical issue that we still face is whether, in the context of this five-year review, we should declare the illegal Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk to be a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

— We all agree that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a serious violation of a central element of that treaty, and we have said so to the Soviets, to the Congress, and to the American public. That is not the issue.

— Today's discussion should focus on clearly identifying:

— the U.S. objectives sought by declaring this illegal radar to be a material breach of the ABM Treaty; and

— the advantages, benefits, risks and consequences to the United States of taking such an action at this time.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Secret.

265. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 5, 1988

SUBJECT

NSPG, Wednesday, July 6

Handling the Krasnoyarsk Radar Issue

On Wednesday, we have scheduled an NSPG to discuss whether we should declare the illegal Soviet large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk to be a "material breach" of the ABM Treaty. Your advisors are split over the issues associated with this decision; and we have already begun receiving Congressional correspondence aimed at helping you sort this all out.

Attached at *Tab A* is a short paper developed by NSC staff and designed to help you prepare for this NSPG. The paper summarizes the situation and provides the recent Congressional correspondence. It also offers two options for handling the package of related issues.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

*HANDLING THE KRASNOYARSK/MATERIAL
BREACH ISSUE (U)*

INTRODUCTION (U)

The ABM Treaty requires us to conduct a five-year review by October 2 of this year; and we had previously told the Soviets that we intended to conduct the review by that date. (U)

ISSUES (U)

1. Are there sufficient grounds to support declaring the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty? (U)

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institution Files, Box SR-113, 0193. Secret. Copies were sent to Bush and Duberstein. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on July 15. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Secret.

2. If so, should we declare it a material breach in the context of the upcoming five-year ABM Treaty review? (U)

ISSUE 1: Are there sufficient grounds for material breach? (U)

According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a material breach of a treaty consists in . . . “violation of a provision *essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty*.” (U)

The International Law Commission (ILC), which provided the official commentary to the Vienna Convention, stated that a material breach should be limited to cases where the violation or breach was of a serious nature; however, that this should not imply that it must involve a violation of a fundamental provision of the treaty. Other provisions *considered by a party to be essential to the effective execution of the treaty* may have been very *material* in inducing it to enter into the treaty, even although these provisions may be of an ancillary character. (U)

Finally, the American Law Institute position is that “not every breach of an agreement is material; only . . . a *significant* violation of a provision *essential* to the agreement . . .” (U)

The legal and policy experts of the various agencies have looked at the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar in light of these definitions. All agree that the prohibition on construction of illegal large phased-array radars was considered *essential* to the agreement since the construction of such radars, which takes years, provides warning that one party is moving to deploy a nation-wide defense. (U)

Setting aside, for the moment, the subsequent issue of whether to declare it to be so at this time, most feel that the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar satisfies the definition of a material breach since the construction already completed erodes that warning time. (S)

However, there remain some who hold the opinion that there are insufficient grounds for upgrading our assessment of the radar to a material breach at this time since:

(1) it has been four years since we discovered the construction of the radar,

(2) we have already declared it to be a serious violation of the treaty and demanded the Soviets dismantle it,

(3) while not taking the radar down, the Soviet Union has claimed to have stopped all work on the radar and there is some evidence that this is the case, and

(4) the Soviets have hinted that they would be prepared to take down the radar in the context of a new strategic forces treaty. (S)

Some twenty Senators, including Bob Dole and key Republican conservatives, recently sent a letter (attached at *Tab 1*) arguing that Krasnoyarsk is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, likely intended as a battle management radar, and a material breach. In fact, the twenty

Senators encourage that we declare Krasnoyarsk to be material breach at the ABM Treaty review. (U)

ISSUE 2: Should we declare material breach? (U)

Even if we decide there are sufficient grounds for calling the Krasnoyarsk violation a material breach, a second basic issue is should we do so now? (U)

Some within the Executive Branch argue that we should declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach because, in their view, it is the only honest, straightforward thing to do. They would note that if this Administration can't declare Krasnoyarsk to be a material breach, then what hope do we have for future administrations taking appropriate measures against significant, but likely less clear-cut violations. They would further argue that a failure to declare a material breach now would send the wrong signal to the Soviets concerning our seriousness about their compliance. (S)

Others advise against declaring a material breach at this time. Some, as discussed earlier, simply feel that such a step is unwarranted at this time. Others, however, take the view that while there are sufficient grounds for calling the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach, we still should not take the step of declaring it as such at this time. They point out that the declaration of material breach is normally associated with some parallel declaration of a response to the breach; and, under customary international law, the declaration of material breach serves notice that the declaring party feels it has the right, because of the material breach, to suspend some or all of the provisions of the treaty involved. (S)

We have already declared the Krasnoyarsk radar a significant violation of the ABM Treaty. Having done so, we already have the right to take any programmatic response to the violation we wish as long as we do not exceed the ABM Treaty's provisions. However, to move beyond the treaty by suspending its provisions in whole or in part in response to the Krasnoyarsk radar we must take the step of declaring a material breach. (S)

We currently have no specific programmatic responses to the Krasnoyarsk radar that we wish to take, and no agency has proposed that we suspend any part of the ABM Treaty at this time. This being the case, those against declaring a material breach now point out that, in their view, by doing so:

1. we may give the wrong impression that we are rapidly moving out from under the ABM Treaty (and that this is part of a tactic to do so before the end of the Administration);
2. in turn, we may encourage legislation designed to ensure we stay under the ABM Treaty, potentially hurting both our Defense & Space negotiating position and SDI options;

3. as time passes should we take no response, although legally we would retain the right, we may politically weaken our ability to take future action against the Krasnoyarsk violation;

4. declaring the material breach and taking no action may signal political weakness in this area to the Soviets; and

5. as a result of all of the above, we may significantly undercut U.S. compliance policy and its ability to affect Soviet non-compliance in the future. (S)

OPTIONS

At the Senior Arms Control Group meeting held last week, we examined six options for handling the Krasnoyarsk radar in the upcoming review.³ Attached at *Tab 2* are two options which represent an effort to capture elements common to all approaches while maintaining the basic difference concerning whether or not to declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach. (S)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

(1) Are the grounds sufficient to call Krasnoyarsk a material breach? (U)

(2) If so, should we do it at this time? (U)

(3) Should we choose either of the options presented? (S)

(4) What would be the consequences of implementing *each* of the two options suggested? (S)

Tab 1

Letter From Multiple U.S. Senators to President Reagan⁴

Washington, June 28, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

As you know, the Senate voted overwhelmingly and the House voted unanimously last year to support your 1984 finding that the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar was a clear violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Your 1985 report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations stated that the Krasnoyarsk radar violates the key provision of the ABM Treaty.

The Krasnoyarsk radar itself will have about ten times the power of each of the 12 U.S. Safeguard ABM radars only planned in 1969 for a U.S. nationwide ABM defense. Moreover, the siting of the Krasnoyarsk radar deep in the interior of the Soviet Union near many key ICBM

³ See Document 261.

⁴ No classification marking.

complexes sacrificed at least 6 minutes of warning time. The high power, interior siting near strategic targets, and sacrifice of warning time all strongly suggest that Krasnoyarsk is intended for ABM battle management. This is contrary to the heart of the ABM Treaty.

As you said in your 1985 compliance report, "Militarily, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty." The almost unanimous Congressional votes agreeing that Krasnoyarsk is a clear violation indicate that there will be strong support for your declaration that it is a "material breach" of the Treaty. We urge you to maintain this policy and to declare Krasnoyarsk a "material breach" at the forthcoming third five year review of the ABM Treaty. The credibility of American foreign policy will be severely damaged if your longstanding policy is changed.

Respectfully,

Malcolm Wallop
Bob Dole
Richard Shelby
Pete Wilson
Ernest F. Hollings
John McCain
Dan Quayle
Phil Gramm
Alan J. Dixon
Bill Cohen
Steve Symms
Gordon Humphrey
Chuck Grassley
Chic Hecht
James A. McClure
John Warner
David K. Karnes
Strom Thurmond
Howell Heflin
Jesse Helms

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

OPTIONS FOR HANDLING KRASNOYARSK AND
THE ISSUE OF MATERIAL BREACH

I. AT THE REVIEW, the U.S. delegation should take the following steps.

a. Reiterate that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty, essential to the treaty's object and purpose.

b. Clearly make the point that the Krasnoyarsk violation will continue to raise questions of material breach and proportional response until resolved [*and that if the Soviets cannot provide any satisfaction with respect to the Krasnoyarsk issue at this review, following the review, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation as a material breach of the treaty* (Option 1)⁶].

c. State that, in this connection, the United States reserves all rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses at a later time should the Soviets continue to refuse to correct the violation.

d. Further state, for the record, that there will be no START or Defense & Space Treaties until this violation is resolved.

e. Be prepared to tell the Soviets what specific steps the United States expects the Soviet Union to take to dismantle in a verifiable fashion the Krasnoyarsk radar.

f. Ask the Soviets what they are prepared to do to resolve this situation promptly.

II. AFTER THE REVIEW (assuming no satisfactory response from the Soviet Union), the President would issue publicly a arms control policy statement making the following main points.

a. Based on the just concluded ABM Treaty review, the United States considers the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty, essential to the treaty's object and purpose.

⁵ Secret. All brackets are in the original.

⁶ *Option 1* has the President declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach. [Footnote is in the original.]

b. *[Since the Soviet Union has given no indication of any willingness to correct this violation, the United States has no alternative but to identify it for what it is, a material breach of the ABM Treaty. (Option 1)⁷]*

or

[The Krasnoyarsk violation will continue to raise questions of material breach and proportional response until resolved. (Option 2)⁸]

c. While it would be fully justified in doing so, the United States does not intend to take an appropriate response at this time to this *[material breach (Option 1)⁹ [significant violation (Option 2)¹⁰]*, rather it will once again go the extra mile to give the Soviet Union additional time (amount unspecified) to reverse its position and act responsibly.

d. The United States reserves all rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses at a later time should the Soviets continue to refuse to correct the violation.

e. In any case, it is the position of the United States that there will be no START or Defense & Space Treaties until this violation is resolved.

III. AFTER THE REVIEW (assuming no satisfactory response from the Soviet Union), in parallel with the PUBLIC arms control policy statement the President would issue an INTERNAL study directive including the following elements.

a. The Department of Defense, working with other agencies as appropriate, should develop an options paper which presents a range of proportionate responses (programmatic and otherwise) from which the President could choose should the Soviets resume construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar or otherwise refuse to correct this violation.

b. During the first three weeks of this activity, a plan should be developed and promptly submitted for Presidential approval on how best to involve the Congress in the options development and review process.

c. As the study continues and options are developed, for programmatic responses, the options should be described in sufficient detail so that, should the President decide to execute one of the options, implementation steps could begin without further study.

d. Individual options should be developed as quickly as possible. They should be presented to the President for his consideration, as a

⁷ *Option 1* has the President declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ *Option 2* does not have the President declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ *Option 1* has the President declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ *Option 2* does not have the President declare Krasnoyarsk a material breach. [Footnote is in the original.]

hedge against all contingencies, as soon as each has been thoroughly staffed, evaluated and coordinated.

e. The overall study, and a comprehensive evaluation of all options developed, should be completed by the end of this calendar year.

266. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, July 6, 1988, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Review (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President's Office:

Craig Fuller

Sam Watson

State:

John Whitehead

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Defense:

Secretary Frank Carlucci

Ronald Lehman

Treasury:

Secretary James Baker, III

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese

CIA:

William Webster

Jay Castillo

White House:

Kenneth Duberstein

Alan Kranowitz

Marlin Fitzwater

Colin Powell

John Negroponte

NSC:

Robert Linhard

Bill Heiser

OMB:

Director James Miller

OSTP:

William Graham

ACDA:

Director William Burns

Louis Nosenzo

JCS:

Robert Herres

Jonathan Howe

Minutes

The meeting opened at 11:00 A.M. The President opened the meeting as follows:

— The ABM Treaty requires us to conduct a five-year review by October 2.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institution Files, Box SR-113, 0193. Secret. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Heiser and Linhard sent the minutes to Stevens under a July 14 covering memorandum, requesting that Stevens approve the minutes for the record. (Ibid.)

— Thanks to the hard work of your staffs, the preparations for that review are coming along quite well.

— However, one critical issue we still face is whether, in the context of this five-year review, we should declare the illegal Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk to be a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

— We all agree that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a serious violation of a central element of that treaty, and we have said so to the Soviets, to the Congress, and to the American public. That is not the issue.

— Today's discussion should focus on clearly identifying:

— the U.S. objectives sought by declaring this illegal radar to be a material breach of the ABM Treaty; and

— the advantages, benefits, risks and consequences to the United States of taking such an action at this time. (S)

General Powell: The ABM Treaty requires us to conduct a five-year review by October 2 of this year; and we had previously told the Soviets that we intended to conduct the review by that date. Based on a SACG held last week,² last Friday we proposed to the Soviets that we conduct the five-year review in Geneva from 14 to 20 of July. The U.S. delegation will be headed by Bill Burns, and the preparations are coming along fairly well. We haven't yet heard from the Soviets on whether they will accept the date. (S)

— The main issue we have to deal with today is Krasnoyarsk and whether we should declare it a material breach. (S)

— There are two questions that we should address. One is are there sufficient grounds to support declaring the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty and two, if that is the case should we declare it a breach in the context of the five-year ABM Treaty review? (S)

— With respect to the first issue (that is, are there sufficient grounds for calling it a material breach), we can, of course, declare a material breach at any time. According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [Article 60, paragraph 3], a material breach of a treaty consists in . . . "violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." (U)

— The International Law Commission (ILC), which provided the official commentary to the Vienna Convention, stated that a material breach should be limited to cases where the violation or breach was of a serious nature; however, that this should not imply that it must involve only a fundamental provision of the treaty. (U)

— The legal and policy experts of the various agencies have looked at the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar in light of these definitions. (U)

— Setting aside, for the moment, the subsequent issue of whether to declare it to be a material breach, you should note that we can declare a material breach at anytime and we should recognize that a lot of people tend to point to this review as the appropriate time for us to look at this issue. As I said, all of your advisors have looked at the law and all agree that it is a serious matter even if the radar is not completed. The reason is that it takes away lead time that we felt was essential

² See Document 261.

to the Treaty itself and the Treaty was designed to stop such actions. A majority of your advisors including OSD, the DCI, ACDA, OSTP, Ambassador Rowny, and Ambassador Cooper feel that the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar satisfies the definition of a material breach since the construction already completed erodes that warning time to respond to this kind of radar system. They feel that it is necessary to respond to this kind of radar in any case. (S)

— State and JCS feel there are insufficient grounds to upgrade our assessment of the radar to a material breach. They recognize that it is a serious violation, however, they hold this view for the following reasons. First of all it has been four years since we discovered the construction of the radar. Second, we have already declared it to be a serious violation of the Treaty and demanded the Soviets dismantle it. Third, while not taking the radar down, the Soviet Union has claimed to have stopped all work on the radar and there is some evidence that this is the case. In fact, according to what the CIA tells me, there is no serious work on the radar and they have not fixed the damage from last year's weather. Finally, the Soviets have hinted to us that they would be prepared to take down the radar in the context of a new strategic forces treaty. (S)

— We have also heard from the Congress on this issue. Some 20 Senators, including Bob Dole and key Republican conservatives, recently sent a letter to you, Mr. President,³ arguing that Krasnoyarsk is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, likely intended as a battle management radar. They think it is material breach. They also think you ought to declare it and do so at the ABM Treaty review. (U)

— This brings us to our second question and that is should we, in fact, declare a breach? (U)

— As I said, 20 Senators or so including Bob Dole, Bill Gramm, John Warner, and a number of conservatives encourage you to do so. (U)

— Some in the Executive Branch also say we should do so now because it is, in their views, the only honest, straightforward thing to do. (U)

— Those who encourage you note that if this Administration can't declare Krasnoyarsk to be a material breach, then what hope do we have for future administrations taking appropriate measures against significant, but likely less clear-cut violations. (U)

— They would further argue that a failure to declare a material breach now would send the wrong signal to the Soviets concerning our seriousness about their compliance. (U)

— Others argue and advise against declaring a material breach at this time. Some feel that we just don't have the evidence to warrant that. These include the State Department and the JCS. (S)

— Others view that declaration of a material breach is normally associated with some parallel declaration of response to the breach; and, under customary international law, the declaration of material breach serves notice that the declaring party feels it has the right, because of the material breach, to suspend all or part of the provisions of the treaty involved. In other words, it declares our right to abrogate the treaty in whole or in part. (U)

³ See Tab 1, Document 265.

— We have already declared the Krasnoyarsk radar a significant violation of the ABM Treaty. (U)

— Having done so, we already have the right to take any programmatic response to the violation we wish. No one is advising now that we abrogate the Treaty in whole or in part and we are kind of short on programmatic responses. (S)

— The packages in front of you contain set of options that we have developed.⁴ The issue that we face is do we tell them at the review or right after the review that we consider this to be a material breach. (U)

— I think now, Mr. President, it would a good idea to get the views of those involved. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: It is the opinion of the Department of Defense that we should declare a material breach at the review. The Krasnoyarsk radar is militarily at the heart of the Treaty and quoting from your own compliance report you have identified it as a significant breach. [Secretary Carlucci then read from the most recent USG Compliance Report.] It is certainly essential to the object and the purpose of the treaty. If you look at it in context, it is part of a recurring pattern of radar construction. This pattern has to be halted if arms control is going to continue. The only military reason that this type of a radar can be located where it is, would be for purposes that are in violation of the treaty. This action declaring a material breach is required if we are to maintain our compliance policy. I think everyone agrees that a material breach does not require a quick and immediate response. (S)

[At this point, General Powell interrupted and said he agreed.] (U)

Secretary Carlucci: Therefore, I think we ought to call it a material breach and then study what our options might be for taking action. If the President doesn't take this action on, I'm sure no future President will. We need to be consistent and consistency is needed in our compliance policy. I would note, Mr. President, that verification is worthless without compliance. Therefore, you should declare it a material breach. (S)

General Powell: I think everyone agrees that some proportional response is needed. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I agree that we should have had a proportional response ready to announce. I think what we need to do now is to consult the Congress. Our responses should not be limited just to programmatic, we could take political and diplomatic responses. I think we could declare it and then work with Congress and decide what our response should be. (S)

Deputy Secretary Whitehead: The problem is that State disagrees with that assessment. We feel that there are not proper grounds now for

⁴ See Tab 2, Document 265.

declaring a material breach and even if we had the grounds, it would not be right to do so right now. Our object is to obtain Soviet compliance and have their radar come down. We have pressed them very, very hard. There is evidence that the approach we have taken is working. We have declared a violation and this approach appears to be working. They have stopped the construction of the radar. They may, in fact, dismantle the radar in the context of the START agreement. Since they are not operating it, and since it is not being improved or under construction right now, we feel there are no grounds for declaring a material breach. Declaring a material breach under these conditions would only signal our intent to withdraw from the treaty. The Soviets, in fact, are in a better position to breakout from the treaty than we are. Now is not the time to signal such a move. And I would like to suggest that we hear from Ambassador Kampelman. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: We have already declared that it's a serious violation and that allows us to do whatever we want except withdraw or suspend the treaty itself. So we can respond if we wish. The term material breach involves magic words that signal an intent to withdraw. If a material breach is declared, it will be clearly understood as laying a foundation for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It is my understanding that no one wants to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. So there is no reason at this point to declare a material breach. What you would be doing would produce an impression which will cause us criticism. I understand, Mr. President, that 20 Senators are urging you to do so but I believe that a large majority of Senators and Congressmen and our Allies would oppose such an action. There are some who would argue that we should do it now at the five-year review, but we can as we said, do it anytime we wish and, Mr. President, we have to ask ourselves what has happened in the last few years that would cause us to declare a material breach. What, in fact, has happened is that diplomacy may have worked. They have stopped construction. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] they are now three to four years from being operational. They have done nothing but move in our direction on this issue after our initial declaring a violation of the Treaty. Are we just to go to a material breach now? I don't think that makes very much sense. I also note that Judge Sofaer says that it is not a material breach because the radar is not operational. It is certainly a serious violation. I do agree that we have a problem. Secretary Carlucci is correct. We do need to show we are serious about compliance. Our record with SALT II is a good example. Maybe we should respond to this Krasnoyarsk radar but not do so on the basis of calling it a material breach, which in my view would bring down the whole house of cards. We have already said there would be no START or Defense and Space Treaties until Krasnoyarsk is resolved and that is certainly a response but perhaps that is not enough of a

response. Why don't we let DOD do work on the options and work with the Congress but let's not call it a material breach. (S)

General Powell: Well, Mr. President, as they say in the artillery, we have had one round over and one short. Let's see if we can hit one on the mark. (U)

Director Burns: I would like to give you my views both as the person who is going to conduct the review and as the Director of ACDA. ACDA's view is that we should declare a material breach because it is a material breach. I see the primary purpose of the five-year review is to remove the radar. A threat of a material breach provides us some leverage. In fact, since we are already discussing this in the press, if we don't do so it might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Therefore, I would like to see you instruct me to try hard to bring it down and if not then to bring back the situation and let you declare it to be a material breach. I think it's absolutely right that you direct DOD to work on options suggested in the options paper. (S)

Judge Webster: Well, I wouldn't want to get involved in the policy debate, and I have no policy comment. However, I would like to talk to you a little about what the likely Soviet response would be. If we do nothing, General Burns may be right.

The Soviets may think, if fact, that it's a sign of weakness. [5 lines not declassified].

Based on [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence, we believe that it will take three to four years to repair the radar. [2½ lines not declassified]. (At this point, Judge Webster also handed out a line-drawing that showed that the radar filled a gap in the warning coverages in the Soviet Union.)⁵ (S)

The reason why they might have put the radar where they did is because they need to fill this gap, and they couldn't put it on the periphery, where they *really* needed to put it, because it's all wasteland up there. And if they didn't put a radar in this general area, there would be a gap. So probably the explanation of why they put it there is to fill that purpose. They exacerbated the situation by claiming it was a space-track radar. Certainly, it's not that, but it does provide a peripheral early-warning function, and they probably couldn't have gotten it any closer to the periphery because of the wasteland. There are differences in the Intelligence Community as to whether it could serve as a battle management function. That function, of course, would be illegal. (S)

With respect to what the Soviets will do if we *do* declare, my sense is if we declare a material breach, the Soviets will take at least three

⁵ Not found.

months or so before they have to do anything. They'll wait to see what the next Administration is going to do. We will call our action a lawful response. They will call their radar lawful. They will challenge our radars at Fylingdales and Thule and claim that they are violations. They will call attention to their moratorium on construction at Krasnoyarsk, which began in October of 1987, and they will use any and all the steps in the Vienna Convention procedures to cause delay in any U.S. activity. Finally, they'll claim that, in fact, this declaration of material breach is really a tactic to get out from under the ABM Treaty and a way to get more support for our SDI program. I would note, after saying all that, that I do think that the radar is a material breach. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: The words "material breach" are used by the Vienna Convention. However, we should recognize that it allows us to consider reactions that suspend the Treaty provisions in whole or in part, and this is a violation to which we could react appropriately by suspending some *parts* of the Treaty. Therefore, our response should be in part. We are not talking about walking away from the *whole* Treaty, Mr. President. We should never say that we intend to walk from the whole Treaty. What we're really doing is responding. Everyone agrees that it is a material breach; therefore, it is wrong not to declare it a material breach. At the same time, it's wrong to say that we're getting away from the entire ABM Treaty, but instead we're moving away appropriately, in part, from the Treaty. (S)

Ambassador Nitze: We need to talk about the political consequences of declaring a material breach. The practical consequences are zero. If we declare a material breach the practical outcome will be that the Soviets will use the Vienna Convention procedures to delay us. We ought to avoid the Vienna Convention procedures in any way we can. We can't have us going to the UN Secretary General, and committees of arbitration. We will be tied up for years. In fact, we can do anything we want right now. We could take proportionate response without calling it a material breach. I agree with Max that many senators will react negatively. They will take steps to *ensure* we don't undercut the ABM Treaty and fight to keep us from walking away from the Treaty. The general Allied response would be very, very negative. There's no gain in this. The Soviets will not be forced to dismantle the radar by the words "material breach." All the consequences are negative. (S)

General Herres: Unfortunately, I have to disagree with the Secretary of Defense. We believe that there can be no material breach until the radar goes on the air. We simply don't know the characteristics of the radar until that time. After it's on the air, we still will have plenty of time as they have to calibrate and integrate the radar. Certainly, there's some loss of lead time for a potential for a breakout, but this one radar alone does not provide that great of potential. They can break out

without this radar. All radars, even our own which are allowed by the Treaty, can contribute to an ABM capability. If we declare the material breach, the Soviets, in fact, could dismantle it, and after dismantling it, put extreme pressure on us to do the same to Thule and Fylingdales. From a military point of view, this structure (which someday could house a radar) is simply not a material breach of the Treaty.

Dr. Graham: I agree with General Herres that this one radar alone is not a problem, but it's a part of a long series of problems. In 1981 and 1982, we repeatedly raised other radars that are, in fact, permitted under the ABM Treaty as being problems because they built on our concern that we were seeing national capability going in. Since then we found the Krasnoyarsk radar, and we've raised it eight times in the SCC. The Soviets have not responded to our concerns, and it's certainly not a space-track radar. (S)

I also have to mention, Mr. President, that a number of people said that everyone here would not object to the ABM Treaty, but I want to add my voice to those who would. The ABM Treaty constrains us a lot more than it does the Soviets. If we had full funding and full freedom, we could do a lot better in research with no ABM Treaty than if the ABM Treaty existed. The type of capability that we were building in the Defense budget in 1983, and when we declared the SDI program, caused the Soviets more concern than anything else. If we were to bring up our concerns and offer the prospect that we would unleash our technology, it would scare the Soviets into taking down the radar. Now, I can't talk to the Congressional problem; I recognize that my approach requires full funding, and the Congress has not been supportive, but I would declare material breach and go for full funding and I think that would help. (C)

[General Powell asks Kranowitz for his opinion.]

Mr. Kranowitz: I'd just like to comment on the politics of the situation. The Senate and House both have clearly voted, repeatedly, that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a "violation," unanimously. But I think, Mr. President, if you would go to the House today, most people would not know what the term "material breach" meant, and the Senate would not be a lot better. This, without a doubt, is going to be a political hot potato. If you don't declare a material breach, it's clear that you will have about 20 senators sign the letter that will oppose your action. If you do declare a material breach, there's no doubt that Senator Nunn will call hearings, and at least the month of September, if not more, will involve a very prolonged arms control debate on the Hill. I'm not sure whether the debate is in our interest or not. So in summary, this is a political hot potato, and there's a great lack of education on the Hill on the issue. (C)

Attorney General Meese: I'm impressed by George Shultz's praise of realism and reciprocity, and that has gotten us very far. We need to be a realist and we need to express the same candor in our relationship with the Soviets. That has been useful for us up to now. This isn't a political issue; either it's a material breach or not. The fact that they have *stopped* their construction, but not dismantled it, doesn't change things. They're just playing along. It's like a burglar who climbs in the window and climbs out, but once he's in, he has committed a crime. We have an issue of domestic credibility if we don't declare a material breach. And by the way, the 20 who signed that letter to you are our friends—they're the people who support the Defense budget. Mr. President, if you call a spade a spade with all candor, you can't lose. We should make it clear that we're not going to abrogate the Treaty and tell them there will be responses if they don't dismantle. Now this can't really upset the U.S.-Soviet relationship if you take it in that manner. The matter is in the Press already; we really do need to go in this direction. Therefore, I recommend that it's a material breach, make it absolutely clear that there's no intention to abrogate the Treaty, and tell them in the future that there will be responses based on their actions. (C)

Secretary Baker: I agree with Ed Meese. We may want to let the negotiator have some leverage. There's no reason to declare material breach *before* we get there for the review. (C)

[General Powell interrupts.]

General Powell: Nobody really wants to do that. We're talking about at the review giving our signal, and after the review having the President make the declaration. (S)

Secretary Baker: Well, Mr. President, okay, then I'm with you. Remember, rather than talk about George Shultz's reciprocity and realism, I'd rather talk about your phrase "peace through strength." If it is a material breach, you lose by not calling it so. Without a doubt, not doing so we would be seen as a sign of weakness. (C)

Judge Webster: I would note that the Soviets probably have political problems too. They may want to do something with this radar short of leveling it. We ought to keep our options open. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: They know it's an embarrassment to them. When we met with Yazov, Ron Lehman asked them who was so dumb as to build the radar there, and Yazov responded that it was not done on his watch.⁶ (C)

⁶ Documentation on Carlucci and Yazov's meetings in Bern and Moscow in 1988 are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLIV, pt. 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

Deputy Secretary Whitehead: Then, Mr. President, my concern is if you declare material breach, you take an action for no recent justification. As Max Kampelman has said, they've backed off on the radar. It's three to four years from being able to be completed. They've given indication that they may dismantle it. For us to take an escalatory move now will absolutely gain us nothing. It will only mean confrontation with no benefits. (S)

Attorney General Meese: But isn't it logical to do this at the ABM Treaty Review? (C)

Secretary Carlucci: If we don't do it, it will take the pressure off the Soviets. (C)

Deputy Secretary Whitehead: But we can do it later if we need to. (C)

Attorney General Meese: If we don't do it at the review, it's going to be a lot harder to do later. (C)

General Herres: If you do it now, with nothing new happening, you're going to lose credibility, because it's very hard to explain if you do decide to declare material breach now why you did so. (S)

General Powell: Well, we have used the upcoming nature of the review for some time to kick this can down the road. (C)

Secretary Baker: Well, so therefore something has happened in the last few years. We've pressed them, and we've kind of kicked the can. (C)

Attorney General Meese: I can't see why we can't do this. Our response can be to deploy SDI. (C)

Mr. Miller: Let me ask you two questions then, Sir. One is what's the judgment on how likely it will be that they take it down if we take this action; and secondly, is the Sofaer judgment on the material breach a matter of law, will it become public, and is that going to be a problem for us? (C)

Attorney General Meese: That's ridiculous. It's not a legal issue; it's a political issue. (U)

Ambassador Kampelman: If I might, I'd like to just read a section from Sofaer. (Kampelman then read a quote from Sofaer that basically said "if we declare it now and don't act, politically we may lose our rights to act later.") (S)

Secretary Carlucci: We disagree. (C)

Attorney General Meese: This is not a legal issue. A material breach is simply a matter of fact. (C)

General Powell: Well, if the Soviets agree to meet us for a review next week, then we're going to need to have guidance. General Burns wants to know whether his guidance is that he may threaten them at

the review with the *assurance* that if they take no action, when he comes back, we will act. (S)

We will provide a decision document to the President later in the week, as needed, when we perhaps hear from the Soviets. (C)

The meeting ended at 11:43 a.m.

[The subject changed and they continued for about 10 more minutes on a different subject.]

267. Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (Abrahamson) to Secretary of Defense Carlucci¹

Washington, July 15, 1988

SUBJECT

Your Briefing on “Good Citizen” This Afternoon—INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM

As I referenced in my earlier paper to you,² the “Good Citizen” concept for the space based interceptor is innovative, but remains controversial. A good way to look at it is that this concept and the Livermore “skunkworks” operation is our technical analog of the high risk, high pay-off part of a well-balanced investment portfolio.

You will hear some claims that this concept could eliminate all other surveillance and weapons and still meet the Phase I requirement. That represents an optimistic concept that we are examining, but I feel may not eventually be acceptable to the operational community which would want more assured communications, command, and control and separate warning of ballistic missile attack. In a similar vein, the concept and its implementation are excellent and progressing at a very fast pace. I am especially proud of this small team of scientists; however, there is an optimistic assumption that enables the very low cost approach—that is that the ultraviolet signatures of Soviet liquid fuel boosters and post boost vehicles will be adequate to be detected and provide reliable signals during the flight of the “Good Citizen”

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci’s Library Subject—1988: SDI [07/01/1988–08/09/1988]. Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum on July 15. No minutes of the briefing were found.

² Not further identified.

attacker. We are gathering information to validate that as quickly as possible. The assumption appears reasonable for solid rocket boosters. We have some indications that certain U.S. liquids are adequately visible at particular altitudes as they pass through the atmosphere, but this requires additional validation on both U.S. and *Soviet* systems. This signature data remains a priority SDI phenomenology effort, but will only be validated slowly over time. Therefore, I am not yet ready to put all of our eggs in this basket.

However, the small investment, a few tens of millions of dollars, and the real progress that is being made warrant strong support of this team. We have tied them to an aerospace contractor so that it is not a one-time, academic/scientific demonstration. My gravest concern is that they be funded, encouraged, and allowed to proceed at the maximum rate without the concept being so oversold that, if a problem develops, it will have a high negative affect on the overall program. You may wish to keep this perspective in mind as you hear the briefing by Dr. Lowell Wood, a senior and very creative scientist at Livermore who heads this support “skunkworks” operation and who is a protégé of Dr. Teller. The briefing this afternoon will concentrate on his concept; however, please keep in mind that we are busily simplifying the other space based interceptor concepts as well. As I indicated in my earlier discussions with you, I believe the SBI concept will become affordable and was poorly served by this spring’s cost estimate.³ The cost estimate did what it was supposed to do . . . focused our next effort . . . it should not be considered the inevitable future weapon system cost. Lowell Wood’s concept, in addition to having merit of its own, is acting as a competitive spur to my other space based interceptor teams.

James A. Abrahamson
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

³Not found.

268. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 25, 1988, 1714Z

17960. S/S: Please alert EUR/SOV immediately upon receipt. Subject: Soviet response on ABM Treaty review. Ref: (A) Moscow 17538² (B) Moscow 16721³ (C) Moscow 16367⁴ (D) State 213218.⁵

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. At 1915 hours Moscow time July 25, MFA USA and Canada desk acting chief Sukhodrev provided EmbOff with the Soviet response to the U.S. proposal for an ABM Treaty review (Ref D). According to Sukhodrev, the Soviet answer has been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Informal embassy translation of Soviet response follows below.

3. Begin text:

The American side has proposed to hold a meeting of delegations in Geneva July 14–20 at a high-ranking level to review the ABM Treaty.

We agree that such a meeting to review questions pertaining to the observance of the ABM Treaty should be held. The Soviet side has put forward many times to the American side the issue of the necessity of conducting the next review of the ABM Treaty, including in the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880642–0327. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

² In telegram 17538 from Moscow, July 20, the Embassy reported that Matlock had met with Shevardnadze the previous day, and that Shevardnadze had promised a response to the U.S. proposal within two days. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880625–0026)

³ In telegram 16721 from Moscow, July 9, the Embassy reported that Matlock had asked Shevardnadze that day about the U.S. proposal to hold the ABM Treaty Review July 14–20 in Geneva, and that “Shevardnadze replied that the Ministry was considering the U.S. proposal, but added that there were already two fora for addressing ABM Treaty related questions—the Defense and Space Talks and the Standing Consultative Commission; he was unsure there was much utility in a third.” The Embassy also reported: “Shevardnadze apparently was not briefed on the proposal or the fact that the Soviet side had been proposing to hold an ABM Treaty review since last fall.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880586–0863)

⁴ In telegram 16367 from Moscow, July 5, the Embassy reported that Matlock had met with Bessmertnykh that day to propose to conduct the ABM Treaty Review from July 14 until 20, as per the Department of State’s instructions on July 2; see Document 262. The Embassy went on to report, “Bessmertnykh said the Soviets would carefully examine the U.S. proposal and provide an answer as soon as possible. He then offered some preliminary comments: —The dates proposed by the U.S. were very soon and could pose some difficulties for the Soviet side; they might prefer to hold the review later, perhaps in early August or early September.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880571–0535)

⁵ See Document 262.

framework of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Committee. As regards the time period for carrying out the proposed meeting, for a number of circumstances it would be preferable to us to conduct it beginning August 1.

In our opinion, such a meeting should not itself replace the regular, second-this-year session of the Standing Consultative Committee. This session should be held, in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement related to the creation of the SCC dated December 21, 1972.

The review of the treaty requires a careful analysis of all circumstances and facts connected with the fulfillment by both sides of their obligations according to the treaty during the five years since the previous review, which took place in 1982. Here it is necessary to be guided by an objective and thoughtful approach, and not to permit one-sidedness and prejudice. This can be achieved only by means of a considerate attitude toward the concerns of both sides. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that the American side intends during the ABM Treaty review meeting to focus attention on questions related to the radar in the region of Krasnoyarsk and to radar fragments currently located in the region of Gomel. Obviously, at a minimum, concerns of the Soviet side must be reviewed with regard to the deployment of an American phased-array radar at Thule (Greenland) and the construction of an analogous radar at Fylingdales-Moor (England).

We have proposed our solutions for the purpose of removing mutual concerns, but the American side refuses to review our proposals.

Of course, we would be prepared to discuss in the meeting other issues regarding observance of the treaty which might be raised by the sides.

We consider that the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, which resumed July 12 in accordance with an earlier agreement by the sides, should proceed without interruption and should be independent of the dates of the meeting.

The chief of the Soviet MFA of Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate, V. P. Karpov, will be head of the Soviet delegation to the meeting.

As regards the length of the meeting, obviously it would be advisable to determine this by taking into account the speed and results of the review, but its length should not exceed two to three weeks.

End text.

Matlock

269. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President's Military Assistant (Mattke) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, July 26, 1988

SUBJECT

SDI, Update following Dr. Teller's Presentation

BACKGROUND. Today the CARDINAL IN THE KREMLIN, a powerful pro-SDI novel by Tom Clancy was released, just as you heard Dr. Teller brief the President on "Brilliant Pebbles," a recent development by Livermore Labs. I believe the coincidence is fortuitous. Clancy's novel will stimulate conversation and support for Strategic Defense just as word of another triumph of American technology begins to circulate.²

As you heard, Livermore's concept calls for deployment in low earth orbit of thousands, tens of thousands, of small, inexpensive, self-contained kinetic kill vehicles. Utilizing micro-miniaturized components (many of which came from Japan), these tiny rockets will detect, track, intercept and kill warheads early in their trajectory.³ The scheme is quite ingenious, relatively low cost and *probably* feasible with near-current technology.

However several problems remain, including how to prevent the "brilliant pebbles" from taking on every rocket launch, including the shuttle, our military missions or commercial rockets. Also, despite Dr. Teller's enthusiasm, the Livermore concept is *not THE answer*. It is a competitor with the "smart rock" approach of the more sophisticated, more expensive KKV program.⁴ (General Abrahamson intends to encourage both approaches, believing competition will stimulate further progress and reduce costs of each.)⁵

Nevertheless, the concept and development is exciting—and very important to you and your plans for SDI. It represents *just one of several promising technologies* emerging from the concept and laboratory stages

¹ Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Don Gregg Files, Subject File, OA/ID 19862–014, SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) [1]. Secret. Bush wrote at the top of the memorandum: "good paper—GB."

² Bush wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this paragraph.

³ Bush wrote checkmarks beside "orbit" in the first sentence and "warheads" in the second sentence of this paragraph.

⁴ Bush wrote a checkmark above "program."

⁵ Bush wrote a checkmark above "reduce."

into the full development and demonstration phase.⁶ Moreover, this development effectively belies the adverse propaganda and apparent confusion currently swirling around SDI.⁷

Finally, the development highlights the *importance of sustaining your commitment to a "comprehensive"*, i.e. layered, ground and space based system. Fierce ideological opposition remains. The current move by Aspin to "gut" the Space Based Interceptor in the Authorization Bill (cutting SBI from \$250M to \$75M) is neither a measure of SDI's potential or progress, rather it is a direct assault on the premise of strategic defense per se.

CURRENT STATUS. Despite widespread speculation in the press, SDI is not in disarray. Technological advances are proliferating not stagnating. The most recent Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) study initiated by Secretary Carlucci recommended, again, a "phased deployment" of elements, incrementally leading to a layered, comprehensive system. Unfortunately, the preliminary report was leaked, emerged piecemeal and misinterpreted.

Since that time, the Press has assumed the Administration will back away from space-based components and settle for ground defenses. The Defense Secretary is looking for political consensus, but finding little. As you heard from General Welch, the Services have other priorities. Damning a "Phase I" system with faint praise is a clear message. The Joint Chiefs are more immediately concerned about their Service Budgets than near term (this century) Strategic Defense.

Mr. Vice President, it remains for you to define the future of SDI. Everyone is looking for guidance. Dukakis is adamantly opposed to the concept and cannot backtrack, not even to Nunn's January 16th idea of Accidental Launch Protection (ALPS). You have the opportunity to clearly delineate the difference—you will defend America, he will not.

You can move forward from your current position by

Committing to deployment of a Strategic Defense System,

but defer definition of the architecture, (the specific ground and space based components) to 1991-92, when research, development and demonstration will provide you adequate information to make the right choice.

Especially after today's presentation, you can make such a pledge with confidence in American technology. Such a declaration would galvanize the conservative, pro-defense element of the country. Yet, unlike the Kemp "deploy now" suggestion, it would not undercut the research and development required to field space-based and advanced defenses.

⁶ Bush wrote a checkmark beside "one."

⁷ Not found. Bush wrote a checkmark above "confusion."

270. Memorandum From William Heiser, William Tobey, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, August 4, 1988

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Review—Proposed NSDD

Purpose. After both SACG and NSPG discussions of whether the U.S. should declare the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty, this package provides a memorandum for the President and accompanying NSDD for your consideration.

The proposed memorandum to the President (*Tab I*)² briefly reviews the issue of declaring or not declaring the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty. It then presents a path through the maze of competing considerations which the President could follow. It forwards for the President's approval an NSDD (*Tab A*)³ which implements the first step on that path. Finally, it also forwards, for the record, a recently received memorandum from Bill Graham addressed to the President (*Tab B*),⁴ relevant Congressional correspondence (*Tab C*),⁵ and a message from Secretary Shultz (*Tab D*).⁶

Discussion. We have summarized the views of *all* the major players in previous memoranda to the President. Additionally, both you and the President heard the various arguments presented by the President's most senior advisors at the NSPG on July 6. We acknowledge that there are a number of very good arguments for declaring the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty at or immediately after the ABM Treaty Review. We will not attempt to restate all the pros and cons again for you in this package. Rather we assume that, based on our previous discussions, you are very familiar with these arguments. Therefore, the following simply provides the NSC Staff recommendation on how to proceed and our rationale for making such a recommendation.

NSC Staff View. Our recommendation is the product of applying two bottom-line criteria to the question of declaring a material breach:

(1) if the President were to decide to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty at this time, could the President's

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-097, NSDD 312. Secret. Sent for action. Powell crossed out the memorandum date, "July 9" and wrote "Aug 4 CP" above it.

² Printed as Document 271.

³ Printed as Document 272.

⁴ Printed as Tab B, Document 271.

⁵ Attached but not printed. See Tab 1, Document 265.

⁶ Printed as Tab D, Document 271.

decision be reasonably explained and justified in light of the circumstances we now confront; and

(2) would the effects of such a decision taken now promote or undermine the integrity of the President's compliance policy.

At this particular point, the only decision that the President must make and announce to the Executive Branch is whether we should declare the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a material breach *before* or *during* the ABM Treaty Review Conference. Based on this decision, he also must approve the U.S. approach to this subject at the Review.

If the President were to decide at this time to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty—a decision favored by many—this would rapidly become a matter of public record and the administration would be asked what had triggered the decision and what the United States intended to do about it. In point of fact, intelligence information indicates that nothing about the status of the radar has changed. The slow-down in construction activity proclaimed as a moratorium by the Soviets last October continues. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when asked by Senators and Congressmen for his view, may be put in the awkward position of having to admit that the Chiefs did not recommend this step be taken, and perhaps he may even be forced to go further to state that the Chiefs do not consider the Krasnoyarsk radar, in its current configuration, to be a militarily significant violation of the ABM Treaty.

Moreover, when the Administration is asked what it proposes to do about the breach, all recognize that we currently have no response. When pressed on whether we want to suspend in whole or in part or terminate the Treaty, few of the President's advisers propose that we do either. On the contrary, most would say that we have no plans either to suspend or terminate the Treaty. We could easily find ourselves detailing all the actions we would *not* undertake when asked the obvious question of what responses we have in mind, thereby undercutting the credibility of the declaration itself.

Based upon these considerations, we would recommend that the President *not* decide to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty at this time.

However, with regard to the treatment of this issue at the ABM Treaty Review, a good case can be made for putting the Soviets on notice at the Review that if they refuse to correct their Treaty violations, the U.S. reserves, consistent with international law, all rights to take the appropriate proportionate response at a later time, and that the U.S. will be forced to consider charging the Soviets with a material breach of the Treaty. We would recommend this be the approach authorized for the Treaty Review.

Further, we would recommend that the Department of Defense immediately be tasked to develop options, in consultation with other appropriate agencies and the Congress, that the President could

consider should the Soviets either once again begin work on the radar or continue to fail to correct their violation to our satisfaction. By taking this action, we would signal seriousness in our resolve and keep pressure on the Soviets to correct the Krasnoyarsk radar violation.

These are the only steps that the President need announce to the Executive Branch *now*. He can then wait to see the results of the ABM Treaty Review before moving further. The NSDD provided at *Tab A* reflects only these steps.

Given cards that we currently have to play, and assuming that the Soviets do not satisfy us concerning Krasnoyarsk at the Review, we think that the following will likely be the best course for the President to follow. After the review, the President should issue a statement making the following points.

— The long-standing Krasnoyarsk violation has not been satisfactorily resolved by the Soviet Union at the ABM Treaty Review; therefore, I am forced to consider declaring this serious violation a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

— The United States is now actively studying responses that would be appropriate and proportionate to the violation.

— As this proceeds over the next few months, the Administration will be working with the Congress and consulting with our Allies on this serious problem.

— We encourage the Soviet Union to promptly dismantle this illegal radar.

— We have already made it clear to the Soviet Union that neither a START or Defense & Space agreement can be concluded until the issue of the illegal radar at Krasnoyarsk is resolved.

Following such a statement, the next milestones that we would face are:

(1) the end of the declared 1-year moratorium on work on the Krasnoyarsk radar (October 24, 1988);

(2) the completion of the options study (November 1, 1988); and

(3) the submission of this Administration's final Congressionally mandated compliance report (December 1, 1988).

The President should understand that by signing this NSDD he will forego declaring a material breach at the Review Conference. *This will not be well received by many of his advisors within the Administration and by many of his strongest supporters in the Congress.* In addition, depending on Soviet behavior during this interim period, and particularly Soviet actions after the construction moratorium at Krasnoyarsk ends in October, *the President could face the decision on material breach once again later this year.* At that time, the President may have specific response options available for his use; but we should not base our actions on this. NSC staff do have some ideas (e.g., how about retaining POSEIDON SSBNs that the Congress encouraged us to retire for “fiscal” reasons to hedge against a breakout). However, past efforts in the Interagency to agree on responses

to Soviet violations (i.e., the RSVP drill) have generally not been successful. On the other hand, at a minimum, the President would certainly be in position to state that he had given the Soviets every opportunity to correct the Krasnoyarsk violation and since they refused to do so, proportionate responses on the part of the U.S. are warranted.

Some NSC Staff feel that prospects could improve for declaring a material breach (if needed) and taking an appropriate response at that time. However, other NSC Staff who fully agree with the recommendation not to declare a material breach now, strongly believe that the chances of the President making such a declaration under favorable circumstances will decline as time passes. Thus, we should recognize that the President's option for doing so will be foreclosed by this recommendation.

All the above being said, NSC Staff recommend the President:

1. approve the NSDD provided at *Tab A*;
2. announce no further decisions at this time and wait for the results of the ABM Treaty Review; and
3. should the Review not resolve the Krasnoyarsk issue and other circumstances not change, follow the course outlined above.

We believe that this is a sound way to proceed, albeit a controversial one, and that it offers the President the best prospect of resolving the Krasnoyarsk violation and preserving the integrity of his compliance policy. The one element of this very difficult issue that most troubles us is that much of the rationale for our recommendation is based on our judgment of the political realities we face, and, based on the NSPG discussion, *it appears that a number of the President's most experienced and senior advisors hold a different view.*

Our draft memorandum for the President (*Tab I*) does not go into all of the above rationale. We felt that, on this issue, if you agree with our approach, you may wish [to] discuss these sensitive considerations with the President in person.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at *TAB I* forwarding the NSDD which moves the U.S. along the path described above in dealing with the Krasnoyarsk violation.⁷

2. That you sign the NSDD distribution memorandum at *TAB II*.⁸

Concurrence: Brooks, Fortier (in draft), Rostow⁹

⁷ Powell did not indicate a preference.

⁸ Powell did not indicate a preference.

⁹ Linhard drew an asterisk next to Rostow's name and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum on July 9: "General, *Nick has not yet shown the draft NSDD to A.B. [A.B. Culvahouse]. He is scheduled to see him Monday. He can try to get to him Sunday if you desire. V/R Bob"

271. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 4, 1988

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Review—Proposed NSDD

Issue

Whether to sign the National Security Decision Directive providing guidance for the third five-year review of the ABM Treaty and tasking assessments of the responses available to the U.S. Government should the Soviet Union not agree at the Treaty Review to correct its violations of the ABM Treaty.

Background

The U.S. and USSR are required to begin a five-year review of the ABM Treaty by October 2, 1988. Since the last review, the U.S. has identified the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk as a serious violation of the ABM Treaty.² During the July 6th NSPG meeting, your key advisors expressed their views on whether we should take the opportunity of the upcoming five-year review to declare the illegal Soviet radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

Discussion

Your advisors were divided on whether to declare the Krasnoyarsk a material breach of the Treaty. Some (among them Secretary Carlucci, Secretary Baker, Attorney General Meese, ACDA Director Burns, Ambassador Rowny, and Defense & Space Negotiator Cooper) believe that there is no question that this radar constitutes a breach of the Treaty and that you should charge the Soviets with a material breach of the Treaty. Your Science Advisor is also of this view and he has provided the memorandum at *Tab B* offering to you his recommendation. As you know, we have heard from some key Senators who also support this position. Their letter, which you had seen before the July 6 NSPG, is attached at *Tab C*.³

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-097, NSDD 312. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Heiser. Copies were sent to Bush and Duberstein. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it on August 5.

² See Document 266.

³ Attached but not printed. See Tab 1, Document 265.

Others (notably Secretary Shultz, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador Nitze, and SCC Commissioner Ellis) advise against declaring a material breach. At the NSPG, General Herres stated that the JCS believe this radar alone does not constitute a militarily significant violation nor does it meet the definition of material breach at this time. Secretary Shultz, who is traveling, has sent you the message at *Tab D* on this issue.

If you were to declare a material breach, two questions immediately arise: what triggered such a decision and what will be the U.S. response. A construction moratorium announced by the Soviets last October continues, and we have not identified any appropriate proportionate responses to this violation to date. In short, it would be very difficult to make a persuasive case for declaring a material breach at this time, and even if such a declaration were made, you would have no proportional response options readily available to execute.

At this point, the only decisions that you must make and announce to the Executive Branch are whether the U.S. should declare the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a material breach of the ABM Treaty *before* or *during* the five-year Review Conference, and how the Krasnoyarsk violation should be handled during the Review.

If approved, the attached NSDD⁴ indicates that you have decided *not* to declare a material breach *before* or *during* the ABM Treaty Review. While it does indicate that you would consider such an action in the future, it explicitly does not signal any decision now on whether you would declare a material breach after the Treaty Review. It does call for putting the Soviets on notice during the Treaty Review that should the Soviets continue to refuse to correct the Krasnoyarsk radar violation, the U.S. would reserve its rights to take the appropriate proportionate response in the future, including a declaration of material breach. The NSDD also tasks the Department of Defense, in consultation with Congress, to develop response options for your consideration later this year.

In accordance with NSDD 266,⁵ Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the NSC, has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you sign the NSDD at *Tab A*.⁶

⁴ Printed as Document 272.

⁵ NSDD-266, "Implementation of the Recommendations of the President's Special Review Board," March 31, 1987, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy.

⁶ Reagan approved the recommendation.

Attachments

Tab B

Memorandum From the President's Science Advisor (Graham) to President Reagan⁷

Washington, July 8, 1988

SUBJECT

ABM TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE

I strongly recommend that the Krasnoyarsk Radar be declared a material breach of the ABM Treaty at the upcoming Treaty Review Conference. I base this recommendation on the unequivocal challenge this facility poses to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

The Krasnoyarsk Radar is strategically significant because of its relationship to the vast network of "legal" Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) on the periphery of Soviet territory. Individually and collectively, these LPARs represent significant components of a base for territorial defense against ballistic missiles. We formally challenged the Soviets on the purpose of these radars four times before we ever even raised the Krasnoyarsk issue with them, and we have now raised Krasnoyarsk at each of the last eight meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission.

This is an extremely serious violation of the Treaty. Large phased array radars are the most visible and verifiable component constrained by the ABM Treaty, and the only reliable source of long lead warning of a Soviet breakout capability. The fact that the Soviets have completed over five years of construction reduces our warning time substantially. No number of on-site inspections could alter that fact. That is why we have insisted the radar be dismantled.

One of the principal arguments against identifying Krasnoyarsk as a "material breach" over the past few years has been our hope that the Soviets would dismantle it before the 1987 ABM Treaty Review Conference. We have now delayed the Conference for nearly a year so that Summits and Ministerials could provide further opportunities to encourage its dismantlement. Despite all of our patience and diplomacy toward that end, the radar still stands.

Some would argue against publicly declaring the Soviets in material breach of the Treaty on the grounds that such a declaration would

⁷ Secret.

call into question our continuing adherence to the Treaty. This argument needs to be seen in the context of national strategy.

From a technological perspective the objectives of the ABM Treaty and your Strategic Defense Initiative are fundamentally inconsistent. In order to advance SDI, we will have to chart a transition out of the ABM Treaty. I have heard the arguments about Soviet advantages in ground-based ABM deployment preparation, space launch capability, and operational experience in strategic defense. These are not irrelevant; but they should not blind us to our own strengths. Our technological capacity remains far beyond that of the Soviet Union (as evidenced by our tremendous progress in SDI) and, given full national support, can more than offset these short-term Soviet advantages.

The forthrightness of your policy on Soviet treaty violations will be counted among this Administration's proudest and most enduring legacies. We have seen the Soviets return to the bargaining table because of your overall defense buildup and specifically because of your Strategic Defense Initiative. Similarly, they will be persuaded to comply with their arms control commitments only if they see the U.S. is prepared to act from strength.

Tab D

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan⁸

Bangkok, July 7, 1988

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty: The Material Breach Issue

I have been told about the discussion at the NSPG today and want to stress again that to declare a material breach is bad policy and bad politics.

There is only one possible interpretation of such a decision by us regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar—that we are getting ourselves positioned to leave the ABM Treaty. The Chiefs do not want this because it would be bad for the national security of the United States. I fully agree with them. The Soviets are in a better position to exploit defenses in the near term than we are. So we want the Soviets to comply with the

⁸ Secret. Shultz was in Thailand from July 6 until July 9 for the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. From there, he traveled to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Japan, and the Marshall Islands before returning to the United States on July 20.

treaty. Our approach is working. The Soviets have stopped construction. We should continue stating that Krasnoyarsk is a serious violation and that we will not sign a START Treaty until it ends. The Soviets are getting the message; they have hinted to you and me that they are considering tearing down the radar in the context of a START agreement.

This is not the time to take a decision that implies we are laying the groundwork for suspension of the ABM Treaty. Such a move would alarm far more senators and congressmen than it would please, and undercut support for defense modernization and SDI. It could undercut the legacy of your arms control accomplishments which are achieving real reductions in Soviet forces.

So I strongly recommend you take no decision now to declare a material breach; we should conduct the treaty review under current policy. This fall, after the review, we can again look at options for responding to Krasnoyarsk. There is nothing to be gained and much to risk in changing our position now. End text.

Shultz

272. National Security Decision Directive 312¹

Washington, August 8, 1988

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF THE 1972 ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY (S)

Introduction. This directive provides guidance concerning: (1) the conduct of the third five-year review of the ABM Treaty and (2) assessment of the responses available to the U.S. Government should the Soviet Union not agree at the Review Conference to correct its violations of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Objectives. The U.S. Delegation should (1) satisfy the legal obligations under Article XIV of the Treaty in conducting the third five-year Review; (2) document the U.S. position on principal outstanding compliance issues but refrain from entering into negotiations concerning

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-097, NSDD 312. Secret. Powell distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Meese, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns under cover of an August 8 memorandum: "The President has approved the instructions for use at the third five-year ABM Treaty Review Conference as presented in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-312)." (Ibid.)

these outstanding issues; (3) state unilaterally that Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, especially the Krasnoyarsk radar, call into question the viability of the Treaty; and (4) avoid undercutting the U.S. position in the Defense and Space negotiations and avoid accepting new prohibitions or constraints beyond those currently in the ABM Treaty. (S)

Krasnoyarsk Radar Violation. Consistent with the above objectives, the U.S. Delegation should make the following points to the Soviet Delegation in the appropriate manner in the course of the Review Conference:

- The basis for U.S. concerns regarding Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty, the totality of which suggests the Soviet Union may be preparing a prohibited ABM territorial defense. (S)

- The Large Phased Array Radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. (S)

- In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The U.S. is prepared to outline the Soviet actions necessary to correct this violation in a verifiable manner. (S)

- The U.S. has observed the current slowdown of construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation. (S)

- The continued existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar calls into question the viability of the ABM Treaty and makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas. (S)

- The Krasnoyarsk radar violation will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved. (S)

- If the Soviet Union is not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference, following the Review, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the Treaty. (S)

- In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future. (The Delegation, however, should not speculate on the details of any potential responses or the timing of such a declaration at the Review Conference.) (S)

- Specifically ask the Soviet Delegation what actions the Soviet Union will take to resolve promptly the Krasnoyarsk violation. (S)

- (*If the Soviets do not agree to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable fashion, then:*)

- Accept no joint statement or communique;

- Issue a unilateral statement criticizing the Soviets for their Krasnoyarsk violation based on the points above, making additional points as appropriate based upon Soviet statements made during the Review; and,

- State that nothing in the Review or its completion should be interpreted as derogating in any way from rights the U.S. has under international law with regard to any Soviet violation of the Treaty. (S)

- (*If the Soviet side agrees to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar on terms acceptable to the United States, then:*)

- Accede to Soviet desires for a joint statement on condition that it reflect the details of the Soviet agreement to verifiably dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar; and,

- State that the U.S. is prepared to work with the Soviet side to eliminate, by their resolution, as many ABM compliance agenda items as possible, perhaps by convening a fall session of the Special Consultative Commission (SCC). (S)

Gomel Activities.

- The Delegation should reiterate the USG finding regarding activities at Gomel and state that nothing observed during the December 1987 visit to that site by U.S. officials changed that finding. (S)

- It should reiterate the position stated at the Moscow Summit calling on the Soviet Union to resolve the Gomel issue. (S)

- It should present the actions the Soviets should take to correct the Gomel violation that would be acceptable to the U.S., drawing upon previous guidance provided to agencies. (S)

Implementation. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Burns will head a special delegation to conduct the ABM Treaty Review. The Delegation will consist of appropriate senior members of the Departments of State and Defense, the Intelligence Community, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The U.S. SCC Commissioner and the U.S. Negotiator at the Defense and Space Talks will also be a part of the delegation. (S)

A special ABM Treaty Review Steering Group chaired by the NSC Staff will support the Delegation. The Steering Group will finalize and provide for my approval the instructions to the Delegation and the plenary statements to be tabled during the Review. Should additional plenary statements be required during the Review, they will be prepared by the Delegation drawing upon this guidance and the instructions to the Delegation. If the Soviets raise an issue not addressed in the U.S. plenary statements or in the guidance and instructions provided, the Delegation will clear its proposed responses with Washington. (S)

Responses to Soviet Violations. The Department of Defense should undertake immediately, with the involvement of other agencies as appropriate, to develop an options paper which presents the range of

proportionate options available should the Soviet Union resume construction at Krasnoyarsk or otherwise refuse to correct this violation. A plan for involving Congress in this process should be submitted for my review during the first three weeks of the study. (S)

Promising individual options should be presented as soon as each analysis is completed. For programmatic responses, the options should be described in sufficient detail so that should I decide to execute one of the options, implementation steps could begin without further study. I want to be in position to take a decision on the appropriate U.S. response quickly should the Soviets decide to resume work on the Krasnoyarsk radar. (S)

All work should be completed fully coordinated with other appropriate agencies, and submitted for my review no later than November 1, 1988, so that I can have the full benefit of this work soon after the end of the Soviet moratorium and before forwarding the administration's December 1, 1988 report to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements at the end of this calendar year. (S)

Ronald Reagan

273. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, August 10, 1988

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

My purpose in writing is quite simply to try to put a critical issue behind us. While we have made substantial progress in arms control and other areas, I am deeply concerned that the problem of the large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk has yet to be resolved.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8890725, 8890750). No classification marking. In telegram 261723 to Moscow, August 12, the Department of State transmitted Reagan's letter to the Embassy in Moscow, along with the instructions: "Ambassador should seek meeting with Acting Foreign Minister ASAP to deliver following presidential letter on the Krasnoyarsk Radar." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N880006-0138) In telegram 19507 from Moscow, August 12, the Embassy reported that Matlock had delivered the letter to Acting Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov that day, and that he had "explained that the letter from the President was a sincere effort on his part to find a solution to a problem that would prevent the conclusion of a Strategic Arms Control Agreement under any U.S. administration and regardless of the outcome of the November elections." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N880006-0143)

That radar constitutes a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty and must be dismantled to comply with the Treaty. Such measures as a slowdown in construction and invitations for visits do not solve the basic problem. The proposed tradeoffs your side has mentioned, involving the permitted modernization of U.S. radars at Thule and Fylingdales, are not acceptable to the United States.

As I stated in Moscow, and as Secretary Shultz told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, our two countries will not be able to conclude further strategic arms agreements until the radar is dismantled. I state that simply as a fact of life. The United States Congress has affirmed overwhelmingly that the Krasnoyarsk radar violates the ABM Treaty. This reflects a strong consensus among all segments of the American people that the radar will be an enduring impediment to progress in arms control until it is dismantled.

As we approach the Review Conference for the ABM Treaty I believe it would serve both our countries' interests to resolve this issue. In our past discussions, you have indicated an appreciation of the importance of its resolution, and I hope that you will give it further personal attention with the aim of getting the issue behind us.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

274. Memorandum From William Heiser, William Tobey, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, August 11, 1988

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Review: Proposed NSDD Approving Instructions to the U.S. Delegation

Purpose. This action implements the President's guidance issued in NSDD-312² by forwarding for his approval the instructions to the U.S. Delegation and the supporting documentation for use by the Delegation in the conduct of the ABM Treaty Review.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-097, NSDD 313. Secret. Sent for action.

² See Document 272.

Discussion. The proposed memorandum to the President at *Tab I*³ notes that the final drafts of the instructions to the Delegation; plenary statements on Krasnoyarsk, Gomel and nonviolation compliance issues; unilateral statement; Communique; and Protocol have been forwarded by the interagency ABM Treaty Review Steering Group to the NSC for decision and approval by the President. It forwards for the President's approval an NSDD (*Tab A*)⁴ that provides the detailed instructions for use by the U.S. Delegation during the conduct of the ABM Treaty Review scheduled to begin on August 24.

The memorandum to the President also confirms that the supporting documentation (*Tab B*),⁵ i.e., plenary statements, unilateral statement, Communique and Protocol, is fully consistent with the instructions to the Delegation, and hence does not warrant his personal attention.

The draft instructions and the supporting documentation, however, contain several brackets indicating agency disagreements. The bracketed texts are at *Tab III*.⁶ Our strategy in resolving these issues is to hold to the same course of action the U.S. has pursued in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), and to ensure that all documents are fully consistent with the guidance in NSDD-312. The instructions and supporting documents at Tabs A and B reflect this approach. If your decision is to approve our proposals, then the memorandum to the President can be sent without delay.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve NSC Staff recommendations on resolving the bracketed material in the instructions to the Delegation and the supporting documentation (*Tab III*).⁷

That you sign the memorandum to the President at *Tab I* forwarding the NSDD.⁸

That you sign the NSDD Distribution memorandum at *Tab II*.⁹
Concurrence: Alison Fortier, Nicholas Rostow, Linton Brooks

³ Printed as Document 275.

⁴ Printed as Document 276.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 275.

⁶ Not attached.

⁷ Powell approved the recommendation.

⁸ Powell approved the recommendation.

⁹ Powell approved the recommendation. Tab II is attached but not printed; see footnote 1, Document 276.

275. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 12, 1988

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Review—Proposed NSDD on U.S. Delegation Instructions

Issue

Whether to sign the National Security Decision Directive providing instructions to the U.S. Delegation to the ABM Treaty Review which is scheduled to begin on August 24, 1988.

Background

In NSDD–312,² you provided guidance to agencies for the conduct of the Review and, *inter alia*, directed that the special interagency ABM Treaty Review Steering Group should finalize and provide for your approval the U.S. Delegation instructions and the plenary statements to be tabled during the ABM Treaty Review. In response to your directive, the Steering Group has forwarded these documents for review and approval.

Discussion

The instructions to the Delegation in the proposed NSDD at Tab A³ indicate that you have decided *not* to declare the illegal Soviet radar near Krasnoyarsk a material breach of the ABM Treaty during the ABM Treaty Review. The instructions make it clear that the U.S. would consider such an action in the future, but there is no suggestion that a decision has been made now to declare a material breach after the Treaty Review. The instructions also call for putting the Soviets on notice during the Treaty Review that should the Soviet Union continue to refuse to correct the Krasnoyarsk radar violation, the U.S. would reserve its rights to take the appropriate proportionate response in the future, including a declaration of material breach.

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–097, NSDD 313. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Heiser. Copies were sent to Bush and Duberstein.

² See Document 272.

³ Printed as Document 276.

The plenary statements, unilateral U.S. statement, communique and protocol at *Tab B*⁴ are fully consistent with the attached NSDD and therefore may be forwarded to agencies along with the attached NSDD. They do not require your review.

In accordance with NSDD-266,⁵ Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the NSC, has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK NO

_____ _____ That you sign the NSDD at *Tab A*.⁶

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ NSDD 266, "Implementation of the Recommendations of the President's Special Review Board," March 31, 1987, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy.

⁶ Reagan approved the recommendation.

276. National Security Decision Directive 313¹

Washington, August 15, 1988

*ABM TREATY REVIEW: U.S. DELEGATION
INSTRUCTIONS (U)*

I hereby approve the appended instructions for use by the U.S. Delegation in the conduct of the third five-year review of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. (S)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-097, NSDD 313. Secret. Powell distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Richard Thornburgh, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns under cover of an August 15 memorandum: "The President has approved the U.S. Delegation instructions for use at the ABM Treaty Review Conference as outlined in the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-313)." (Ibid.)

Tab A

**Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the
Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva²**

Washington, undated

ABM Treaty Review Instructions

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The U.S. objectives for the ABM treaty review are to elicit Soviet agreement to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel radars and to resolve as many other ABM Treaty compliance questions as possible. Toward this end, the U.S. delegation should:

— Satisfy the legal obligations under Article XIV of the treaty in conducting the third five-year review;

— Document the U.S. position on principal outstanding compliance issues, but refrain from entering into negotiations concerning the outstanding issues;

— Review the status of U.S. efforts to resolve these issues;

— State unilaterally that Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, especially the Krasnoyarsk radar, call into question the viability of the treaty;

— Provide an opportunity for the Soviets to respond positively to correct these violations;

— Reserve all rights under international law to respond to continuing Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty;

— Encourage the Soviet Union to correct its activities in areas where the U.S. believes that there are probable or possible violations, which are important issues;

— Avoid undercutting the U.S. position in the Defense and Space Negotiations and avoid accepting new prohibitions or constraints beyond those currently in the ABM Treaty.

3. It remains the U.S. objective to keep the ABM review conference as short as possible, not to exceed one week. Should the delegation consider it advisable to extend the agreed duration of the review conference, the delegation's recommendations should be provided to Washington.

² Secret. The Department transmitted these instructions in telegram 271904 to NST Geneva, August 20. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, P890001–0986)

4. With respect to the issue of a second SCC meeting during 1988, the U.S. delegation should inform the Soviet side that, as conveyed by the U.S. through diplomatic channels, the U.S. delegation is prepared to discuss, during the treaty review, the practical usefulness of holding such a second session. The U.S. delegation should state that the U.S. continues to believe that the review meeting obviates the need for the required second session of the SCC this year. The U.S., therefore, continues to believe that a second SCC session is unnecessary. The U.S. delegation may note that the U.S. believes that there is nothing in the 1972 Memorandum of Understanding which precludes agreement between the parties to hold fewer than two SCC sessions in a given year. The U.S. delegation should state that the U.S. is prepared to exchange the required notifications during the review.

If the Soviet side continues to insist on holding a second SCC session this year, the U.S. delegation should state that the U.S. will advise the USSR through diplomatic channels, after the review, of its views.

5. The USG intends to focus on Soviet noncompliance. The delegation should not solicit from the Soviets responses (e.g. requests for information, etc.) other than those relevant to correction of their violations.

The intent of the USG is that this review focus on the broad issues of noncompliance and Soviet willingness to correct their violations, and not on technical issues. The delegation will avoid engaging in such technical discussions.

The delegation should avoid an "article by article" discussion of the treaty, and a discussion of the precise legal meanings of the provisions of those articles.

6. The U.S. desires to minimize the discussion of the SDI at the review conference. The delegation should refer all questions concerning our Defense & Space proposals and future plans to the DST. With regard to specific SDI activities, the delegation should follow the appropriate sections of paragraph 15 of these instructions.

7. Plenary statements provided septel on Krasnoyarsk, Gomel, and other Soviet compliance issues shall be delivered as written and approved in Washington.³ Prior authorization should be requested from Washington if the delegation believes that it is necessary to make

³ The Department transmitted an opening plenary statement on Krasnoyarsk, Gomel, and other Soviet compliance issues in telegram 274163 to NST Geneva, August 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880739-0251) In telegram 9459 from the Mission in Geneva, August 25, the Delegation transmitted the text of Burns's opening plenary statement given that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880751-0959) In telegram 9514 from the Mission in Geneva, August 26, the Delegation transmitted Burns's three more expansive plenary statements in the second plenary session held on that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880755-0903)

substantive changes in these statements. In any additional plenary statements or in contingency or supplementary presentations, the delegation should draw on material in paragraphs 12–15 below. Should additional points be necessary to rebut Soviet responses during the review, the delegation should advise Washington.

8. The delegation should prepare a closing statement to be made to the Soviets based on the delegation's estimate of the outcome of the review and submit it to Washington for review and approval. Should a joint statement be warranted by Soviet agreement to dismantle Krasnoyarsk, the delegation should also submit the proposed statement to Washington for review and approval. In discussions of a joint statement with the Soviets, the delegation should not accept language which might suggest that the remaining compliance issues are important or that the ABM Treaty is working effectively. Furthermore, the delegation should not accept language which suggests that the conceptual basis of the ABM Treaty—mutual vulnerability—is a workable long-term security solution.

9. Drafts of two final public statements, one unilateral and the other a joint statement are being provided septel, in anticipation of possible Soviet responses.⁴ Any modifications of these draft statements should be submitted to Washington for review and approval before presentation to the Soviets and before release. Should agreement be reached, and a joint public statement be appropriate, the joint draft protocol between the delegations will be transmitted to Washington for approval.

The U.S. objective for the dismantling of Krasnoyarsk shall be the demolition of the receiver and transmitter building structures and the explosive destruction of their foundations. With regard to the Gomel radars, our objective is that the Soviet Union should verifiably destroy all Gomel Flat Twin and Pawn Shop parts including the Flat Twin pedestal support base. The United States will not foreclose the consideration of alternative Soviet proposals for correcting the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel violations. However, the U.S. delegation should reject any Soviet proposed trade of Krasnoyarsk for the dismantlement of the radars at Thule and Fylingdales or any Soviet suggestion that dismantlement shall merely entail the removal of equipment from the Krasnoyarsk radar buildings. If the Soviets present a new proposal, it should be forwarded to Washington with the delegation's recommendation.

10. During the ABM Treaty review, the U.S. delegation should neither raise the issue of parameters and characteristics exchange nor reiterate previous U.S. offers. If the Soviets repeat their proposal to

⁴ The Department transmitted a unilateral statement, communiqué, and protocol in telegram 284578 to NST Geneva, August 31. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880768–0164)

type-categorize radars based upon their parameters and characteristics, the U.S. delegation should advise the Soviet side that, at this time, we have no basis to change our determination that a comparison of types of radars, based solely on individual parameters or physical features, as observed by NTM, will provide only ambiguous conclusions and will not be definitive in manifestly distinguishing ABM radars from early warning radars. It is clear that the role and capability of radars must be judged in the context of a broader picture, taking into account the ABM capability and role of other systems and their interrelationship.

11. If the Soviets raise the question of D&D procedures for radars at test ranges, the U.S. delegation should advise the Soviet side that the U.S. government is considering the Soviet Union's proposal to work out procedures for dismantling or destruction of ABM radars at ABM test ranges and will respond when the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel violations are satisfactorily resolved. During the course of the discussion, the U.S. delegation should make clear that the violation at Gomel is one of illegal deployment.

12. Krasnoyarsk Radar

The U.S. delegation should make the following points to the Soviet delegation in an appropriate manner in the course of the review conference:

- The basis for U.S. concerns regarding Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty, the totality of which suggests the Soviet Union may be preparing a prohibited ABM territorial defense.

- The Large Phased Array Radar deployed in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty.

- In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The U.S. is prepared to outline the Soviet actions necessary to correct this violation in a verifiable manner.

- The U.S. has observed the current slowdown of construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation.

- The continued existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar calls into question the viability of the ABM Treaty and makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas.

- The Krasnoyarsk radar violation will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved.

- If the Soviet Union is not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the review conference,

following the review, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the treaty.

— In this connection, the United States reserves all of its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future. (The delegation, however, should not speculate on the details of any potential responses or the timing of such a declaration at the review conference.)

— Specifically ask the Soviet delegation what actions the Soviet Union will take to resolve promptly the Krasnoyarsk violation.

— If the Soviets do not agree to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable fashion, then:

— Accept no joint statement or communiqué;

— Issue a unilateral statement criticizing the Soviets for their Krasnoyarsk violation, based on the points above, making additional points as appropriate based upon Soviet statements made during the review; and,

— State that nothing in the review or its completion should be interpreted as derogating in any way from rights the U.S. has under international law with regard to any Soviet violation of the treaty.

— If the Soviet side agrees to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar on terms acceptable to the United States, then:

— Accede to Soviet desires for a joint statement on condition that it reflect the details of the Soviet agreement to verifiably dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar; and,

— State that the U.S. is prepared to work with the Soviet side to eliminate, by their resolution, as many ABM compliance agenda items as possible, perhaps by convening a fall session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

The delegation may draw upon the following points:

A. Since July 1983, the question of the deployment of the Large Phased-Array Radar (LPAR) in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk has been discussed with the Soviet side in a number of different fora and between various high level officials, including the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party. During this long period of discussion, the Soviet Union has not satisfied U.S. concerns regarding this radar. The U.S. Government continues to believe that this radar is a clear and serious violation of the Soviet Union's obligation under the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

B. The reasons for the U.S. determination of a violation and call for the dismantling of this radar include the following points:

— In accord with the provisions of agreed statement "F" to the ABM Treaty, LPARs may not be deployed except:

(1) As ABM radars within an ABM deployment area permitted under Article III;

(2) As ABM radars located at a test range in accordance with Article IV;

(3) For early warning of Strategic Ballistic Missile attack deployed (after the treaty entered into force) along the periphery of a party's national territory and oriented outward, in accordance subparagraph (B) of Article VI;

(4) For purposes of tracking objects in outer space; and,

(5) For use as national technical means of verification.

C. The LPAR deployed in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk meets none of these criteria. Specifically:

— The radar is neither located within a permitted ABM deployment area, nor is it at an agreed ABM test range.

— The radar is not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and oriented outward. Instead, it is located over 700 kilometers from the Soviet Union's nearest border and is oriented across Soviet territory toward the Soviet Union's northeastern border, 4600 kilometers away.

— The radar is similar to phased-array radars that the Soviet side has characterized previously as radars for early warning of Strategic Ballistic Missile attack.

— The radar's physical boresight is optimized for long-range surveillance of the horizon—an essential requirement for an early warning radar.

— The radar is located and oriented in such a manner as to fill a major gap in the ballistic missile detection, warning and tracking screen of the Soviet Union.

D. The U.S. has rejected the Soviet claim that the Krasnoyarsk radar is intended to perform exclusively a spacetrack role using the following points:

— The elevation boresight of the radar will not be optimized for long-range space surveillance.

— The Soviet side's previous suggestion that the "elevation of the direction of the electrical axis" will be different from the elevation boresight does not change the fact that this radar's elevation boresight is optimized for long-range surveillance of the horizon.

— The U.S. does not find any practical application for this radar in future Soviet manned space programs.

— The radar could not monitor the current insertion and landing phases of spacecraft launched from current Soviet test ranges.

— While the radar might be able to track some satellites in medium-to-high orbits when they enter its field of view, the opportunities to

track satellites in this altitude regime will occur only infrequently. Moreover, there are other Soviet radars better suited for this and other spacetrack tasks.

— It will not be possible for this radar to track the first revolution of any satellites currently launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base.

E. The U.S. has emphasized the following points:

— That this radar is not a spacetrack radar as the Soviet side has claimed. Rather it is at least an early warning radar, primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking and has the inherent potential for attack assessment in support of ballistic missile defense. That it is neither oriented outward nor located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and as such it violates subparagraph (B) of Article VI of the ABM Treaty.

— That during the negotiations leading to the ABM treaty, it was recognized that LPARs were the long-lead time elements of a territorial defense. In view of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article I prohibiting the deployment of a defense for an individual region of a party's territory and not to provide a base for such a defense, the deployment of a prohibited LPAR takes on added significance;

— The Krasnoyarsk radar violation could be easily reversed by existing techniques;

— That the position of the U.S. Government is that the Soviet Union must dismantle the Large Phased-Array Radar located in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk by demolishing the receiver and transmitter building structures and explosively destroying their foundations.

13. Gomel

— The delegation should reiterate the USG finding regarding activities at Gomel and state that nothing observed during the December 1987 visit to that site by U.S. officials changed that finding.

— It should reiterate the position stated at the Moscow Summit calling on the Soviet Union to resolve the Gomel issue.

— It should present the actions the Soviets should take to correct the Gomel violation that would be acceptable to the U.S., drawing upon previous guidance provided to agencies.

The delegation may draw upon the following points:

A. The U.S. considers the Soviet deployment of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop radars at an electronics facility near Gomel to be a violation of the ABM Treaty.

— The Soviet side was aware, at the time they moved the radars from Sary Shagan, that the U.S. considered the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop to be ABM components because they have met the criteria for being "tested in an ABM mode." The U.S. is aware of numerous instances in

which they had been tested "in an ABM mode" at the Sary Shagan ABM test range.

— Paragraph (8) of Section II of the 1978 agreed statement provides that deployment of radars of a type tested in an ABM mode, except as provided for in Articles III and IV of the treaty, to carry out any functions would be inconsistent with obligation of each party not to provide a base for an ABM defense of the territory of its country. Gomel is not an ABM deployment area or an agreed ABM test range and, thus, radars "tested in an ABM mode" may not be deployed at Gomel for any purpose.

— The Soviet Union has undertaken actions at Gomel, specifically, the construction of the Flat Twin pedestal base, which constitute initiation of deployment in violation of the ABM Treaty.

— The fact that the equipment at Gomel was not "operational" at the time of the U.S. visit does not affect the U.S. determination that the deployment of the Flat Twin and Pawn radars at Gomel constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty.

— Initiation of deployment has occurred and the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop radars at Gomel are subject to the limitations of the ABM Treaty. The work on the pedestal constitutes the initiation of deployment of a radar of a type "tested in an ABM mode."

— The Gomel radar violation could be easily reversed by existing techniques.

— Given the nature of the violation of the illegal deployment of an ABM radar at Gomel, the United States calls upon the Soviet Union to verifiably destroy, (cut up or crush), all Flat Twin and Pawn Shop parts including the Flat Twin pedestal support base.

— This verifiable destruction by the Soviet side would reverse the violation of the ABM treaty that has occurred with illegal deployment of an ABM radar at Gomel.

B. Should the Soviets agree to correct Gomel, and request more discussion about cutting and crushing, the U.S. delegation will advise Washington.

14. Other questions regarding Soviet compliance

A. Territorial defense

(1) The U.S. delegation should continue to emphasize that the totality and interrelationship of the ABM or ABM-related activities suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

(2) In doing this the U.S. delegation may draw upon the following points:

— There are a number of ABM and ABM-related activities in the Soviet Union which in their totality and interrelationship suggest that

the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, e.g., radar construction, concurrent operations, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility and the illegal deployment of ABM radars at Gomel.

— The U.S. side has repeatedly stressed that Large Phased-Array Radars would be the key element in providing a base for territorial defense. We have noted that the Soviet Union has built or is building a number of Large Phased-Array Radars which together could potentially support a nationwide ABM defense. The new deployment of three additional LPARs increases this concern.

— The deployment of the Large Phased-Array Radar at Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the ABM Treaty, can only lead the U.S. to regard with more concern other Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities.

— It is incumbent upon the Soviet Union, in addition to taking the necessary step of dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar, also to give clear and detailed explanations regarding other ABM and ABM-related activities.

3. FYI. In making these points the U.S. delegation should bear in mind the USG position stated to the Soviets in June 1985, during the NST negotiations, that it is not possible to violate Article I of the ABM treaty without violating at least one of the subsequent treaty provisions. End FYI.

B. SAM Upgrade

(1) In the ABM treaty review, the U.S. delegation should pursue the SAM upgrade issue only as a part of the U.S. territorial defense concern. In doing this the U.S. delegation may draw upon the following points:

— The U.S. has serious concerns about the potential ABM capability of Soviet SAMs. This concern predates the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union maintains a massive network of SAM missiles for strategic air defense.

— The Soviet development and testing of modern air defense systems that the U.S. believes have capabilities against some types of ballistic missiles adds to our concern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The U.S. has noted specifically the surface-to-air missile system known to the U.S. as the SA-12. Providing ABM capabilities to air defense missile systems would permit the rapid expansion of ABM forces beyond the treaty-established limit of 100 launchers for ABM interceptor missiles.

(2) The United States is still concerned that the SA-12 may have the capability to intercept Strategic Ballistic Missiles in flight.

C. Mobile ABM Components

(1) The U.S. delegation should note the inadequacies of Soviet explanations on the disposition of the third Pawn Shop that were provided during SCC-XXXIV.

(2) In doing this the U.S. delegation may draw upon the following points:

— The U.S. has repeatedly sought additional information with regard to the disposition of the unaccounted for Pawn Shop radar. None has been forthcoming from the Soviet side. The U.S. has asked the Soviet side how it can be sure that the Pawn Shop will no longer have application to the Soviet ABM program. We have not obtained a meaningful response from the Soviet Union.

— To resolve the U.S. concern about Soviet intentions, the USG believes that all Pawn Shop radars, including the radar near Moscow, must be destroyed.

D. Concurrent Operations

(1) The U.S. delegation should inform the Soviets that the “other categories” of concurrent activity are of concern to the U.S.

(2) In doing this, the U.S. delegation may draw upon:

— Incidents of concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM system components have created a long-standing concern on the part of the United States in the context of the provisions of Article VI of the ABM Treaty.

— The June 1985 common understanding deals exclusively with circumstances in which Strategic Ballistic Missiles or ABM interceptor missiles are in flight.

— The U.S. is also concerned about two other kinds of concurrent operations of ABM system components and air defense components that are not covered by the common understanding. One of these is the operation of ABM radars concurrently with the launches of SAM interceptor missiles. The other is the concurrent operation of ABM and air defense (SAM) radars when no Strategic Ballistic Missile or interceptor missile is in flight.

— It is incumbent upon the Soviet Union to terminate its practice of conducting type 2 and 3 activity.

E. Rapid Reload

(1) The U.S. delegation may draw upon the following points:

The Soviet Union has demonstrated the reload of an ABM interceptor launcher in much less than a day.

— The principal concern is with the High Acceleration Interceptor Missile launcher at Sary Shagan.

— This activity is of particular concern when considered with other Soviet activities which, in their totality and interrelationship,

suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

(2) The U.S. delegation should not respond to the Soviet definition of rapid reload nor discuss any U.S. definition.

15. U.S. ABM and ABM-Related Activity

— Should the Soviet side raise compliance issues concerning U.S. ABM or ABM-related systems or programs, the U.S. delegation should respond and may draw upon the following talking points to do so:

A. SMR

— As the Soviet side had not raised the SMR issue between SCC-XXIX and XXXIV, the U.S. side assumed the Soviets had reexamined the U.S. position and found that the U.S. was in compliance with the provisions of the treaty and there was no cause for further consideration of this issue.

— Section II, paragraph 6, of the agreed statement of November 1, 1978, states: “The term ‘tested in an ABM mode’ shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment.”

— The SMR was an instrumentation radar, not an ABM radar. One SMR was built and, upon completion of its instrumentation mission, was dismantled. Its operation was consistent with the 1978 agreed statement and common understanding which permit radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment to track strategic ballistic missiles without being considered “tested in an ABM mode” or classified as an ABM radar.

— The SMR was never “tested in an ABM mode” nor ever operated in conjunction with a radar “tested in an ABM mode” or during an ABM interceptor missile test.

— Because the SMR was an instrumentation radar and not an ABM radar, its movement from location to location at KMR was not limited by the ABM Treaty.

B. Designated Optical Tracker

— The device (do not use the term DOT) was not an ABM component (neither an ABM interceptor missile nor an ABM radar). It was not constructed and deployed for an ABM role. It was not “tested in an ABM mode.” It did not have the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.

— Nor was the device in question capable of substituting for an ABM component.

— Should the Soviets assert that DOT had been in violation of the Article V prohibition on the testing of other than fixed land-based ABM components, respond that the devices in question were launched

from fixed, land-based launchers and were not ABM components, thus Article V does not, in any way, apply.

C. Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)

— The Homing Overlay Experiment was permitted by the ABM Treaty.

— The Soviet side has reaffirmed in the defense and Space Talks that tests of fixed, land-based interceptors at agreed test ranges are compatible with the ABM treaty. HOE met those conditions.

— The HOE interceptor was assembled using a combination of available elements of decommissioned systems, off-the-shelf items, and a single non-nuclear kill mechanism. That mechanism successfully intercepted a simulated ICBM reentry vehicle outside the atmosphere.

— While the missile used in this test was not of a type constructed and deployed for an ABM role, it was of a type tested in an ABM mode as defined in Paragraph 1(A) of Article II of the ABM Treaty and further defined in Paragraphs 2 and 4(A) of Section II of the agreed statement of November 1978.

— Accordingly, this event was not a test or part of a development process to give a missile, other than an ABM interceptor missile, capability to counter Strategic Ballistic Missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or to test such a missile in an ABM mode. Therefore, the test of the HOE was not inconsistent with Article VI(A) or any other provision of the ABM Treaty.

— There have never been nor are there now any multiple-warhead ABM interceptors undergoing testing or development in the U.S. The HOE employed a single non-nuclear kill mechanism to destroy a single target. No elements of a multiple warhead were used. This test in no way violated agreed statement E.

— If asked, no radar guided the interceptor missile at any time. The Kaena point radar is an instrumentation radar. This radar was not tested in an ABM mode since it did not operate in conjunction with an ABM interceptor missile or ABM radar.

— If the Soviets raise, in relation to HOE, the issue of “other physical principles,” the U.S. delegation should seek guidance from Washington.

D. U.S. BMEW Radars

(1) Thule/Fylingdales

— The restrictions contained in the ABM Treaty on early warning radars do not apply to the facilities at Thule and Fylingdales. Article VI(B), which obligates the parties “not to deploy in the future” early warning radars except at locations along the periphery of their national territory and oriented outward, prohibits such deployments only after 1972. Neither side proposed, and the treaty does not contain, any

limitations on the modernization by replacement of permitted early warning radars which existed at the time the treaty entered into force. Therefore, there was no need for the provisions of the treaty to include explicit permission for the modernization of these radars. This is consistent with the treaty's approach of permitting the modernization and replacement of ABM systems and components.

— Nor does agreed statement F prohibit modernization of the early warning radars at Thule/Fylingdales by replacement with an LPAR. In agreed statement F, the parties agreed not to deploy LPARs, "except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification." Thus, agreed statement F limits LPARs to five uses: those permitted in ABM deployment areas (Article III), those at permitted ABM test ranges (Article IV), ballistic missile early warning radars at locations provided for in Article VI, space tracking radars, and radars for national technical means of verification. Since the facilities at Thule and Fylingdales are for early warning and were deployed prior to signing of the treaty, the modernization of the early warning radar facilities at those locations with LPARs does not constitute a "deployment" within the meaning of agreed statement F. Put another way, Article VI(B) "grandfathers" the Thule and Fylingdales radar sites for ballistic missile early warning purposes, not merely the specific equipment there at the time of the signing of the ABM treaty. Since the U.S. is only modernizing (by replacing) that equipment, agreed statement F does not prohibit these modernizations.

— Furthermore, the modernizations at Thule and Fylingdales are consistent with the intent and purpose behind Article VI(B) and agreed statement "F". These provisions were meant to ensure that the parties would not deploy LPARs in the interior of their territory which had the potential to perform ABM functions, yet preserved the early warning function which both parties recognized as necessary for stability and each party's national security.

— Article IX prohibits the deployment of ABM systems or their components outside the national territory of the parties and prohibits the transfer of ABM systems or their components to other states. However, the U.S. BMEWS radars are not ABM radars; they are early warning radars. They are not capable of substituting for ABM radars.

— The Soviet concern about radar potential is not relevant. The ABM treaty and agreed statements allow legitimate BMEWS radars to exceed the three million watt-meters-squared criterion.

— The dismantlement of the old existing radars at Thule is nearly complete, and will begin at Fylingdales shortly after the Phased-Array Radar becomes operational.

— If the Soviets again propose an agreement which would link Thule/Fylingdales with Krasnoyarsk, remind the Soviets that the USG has previously rejected such proposals.

— If the Soviets mention the moratorium on Krasnoyarsk construction and attempt to link this to a reciprocal moratorium on the Fylingdales modernization, the U.S. side should point out that the USG insists on dismantlement of the illegal Krasnoyarsk LPAR. This, however, has no bearing upon, and cannot in any way be linked to, the legal modernization of the existing early-warning radar at Fylingdales, as the situations are in no way analogous.

— Should the Soviet side raise the issue of contractor testimony, the U.S. delegation should respond that:

— The congressional testimony of the spokesmen for private contractors is not indicative of U.S. Government policy or positions; the portions of the testimony quoted were taken out of context by the Soviet side, their meaning distorted and,

— There is, in fact, no basis for the Soviets' charge that the Thule and proposed Fylingdales radars have within them elements which would upgrade their performance to that of ABM radars.

— In several sessions of the SCC, the Soviet Union has claimed the right to modernize its early warning radar system with modern technology in the form of LPARs, which were developed for the replacement of radars whose useful life had expired. It is logically inconsistent to assert that one side may modernize, by replacement non-ABM functions allowed by the ABM treaty, while denying that right to the other side.

(2) Fylingdales (text approved by UK):

— The Fylingdales radar facility is a BMEW radar facility in the United Kingdom that was deployed prior to the signing of the ABM Treaty. The treaty does not address modernization of BMEW radar facilities. Thus, the intended modernization of this radar would be fully consistent with U.S. treaty obligations.

(3) Clear (use only if Soviets raise an issue with the site):

— The facility at Clear, Alaska, is a BMEW radar deployed prior to the signing of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side recognized this fact during the negotiations.

— The U.S. has the right to maintain the current early warning capability or to modernize that capability based on its national interest and is not prohibited from doing so under the ABM Treaty.

E. PAVE PAWS

— PAVE PAWS radars are early warning radars for the detection of ballistic missile attack, primarily SLBM attack. They are located on the

periphery of U.S. national territory and oriented outward in full compliance with Subparagraph (B) of Article VI of the ABM Treaty.

— Because PAVE PAWS radars are Ballistic Missile Early Warning radars and are deployed as provided for in Article VI (B) of the treaty, they meet the restrictions of agreed statement “F”.

— The U.S. delegation should neither provide any information on PAVE PAWS nor compare the technical parameters of PAVE PAWS with the PARCS radar.

— If the Soviet side raises the matter of early warning coverage, the U.S. delegation should state that coverage is neither defined nor even mentioned in the ABM Treaty. The coverage of early warning radars must be sufficient to provide satisfactory warning to the side concerned, and providing the early warning radars in question are consistent with provisions of the ABM Treaty, there should be no question concerning their legality.

— If the Soviet side questions whether the azimuth FOV of 240 degrees makes the term “oriented outward” meaningless, the U.S. delegation should state that the purpose of PAVE PAWS is to provide early warning of ballistic missile attack primarily from the ocean areas. The use of 240 degrees for the FOV minimizes the number of radar sites needed for this purpose and takes into account the intent of the ABM Treaty which is to allow warning of attack from beyond the national territory.

— If the Soviet side claims that the U.S. has upgraded the PAVE PAWS radars the U.S. delegation should note that the Soviets have failed to provide information requested by the U.S. in order to substantiate such allegations.

— Should the Soviet side raise the issue of contractor testimony, the U.S. should respond that:

— The congressional testimony of spokesmen for private contractors is not indicative of U.S. Government policy or positions; the portions of the testimony quoted were taken out of context by the Soviet side and their meaning distorted and,

— There is, in fact, no basis for the Soviets’ charge that the PAVE PAWS-type radars have within them elements which would upgrade their performance to that of ABM radars.

F. General SDI

— The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative research program is designed to: (A) assess the feasibility of using advanced technologies to provide the basis for an informed decision to move toward a stable deterrent based increasingly upon the contribution of effective defensive systems and (B) provide a defensive technology base to be able to respond to Soviet violation of, or withdrawal from, the ABM Treaty.

(2) The Strategic Defense Initiative is consistent with all U.S. international obligations including its legal obligations under the ABM treaty, and supports U.S. national security policy. The U.S. will remain in compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty by ensuring that information passed to third nations does not contain ABM designs or specifications.

(3) In the near term, the SDI program provides a balance to the ongoing and extensive Soviet strategic defense research, development, testing, and deployment efforts. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to expand its anti-ballistic missile defense system beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. The U.S. is confident that the Strategic Defense Initiative will facilitate deep reductions in offensive ballistic missiles and enhance stability in the strategic relationship.

(4) When the President first announced the SDI program in March 1983, he made clear that it would be conducted "consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty." This commitment has been maintained.

(5) The 1972 ABM Treaty is an agreement that addresses the development, testing, and deployment of different types of ABM systems and components. It should be noted that nowhere does the ABM Treaty use the word "research." Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet delegation to the SALT I negotiations chose to place limitations on research, and the ABM Treaty makes no attempt to do so. The United States made clear during the ABM Treaty negotiations that development commences with the initiation of field testing of a prototype ABM system or component. The United States has traditionally distinguished "research" from "development" along the lines outlined by Harold Brown in a 1971 statement to the Soviet SALT I delegation. Research includes, but is not limited to, conceptual design and laboratory testing of systems and components designed for actual deployment. Development of a weapon system is usually associated with the construction and testing of one or more prototypes of the system or its major components. However, the construction of a prototype cannot necessarily be verified by National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. Therefore, in large part because of these verification difficulties, the ABM Treaty prohibition on the development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems, or components for such systems, applies when a prototype of a system or its components enters the field testing stage.

(6) The ABM Treaty regulates the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems whose components were defined in the 1972 treaty as consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Systems and components based on "other physical principles" are addressed only in an agreed statement to the treaty as

“ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars.” This agreed statement prohibits the deployment of such systems, but does not proscribe their development and testing regardless of basing mode. The SDI program will continue to be conducted in a manner that fully complies with all U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.

(7) Research and certain development and testing on defensive systems is not only permitted by the ABM Treaty, but was anticipated at the time the treaty was negotiated and signed. Both the United States and the Soviet Union supported this position in testimony to their respective legislative bodies. When the treaty was before the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird advocated in his testimony that the U.S. “vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM technology program.” In a statement before the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Marshal Grechko said the ABM Treaty “places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed towards solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes.”

(8) If the Soviets raise Article IX with respect to SDI and technology transfer to third parties, the U.S. component should respond along the following lines:

— All SDI research agreements with third parties have been and will be implemented in a manner consistent with U.S. international obligations, including the ABM treaty. The USG has adopted guidelines to ensure that all exchanges of data and research activities are conducted in full compliance with ABM treaty obligations not to transfer to other states ABM systems or components limited by the treaty, nor to provide technical descriptions of blueprints specially worked out for the construction of such systems or components.

G. SDI Programs

(1) Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment (FLAGE)

— FLAGE was an experimental program to investigate technologies that may have application for non-nuclear defense against tactical ballistic missiles. FLAGE was not a program to develop an ABM interceptor missile.

— FLAGE’s relationship to the U.S. SDI program neither constitutes nor implies ABM capability. The SDI program is a research program involved in the examination of technologies, not all of which are necessarily under consideration for ABM applications.

— On 21 May 1987, a test of the FLAGE device was conducted at White Sands Missile Range, in which a target missile was intercepted and destroyed. Previous tests were conducted against targets, specially

constructed to have simple radar signatures, which were not ballistic missiles. The May 1987 test was a "proof-of-principle" experiment intended to resolve critical technology issues associated with a non-nuclear, "hit-to-kill," defense against tactical ballistic missiles. The test verified guidance and control techniques for the interception of tactical ballistic missiles within the atmosphere.

— This experiment, like all aspects of the FLAGE program, was fully consistent with the ABM Treaty, in that it did not involve ABM systems or components, prototypes thereof, or devices with ABM capability, and the device involved was not tested in an ABM mode.

— FLAGE was an experimental test device and was not intended to be an operational system of any type. The FLAGE device was not an ABM component and specifically was not an ABM interceptor missile. It was neither constructed nor deployed for an ABM role, nor was it a prototype of, nor capable of substituting for, an ABM interceptor missile.

— The FLAGE device was not on this or any other occasion tested in an ABM mode. It has not been tested against a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. The target for the 21 May 1987 test was a Lance short-range, surface-to-surface tactical ballistic missile, a type which does not, and did not during this test, have the characteristics of a Strategic Ballistic Missile or its elements in flight trajectory. The target missile was intercepted at an altitude of 12,000 feet and both it and the FLAGE device were destroyed.

— The launcher for the FLAGE device was not an ABM launcher nor has it been tested in an ABM mode. Since the FLAGE experiment did not involve ABM components, the question of the launcher's mobility is irrelevant.

(2) Airborne Optical Adjunct (AOA)

FYI: This is a future program (i.e., no observable test or experimental activity has taken place). The Soviets have not formally identified this activity as AOA, but only as an "aircraft system." Consequently, in responding to the soviets, the component should not refer to a specific program (i.e., AOA, AOS, or OAMP). End FYI.

If the Soviets raise this issue:

— State, if appropriate, that no planned U.S. activity will violate the provisions of the ABM Treaty;

— State that no ongoing U.S. activity is inconsistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty;

— State, if appropriate, that the sides should only consider Soviet concerns regarding activities observable by NTM which the U.S. actually had undertaken in carrying out the SDI program.

(3) Skylite Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL)/beam director experiment talking points

— The Skylite program is a future program and should not be discussed beyond saying that:

— This is a future program (i.e., no observable test or experimental activity has taken place).

— The U.S. has not conducted a demonstration observable by NTM (e.g., experiments taking place within a laboratory).

— No planned U.S. activity will violate the provisions of the ABM treaty,

— No ongoing U.S. activity is inconsistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty,

— The sides should limit themselves to considering Soviet concerns regarding activities observable by NTM which the U.S. actually had undertaken in carrying out the SDI program.

FYI: The 1985 test concerning the MIRACL laser and the Titan missile stage could have been observed by NTM. The only aspect of the MIRACL laser that may be discussed is the September 1985 Titan destruction test. End FYI:

— The device used was not an ABM system or component. It was not capable of countering a Strategic Ballistic Missile or its elements in flight trajectory.

— The device was not tested in an ABM mode.

— Therefore, it was not subject to ABM Treaty constraints.

— Testing of non-ABM devices at an established ABM test range is not precluded by the ABM Treaty.

(4) Nuclear Tests and the ABM Treaty

— The SDI research program is focused primarily on non-nuclear technologies. However, as the U.S. Government has consistently stated, it is critical to the program to explore the feasibility and significance of nuclear-driven, directed-energy concepts, in order to understand the potential impact of any such systems that the Soviet Union might develop, as well as to determine the feasibility of these concepts for future SDI options.

— Testing related to the feasibility of nuclear-driven, directed-energy concepts is in conformity with the ABM Treaty. It does not involve an ABM component or testing in an ABM mode.

— The ABM treaty does not prohibit such underground nuclear testing, wherever conducted.

— The Soviet Union has pursued nuclear-driven, directed-energy related research and some of the work in the open literature predates work done in the West.

(5) Activities at Shemya (Queen Match) talking points:

— The activities at Shemya are entirely consistent with the ABM Treaty and international law.

— Soviet allegations to the contrary are based on the premise that the activity at Shemya involves ABM components. Since the only activity that has taken place at Shemya to date has been construction of support facilities, there is no factual basis on which the Soviet Union can reach such a conclusion or raise such an objection.

— The facilities built at Shemya support activities which are fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The activity at Shemya supports technology research and the collection of data, and is carried out in a manner and for purposes which are fully consistent with the ABM Treaty and the recognized principles of international law and will be used for purposes of early warning and national technical means of verification.

— The data collection device in question is not an ABM component or a prototype thereof. It is specifically designed for the collection of data. It has no acquisition, tracking, or guidance capabilities, and thus is not capable of substituting for an ABM radar.

— If the Soviets again attempt to draw analogies between activity at Shemya and activity observed earlier at Kwajalein from 1978 to 1982, the delegation should point out that:

(1) The activity at Kwajalein did not involve ABM components or testing in an ABM mode; and

(2) Soviet speculation concerning earlier activity which occurred elsewhere has no bearing on the legality of the activity at Shemya.

— The activity at Shemya is not prohibited by Article III because the U.S. is not deploying ABM systems or their components at Shemya. Article V does not apply because the activity at Shemya does not involve the development, testing, or deployment of ABM systems or their components.

— Since the device in question is not an ABM component or capable of substituting for one, the question of its basing mode (per Article V.1) is irrelevant. FYI: Although the Queen Match sensor performs its function while temporarily in space, it is in fact launched from a fixed, land based launcher, and thus its basing mode is regarded by the U.S. as being fixed land-based rather than mobile space-based. End FYI.

— The booster used to launch the device in question is not an ABM interceptor missile, is not capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile, and has not been tested in an ABM mode.

— In short, the activities at Shemya do not and will not involve ABM systems or components or devices capable of substituting for them, nor the development and testing of such devices, nor testing in an ABM mode. Unless in the future the Soviet Union observes and

identifies such activity, the Soviet side has no basis in fact or logic to continue this item on the SCC agenda.

(6) Shemya Contingency

The following talking points may be draw upon if the Soviets raise the issue of a Soviet visit to Shemya. Included are talking points which may be used if the Soviets raise such an issue in the context of the U.S. visit to Gomel and Moscow.

— There is no basis for a Soviet visit to Shemya. All activity there is fully compliant with the ABM Treaty and international law.

— In accepting the Soviet invitation to inspect the ABM radars at Gomel and Moscow, the U.S. emphasized that the visit could not be regarded as a precedent for future inspections and that the invitation was accepted with no preconditions of reciprocity. Verification of the provisions of the ABM Treaty is based on national technical means.

— This situation is in sharp contrast to the situation at Gomel, where U.S. NTM observed ABM radars which had been tested in an ABM mode whose presence there is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

— The U.S. side has repeatedly explained to the Soviet side the nature and purpose of the activity at Shemya. Those activities which have taken place have not violated the ABM Treaty, and no planned activity will violate the treaty. This can be verified by national technical means.

— The facilities built at Shemya support activities which are fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The activity at Shemya supports technology research and the collection of data for purposes fully consistent with the ABM Treaty.

(7) Delta 180

— This experiment was fully compliant with the ABM Treaty. No ABM components were used during this experiment. Neither vehicle had the flight trajectory characteristics of a Strategic Ballistic Missile or its elements. Thus, this experiment did not constitute a test in an ABM mode as defined in the ABM Treaty.

— The experiment was designed so that the range, speed, orbital parameters, relative velocities, and sensor limitations precluded any possibility that the vehicles would have ABM capability or that the experiment involved a test in an ABM mode.

— This experiment's objective was to collect a variety of data in a space environment. To do this, both vehicles contained a variety of sensors. The orbit of each vehicle was controlled so we could accurately evaluate the performance of the sensors. Because we wanted to evaluate the guidance laws appropriate to a hit-to-kill vehicle, and because of the very sensitive and time-critical vehicle dynamics, it was necessary to program the vehicles for a collision. This aided our ability to gather

valid signature data because of the limited resolution of several of the sensors.

— The STM experiment could not meet its objectives unless it was conducted in space. In particular, we needed to validate guidance laws using actual vehicles accelerating over great distances.

— The STM vehicle is not suitable for modification to give it ABM capability. It used off-the-shelf items with inherent performance limitations.

— Inherently limited sensor capabilities required the STM encounter to occur at relative speeds significantly below those required for an ICBM intercept. This enhanced the scientific data gathered and ensured that there was no conflict with the ABM Treaty. Realistic space intercepts of ICBM boosters would require relative speeds much greater than is possible with the STM equipment.

— The guided vehicle required an orbital safety and flight termination destruct package to conduct the experiment prudently. This destruct package was necessary to ensure that certain classified components would not survive reentry intact. The device used was a modified, non-nuclear, warhead with almost all the metal components replaced with fiberglass counterparts. The use of fiberglass minimized the amount of fragmentation into debris, and allowed U.S. to study certain shock phenomena. The device was also used during the intercept.

— The agreed statement of November 1, 1978, provides in part that an interceptor missile is considered to be “tested in an ABM mode” if it has attempted to intercept (successfully or not) a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. Likewise a radar is considered to be “tested in an ABM mode” if it performs certain functions such as tracking ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in conjunction with an ABM radar which is tracking and guiding an ABM interceptor missile.

— “Strategic Ballistic Missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,” used in the treaty, also refers to ballistic target-missiles which, after being launched, are used for testing these ABM system components in an ABM mode, and the flight trajectories of which, over the portions of the flight trajectory involved in such testing, have the characteristics of the flight trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile or its elements.

— Delta 180 was not a test in an ABM mode. Neither vehicle was a strategic ballistic missile or one of its elements, nor did either follow a ballistic missile trajectory. Instead, both vehicles travelled in orbit in space. Neither vehicle was an ABM interceptor missile, nor did the experiment involve an ABM launcher or an ABM radar.

(8) Delta 181 (Significant Technical Milestone (STM) II) Talking Points:

- The Delta 181 experiment complied fully with the ABM Treaty.
- The purpose of the Delta 181 experiment was to evaluate phenomenology associated with the detection and tracking of space objects.
- The experiments were launched on a Delta rocket from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on 8 February 1988. The payload included both passive and active sensors, none of which were capable of performing an ABM function. The sensors observed twelve test objects, none of which followed the trajectory of a Strategic Ballistic Missile or its elements in flight.
- The Delta 181 mission experiments included the collection of data and its subsequent retrieval. The data collection consisted of deployment of the test objects and observations of them and other phenomena by the sensors against various backgrounds and in several environments, as well as observation of a sounding rocket launched from Barking Sands, Hawaii. Neither the orbiting test objects nor the sounding rocket followed the flight trajectory of a Strategic Ballistic Missile or its elements. Additionally, none of the sensors was capable of independently locating and tracking the test objects. Finally, there was no real-time downlink of the sensor data, nor did such capability exist. Therefore, the Delta 181 experiment in no way constituted a test in an ABM mode.
- Delta 181 had no hardware which was ABM capable, nor any devices capable of substituting for ABM components. Delta 181 did not involve a “test in an ABM mode.” Therefore, the Delta 181 experiment complied fully with the ABM Treaty.
- If the Soviets allege that the involvement of the Kwajalein and White Sands ABM test ranges is in some way prohibited, the U.S. delegation should state:
 - The 1978 agreed statement allows the testing of non-ABM equipment at ABM test ranges.
 - If the Soviet delegation charges that the U.S. is undertaking a U.S. territorial defense, the U.S. delegation should state:
 - The goal of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative program is to conduct a vigorous research and technology development program to assess the feasibility of using advanced technologies to provide the basis for an informed decision to move toward a stable deterrent based increasingly upon the contribution of effective defensive systems.
 - Our long-term goal is to develop a safer and more stable means of deterring aggression. Deterrence would be strengthened significantly and placed on a more stable foundation by reducing the role

of offensive ballistic missile weapons and placing greater reliance on strategic defense.

— The Strategic Defense Initiative program is consistent with all U.S. international obligations including its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty.

— In the near term, the SDI program provides a balance to the on-going and extensive Soviet strategic defense research, development, testing and development efforts.

— The U.S. is confident that an effective Strategic Defense Initiative will facilitate deep reductions in strategic offensive forces and enhance stability in the strategic relationship.

— When the President first announced the SDI program in March 1983, he made clear that it would be conducted “consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty.” This commitment remains in force.

— The SDI is a research and technology program. Hence it could not possibly constitute a base for a deployed ABM system for a defense of the territory of a country.

— The Soviets also know that such research is allowed and willingly acknowledged it when, in a major statement before the Soviet Presidium in 1972, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko stated that the ABM Treaty “. . . places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed toward solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strike.”

— SDI is a research program to explore promising new technologies and will permit an informed policy decision in the early 1990s regarding possible future development. Under presidential direction the overall SDI program is under constant review to ensure that all SDI efforts will be fully consistent with our international legal obligations including the ABM treaty.

277. Editorial Note

On August 24, 1988, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency General William F. Burns met with Chief of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Viktor Karpov to discuss the upcoming review of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Robert Linhard of the National Security Council staff relayed Burns’s account of the meeting to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Colin Powell in an electronic message on

August 24, 12:40 p.m.: "We have Bill Burns calling in after each session in Geneva so that we stay ahead of the action there. Call today related the following: Bill had lunch (one-on-one) with Viktor Karpov. Karpov suggested that, in the interest of avoiding deteriorating relations, the Soviets are prepared to deal with the K-radar [Krasnoyarsk radar]. They recognize that it is in the wrong location. They would be prepared to eliminate all but its Spacetrack functions (e.g., by electronic or physical baffles to constrain the angle of the radar beam) and permit unilateral OSI to confirm this. To go further will be difficult in Moscow; given the expense involved, they want to use the facility if possible. When Bill did not bite, Viktor went further to note that, to avoid any worsening of US/USSR relations, they may have to take the first step and destroy the radar. If the situation is resolved to US satisfaction, they would expect some phrase in the joint statement issued after the ABM Treaty Review to express mutual satisfaction with the ABM Treaty. When pressed on what that meant, Viktor dropped the subject. Viktor did add that, of course, if K-radar worked, the Soviets would dismantle Gomel. Viktor also added that Shevardnadze wants something to come out of this ABM Treaty review session that 'he and Shultz can build upon' in September. We will have to wait and see what all this means. Bill is handling this well. He did not bite (or show much interest) in anything short of total destruction of K-radar. His is not asking for any added guidance at this point; recommends we listen to what the Soviets have to say over the next few days. I agree. He did debrief his delegation on the conversation, so we may face a leak or two over the next few days. Bill says that, so far, the dozen or so U.S. 'experts' in Geneva are behaving like 'little ladies and gentlemen' with each other. Tomorrow (Thursday) will be the first official plenary session. Both sides will bash each other 'for the record' and get this behind us. Following the plenary, Bill will have a 3-on-3 session (Burns+Cooper and Ellis) with Karpov and two other Godless Commies to be named later. There is a social event Friday evening. Max arrives in Geneva on Monday. He (Max) and Bill will have dinner with Viktor and Obukov on Tuesday. So far, so good." (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81686) The Mission in Geneva transmitted a memorandum of conversation of Burns's meeting with Karpov in telegram 9445, August 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880747–0565)

In an August 25 electronic message, Linhard wrote Powell: "The 1st plenary and post-plenary sessions went down today. Only one surprise. The Soviets 'expressed concern' about a new radar at VARDØ, Norway, that 'came on the air' in 1987 and which produces 'emissions close to the ABM radars tested at Kwajalein' in the Pacific. We are trying to run down what this radar is. STATE/EUR called the del to tell them not to refer to it in reporting, as it is sensitive. We still haven't

run this to ground. When we get data on the radar later today, we will add to this update. All other discussions went as expected. No further movement of feelers on the K-radar issue.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration) The Mission in Geneva transmitted a summary report of the first plenary in telegram 9487 from Geneva, August 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880752–0289) The Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva transmitted a memorandum of conversation of the post-plenary “3-on-3” session between U.S. and Soviet officials in telegram 9515 from Geneva, August 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880755–0910)

In an August 27 electronic message, Linhard wrote Powell: “Bill called me from Geneva today to debrief on his lunch with Viktor. He laid it on pretty heavy that we needed to resolve the K-radar via acceptable means now, not in the future. Karpov ran the expected gambits of alternative approaches (modify the radar, etc.), but Bill gave no slack. Bill also made it clear that there will be no statement of satisfaction with the ABM Treaty, in fact, there will be no Joint Statement at all after the review if the K-radar is not resolved. Finally, he told Karpov that the clock is ticking on the review, and that it was time that we start seeing some of the Soviet flexibility on this issue in the formal presentations. Karpov said that he would have to talk to Shevardnadze, and would do so. He also said that it is important that if the USSR moves, the US not ‘rub its nose in it’ in response. He also said that Karpov hinted that this could be worked out on Tuesday evening (when Max arrives for dinner). Bill said that he told Karpov that that would be unacceptable, and the Soviets need to start playing cards on Monday at the latest. I intend to call Max and make it clear to him that he needs to make it clear to the Soviets at the onset and in unambiguous terms that he is not there to ‘close the deal’ on the ABM Treaty Review. I will try to get to Max today. He leaves Sunday for Geneva. This is a Max generated trip, to have dinner with Karpov and Obukov (Burns also invited). The delegation will take Sunday off.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81802) Reference is to Sunday, August 28. The Mission in Geneva transmitted a memorandum of conversation of Burns’s meeting with Karpov in telegram 9552 from Geneva, August 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880759–0032)

In an August 30 electronic message, Linhard wrote Powell: “Per our phone conversation, I did talk to Bill Burns this morning after his lunch with Karpov. Karpov made the following points.—He has no instructions from Moscow authorizing a destruction of K-radar.—He proposed some language for a joint statement that expressed satisfaction with ABM Treaty and looked to the future.—(After Burns rejected this),

he said there is a faction in Kremlin that is strongly opposed to the destruction of the radar.—He said that he could informally offer an idea discussed before he left Moscow in the Kremlin, that being that the US and USSR jointly man and operate the K-radar as a joint venture in deep space tracking. Burns said that he would report the idea, but that the US position is that this violation must be corrected by being taken down. Burns asked for guidance on how to handle this, saying he needed it by 1300 today (Wash time), prior to his dinner tonight with Karpov. Burns recommended that we simply say that the proposal is not acceptable for the purposes of the ABM Treaty Review (will require further study and could be discussed at Shultz-Shevardnadze). For the review, it cannot end satisfactorily without a firm commitment to take the K-radar down. Therefore, the US proposes the Wednesday be the last day of the review, and that each side will issue its statement (but no joint statement). He would also tell Karpov on the side that we will study the Soviet idea. Having done this, Bill would end the review on Wednesday. He would not have a press conference in Geneva, but simply issue the US statement that has been worked. We would have no White House statement at this time, but would have a Q&A package available to handle questions. We have turned the action over to the ABM Treaty Review backstopping group for action prior to 1300 today. We intend that I will pass instructions to Bill Burns at 1300. We will follow-up with an instructions cable later today. We will also generate press guidance against the Sovs leaking. The current thinking is that we should make it clear that the informal proposal is not acceptable. It does not provide the 'lead time protection' necessary and originally provided by the treaty. We will move in this direction. Therefore, based on the rationale we discussed, intend to tell Burns to 'just say no!' and not imply that we are studying or interested in this 'informal' proposal. Burns's basic points would be:—he has reported Karpov's informal idea to Washington;—the US has looked at variations on this idea in the past, and it is unacceptable because it does not restore the lead time protection that the ABM Treaty intended by prohibiting such radars;—the K-radar must come down to restore that protection and correct the violation;—the review cannot end satisfactorily (e.g., joint statement expressing mutual view that treaty is working) without Soviet commitment to a resolution of K-radar and Gomel (e.g., to take the radars down);—review should end Wednesday. Judyt Mandel will ensure that the West Coast has a copy of the statement that Burns will release in Geneva tomorrow and any additional press material we produce today to handle contingencies." (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81879) Reference is to Wednesday, August 31. No other record of Linhard's telephone conversation was found. The Mission in Geneva transmitted an assessment of the ABM

Treaty Review in telegram 9620, August 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880765–0277)

In an August 31 electronic message William Heiser of the National Security Council staff wrote Powell: “The ABM Treaty Review Conference was concluded today without Soviet agreement to correct its Treaty violations at Krasnoyarsk and Gomel. General Burns released to the press in Geneva the Washington-approved US unilateral statement, a copy of which has been given to our press office.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81952) Telegram 9698 from the Mission in Geneva, August 31, transmitted the text of the unilateral statement, which began: “The United States and the Soviet Union conducted the third review of the ABM Treaty as required at five-year intervals by the provisions of that treaty. The review was conducted from August 24, 1988 to August 31, 1988. The U.S. delegation was led by William F. Burns, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. During the review, the United States emphasized the importance of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, which are a threat to the viability of the treaty. Throughout the review conference, the Soviet Union gave no indication that it was prepared to correct the violations without linking their agreement to do so to unacceptable demands.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy, Electronic Telegrams, D880770–0417)

278. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, September 12, 1988, 1636Z

10050. PM for Mr. Harrison Only; EUR for Mr. Thomas Only; C for Mr. Ramee Only; D for Dr. Timbie Only; S/ARN for Mr. Clyne Only From Edward Ifft. Subject: Krasnoyarsk and other Favorites.

Conversation on Krasnoyarsk

1. At an otherwise uneventful lunch with Yuri Roslyakov on September 8 (reported septel),² the topic of the Krasnoyarsk radar came up, and I thought it best to report this only in this channel. I noted our disappointment with the ABM Treaty review. I said Karpov had

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880810–0870. Secret; Immediate.

² Reference is to telegram 10035 from NST Geneva, September 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880808–0075)

started out the week with the statement that the Soviet side is prepared to tear down the radar (or its equipment, whatever that means) in exchange for some joint statement about the treaty. This had seemed to me a promising approach, but Karpov did not follow through and, by the end of the review, was claiming he had no authority to offer to tear down the radar. This was a curious performance.

2. Roslyakov said that Karpov had some “golden words,” which he could not remember exactly, by which the sides would commit themselves to “observe” the ABM Treaty for some period of time. I said the Soviet side could not get such a commitment in exchange for Krasnoyarsk. Any attempt to do so would quickly run into the issues D and S has been unable to resolve—legal status of a non-withdrawal commitment, broad vs. narrow interpretation, time period, etc. What might have been possible, though by no means certain, if Karpov had agreed to dismantle the radar and settle Gomel, was some joint statement to the effect that the sides consider that the treaty is operating satisfactorily. This should have been sufficient for the Soviet side, but the opportunity was missed.

3. Roslyakov said that Karpov and General Burns had agreed to meet again in Geneva on or about September 15 to try again to find a solution. He thought it was good for these two to work on the problem without 20 people in the room. I said I had no knowledge of such a Karpov-Burns meeting, although Karpov had said the sides should continue to work on the problem prior to the Shultz-Shevardnadze.³ I asked whether Karpov had described this meeting as firmly scheduled or only as a possibility. Roslyakov replied that Karpov described it as definitely agreed. He added that perhaps Karpov was mistaken. In any case, this is evidently a sensitive matter.

4. Roslyakov told me August 31 that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a stupid mistake. He now added that those responsible are dead and we cannot expect any solution which humiliates Gorbachev, who was not to blame. He called attention to the fact that the link to Thule and Fylingdales had been essentially dropped, although they were mentioned by Karpov. He thought this was a significant move by the Soviet side that the U.S. side had missed. I said I had noticed and welcomed the change on Thule and Fylingdales. I also understood the Soviet sensitivity to any humiliation of Gorbachev. However, the Soviet side must understand that the U.S. cannot be in the position of appearing to pay something in exchange for the correction of Soviet violation. Roslyakov then remarked that there is a real question whether the issue must be

³ Shevardnadze met with Shultz and Reagan in Washington on September 22 and September 23. Memoranda of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 171–177.

resolved now. Perhaps, from the Soviet point of view, it would be better to settle the problem in the next administration.

5. I strongly urged him to understand the seriousness of the situation. The U.S. has essentially no flexibility on the issue—the only solution is to dismantle the radar. If this does not happen soon, events could be set in motion which would be hard to control. Roslyakov objected that U.S.-Soviet relations are now reasonably good and the U.S. would not want to provoke a “crisis” during the election campaign. I said he failed to understand the U.S. electorate—a very tough stand on Krasnoyarsk would be popular with the U.S. public. Furthermore, waiting for a new administration could be a big mistake if events in the next few months serve to limit the options the new administration will have. Roslyakov took these points, but seemed unconvinced.

6. One other tidbit from this conversation is that Armand Hammer, who was on his way to Moscow, told Obukhov and Roslyakov September 7 that President Reagan is eager for another summit with Gorbachev. Roslyakov threw cold water on this idea, saying it was unlikely to happen. This completes the memcon portion of this message.

Comments on Krasnoyarsk

7. I fear the Soviets do not understand the seriousness of the situation or what bad things could happen if it is not resolved. I talked independently to Karpov, Obukhov and Roslyakov at the U.S. reception August 31 just after the review had collapsed. None of them seemed at all concerned or disappointed. I might add that some members of the U.S. delegation were full of undisguised glee at the fact that the problem had not been resolved. I think Roslyakov's remark noted above may explain a lot. From the Soviet point of view, it makes no sense that a U.S. administration which has worked hard and successfully to develop reasonably good U.S.-Soviet relations would kick that all away in its final days over an issue which has been around for years. While that is perfectly logical from their point of view, it fails to understand the forces at work in and on the USG right now.

8. The only advice I have to suggest is to do the obvious thing that was curiously not attempted during the review. This is to work in parallel on a commitment to dismantle Krasnoyarsk and language for a joint statement saying something positive about the ABM Treaty. Assuming both parts of the deal were accepted, the statement could be signed by either Shultz and Shevardnadze or Burns and Karpov.

9. We also should accept the Soviet suggestion to develop criteria for determining the difference between ABM radars and Spacetrack radars (I would also add NTM radars). This would provide a small fig leaf for Gorbachev. It should also be in our interest, since it was the failure of the two sides to do this in 1972 which provided the cover story

the Soviets apparently thought would make Krasnoyarsk acceptable. Failure to work out such criteria now would just invite the Krasnoyarsk problem to be repeated all over again in the future.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

Hammer

279. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Negroponte)¹

Washington, September 8, 1988, 3:02 p.m.

SUBJECT

SDI and Abrahamson Interview

General,

There was an article in today's *Post*² about SDI saying Abe had given an interview in which he said he could cut program costs. Thought you might like an update on facts.

The cost for Phase-I that had made Frank choke was \$120B. Of that, about \$60–65B was for 300 garages carrying 10 Space-based Interceptors (SBI) each. The rest of cost was for sensors (BSTS, SSTS & LWIR ground-launched probes) an additional 100 ERIS ground based interceptors. Based upon the JCS requirements, set at the 1st DAB, this mix was designed to kill 50% of SS-18 force and 30% of remainder of attacking ballistic force.

After "Brilliant Pebbles" gave USAF Space Division a scare, the cost of the SDI has dropped from \$60–65B to \$15B. This is due to the following:

a. the number of garages and interceptors (total) dropped from 300/3000 to 147/1470 while the number of ERIS is going up to about 1700;

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 82191. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Steiner, Tobey, Brooks, Mandel, Heiser, and Mahley. Sent through Stevens and Perito.

² For the original interview, see John H. Cushman, Jr., "Pentagon Official Proposes Cost Cut For Space Weapon," *New York Times*, September 8, 1988, p. A1.

b. the sensor capability of each garage was also reduced to some extent basically cutting out redundancy with SSTS satellites, but making the value of each SSTS even greater and,

c. some cost savings.

As the cost of SBI dropped, the cost of the ERIS went up a bit and the costs of the sensors was also adjusted. Some cost increases in the SSTS satellites were avoided by dropping the requirement that SSTS be able to do the mid-course discrimination necessary to target ERIS against late mid-course targets. To do this targeting, additional requirements were levied on the ground-launched LWIR probes.

The overall cost of this package (147 SBI garages, SSTS, BSTS, ground-launch probes, and 1700 ERIS) should come out slightly under \$60B down from \$120B.

Brilliant Pebbles still claims to be able to do the same mission for about \$10B. Abe intends to present brilliant pebbles as a lower cost potential solution to the DAB in early October (12th). The baseline case he will present is the \$60B program—but he will also offer a lower cost/high risk “brilliant pebbles” program option, and a lower cost all ground-based option.

Please protect the summary provided above. Abe has not shared this detail as yet with many in DOD.

**280. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President
and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to
Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, September 15, 1988

SUBJECT

Brilliant Pebbles

Two days ago, I was briefed by Lowell Wood from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Jack Hammond, Director of Directed Energy Weapons at SDIO, on the “brilliant pebbles” concept. If a system such as the one that Wood and Hammond described is

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, September 1988. Secret; Sensitive.

feasible, then it may hold the promise to meet our criteria of survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margin.

Under this concept, the United States would place into orbit some 6000–10,000 small interceptors that would destroy Soviet ballistic missiles and warheads by impact. Each interceptor would be capable of locating and destroying missiles or post-boost vehicles autonomously. Software packages would protect against “decoy launches” exhausting the defenses locally to create a “window” through which a larger number of missiles could be launched. “Safe launch areas” on Soviet territory could be designated to prevent an interceptor from shooting at civilian payloads. With approximately 10% of these interceptors over Soviet ICBM fields at any one time and with global coverage of SLBM launch areas, Wood believes that this constellation would meet the JCS Phase I requirement to negate 50% of Soviet SS–18 RVs and 30% of the other RVs.

Livermore is advertising that these interceptors would be based on innovative packaging of otherwise commercially available technologies. Miniaturization of the sensing, computing and propulsion technologies are at the heart of the brilliant pebbles concept. Of particular note is an on-board computer which has 80% of the computing power of a Cray–1 supercomputer, but is packaged on a board the size of a cassette using a new laser etching technique and commercially available highly integrated Japanese chips. This capability would support all onboard sensing, computations and autonomous decision-making functions.

Given the small size (about 36” long by 12” diameter), low weight (about 10kg) and the availability of the basic technologies, Wood believes that a constellation of 6000 interceptors with a ten year life design could be produced and launched for about \$3 billion, or a production/launch cost of about \$500,000 per copy. By comparison, a deployed SS–18 costs about \$100 million over ten years. Wood estimated that Soviet nuclear ASATs could cost about 50 times more than each radiation- and EMP-hardened interceptor. In principle, such characteristics could make a substantial contribution to achieving our survivability and cost-effectiveness criteria.

Wood reported that Abrahamson requested ten months ago that a fully integrated vehicle be constructed. The technology development had been underway for some two years. Ground testing of the sensor and propulsion components will begin next summer, with space testing possibly beginning next summer. Much of this work can be done within the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Further investigation needs to be done, especially on assessing both the effectiveness and costs of the constituent technologies and the deployed interceptors, and the capability of U.S. industry to fabricate such miniaturized components as envisioned by Wood.

281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 16, 1988

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Letter on Krasnoyarsk

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin called on me today. He delivered a Gorbachev letter responding to your August 12 message² on Krasnoyarsk (an unofficial translation is attached). Gorbachev:

- writes that we should not let “mutual” complaints about ABM Treaty compliance undermine what we have achieved;

- recalls the Soviet offer to dismantle the “equipment” at Krasnoyarsk if we agree to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972;

- repeats alleged Soviet concerns about U.S. radars at Thule and Fylingdales Moor (although without linking these directly to Krasnoyarsk) and the Soviet request to visit the Thule radar; and

- offers to discuss measures to convert Krasnoyarsk into an international space research center, and invites U.S. scientists to travel there to explore this.

There is no suggestion of any physical changes to the radar facility in the process of its proposed conversion to a “center for international cooperation in peaceful space activities.” I put the question directly to Dubinin; he could not answer.

The Soviets appear to be seeking a fig leaf to resolve the Krasnoyarsk issue. At first glance, this seems little more than a variation of the “joint manning” idea informally floated to General Burns during the ABM Treaty review. If so, our response can only be negative: it neither corrects the violation nor lengthens the lead-time for ABM breakout that the Soviets have gained through construction of Krasnoyarsk to date. In fact, conversion of the radar to a “research center” would presumably entail our agreement to completion and activation of the radar.

Whether Gorbachev’s letter represents the final Soviet word or an opening gambit setting the stage for Shevardnadze to offer something more substantial next week remains to be seen. I intend to press

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8890725, 8890750). Secret; Sensitive. According to the NSC correspondence profile, Reagan noted the memorandum and letter on September 20. (Ibid.)

² See Document 273, and footnote 1 thereto.

Shevardnadze hard on meeting our concern over Krasnoyarsk, and tell him that this idea does not suffice.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan³

Moscow, September 13, 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I have read your letter of August 12 very carefully.

I would like, in the frank and constructive spirit that characterizes our dialogue, to share with you my thoughts regarding the question of ABM Treaty compliance raised in your letter.

This question has been repeatedly discussed both by ourselves and by our experts, most recently during the latest consultations to review the ABM Treaty. In the course of the negotiations the sides have stated their concerns regarding compliance with the treaty. Regrettably, thus far the US representatives have failed to provide persuasive answers to the questions we raised, while the Soviet side has clarified in great detail the situation surrounding the radar which was under construction in the Krasnoyarsk area, having reiterated that it is not a missile attack warning radar. In light of our answers the complaints expressed again and again by the US side cause perplexity and suggest that, perhaps, there are some other, more far-reaching calculations behind them.

I think you will agree with me that it would be impardonable if our mutual complaints about the violations of the ABM Treaty were to undermine all that we, thanks to the efforts of both sides, have succeeded in accomplishing to improve US-Soviet relations. With the aim of not allowing this to occur we have, as a gesture of good will, not only discontinued the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, but have also expressed willingness to dismantle its equipment, if our countries reach agreement to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. Such a solution would represent a true confirmation of the commitment of the sides to the ABM Treaty, a commitment about which you, Mr. President, have repeatedly spoken and written to me.

³ No classification marking. Printed from the official translation prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of State, which bears Gorbachev's typed signature.

At the same time I cannot fail to emphasize that we are increasingly concerned over the situation that has arisen in connection with the construction of US radars in Thule and Fylingdales Moor. In the assessment of our experts, the now operational Thule radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. Your specialists deny that. But, as you know, an American proverb says: "Seeing is believing". So we are hoping that you will agree to a visit of this radar by Soviet specialists.

As for the Krasnoyarsk radar, I wish to inform you of our decision which will once and for all put an end to all speculations about its nature, to wit: we are ready to establish on the base of this radar a center for international cooperation in the interest of the peaceful use of outer space. This center could be incorporated into the system of a World Space Organization which we proposed, so as to make it possible for all states to participate in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

We are prepared to discuss with United States' representatives, as well as with other interested countries, the concrete measures that would make it possible to transform the Krasnoyarsk radar into a Center for International Cooperation in Peaceful Space Activities. I would like, through your intermediary, to invite American scientists to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar in order to discuss the questions connected therewith.

In conclusion, I wish to express my hope that your administration, Mr. President, will be guided in its practical actions by the desire to preserve the ABM Treaty as an important instrument for maintaining strategic stability in conditions where our two countries—I believe the agreement on that is not far away—will be implementing the 50 percent reduction in their strategic offensive arms. In this context, we will expect the US side also to take practical steps which would remove our concern over the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

Respectfully,

M. Gorbachev

282. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

Limitations on OPP ABM Testing In Space and U.S. Objectives

Introduction. The Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987 explicitly acknowledged that the United States and the Soviet Union may conduct “research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” To date, the United States has not developed a way in which it intends to carry out development and testing, while fulfilling its obligation not to deploy ABM systems or components not authorized by Article III of the ABM Treaty. (S)

This paper defines a set of basic objectives the United States should meet in clarifying the Washington Summit Joint Statement and proposes a limitation on U.S. space-based testing which would serve as the guideline for future U.S. activities to ensure that such activities would not constitute deployment prohibited by the ABM Treaty. The proposal outlined below is compatible with SDI programmatic objectives through 1996. (S)

Additionally, a statement of this limitation in the Defense and Space Talks might serve as an explanation of the SDI testing program, in the context of Article III(1), draft Defense and Space Treaty, which states, “Both Parties shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war.” This statement would be a statement of current policy and would assume Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S)

Objectives. The following are broad U.S. objectives in this area and more specific objectives derived therefrom:

- Promote robust SDI research and development.
- Accept no limitations on ABM activities beyond those the United States accepted in 1972.
- Protect the U.S. right to conduct realistic feasibility tests of integrated space-based ABM systems based on other physical principles and of space-based components of such systems capable of substituting for traditional components.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, ACSG (Arms Control Support Group), 09/27/1988. Secret. All brackets are in the original. An unknown hand wrote “9/20” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Linhard, Tobey, and Brooks sent the paper to Powell under cover of a September 21 memorandum. (Ibid.)

- Obtain [indication of] (JCS would delete) Soviet acceptance of the U.S. right to test in space ABM systems and components based on OPP.

- Retain the ABM Treaty until the United States is ready to make a conscious decision to move beyond it.

- Conduct, within the ABM Treaty, as much ABM research, development and testing as required.

- Build sufficient confidence through testing to support an informed deployment decision.

- Protect non-SDI programs.

- Permit no on-site inspection of any spacecraft.

- Provide no launch information on space systems' functions prior to launch.

- Do not designate specific orbits or regions of space as the only locations for conducting ABM tests.

- Avoid restrictions on non-SDI space-based sensors.

- Ensure that the United States has a comprehensive and defensible Defense and Space position.

- Provide a logical approach to showing that planned ABM development and testing in space would not constitute deployment. (S)

Proposal. In conjunction with Soviet acceptance of the U.S. space-based sensor proposal, the United States would make the following statement (A) and seek Soviet concurrence with the Predictability Protocol, including the addition associated with the U.S. statement (A) provided at (B) below. (S)

A. *U.S. Unilateral Statement.* In conducting research, development and testing, as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, as acknowledged in the December 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, parties to the ABM Treaty may test space-based systems in accordance with the Treaty. At the same time, the Treaty is clear that no such system can be deployed except pursuant to the procedures specified in Article XV and Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty. (U)

In order to ensure that the testing of space-based components capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, does not generate concern that this activity represents the deployment of such components, the United States is prepared to confine such permitted testing to designated ABM test satellites. Any platform based in space from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory shall be designated as an ABM test satellite. Further, the number of U.S. designated test satellites in orbit simultaneously shall not exceed 15, a number well short of that associated with any realistic

concern about such ABM test satellites serving as a deployed capability. [No more than 3 of those ABM test vehicles would be used for testing a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for more than 1 ABM interceptor missile.] (ACDA add) (S)

Given this U.S. commitment, the United States proposes the following addition to the Predictability Protocol currently under negotiation. (S)

B. *Addition to Predictability Protocol.* Parties shall provide to each other the following data:

a. identification of each ABM test satellite no more than 12 hours after launch;

b. notification of the removal of each ABM test satellite from its orbit within 12 hours of re-entry or change in orbit; and

c. notification of a test using an ABM satellite to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory no less than two hours prior to the conduct of any such test in an ABM mode. (S)

Discussion of Terms. In order to assess the impact of the above proposal, a clear understanding of certain of its terms is required. With the exception of the term “ABM Test Satellite,” all terms are drawn from the ABM Treaty, specifically Article II and Agreed Statement D. Agreed Statement D permits the testing and development in space of certain ABM systems and components. (S)

An ABM test satellite is a platform based in space from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. (S)

The guidelines described in the proposal above, based on Agreed Statement D, affect only ABM systems including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars:

a. which are space-based; *and,*

b. which are tested in a mode to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. (S)

Issues. There are five outstanding issues associated with the testing in space proposal.

1. *Should the proposal be a unilateral declaration or should it be negotiated with the Soviets?* State, ACDA, and JCS feel strongly that Soviet agreement to this approach would be extremely useful in gaining support for SDI in Congress and with the public. A unilateral statement, however, would not be helpful. Therefore, they favor negotiating the proposal with the Soviets. Moreover, they believe we could make such

a proposal without abandoning our right to do this unilaterally at a later date. (S)

OSD, Amb. Cooper, and Amb. Rowny believe that we should declare the proposal as our means for conducting OPP ABM tests in space, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, while fulfilling our obligation not to deploy OPP ABM systems. They argue that negotiating the proposal would inevitably lead to limitations beyond those of the ABM Treaty as signed and ratified in 1972. Moreover, they believe that if the Soviets were to accept a notification of testing requirement in the predictability protocol, it would constitute Soviet acceptance of OPP ABM testing in space. (S)

2. *Should non-OPP interceptors be included in the proposal?* State believes that Soviet agreement to test OPP systems in space would not clear the way for space-based interceptor testing because we have thus far been unable to characterize kinetic interceptors to be based on OPP. Although the U.S. has reserved judgment on this issue, OSD believes that for compelling reasons kinetic interceptors *are* based on OPP, and therefore their testing in space is clearly permitted. Ambassador Rowny concurs. Moreover, they believe that including non-OPP systems would go well beyond the original intent of the proposal, which was to delineate a "safe harbor" for testing within our rights under the ABM Treaty. Such a step would require negotiations which could cause us to forego our current rights under the ABM Treaty. (S)

3. *Should tabling the proposal on ABM test satellites be contingent on Soviet acceptance of the sensors run free proposal?* JCS believes that unless the Soviets accept the sensors run free proposal that clearly exempts early warning systems, the testing in space proposal is unworkable. State and OSD believe that there is no need to link the ABM test satellite proposal to Soviet acceptance of the proposal to remove all restriction on space-based sensors. They argue that we would prefer that the Soviets accept our proposal that space-based sensors run free. If the Soviets finally reject this proposal, the U.S. can refrain from testing OPP ABM sensors in space until we have defined acceptable guidelines for future sensor activity that avoids prohibited deployment. (S)

4. *Should there be a sublimit of 3 covering test satellites from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for more than one ABM interceptor missile is tested?* ACDA believes that such a sublimit may be necessary for advanced directed energy weapons in order to ensure that an illegal ABM deployment is not undertaken. All others believe that because of orbital geometry even fifteen test platforms carrying advanced directed energy systems would not provide sufficient coverage for a meaningful ABM system. They note that for anticipated directed energy weapon power levels, roughly four times as many

systems as could be tested simultaneously would be necessary for initial capability, and six to eight times as many for an optimal capability. They further argue that the question is moot because neither the U.S. nor the Soviets would be able to deploy such systems during the non-withdrawal period.

5. *Should we table this proposal at the upcoming Ministerial meeting, or should it be delayed?* Those who favor tabling the proposal now believe that it has had sufficient study over the past year and a half, and particularly intensive study from the period prior to the Moscow summit to date. They believe that the proposal is necessary to explain how we intend to conduct ABM tests in space consistent with the Washington Summit Joint Statement. And they believe that this option is superior to past proposals for setting ground rules for testing. *OSD* and *State* each favor tabling their (differing) versions of the proposal now. (S)

Ambassador Rowny favors delaying placing this on the table until some date after the Ministerial and then only after coordinating the timing with whatever actions we may take re: Krasnoyarsk. Some who favor delay believe that we have not had sufficient time to study the proposal and question why the proposal is necessary now given that our draft treaty has been on the table since January. The *Joint Staff* believes that the USG has not addressed in sufficient detail those questions which the Soviets would raise following the tabling of this proposal. For example: Are the test platforms for the interceptors to be tested ABM launchers? Does the number of designated platforms include targets that might be launched from ABM test satellites as part of an ABM test? Does the United States maintain that if one more designated test satellite were in orbit, then deployment has occurred, or that this would be laying the basis for a territorial defense? (S)

283. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1988, 3:30–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze—Second Small Group Meeting: Arms Control Issues

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, National Security
Advisor to the President
Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor on
Arms Control Matters
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant
Secretary of State (EUR)
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to
the USSR
Alexander R. Vershbow, Director,
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
(notetaker)
John M. Evans, Deputy Director,
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
(notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

USSR

Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy
Foreign Minister
Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head,
Soviet MFA
Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador
to the U.S.
Yevgeniy Gusarov, MFA (notetaker)
Pavel Palazhchenko, USA &
Canada Department, Soviet
MFA (interpreter)

DEFENSE AND SPACE/ABM TREATY

The Secretary suggested that they begin with strategic arms and invited Shevardnadze to open the discussion. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said there was reason for some satisfaction about the results achieved to date. We not only had completed the INF Treaty but also other useful agreements. Moreover, despite our great differences in START, positive assets were increasing gradually. It would be desirable to make the process more dynamic, but he understood the objective reasons why this was not possible.

Shevardnadze said that the President and Gorbachev had both said many times that it was necessary to use to the maximum the existing

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and John Evans (EUR/SOV); cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initialed for both Evans and Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 173.

opportunities, to make good use of the experience we had gained. The question was what we needed to do to conclude our interaction with real progress. He wanted to begin with the most difficult problems where the prospects were not very bright. He had in mind the situation with regard to the ABM Treaty. Time had shown that the road we mapped together in searching for an agreement on the ABM Treaty was the only possible basis for agreement. This was what the joint statements of the Washington and Moscow Summits made clear. In the future we needed to stick to the same course: the provisions and the language agreed upon in Washington. One of the most important fundamental issues was the relationship between adherence to the ABM Treaty and START. He wanted to reemphasize the Soviet Union's fundamental approach.

Regarding the specific problems that had emerged, *Shevardnadze* said he wanted to begin with the problem of sensors. The Soviets had considered very carefully this question and all aspects of the U.S. proposal. They had concluded that unlimited permission of sensors in space would seriously undermine the ABM Treaty. It would not be consistent with our objectives. At the same time the Soviets could agree to discuss the problem in hopes of finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviets proposed that this question be considered in the context of Soviets suggestions that had been made earlier with respect to reaching an agreement on a list of devices that would be permitted in space. At the outset the sides would have to agree that the launching of space based sensors would be conducted under conditions of verification with inspections. On this basis the Soviets would be prepared to continue the dialogue in the working group and in the negotiations in Geneva.

The next question, *Shevardnadze* continued, concerned the sides' mutual concerns with respect to the ABM treaty. Our two leaders had discussed this question thoroughly. It was very important not to permit our differences to result in an undermining of everything we had achieved through mutual efforts. The U.S., *Shevardnadze* said, was aware of the most recent proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev at Krasnoyarsk. The U.S. was also aware of the Soviet side's other suggestions regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets were very sincere in trying to set aside everything that stands in the way of solving this problem. Soviet proposals called for creating on the basis of that radar a center for international cooperation for peaceful space research.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to tell the Secretary frankly that the Soviets had not wanted to make a public statement and would have preferred to address this issue at the working level in private confidential discussions. They had made it public, however, because of certain propagandistic steps by the U.S. with respect to Krasnoyarsk by the

Administration (an "uproar of accusations" against the Soviet Union alleging violations and, indeed, statements that Krasnoyarsk was almost a material breach of the Treaty). Because of these statements the Soviet side had to react publicly. Shevardnadze explained that the space center would be included in the system of a world space organization and that it would be possible for many countries to participate in its research efforts. The Soviets were ready for experts from the U.S. and the USSR to lead the way in the process of practically implementing this decision. This would imply visits to Krasnoyarsk and joint work to look at the equipment there.

Shevardnadze added that another Soviet proposal was still on the table. If the sides were able to agree on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the Soviets would dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. This, however, would be a pity because the radar provided a good basis for joint use for peaceful purposes. But he repeated that the old proposal was still in effect. It would be helpful if the U.S. side were to consider Soviet proposals and respond in kind. He had in mind Soviet concerns about the U.S. radar in Greenland as well as the rocket probe launch facility at Shemya Island. He urged that the U.S. let Soviet experts visit these facilities. While he was no expert, *Shevardnadze* said Soviet specialists were certain that these were clear violations of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets had permitted members of the U.S. Congress and scientists to visit Krasnoyarsk, so it was quite logical to expect the U.S. side to respond similarly with visits to its facilities.

Secretary Shultz replied by saying he was sorry the Soviet delegation had responded negatively to the U.S. sensors proposal. He noted *Shevardnadze's* expression of readiness to continue the discussion on this proposal, however, and said the U.S. intended to pursue it further. In the U.S. view, it was impossible to distinguish between the functions of sensors of different kinds. It would lend itself to serious disputes if we tried to differentiate. This was why we thought our proposal would be helpful and fit the situation well. As we had looked at the situation in the defense and space talks it seemed to us that the length of the non-withdrawal period, based on discussions between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, should fall into place without difficulty. The U.S. also felt that the question of what happens after the period of non-withdrawal had been settled at the Washington Summit by Gorbachev's statement (he had said that, at the end of the period, each side would be free to decide its course, while in the meantime the ABM Treaty would remain in effect). In Geneva, however, disagreement had broken out on this question.

The most difficult question, *the Secretary* continued, continued to be what would occur during the non-withdrawal period. The sensors proposal was an attempt to address that along with our proposed

confidence-building measures. Much good work had been done with respect to the predictability protocol, and we should instruct our negotiators to get that portion of our work completed. Many things already had been agreed, such as data exchange and observation of tests. We did not think mandatory on-site inspection would work, however—we had sensitive facilities and so did the Soviets. But there was a lot of good material in the Protocol and we should get it done to pass along to the next group.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, *the Secretary* said, was a very troublesome issue. There was a wide bipartisan consensus that the radar, because of its location and orientation, was a violation of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze had said this issue had the potential to be a major disruptive force, and he believed the Minister was right. *Shevardnadze* interjected that he had not said that. *The Secretary* rejoined that, in that case, he would say it! We had to consider what we would do in the absence of any agreement on this issue. We had studied the General Secretary's letter² and would like to raise some questions about his proposal.

The problem with the Krasnoyarsk radar, *the Secretary* said, was that it is one of the critical items identified in the ABM Treaty as representing a long lead-time item for a territorial ABM defense. The ban on LPARs except on the periphery was a sort of insurance policy against ABM breakout. The existence of the radar was the problem. It might be used for other purposes, but it could easily be reconverted to an LPAR. Thus, knowing the origins of the LPAR limits, we had to ask what Gorbachev had in mind:

— Was he proposing to dismantle the radar and establish a space science center in its place? If so, we might “dig into that one.” We didn't see the location as ideal for such research, but if that was the proposal we could look at it.

— Another variation was that Gorbachev meant the radar would be completed, with additional parts added for space research purposes. For reasons he had already explained, the Secretary said, that would not do the job.

We needed to know whether the plan was to dismantle the radar and put something else useful there, or whether it was something else. The Secretary added that the U.S. had no problem with salvaging equipment from Krasnoyarsk and recovering it for other uses.

There was also a major problem, *Secretary Shultz* continued, with Soviet activities at Gomel. The movement of radars from a test range to another site was, in itself, a violation. We did visit the site, and the Soviets had explained their plans; now those plans were being carried

²See Attachment, Document 281.

out. Ambassador Karpov had spoken about a "radical solution" to Gomel during the ABM Treaty review, and we would like to know what was meant by this.

With respect to Thule and Fylingdales, *the Secretary* said, these radars had been grandfathered under the ABM Treaty. We did not regard them as in any way parallel to Krasnoyarsk.

Shevardnadze asked whether the radar in Greenland was a phased-array type. *The Secretary* said he could not give a description. *General Powell* intervened to say that this question was irrelevant. The point was that the radar was at a site in existence at the time the ABM Treaty was signed; the Treaty allowed such radars to remain and modernization was permitted under the Treaty.

Shevardnadze asked whether, if it was an LPAR and was outside national territory, it was not a violation. *The Secretary* replied that it was not a violation as long as the Treaty grandfathered such radars. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed that modernization was permitted, but using the site for an ABM radar was a violation, in the Soviet view. *Karpov* added that, after signing the ABM Treaty, the sides were barred from building outside their national territory phased-array radars with a potential greater than 3 million.

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. let the Soviet side visit Thule. If there were no violation, the Soviets would take the issue off the agenda. *The Secretary* replied that "what you see is not as important as what we say." The radar was there before the Treaty was signed and could be modernized. If the Soviets visited, they would see that it was being modernized. The same thing occurred with the U.S. visit to Krasnoyarsk: the Congressmen took photos; the visit confirmed what we already knew: that an LPAR was being built at that location.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to imagine the Soviet side had violated the ABM Treaty with the Krasnoyarsk radar. Then, after the two countries had agreed in Washington and Moscow that the ABM Treaty would be observed for a specified period of time, the Soviets put forward a proposal: if that issue was settled, the Soviets would dismantle the radar. This seemed to solve the problem. And now, the Soviets were offering a further step: to transfer the radar to the use of Soviet, U.S., Indian, Japanese and other scientists. If these scientists found elements that confirmed the radar was a violation, those elements would be removed and the building used for scientific purposes. *Shevardnadze* added that the Soviets could present this case to any audience and it would agree the U.S. position was indefensible. Why destroy the radar if it could be used for science?

The Secretary replied that there was a reason why not: Under the ABM Treaty regime, there were provisions aimed at making it difficult to break out of the Treaty. The chief one was the prohibition on battle

management radars inside national boundaries and pointed inwards. Since it took a long time to build such radars, we could see them coming. That was the theory underlying the Treaty and that was why we regard Krasnoyarsk as a serious problem. It was not just a technical violation without real meaning; it had a lot of meaning.

Shevardnadze asked what would be so bad about making the radar into a laboratory for the use of world science or a world space organization, a place for peaceful research, for tracking space objects, to be used collectively not only by Soviet scientists? If there were certain elements of the radar that are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, these could be removed. If not inconsistent, then all other devices and instruments could be used for peaceful purposes. This was a very noble idea and a reasonable solution, taking care of both the political problem and the interests of scientists. *Shevardnadze* asked the Secretary to please think again about the proposal, as it opened up an interesting prospect. As for the Greenland and UK radars, the Soviets believed they could seriously and earnestly say that these were violations of the ABM Treaty. If LPARs were there, they were violations. If no LPARs were there, then let the Soviets visit to confirm that there were no grounds for complaint.

Karpov said that when the Secretary spoke of modernization, one had to note that there were five radars at Thule and Fylingdales when the ABM Treaty was signed, but not one of them was a phased-array radar. Now LPARs with a potential much greater than 3 million were being built. These could have been built legally in Connecticut or Washington, but they should not have been built at Thule or Fylingdales.

Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev had *not* conditioned his proposal on the U.S. doing the same thing to its disputed radars as Gorbachev had proposed to do with Krasnoyarsk. *Secretary Shultz* replied that he had noticed this. We contend that no matter what exists at Thule and Fylingdales, these were permitted, modernized radars. When it came to using Krasnoyarsk as a site for scientific research, however, there was a question as to what existed there. If it was an LPAR, then it was a problem. If there was a significant proportion of what is needed for an LPAR, it was also a problem. If the LPAR was gone, that would be a different story. This was why he had asked whether the Gorbachev proposal entailed dismantlement or substantial alteration of the radar. Whatever the Soviets might say about Thule and Fylingdales, the Secretary added, they were far away from U.S. national borders.

Shevardnadze said he had been told that, when scientists met at Krasnoyarsk, they would be able to decide what kind of equipment could be preserved and what should be taken away. If there were elements that represented a violation of the ABM Treaty, then the Soviets would remove them. He reiterated that keeping the radar functioning would

be useful for world science. Many countries' scientists would jointly determine its use as a laboratory. With some emotion, Shevardnadze stressed that he thought this was a good idea. If there were elements of concern, the Soviets would be ready to dismantle them and convert the installation. The aim, he said, was to remove this problem from contention as well as to make the radar available to help implement the plans our countries had for space exploration. This was a mission that could only be accomplished by big countries like the U.S., Soviet Union, and Japan. Shevardnadze noted that there was a big building at Krasnoyarsk, with much costly equipment—all of this could be used. But the Soviets had made a political decision: they were ready to do something useful for world science and were surprised the U.S. had reacted so negatively.

The Secretary said his reaction was not negative, but one of questioning what will be at Krasnoyarsk under the Soviet proposal. If the LPAR were there, in whole or in part, then the problem would not be solved. If something else was implied, then we could work it out. The Working Group should delve further into this idea. But if the idea was to use an LPAR for scientific purposes, this would be a problem.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to confirm the Soviet aim: to preserve at Krasnoyarsk *only* that equipment needed for scientific purposes. *Karpov* added that he had told General Burns that various options existed for converting the radar. They had discussed dismantling the transmitter antenna and replacing it with a parabolic antenna. This was a radical solution, one which would remove any concern about the radar's use for early warning of ballistic missile launch.

The Secretary suggested that the Working Group continue this discussion. He could not say he was very optimistic, but he accepted that it was a good faith effort to resolve the problem. He asked again for the Soviets to explain what would be a "radical solution" at Gomel.

Karpov replied: To eliminate what exists there—to eliminate the base for the antenna. *Shevardnadze* broke in to say that "Gomel is not a problem; let me assure you of this. Let us not fan that issue into a big problem; it's a matter that can be taken off the agenda quickly." As for Krasnoyarsk, *Shevardnadze* continued, he wanted to ask the U.S. again to take a very careful look at the Soviet proposal—to think of what the U.S. would want to see done so that it was sure Krasnoyarsk was only a research center. Let us allow our experts to work on the problem. Do not dismiss the Soviet proposal out of hand: that would shape public opinion in a way that the U.S. would find difficult to cope with, he warned, since the U.S. would have trouble explaining what was wrong with the Soviet proposal for a genuine scientific research center at Krasnoyarsk. If the U.S. didn't trust the Soviets, then it could come and see the radar for itself. Let the experts come and decide, *Shevardnadze* concluded.

The Secretary said that the Soviet proposal would be a great idea if it meant there would be no LPAR at Krasnoyarsk, in whole or in part. There might be ways to change the physical characteristics of the radar such that it would be dismantled in terms of its ability to operate as an LPAR.

Ambassador Ridgway, referring to Shevardnadze's comment that the Gomel issue should not be allowed to become a major problem, commented that our concerns had been exacerbated by the fact that construction work was continuing at Gomel. This made management of the issue more difficult.

Shevardnadze asked what U.S. experts had found at Gomel. If there was a violation, then why would the Soviets have invited experts? The fact was that they did not find anything. But he repeated that Gomel was not a big problem, since there was not a big structure involved. Krasnoyarsk was much larger. Gomel was a simple matter that could be solved. *Karpov* noted that at Gomel there was simply a rotating tower on which a mirror antenna had been placed.

Shevardnadze invited U.S. experts to visit Gomel again, and quipped that he was considering visiting Gomel himself. Regarding Krasnoyarsk, he again urged the U.S. to look carefully at the Soviet proposal. It was a serious one presented in good faith. When Krasnoyarsk becomes a facility for space cooperation, perhaps the U.S. could do the same thing at Thule.

Secretary Shultz said that his understanding of the Gomel problem was that, while the sides were allowed to have ABM radars at test ranges for experimental purposes, they were barred from moving them to other locations. So simply moving the radar was a violation. Beyond this, one must ask why the negotiators had made this a violation. The answer was that they did not want lesser radars to proliferate, since a large number of such radars could add up to a significant capability. Therefore, when the radar was moved, it was a technical violation. Now that we were seeing the parts reconstructed, it exacerbated the situation. *Karpov* said the Soviets were not building at Gomel.

General Powell noted that, in the fall of 1987, we seriously considered whether the Gomel matter constituted a violation. We judged that, on technical grounds, there was no doubt, although we reported to Congress that this was a minor problem. Inspectors subsequently visited Gomel. But the problem had since become more serious with the renewal of assembly activity there. In December we would need to report again to Congress on the status of the issue, and this activity would turn a small problem into a big one.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides decide on the following course: At Gomel, where there was nothing that constituted a violation,

the U.S. should come and visit once again and have its experts take another look. The Soviets had a vital interest in removing all irritants in this area. The inspectors could go for 10 days or two weeks, if they wished. In our joint statement, we could note the readiness of the Soviet side to allow this to happen.

The Secretary replied that it was not a secret what was happening at Gomel. When our people visited, they were openly shown the plans, and now we were seeing those plans carried out. It was not as though we were mystified about what was going on. It was the fact that the radar was there that posed the problem. We had no problem verifying what the Soviets had been telling us.

General Powell explained that it was the simple presence of those components that was the issue. The simplest solution would be to remove them to a test range or destroy them. The question was not the purpose of the radar, but its location. And if the work continued, this meant more of a problem for our December compliance report.

The Secretary said that what the Soviets called a van was, in fact, a radar. *Shevardnadze* said it really was a van. The Soviets may have done something they shouldn't have, taking it from one place to another. But if they had wanted to violate the Treaty, then why would they have invited U.S. experts to come inspect the facility? Did the Secretary think the Soviets were naive or trying openly to provoke the U.S.?

The Secretary said he did not think Gomel was a big enough deal to warrant all this trouble. *Shevardnadze* said: "I have an interest in resolving the issue." He said he would ask Karpov and the highest authorities to go there to see the site. Removing one van was not going to be a problem. *General Powell* said it was more than just one van that was involved. Other components that had been moved to Gomel also had to be eliminated. We now knew what's there based on our experts' visit. He added that, before we had included Gomel in our compliance report, we had raised this issue with the Soviets privately in an effort to resolve it.

Karpov said he wanted to point out that there was no radar at Gomel of a kind deployed at test ranges, but only a rotating tower on which mirror antennas and other devices had been placed. This was not the same kind of antenna as was located at test ranges.

The Secretary said he would like to tell the Soviets again precisely what we considered a violation. *Powell* argued that this was surely a problem we could solve. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed. The Soviets recognized the concerns of the U.S. side and wanted to find a solution. He confirmed the Soviets' readiness to receive U.S. experts again at Gomel, after which, he joked, they could all go together to Greenland. *Secretary Shultz* said this should wait until the summer. *Shevardnadze* said he was

ready to go even in winter. *The Secretary* said they would need to ask Danish Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen.

Shevardnadze suggested that the sides think of language on Krasnoyarsk, to see what might be possible here. The Soviets were not sure what the U.S. wanted, what conditions had to be satisfied. He had confirmed the Soviet Government's readiness to ensure that it becomes a scientific facility. If this approach was acceptable, we could say this in the joint statement.

The Secretary said the U.S. was looking for something that fixed the radar so that, from a physical and operational viewpoint, it was not a phased-array radar in whole or in part. This was the essence of the problem. If, in the process, something useful was created, this was fine—a creative idea. But if what was being proposed was to have scientists use the LPAR, Gorbachev's proposal would not solve the problem.

The Secretary recalled the Soviets' Moscow offer that, in connection with a satisfactory arrangement on the ABM Treaty, they would dismantle the radar. Of course, we hadn't been able to work this out. On the other hand, if we could resolve the problem by accompanying dismantlement with a statement that expressed satisfaction with the ABM Treaty as it stands, leaving aside what we were negotiating in NST, we could do that too. If this idea was of interest, then there were several solutions to explore. But the essence of the question was that we cannot wind up with something that had the physical characteristics of an LPAR in whole or in part.

Shevardnadze said: "We agree on this." Let us give the task to the experts to find a way to do this. Of course, an inventory would need to be taken of the equipment and structure to see what elements were incompatible with the Treaty. These would need to be dismantled. What was not incompatible could stay in place and be used for science. On the basis of the Secretary's proposal, *Shevardnadze* concluded, work could be done.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to the ABM Treaty.]

284. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 23, 1988, 9 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze—Third Small Group Meeting: Regional Issues, Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk Speech, Nuclear Testing, Conventional Arms Control, Krasnoyarsk Radar

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, National Security
Advisor to the President
Michael H. Armacost, Under
Secretary of State*
Richard Solomon, Director, Policy
Planning Staff*
MGEN William Burns, Director,
ACDA*
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant
Secretary of State (EUR)
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the
USSR
Paul Robinson, U.S. Ambassador to
the Nuclear Testing Talks*
Charles Thomas, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State (EUR)*
Jay Castillo*
Alexander R. Vershbow, Director,
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
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* for portions of the meeting only

The meeting opened with an exchange of pleasantries about the ongoing Olympic Games. *Shevardnadze* commented that it was good the games were proceeding normally. The atmosphere was good. He knew the U.S. had had some concerns, but it seemed that order was being maintained and he hoped it would continue.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initialed for Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department State. The complete memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 175.

The Secretary suggested that the nuclear testing Ambassadors be summoned for discussion with the Ministers. He said he had also asked ACDA Director Burns and our verification expert Jay Castillo to talk with Ambassador Karpov about the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel problems. *Ambassador Dubinin* confirmed that they had already begun to talk. *Shevardnadze* reiterated that he had an interest in achieving real clarity on this question so that there was no misunderstanding. *The Secretary* remarked that we had great confidence in our people.

Shevardnadze asked whether they should wait for the explosives people to arrive or begin with regional issues. *The Secretary* noted that he had asked Under Secretary Armacost to join for the regional discussion. *Shevardnadze* sent for Ambassador Polyakov.

Shevardnadze said there was one question he had not covered the previous day. While he understood the U.S. was not very enthusiastic about it, at some point our countries would have to begin at least at the expert level to discuss the problem of naval activities. He knew this was not a simple problem for the U.S. but we would have to begin sooner or later.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to the ABM Treaty.]

KRASNOYARSK RADAR

Burns and Castillo joined the discussion. *General Burns* reported that he had discussed the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel issues at length with Ambassador Karpov. They agreed that the Krasnoyarsk problem needed to be resolved, but they disagreed on the extent of dismantlement and destruction that would be required. The Soviets argued that only the transmitter antenna had to be dismantled; they claimed the building could be retained and only the face of the antenna destroyed. The Soviet side also agreed that the Gomel issue could be resolved in the context of a solution to Krasnoyarsk, although the sides were unable to agree on words to reflect their present positions.

Ambassador Karpov said he would like to add that the Soviets had taken into account in their proposal the concerns expressed by Burns. The main difference was in the scope of the possible dismantling of the LPAR at Krasnoyarsk. The Soviets believed these questions should be given to experts for further consideration. Based on the mission of the future space research center, they could determine what should be done to the radar. To write into the text of the joint statement today the scope of the future dismantlement effort would not be possible.

The Secretary replied that he accepted that this might be the case, but that he believed our experts would need clear instructions. Part of their guidance should specify what space research activities would be allowed; and they should also have negative guidance, that is instructions specifying the kinds of equipment that could not be present at

Krasnoyarsk when it was converted to a space research center. In short, the experts could not have an entirely free hand but rather needed instructions on the negative and the positive side.

Karpov said the Soviets had suggested language to the effect that their side was ready to have experts meet to develop specific measures to ensure that the Krasnoyarsk radar would be converted to an international space research center; that this would include dismantlement and destruction of specific devices there, including elements of the phased array and of the structures, along with the introduction of other equipment. This language would make clear that the only difference between the sides was the exact scope of the future dismantlement. The Soviets believed it was desirable for the experts to look at the complex aspects.

The Secretary said that perhaps some different language would offer a way out of the problem. *Burns* said that the sides had already discussed language and it seemed unwise to provide so general an instruction to the experts. Some rather fundamental decisions had to be made. We needed agreement that the LPAR as it currently existed—with a transmitter and a receiver—needed to be dismantled. At the same time, the U.S. had no objection to the removal of the electronics for other uses.

The Secretary asked whether language could be devised which spoke of dismantling those elements which lend themselves to the long lead-time problem.

Burns replied that there were a number of structures at Krasnoyarsk that were suitable for use as a space research center; only two structures were of concern, the transmitter and receiver. By eliminating these structures all advantages for ABM breakout would be removed. If these were not eliminated, on the other hand, there would still be some ABM potential. The Soviet side, *Burns* explained, had suggested two things: that the transmitter be eliminated and the receiver maintained. This would preserve the less egregious half of the LPAR, but would not eliminate the whole threat. If the structure were eliminated, on the other hand, it would restore more of the lead time. In sum, there was no way the problem could be resolved if the structure were not affected in some major way.

The Secretary asked whether *Burns* meant to say that any language agreed had to make clear it was a particular structure which had to be dealt with. *Burns* replied that this was correct: there was only one structure involved; we were not talking about the power plants, offices or any other building that might be useful for scientific purposes.

The Secretary suggested that the sides reflect on this. The Ministers now needed to break to have lunch and return for the working group reports.

Shevardnadze said that the ministers should clarify the general approach. The Soviet side had expressed a readiness to work closely so that all elements and components would be rendered exclusively for the use of the international space research center. If the sides could not agree on language for the joint statement, they could not mention the subject at all.

The Secretary said the words we are looking for should state that Krasnoyarsk would not be available as a phased array radar. *Shevardnadze* urged that the sides look for more general language. *The Secretary* responded that we understood that the Soviets wanted a positive twist and we were not afraid of that. That was what we should try to achieve.

285. Briefing Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 26, 1988

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Resolving Krasnoyarsk

Last week you discussed with Mr. Shevardnadze² a number of potential ways to correct the Krasnoyarsk violation:

— dismantling the radar and perhaps building a space facility on the site;

— dismantling the radar in the context of a settlement on D&S; and

— dismantling the radar with a statement expressing satisfaction with (but not commitment to) the ABM Treaty.

With a settlement on D&S not in sight, the most plausible solution would be for them to dismantle the radar and salvage some of their investment for other uses, accompanied by a joint statement on the ABM Treaty.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 NODIS and EXDIS Memorandums, Lot 94D433, 1988 NODIS and EXDIS Memorandums: September 16–30, 1988. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Shultz saw it.

² See Documents 283 and 284.

At the end of the exchange with Shevardnadze, you expressed willingness to pursue a solution along these lines, and Shevardnadze agreed. He went on to suggest that experts take inventory of the equipment and structures at Krasnoyarsk. Elements incompatible with the Treaty would be dismantled; elements not incompatible would stay in place.

The purpose of this memo is to suggest a way to follow up on this discussion by nailing down an agreement between you and Shevardnadze on the dismantlement of the radar. Such an agreement could guide the work of experts to conclude a more detailed agreement on precisely what would be dismantled to correct the violation.

Two criteria are particularly pertinent to the resolution of Krasnoyarsk. The first is that the early warning capability at Krasnoyarsk must be eliminated. The second is that the lead time for the construction of an early warning or ABM radar should be restored to that period which was envisioned when the Treaty was negotiated.

These are the criteria that should be used to assess Shevardnadze's suggestion that an inventory of the equipment and structures at Krasnoyarsk be taken to see what elements are incompatible with the Treaty. In the U.S. view, the following need to be destroyed:

- the transmitter antenna
- the building on which the transmitter antenna is mounted
- the receiver antenna
- the building on which the receiver antenna is mounted.

Other elements of the radar site, such as the power supply and various support structures, might be allowed to remain, consistent with our two criteria. This would be a subject for discussion by the experts.

We recommend that you find an opportunity to return to this subject with Shevardnadze in New York along the following lines:

— Last week we held constructive discussions on many issues which face our two nations.

— The discussion of the Krasnoyarsk radar was particularly useful, but inconclusive. Perhaps this can be resolved.

— The solution we discussed would have three elements:

- Dismantle the large phased-array radar at that location.
- If something useful can be done at that site once this is done, so be it.

○ Such an agreement to dismantle the radar could be accompanied by a statement expressing satisfaction with the ABM Treaty.

— You expressed overall agreement to such an approach, and made a suggestion—that experts take an inventory of the equipment and structure to see what elements are incompatible with the Treaty.

These would need to be dismantled. What is not incompatible could be used for other purposes.

— This is a constructive suggestion, and can be pursued.

— Our view is that the dismantling should eliminate an early warning capability at that site; any early warning capability at that location is incompatible with the Treaty. The dismantling should also be such that the time to construct a capability at Krasnoyarsk not allowed by the Treaty not be shortened below that contemplated in 1972 by whatever remains at the site.

◦ Mutual recognition in 1972 that large radars were the long lead time items in an ABM deployment. This was the motivation for the radar constraints in the Treaty.

— The following would need to be dismantled:

- The transmitter antenna
- The building on which the transmitter antenna is mounted
- The receiver antenna
- The building on which the receiver antenna is mounted.

— If you agree with these points, then we could follow your suggestion that a team of experts from both sides could meet to discuss the details of what elements of the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled to satisfy U.S. concerns that I have outlined.

If Shevardnadze can agree to this, in the first instance our experts can be Burns and Castillo. (Castillo is in fact quite knowledgeable on radars). With appropriate guidance from you and Shevardnadze, perhaps they could now succeed where they were unable to do so last week.

For your information, the paragraph in the ABM Treaty relevant to the Krasnoyarsk violation is Article VI(b), which reads as follows:

“(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.”

You will note that this language makes no reference to large phased-array radars. All radars for early warning constructed since 1972 have been LPARs, but some dish radars also have such capabilities.

286. Memorandum for the Record¹

New York, September 27, 1988

SUBJECT

Burns-Karpov Conversation, 27 September 1988

1. MGen William F. Burns, Director, ACDA, and Ambassador Victor Karpov met for breakfast at Karpov's request at the Pierre Hotel, New York City, from 0900–1030 on 27 September 1988.

2. After a few minutes of general conversation, Burns asked Karpov if the Soviet side had considered the positions of the sides on the Krasnoyarsk radar issue since the Ministerial. Karpov said it had and asked Burns if the U.S. had considered the Soviet proposals, particularly the use of Krasnoyarsk as an international space scientific center. Burns responded that the U.S. was primarily interested in eliminating the radars at Krasnoyarsk as a violation of the ABM Treaty; what the installation could be used for after such correction is a matter for the Soviet Government to decide. Burns cited concern that no progress had been made at the Ministerial in Washington and indicated that time was passing.

3. Karpov asked if the U.S. were interested in the Soviet proposal to dismantle only the transmission antenna. Burns replied that he had only considered destruction of both the transmitting and receiving antennas. Karpov responded that Soviet experts see the transmitter as the key. The radar at Krasnoyarsk is useless without it. Burns asked, why, then, keep the receiver? Karpov said that it could be used for space research. He stated that he did not know the technical details, but Soviet experts believe that a non-LPAR transmitter could be used with the LPAR receiver for limited, space-oriented research. Burns suggested that an LPAR was the wrong type of radar for space research.

4. Karpov argued that the Soviets wanted to keep as much of the facility as possible because of sunk costs—"perhaps as much as a billion rubles"—in the facility. There was considerable opposition in the Soviet Union to any kind of dismantlement. Karpov readily acknowledged that the decision was made to build the radar under Brezhnev; now, the present Soviet leadership was willing to provide whatever assurances are needed that the installation will have no ABM function, but at the same time the leadership wants to recoup as much from the site as possible.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci's Library, Subject—1988: Countries—USSR. Secret. Drafted on October 4 by Burns. Copies were sent to Shultz, Carlucci, Crowe, Webster, Powell, Linhard, Timbie, and David Fite, Manfred Eimer, James McNally, and Richard Toye (all in ACDA). A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum on October 5.

5. Burns responded that the U.S. side needs to understand exactly what the Soviet side is proposing with regard to dismantlement. U.S. technical experts see destruction of both radar buildings as the only certain solution to the problem.

6. Karpov stated that the Soviet side has been giving some thought to the problem. Soviet technical experts have come up with a proposal that would eliminate the antenna face of the transmitting radar building. In their view, this would preclude the use of the facility in an ABM mode. Burns was skeptical of this approach; how could one ensure that the transmitting radar components could not be installed again in short order? As a rule of thumb, reconstruction of the facility to perform in an ABM mode should take at least as long as it would take to build such a facility at Krasnoyarsk from scratch. In any event, there are technical problems associated with such a judgement as well as problems with the use of the receiving antenna. Again, U.S. experts were doubtful that such a solution as suggested by Karpov, was feasible.

7. Karpov suggested that the two sides could reach agreement that the “radar at Krasnoyarsk would be dismantled.” This should resolve the U.S. concerns about possible violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side would also include destruction of the radar parts at Gomel in the bargain. Then, the sides could meet, soon if that is what the U.S. preferred, in technical discussions to determine the best way to dismantle the capability.

8. Burns answered that he believed that the U.S. side would need a much more substantial commitment to what is meant by the Soviet side in an agreement to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. He argued that the only sure method was to destroy the buildings housing the transmitting and receiving antennas. While he will report the results of this conversation to Washington, he needed assurances that what he just said would be reported to Moscow. In Burns’ view, it is extremely important that Moscow understand the seriousness of the present situation with regard to Krasnoyarsk. Karpov indicated that he would so report. Karpov also stated that he would like to get an authoritative statement from Washington on the Soviet proposal (para 7). Could Burns meet with him again before he returns to Moscow on Sunday (2 October)? Burns responded that he did not know. He would not return to Washington himself until the weekend, but he assured Karpov that he would report this conversation immediately. Karpov asked if Burns thought that the U.S. would reply by Friday. Could he speculate whether or not he thought the U.S. might be interested? Burns replied that he doubted U.S. interest in the proposal as Karpov stated it since it did not meet essential U.S. conditions. Neither could he speculate on the technical aspects of the Soviet dismantlement proposal. At this point, conversation turned to non-substantive matters.

287. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Graham) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 28, 1988

SUBJECT

WHITE HOUSE SCIENCE COUNCIL—SDI TECHNICAL REPORT

I. WHSC REPORT

At my request, the White House Science Council (WHSC) undertook a year long study of the Strategic Defense Initiative program, in order to provide you with independent technical advice on SDI. The members of the WHSC SDI Task Force include some of the foremost strategic defense experts in the United States:

Chairman, Sol Buchsbaum, Bell Laboratories

Edward Teller, Livermore National Laboratory and Hoover Institute

Harold Agnew, GA Technologies

Gregory Canavan, Los Alamos National Laboratory

John Deutch, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Isadore Singer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

William Happer, Princeton University

Edward Frieman, Scripps Institute of Oceanography

Allen Peterson, Stanford University

Gerold Yonas, Titan Corporation/Titan Technologies

Attached you will find a summary report of their findings. Their principal recommendation is that you approve the near-term deployment of mature technologies, while at the same time preserving the great promise associated with advanced research.

Elements of the academic community have charged that SDI has not been subjected to competent scientific review. Those charges are false. The technical and strategic merit of SDI has been intensively studied and validated by scientific contractors, Department of Defense scientific review boards, and government laboratories. This report by the White House Science Council is further confirmation of the scientific and technological merit of SDI objectives and progress to date.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci's Library Subject—1988: SDI [09/28/1988–10/13/1988]. No classification marking.

II. BUDGET REVIEW

Shortly, you will be reviewing the proposed DOD budget for FY 1990. That budget submission to Congress will be your last opportunity as President to persuade Congress of the merits of SDI, and the national security priority it deserves.

As that budget is being developed, costs associated with SDI are at issue. There is a school of thought that believes little new obligational authority can be made available for SDI and, as a result, funds for immediate deployment of mature technologies must come from SDI's already meager research budget. I am concerned that this thinking is shortsighted from a political, technological, programmatic, and strategic standpoint, and fails to respect the priority you have assigned SDI. I see no reason why the Defense Department's production and deployment responsibilities can only be funded at the expense of SDIO's research and development charter.

As the WHSC report makes clear, in five short years, we have made tremendous progress toward developing technologies to protect America and our allies against the threat of ballistic missile attack. Thanks to the genius of our scientists and engineers, and to the clarity of your vision, we are on the threshold of a future secure from nuclear blackmail. The question remains, however, how best to consolidate that progress in order to leave a clear and vital legacy for your successor. The thrust of this report is constructive and I support it. I would value the opportunity to discuss this with you further.

Attachment

Letter From the Chairman of the White House Science Council Panel on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Buchsbaum) to President Reagan²

Washington, September 9, 1988

The White House Science Council has been following the progress being made in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ever since your memorable speech to the nation in March 1983. During the past year, at the request of Dr. William R. Graham, we have been assessing the

²No classification marking. Powell sent a copy of the letter to Carlucci under cover of an October 6 memorandum: "Enclosed is a summary White House Science Council report on the Strategic Defense Initiative. I would like to forward to the President Defense Department views on this report, which I believe your staff is already looking at, at your earliest convenience." (Ibid.)

technical feasibility of various deployment possibilities and associated development and testing programs. This report is a short summary of our conclusions regarding progress to date and options for the future.

PROGRESS TO DATE

There is no question in our minds that the approximately thirteen billion dollars invested in SDI to date has served the nation well. A sense of accomplishment has been rightly earned by all associated with the program, despite the obviously rocky road the program has travelled and vocal opposition to it. What leads us to this overall conclusion? Solid technical progress in just about every facet of SDI. For example:

- Non-nuclear hit-to-kill capability has been demonstrated in several experiments conducted in space. This was made possible by advances in sensor and terminal guidance technologies.

- We are gaining an understanding of both the potential and the problems still to be solved associated with directed energy weapon systems, such as laser and neutral particle beams. In particular, the more likely systems have been distinguished from the less likely ones and the work has been focused accordingly.

- Evidence has accumulated that optical systems can replace radars needed for surveillance.

- Information gained from space-based experiments has opened novel approaches for discriminating warheads from decoys.

- The use of modern technology can lead to components and systems that are both small and cheap and thus greatly help resolve the problem of survivability. For example, small satellites can be built that are survivable.

- We are of the view that a reliable, testable command and control system can be built and deployed especially for modest defense systems, despite the continuing controversy about the feasibility of full-sized command and control systems.

Based on these and related considerations we conclude that technology is in hand to develop, deploy and then improve a Limited Protection System (LPS).

SDI OPTIONS

We understand that the SDI program is presently being reexamined and perhaps redirected. We discuss below the technical pros and cons of various redirection options. However, we do believe that whatever course is chosen for the SDI program, in order to be viable, the program must, ultimately, meet your original objective, that is, emphasis on defense rather than offense.

The options discussed below range from reverting to “pure” research on SDI-related sciences and technology at one end of the

spectrum, to maintaining the deployment timetable as originally proposed by the SDI organization, on the other.

Option 1

Under this option the program would reduce its size and scope and merely pursue research in generic defense technologies. Such a program would be least costly, it might afford some protection against a technological breakout by the Soviets, but it would lack focus and a clear objective. Thus, it would lose the discipline and the efficacy that can come only from having a clear objective. Defining an objective short of a deployment objective might help.

Option 2

In this option the program would set the deployment of an LPS as a near-term objective and would pursue a generic R&D program focused on expanding, in time, the LPS to a strategic defense system. There are three important variants under this option:

- a. LPS deployment at Grand Forks utilizing the existing facilities of the now abandoned SAFEGUARD program,
- b. deployment near Washington, D.C., and,
- c. deployment is at both the sites above, and perhaps more sites.

Any of the variations of LPS would afford some protection to the U.S. against a catastrophe, however implausible that catastrophe is. It would represent a concrete step toward deployment of a more ambitious, more capable system, thus providing valuable experience, assuming that the LPS is configured as a flexible, evolving system.

The Grand Forks basing is likely to be less costly, because important elements of an LPS already exist there and would afford better coverage for an attack across the North Pole. The Washington, D.C. basing would afford some protection to the National Command Authority, and is expandable to cover the heavily populated east coast, although it would provide reduced coverage of the west coast. Proliferation of bases is needed to provide protection against sea-launched ballistic missiles that are launched close to our coasts.

As we said earlier, sufficient technology is in hand so that a decision to deploy (or not to deploy) an LPS can be made now. However, a detailed trade-off study is needed before elements of the LPS can be selected for engineering development.

Option 3

In this option the program would set the deployment of an LPS and the simultaneous development of more capable surveillance systems as a near-term objective. This would be more costly than Option 2, but it could lead to more rapid development of a more capable system.

Sensors that can track buses and RVs are a necessary component of any strategic defense system and a long lead-time element of it. They would improve the efficacy of an LPS. Further development of sensors is important for SDI, as well as for other military and intelligence purposes.

Option 4

In this option the SDI program would be maintained on its present course, i.e., Phase I deployment in the mid-1990s. This would call for more budgetary and other resources than appear to be available to the program, and would be a technically risky undertaking because of the sheer magnitude of the job—the simultaneous development and deployment of several complex systems—as well as present concerns over midcourse discrimination and the cost of the space-based interceptor.

SUMMARY CONCLUSION

In summary, Option 1—research only—carries with it the least risk, but also the least benefit, because the SDI program has matured to the point where the nation clearly would profit from pursuing elements closer to timely deployment in addition to pursuing further research.

Option 4—full Phase I deployment—remains a technical objective, but not all elements of Phase I are at comparable levels of maturity. If present Phase I plans are maintained, directed at a concurrent deployment of all elements, the schedule for first deployment would be dictated by the most time-consuming elements in the Phase I development process.

As between Options 2 and 3, we believe that the emphasis in Option 3 on early sensor deployment could be beneficial, but we believe that space-based sensor systems require further definition before deployment decisions are made.

The objective of earliest possible deployment at minimum risk is best satisfied by Option 2. We envisage Option 2 to be a program consisting of 1) deployment of LPS as a near-term objective and 2) an aggressive R&D program focused on expanding the LPS to a defense system capable of meeting your objective. The two parts would be balanced and mutually reinforcing, and neither would dominate the other. The research program would initially emphasize the development of better sensors, capable of tracking buses and reentry objects. The deployment of such sensors would greatly increase the capabilities and robustness of any LPS and possible follow-on systems. A vigorous R&D program would help ensure that the deployed LPS does not end up in a programmatic “cul-de-sac,” and would provide the technology

needed for an orderly evolution from the LPS to the first phase of a robust strategic defense system.

Very truly yours,

S.J. Buchsbaum

Chairman

White House Science Council

Panel on the Strategic Defense Initiative

288. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Negroponte)¹

Washington, October 5, 1988, 11:17 a.m.

SUBJECT

C-W-P Breakfast 10/04/88: SDI

Carlucci brought this non-agenda subject up, noting that there will be a major play tomorrow on SDI, with a joint hearing on the program. The Democrats will use the hearing to attack SDI. The Administration has a good story to tell on cost reduction for the SBI, he felt. The costs have fallen from an estimated \$52B to a new estimate of \$18B. This is attributable to technical breakthroughs, better focal plane capabilities. In addition, we can now take some capabilities in the “garage” and put them on the vehicles themselves, so we don’t need as many garages or KKV’s. As a consequence, SBI now looks much more feasible. Under the new approach, the year 2002 appears feasible for achievement of Full Operational Capability (FOC) for Phase I. (This is a slight “pushing out” of the previous schedule.) The 2002 date, of course, rests on many caveats and hedges. Carlucci said that he had decided not to testify himself, out of concern that that might appear too political. Bob Costello will be the lead witness, accompanied by Herres and Abrahamson. Frank has told Abe to hit hard the *New York Times* editorial theme that he is quitting because of program restructuring. Frank feels that we have a good story to tell now. DOD’s new report on SDI is quite convincing. He will

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 83392. Secret. Copies were sent to Grant, Robert Dean, Linhard, Mandel, Fortier, Perina, Rodman, Schillaci, and Andrico. Sent through Stevens and Perito. No minutes of the meeting among Carlucci, Whitehead, and Powell were found.

provide copies to the breakfast attendees. Kampelman said he senses a growing feeling on the Hill, among both Democrats and Republicans, that the program is becoming more achievable. Carlucci agreed. He feels it is becoming harder to argue against it. Whitehead said he had heard recently about the "Brilliant Pebbles" concept . . . "it sounds wonderful." Kampelman added that there will be a briefing on the concept at State later today. Carlucci said the concept is appealing. We are not ready to go that way at this point, but the technology trend is in the direction of something like "Brilliant Pebbles" that allows you to put more and more of the IR capability in the interceptor. "If we get there, that will be a very significant breakthrough". Returning to the subject of tomorrow's hearings, Carlucci noted that the committees have stacked the deck with lots of hostile (to SDI) witnesses. The hearings will be in a large room and there's no doubt the Democrats will attempt to politicize them. Whitehead felt that might backfire on the Democrats. Carlucci added that he had told his people to stay away from the treaty interpretation issue. If asked, they should say that's an issue that future administrations will have to come to grips with. They are there as the officials responsible for program management, to present a technical briefing on technological progress and costs. Beyond that, they will say that there are no near-term testing plans that would require application of the broad interpretation.

289. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Carlucci to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, October 25, 1988

SUBJECT

Defense Department Views, White House Science Council Report on SDI (U)

(S) I read with interest the White House Science Council Report on SDI.² However, I should point out that the Council reviewed the Phase One program as it was last spring. Although the report is dated in September, it was written in June and does not reflect the Phase I program presented to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) earlier this

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, SECDEF Carlucci's Library Subject—1988: SDI [10/14/1988–10/26/1988]. Secret.

² See Attachment, Document 287.

month. In fact, in their analysis of the prior Phase One program, the Council discussed many of the same problems I identified, and LTG Abrahamson remedied, this past summer. We now have an affordable, feasible, stepped approach to Phase One.

(S) Furthermore, while I agree with the Report's assessment of the "tremendous technical progress" achieved in SDI since the President's speech in March, 1983, I take exception to the policy approach advocated in the Report, particularly the endorsement now of deployment of a Limited Protection System (LPS). I oppose abandoning our current policy approach (moving to prepare Phase One, while maintaining an *option* to deploy LPS), and replacing it with a commitment now to deploy an LPS.

(S) Although there may be some advantages to moving to deploy an LPS now, there are a number of overriding drawbacks. For example:

— It would siphon off resources from other, more promising ABM systems and technologies, including space-based systems where the defense has much greater leverage over the offense.

— The JCS believe that the Phase I SDS represents the minimum level of military effectiveness that is considered to be a meaningful addition to deterrence. LPS would not have that level of capability.

— LPS would have a significant possibility of being a programmatic "dead end."

(S) The SDI program is being managed soundly, with a focus on reducing the costs while maintaining the military effectiveness of the Phase One Strategic Defense System (SDS). The Space-Based Interceptor (SBI), in particular, has been modified significantly to bring down costs. These cost-reduction efforts will continue.

(S) The President's veto of the Defense Authorization bill—a bill that would have gutted the SBI program and placed unwarranted and counterproductive restrictions on numerous other SDI projects—served to underscore the strength of the President's conviction that our current policy with respect to SDI is indeed the proper approach. For these reasons, I believe the SDI program is on sound footing, and our current policy vis-a-vis SDI is working and should not be changed.

Frank Carlucci

290. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, October 31, 1988, 2110Z

12030. Department Please Pass to NSC for Linhard, OSD for Ron Lehman, JCS for J-5 and DDIN, ACDA for Fite (NSC/OSD/JCS Deliver Between 0800–1800 EST). Subject: KRAS: Summary Report of Krasnoyarsk Experts Meeting, October 31, 1988.

1. This is KRAS-002. Secret—Entire text.

SUMMARY

2. At the first meeting of U.S.-Soviet experts, Burns reiterated the U.S. position and criteria on Krasnoyarsk, pointed out that the U.S. reserves the right under international law to take appropriate and proportionate responses, and stated that the U.S. group is in Geneva to listen and clarify Soviet proposals regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar and expects the Soviet side to be forthcoming with complete technical information.

3. Karpov began the Soviet presentation by turning the floor over to Sidorov. Sidorov stated that there are six features which he claimed prevented the Krasnoyarsk radar from performing early warning functions (see para 7). Sidorov estimated that at least three years would be required to modify the radar to perform early warning functions and that a new radar would have to be built if it were to perform ABM functions. (Vasil'yev later corrected Sidorov stating that it would take three to four years to renew and complete the construction.) Sidorov then asserted that U.S. participation in an international space center could prevent such modifications from being made. Burns questioned the requirement to link Krasnoyarsk to an international space center in order to resolve U.S. concerns and the time periods that the Soviets had quoted. Several Soviets defended the linkage between the international space center and resolving U.S. concerns.

4. Karpov suggested working groups begin meeting to discuss the issues of how U.S. concerns could be resolved through technical means and what the purposes of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be in an international space center. When Burns responded that he had heard little today that would suggest working groups, Karpov agreed to Burns'

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880965–0736. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow.

proposal that Tuesday's² meetings be limited to two full-size experts group meetings with the first to begin at 1000 hours.

5. In a fifteen-minute post-meeting session between Burns and Karpov, Karpov stressed that his experts were instructed to respond comprehensively to U.S. questions. Burns replied that the Soviet presentation thus far touched only at the most uninteresting end of the spectrum of Soviet suggested solutions.

OPENING U.S. REMARKS

6. In lieu of tabling a formal opening statement, Burns used the following talking points:

— We are here today in response to a proposal of the Soviet Union to convene an ad hoc group of experts to listen to the proposed actions the Soviet side is prepared to take to meet our concerns regarding the Large Phased-Array Radar (LPAR) deployed in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk. The United States regards this meeting as an ad hoc group and not as an extension of the NST, the ABM treaty review conference, or the SCC. We are prepared to listen to the proposals of the Soviet side and to clarify Soviet positions so as to ensure that the United States has complete technical information regarding these proposals. We are not prepared to negotiate such proposals. We believe that the meeting should not exceed three days.

— The United States position regarding the Large Phased-Array Radar in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is well known to the Soviet side. However, I would like to reiterate that position to make sure that there is no misunderstanding. We believe that the deployment of the Krasnoyarsk radar in this location and with its orientation is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. We believe that, in order for this violation to be corrected, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The continued existence of this radar calls into question the viability of the ABM treaty and makes it impossible to conclude any future arms control agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas.

— The Krasnoyarsk violation continues to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved. The United States reserves all its rights under international law to take appropriate and proportionate responses if the violations of the ABM treaty are not corrected. This meeting of experts is without prejudice to that position.

— Any satisfactory solution:

— must reestablish the lead time acceptable to the United States that was the purpose of the LPAR provisions of the ABM Treaty;

²November 1.

- must verifiably remove all treaty-prohibited radar capability;
- should add no new obligations, requirements, or definitions to the ABM Treaty such as on-site inspections; and
- should not prejudice the sides' positions in the Defense and Space Negotiations.

— the United States believes that these criteria for correction of this violation can only be met by dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar and destruction of the transmitter and receiver buildings, including their foundations. However, the United States is here to hear the ideas of the Soviet side. We expect to receive complete technical information regarding the Soviet proposals on the Krasnoyarsk radar, including:

- exactly what kind of technical solution the Soviet side is prepared to carry out and why the Soviet side believes this solution might offer the basis for resolution of the violation, specifically, what actions the Soviet side is willing to take in regard to the receiver and transmitter it plans to build at Krasnoyarsk;
- when the Soviet side would begin and how long it would take to complete the action;
- what radar capabilities would remain; and
- how long it would take the Soviets to reconvert the radar to a prohibited radar once the Soviet modifications were completed.
- we are ready to listen.

OPENING SOVIET REMARKS

7. Karpov stated that he too preferred not to present a formal statement and reiterated previous Soviet linkage between the ABM Treaty and fifty percent reductions in offensive strategic arms. Karpov then turned to Sidorov to outline the Soviet proposals. Sidorov claimed that Krasnoyarsk was a unique facility which could be used for scientific research. He listed six features which he said would not allow Krasnoyarsk to be used as an early warning facility.

- He claimed the Krasnoyarsk radar was not designed to process large amounts of data in real-time and did not contain specialized computer equipment or specialized algorithms. It would take two to three years to carry out work to provide early warning capability in this area. As an additional matter to help remove U.S. concerns Krasnoyarsk could be equipped with U.S. computer components which could not perform real-time early warning (EW) functions.

- He stated that EW radars normally operated in an environment of deliberate interference. The computers at Krasnoyarsk could not do that; again it would take two to three years to perform modifications which would allow early warning capability.

- He asserted that Krasnoyarsk used types of signals characteristic of Spacetrack radars. He proposed the sides could agree on radar signals for specific Spacetrack purposes.

— He said the Krasnoyarsk radar lacked a shelter against EMP.

— He further stated that the radar did not have an autonomous power source and added that neither this nor the EMP problem could be overcome without building an entirely new radar.

— He then asserted that there was an absence of a real-time data interface which would be required for an early warning system and suggested that the sides could agree on an interface system.

8. He concluded that all the above features make the radar unsuitable for early warning purposes and that it would take at least three years to modify it to become an early warning radar.

U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSION

9. In the discussion that followed, Burns commented that he did not see a linkage between an international space center and the Krasnoyarsk radar, that would affect compliance with the ABM Treaty, yet the Soviets seem to make them inseparable. He asked whether the time periods discussed were cumulative or whether the work could be done concurrently. He questioned whether the Soviet side had said it would take two to three years for that EW radar to be modified to operate in the ABM mode. He asked for an estimate of how long it would take to complete the Krasnoyarsk radar from its current status.

10. Karpov responded that it would take both mechanical and physical, as well as computer software, modifications. However, it could not be converted to an ABM radar, only to an early warning radar. He then added that a new radar would have to be built if it were to have an ABM capability.

11. Sidorov added that Krasnoyarsk was unsuited for ABM functions because it operated in the meter band and would not be able to operate in an environment of nuclear explosions. He stated that in answer to Burns question the characteristics of Krasnoyarsk were linked to the international space center because its functions in that center would allow the U.S. to see how it operates. In response to how long it would take to modify the radar he stated that it would require modification to external structures then changes to primary and secondary processing and protection against interference. He stated their figures were estimates and they did not know exactly how much time would be involved. Their estimate was three years to complete the work at Krasnoyarsk. That time period would get longer as a result of the continued suspension of construction.

12. Vasil'yev corrected Sidorov stating that it would take three or four years to renew and complete the construction. He also stated that the two ideas of Krasnoyarsk capability and an international space center were linked closely and that the proposal to establish such a center

was of great interest to Soviet scientists. He pointed out that western European nations had found this type of space research was very expensive and had established a special body to perform such studies. He suggested that experts could discuss the importance and interests of scientists in such efforts and that the optimization of the Krasnoyarsk configuration could change the radars data processing and signal features. He stated that this could remove U.S. concerns.

13. Kondrat'yev remarked that the ABM Treaty limited the building of radars only if they were built for early warning, there were no restrictions on other types of radars. He continued that the U.S. started on the false assumption that there was an ABM Treaty violation that needed correction. Such a misunderstanding could be resolved only through joint and not unilateral actions.

14. Burns stated that the sides should meet again tomorrow. He reminded Karpov of the political as well as the scientific context of the meeting. He noted that the hands of the clock were moving.

15. Karpov suggested that two working groups meet either before or after the next day's meeting. He suggested one could discuss what could be done by technical means to resolve the U.S. concern. A second group could discuss what the purposes of the radar would be in an international space center.

16. Burns said he would consider this suggestion and he and Karpov agreed to have a full experts meeting at 1000 hours on November 1. Burns also agreed to meet privately with Karpov after the meeting was adjourned.

BURNS-KARPOV ONE-ON-ONE POST MEETING

17. In a fifteen minute one-on-one, Karpov began by stressing that his experts had been carefully selected, were fully knowledgeable about Krasnoyarsk and its radar construction, and were directed to respond comprehensively to any questions the U.S. side might raise. Karpov added that he "did not mind" if the U.S. side used a questioning technique to elicit information. Burns stated that he was unhappy that the Soviet presentation thus far considered only the most uninteresting end of the spectrum of Soviet suggested solutions to the Krasnoyarsk violation. If we are to make progress, Burns added, then the Soviet side must offer real solutions on Tuesday that go to the heart of the issue. Karpov suggested that experts' subgroups would be useful. Burns argued that, thus far, we had little for them to address and added that given the short time available, the general sessions seemed to be adequate.

18. Karpov stated that he had to return to Moscow on Thursday, but he could leave experts behind if necessary. Burns indicated that three days should be enough.

19. Karpov asked if the D&S Negotiating Group would be able to specify a return date in January; he indicated that he was aware that the group, as well as START, would take a break in negotiations in mid-November. Burns responded that he did not know about a resumption date; he assumed the president-elect would be consulted on such an issue.

20. Karpov invited Burns to lunch on Tuesday, 1 November and Burns accepted. They then agreed to meet in two full group sessions on Tuesday, with the first meeting to begin at 1000 hours.

21. Meeting Date: October 31, 1988

Time: 1600–1727 hours

Place: Soviet Mission

22. Participants:

U.S.

Gen Burns

LTC Ankley

Mr. Castillo

Mr. Schneider

Mr. Pifer

Mr. Teele

Mr. McCormick

LtCol Pitts

Mr. Tyrrell

Mr. Trimpin

Mr. Brown

Mr. Wittwer

Mr. Koncher

Mr. Wollan

Mr. Holt

Mr. Krimer (int)

USSR

Amb. Karpov

Mr. Kuklev

Mr. Vasil'yev

Mr. Yepifantsev

Mr. Kondrat'yev

Mr. Sidorov

Mr. Uspenskiy

Mr. Chulitskiy

Mr. Gor'kovskiy

Mr. Trepelkov (int)

23. The next experts meeting is scheduled for 1000 hours on Tuesday, November 1, 1988, at the U.S. Mission.

Burns

291. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Negroponte)¹

Washington, November 2, 1988, 9:39 a.m.

SUBJECT

Status of Experts' Talks on Krasnoyarsk

The experts' session ended this morning in Geneva. The Soviets had nothing to put on the table (although Karpov told Burns on at least two occasions that he was consulting with Moscow and may have something). Karpov also made a point that the "Soviets experts were under instructions to answer any questions fully" and Embassy Moscow sent a special message² in to Washington suggesting that we ensure we ask questions. The delegation did, asking 9 times on Tuesday³ what was meant in the press release by the Soviets by the possible modification of facilities and getting garbage about computer hardware and software modifications/capabilities.

The cables reporting on this are in the VAX database, listed in text as Kras-001 thru Kras-005⁴ (search first para text for that phrase on GESCAN). Burns had his last session with Karpov this morning and has sent a backchannel with his assessment (that we have yet to see). He called me this morning and told me that Viktor went out of his way to end on friendly note⁵—and we may still see some last minute contact.

All concerned are pleased with Burns's performance.

¹ Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 84367. Secret. Copies were sent to Mandel, Brooks, Heiser, Tobey, Mahley, Stevens, Pearson, and Fortier. Sent through Stevens and Perito.

² Not found.

³ November 1.

⁴ KRAS-001 is telegram 12001 from the Mission in Geneva, October 31 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880965-0102); KRAS-002 is Document 290; KRAS-003 is telegram 12085 from the Mission in Geneva, November 1 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880969-0301); KRAS-004 is telegram 12059 from the Mission in Geneva, November 1 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880968-0842); KRAS-005 is telegram 12089 from the Mission in Geneva, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880969-0355)

⁵ Not found. The Mission in Geneva transmitted a summary report of the final meeting of the experts group in telegram 12101 from Geneva, November 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800972-0599)

PROGRAMMATIC & POLICY PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES
(NSDD 312)⁶

On a related matter, the DoD Report on programmatic responses, due to the President on 1 November as tasked by NSDD 312 is still not here. The DoD developed 7 programmatic responses and 3 policy responses. We are not supposed to have seen them (protect) but these include:

Programmatic Responses

- convert 50 MM II's to MM III's
- overhaul (vice retire) 2 SSBNs
- change plans on retiring 2 squadrons of B-52Gs in early 1990s
- conduct integrated SDI weapons/sensors testing
- deploy limited accidental launch protection system (against ballistics) at one site
- deploy limited ALPS at two sites
- one other I forgot

Policy Responses

- don't go to this year's 2nd SCC session
- two others that I have forgotten

The package was briefed to the Chiefs last week, and they feel that we are already doing all we should programmatically in the POM. They feel the right policy response is what the President has already announced (no new agreements until Krasnoyarsk comes down). We have pressed OSD to get us some response, preferably the list of responses above and the JCS view that we should do none of them if that is the truth. Unfortunately, no one is home at OSD this week.

HILL DEBRIEF. Burns returns on Thursday.⁷ He is scheduled to brief on the Hill on Friday. He asked what to say, and I told him to speak the truth. PRESS GUIDANCE. The following is the "contingency" press guidance if asked about the experts' meeting.

QUESTION. What can you say about the meeting in Geneva of US and Soviet experts on Krasnoyarsk?

ANSWER:

— The Krasnoyarsk radar is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. We have made it clear to the Soviets that the violation must be corrected without delay or precondition.

— Last week, the US agreed to a Soviet suggestion to have a meeting of technical experts in order to listen to Soviet proposals and clarify

⁶ See Document 272.

⁷ November 3.

Soviet positions on actions they (the Soviets) are prepared to take to correct the Krasnoyarsk problem.

— We had hoped that they were prepared to meet US concerns about the radars.

— That meeting of US and Soviet experts on the Krasnoyarsk radar violation ended on November 2. We listened to what they had to say. Unfortunately, the Soviet experts did not have any new proposals that addressed our concerns, and could not answer questions about how they would correct the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable manner that meets US concerns.

— We have made clear to them that any satisfactory solution of the Krasnoyarsk violation must:

— reestablish the lead time acceptable to the US that was the purpose of the Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) provisions of the ABM Treaty, and

— must verifiably remove all Treaty-prohibited radar capability.

— Based on what we have heard to date, we continue to believe strongly that the US criteria can only be met by dismantlement of the radar and destruction of the transmitter and receiver buildings, including their foundations.

— We continue to reserve all our rights under international law to take appropriate and proportionate response to the Soviet violation. We have not foreclosed the option of declaring that violation to be a material breach.

QUESTION: What are the next steps?

ANSWER:

— General Burns and his team are returning to Washington to brief the Administration⁸ before further decisions are made.

⁸ In a personal diary entry for November 3, Reagan wrote: "In Geneva no breakthrough on Krasnoyarsk Radar which we see as breach of A.B.M. treaty." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 973) No minutes were found.

292. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Carlucci to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, November 10, 1988

SUBJECT

Report to the President on Responses to Soviet ABM Treaty Violations—(U)

(S) The attached report has been prepared by the Department of Defense in response to the direction by the President in National Security Decision Directive 312,² that the "Department of Defense should undertake immediately, with the involvement of other agencies as appropriate, to develop an options paper which presents the range of proportionate options available should the Soviet Union resume construction at Krasnoyarsk or otherwise refuse to correct this violation." Comments from the Department of State, Department of Energy, Central Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are appended to the report at TAB A.³

(S) The report provides a range of programmatic and policy options, none of which is mutually exclusive, which the Department of Defense has developed for consideration as possible responses to the Krasnoyarsk violation. Each of the options has been assessed on the basis of evaluation criteria identified in the report. None of the options satisfies all of these criteria; in fact, all options have drawbacks which must be considered. It is difficult to construct responses that provide direct and immediate leverage on the Soviet Union to correct its violations. Cost, political and programmatic constraints must be taken into account in any review of the options. In the context of our overall military posture, there is only limited military utility to any of the options provided. Except for the strategic options, the feasibility of the responses may be called into question because of current political and economic constraints. The strategic offensive options provide marginal enhancements but at costs that will be difficult to accommodate in current and anticipated budgets. In addition, the execution of certain options could be viewed as disproportionate to the Krasnoyarsk radar by itself.

(S) With respect to the programmatic options, the Department of Defense cannot support reprogramming from current programs or accounts. Thus, new funding above the line must be achieved through

¹ Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR-097, NSDD 312. Secret; Noform; Wnintel.

² See Document 272.

³ Attached but not printed.

either a supplemental appropriation or specific legislative authorization for responses to noncompliance with arms control agreements. Given the small likelihood of receiving such funds, I believe it imperative to examine the policy options very closely. The options offered in this report do not represent an exhaustive list of those that could be considered. The Department of Defense will continue to examine other possible responses, and will provide additional options which may be developed.

(S) It must be noted, the attached report places the Krasnoyarsk radar in the context of possible Soviet preparations for a territorial defense. The Krasnoyarsk radar, of course, does not in and of itself pose as severe a threat as would a territorial defense. If a Soviet territorial ABM defense is developed, the report's proposed options would fail to counter such a defense and would likely require a national commitment an order of magnitude greater.

(S) The President has already taken a most fitting political response by notifying the Soviet Union that the United States will not conclude any future arms control agreements in the START and Defense and Space areas until the Krasnoyarsk violation is resolved. Further responses, if required, should build on that action. The Department of Defense further believes that increased funding for the completion of the full strategic modernization program, modernized conventional forces, and vigorous SDI research provides the most viable military options and the most appropriate hedge against future Soviet threats.

Frank Carlucci

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, November 9, 1988

RESPONSES TO SOVIET ABM TREATY VIOLATIONS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

INTRODUCTION

(S) This report responds to the direction by the President in NSDD 312 that the "Department of Defense should undertake immediately, with the involvement of other agencies as appropriate, to develop an

⁴ Secret; Noform; Wnintel. Brackets, except those indicating omission statements, are in the original.

options paper which presents the range of proportionate options available should the Soviet Union resume construction at Krasnoyarsk or otherwise refuse to correct this violation.”

(U) The specific options are detailed in Part II of this report. Part I provides the context in which the Department developed those options: the U.S. Government position on the nature and significance of the Krasnoyarsk violation; and the factors used to evaluate options. The discussion of the Krasnoyarsk violation in Part I is an executive summary; more detail is provided in the Annex to this Report.

Part I

The Krasnoyarsk Violation

(U) The President has repeatedly emphasized the absolute importance to the United States of strict compliance with arms control agreements, and the unacceptability of any dual-standard of compliance. In several reports to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance, he has stated that:

“In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.”

While the U.S. Government cannot accept or condone any violation of any arms control agreement, we are particularly concerned at Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty and possible preparations for a prohibited territorial defense against ballistic missiles. The significance of such a defense for U.S. and Allied security has been repeatedly noted by the President:

“This would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its capability.”

(S) A key element of a territorial ABM defense could be provided by the large phased-array radar (LPAR) at Krasnoyarsk. In his instructions to the U.S. delegation to the ABM Treaty Review Conference (NSDD 312), the President made the following basic points about the Krasnoyarsk violation:

— The Large Phased Array Radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty.

— In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled.

— The U.S. has observed the current slowdown of construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation.

— The continued existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar calls into question the viability of the ABM Treaty and makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START and Defense and Space areas.

— The Krasnoyarsk radar violation will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved.

— If the Soviet Union is not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference, following the Review, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the Treaty.

— In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future.

(U) Large phased-array radars have always been considered to be the long lead-time element of a possible territorial defense against ballistic missiles. The only permitted functions for an LPAR with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and national technical means of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, the United States judges that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking.

(S/NF/WN) In addition to the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar, eight legal new LPARs outside of Moscow have been identified; three are already operational. At least one additional LPAR may be constructed. Each of the nine new Soviet LPARs has, or will have, at a minimum, an early warning detection and tracking capability. All U.S. intelligence agencies agree that the LPARs have the technical potential to provide target-tracking data or support of a widespread ABM system. Agencies differ on whether the Soviets would deploy a widespread ABM system that relied on these radars for battle management support. DIA believes that all nine of these LPARs will be suitable for supporting a widespread ABM defense.

(S/NF/WN) U.S. concerns about the Krasnoyarsk LPAR are further heightened by the broad range of other Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities which could allow them to take advantage of the modern LPAR infrastructure to deploy a territorial ABM defense with little or no prior warning to the United States. The Soviets have been developing and testing the rapidly deployable ABM-X-3 system for about two decades. Initial ABM sites using the ABM-X-3 could be deployed within about two months of ground breaking. The Soviet Union may also be engaged in giving militarily significant ABM

capability to its large, and widely deployed surface-to-air missile force. At least one of the Soviet ABM activities in addition to the Krasnoyarsk radar—the deployment of Flat Twin and Pawn Shop radars at Gomel—clearly violates the ABM Treaty. Others potentially violate the Treaty. The President has determined that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

(S) The United States has repeatedly raised with the Soviet Union the issue of its non-compliance with the ABM Treaty over several years in a variety of fora, including the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), ministerial meetings, and most recently in the ABM Treaty Review Conference of August 1988 and the experts meeting of 31 October–2 November 1988.⁵ However, the Soviets have not corrected the Krasnoyarsk or Gomel violations or taken any actions which redress our concerns regarding their possible preparation of a territorial defense.

Response to Soviet Violations

(S) The U.S. response to the Krasnoyarsk violation should be designed to persuade the USSR to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar without delay and without preconditions. Moreover, an appropriate U.S. response to the Krasnoyarsk violation should send a clear signal regarding the unacceptability of the overall apparent Soviet preparations for a territorial defense.

(S) The U.S. refusal to conclude a START or Defense and Space Agreement until the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled is a first, and essential, response. The impact of a Soviet territorial defense on the retaliatory capability of our current forces would be severe; the effect on START-constrained forces would be even more damaging.

(S) This report presents additional options, in both programmatic and policy areas, which the Department of Defense has developed for responding to the Krasnoyarsk violation. The programmatic options cover both strategic offensive and strategic defensive programs; each requires additional funding from the Congress beyond that provided in the FY1989 Defense Appropriations, through either a supplemental appropriation or specific legislative authorization of responses to non-compliance with arms control agreements.

(U) The costing estimates presented for the options are macro-level and not budget quality. They are suitable for assessments of the feasibility of options but should not be used out of the context of this report to define the precise cost of a specific program. Projection of

⁵ See Documents 277 and 290.

programmatic expenses up to 10 years in the future, often relating to future weapons systems, cannot be precise. All funding estimates in this report are expressed in 1988 dollars.

Evaluation Factors

(S) The Department of Defense evaluated options according to the following factors: proportionality; linkage; consistency with NST; compliance with existing U.S. arms control agreements; timeliness; reversibility; cost; military effectiveness; technical benefit; growth potential; political acceptability; leverage; and whether the option represents a new initiative. A brief description of each of these factors follows.

- *Proportionality*: Is the response option similar in magnitude to the Soviet violation?

- *Linkage*: Is there a logical connection and relationship between Soviet non-compliance and the proposed U.S. response?

- *Consistency with NST*: Is the response option consistent with agreed elements in START? Is the option supportive of the objectives established by the President for NST?

- *Consistency with Existing Arms Control Agreements*: Is the response option consistent with existing arms control agreements?

- *Timeliness*: Can the response option be initiated and effected within a reasonable timeframe in order to underscore U.S. determination to respond to the Soviet violation?

- *Reversibility*: Could the response option be halted and/or undone should the decision be made to take such action? If the response option is part of an existing or anticipated U.S. strategic modernization program initiative, could it be halted or endangered by Soviet actions to correct their non-compliance with the ABM Treaty?

- *Cost*: What is the total cost of the response option? What is the breakdown of the cost over fiscal years and/or by divisible portions?

- *Military Effectiveness*: What impact would the response option, if military in nature, have on the strategic offensive and defensive capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union?

- *Technological Benefit*: What tangible technological benefit would the response option have for U.S. research and development programs, proposed or existing military systems?

- *Growth Potential*: Could the response option be augmented or modified should it be necessary to increase the level of response?

- *Political Acceptability*: What is the expected nature and source of support or opposition to the response option, in both the United States and Allied countries? Would the response option be affected by Congressionally-mandated arms control provisions?

◦ *Leverage*: Is the response option likely to help bring about the desired result—inducing the USSR to correct its noncompliant activity?

◦ *New Initiative*: Is the response a new measure specifically tailored to offset the Soviet violation?

(S) Each of the options presented in Part II of this report differ significantly with respect to the evaluation factors. None fully satisfies all of the factors. At the same time, none of the options are mutually exclusive.

(S) The Department of Defense considered, but chose not to forward, several policy and programmatic options in addition those presented in this Report. Among those were: postpone retirement of two Poseidon SSBNs from FY 1989 to FY 1990; undistributed increase in the SDI budget; and delay in the NST negotiations. The option to delay the Poseidon retirements was rejected because it would have little operational value, since the boats involved would run out of fuel in May 1989 and September 1989, respectively.

(S) Finally, it is important to note that the options described in Part II of this Report do not represent an exhaustive list of possible U.S. responses. Instead, the list is designed to encompass a full range of programmatic and policy options which the Department of Defense believes the United States could pursue, based on an analysis of the several evaluation factors.

ABM Treaty Considerations

(S) Some of the options presented in this report are fully consistent with the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty; some would require exercising our legal rights under the broad interpretation; and some would eventually require actions which would be inconsistent with our ABM Treaty obligations if they were not proportionate responses to a Soviet violation. The options in the last category include: SDI system experiment; deployment of a two-site Limited Protection System; refusal to attend a second session of the SCC during 1988; and a unilateral decision that space-based sensors run free.

(U) International law would permit the United States to respond to the Soviet treaty violation with an action which would otherwise be inconsistent with our treaty obligations, provided the response is “necessary to terminate the violation, or prevent further violation, or to remedy the violation” and is “not out of proportion to the violation and the injury suffered.” (See Restatement [Third] of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Sec. 905 [1986].) With regard to necessity, according to the Restatement, exercise of such an option would require a determination that “genuine negotiation” that “offers some promise of resolving the matter” is not available. It is unclear whether such a legally permitted proportionate response would require suspension of

a treaty obligation (which would be reciprocal in its effect). It would not require declaration by the U.S. of a Soviet material breach.

(S) Furthermore, proportionality under international law does not require that a response which would otherwise be inconsistent with our treaty obligations be confined to the precise scope and scale of the violation. In short, the United States could undertake a response that is of a lesser nature than the Soviet violation, or we could trump the Soviet violation with an arguably greater response—all within our legal rights, provided the response is not out of proportion to the violation or the injury suffered. It should be designed to induce a return to compliance.

(S) With respect to the obligation under domestic law to observe the provisions of the ABM Treaty, it appears that a proportionate response which would otherwise be inconsistent with the Treaty would lie within the President's power to conduct foreign affairs. However, responses which entailed actions outside the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty would require relief from existing legislation which restricts SDI development and testing to that presented in the 1988 Report to the Congress on the SDI Program.

(S) Finally, none of the options presented—except for the refusal to hold a second SCC session in 1988—would entail an immediate implementation of the broad interpretation or of our legal right to undertake a proportionate response which would otherwise be inconsistent with our ABM Treaty obligations. It would be two years before the SDI system experiment could take place, and even longer before the United States could test ABM-capable space-based sensors, or deploy a two-site Limited Protection System.

PART II

PROGRAM OPTIONS

1. Retain 1–3 Poseidon SSBNs vice early retirement;
2. Advanced penetration aids program;
3. Deployment of 50 additional Minuteman III ICBMs;
4. Retention of nuclear B–52G squadrons;
5. SDI system experiment;
6. Accelerate sensors segment of SDI;
7. Deploy a limited protection system (single site);
8. Deploy a limited protection system (multiple site);

POLICY OPTIONS

9. Refuse to attend a second session of the SCC;
10. Unilateral decision that space-based sensors run free;

11. Reduced restrictions on accelerated SDI.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper, which describes and evaluates the program and policy options, as well as the paper's Annex.]

293. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 7, 1988, 1:40–3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Luncheon with Chairman Gorbachev (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

US

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State George P. Shultz
 Kenneth Duberstein, Chief of Staff to
 the President
 Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the Presi-
 dent for National Security Affairs
 Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary
 of State, European and Canadian
 Affairs
 Ambassador Jack Matlock
 Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (Notetaker)
 Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC Staff
 (Notetaker)
 Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

USSR

Chairman M.S. Gorbachev
 Aleksandr Yakovlev
 Foreign Minister Eduard
 Shevardnadze
 Anatoliy Chernayev
 Anatoliy Dobrynin
 Yuriy Dubinin
 Viktor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)
 Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Depart-
 ment Head, Ministry of Foreign
 Affairs (Notetaker)
 Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, December 1988 Governor's Island. Secret. The meeting took place in the Commandant's Residence at Governor's Island. Drafted by Ledsky and Simons. Stevens sent the memorandum of conversation to Levitsky under a January 9, 1989, memorandum, indicating that it was a "revised" and "reformatted" draft of the President's luncheon with Gorbachev, which is the version printed here. (Ibid.) The complete memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 181. Documents pertaining to the December 1988 New York meeting between Reagan, Gorbachev, and Bush, as well as Shevardnadze and Shultz, are in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 178–182.

President Reagan warned Chairman Gorbachev that they would again be facing five waves of newsmen and photographers. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion not pertaining to Krasnoyarsk.]

The President noted that there were still major differences between us. The radar at Krasnoyarsk, for instance, was unresolved and remained a serious concern. We also need to keep on working in Geneva for an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that he thought he had put an end to the Krasnoyarsk problem. The installation had been transferred from the military to the scientists. This had been done to make life easier for the next President. Secretary Shultz has already spent so much time on this problem that the Soviet side had decided to turn the matter over to the scientists. (S)

Secretary Shultz said he had listened to the portion of Gorbachev's address concerning Krasnoyarsk and noted that the word Gorbachev had used had been translated as "dismantle." (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied with a smile that he bet the Secretary had written that down. He said he could confirm the translation. It was another victory for the Secretary. The important thing was to make life easier for the next President. (S)

The Vice President interjected that there were other areas he could use some help on, if that was what the Soviets had in mind. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev responded jocularly that the Vice President was probably now thinking of what else he could ask for. (S)

Secretary Shultz suggested helping end the US budget deficit. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said the Soviets could not solve the US budget deficit. The US could not solve the Soviet deficit. But working together, we could help each other with both deficits. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion not pertaining to Krasnoyarsk.]

294. Editorial Note

On December 12, 1988, President Ronald Reagan participated in a national security briefing in the Oval Office from 10:30 until 11 a.m. No minutes were found. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) According to a December 12 memorandum for the record initialed by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Colin Powell, Vice President and President-Elect George H.W. Bush "asked whether there was anything new in President Gorbachev's statement to the effect

that” the radar at Krasnoyarsk “was being ‘dismantled.’” White House Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein and President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs John Negroponte “responded that there does not appear to be anything new in Gorbachev’s position,” and that turning the radar at Krasnoyarsk over to the scientific community would be insufficient to meeting U.S. concerns. (Reagan Library, Colin Powell Files, Subject File, The President)

The Office of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council prepared a series of briefing books for President-Elect Bush in advance of his inauguration on January 20, 1989. The second briefing book, which was dated November 1988 and focused on issues requiring attention prior to the inauguration as well as those that would confront the new administration in its first six months, included papers prepared by the National Security Council (NSC) Arms Control Directorate and the NSC Defense Policy Directorate. The Arms Control Directorate paper included a section on the Krasnoyarsk Radar, which read, in part: “The United States has concluded that the Krasnoyarsk radar constitutes a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. We have called upon the Soviets to reverse the violation by dismantling the transmitter and receiver buildings and destroying their foundations. We have also made it clear to the Soviets that we will not conclude any additional strategic arms agreement while the violation remains unresolved.” A subsequent section on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) read, in part: “SDI policy is guided primarily by NSDDs 172 and 192. The objective of the program is to determine the feasibility of effective strategic defenses that will improve the strength and quality of deterrence. The Defense Acquisition Board has certified a Phase I architecture beyond milestone I of the acquisition process. That architecture consists of: space-based interceptors; ground-based exoatmospheric interceptors; a boost-surveillance and tracking system; a ground-based surveillance probe; and battle management systems. This architecture provides for layered defenses that could intercept Soviet missiles in the boost phase and meet the JCS effectiveness requirements for strengthening deterrence.” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Transition Material, OA/ID 99015) National Security Decision Directive 172, “Presenting the Strategic Defense Initiative,” May 30, 1985, and National Security Decision Directive 192, “The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program,” October 11, 1985, are Documents 40 and 76. The Defense Policy Directorate paper proposed that a “rapid, in-depth review” of the “basic elements of U.S. National Security Strategy,” in two phases, “the faster portion” of which “could review strategy, policy, forces, and programs to provide for our strategic nuclear deterrent—much work in this area is already done.” A subsequent section on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile modernization

read, in part: "The funds provided in the FY 89 Authorization and Appropriations Bills will keep the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison Program on schedule and allow DOD to keep the Small ICBM contractors working at a minimal level of effort through FY 89. The new President is required to provide Congress an obligation plan for the \$350M which the current Administration is prohibited from obligating, by February 15, 1989. The current direction to the Department of Defense supports a combined Peacekeeper Rail Garrison, Small ICBM program as well as completion of Peacekeeper in Minuteman Silos in December 1988. Although the FY 90 DOD Budget has not been finalized, the current version delays the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison Program by six months and eliminates the Small ICBM Program." (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Transition Material, OA/ID 99015)

On January 18, 1989, President Reagan participated in a national security briefing in the Oval Office from 10:15 until 10:30 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal minutes were found. Reagan noted in a personal diary entry for that day: "Again decision called for on Krasnoyarsk radar. We view it as a serious breach of A.B.M. treaty. We do not have time to change that to a 'Material Breach.'" (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume II, November 1985–January 1989, page 1010)

Appendix

A. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, November 7, 1986

NLR-281-1-8-6-4

njk

PRESERVATION UNIT

11/7/86

Special Advisors mtg w/ Pres

JMP ~~summary~~ / ~~brief~~

Chp Intro / new hls

- what 150 in silos, long raid so
- apt Scowcroft: raid in silos

Options: ① [REDACTED]

② -- predetermined launch pts

- least expensive
- [REDACTED]
- widely dispersed
- on line ~~start~~ starting 1990

③ [REDACTED] (depths)

- 360 mi² [REDACTED]
- grave doubt about
- a lot of mine blasts to [REDACTED] (effects
- survives attached to)
- very high cost, some higher
- survivability (no need to
- will not be seen)

③ [REDACTED]

- similar, wrong art of lead
- FLS 999 ...

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¹Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, Ballistic Missile Defense. No classification marking. Drafted by Keel, who handwrote the notes. For the transcribed text of these notes and excision statements, see Document 155.

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-- some more uncertainty

(4)

- new [redacted]
- can get [redacted]
give the feedback, specific
kind of goals (y)
- case [redacted]
not much better for [redacted]
- don't get certain sure if
be hit close (center if en
if don't violate)
- perhaps, at this pt second best
(very likely not finally see)

On basis of what I've seen so far,
likely see caution rail

- no new law
- ~~in public~~ on public land
- not likely a public outcry

SMALL ICSM

- Rec at this pt go to mobile, ~~mobile~~ mobile,
hardened corner
- diff in that IRU, [redacted]

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my

- .. is favorite of 2,3 people - Capen
- ~~335~~ 335 if go w/ original weight
- the road could go to 2 w/n,
increase w/n
- not till 1994

o I have to tell you that I've never felt
more worn out, off, or very upset

o Carl Langaris

- .. another option #5, [redacted] not
considered very much
- .. at [redacted], not probably going to see
.. [redacted]
- .. not go w/ SM 1CSM

o Pres:

- .. I can see people asking why don't, if we
going to decide
- .. yet must have appearance to go ahead if
get Soviets to be serious
- .. good small, perhaps get each
counsellor to take one in each district

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- Pres: • Don't see how anyone (Pres) could sit at that desk and not retaliate (read out notes) have that empty sides
- Ceane: • Well if dilemma for Soviets, if read only 100, is suicide for them; if read 1000, we'll know it's suicide
- CAP: • If we don't proceed w/ small ICSM, then have 1.25 in five years
• Need to start production 1989, 1990
- JMP: • What do we need to get into next budget 1990, 1999 to convince Soviets
- CAP: • If we ~~app~~ don't go w/ small ICSM, then we have 1.25 avail FY89
- Pres: • Perhaps they is to look like we're going ahead
- Ceane: • In looking ahead to what he signed Regle -- couldn't [redacted] not small ICSM

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mb

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Reqs: ① Cat of [REDACTED]

Chp: ① Approx 8000

Reqs: • any way to proceed w/ both
for reqs purpose

Cause: • Few started nego w/ Soviets,
believe they calu capability, so
they look at [REDACTED] W/U's
-- believe for milly reasons (nego
reasons, don't need to do
-- political is another problem, however

[REDACTED]

- bias toward: get out on COMUS
- are less accurate, although close
- comm real time is problem
but need to work on
- larger W/U
- could conceivably launch from bottom

Pres: • But could keep (again) R&D going
for small ICSN at
lower level to keep for reqs purpose.

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nd

JMP: ① Work w/ Cong/Bill to consider
-- Am. Center study
-- Start g/y w/ Cong
-- Later like we ~~all agree~~ it
shorten on rail to include in
MX.

Pro: The job is moved
① Similar to the before in our case.
② push w/ Public re limited evidence

Con: May be named if we
have more proceeds w/ MX -

